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sev: add sev-inject-launch-secret

PATCH Applied [email protected] 4 participants 10 messages Oct 15, 2020 – Oct 20, 2020

v5 of 8 Applied Latest is v8 →

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/1 sev: add sev-inject-launch-secret

From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>

AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity Key. Although QEMU facilitates the injection of the launch secret, it cannot access the secret.

---
 include/monitor/monitor.h |  3 ++
 include/sysemu/sev.h      |  2 ++
 monitor/misc.c            |  8 ++---
 qapi/misc-target.json     | 18 +++++++++++
 target/i386/monitor.c     |  7 +++++
 target/i386/sev-stub.c    |  5 +++
 target/i386/sev.c         | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/trace-events  |  1 +
 8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/monitor/monitor.h +3 -0
index 348bfad3d5..af3887bb71 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include "block/block.h"
 #include "qapi/qapi-types-misc.h"
 #include "qemu/readline.h"
+#include "include/exec/hwaddr.h"
 
 typedef struct MonitorHMP MonitorHMP;
 typedef struct MonitorOptions MonitorOptions;
@@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ void monitor_flush(Monitor *mon);
 int monitor_set_cpu(Monitor *mon, int cpu_index);
 int monitor_get_cpu_index(Monitor *mon);
 
+void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, uint64_t size, Error **errp);
+
 void monitor_read_command(MonitorHMP *mon, int show_prompt);
 int monitor_read_password(MonitorHMP *mon, ReadLineFunc *readline_func,
                           void *opaque);
include/sysemu/sev.h +2 -0
index 98c1ec8d38..7ab6e3e31d 100644
@@ -18,4 +18,6 @@
 
 void *sev_guest_init(const char *id);
 int sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
+int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
+                             uint64_t gpa, Error **errp);
 #endif
monitor/misc.c +4 -4
index 4a859fb24a..f1ade245d5 100644
@@ -667,10 +667,10 @@ static void hmp_physical_memory_dump(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     memory_dump(mon, count, format, size, addr, 1);
 }
 
-static void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, Error **errp)
+void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, uint64_t size, Error **errp)
 {
     MemoryRegionSection mrs = memory_region_find(get_system_memory(),
-                                                 addr, 1);
+                                                 addr, size);
 
     if (!mrs.mr) {
         error_setg(errp, "No memory is mapped at address 0x%" HWADDR_PRIx, addr);
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static void hmp_gpa2hva(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     MemoryRegion *mr = NULL;
     void *ptr;
 
-    ptr = gpa2hva(&mr, addr, &local_err);
+    ptr = gpa2hva(&mr, addr, 1, &local_err);
     if (local_err) {
         error_report_err(local_err);
         return;
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ static void hmp_gpa2hpa(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     void *ptr;
     uint64_t physaddr;
 
-    ptr = gpa2hva(&mr, addr, &local_err);
+    ptr = gpa2hva(&mr, addr, 1, &local_err);
     if (local_err) {
         error_report_err(local_err);
         return;
qapi/misc-target.json +18 -0
index 1e561fa97b..4486a543ae 100644
@@ -201,6 +201,24 @@
 { 'command': 'query-sev-capabilities', 'returns': 'SevCapability',
   'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' }
 
+##
+# @sev-inject-launch-secret:
+#
+# This command injects a secret blob into memory of SEV guest.
+#
+# @packet-header: the launch secret packet header encoded in base64
+#
+# @secret: the launch secret data to be injected encoded in base64
+#
+# @gpa: the guest physical address where secret will be injected.
+#
+# Since: 5.2
+#
+##
+{ 'command': 'sev-inject-launch-secret',
+  'data': { 'packet-header': 'str', 'secret': 'str', 'gpa': 'uint64' },
+  'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' }
+
 ##
 # @dump-skeys:
 #
target/i386/monitor.c +7 -0
index 7abae3c8df..f9d4951465 100644
@@ -728,3 +728,10 @@ SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error **errp)
 {
     return sev_get_capabilities(errp);
 }
+
+void qmp_sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *packet_hdr,
+                                  const char *secret, uint64_t gpa,
+                                  Error **errp)
+{
+    sev_inject_launch_secret(packet_hdr, secret, gpa, errp);
+}
target/i386/sev-stub.c +5 -0
index 88e3f39a1e..2d2ee54cc6 100644
@@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
     error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
     return NULL;
 }
+int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
+                             uint64_t gpa)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
target/i386/sev.c +65 -0

77 lines not on this page · raw message

target/i386/trace-events +1 -0
index 789c700d4a..9f299e94a2 100644
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session
 kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64
 kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s"
 kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) ""
+kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d"
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1 (Apple Git-117)
Reviewed-by on v5 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · On 10/15/20 9:37 AM, [email protected] wrote:

From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>

AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity Key. Although QEMU facilitates the injection of the launch secret, it cannot access the secret.

thanks

Quoted 227 lines
---
 include/monitor/monitor.h |  3 ++
 include/sysemu/sev.h      |  2 ++
 monitor/misc.c            |  8 ++---
 qapi/misc-target.json     | 18 +++++++++++
 target/i386/monitor.c     |  7 +++++
 target/i386/sev-stub.c    |  5 +++
 target/i386/sev.c         | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/i386/trace-events  |  1 +
 8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/monitor/monitor.h +3 -0
index 348bfad3d5..af3887bb71 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 #include "block/block.h"
 #include "qapi/qapi-types-misc.h"
 #include "qemu/readline.h"
+#include "include/exec/hwaddr.h"
 
 typedef struct MonitorHMP MonitorHMP;
 typedef struct MonitorOptions MonitorOptions;
@@ -37,6 +38,8 @@ void monitor_flush(Monitor *mon);
 int monitor_set_cpu(Monitor *mon, int cpu_index);
 int monitor_get_cpu_index(Monitor *mon);
 
+void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, uint64_t size, Error **errp);
+
 void monitor_read_command(MonitorHMP *mon, int show_prompt);
 int monitor_read_password(MonitorHMP *mon, ReadLineFunc *readline_func,
                           void *opaque);
include/sysemu/sev.h +2 -0
index 98c1ec8d38..7ab6e3e31d 100644
@@ -18,4 +18,6 @@
 
 void *sev_guest_init(const char *id);
 int sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
+int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
+                             uint64_t gpa, Error **errp);
 #endif
monitor/misc.c +4 -4
index 4a859fb24a..f1ade245d5 100644
@@ -667,10 +667,10 @@ static void hmp_physical_memory_dump(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     memory_dump(mon, count, format, size, addr, 1);
 }
 
-static void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, Error **errp)
+void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, uint64_t size, Error **errp)
 {
     MemoryRegionSection mrs = memory_region_find(get_system_memory(),
-                                                 addr, 1);
+                                                 addr, size);
 
     if (!mrs.mr) {
         error_setg(errp, "No memory is mapped at address 0x%" HWADDR_PRIx, addr);
@@ -694,7 +694,7 @@ static void hmp_gpa2hva(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     MemoryRegion *mr = NULL;
     void *ptr;
 
-    ptr = gpa2hva(&mr, addr, &local_err);
+    ptr = gpa2hva(&mr, addr, 1, &local_err);
     if (local_err) {
         error_report_err(local_err);
         return;
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ static void hmp_gpa2hpa(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict)
     void *ptr;
     uint64_t physaddr;
 
-    ptr = gpa2hva(&mr, addr, &local_err);
+    ptr = gpa2hva(&mr, addr, 1, &local_err);
     if (local_err) {
         error_report_err(local_err);
         return;
qapi/misc-target.json +18 -0
index 1e561fa97b..4486a543ae 100644
@@ -201,6 +201,24 @@
 { 'command': 'query-sev-capabilities', 'returns': 'SevCapability',
   'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' }
 
+##
+# @sev-inject-launch-secret:
+#
+# This command injects a secret blob into memory of SEV guest.
+#
+# @packet-header: the launch secret packet header encoded in base64
+#
+# @secret: the launch secret data to be injected encoded in base64
+#
+# @gpa: the guest physical address where secret will be injected.
+#
+# Since: 5.2
+#
+##
+{ 'command': 'sev-inject-launch-secret',
+  'data': { 'packet-header': 'str', 'secret': 'str', 'gpa': 'uint64' },
+  'if': 'defined(TARGET_I386)' }
+
 ##
 # @dump-skeys:
 #
target/i386/monitor.c +7 -0
index 7abae3c8df..f9d4951465 100644
@@ -728,3 +728,10 @@ SevCapability *qmp_query_sev_capabilities(Error **errp)
 {
     return sev_get_capabilities(errp);
 }
+
+void qmp_sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *packet_hdr,
+                                  const char *secret, uint64_t gpa,
+                                  Error **errp)
+{
+    sev_inject_launch_secret(packet_hdr, secret, gpa, errp);
+}
target/i386/sev-stub.c +5 -0
index 88e3f39a1e..2d2ee54cc6 100644
@@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
     error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
     return NULL;
 }
+int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
+                             uint64_t gpa)
+{
+    return 1;
+}
target/i386/sev.c +65 -0
index 93c4d60b82..1546606811 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
 #include "trace.h"
 #include "migration/blocker.h"
 #include "qom/object.h"
+#include "exec/address-spaces.h"
+#include "monitor/monitor.h"
 
 #define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest"
 OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST)
@@ -785,6 +787,69 @@ sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
     return 0;
 }
 
+int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *packet_hdr, const char *secret,
+                             uint64_t gpa, Error **errp)
+{
+    struct kvm_sev_launch_secret input;
+    g_autofree guchar *data = NULL, *hdr = NULL;
+    int error, ret = 1;
+    void *hva;
+    gsize hdr_sz = 0, data_sz = 0;
+    MemoryRegion *mr = NULL;
+
+    if (!sev_guest) {
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV: SEV not enabled.");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    /* secret can be injected only in this state */
+    if (!sev_check_state(sev_guest, SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_SECRET)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV: Not in correct state. (LSECRET) %x",
+                     sev_guest->state);
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    hdr = g_base64_decode(packet_hdr, &hdr_sz);
+    if (!hdr || !hdr_sz) {
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to decode sequence header");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    data = g_base64_decode(secret, &data_sz);
+    if (!data || !data_sz) {
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV: Failed to decode data");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    hva = gpa2hva(&mr, gpa, data_sz, errp);
+    if (!hva) {
+        error_prepend(errp, "SEV: Failed to calculate guest address: ");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    input.hdr_uaddr = (uint64_t)(unsigned long)hdr;
+    input.hdr_len = hdr_sz;
+
+    input.trans_uaddr = (uint64_t)(unsigned long)data;
+    input.trans_len = data_sz;
+
+    input.guest_uaddr = (uint64_t)(unsigned long)hva;
+    input.guest_len = data_sz;
+
+    trace_kvm_sev_launch_secret(gpa, input.guest_uaddr,
+                                input.trans_uaddr, input.trans_len);
+
+    ret = sev_ioctl(sev_guest->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET,
+                    &input, &error);
+    if (ret) {
+        error_setg(errp, "SEV: failed to inject secret ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+                     ret, error, fw_error_to_str(error));
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 static void
 sev_register_types(void)
 {
target/i386/trace-events +1 -0
index 789c700d4a..9f299e94a2 100644
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_start(int policy, void *session, void *pdh) "policy 0x%x session
 kvm_sev_launch_update_data(void *addr, uint64_t len) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIu64
 kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s"
 kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) ""
+kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d"
#2 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]
Quoted 11 lines · On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 10:37:13AM -0400, [email protected] wrote:

From: Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <[email protected]>

AMD SEV allows a guest owner to inject a secret blob into the memory of a virtual machine. The secret is encrypted with the SEV Transport Encryption Key and integrity is guaranteed with the Transport Integrity Key. Although QEMU facilitates the injection of the launch secret, it cannot access the secret.

Queued, thanks!

Signature · 1 line
Eduardo
#4 lore raw
In reply to Eduardo Habkost
Quoted 25 lines · Eduardo Habkost

On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 10:37:13AM -0400, [email protected] wrote:
[...]

target/i386/sev-stub.c SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp) · line 56

Quoted 13 lines
target/i386/sev-stub.c +5 -0
index 88e3f39a1e..2d2ee54cc6 100644
@@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
     error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
     return NULL;
 }
+int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
+                             uint64_t gpa)
+{
+    return 1;
+}

This doesn't match the actual function prototype. I had to apply the following fixup:

---

target/i386/sev-stub.c +0 -0
index 2d2ee54cc6..62a2587e7b 100644

target/i386/sev-stub.c SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp) · line 54

Quoted 7 lines
target/i386/sev-stub.c +2 -1
@@ -49,8 +49,10 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
     error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
     return NULL;
 }
+
 int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
-                             uint64_t gpa)
+                             uint64_t gpa, Error *errp)

Oops. Fixing up the fixup:

---

target/i386/sev-stub.c +1 -1
index 62a2587e7b..e4e60d9a7d 100644
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
 }
 
 int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
-                             uint64_t gpa, Error *errp)
+                             uint64_t gpa, Error **errp)
 {
     error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
     return 1;
Signature · 1 line
Eduardo
#3 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]

On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 10:37:13AM -0400, [email protected] wrote:
[...]

target/i386/sev-stub.c SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp) · line 56

Quoted 13 lines
target/i386/sev-stub.c +5 -0
index 88e3f39a1e..2d2ee54cc6 100644
@@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
     error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
     return NULL;
 }
+int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
+                             uint64_t gpa)
+{
+    return 1;
+}

This doesn't match the actual function prototype. I had to apply the following fixup:

---

target/i386/sev-stub.c +3 -1
index 2d2ee54cc6..62a2587e7b 100644
@@ -49,8 +49,10 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
     error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
     return NULL;
 }
+
 int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
-                             uint64_t gpa)
+                             uint64_t gpa, Error *errp)
 {
+    error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
     return 1;
 }
Signature · 1 line
Eduardo
#5 lore raw
In reply to Eduardo Habkost
Quoted 20 lines · Eduardo Habkost
Quoted 19 lines · Eduardo Habkost

On Thu, Oct 15, 2020 at 10:37:13AM -0400, [email protected] wrote:
[...]

target/i386/sev-stub.c SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp) · line 56

Quoted 13 lines
target/i386/sev-stub.c +5 -0
index 88e3f39a1e..2d2ee54cc6 100644
@@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
     error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
     return NULL;
 }
+int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
+                             uint64_t gpa)
+{
+    return 1;
+}

This doesn't match the actual function prototype. I had to apply the following fixup:

Quoted 15 lines

target/i386/sev-stub.c SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp) · line 54

Quoted 13 lines

---

target/i386/sev-stub.c +2 -1
index 2d2ee54cc6..62a2587e7b 100644
@@ -49,8 +49,10 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
     error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
     return NULL;
 }
+
 int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
-                             uint64_t gpa)
+                             uint64_t gpa, Error *errp)

Oops. Fixing up the fixup:

Thanks Eduardo.

-Tobin

Quoted 15 lines

---

target/i386/sev-stub.c +1 -1
index 62a2587e7b..e4e60d9a7d 100644
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
 }
 
 int sev_inject_launch_secret(const char *hdr, const char *secret,
-                             uint64_t gpa, Error *errp)
+                             uint64_t gpa, Error **errp)
 {
     error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
     return 1;
#6 lore raw
In reply to [email protected]

monitor/misc.c static void hmp_physical_memory_dump(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict) · line 673

Quoted 6 lines · On 15/10/20 16:37, [email protected] wrote:
monitor/misc.c +2 -2
-static void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, Error **errp)
+void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, uint64_t size, Error **errp)
 {
     MemoryRegionSection mrs = memory_region_find(get_system_memory(),
-                                                 addr, 1);
+                                                 addr, size);

You need to check size against mrs.size and fail if mrs.size is smaller.
Otherwise, the ioctl can access memory out of range.

Sorry Eduardo for the late review.

Paolo

#7 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Paolo Bonzini

monitor/misc.c static void hmp_physical_memory_dump(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict) · line 673

Quoted 6 lines · On 15/10/20 16:37, [email protected] wrote:
monitor/misc.c +2 -2
-static void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, Error **errp)
+void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, uint64_t size, Error **errp)
 {
     MemoryRegionSection mrs = memory_region_find(get_system_memory(),
-                                                 addr, 1);
+                                                 addr, size);

You need to check size against mrs.size and fail if mrs.size is smaller.
Otherwise, the ioctl can access memory out of range.

Good catch! I'm dequeuing it.

Is there a reason memory_region_find() doesn't ensure that by default?

It looks like there's only one memory_region_find() call in the code that doesn't expect the returned section to contain the entire range (at platform_bus_map_mmio()). All the remaining memory_region_find() calls either have size==1 (so it doesn't matter) or have an extra check for MemoryRegionSection.size.

The call at virtio_balloon_handle_output() looks suspicious, though, because it looks for a BALLOON_PAGE_SIZE range, but there's no check for the returned section size.

Signature · 1 line
Eduardo
#8 lore raw
Quoted 12 lines · Eduardo Habkost
Quoted 10 lines · Paolo Bonzini

monitor/misc.c static void hmp_physical_memory_dump(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict) · line 673

Quoted 6 lines · On 15/10/20 16:37, [email protected] wrote:
monitor/misc.c +2 -2
-static void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, Error **errp)
+void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, uint64_t size, Error **errp)
 {
     MemoryRegionSection mrs = memory_region_find(get_system_memory(),
-                                                 addr, 1);
+                                                 addr, size);

You need to check size against mrs.size and fail if mrs.size is smaller.
Otherwise, the ioctl can access memory out of range.

Quoted 4 lines

Good catch! I'm dequeuing it.

Is there a reason memory_region_find() doesn't ensure that by default?

IIRC memory_region_find() was used to do DMA in the very first versions of "virtio-blk dataplane" so you would call it multiple times in a loop.
So it's like that because it maps the way address_space_map() works.

Quoted 3 lines

The call at virtio_balloon_handle_output() looks suspicious, though, because it looks for a BALLOON_PAGE_SIZE range, but there's no check for the returned section size.

I think it's not a bug because ultimately it's checked in ram_block_discard_range, but it's not pretty.

Paolo

#9 lore raw
Quoted 25 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 15 lines · Eduardo Habkost
Quoted 13 lines · Paolo Bonzini

monitor/misc.c static void hmp_physical_memory_dump(Monitor *mon, const QDict *qdict) · line 673

Quoted 9 lines · On 15/10/20 16:37, [email protected] wrote:

-static void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, Error **errp)
+void *gpa2hva(MemoryRegion **p_mr, hwaddr addr, uint64_t size, Error **errp)
{
MemoryRegionSection mrs =
memory_region_find(get_system_memory(),

monitor/misc.c +1 -1
-                                                 addr, 1);
+                                                 addr, size);

You need to check size against mrs.size and fail if mrs.size is smaller.
Otherwise, the ioctl can access memory out of range.

Quoted 4 lines

Good catch! I'm dequeuing it.

Is there a reason memory_region_find() doesn't ensure that by default?

IIRC memory_region_find() was used to do DMA in the very first versions of "virtio-blk dataplane" so you would call it multiple times in a loop.
So it's like that because it maps the way address_space_map() works.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

The call at virtio_balloon_handle_output() looks suspicious, though, because it looks for a BALLOON_PAGE_SIZE range, but there's no check for the returned section size.

I think it's not a bug because ultimately it's checked in ram_block_discard_range, but it's not pretty.

Paolo

Ok, it seems like the best solution is, as Paolo suggested, to add a simple check at the end of gpa2hva that makes sure mr.size is equal to size. gpa2hva is used one other place where the size is hard-coded as 1, so adding the check isn't going to break anything.

Would you like me to resubmit with this tweak?

-Tobin