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4.14.202-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 5 participants 23 messages Oct 16, 2020 – Oct 17, 2020

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Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 4.14.202-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.202 release. There are 18 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 18 Oct 2020 09:04:25 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.202-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.14.202-rc1

Dominik Przychodni <[email protected]>
crypto: qat - check cipher length for aead AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA

Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
crypto: bcm - Verify GCM/CCM key length in setkey

Arnaud Patard <[email protected]>
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvmdio.c: Fix non OF case

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
reiserfs: Fix oops during mount

Jan Kara <[email protected]>
reiserfs: Initialize inode keys properly

Mychaela N. Falconia <[email protected]>
USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add support for FreeCalypso JTAG+UART adapters

Scott Chen <[email protected]>
USB: serial: pl2303: add device-id for HP GC device

Anant Thazhemadam <[email protected]>
staging: comedi: check validity of wMaxPacketSize of usb endpoints found

Leonid Bloch <[email protected]>
USB: serial: option: Add Telit FT980-KS composition

Wilken Gottwalt <[email protected]>
USB: serial: option: add Cellient MPL200 card

Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>
media: usbtv: Fix refcounting mixup

Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4

Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: Fix update of connection state in hci_encrypt_cfm

Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm

Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix not checking if BT_HS is enabled

Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix calling sk_filter on non-socket based channel

Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: A2MP: Fix not initializing all members

Alain Michaud <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: fix kernel oops in store_pending_adv_report

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                 |  4 +-
 drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c              | 15 ++++++-
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c | 10 ++++-
 drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c     |  3 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvmdio.c    | 22 +++++++---
 drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c |  3 ++
 drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c            |  5 +++
 drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h        |  7 ++++
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c              |  5 +++
 drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c              |  1 +
 drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h              |  1 +
 fs/reiserfs/inode.c                      |  6 +--
 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c                      |  7 ++++
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h         | 30 +++++++++++---
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h            |  2 +
 net/bluetooth/a2mp.c                     | 22 +++++++++-
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c                 | 17 ++++++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c                | 70 +++++++++++++-------------------
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c               |  7 ++--
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c               | 14 +++++++
 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c                     |  7 +++-
 21 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/18 Bluetooth: fix kernel oops in store_pending_adv_report

From: Alain Michaud <[email protected]>

commit a2ec905d1e160a33b2e210e45ad30445ef26ce0e upstream.

Fix kernel oops observed when an ext adv data is larger than 31 bytes.

This can be reproduced by setting up an advertiser with advertisement larger than 31 bytes. The issue is not sensitive to the advertisement content. In particular, this was reproduced with an advertisement of 229 bytes filled with 'A'. See stack trace below.

This is fixed by not catching ext_adv as legacy adv are only cached to be able to concatenate a scanable adv with its scan response before sending it up through mgmt.

With ext_adv, this is no longer necessary.

  general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 6 PID: 205 Comm: kworker/u17:0 Not tainted 5.4.0-37-generic #41-Ubuntu
  Hardware name: Dell Inc. XPS 15 7590/0CF6RR, BIOS 1.7.0 05/11/2020
  Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work [bluetooth]
  RIP: 0010:hci_bdaddr_list_lookup+0x1e/0x40 [bluetooth]
  Code: ff ff e9 26 ff ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 8b 07 48 89 e5 48 39 c7 75 0a eb 24 48 8b 00 48 39 f8 74 1c 44 8b 06 <44> 39 40 10 75 ef 44 0f b7 4e 04 66 44 39 48 14 75 e3 38 50 16 75
  RSP: 0018:ffffbc6a40493c70 EFLAGS: 00010286
  RAX: 4141414141414141 RBX: 000000000000001b RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9903e76c100f RDI: ffff9904289d4b28
  RBP: ffffbc6a40493c70 R08: 0000000093570362 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9904344eae38 R12: ffff9904289d4000
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000ffffffa3 R15: ffff9903e76c100f
  FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff990434580000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00007feed125a000 CR3: 00000001b860a003 CR4: 00000000003606e0
  Call Trace:
    process_adv_report+0x12e/0x560 [bluetooth]
    hci_le_meta_evt+0x7b2/0xba0 [bluetooth]
    hci_event_packet+0x1c29/0x2a90 [bluetooth]
    hci_rx_work+0x19b/0x360 [bluetooth]
    process_one_work+0x1eb/0x3b0
    worker_thread+0x4d/0x400
    kthread+0x104/0x140
---
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c |   22 +++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +17 -5
@@ -1133,6 +1133,9 @@ static void store_pending_adv_report(str
 {
 	struct discovery_state *d = &hdev->discovery;
 
+	if (len > HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH)
+		return;
+
 	bacpy(&d->last_adv_addr, bdaddr);
 	d->last_adv_addr_type = bdaddr_type;
 	d->last_adv_rssi = rssi;
@@ -4779,6 +4782,11 @@ static void process_adv_report(struct hc
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (len > HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH) {
+		pr_err_ratelimited("legacy adv larger than 31 bytes");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	/* Find the end of the data in case the report contains padded zero
 	 * bytes at the end causing an invalid length value.
 	 *
@@ -4839,7 +4847,7 @@ static void process_adv_report(struct hc
 	 */
 	conn = check_pending_le_conn(hdev, bdaddr, bdaddr_type, type,
 								direct_addr);
-	if (conn && type == LE_ADV_IND) {
+	if (conn && type == LE_ADV_IND && len <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH) {
 		/* Store report for later inclusion by
 		 * mgmt_device_connected
 		 */
@@ -4964,10 +4972,14 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct
 		struct hci_ev_le_advertising_info *ev = ptr;
 		s8 rssi;
 
-		rssi = ev->data[ev->length];
-		process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr,
-				   ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi,
-				   ev->data, ev->length);
+		if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH) {
+			rssi = ev->data[ev->length];
+			process_adv_report(hdev, ev->evt_type, &ev->bdaddr,
+					   ev->bdaddr_type, NULL, 0, rssi,
+					   ev->data, ev->length);
+		} else {
+			bt_dev_err(hdev, "Dropping invalid advertising data");
+		}
 
 		ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length + 1;
 	}
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/18 Bluetooth: A2MP: Fix not initializing all members

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

commit eddb7732119d53400f48a02536a84c509692faa8 upstream.

This fixes various places where a stack variable is used uninitialized.

---
 net/bluetooth/a2mp.c |   22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/a2mp.c +21 -1
@@ -233,6 +233,9 @@ static int a2mp_discover_rsp(struct amp_
 			struct a2mp_info_req req;
 
 			found = true;
+
+			memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+
 			req.id = cl->id;
 			a2mp_send(mgr, A2MP_GETINFO_REQ, __next_ident(mgr),
 				  sizeof(req), &req);
@@ -312,6 +315,8 @@ static int a2mp_getinfo_req(struct amp_m
 	if (!hdev || hdev->dev_type != HCI_AMP) {
 		struct a2mp_info_rsp rsp;
 
+		memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 		rsp.id = req->id;
 		rsp.status = A2MP_STATUS_INVALID_CTRL_ID;
 
@@ -355,6 +360,8 @@ static int a2mp_getinfo_rsp(struct amp_m
 	if (!ctrl)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+
 	req.id = rsp->id;
 	a2mp_send(mgr, A2MP_GETAMPASSOC_REQ, __next_ident(mgr), sizeof(req),
 		  &req);
@@ -383,6 +390,8 @@ static int a2mp_getampassoc_req(struct a
 		struct a2mp_amp_assoc_rsp rsp;
 		rsp.id = req->id;
 
+		memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 		if (tmp) {
 			rsp.status = A2MP_STATUS_COLLISION_OCCURED;
 			amp_mgr_put(tmp);
@@ -471,7 +480,6 @@ static int a2mp_createphyslink_req(struc
 				   struct a2mp_cmd *hdr)
 {
 	struct a2mp_physlink_req *req = (void *) skb->data;
-
 	struct a2mp_physlink_rsp rsp;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon;
@@ -482,6 +490,8 @@ static int a2mp_createphyslink_req(struc
 
 	BT_DBG("local_id %d, remote_id %d", req->local_id, req->remote_id);
 
+	memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 	rsp.local_id = req->remote_id;
 	rsp.remote_id = req->local_id;
 
@@ -560,6 +570,8 @@ static int a2mp_discphyslink_req(struct
 
 	BT_DBG("local_id %d remote_id %d", req->local_id, req->remote_id);
 
+	memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 	rsp.local_id = req->remote_id;
 	rsp.remote_id = req->local_id;
 	rsp.status = A2MP_STATUS_SUCCESS;
@@ -682,6 +694,8 @@ static int a2mp_chan_recv_cb(struct l2ca
 	if (err) {
 		struct a2mp_cmd_rej rej;
 
+		memset(&rej, 0, sizeof(rej));
+
 		rej.reason = cpu_to_le16(0);
 		hdr = (void *) skb->data;
 
@@ -905,6 +919,8 @@ void a2mp_send_getinfo_rsp(struct hci_de
 
 	BT_DBG("%s mgr %p", hdev->name, mgr);
 
+	memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 	rsp.id = hdev->id;
 	rsp.status = A2MP_STATUS_INVALID_CTRL_ID;
 
@@ -1002,6 +1018,8 @@ void a2mp_send_create_phy_link_rsp(struc
 	if (!mgr)
 		return;
 
+	memset(&rsp, 0, sizeof(rsp));
+
 	hs_hcon = hci_conn_hash_lookup_state(hdev, AMP_LINK, BT_CONNECT);
 	if (!hs_hcon) {
 		rsp.status = A2MP_STATUS_UNABLE_START_LINK_CREATION;
@@ -1034,6 +1052,8 @@ void a2mp_discover_amp(struct l2cap_chan
 
 	mgr->bredr_chan = chan;
 
+	memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+
 	req.mtu = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_A2MP_DEFAULT_MTU);
 	req.ext_feat = 0;
 	a2mp_send(mgr, A2MP_DISCOVER_REQ, 1, sizeof(req), &req);
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/18 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix calling sk_filter on non-socket based channel

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

commit f19425641cb2572a33cb074d5e30283720bd4d22 upstream.

Only sockets will have the chan->data set to an actual sk, channels like A2MP would have its own data which would likely cause a crash when calling sk_filter, in order to fix this a new callback has been introduced so channels can implement their own filtering if necessary.

---
 include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h |    2 ++
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c    |    7 ++++---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c    |   14 ++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/l2cap.h +2 -0
@@ -619,6 +619,8 @@ struct l2cap_ops {
 	struct sk_buff		*(*alloc_skb) (struct l2cap_chan *chan,
 					       unsigned long hdr_len,
 					       unsigned long len, int nb);
+	int			(*filter) (struct l2cap_chan * chan,
+					   struct sk_buff *skb);
 };
 
 struct l2cap_conn {
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c +4 -3
@@ -6683,9 +6683,10 @@ static int l2cap_data_rcv(struct l2cap_c
 		goto drop;
 	}
 
-	if ((chan->mode == L2CAP_MODE_ERTM ||
-	     chan->mode == L2CAP_MODE_STREAMING) && sk_filter(chan->data, skb))
-		goto drop;
+	if (chan->ops->filter) {
+		if (chan->ops->filter(chan, skb))
+			goto drop;
+	}
 
 	if (!control->sframe) {
 		int err;
net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +14 -0
@@ -1477,6 +1477,19 @@ static void l2cap_sock_suspend_cb(struct
 	sk->sk_state_change(sk);
 }
 
+static int l2cap_sock_filter(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = chan->data;
+
+	switch (chan->mode) {
+	case L2CAP_MODE_ERTM:
+	case L2CAP_MODE_STREAMING:
+		return sk_filter(sk, skb);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static const struct l2cap_ops l2cap_chan_ops = {
 	.name			= "L2CAP Socket Interface",
 	.new_connection		= l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb,
@@ -1491,6 +1504,7 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops l2cap_chan
 	.set_shutdown		= l2cap_sock_set_shutdown_cb,
 	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_sock_get_sndtimeo_cb,
 	.alloc_skb		= l2cap_sock_alloc_skb_cb,
+	.filter			= l2cap_sock_filter,
 };
 
 static void l2cap_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/18 Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix not checking if BT_HS is enabled

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

commit b560a208cda0297fef6ff85bbfd58a8f0a52a543 upstream.

This checks if BT_HS is enabled relecting it on MGMT_SETTING_HS instead of always reporting it as supported.

---
 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +6 -1
@@ -635,7 +635,8 @@ static u32 get_supported_settings(struct
 
 		if (lmp_ssp_capable(hdev)) {
 			settings |= MGMT_SETTING_SSP;
-			settings |= MGMT_SETTING_HS;
+			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_HS))
+				settings |= MGMT_SETTING_HS;
 		}
 
 		if (lmp_sc_capable(hdev))
@@ -1645,6 +1646,10 @@ static int set_hs(struct sock *sk, struc
 
 	BT_DBG("request for %s", hdev->name);
 
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BT_HS))
+		return mgmt_cmd_status(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_SET_HS,
+				       MGMT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+
 	status = mgmt_bredr_support(hdev);
 	if (status)
 		return mgmt_cmd_status(sk, hdev->id, MGMT_OP_SET_HS, status);
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/18 Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

commit 3ca44c16b0dcc764b641ee4ac226909f5c421aa3 upstream.

This makes hci_encrypt_cfm calls hci_connect_cfm in case the connection state is BT_CONFIG so callers don't have to check the state.

---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |   20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        |   28 +++-------------------------
 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +18 -2
@@ -1252,10 +1252,26 @@ static inline void hci_auth_cfm(struct h
 		conn->security_cfm_cb(conn, status);
 }
 
-static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status,
-								__u8 encrypt)
+static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struct hci_conn *conn, __u8 status)
 {
 	struct hci_cb *cb;
+	__u8 encrypt;
+
+	if (conn->state == BT_CONFIG) {
+		if (status)
+			conn->state = BT_CONNECTED;
+
+		hci_connect_cfm(conn, status);
+		hci_conn_drop(conn);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
+		encrypt = 0x00;
+	else if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags))
+		encrypt = 0x02;
+	else
+		encrypt = 0x01;
 
 	if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
 		conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +3 -25
@@ -2493,7 +2493,7 @@ static void hci_auth_complete_evt(struct
 				     &cp);
 		} else {
 			clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
-			hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status, 0x00);
+			hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status);
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -2579,22 +2579,7 @@ static void read_enc_key_size_complete(s
 		conn->enc_key_size = rp->key_size;
 	}
 
-	if (conn->state == BT_CONFIG) {
-		conn->state = BT_CONNECTED;
-		hci_connect_cfm(conn, 0);
-		hci_conn_drop(conn);
-	} else {
-		u8 encrypt;
-
-		if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
-			encrypt = 0x00;
-		else if (test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags))
-			encrypt = 0x02;
-		else
-			encrypt = 0x01;
-
-		hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, 0, encrypt);
-	}
+	hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, 0);
 
 unlock:
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
@@ -2691,14 +2676,7 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struc
 	}
 
 notify:
-	if (conn->state == BT_CONFIG) {
-		if (!ev->status)
-			conn->state = BT_CONNECTED;
-
-		hci_connect_cfm(conn, ev->status);
-		hci_conn_drop(conn);
-	} else
-		hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status, ev->encrypt);
+	hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status);
 
 unlock:
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/18 Bluetooth: Fix update of connection state in `hci_encrypt_cfm`

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Patrick Steinhardt <[email protected]>

commit 339ddaa626995bc6218972ca241471f3717cc5f4 upstream.

Starting with the upgrade to v5.8-rc3, I've noticed I wasn't able to connect to my Bluetooth headset properly anymore. While connecting to the device would eventually succeed, bluetoothd seemed to be confused about the current connection state where the state was flapping hence and forth. Bisecting this issue led to commit 3ca44c16b0dc (Bluetooth:
Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm, 2020-05-19), which refactored hci_encrypt_cfm to also handle updating the connection state.

The commit in question changed the code to call hci_connect_cfm inside hci_encrypt_cfm and to change the connection state. But with the conversion, we now only update the connection state if a status was set already. In fact, the reverse should be true: the status should be updated if no status is yet set. So let's fix the isuse by reversing the condition.

Fixes 3ca44c16b0dc ("Bluetooth: Consolidate encryption handling in hci_encrypt_cfm")
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +1 -1
@@ -1258,7 +1258,7 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struc
 	__u8 encrypt;
 
 	if (conn->state == BT_CONFIG) {
-		if (status)
+		if (!status)
 			conn->state = BT_CONNECTED;
 
 		hci_connect_cfm(conn, status);
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/18 Bluetooth: Disconnect if E0 is used for Level 4

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

commit 8746f135bb01872ff412d408ea1aa9ebd328c1f5 upstream.

E0 is not allowed with Level 4:

BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C page 1319:

'128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed, SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key not shortened'

SC enabled:

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x0b 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)
          Secure Connections (Host Support)
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with AES-CCM (0x02)

SC disabled:

Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Read Remote Extended Features (0x23) plen 13

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Page: 1/2
        Features: 0x03 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
          Secure Simple Pairing (Host Support)
          LE Supported (Host)
Quoted 1 line

HCI Event: Encryption Change (0x08) plen 4

        Status: Success (0x00)
        Handle: 256
        Encryption: Enabled with E0 (0x01)
[May 8 20:23] Bluetooth: hci0: Invalid security: expect AES but E0 was used
< HCI Command: Disconnect (0x01|0x0006) plen 3
        Handle: 256
        Reason: Authentication Failure (0x05)
---
 include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h |   10 ++++++----
 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c         |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c        |   20 ++++++++------------
 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +6 -4
@@ -1273,11 +1273,13 @@ static inline void hci_encrypt_cfm(struc
 	else
 		encrypt = 0x01;
 
-	if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
-		conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
+	if (!status) {
+		if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_SDP)
+			conn->sec_level = BT_SECURITY_LOW;
 
-	if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
-		conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+		if (conn->pending_sec_level > conn->sec_level)
+			conn->sec_level = conn->pending_sec_level;
+	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&hci_cb_list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(cb, &hci_cb_list, list) {
net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c +17 -0
@@ -1163,6 +1163,23 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_
 			return 0;
 	}
 
+	 /* AES encryption is required for Level 4:
+	  *
+	  * BLUETOOTH CORE SPECIFICATION Version 5.2 | Vol 3, Part C
+	  * page 1319:
+	  *
+	  * 128-bit equivalent strength for link and encryption keys
+	  * required using FIPS approved algorithms (E0 not allowed,
+	  * SAFER+ not allowed, and P-192 not allowed; encryption key
+	  * not shortened)
+	  */
+	if (conn->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_FIPS &&
+	    !test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags)) {
+		bt_dev_err(conn->hdev,
+			   "Invalid security: Missing AES-CCM usage");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if (hci_conn_ssp_enabled(conn) &&
 	    !test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
 		return 0;
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +8 -12
@@ -2626,26 +2626,22 @@ static void hci_encrypt_change_evt(struc
 
 	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->flags);
 
+	/* Check link security requirements are met */
+	if (!hci_conn_check_link_mode(conn))
+		ev->status = HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE;
+
 	if (ev->status && conn->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
 		if (ev->status == HCI_ERROR_PIN_OR_KEY_MISSING)
 			set_bit(HCI_CONN_AUTH_FAILURE, &conn->flags);
 
+		/* Notify upper layers so they can cleanup before
+		 * disconnecting.
+		 */
+		hci_encrypt_cfm(conn, ev->status);
 		hci_disconnect(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
 		hci_conn_drop(conn);
 		goto unlock;
 	}
-
-	/* In Secure Connections Only mode, do not allow any connections
-	 * that are not encrypted with AES-CCM using a P-256 authenticated
-	 * combination key.
-	 */
-	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) &&
-	    (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->flags) ||
-	     conn->key_type != HCI_LK_AUTH_COMBINATION_P256)) {
-		hci_connect_cfm(conn, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
-		hci_conn_drop(conn);
-		goto unlock;
-	}
 
 	/* Try reading the encryption key size for encrypted ACL links */
 	if (!ev->status && ev->encrypt && conn->type == ACL_LINK) {
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/18 media: usbtv: Fix refcounting mixup

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>

commit bf65f8aabdb37bc1a785884374e919477fe13e10 upstream.

The premature free in the error path is blocked by V4L refcounting, not USB refcounting. Thanks to Ben Hutchings for review.

[v2] corrected attributions

Fixes 50e704453553 ("media: usbtv: prevent double free in error case")
---
 drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/usbtv/usbtv-core.c +2 -1
@@ -113,7 +113,8 @@ static int usbtv_probe(struct usb_interf
 
 usbtv_audio_fail:
 	/* we must not free at this point */
-	usb_get_dev(usbtv->udev);
+	v4l2_device_get(&usbtv->v4l2_dev);
+	/* this will undo the v4l2_device_get() */
 	usbtv_video_free(usbtv);
 
 usbtv_video_fail:
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/18 USB: serial: option: add Cellient MPL200 card

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Wilken Gottwalt <[email protected]>

commit 3e765cab8abe7f84cb80d4a7a973fc97d5742647 upstream.

Add usb ids of the Cellient MPL200 card.

---
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +3 -0
@@ -531,6 +531,7 @@ static void option_instat_callback(struc
 /* Cellient products */
 #define CELLIENT_VENDOR_ID			0x2692
 #define CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MEN200			0x9005
+#define CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MPL200			0x9025
 
 /* Hyundai Petatel Inc. products */
 #define PETATEL_VENDOR_ID			0x1ff4
@@ -1985,6 +1986,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(MEDIATEK_VENDOR_ID, MEDIATEK_PRODUCT_DC_4COM2, 0xff, 0x02, 0x01) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(MEDIATEK_VENDOR_ID, MEDIATEK_PRODUCT_DC_4COM2, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(CELLIENT_VENDOR_ID, CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MEN200) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(CELLIENT_VENDOR_ID, CELLIENT_PRODUCT_MPL200),
+	  .driver_info = RSVD(1) | RSVD(4) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(PETATEL_VENDOR_ID, PETATEL_PRODUCT_NP10T_600A) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(PETATEL_VENDOR_ID, PETATEL_PRODUCT_NP10T_600E) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_AND_INTERFACE_INFO(TPLINK_VENDOR_ID, TPLINK_PRODUCT_LTE, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00) },	/* TP-Link LTE Module */
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/18 USB: serial: option: Add Telit FT980-KS composition

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Leonid Bloch <[email protected]>

commit 924a9213358fb92fa3c3225d6d042aa058167405 upstream.

This commit adds the following Telit FT980-KS composition:

0x1054: rndis, diag, adb, nmea, modem, modem, aux

AT commands can be sent to /dev/ttyUSB2.

---
 drivers/usb/serial/option.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/option.c +2 -0
@@ -1190,6 +1190,8 @@ static const struct usb_device_id option
 	  .driver_info = NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1053, 0xff),	/* Telit FN980 (ECM) */
 	  .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(1) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE_INTERFACE_CLASS(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, 0x1054, 0xff),	/* Telit FT980-KS */
+	  .driver_info = NCTRL(2) | RSVD(3) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_ME910),
 	  .driver_info = NCTRL(0) | RSVD(1) | RSVD(3) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(TELIT_VENDOR_ID, TELIT_PRODUCT_ME910_DUAL_MODEM),
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/18 staging: comedi: check validity of wMaxPacketSize of usb endpoints found

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Anant Thazhemadam <[email protected]>

commit e1f13c879a7c21bd207dc6242455e8e3a1e88b40 upstream.

While finding usb endpoints in vmk80xx_find_usb_endpoints(), check if wMaxPacketSize = 0 for the endpoints found.

Some devices have isochronous endpoints that have wMaxPacketSize = 0 (as required by the USB-2 spec).
However, since this doesn't apply here, wMaxPacketSize = 0 can be considered to be invalid.

---
 drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c +3 -0
@@ -676,6 +676,9 @@ static int vmk80xx_find_usb_endpoints(st
 	if (!devpriv->ep_rx || !devpriv->ep_tx)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
+	if (!usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_rx) || !usb_endpoint_maxp(devpriv->ep_tx))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/18 USB: serial: pl2303: add device-id for HP GC device

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Scott Chen <[email protected]>

commit 031f9664f8f9356cee662335bc56c93d16e75665 upstream.

This is adds a device id for HP LD381 which is a pl2303GC-base device.

---
 drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c |    1 +
 drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.c +1 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD220_PRODUCT_ID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD220TA_PRODUCT_ID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD381_PRODUCT_ID) },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD381GC_PRODUCT_ID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD960_PRODUCT_ID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LD960TA_PRODUCT_ID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(HP_VENDOR_ID, HP_LCM220_PRODUCT_ID) },
drivers/usb/serial/pl2303.h +1 -0
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@
 
 /* Hewlett-Packard POS Pole Displays */
 #define HP_VENDOR_ID		0x03f0
+#define HP_LD381GC_PRODUCT_ID	0x0183
 #define HP_LM920_PRODUCT_ID	0x026b
 #define HP_TD620_PRODUCT_ID	0x0956
 #define HP_LD960_PRODUCT_ID	0x0b39
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/18 USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add support for FreeCalypso JTAG+UART adapters

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Mychaela N. Falconia <[email protected]>

commit 6cf87e5edd9944e1d3b6efd966ea401effc304ee upstream.

There exist many FT2232-based JTAG+UART adapter designs in which FT2232 Channel A is used for JTAG and Channel B is used for UART. The best way to handle them in Linux is to have the ftdi_sio driver create a ttyUSB device only for Channel B and not for Channel A:
a ttyUSB device for Channel A would be bogus and will disappear as soon as the user runs OpenOCD or other applications that access Channel A for JTAG from userspace, causing undesirable noise for users. The ftdi_sio driver already has a dedicated quirk for such JTAG+UART FT2232 adapters, and it requires assigning custom USB IDs to such adapters and adding these IDs to the driver with the ftdi_jtag_quirk applied.

Boutique hardware manufacturer Falconia Partners LLC has created a couple of JTAG+UART adapter designs (one buffered, one unbuffered) as part of FreeCalypso project, and this hardware is specifically made to be used with Linux hosts, with the intent that Channel A will be accessed only from userspace via appropriate applications, and that Channel B will be supported by the ftdi_sio kernel driver, presenting a standard ttyUSB device to userspace. Toward this end the hardware manufacturer will be programming FT2232 EEPROMs with custom USB IDs, specifically with the intent that these IDs will be recognized by the ftdi_sio driver with the ftdi_jtag_quirk applied.

[johan: insert in PID order and drop unused define]
---
 drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c     |    5 +++++
 drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h |    7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio.c +5 -0
@@ -1032,6 +1032,11 @@ static const struct usb_device_id id_tab
 	/* U-Blox devices */
 	{ USB_DEVICE(UBLOX_VID, UBLOX_C099F9P_ZED_PID) },
 	{ USB_DEVICE(UBLOX_VID, UBLOX_C099F9P_ODIN_PID) },
+	/* FreeCalypso USB adapters */
+	{ USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_BUF_PID),
+		.driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&ftdi_jtag_quirk },
+	{ USB_DEVICE(FTDI_VID, FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_UNBUF_PID),
+		.driver_info = (kernel_ulong_t)&ftdi_jtag_quirk },
 	{ }					/* Terminating entry */
 };
 
drivers/usb/serial/ftdi_sio_ids.h +7 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
 
 #define FTDI_LUMEL_PD12_PID	0x6002
 
+/*
+ * Custom USB adapters made by Falconia Partners LLC
+ * for FreeCalypso project, ID codes allocated to Falconia by FTDI.
+ */
+#define FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_BUF_PID	0x7150
+#define FTDI_FALCONIA_JTAG_UNBUF_PID	0x7151
+
 /* Sienna Serial Interface by Secyourit GmbH */
 #define FTDI_SIENNA_PID		0x8348
 
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/18 reiserfs: Initialize inode keys properly

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit 4443390e08d34d5771ab444f601cf71b3c9634a4 upstream.

reiserfs_read_locked_inode() didn't initialize key length properly. Use _make_cpu_key() macro for key initialization so that all key member are properly initialized.

---
 fs/reiserfs/inode.c |    6 +-----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/reiserfs/inode.c +1 -5
@@ -1552,11 +1552,7 @@ void reiserfs_read_locked_inode(struct i
 	 * set version 1, version 2 could be used too, because stat data
 	 * key is the same in both versions
 	 */
-	key.version = KEY_FORMAT_3_5;
-	key.on_disk_key.k_dir_id = dirino;
-	key.on_disk_key.k_objectid = inode->i_ino;
-	key.on_disk_key.k_offset = 0;
-	key.on_disk_key.k_type = 0;
+	_make_cpu_key(&key, KEY_FORMAT_3_5, dirino, inode->i_ino, 0, 0, 3);
 
 	/* look for the object's stat data */
 	retval = search_item(inode->i_sb, &key, &path_to_sd);
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/18 reiserfs: Fix oops during mount

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

commit c2bb80b8bdd04dfe32364b78b61b6a47f717af52 upstream.

With suitably crafted reiserfs image and mount command reiserfs will crash when trying to verify that XATTR_ROOT directory can be looked up in / as that recurses back to xattr code like:

 xattr_lookup+0x24/0x280 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:395
 reiserfs_xattr_get+0x89/0x540 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:677
 reiserfs_get_acl+0x63/0x690 fs/reiserfs/xattr_acl.c:209
 get_acl+0x152/0x2e0 fs/posix_acl.c:141
 check_acl fs/namei.c:277 [inline]
 acl_permission_check fs/namei.c:309 [inline]
 generic_permission+0x2ba/0x550 fs/namei.c:353
 do_inode_permission fs/namei.c:398 [inline]
 inode_permission+0x234/0x4a0 fs/namei.c:463
 lookup_one_len+0xa6/0x200 fs/namei.c:2557
 reiserfs_lookup_privroot+0x85/0x1e0 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c:972
 reiserfs_fill_super+0x2b51/0x3240 fs/reiserfs/super.c:2176
 mount_bdev+0x24f/0x360 fs/super.c:1417

Fix the problem by bailing from reiserfs_xattr_get() when xattrs are not yet initialized.

---
 fs/reiserfs/xattr.c |    7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
fs/reiserfs/xattr.c +7 -0
@@ -665,6 +665,13 @@ reiserfs_xattr_get(struct inode *inode,
 	if (get_inode_sd_version(inode) == STAT_DATA_V1)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	/*
+	 * priv_root needn't be initialized during mount so allow initial
+	 * lookups to succeed.
+	 */
+	if (!REISERFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->priv_root)
+		return 0;
+
 	dentry = xattr_lookup(inode, name, XATTR_REPLACE);
 	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
 		err = PTR_ERR(dentry);
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/18 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvmdio.c: Fix non OF case

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Arnaud Patard <[email protected]>

commit d934423ac26ed373dfe089734d505dca5ff679b6 upstream.

Orion5.x systems are still using machine files and not device-tree. Commit 96cb4342382290c9 ("net: mvmdio: allow up to three clocks to be specified for orion-mdio") has replaced devm_clk_get() with of_clk_get(), leading to a oops at boot and not working network, as reported in
https://lists.debian.org/debian-arm/2019/07/msg00088.html and possibly in
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=908712.

Fixes 96cb4342382290c9 ("net: mvmdio: allow up to three clocks to be specified for orion-mdio")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvmdio.c |   22 ++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvmdio.c +16 -6
@@ -319,15 +319,25 @@ static int orion_mdio_probe(struct platf
 
 	init_waitqueue_head(&dev->smi_busy_wait);
 
-	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dev->clk); i++) {
-		dev->clk[i] = of_clk_get(pdev->dev.of_node, i);
-		if (PTR_ERR(dev->clk[i]) == -EPROBE_DEFER) {
+	if (pdev->dev.of_node) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dev->clk); i++) {
+			dev->clk[i] = of_clk_get(pdev->dev.of_node, i);
+			if (PTR_ERR(dev->clk[i]) == -EPROBE_DEFER) {
+				ret = -EPROBE_DEFER;
+				goto out_clk;
+			}
+			if (IS_ERR(dev->clk[i]))
+				break;
+			clk_prepare_enable(dev->clk[i]);
+		}
+	} else {
+		dev->clk[0] = clk_get(&pdev->dev, NULL);
+		if (PTR_ERR(dev->clk[0]) == -EPROBE_DEFER) {
 			ret = -EPROBE_DEFER;
 			goto out_clk;
 		}
-		if (IS_ERR(dev->clk[i]))
-			break;
-		clk_prepare_enable(dev->clk[i]);
+		if (!IS_ERR(dev->clk[0]))
+			clk_prepare_enable(dev->clk[0]);
 	}
 
 	dev->err_interrupt = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/18 crypto: bcm - Verify GCM/CCM key length in setkey

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

commit 10a2f0b311094ffd45463a529a410a51ca025f27 upstream.

The setkey function for GCM/CCM algorithms didn't verify the key length before copying the key and subtracting the salt length.

This patch delays the copying of the key til after the verification has been done. It also adds checks on the key length to ensure that it's at least as long as the salt.

Fixes 9d12ba86f818 ("crypto: brcm - Add Broadcom SPU driver")
---
 drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c |   15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/bcm/cipher.c +14 -1
@@ -2981,7 +2981,6 @@ static int aead_gcm_ccm_setkey(struct cr
 
 	ctx->enckeylen = keylen;
 	ctx->authkeylen = 0;
-	memcpy(ctx->enckey, key, ctx->enckeylen);
 
 	switch (ctx->enckeylen) {
 	case AES_KEYSIZE_128:
@@ -2997,6 +2996,8 @@ static int aead_gcm_ccm_setkey(struct cr
 		goto badkey;
 	}
 
+	memcpy(ctx->enckey, key, ctx->enckeylen);
+
 	flow_log("  enckeylen:%u authkeylen:%u\n", ctx->enckeylen,
 		 ctx->authkeylen);
 	flow_dump("  enc: ", ctx->enckey, ctx->enckeylen);
@@ -3057,6 +3058,10 @@ static int aead_gcm_esp_setkey(struct cr
 	struct iproc_ctx_s *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(cipher);
 
 	flow_log("%s\n", __func__);
+
+	if (keylen < GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ctx->salt_len = GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE;
 	ctx->salt_offset = GCM_ESP_SALT_OFFSET;
 	memcpy(ctx->salt, key + keylen - GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE, GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE);
@@ -3085,6 +3090,10 @@ static int rfc4543_gcm_esp_setkey(struct
 	struct iproc_ctx_s *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(cipher);
 
 	flow_log("%s\n", __func__);
+
+	if (keylen < GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ctx->salt_len = GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE;
 	ctx->salt_offset = GCM_ESP_SALT_OFFSET;
 	memcpy(ctx->salt, key + keylen - GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE, GCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE);
@@ -3114,6 +3123,10 @@ static int aead_ccm_esp_setkey(struct cr
 	struct iproc_ctx_s *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(cipher);
 
 	flow_log("%s\n", __func__);
+
+	if (keylen < CCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ctx->salt_len = CCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE;
 	ctx->salt_offset = CCM_ESP_SALT_OFFSET;
 	memcpy(ctx->salt, key + keylen - CCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE, CCM_ESP_SALT_SIZE);
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/18 crypto: qat - check cipher length for aead AES-CBC-HMAC-SHA

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dominik Przychodni <[email protected]>

commit 45cb6653b0c355fc1445a8069ba78a4ce8720511 upstream.

Return -EINVAL for authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes)), authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)) and authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(aes)) if the cipher length is not multiple of the AES block. This is to prevent an undefined device behaviour.

Fixes d370cec32194 ("crypto: qat - Intel(R) QAT crypto interface")
[[email protected]: reworded commit message]
---
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c |   10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/qat_algs.c +9 -1
@@ -825,6 +825,11 @@ static int qat_alg_aead_dec(struct aead_
 	struct icp_qat_fw_la_bulk_req *msg;
 	int digst_size = crypto_aead_authsize(aead_tfm);
 	int ret, ctr = 0;
+	u32 cipher_len;
+
+	cipher_len = areq->cryptlen - digst_size;
+	if (cipher_len % AES_BLOCK_SIZE != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	ret = qat_alg_sgl_to_bufl(ctx->inst, areq->src, areq->dst, qat_req);
 	if (unlikely(ret))
@@ -839,7 +844,7 @@ static int qat_alg_aead_dec(struct aead_
 	qat_req->req.comn_mid.src_data_addr = qat_req->buf.blp;
 	qat_req->req.comn_mid.dest_data_addr = qat_req->buf.bloutp;
 	cipher_param = (void *)&qat_req->req.serv_specif_rqpars;
-	cipher_param->cipher_length = areq->cryptlen - digst_size;
+	cipher_param->cipher_length = cipher_len;
 	cipher_param->cipher_offset = areq->assoclen;
 	memcpy(cipher_param->u.cipher_IV_array, areq->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	auth_param = (void *)((uint8_t *)cipher_param + sizeof(*cipher_param));
@@ -868,6 +873,9 @@ static int qat_alg_aead_enc(struct aead_
 	uint8_t *iv = areq->iv;
 	int ret, ctr = 0;
 
+	if (areq->cryptlen % AES_BLOCK_SIZE != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ret = qat_alg_sgl_to_bufl(ctx->inst, areq->src, areq->dst, qat_req);
 	if (unlikely(ret))
 		return ret;
maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#19 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.202 release. There are 18 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 18 Oct 2020 09:04:25 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.202-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.14:

    8 builds:	8 pass, 0 fail
    16 boots:	16 pass, 0 fail
    30 tests:	30 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 4.14.202-rc1-g7d10bbd1a872
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,

                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon

Tested-by on the v1 series
#20 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.202 release. There are 18 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 18 Oct 2020 09:04:25 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 168 pass: 168 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 408 pass: 408 fail: 0

Guenter

Tested-by Linux Kernel Functional Testing on the v1 series
#21 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.202 release. There are 18 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 18 Oct 2020 09:04:25 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.202-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.14.202-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.14.y
git commit: 7d10bbd1a87237a93f881d8cd84dc686b9212378
git describe: v4.14.201-19-g7d10bbd1a872
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.14.y/build/v4.14.201-19-g7d10bbd1a872

No regressions (compared to build v4.14.201)

No fixes (compared to build v4.14.201)

Ran 24934 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- juno-r2-compat
- juno-r2-kasan
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
- x86-kasan

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* perf
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* network-basic-tests
* v4l2-compliance
* ltp-fs-tests
* ssuite

Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
Tested-by on the v1 series
#22 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.14.202 release. There are 18 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 18 Oct 2020 09:04:25 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.14.202-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.14.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah