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md/bitmap: fix memory leak of temporary bitmap

PATCH New Sasha Levin 1 participant 101 messages Oct 18, 2020

Subsystems (24)
lore
Share & tools
lore
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 30/101 fs: dlm: fix configfs memory leak

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alexander Aring <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3d2825c8c6105b0f36f3ff72760799fa2e71420e ]

This patch fixes the following memory detected by kmemleak and umount gfs2 filesystem which removed the last lockspace:

unreferenced object 0xffff9264f482f600 (size 192):
comm "dlm_controld", pid 325, jiffies 4294690276 (age 48.136s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):

    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 6e 6f 64 65 73 00 00 00  ........nodes...
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<00000000060481d7>] make_space+0x41/0x130
    [<000000008d905d46>] configfs_mkdir+0x1a2/0x5f0
    [<00000000729502cf>] vfs_mkdir+0x155/0x210
    [<000000000369bcf1>] do_mkdirat+0x6d/0x110
    [<00000000cc478a33>] do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
    [<00000000ce9ccf01>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

The patch just remembers the "nodes" entry pointer in space as I think it's created as subdirectory when parent "spaces" is created. In function drop_space() we will lost the pointer reference to nds because configfs_remove_default_groups(). However as this subdirectory is always available when "spaces" exists it will just be freed when "spaces" will be freed.

---
 fs/dlm/config.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/dlm/config.c +3 -0
index 3b21082e1b550..3b1012a3c4396 100644
@@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ struct dlm_space {
 	struct list_head members;
 	struct mutex members_lock;
 	int members_count;
+	struct dlm_nodes *nds;
 };
 
 struct dlm_comms {
@@ -424,6 +425,7 @@ static struct config_group *make_space(struct config_group *g, const char *name)
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sp->members);
 	mutex_init(&sp->members_lock);
 	sp->members_count = 0;
+	sp->nds = nds;
 	return &sp->group;
 
  fail:
@@ -445,6 +447,7 @@ static void drop_space(struct config_group *g, struct config_item *i)
 static void release_space(struct config_item *i)
 {
 	struct dlm_space *sp = config_item_to_space(i);
+	kfree(sp->nds);
 	kfree(sp);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#62 lore raw

PATCH 63/101 reiserfs: only call unlock_new_inode() if I_NEW

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8859bf2b1278d064a139e3031451524a49a56bd0 ]

unlock_new_inode() is only meant to be called after a new inode has already been inserted into the hash table. But reiserfs_new_inode() can call it even before it has inserted the inode, triggering the WARNING in unlock_new_inode(). Fix this by only calling unlock_new_inode() if the inode has the I_NEW flag set, indicating that it's in the table.

This addresses the syzbot report "WARNING in unlock_new_inode"
(https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=187510916eb6a14598f7).

---
 fs/reiserfs/inode.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/reiserfs/inode.c +2 -1
index 1509775da040a..e3af44c61524d 100644
@@ -2163,7 +2163,8 @@ int reiserfs_new_inode(struct reiserfs_transaction_handle *th,
 out_inserted_sd:
 	clear_nlink(inode);
 	th->t_trans_id = 0;	/* so the caller can't use this handle later */
-	unlock_new_inode(inode); /* OK to do even if we hadn't locked it */
+	if (inode->i_state & I_NEW)
+		unlock_new_inode(inode);
 	iput(inode);
 	return err;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#81 lore raw

PATCH 82/101 fbmem: add margin check to fb_check_caps()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: George Kennedy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a49145acfb975d921464b84fe00279f99827d816 ]

A fb_ioctl() FBIOPUT_VSCREENINFO call with invalid xres setting or yres setting in struct fb_var_screeninfo will result in a

KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds failure in bitfill_aligned() as

the margins are being cleared. The margins are cleared in chunks and if the xres setting or yres setting is a value of zero upto the chunk size, the failure will occur.

Add a margin check to validate xres and yres settings.

---
 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbmem.c +4 -0
index da7c88ffaa6a8..1136b569ccb7c 100644
@@ -1006,6 +1006,10 @@ fb_set_var(struct fb_info *info, struct fb_var_screeninfo *var)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/* bitfill_aligned() assumes that it's at least 8x8 */
+	if (var->xres < 8 || var->yres < 8)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	ret = info->fbops->fb_check_var(var, info);
 
 	if (ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#85 lore raw

PATCH 86/101 ipvs: Fix uninit-value in do_ip_vs_set_ctl()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Peilin Ye <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5a8a8498eed1c164afc94f50a939c1a10abf8ad ]

do_ip_vs_set_ctl() is referencing uninitialized stack value when len is zero. Fix it.

---
 net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c +4 -3
index 412656c34f205..beeafa42aad76 100644
@@ -2471,6 +2471,10 @@ do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		/* Set timeout values for (tcp tcpfin udp) */
 		ret = ip_vs_set_timeout(ipvs, (struct ip_vs_timeout_user *)arg);
 		goto out_unlock;
+	} else if (!len) {
+		/* No more commands with len == 0 below */
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
 	usvc_compat = (struct ip_vs_service_user *)arg;
@@ -2547,9 +2551,6 @@ do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		break;
 	case IP_VS_SO_SET_DELDEST:
 		ret = ip_vs_del_dest(svc, &udest);
-		break;
-	default:
-		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
   out_unlock:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#86 lore raw

PATCH 87/101 reiserfs: Fix memory leak in reiserfs_parse_options()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e9d4709fcc26353df12070566970f080e651f0c9 ]

When a usrjquota or grpjquota mount option is used multiple times, we will leak memory allocated for the file name. Make sure the last setting is used and all the previous ones are properly freed.

---
 fs/reiserfs/super.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/reiserfs/super.c +4 -4
index a6bce5b1fb1dc..1b9c7a387dc71 100644
@@ -1258,6 +1258,10 @@ static int reiserfs_parse_options(struct super_block *s,
 						 "turned on.");
 				return 0;
 			}
+			if (qf_names[qtype] !=
+			    REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[qtype])
+				kfree(qf_names[qtype]);
+			qf_names[qtype] = NULL;
 			if (*arg) {	/* Some filename specified? */
 				if (REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[qtype]
 				    && strcmp(REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[qtype],
@@ -1287,10 +1291,6 @@ static int reiserfs_parse_options(struct super_block *s,
 				else
 					*mount_options |= 1 << REISERFS_GRPQUOTA;
 			} else {
-				if (qf_names[qtype] !=
-				    REISERFS_SB(s)->s_qf_names[qtype])
-					kfree(qf_names[qtype]);
-				qf_names[qtype] = NULL;
 				if (qtype == USRQUOTA)
 					*mount_options &= ~(1 << REISERFS_USRQUOTA);
 				else
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 4/101 crypto: ccp - fix error handling

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pavel Machek <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e356c49c6cf0db3f00e1558749170bd56e47652d ]

Fix resource leak in error handling.

---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-ops.c +1 -1
index 64112c736810e..7234b95241e91 100644
@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ ccp_run_sha_cmd(struct ccp_cmd_queue *cmd_q, struct ccp_cmd *cmd)
 			break;
 		default:
 			ret = -EINVAL;
-			goto e_ctx;
+			goto e_data;
 		}
 	} else {
 		/* Stash the context */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 6/101 x86/mce: Add Skylake quirk for patrol scrub reported errors

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fd258dc4442c5c1c069c6b5b42bfe7d10cddda95 ]

The patrol scrubber in Skylake and Cascade Lake systems can be configured to report uncorrected errors using a special signature in the machine check bank and to signal using CMCI instead of machine check.

Update the severity calculation mechanism to allow specifying the model, minimum stepping and range of machine check bank numbers.

Add a new rule to detect the special signature (on model 0x55, stepping

Quoted 1 line

=4 in any of the memory controller banks).

[ bp: Rewrite it.
aegl: Productize it. ]

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c +26 -2
index e1da619add192..567ce09a02868 100644
@@ -9,9 +9,11 @@
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/debugfs.h>
-#include <asm/mce.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+
 #include "internal.h"
 
 /*
@@ -40,9 +42,14 @@ static struct severity {
 	unsigned char context;
 	unsigned char excp;
 	unsigned char covered;
+	unsigned char cpu_model;
+	unsigned char cpu_minstepping;
+	unsigned char bank_lo, bank_hi;
 	char *msg;
 } severities[] = {
 #define MCESEV(s, m, c...) { .sev = MCE_ ## s ## _SEVERITY, .msg = m, ## c }
+#define BANK_RANGE(l, h) .bank_lo = l, .bank_hi = h
+#define MODEL_STEPPING(m, s) .cpu_model = m, .cpu_minstepping = s
 #define  KERNEL		.context = IN_KERNEL
 #define  USER		.context = IN_USER
 #define  KERNEL_RECOV	.context = IN_KERNEL_RECOV
@@ -97,7 +104,6 @@ static struct severity {
 		KEEP, "Corrected error",
 		NOSER, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_UC)
 		),
-
 	/*
 	 * known AO MCACODs reported via MCE or CMC:
 	 *
@@ -113,6 +119,18 @@ static struct severity {
 		AO, "Action optional: last level cache writeback error",
 		SER, MASK(MCI_UC_AR|MCACOD, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCACOD_L3WB)
 		),
+	/*
+	 * Quirk for Skylake/Cascade Lake. Patrol scrubber may be configured
+	 * to report uncorrected errors using CMCI with a special signature.
+	 * UC=0, MSCOD=0x0010, MCACOD=binary(000X 0000 1100 XXXX) reported
+	 * in one of the memory controller banks.
+	 * Set severity to "AO" for same action as normal patrol scrub error.
+	 */
+	MCESEV(
+		AO, "Uncorrected Patrol Scrub Error",
+		SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_ADDR|0xffffeff0, MCI_ADDR|0x001000c0),
+		MODEL_STEPPING(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 4), BANK_RANGE(13, 18)
+	),
 
 	/* ignore OVER for UCNA */
 	MCESEV(
@@ -324,6 +342,12 @@ static int mce_severity_intel(struct mce *m, int tolerant, char **msg, bool is_e
 			continue;
 		if (s->excp && excp != s->excp)
 			continue;
+		if (s->cpu_model && boot_cpu_data.x86_model != s->cpu_model)
+			continue;
+		if (s->cpu_minstepping && boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < s->cpu_minstepping)
+			continue;
+		if (s->bank_lo && (m->bank < s->bank_lo || m->bank > s->bank_hi))
+			continue;
 		if (msg)
 			*msg = s->msg;
 		s->covered = 1;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 8/101 media: ati_remote: sanity check for both endpoints

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Oliver Neukum <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a8be80053ea74bd9c3f9a3810e93b802236d6498 ]

If you do sanity checks, you should do them for both endpoints. Hence introduce checking for endpoint type for the output endpoint, too.

---
 drivers/media/rc/ati_remote.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/media/rc/ati_remote.c +4 -0
index 9cdef17b4793f..c12dda73cdd53 100644
@@ -835,6 +835,10 @@ static int ati_remote_probe(struct usb_interface *interface,
 		err("%s: endpoint_in message size==0? \n", __func__);
 		return -ENODEV;
 	}
+	if (!usb_endpoint_is_int_out(endpoint_out)) {
+		err("%s: Unexpected endpoint_out\n", __func__);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
 
 	ati_remote = kzalloc(sizeof (struct ati_remote), GFP_KERNEL);
 	rc_dev = rc_allocate_device(RC_DRIVER_SCANCODE);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 11/101 media: exynos4-is: Fix several reference count leaks due to pm_runtime_get_sync

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qiushi Wu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7ef64ceea0008c17e94a8a2c60c5d6d46f481996 ]

On calling pm_runtime_get_sync() the reference count of the device is incremented. In case of failure, decrement the reference count before returning the error.

---
 drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp.c  | 4 +++-
 drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-lite.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-isp.c +3 -1
index cde0d254ec1c4..a77c49b185115 100644
@@ -305,8 +305,10 @@ static int fimc_isp_subdev_s_power(struct v4l2_subdev *sd, int on)
 
 	if (on) {
 		ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(&is->pdev->dev);
-		if (ret < 0)
+		if (ret < 0) {
+			pm_runtime_put(&is->pdev->dev);
 			return ret;
+		}
 		set_bit(IS_ST_PWR_ON, &is->state);
 
 		ret = fimc_is_start_firmware(is);
drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/fimc-lite.c +1 -1
index 394e0818f2d5c..92130d7791378 100644
@@ -470,7 +470,7 @@ static int fimc_lite_open(struct file *file)
 	set_bit(ST_FLITE_IN_USE, &fimc->state);
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(&fimc->pdev->dev);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto unlock;
+		goto err_pm;
 
 	ret = v4l2_fh_open(file);
 	if (ret < 0)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 13/101 media: exynos4-is: Fix a reference count leak

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qiushi Wu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 64157b2cb1940449e7df2670e85781c690266588 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code, causing incorrect ref count if pm_runtime_put_noidle() is not called in error handling paths. Thus call pm_runtime_put_noidle() if pm_runtime_get_sync() fails.

---
 drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/mipi-csis.c +3 -1
index 540151bbf58f2..1aac167abb175 100644
@@ -510,8 +510,10 @@ static int s5pcsis_s_stream(struct v4l2_subdev *sd, int enable)
 	if (enable) {
 		s5pcsis_clear_counters(state);
 		ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(&state->pdev->dev);
-		if (ret && ret != 1)
+		if (ret && ret != 1) {
+			pm_runtime_put_noidle(&state->pdev->dev);
 			return ret;
+		}
 	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&state->lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 15/101 media: platform: s3c-camif: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dafa3605fe60d5a61239d670919b2a36e712481e ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

Also, call pm_runtime_disable() when pm_runtime_get_sync() returns an error code.

---
 drivers/media/platform/s3c-camif/camif-core.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/s3c-camif/camif-core.c +2 -3
index c6fbcd7036d6d..ee624804862e2 100644
@@ -464,7 +464,7 @@ static int s3c_camif_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	ret = camif_media_dev_init(camif);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto err_alloc;
+		goto err_pm;
 
 	ret = camif_register_sensor(camif);
 	if (ret < 0)
@@ -498,10 +498,9 @@ static int s3c_camif_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	media_device_unregister(&camif->media_dev);
 	media_device_cleanup(&camif->media_dev);
 	camif_unregister_media_entities(camif);
-err_alloc:
+err_pm:
 	pm_runtime_put(dev);
 	pm_runtime_disable(dev);
-err_pm:
 	camif_clk_put(camif);
 err_clk:
 	s3c_camif_unregister_subdev(camif);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 16/101 media: platform: sti: hva: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d912a1d9e9afe69c6066c1ceb6bfc09063074075 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 drivers/media/platform/sti/hva/hva-hw.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/platform/sti/hva/hva-hw.c +1 -1
index bb13348be0832..43f279e2a6a38 100644
@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ int hva_hw_probe(struct platform_device *pdev, struct hva_dev *hva)
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "%s     failed to set PM\n", HVA_PREFIX);
-		goto err_clk;
+		goto err_pm;
 	}
 
 	/* check IP hardware version */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 18/101 media: media/pci: prevent memory leak in bttv_probe

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Xiaolong Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7b817585b730665126b45df5508dd69526448bc8 ]

In bttv_probe if some functions such as pci_enable_device, pci_set_dma_mask and request_mem_region fails the allocated
memory for btv should be released.

---
 drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/pci/bt8xx/bttv-driver.c +10 -3
index 9144f795fb933..b721720f9845a 100644
@@ -4013,11 +4013,13 @@ static int bttv_probe(struct pci_dev *dev, const struct pci_device_id *pci_id)
 	btv->id  = dev->device;
 	if (pci_enable_device(dev)) {
 		pr_warn("%d: Can't enable device\n", btv->c.nr);
-		return -EIO;
+		result = -EIO;
+		goto free_mem;
 	}
 	if (pci_set_dma_mask(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32))) {
 		pr_warn("%d: No suitable DMA available\n", btv->c.nr);
-		return -EIO;
+		result = -EIO;
+		goto free_mem;
 	}
 	if (!request_mem_region(pci_resource_start(dev,0),
 				pci_resource_len(dev,0),
@@ -4025,7 +4027,8 @@ static int bttv_probe(struct pci_dev *dev, const struct pci_device_id *pci_id)
 		pr_warn("%d: can't request iomem (0x%llx)\n",
 			btv->c.nr,
 			(unsigned long long)pci_resource_start(dev, 0));
-		return -EBUSY;
+		result = -EBUSY;
+		goto free_mem;
 	}
 	pci_set_master(dev);
 	pci_set_command(dev);
@@ -4211,6 +4214,10 @@ static int bttv_probe(struct pci_dev *dev, const struct pci_device_id *pci_id)
 	release_mem_region(pci_resource_start(btv->c.pci,0),
 			   pci_resource_len(btv->c.pci,0));
 	pci_disable_device(btv->c.pci);
+
+free_mem:
+	bttvs[btv->c.nr] = NULL;
+	kfree(btv);
 	return result;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 19/101 x86/mce: Annotate mce_rd/wrmsrl() with noinstr

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e100777016fdf6ec3a9d7c1773b15a2b5eca6c55 ]

They do get called from the #MC handler which is already marked "noinstr".

Commit

e2def7d49d08 ("x86/mce: Make mce_rdmsrl() panic on an inaccessible MSR")

already got rid of the instrumentation in the MSR accessors, fix the annotation now too, in order to get rid of:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: do_machine_check()+0x4a: call to mce_rdmsrl() leaves .noinstr.text section

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c +21 -6
index 14e4b4d17ee5b..d8dca24feccbe 100644
@@ -371,16 +371,25 @@ static int msr_to_offset(u32 msr)
 }
 
 /* MSR access wrappers used for error injection */
-static u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
+static noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
 {
 	u64 v;
 
 	if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
-		int offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
+		int offset;
+		u64 ret;
 
+		instrumentation_begin();
+
+		offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
 		if (offset < 0)
-			return 0;
-		return *(u64 *)((char *)this_cpu_ptr(&injectm) + offset);
+			ret = 0;
+		else
+			ret = *(u64 *)((char *)this_cpu_ptr(&injectm) + offset);
+
+		instrumentation_end();
+
+		return ret;
 	}
 
 	if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &v)) {
@@ -396,13 +405,19 @@ static u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
 	return v;
 }
 
-static void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
+static noinstr void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
 {
 	if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
-		int offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
+		int offset;
 
+		instrumentation_begin();
+
+		offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
 		if (offset >= 0)
 			*(u64 *)((char *)this_cpu_ptr(&injectm) + offset) = v;
+
+		instrumentation_end();
+
 		return;
 	}
 	wrmsrl(msr, v);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#22 lore raw

PATCH 23/101 media: rcar_drif: Fix fwnode reference leak when parsing DT

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Laurent Pinchart <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cdd4f7824994c9254acc6e415750529ea2d2cfe0 ]

The fwnode reference corresponding to the endpoint is leaked in an error path of the rcar_drif_parse_subdevs() function. Fix it, and reorganize fwnode reference handling in the function to release references early, simplifying error paths.

---
 drivers/media/platform/rcar_drif.c | 16 +++++-----------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/rcar_drif.c +5 -11
index 3d2451ac347d7..3f1e5cb8b1976 100644
@@ -1227,28 +1227,22 @@ static int rcar_drif_parse_subdevs(struct rcar_drif_sdr *sdr)
 	if (!ep)
 		return 0;
 
+	/* Get the endpoint properties */
+	rcar_drif_get_ep_properties(sdr, ep);
+
 	fwnode = fwnode_graph_get_remote_port_parent(ep);
+	fwnode_handle_put(ep);
 	if (!fwnode) {
 		dev_warn(sdr->dev, "bad remote port parent\n");
-		fwnode_handle_put(ep);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	sdr->ep.asd.match.fwnode = fwnode;
 	sdr->ep.asd.match_type = V4L2_ASYNC_MATCH_FWNODE;
 	ret = v4l2_async_notifier_add_subdev(notifier, &sdr->ep.asd);
-	if (ret) {
-		fwnode_handle_put(fwnode);
-		return ret;
-	}
-
-	/* Get the endpoint properties */
-	rcar_drif_get_ep_properties(sdr, ep);
-
 	fwnode_handle_put(fwnode);
-	fwnode_handle_put(ep);
 
-	return 0;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /* Check if the given device is the primary bond */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#25 lore raw

PATCH 26/101 mmc: sdio: Check for CISTPL_VERS_1 buffer size

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pali Rohár <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ebe2607965d3e2dc02029e8c7dd35fbe508ffd0 ]

Before parsing CISTPL_VERS_1 structure check that its size is at least two bytes to prevent buffer overflow.

---
 drivers/mmc/core/sdio_cis.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/mmc/core/sdio_cis.c +3 -0
index e0655278c5c32..3efaa9534a777 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ static int cistpl_vers_1(struct mmc_card *card, struct sdio_func *func,
 	unsigned i, nr_strings;
 	char **buffer, *string;
 
+	if (size < 2)
+		return 0;
+
 	/* Find all null-terminated (including zero length) strings in
 	   the TPLLV1_INFO field. Trailing garbage is ignored. */
 	buf += 2;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 31/101 media: venus: core: Fix error handling in probe

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Rajendra Nayak <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 98cd831088c64aa8fe7e1d2a8bb94b6faba0462b ]

Post a successful pm_ops->core_get, an error in probe should exit by doing a pm_ops->core_put which seems to be missing. So fix it.

---
 drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/core.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/core.c +10 -5
index 203c6538044fb..bfcaba37d60fe 100644
@@ -224,13 +224,15 @@ static int venus_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	ret = dma_set_mask_and_coherent(dev, core->res->dma_mask);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto err_core_put;
 
 	if (!dev->dma_parms) {
 		dev->dma_parms = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*dev->dma_parms),
 					      GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!dev->dma_parms)
-			return -ENOMEM;
+		if (!dev->dma_parms) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err_core_put;
+		}
 	}
 	dma_set_max_seg_size(dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));
 
@@ -242,11 +244,11 @@ static int venus_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 					IRQF_TRIGGER_HIGH | IRQF_ONESHOT,
 					"venus", core);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto err_core_put;
 
 	ret = hfi_create(core, &venus_core_ops);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto err_core_put;
 
 	pm_runtime_enable(dev);
 
@@ -302,6 +304,9 @@ static int venus_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	pm_runtime_set_suspended(dev);
 	pm_runtime_disable(dev);
 	hfi_destroy(core);
+err_core_put:
+	if (core->pm_ops->core_put)
+		core->pm_ops->core_put(dev);
 	return ret;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 33/101 ipv6/icmp: l3mdev: Perform icmp error route lookup on source device routing table (v2)

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 272928d1cdacfc3b55f605cb0e9115832ecfb20c ]

As per RFC4443, the destination address field for ICMPv6 error messages is copied from the source address field of the invoking packet.

In configurations with Virtual Routing and Forwarding tables, looking up which routing table to use for sending ICMPv6 error messages is currently done by using the destination net_device.

If the source and destination interfaces are within separate VRFs, or one in the global routing table and the other in a VRF, looking up the source address of the invoking packet in the destination interface's routing table will fail if the destination interface's routing table contains no route to the invoking packet's source address.

One observable effect of this issue is that traceroute6 does not work in the following cases:

- Route leaking between global routing table and VRF
- Route leaking between VRFs

Use the source device routing table when sending ICMPv6 error messages.

[ In the context of ipv4, it has been pointed out that a similar issue
may exist with ICMP errors triggered when forwarding between network namespaces. It would be worthwhile to investigate whether ipv6 has similar issues, but is outside of the scope of this investigation. ]

[ Testing shows that similar issues exist with ipv6 unreachable /
fragmentation needed messages. However, investigation of this additional failure mode is beyond this investigation's scope. ]

---
 net/ipv6/icmp.c       | 7 +++++--
 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c | 2 --
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/icmp.c +5 -2
index 9df8737ae0d32..e13affaa6c806 100644
@@ -501,8 +501,11 @@ static void icmp6_send(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type, u8 code, __u32 info,
 	if (__ipv6_addr_needs_scope_id(addr_type)) {
 		iif = icmp6_iif(skb);
 	} else {
-		dst = skb_dst(skb);
-		iif = l3mdev_master_ifindex(dst ? dst->dev : skb->dev);
+		/*
+		 * The source device is used for looking up which routing table
+		 * to use for sending an ICMP error.
+		 */
+		iif = l3mdev_master_ifindex(skb->dev);
 	}
 
 	/*
net/ipv6/ip6_output.c +0 -2
index 8a8c2d0cfcc81..00243d7d276cc 100644
@@ -468,8 +468,6 @@ int ip6_forward(struct sk_buff *skb)
 	 *	check and decrement ttl
 	 */
 	if (hdr->hop_limit <= 1) {
-		/* Force OUTPUT device used as source address */
-		skb->dev = dst->dev;
 		icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_TIME_EXCEED, ICMPV6_EXC_HOPLIMIT, 0);
 		__IP6_INC_STATS(net, idev, IPSTATS_MIB_INHDRERRORS);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#34 lore raw

PATCH 35/101 ip_gre: set dev->hard_header_len and dev->needed_headroom properly

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Cong Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fdafed459998e2be0e877e6189b24cb7a0183224 ]

GRE tunnel has its own header_ops, ipgre_header_ops, and sets it conditionally. When it is set, it assumes the outer IP header is already created before ipgre_xmit().

This is not true when we send packets through a raw packet socket, where L2 headers are supposed to be constructed by user. Packet socket calls dev_validate_header() to validate the header. But GRE tunnel does not set dev->hard_header_len, so that check can be simply bypassed, therefore uninit memory could be passed down to ipgre_xmit(). Similar for dev->needed_headroom.

dev->hard_header_len is supposed to be the length of the header created by dev->header_ops->create(), so it should be used whenever header_ops is set, and dev->needed_headroom should be used when it is not set.

---
 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c | 15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/ip_gre.c +11 -4
index 4e31f23e4117e..e70291748889b 100644
@@ -625,9 +625,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t ipgre_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	}
 
 	if (dev->header_ops) {
-		/* Need space for new headers */
-		if (skb_cow_head(skb, dev->needed_headroom -
-				      (tunnel->hlen + sizeof(struct iphdr))))
+		if (skb_cow_head(skb, 0))
 			goto free_skb;
 
 		tnl_params = (const struct iphdr *)skb->data;
@@ -748,7 +746,11 @@ static void ipgre_link_update(struct net_device *dev, bool set_mtu)
 	len = tunnel->tun_hlen - len;
 	tunnel->hlen = tunnel->hlen + len;
 
-	dev->needed_headroom = dev->needed_headroom + len;
+	if (dev->header_ops)
+		dev->hard_header_len += len;
+	else
+		dev->needed_headroom += len;
+
 	if (set_mtu)
 		dev->mtu = max_t(int, dev->mtu - len, 68);
 
@@ -944,6 +946,7 @@ static void __gre_tunnel_init(struct net_device *dev)
 	tunnel->parms.iph.protocol = IPPROTO_GRE;
 
 	tunnel->hlen = tunnel->tun_hlen + tunnel->encap_hlen;
+	dev->needed_headroom = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(tunnel->parms.iph);
 
 	dev->features		|= GRE_FEATURES;
 	dev->hw_features	|= GRE_FEATURES;
@@ -987,10 +990,14 @@ static int ipgre_tunnel_init(struct net_device *dev)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			dev->flags = IFF_BROADCAST;
 			dev->header_ops = &ipgre_header_ops;
+			dev->hard_header_len = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(*iph);
+			dev->needed_headroom = 0;
 		}
 #endif
 	} else if (!tunnel->collect_md) {
 		dev->header_ops = &ipgre_header_ops;
+		dev->hard_header_len = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(*iph);
+		dev->needed_headroom = 0;
 	}
 
 	return ip_tunnel_init(dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#33 lore raw

PATCH 34/101 ntfs: add check for mft record size in superblock

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Rustam Kovhaev <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4f8c94022f0bc3babd0a124c0a7dcdd7547bd94e ]

Number of bytes allocated for mft record should be equal to the mft record size stored in ntfs superblock as reported by syzbot, userspace might trigger out-of-bounds read by dereferencing ctx->attr in ntfs_attr_find()

---
 fs/ntfs/inode.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/ntfs/inode.c +6 -0
index d4359a1df3d5e..84933a0af49b6 100644
@@ -1809,6 +1809,12 @@ int ntfs_read_inode_mount(struct inode *vi)
 		brelse(bh);
 	}
 
+	if (le32_to_cpu(m->bytes_allocated) != vol->mft_record_size) {
+		ntfs_error(sb, "Incorrect mft record size %u in superblock, should be %u.",
+				le32_to_cpu(m->bytes_allocated), vol->mft_record_size);
+		goto err_out;
+	}
+
 	/* Apply the mst fixups. */
 	if (post_read_mst_fixup((NTFS_RECORD*)m, vol->mft_record_size)) {
 		/* FIXME: Try to use the $MFTMirr now. */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#36 lore raw

PATCH 37/101 staging: wfx: fix handling of MMIC error

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jérôme Pouiller <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8d350c14ee5eb62ecd40b0991248bfbce511954d ]

As expected, when the device detect a MMIC error, it returns a specific status. However, it also strip IV from the frame (don't ask me why).

So, with the current code, mac80211 detects a corrupted frame and it drops it before it handle the MMIC error. The expected behavior would be to detect MMIC error then to renegotiate the EAP session.

So, this patch correctly informs mac80211 that IV is not available. So, mac80211 correctly takes into account the MMIC error.

---
 drivers/staging/wfx/data_rx.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/staging/wfx/data_rx.c +1 -1
index 0e959ebc38b56..a9fb5165b33d9 100644
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ void wfx_rx_cb(struct wfx_vif *wvif,
 		goto drop;
 
 	if (arg->status == HIF_STATUS_RX_FAIL_MIC)
-		hdr->flag |= RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR;
+		hdr->flag |= RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED;
 	else if (arg->status)
 		goto drop;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 42/101 scsi: target: core: Add CONTROL field for trace events

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Roman Bolshakov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7010645ba7256992818b518163f46bd4cdf8002a ]

trace-cmd report doesn't show events from target subsystem because scsi_command_size() leaks through event format string:

[target:target_sequencer_start] function scsi_command_size not defined [target:target_cmd_complete] function scsi_command_size not defined

Addition of scsi_command_size() to plugin_scsi.c in trace-cmd doesn't help because an expression is used inside TP_printk(). trace-cmd event parser doesn't understand minus sign inside [ ]:

Error: expected ']' but read '-'

Rather than duplicating kernel code in plugin_scsi.c, provide a dedicated field for CONTROL byte.

---
 include/scsi/scsi_common.h    |  7 +++++++
 include/trace/events/target.h | 12 ++++++------
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/scsi/scsi_common.h +7 -0
index 731ac09ed2313..5b567b43e1b16 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,13 @@ scsi_command_size(const unsigned char *cmnd)
 		scsi_varlen_cdb_length(cmnd) : COMMAND_SIZE(cmnd[0]);
 }
 
+static inline unsigned char
+scsi_command_control(const unsigned char *cmnd)
+{
+	return (cmnd[0] == VARIABLE_LENGTH_CMD) ?
+		cmnd[1] : cmnd[COMMAND_SIZE(cmnd[0]) - 1];
+}
+
 /* Returns a human-readable name for the device */
 extern const char *scsi_device_type(unsigned type);
 
include/trace/events/target.h +6 -6
index 77408edd29d2a..67fad2677ed55 100644
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_sequencer_start,
 		__field( unsigned int,	opcode		)
 		__field( unsigned int,	data_length	)
 		__field( unsigned int,	task_attribute  )
+		__field( unsigned char,	control		)
 		__array( unsigned char,	cdb, TCM_MAX_COMMAND_SIZE	)
 		__string( initiator,	cmd->se_sess->se_node_acl->initiatorname	)
 	),
@@ -151,6 +152,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_sequencer_start,
 		__entry->opcode		= cmd->t_task_cdb[0];
 		__entry->data_length	= cmd->data_length;
 		__entry->task_attribute	= cmd->sam_task_attr;
+		__entry->control	= scsi_command_control(cmd->t_task_cdb);
 		memcpy(__entry->cdb, cmd->t_task_cdb, TCM_MAX_COMMAND_SIZE);
 		__assign_str(initiator, cmd->se_sess->se_node_acl->initiatorname);
 	),
@@ -160,9 +162,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_sequencer_start,
 		  __entry->tag, show_opcode_name(__entry->opcode),
 		  __entry->data_length, __print_hex(__entry->cdb, 16),
 		  show_task_attribute_name(__entry->task_attribute),
-		  scsi_command_size(__entry->cdb) <= 16 ?
-			__entry->cdb[scsi_command_size(__entry->cdb) - 1] :
-			__entry->cdb[1]
+		  __entry->control
 	)
 );
 
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_cmd_complete,
 		__field( unsigned int,	opcode		)
 		__field( unsigned int,	data_length	)
 		__field( unsigned int,	task_attribute  )
+		__field( unsigned char,	control		)
 		__field( unsigned char,	scsi_status	)
 		__field( unsigned char,	sense_length	)
 		__array( unsigned char,	cdb, TCM_MAX_COMMAND_SIZE	)
@@ -191,6 +192,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_cmd_complete,
 		__entry->opcode		= cmd->t_task_cdb[0];
 		__entry->data_length	= cmd->data_length;
 		__entry->task_attribute	= cmd->sam_task_attr;
+		__entry->control	= scsi_command_control(cmd->t_task_cdb);
 		__entry->scsi_status	= cmd->scsi_status;
 		__entry->sense_length	= cmd->scsi_status == SAM_STAT_CHECK_CONDITION ?
 			min(18, ((u8 *) cmd->sense_buffer)[SPC_ADD_SENSE_LEN_OFFSET] + 8) : 0;
@@ -208,9 +210,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(target_cmd_complete,
 		  show_opcode_name(__entry->opcode),
 		  __entry->data_length, __print_hex(__entry->cdb, 16),
 		  show_task_attribute_name(__entry->task_attribute),
-		  scsi_command_size(__entry->cdb) <= 16 ?
-			__entry->cdb[scsi_command_size(__entry->cdb) - 1] :
-			__entry->cdb[1]
+		  __entry->control
 	)
 );
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 43/101 mic: vop: copy data to kernel space then write to io memory

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sherry Sun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 675f0ad4046946e80412896436164d172cd92238 ]

Read and write io memory should address align on ARCH ARM. Change to use memcpy_toio to avoid kernel panic caused by the address un-align issue.

---
 drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_vringh.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_vringh.c +14 -6
index 30eac172f0170..d069947b09345 100644
@@ -602,6 +602,7 @@ static int vop_virtio_copy_from_user(struct vop_vdev *vdev, void __user *ubuf,
 	size_t partlen;
 	bool dma = VOP_USE_DMA && vi->dma_ch;
 	int err = 0;
+	size_t offset = 0;
 
 	if (dma) {
 		dma_alignment = 1 << vi->dma_ch->device->copy_align;
@@ -655,13 +656,20 @@ static int vop_virtio_copy_from_user(struct vop_vdev *vdev, void __user *ubuf,
 	 * We are copying to IO below and should ideally use something
 	 * like copy_from_user_toio(..) if it existed.
 	 */
-	if (copy_from_user((void __force *)dbuf, ubuf, len)) {
-		err = -EFAULT;
-		dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
-			__func__, __LINE__, err);
-		goto err;
+	while (len) {
+		partlen = min_t(size_t, len, VOP_INT_DMA_BUF_SIZE);
+
+		if (copy_from_user(vvr->buf, ubuf + offset, partlen)) {
+			err = -EFAULT;
+			dev_err(vop_dev(vdev), "%s %d err %d\n",
+				__func__, __LINE__, err);
+			goto err;
+		}
+		memcpy_toio(dbuf + offset, vvr->buf, partlen);
+		offset += partlen;
+		vdev->out_bytes += partlen;
+		len -= partlen;
 	}
-	vdev->out_bytes += len;
 	err = 0;
 err:
 	vpdev->hw_ops->unmap(vpdev, dbuf);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 49/101 udf: Avoid accessing uninitialized data on failed inode read

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 044e2e26f214e5ab26af85faffd8d1e4ec066931 ]

When we fail to read inode, some data accessed in udf_evict_inode() may be uninitialized. Move the accesses to !is_bad_inode() branch.

---
 fs/udf/inode.c | 25 ++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/udf/inode.c +14 -11
index adaba8e8b326e..566118417e562 100644
@@ -139,21 +139,24 @@ void udf_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)
 	struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
 	int want_delete = 0;
 
-	if (!inode->i_nlink && !is_bad_inode(inode)) {
-		want_delete = 1;
-		udf_setsize(inode, 0);
-		udf_update_inode(inode, IS_SYNC(inode));
+	if (!is_bad_inode(inode)) {
+		if (!inode->i_nlink) {
+			want_delete = 1;
+			udf_setsize(inode, 0);
+			udf_update_inode(inode, IS_SYNC(inode));
+		}
+		if (iinfo->i_alloc_type != ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB &&
+		    inode->i_size != iinfo->i_lenExtents) {
+			udf_warn(inode->i_sb,
+				 "Inode %lu (mode %o) has inode size %llu different from extent length %llu. Filesystem need not be standards compliant.\n",
+				 inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode,
+				 (unsigned long long)inode->i_size,
+				 (unsigned long long)iinfo->i_lenExtents);
+		}
 	}
 	truncate_inode_pages_final(&inode->i_data);
 	invalidate_inode_buffers(inode);
 	clear_inode(inode);
-	if (iinfo->i_alloc_type != ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB &&
-	    inode->i_size != iinfo->i_lenExtents) {
-		udf_warn(inode->i_sb, "Inode %lu (mode %o) has inode size %llu different from extent length %llu. Filesystem need not be standards compliant.\n",
-			 inode->i_ino, inode->i_mode,
-			 (unsigned long long)inode->i_size,
-			 (unsigned long long)iinfo->i_lenExtents);
-	}
 	kfree(iinfo->i_ext.i_data);
 	iinfo->i_ext.i_data = NULL;
 	udf_clear_extent_cache(inode);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#46 lore raw

PATCH 47/101 rtw88: pci: Power cycle device during shutdown

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Kai-Heng Feng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 44492e70adc8086c42d3745d21d591657a427f04 ]

There are reports that 8822CE fails to work rtw88 with "failed to read DBI register" error. Also I have a system with 8723DE which freezes the whole system when the rtw88 is probing the device.

According to [1], platform firmware may not properly power manage the device during shutdown. I did some expirements and putting the device to D3 can workaround the issue.

So let's power cycle the device by putting the device to D3 at shutdown to prevent the issue from happening.

[1] https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206411#c9

---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.c +2 -0
index 3413973bc4750..7f1f5073b9f4d 100644
@@ -1599,6 +1599,8 @@ void rtw_pci_shutdown(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 
 	if (chip->ops->shutdown)
 		chip->ops->shutdown(rtwdev);
+
+	pci_set_power_state(pdev, PCI_D3hot);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(rtw_pci_shutdown);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#49 lore raw

PATCH 50/101 rtw88: increse the size of rx buffer size

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tzu-En Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ee755732b7a16af018daa77d9562d2493fb7092f ]

The vht capability of MAX_MPDU_LENGTH is 11454 in rtw88; however, the rx buffer size for each packet is 8192. When receiving packets that are larger than rx buffer size, it will leads to rx buffer ring overflow.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw88/pci.h +2 -2
index 024c2bc275cbe..ca17aa9cf7dc7 100644
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
 #define RTK_BEQ_TX_DESC_NUM	256
 
 #define RTK_MAX_RX_DESC_NUM	512
-/* 8K + rx desc size */
-#define RTK_PCI_RX_BUF_SIZE	(8192 + 24)
+/* 11K + rx desc size */
+#define RTK_PCI_RX_BUF_SIZE	(11454 + 24)
 
 #define RTK_PCI_CTRL		0x300
 #define BIT_RST_TRXDMA_INTF	BIT(20)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#52 lore raw

PATCH 53/101 usb: dwc3: simple: add support for Hikey 970

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b68d9251561f33661e53dd618f1cafe7ec9ec3c2 ]

This binding driver is needed for Hikey 970 to work, as otherwise a Serror is produced:

    [    1.837458] SError Interrupt on CPU0, code 0xbf000002 -- SError
    [    1.837462] CPU: 0 PID: 74 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.8.0+ #205
    [    1.837463] Hardware name: HiKey970 (DT)
    [    1.837465] Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
    [    1.837467] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
    [    1.837468] pc : _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x18/0x50
    [    1.837469] lr : regmap_unlock_spinlock+0x14/0x20
    [    1.837470] sp : ffff8000124dba60
    [    1.837471] x29: ffff8000124dba60 x28: 0000000000000000
    [    1.837474] x27: ffff0001b7e854c8 x26: ffff80001204ea18
    [    1.837476] x25: 0000000000000005 x24: ffff800011f918f8
    [    1.837479] x23: ffff800011fbb588 x22: ffff0001b7e40e00
    [    1.837481] x21: 0000000000000100 x20: 0000000000000000
    [    1.837483] x19: ffff0001b767ec00 x18: 00000000ff10c000
    [    1.837485] x17: 0000000000000002 x16: 0000b0740fdb9950
    [    1.837488] x15: ffff8000116c1198 x14: ffffffffffffffff
    [    1.837490] x13: 0000000000000030 x12: 0101010101010101
    [    1.837493] x11: 0000000000000020 x10: ffff0001bf17d130
    [    1.837495] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : ffff0001b6938080
    [    1.837497] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
    [    1.837500] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
    [    1.837502] x3 : ffff80001096a880 x2 : 0000000000000000
    [    1.837505] x1 : ffff0001b7e40e00 x0 : 0000000100000001
    [    1.837507] Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt
    [    1.837509] CPU: 0 PID: 74 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.8.0+ #205
    [    1.837510] Hardware name: HiKey970 (DT)
    [    1.837511] Workqueue: events deferred_probe_work_func
    [    1.837513] Call trace:
    [    1.837514]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1e0
    [    1.837515]  show_stack+0x18/0x24
    [    1.837516]  dump_stack+0xc0/0x11c
    [    1.837517]  panic+0x15c/0x324
    [    1.837518]  nmi_panic+0x8c/0x90
    [    1.837519]  arm64_serror_panic+0x78/0x84
    [    1.837520]  do_serror+0x158/0x15c
    [    1.837521]  el1_error+0x84/0x100
    [    1.837522]  _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x18/0x50
    [    1.837523]  regmap_write+0x58/0x80
    [    1.837524]  hi3660_reset_deassert+0x28/0x34
    [    1.837526]  reset_control_deassert+0x50/0x260
    [    1.837527]  reset_control_deassert+0xf4/0x260
    [    1.837528]  dwc3_probe+0x5dc/0xe6c
    [    1.837529]  platform_drv_probe+0x54/0xb0
    [    1.837530]  really_probe+0xe0/0x490
    [    1.837531]  driver_probe_device+0xf4/0x160
    [    1.837532]  __device_attach_driver+0x8c/0x114
    [    1.837533]  bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xcc
    [    1.837534]  __device_attach+0x108/0x1a0
    [    1.837535]  device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
    [    1.837537]  bus_probe_device+0x98/0xa0
    [    1.837538]  deferred_probe_work_func+0x88/0xe0
    [    1.837539]  process_one_work+0x1cc/0x350
    [    1.837540]  worker_thread+0x2c0/0x470
    [    1.837541]  kthread+0x154/0x160
    [    1.837542]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
    [    1.837569] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
    [    1.837570] Kernel Offset: 0x1d0000 from 0xffff800010000000
    [    1.837571] PHYS_OFFSET: 0x0
    [    1.837572] CPU features: 0x240002,20882004
    [    1.837573] Memory Limit: none
---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-of-simple.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/usb/dwc3/dwc3-of-simple.c +1 -0
index 8852fbfdead4e..336253ff55749 100644
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id of_dwc3_simple_match[] = {
 	{ .compatible = "cavium,octeon-7130-usb-uctl" },
 	{ .compatible = "sprd,sc9860-dwc3" },
 	{ .compatible = "allwinner,sun50i-h6-dwc3" },
+	{ .compatible = "hisilicon,hi3670-dwc3" },
 	{ /* Sentinel */ }
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, of_dwc3_simple_match);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#57 lore raw

PATCH 58/101 drm/panfrost: add Amlogic GPU integration quirks

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit afcd0c7d3d4c22afc8befcfc906db6ce3058d3ee ]

This adds the required GPU quirks, including the quirk in the PWR registers at the GPU reset time and the IOMMU quirk for shareability issues observed on G52 in Amlogic G12B SoCs.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_drv.c +11 -0
index 882fecc33fdb1..6e11a73e81aa3 100644
@@ -667,7 +667,18 @@ static const struct panfrost_compatible default_data = {
 	.pm_domain_names = NULL,
 };
 
+static const struct panfrost_compatible amlogic_data = {
+	.num_supplies = ARRAY_SIZE(default_supplies),
+	.supply_names = default_supplies,
+	.vendor_quirk = panfrost_gpu_amlogic_quirk,
+};
+
 static const struct of_device_id dt_match[] = {
+	/* Set first to probe before the generic compatibles */
+	{ .compatible = "amlogic,meson-gxm-mali",
+	  .data = &amlogic_data, },
+	{ .compatible = "amlogic,meson-g12a-mali",
+	  .data = &amlogic_data, },
 	{ .compatible = "arm,mali-t604", .data = &default_data, },
 	{ .compatible = "arm,mali-t624", .data = &default_data, },
 	{ .compatible = "arm,mali-t628", .data = &default_data, },
Signature · 6 lines
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[email protected]
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author maintainer
#53 lore raw

PATCH 54/101 habanalabs: cast to u64 before shift > 31 bits

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Oded Gabbay <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f763946aefe67b3ea58696b75a930ba1ed886a83 ]

When shifting a boolean variable by more than 31 bits and putting the result into a u64 variable, we need to cast the boolean into unsigned 64 bits to prevent possible overflow.

---
 drivers/misc/habanalabs/gaudi/gaudi.c | 8 +++++---
 drivers/misc/habanalabs/goya/goya.c   | 8 +++++---
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/habanalabs/gaudi/gaudi.c +5 -3
index ca183733847b6..bcc45bf7af2c8 100644
@@ -6285,7 +6285,7 @@ static bool gaudi_is_device_idle(struct hl_device *hdev, u32 *mask,
 		is_idle &= is_eng_idle;
 
 		if (mask)
-			*mask |= !is_eng_idle <<
+			*mask |= ((u64) !is_eng_idle) <<
 					(GAUDI_ENGINE_ID_DMA_0 + dma_id);
 		if (s)
 			seq_printf(s, fmt, dma_id,
@@ -6308,7 +6308,8 @@ static bool gaudi_is_device_idle(struct hl_device *hdev, u32 *mask,
 		is_idle &= is_eng_idle;
 
 		if (mask)
-			*mask |= !is_eng_idle << (GAUDI_ENGINE_ID_TPC_0 + i);
+			*mask |= ((u64) !is_eng_idle) <<
+						(GAUDI_ENGINE_ID_TPC_0 + i);
 		if (s)
 			seq_printf(s, fmt, i,
 				is_eng_idle ? "Y" : "N",
@@ -6336,7 +6337,8 @@ static bool gaudi_is_device_idle(struct hl_device *hdev, u32 *mask,
 		is_idle &= is_eng_idle;
 
 		if (mask)
-			*mask |= !is_eng_idle << (GAUDI_ENGINE_ID_MME_0 + i);
+			*mask |= ((u64) !is_eng_idle) <<
+						(GAUDI_ENGINE_ID_MME_0 + i);
 		if (s) {
 			if (!is_slave)
 				seq_printf(s, fmt, i,
drivers/misc/habanalabs/goya/goya.c +5 -3
index c179085ced7b8..a8041a39fae31 100644
@@ -5098,7 +5098,8 @@ static bool goya_is_device_idle(struct hl_device *hdev, u32 *mask,
 		is_idle &= is_eng_idle;
 
 		if (mask)
-			*mask |= !is_eng_idle << (GOYA_ENGINE_ID_DMA_0 + i);
+			*mask |= ((u64) !is_eng_idle) <<
+						(GOYA_ENGINE_ID_DMA_0 + i);
 		if (s)
 			seq_printf(s, dma_fmt, i, is_eng_idle ? "Y" : "N",
 					qm_glbl_sts0, dma_core_sts0);
@@ -5121,7 +5122,8 @@ static bool goya_is_device_idle(struct hl_device *hdev, u32 *mask,
 		is_idle &= is_eng_idle;
 
 		if (mask)
-			*mask |= !is_eng_idle << (GOYA_ENGINE_ID_TPC_0 + i);
+			*mask |= ((u64) !is_eng_idle) <<
+						(GOYA_ENGINE_ID_TPC_0 + i);
 		if (s)
 			seq_printf(s, fmt, i, is_eng_idle ? "Y" : "N",
 				qm_glbl_sts0, cmdq_glbl_sts0, tpc_cfg_sts);
@@ -5141,7 +5143,7 @@ static bool goya_is_device_idle(struct hl_device *hdev, u32 *mask,
 	is_idle &= is_eng_idle;
 
 	if (mask)
-		*mask |= !is_eng_idle << GOYA_ENGINE_ID_MME_0;
+		*mask |= ((u64) !is_eng_idle) << GOYA_ENGINE_ID_MME_0;
 	if (s) {
 		seq_printf(s, fmt, 0, is_eng_idle ? "Y" : "N", qm_glbl_sts0,
 				cmdq_glbl_sts0, mme_arch_sts);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#58 lore raw

PATCH 59/101 drm/panfrost: add amlogic reset quirk callback

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 110003002291525bb209f47e6dbf121a63249a97 ]

The T820, G31 & G52 GPUs integrated by Amlogic in the respective GXM, G12A/SM1 & G12B SoCs needs a quirk in the PWR registers at the GPU reset time.

Since the Amlogic's integration of the GPU cores with the SoC is not publicly documented we do not know what does these values, but they permit having a fully functional GPU running with Panfrost.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.c  | 11 +++++++++++
 drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.h  |  2 ++
 drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_regs.h |  4 ++++
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.c +11 -0
index f2c1ddc41a9bf..6606643850fc6 100644
@@ -75,6 +75,17 @@ int panfrost_gpu_soft_reset(struct panfrost_device *pfdev)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+void panfrost_gpu_amlogic_quirk(struct panfrost_device *pfdev)
+{
+	/*
+	 * The Amlogic integrated Mali-T820, Mali-G31 & Mali-G52 needs
+	 * these undocumented bits in GPU_PWR_OVERRIDE1 to be set in order
+	 * to operate correctly.
+	 */
+	gpu_write(pfdev, GPU_PWR_KEY, GPU_PWR_KEY_UNLOCK);
+	gpu_write(pfdev, GPU_PWR_OVERRIDE1, 0xfff | (0x20 << 16));
+}
+
 static void panfrost_gpu_init_quirks(struct panfrost_device *pfdev)
 {
 	u32 quirks = 0;
drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.h +2 -0
index 4112412087b27..468c51e7e46db 100644
@@ -16,4 +16,6 @@ int panfrost_gpu_soft_reset(struct panfrost_device *pfdev);
 void panfrost_gpu_power_on(struct panfrost_device *pfdev);
 void panfrost_gpu_power_off(struct panfrost_device *pfdev);
 
+void panfrost_gpu_amlogic_quirk(struct panfrost_device *pfdev);
+
 #endif
drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_regs.h +4 -0
index ea38ac60581c6..eddaa62ad8b0e 100644
@@ -51,6 +51,10 @@
 #define GPU_STATUS			0x34
 #define   GPU_STATUS_PRFCNT_ACTIVE	BIT(2)
 #define GPU_LATEST_FLUSH_ID		0x38
+#define GPU_PWR_KEY			0x50	/* (WO) Power manager key register */
+#define  GPU_PWR_KEY_UNLOCK		0x2968A819
+#define GPU_PWR_OVERRIDE0		0x54	/* (RW) Power manager override settings */
+#define GPU_PWR_OVERRIDE1		0x58	/* (RW) Power manager override settings */
 #define GPU_FAULT_STATUS		0x3C
 #define GPU_FAULT_ADDRESS_LO		0x40
 #define GPU_FAULT_ADDRESS_HI		0x44
Signature · 6 lines
2.25.1

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author maintainer
#59 lore raw

PATCH 60/101 drm/panfrost: add support for vendor quirk

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Neil Armstrong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 91e89097b86f566636ea5a7329c79d5521be46d2 ]

The T820, G31 & G52 GPUs integrated by Amlogic in the respective GXM, G12A/SM1 & G12B SoCs needs a quirk in the PWR registers after each reset.

This adds a callback in the device compatible struct of permit this.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_device.h | 3 +++
 drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.c    | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_device.h +3 -0
index c30c719a80594..3c4a85213c15f 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,9 @@ struct panfrost_compatible {
 	int num_pm_domains;
 	/* Only required if num_pm_domains > 1. */
 	const char * const *pm_domain_names;
+
+	/* Vendor implementation quirks callback */
+	void (*vendor_quirk)(struct panfrost_device *pfdev);
 };
 
 struct panfrost_device {
drivers/gpu/drm/panfrost/panfrost_gpu.c +4 -0
index 6606643850fc6..502b1f1f7b204 100644
@@ -146,6 +146,10 @@ static void panfrost_gpu_init_quirks(struct panfrost_device *pfdev)
 
 	if (quirks)
 		gpu_write(pfdev, GPU_JM_CONFIG, quirks);
+
+	/* Here goes platform specific quirks */
+	if (pfdev->comp->vendor_quirk)
+		pfdev->comp->vendor_quirk(pfdev);
 }
 
 #define MAX_HW_REVS 6
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author maintainer
#61 lore raw

PATCH 62/101 misc: rtsx: Fix memory leak in rtsx_pci_probe

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Keita Suzuki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bc28369c6189009b66d9619dd9f09bd8c684bb98 ]

When mfd_add_devices() fail, pcr->slots should also be freed. However, the current implementation does not free the member, leading to a memory leak.

Fix this by adding a new goto label that frees pcr->slots.

---
 drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_pcr.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/misc/cardreader/rtsx_pcr.c +3 -1
index 0d5928bc1b6d7..82246f7aec6fb 100644
@@ -1536,12 +1536,14 @@ static int rtsx_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pcidev,
 	ret = mfd_add_devices(&pcidev->dev, pcr->id, rtsx_pcr_cells,
 			ARRAY_SIZE(rtsx_pcr_cells), NULL, 0, NULL);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto disable_irq;
+		goto free_slots;
 
 	schedule_delayed_work(&pcr->idle_work, msecs_to_jiffies(200));
 
 	return 0;
 
+free_slots:
+	kfree(pcr->slots);
 disable_irq:
 	free_irq(pcr->irq, (void *)pcr);
 disable_msi:
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#60 lore raw

PATCH 61/101 bpf: Limit caller's stack depth 256 for subprogs with tailcalls

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7f6e4312e15a5c370e84eaa685879b6bdcc717e4 ]

Protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 = 8k).

---
 include/linux/bpf_verifier.h |  1 +
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c        | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +1 -0
index ca08db4ffb5f7..ce3f5231aa698 100644
@@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info {
 	u32 start; /* insn idx of function entry point */
 	u32 linfo_idx; /* The idx to the main_prog->aux->linfo */
 	u16 stack_depth; /* max. stack depth used by this function */
+	bool has_tail_call;
 };
 
 /* single container for all structs
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +29 -0
index 89b07db146763..17145f8f81979 100644
@@ -1470,6 +1470,10 @@ static int check_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
 		u8 code = insn[i].code;
 
+		if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) &&
+		    insn[i].imm == BPF_FUNC_tail_call &&
+		    insn[i].src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
+			subprog[cur_subprog].has_tail_call = true;
 		if (BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP && BPF_CLASS(code) != BPF_JMP32)
 			goto next;
 		if (BPF_OP(code) == BPF_EXIT || BPF_OP(code) == BPF_CALL)
@@ -2951,6 +2955,31 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 	int ret_prog[MAX_CALL_FRAMES];
 
 process_func:
+	/* protect against potential stack overflow that might happen when
+	 * bpf2bpf calls get combined with tailcalls. Limit the caller's stack
+	 * depth for such case down to 256 so that the worst case scenario
+	 * would result in 8k stack size (32 which is tailcall limit * 256 =
+	 * 8k).
+	 *
+	 * To get the idea what might happen, see an example:
+	 * func1 -> sub rsp, 128
+	 *  subfunc1 -> sub rsp, 256
+	 *  tailcall1 -> add rsp, 256
+	 *   func2 -> sub rsp, 192 (total stack size = 128 + 192 = 320)
+	 *   subfunc2 -> sub rsp, 64
+	 *   subfunc22 -> sub rsp, 128
+	 *   tailcall2 -> add rsp, 128
+	 *    func3 -> sub rsp, 32 (total stack size 128 + 192 + 64 + 32 = 416)
+	 *
+	 * tailcall will unwind the current stack frame but it will not get rid
+	 * of caller's stack as shown on the example above.
+	 */
+	if (idx && subprog[idx].has_tail_call && depth >= 256) {
+		verbose(env,
+			"tail_calls are not allowed when call stack of previous frames is %d bytes. Too large\n",
+			depth);
+		return -EACCES;
+	}
 	/* round up to 32-bytes, since this is granularity
 	 * of interpreter stack size
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#64 lore raw

PATCH 65/101 xfs: make sure the rt allocator doesn't run off the end

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: "Darrick J. Wong" <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2a6ca4baed620303d414934aa1b7b0a8e7bab05f ]

There's an overflow bug in the realtime allocator. If the rt volume is large enough to handle a single allocation request that is larger than the maximum bmap extent length and the rt bitmap ends exactly on a bitmap block boundary, it's possible that the near allocator will try to check the freeness of a range that extends past the end of the bitmap. This fails with a corruption error and shuts down the fs.

Therefore, constrain maxlen so that the range scan cannot run off the end of the rt bitmap.

---
 fs/xfs/xfs_rtalloc.c | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
fs/xfs/xfs_rtalloc.c +11 -0
index 6209e7b6b895b..86994d7f7cba3 100644
@@ -247,6 +247,9 @@ xfs_rtallocate_extent_block(
 		end = XFS_BLOCKTOBIT(mp, bbno + 1) - 1;
 	     i <= end;
 	     i++) {
+		/* Make sure we don't scan off the end of the rt volume. */
+		maxlen = min(mp->m_sb.sb_rextents, i + maxlen) - i;
+
 		/*
 		 * See if there's a free extent of maxlen starting at i.
 		 * If it's not so then next will contain the first non-free.
@@ -442,6 +445,14 @@ xfs_rtallocate_extent_near(
 	 */
 	if (bno >= mp->m_sb.sb_rextents)
 		bno = mp->m_sb.sb_rextents - 1;
+
+	/* Make sure we don't run off the end of the rt volume. */
+	maxlen = min(mp->m_sb.sb_rextents, bno + maxlen) - bno;
+	if (maxlen < minlen) {
+		*rtblock = NULLRTBLOCK;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Try the exact allocation first.
 	 */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#66 lore raw

PATCH 67/101 drm: fix double free for gbo in drm_gem_vram_init and drm_gem_vram_create

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jia Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit da62cb7230f0871c30dc9789071f63229158d261 ]

I got a use-after-free report when doing some fuzz test:

If ttm_bo_init() fails, the "gbo" and "gbo->bo.base" will be freed by ttm_buffer_object_destroy() in ttm_bo_init(). But then drm_gem_vram_create() and drm_gem_vram_init() will free "gbo" and "gbo->bo.base" again.

BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in drm_vma_offset_remove+0xb3/0x150
CPU: 0 PID: 24282 Comm: syz-executor.1 Tainted: G    B   W         5.7.0-rc4-msan #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack
 dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220
 kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0
 __msan_warning+0x58/0xa0
 drm_vma_offset_remove+0xb3/0x150
 drm_gem_free_mmap_offset
 drm_gem_object_release+0x159/0x180
 drm_gem_vram_init
 drm_gem_vram_create+0x7c5/0x990
 drm_gem_vram_fill_create_dumb
 drm_gem_vram_driver_dumb_create+0x238/0x590
 drm_mode_create_dumb
 drm_mode_create_dumb_ioctl+0x41d/0x450
 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x5a4/0x710
 drm_ioctl+0xc6f/0x1240
 vfs_ioctl
 ksys_ioctl
 __do_sys_ioctl
 __se_sys_ioctl+0x2e9/0x410
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4a/0x70
 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x4689b9
Code: fd e0 fa ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb e0 fa ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f368fa4dc98 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000076bf00 RCX: 00000000004689b9
RDX: 0000000020000240 RSI: 00000000c02064b2 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00000000004d17e0 R14: 00007f368fa4e6d4 R15: 000000000076bf0c

Uninit was created at:
kmsan_save_stack_with_flags

 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x66/0xd0
 kmsan_slab_free+0x6e/0xb0
 slab_free_freelist_hook
 slab_free
 kfree+0x571/0x30a0
 drm_gem_vram_destroy
 ttm_buffer_object_destroy+0xc8/0x130
 ttm_bo_release
 kref_put
 ttm_bo_put+0x117d/0x23e0
 ttm_bo_init_reserved+0x11c0/0x11d0
 ttm_bo_init+0x289/0x3f0
 drm_gem_vram_init
 drm_gem_vram_create+0x775/0x990
 drm_gem_vram_fill_create_dumb
 drm_gem_vram_driver_dumb_create+0x238/0x590
 drm_mode_create_dumb
 drm_mode_create_dumb_ioctl+0x41d/0x450
 drm_ioctl_kernel+0x5a4/0x710
 drm_ioctl+0xc6f/0x1240
 vfs_ioctl
 ksys_ioctl
 __do_sys_ioctl
 __se_sys_ioctl+0x2e9/0x410
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4a/0x70
 do_syscall_64+0xb8/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

If ttm_bo_init() fails, the "gbo" will be freed by ttm_buffer_object_destroy() in ttm_bo_init(). But then drm_gem_vram_create() and drm_gem_vram_init() will free "gbo" again.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_vram_helper.c | 28 +++++++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_vram_helper.c +16 -12
index 8b2d5c945c95c..1d85af9a481ac 100644
@@ -175,6 +175,10 @@ static void drm_gem_vram_placement(struct drm_gem_vram_object *gbo,
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Note that on error, drm_gem_vram_init will free the buffer object.
+ */
+
 static int drm_gem_vram_init(struct drm_device *dev,
 			     struct drm_gem_vram_object *gbo,
 			     size_t size, unsigned long pg_align)
@@ -184,15 +188,19 @@ static int drm_gem_vram_init(struct drm_device *dev,
 	int ret;
 	size_t acc_size;
 
-	if (WARN_ONCE(!vmm, "VRAM MM not initialized"))
+	if (WARN_ONCE(!vmm, "VRAM MM not initialized")) {
+		kfree(gbo);
 		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	bdev = &vmm->bdev;
 
 	gbo->bo.base.funcs = &drm_gem_vram_object_funcs;
 
 	ret = drm_gem_object_init(dev, &gbo->bo.base, size);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(gbo);
 		return ret;
+	}
 
 	acc_size = ttm_bo_dma_acc_size(bdev, size, sizeof(*gbo));
 
@@ -203,13 +211,13 @@ static int drm_gem_vram_init(struct drm_device *dev,
 			  &gbo->placement, pg_align, false, acc_size,
 			  NULL, NULL, ttm_buffer_object_destroy);
 	if (ret)
-		goto err_drm_gem_object_release;
+		/*
+		 * A failing ttm_bo_init will call ttm_buffer_object_destroy
+		 * to release gbo->bo.base and kfree gbo.
+		 */
+		return ret;
 
 	return 0;
-
-err_drm_gem_object_release:
-	drm_gem_object_release(&gbo->bo.base);
-	return ret;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -243,13 +251,9 @@ struct drm_gem_vram_object *drm_gem_vram_create(struct drm_device *dev,
 
 	ret = drm_gem_vram_init(dev, gbo, size, pg_align);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto err_kfree;
+		return ERR_PTR(ret);
 
 	return gbo;
-
-err_kfree:
-	kfree(gbo);
-	return ERR_PTR(ret);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_gem_vram_create);
 
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#68 lore raw

PATCH 69/101 drm/msm/a6xx: fix a potential overflow issue

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Zhenzhong Duan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 08d3ab4b46339bc6f97e83b54a3fb4f8bf8f4cd9 ]

It's allocating an array of a6xx_gpu_state_obj structure rathor than its pointers.

This patch fix it.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gpu_state.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/adreno/a6xx_gpu_state.c +1 -1
index d6023ba8033c0..3bb567812b990 100644
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@ static void a6xx_get_indexed_registers(struct msm_gpu *gpu,
 	int i;
 
 	a6xx_state->indexed_regs = state_kcalloc(a6xx_state, count,
-		sizeof(a6xx_state->indexed_regs));
+		sizeof(*a6xx_state->indexed_regs));
 	if (!a6xx_state->indexed_regs)
 		return;
 
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#72 lore raw

PATCH 73/101 selftests/bpf: Fix test_sysctl_loop{1, 2} failure due to clang change

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7fb5eefd76394cfefb380724a87ca40b47d44405 ]

Andrii reported that with latest clang, when building selftests, we have
error likes:
error: progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c:23:16: in function sysctl_tcp_mem i32 (%struct.bpf_sysctl*):
Looks like the BPF stack limit of 512 bytes is exceeded.
Please move large on stack variables into BPF per-cpu array map.

The error is triggered by the following LLVM patch:
https://reviews.llvm.org/D87134

For example, the following code is from test_sysctl_loop1.c:
static __always_inline int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)

  {
    volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
    ...

}
Without the above LLVM patch, the compiler did optimization to load the string (59 bytes long) with 7 64bit loads, 1 8bit load and 1 16bit load, occupying 64 byte stack size.

With the above LLVM patch, the compiler only uses 8bit loads, but subregister is 32bit. So stack requirements become 4 * 59 = 236 bytes. Together with other stuff on the stack, total stack size exceeds 512 bytes, hence compiler complains and quits.

To fix the issue, removing "volatile" key word or changing "volatile" to "const"/"static const" does not work, the string is put in .rodata.str1.1 section, which libbpf did not process it and errors out with
libbpf: elf: skipping unrecognized data section(6) .rodata.str1.1
libbpf: prog 'sysctl_tcp_mem': bad map relo against '.L__const.is_tcp_mem.tcp_mem_name'

          in section '.rodata.str1.1'

Defining the string const as global variable can fix the issue as it puts the string constant in '.rodata' section which is recognized by libbpf. In the future, when libbpf can process '.rodata.str*.*' properly, the global definition can be changed back to local definition.

Defining tcp_mem_name as a global, however, triggered a verifier failure.
./test_progs -n 7/21
libbpf: load bpf program failed: Permission denied
libbpf: -- BEGIN DUMP LOG ---
libbpf:
invalid stack off=0 size=1
verification time 6975 usec
stack depth 160+64
processed 889 insns (limit 1000000) max_states_per_insn 4 total_states 14 peak_states 14 mark_read 10

libbpf: -- END LOG --
libbpf: failed to load program 'sysctl_tcp_mem'
libbpf: failed to load object 'test_sysctl_loop2.o' test_bpf_verif_scale:FAIL:114
#7/21 test_sysctl_loop2.o:FAIL
This actually exposed a bpf program bug. In test_sysctl_loop{1,2}, we have code like
const char tcp_mem_name[] = "<...long string...>";
...
char name[64];
...
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tcp_mem_name); ++i)

      if (name[i] != tcp_mem_name[i])
          return 0;

In the above code, if sizeof(tcp_mem_name) > 64, name[i] access may be out of bound. The sizeof(tcp_mem_name) is 59 for test_sysctl_loop1.c and 79 for test_sysctl_loop2.c.

Without promotion-to-global change, old compiler generates code where the overflowed stack access is actually filled with valid value, so hiding the bpf program bug. With promotion-to-global change, the code is different, more specifically, the previous loading constants to stack is gone, and "name" occupies stack[-64:0] and overflow access triggers a verifier error. To fix the issue, adjust "name" buffer size properly.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c | 4 ++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop1.c +2 -2
index 458b0d69133e4..553a282d816ab 100644
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@
 #define MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN 7
 #define MAX_VALUE_STR_LEN (TCP_MEM_LOOPS * MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN)
 
+const char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
 static __always_inline int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)
 {
-	volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string";
 	unsigned char i;
-	char name[64];
+	char name[sizeof(tcp_mem_name)];
 	int ret;
 
 	memset(name, 0, sizeof(name));
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_sysctl_loop2.c +2 -2
index b2e6f9b0894d8..2b64bc563a12e 100644
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@
 #define MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN 7
 #define MAX_VALUE_STR_LEN (TCP_MEM_LOOPS * MAX_ULONG_STR_LEN)
 
+const char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string_to_stress_byte_loop";
 static __attribute__((noinline)) int is_tcp_mem(struct bpf_sysctl *ctx)
 {
-	volatile char tcp_mem_name[] = "net/ipv4/tcp_mem/very_very_very_very_long_pointless_string_to_stress_byte_loop";
 	unsigned char i;
-	char name[64];
+	char name[sizeof(tcp_mem_name)];
 	int ret;
 
 	memset(name, 0, sizeof(name));
Signature · 1 line
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author maintainer
#75 lore raw

PATCH 76/101 Fix use after free in get_capset_info callback.

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Doug Horn <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e219688fc5c3d0d9136f8d29d7e0498388f01440 ]

If a response to virtio_gpu_cmd_get_capset_info takes longer than five seconds to return, the callback will access freed kernel memory in vg->capsets.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_kms.c |  2 ++
 drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c  | 10 +++++++---
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_kms.c +2 -0
index 0a5c8cf409fb8..dc8cb8dfce58e 100644
@@ -80,8 +80,10 @@ static void virtio_gpu_get_capsets(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
 					 vgdev->capsets[i].id > 0, 5 * HZ);
 		if (ret == 0) {
 			DRM_ERROR("timed out waiting for cap set %d\n", i);
+			spin_lock(&vgdev->display_info_lock);
 			kfree(vgdev->capsets);
 			vgdev->capsets = NULL;
+			spin_unlock(&vgdev->display_info_lock);
 			return;
 		}
 		DRM_INFO("cap set %d: id %d, max-version %d, max-size %d\n",
drivers/gpu/drm/virtio/virtgpu_vq.c +7 -3
index 9e663a5d99526..2517450bf46ba 100644
@@ -684,9 +684,13 @@ static void virtio_gpu_cmd_get_capset_info_cb(struct virtio_gpu_device *vgdev,
 	int i = le32_to_cpu(cmd->capset_index);
 
 	spin_lock(&vgdev->display_info_lock);
-	vgdev->capsets[i].id = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_id);
-	vgdev->capsets[i].max_version = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_max_version);
-	vgdev->capsets[i].max_size = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_max_size);
+	if (vgdev->capsets) {
+		vgdev->capsets[i].id = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_id);
+		vgdev->capsets[i].max_version = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_max_version);
+		vgdev->capsets[i].max_size = le32_to_cpu(resp->capset_max_size);
+	} else {
+		DRM_ERROR("invalid capset memory.");
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&vgdev->display_info_lock);
 	wake_up(&vgdev->resp_wq);
 }
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#79 lore raw

PATCH 80/101 scsi: qedi: Protect active command list to avoid list corruption

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c0650e28448d606c84f76c34333dba30f61de993 ]

Protect active command list for non-I/O commands like login response, logout response, text response, and recovery cleanup of active list to avoid list corruption.

---
 drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_fw.c    | 8 ++++++++
 drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_iscsi.c | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_fw.c +8 -0
index 946cebc4c9322..32586800620bd 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ static void qedi_process_logout_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 		  "Freeing tid=0x%x for cid=0x%x\n",
 		  cmd->task_id, qedi_conn->iscsi_conn_id);
 
+	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 	if (likely(cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
 		cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
 		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
@@ -69,6 +70,7 @@ static void qedi_process_logout_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 			  cmd->task_id, qedi_conn->iscsi_conn_id,
 			  &cmd->io_cmd);
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 
 	cmd->state = RESPONSE_RECEIVED;
 	qedi_clear_task_idx(qedi, cmd->task_id);
@@ -122,6 +124,7 @@ static void qedi_process_text_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 		  "Freeing tid=0x%x for cid=0x%x\n",
 		  cmd->task_id, qedi_conn->iscsi_conn_id);
 
+	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 	if (likely(cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
 		cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
 		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
@@ -132,6 +135,7 @@ static void qedi_process_text_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 			  cmd->task_id, qedi_conn->iscsi_conn_id,
 			  &cmd->io_cmd);
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 
 	cmd->state = RESPONSE_RECEIVED;
 	qedi_clear_task_idx(qedi, cmd->task_id);
@@ -222,11 +226,13 @@ static void qedi_process_tmf_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 
 	tmf_hdr = (struct iscsi_tm *)qedi_cmd->task->hdr;
 
+	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 	if (likely(qedi_cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
 		qedi_cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
 		list_del_init(&qedi_cmd->io_cmd);
 		qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 
 	if (((tmf_hdr->flags & ISCSI_FLAG_TM_FUNC_MASK) ==
 	      ISCSI_TM_FUNC_LOGICAL_UNIT_RESET) ||
@@ -288,11 +294,13 @@ static void qedi_process_login_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 		  ISCSI_LOGIN_RESPONSE_HDR_DATA_SEG_LEN_MASK;
 	qedi_conn->gen_pdu.resp_wr_ptr = qedi_conn->gen_pdu.resp_buf + pld_len;
 
+	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 	if (likely(cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
 		cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
 		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
 		qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 
 	memset(task_ctx, '\0', sizeof(*task_ctx));
 
drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_iscsi.c +2 -0
index 425e665ec08b2..6e92625df4b7c 100644
@@ -975,11 +975,13 @@ static void qedi_cleanup_active_cmd_list(struct qedi_conn *qedi_conn)
 {
 	struct qedi_cmd *cmd, *cmd_tmp;
 
+	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(cmd, cmd_tmp, &qedi_conn->active_cmd_list,
 				 io_cmd) {
 		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
 		qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
 	}
+	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 }
 
 static void qedi_ep_disconnect(struct iscsi_endpoint *ep)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#83 lore raw

PATCH 84/101 drm/amd/display: Fix a list corruption

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: xinhui pan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1545fbf97eafc1dbdc2923e58b4186b16a834784 ]

Remove the private obj from the internal list before we free aconnector.

[   56.925828] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8f84a870a560
[   56.933272] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[   56.938801] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[   56.944376] PGD 18e605067 P4D 18e605067 PUD 86a614067 PMD 86a4d0067 PTE 800ffff8578f5060
[   56.953260] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC NOPTI
[   56.958815] CPU: 6 PID: 1407 Comm: bash Tainted: G           O      5.9.0-rc2+ #46
[   56.967092] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/PRIME Z390-A, BIOS 1401 11/26/2019
[   56.977162] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x31/0xa0
[   56.982768] Code: 00 ad de 55 48 8b 17 4c 8b 47 08 48 89 e5 48 39 c2 74 27 48 b8 22 01 00 00 00 00 ad de 49 39 c0 74 2d 49 8b 30 48 39 fe 75 3d <48> 8b 52 08 48 39 f2 75 4c b8 01 00 00 00 5d c3 48 89 7
[   57.003327] RSP: 0018:ffffb40c81687c90 EFLAGS: 00010246
[   57.009048] RAX: dead000000000122 RBX: ffff8f84ea41f4f0 RCX: 0000000000000006
[   57.016871] RDX: ffff8f84a870a558 RSI: ffff8f84ea41f4f0 RDI: ffff8f84ea41f4f0
[   57.024672] RBP: ffffb40c81687c90 R08: ffff8f84ea400998 R09: 0000000000000001
[   57.032490] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000006
[   57.040287] R13: ffff8f84ea422a90 R14: ffff8f84b4129a20 R15: fffffffffffffff2
[   57.048105] FS:  00007f550d885740(0000) GS:ffff8f8509600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   57.056979] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   57.063260] CR2: ffff8f84a870a560 CR3: 00000007e5144001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[   57.071053] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   57.078849] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   57.086684] Call Trace:
[   57.089381]  drm_atomic_private_obj_fini+0x29/0x82 [drm]
[   57.095247]  amdgpu_dm_fini+0x83/0x170 [amdgpu]
[   57.100264]  dm_hw_fini+0x23/0x30 [amdgpu]
[   57.104814]  amdgpu_device_fini+0x1df/0x4fe [amdgpu]
[   57.110271]  amdgpu_driver_unload_kms+0x43/0x70 [amdgpu]
[   57.116136]  amdgpu_pci_remove+0x3b/0x60 [amdgpu]
[   57.121291]  pci_device_remove+0x3e/0xb0
[   57.125583]  device_release_driver_internal+0xff/0x1d0
[   57.131223]  device_release_driver+0x12/0x20
[   57.135903]  pci_stop_bus_device+0x70/0xa0
[   57.140401]  pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x1b/0x30
[   57.146571]  remove_store+0x7b/0x90
[   57.150429]  dev_attr_store+0x17/0x30
[   57.154441]  sysfs_kf_write+0x4b/0x60
[   57.158479]  kernfs_fop_write+0xe8/0x1d0
[   57.162788]  vfs_write+0xf5/0x230
[   57.166426]  ksys_write+0x70/0xf0
[   57.170087]  __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
[   57.174219]  do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[   57.178145]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/amdgpu_dm/amdgpu_dm.c +1 -0
index 7c1cc0ba30a55..a3b39b6398737 100644
@@ -4862,6 +4862,7 @@ static void amdgpu_dm_connector_destroy(struct drm_connector *connector)
 	struct amdgpu_device *adev = connector->dev->dev_private;
 	struct amdgpu_display_manager *dm = &adev->dm;
 
+	drm_atomic_private_obj_fini(&aconnector->mst_mgr.base);
 #if defined(CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_CLASS_DEVICE) ||\
 	defined(CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_CLASS_DEVICE_MODULE)
 
Signature · 6 lines
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_______________________________________________
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author maintainer
#82 lore raw

PATCH 83/101 tty: ipwireless: fix error handling

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tong Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit db332356222d9429731ab9395c89cca403828460 ]

ipwireless_send_packet() can only return 0 on success and -ENOMEM on error, the caller should check non zero for error condition

---
 drivers/tty/ipwireless/network.c | 4 ++--
 drivers/tty/ipwireless/tty.c     | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/ipwireless/network.c +2 -2
index cf20616340a1a..fe569f6294a24 100644
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int ipwireless_ppp_start_xmit(struct ppp_channel *ppp_channel,
 					       skb->len,
 					       notify_packet_sent,
 					       network);
-			if (ret == -1) {
+			if (ret < 0) {
 				skb_pull(skb, 2);
 				return 0;
 			}
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ static int ipwireless_ppp_start_xmit(struct ppp_channel *ppp_channel,
 					       notify_packet_sent,
 					       network);
 			kfree(buf);
-			if (ret == -1)
+			if (ret < 0)
 				return 0;
 		}
 		kfree_skb(skb);
drivers/tty/ipwireless/tty.c +1 -1
index fad3401e604d9..23584769fc292 100644
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ static int ipw_write(struct tty_struct *linux_tty,
 	ret = ipwireless_send_packet(tty->hardware, IPW_CHANNEL_RAS,
 			       buf, count,
 			       ipw_write_packet_sent_callback, tty);
-	if (ret == -1) {
+	if (ret < 0) {
 		mutex_unlock(&tty->ipw_tty_mutex);
 		return 0;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#87 lore raw

PATCH 88/101 s390/qeth: strictly order bridge address events

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Julian Wiedmann <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9d6a569a4cbab5a8b4c959d4e312daeecb7c9f09 ]

The current code for bridge address events has two shortcomings in its control sequence:

1. after disabling address events via PNSO, we don't flush the remaining events from the event_wq. So if the feature is re-enabled fast enough, stale events could leak over.
2. PNSO and the events' arrival via the READ ccw device are unordered. So even if we flushed the workqueue, it's difficult to say whether the READ device might produce more events onto the workqueue afterwards.

Fix this by
1. explicitly fencing off the events when we no longer care, in the READ device's event handler. This ensures that once we flush the workqueue, it doesn't get additional address events.
2. Flush the workqueue after disabling the events & fencing them off. As the code that triggers the flush will typically hold the sbp_lock, we need to rework the worker code to avoid a deadlock here in case of a 'notifications-stopped' event. In case of lock contention, requeue such an event with a delay. We'll eventually aquire the lock, or spot that the feature has been disabled and the event can thus be discarded.

This leaves the theoretical race that a stale event could arrive _after_ we re-enabled ourselves to receive events again. Such an event would be impossible to distinguish from a 'good' event, nothing we can do about it.

---
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_core.h    |  6 ++++
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_sys.c  |  1 +
 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/s390/net/qeth_core.h +6 -0
index 51ea56b73a97d..4e30047d76c46 100644
@@ -680,6 +680,11 @@ struct qeth_card_blkt {
 	int inter_packet_jumbo;
 };
 
+enum qeth_pnso_mode {
+	QETH_PNSO_NONE,
+	QETH_PNSO_BRIDGEPORT,
+};
+
 #define QETH_BROADCAST_WITH_ECHO    0x01
 #define QETH_BROADCAST_WITHOUT_ECHO 0x02
 struct qeth_card_info {
@@ -696,6 +701,7 @@ struct qeth_card_info {
 	/* no bitfield, we take a pointer on these two: */
 	u8 has_lp2lp_cso_v6;
 	u8 has_lp2lp_cso_v4;
+	enum qeth_pnso_mode pnso_mode;
 	enum qeth_card_types type;
 	enum qeth_link_types link_type;
 	int broadcast_capable;
drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_main.c +45 -8

117 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/s390/net/qeth_l2_sys.c +1 -0
index 86bcae992f725..4695d25e54f24 100644
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ static ssize_t qeth_bridgeport_hostnotification_store(struct device *dev,
 		rc = -EBUSY;
 	else if (qeth_card_hw_is_reachable(card)) {
 		rc = qeth_bridgeport_an_set(card, enable);
+		/* sbp_lock ensures ordering vs notifications-stopped events */
 		if (!rc)
 			card->options.sbp.hostnotification = enable;
 	} else
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#88 lore raw

PATCH 89/101 mwifiex: don't call del_timer_sync() on uninitialized timer

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 621a3a8b1c0ecf16e1e5667ea5756a76a082b738 ]

syzbot is reporting that del_timer_sync() is called from mwifiex_usb_cleanup_tx_aggr() from mwifiex_unregister_dev() without checking timer_setup() from mwifiex_usb_tx_init() was called [1].

Ganapathi Bhat proposed a possibly cleaner fix, but it seems that that fix was forgotten [2].

"grep -FrB1 'del_timer' drivers/ | grep -FA1 '.function)'" says that currently there are 28 locations which call del_timer[_sync]() only if that timer's function field was initialized (because timer_setup() sets that timer's function field). Therefore, let's use same approach here.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=26525f643f454dd7be0078423e3cdb0d57744959
[2] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+ASDXMHt2gq9Hy+iP_BYkWXsSreWdp3_bAfMkNcuqJ3K+-jbQ@mail.gmail.com

---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/usb.c +2 -1
index 6f3cfde4654cc..426e39d4ccf0f 100644
@@ -1353,7 +1353,8 @@ static void mwifiex_usb_cleanup_tx_aggr(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter)
 				skb_dequeue(&port->tx_aggr.aggr_list)))
 				mwifiex_write_data_complete(adapter, skb_tmp,
 							    0, -1);
-		del_timer_sync(&port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_timer);
+		if (port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_timer.function)
+			del_timer_sync(&port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_timer);
 		port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.is_hold_timer_set = false;
 		port->tx_aggr.timer_cnxt.hold_tmo_msecs = 0;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#84 lore raw

PATCH 85/101 Bluetooth: btusb: Fix memleak in btusb_mtk_submit_wmt_recv_urb

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d33fe77bdf75806d785dabf90d21d962122e5296 ]

When kmalloc() on buf fails, urb should be freed just like when kmalloc() on dr fails.

---
 drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/bluetooth/btusb.c +1 -0
index a5fef9aa419fd..91a0c84d55c97 100644
@@ -2849,6 +2849,7 @@ static int btusb_mtk_submit_wmt_recv_urb(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 	buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!buf) {
 		kfree(dr);
+		usb_free_urb(urb);
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#92 lore raw

PATCH 93/101 ASoC: Intel: sof_rt5682: override quirk data for tgl_max98373_rt5682

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sathyanarayana Nujella <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3e1734b64ce786c54dc98adcfe67941e6011d735 ]

A Chrome System based on tgl_max98373_rt5682 has different SSP interface configurations. Using DMI data of this variant DUT, override quirk data.

---
 sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_rt5682.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
sound/soc/intel/boards/sof_rt5682.c +13 -0
index 13a48b0c35aef..11233c3aeadfb 100644
@@ -118,6 +118,19 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id sof_rt5682_quirk_table[] = {
 		.driver_data = (void *)(SOF_RT5682_MCLK_EN |
 					SOF_RT5682_SSP_CODEC(0)),
 	},
+	{
+		.callback = sof_rt5682_quirk_cb,
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_FAMILY, "Google_Volteer"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Terrador"),
+		},
+		.driver_data = (void *)(SOF_RT5682_MCLK_EN |
+					SOF_RT5682_SSP_CODEC(0) |
+					SOF_SPEAKER_AMP_PRESENT |
+					SOF_MAX98373_SPEAKER_AMP_PRESENT |
+					SOF_RT5682_SSP_AMP(2) |
+					SOF_RT5682_NUM_HDMIDEV(4)),
+	},
 	{}
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#93 lore raw

PATCH 94/101 scsi: smartpqi: Avoid crashing kernel for controller issues

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Kevin Barnett <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9e68cccc8ef7206f0bccd590378d0dca8f9b4f57 ]

Eliminate kernel panics when getting invalid responses from controller. Take controller offline instead of causing kernel panics.

---
 drivers/scsi/smartpqi/smartpqi.h      |   2 +-
 drivers/scsi/smartpqi/smartpqi_init.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/smartpqi/smartpqi.h +1 -1
index 1129fe7a27edd..ee069a8b442a7 100644
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ struct pqi_event_response {
 	struct pqi_iu_header header;
 	u8	event_type;
 	u8	reserved2 : 7;
-	u8	request_acknowlege : 1;
+	u8	request_acknowledge : 1;
 	__le16	event_id;
 	__le32	additional_event_id;
 	union {
drivers/scsi/smartpqi/smartpqi_init.c +67 -34

191 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
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author maintainer
#97 lore raw

PATCH 98/101 drm/amd/display: Screen corruption on dual displays (DP+USB-C)

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qingqing Zhuo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce271b40a91f781af3dee985c39e841ac5148766 ]

[why]
Current pipe merge and split logic only supports cases where new dc_state is allocated and relies on dc->current_state to gather information from previous dc_state.

Calls to validate_bandwidth on UPDATE_TYPE_MED would cause an issue because there is no new dc_state allocated, and data in dc->current_state would be overwritten during pipe merge.

[how]
Only allow validate_bandwidth when new dc_state space is created.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc.c              | 2 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn20/dcn20_resource.c | 3 +++
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn21/dcn21_resource.c | 3 +++
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc.c +1 -1
index d016f50e187c8..d261f425b80ec 100644
@@ -2538,7 +2538,7 @@ void dc_commit_updates_for_stream(struct dc *dc,
 
 	copy_stream_update_to_stream(dc, context, stream, stream_update);
 
-	if (update_type > UPDATE_TYPE_FAST) {
+	if (update_type >= UPDATE_TYPE_FULL) {
 		if (!dc->res_pool->funcs->validate_bandwidth(dc, context, false)) {
 			DC_ERROR("Mode validation failed for stream update!\n");
 			dc_release_state(context);
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn20/dcn20_resource.c +3 -0
index 20bdabebbc434..76cd4f3de4eaf 100644
@@ -3165,6 +3165,9 @@ static noinline bool dcn20_validate_bandwidth_fp(struct dc *dc,
 	context->bw_ctx.dml.soc.allow_dram_clock_one_display_vactive =
 		dc->debug.enable_dram_clock_change_one_display_vactive;
 
+	/*Unsafe due to current pipe merge and split logic*/
+	ASSERT(context != dc->current_state);
+
 	if (fast_validate) {
 		return dcn20_validate_bandwidth_internal(dc, context, true);
 	}
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn21/dcn21_resource.c +3 -0
index f00a568350848..c6ab3dee4fd69 100644
@@ -1184,6 +1184,9 @@ bool dcn21_validate_bandwidth(struct dc *dc, struct dc_state *context,
 
 	BW_VAL_TRACE_COUNT();
 
+	/*Unsafe due to current pipe merge and split logic*/
+	ASSERT(context != dc->current_state);
+
 	out = dcn20_fast_validate_bw(dc, context, pipes, &pipe_cnt, pipe_split_from, &vlevel);
 
 	if (pipe_cnt == 0)
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author maintainer
#99 lore raw

PATCH 100/101 dmaengine: dw: Activate FIFO-mode for memory peripherals only

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6d9459d04081c796fc67c2bb771f4e4ebb5744c4 ]

CFGx.FIFO_MODE field controls a DMA-controller "FIFO readiness" criterion. In other words it determines when to start pushing data out of a DW DMAC channel FIFO to a destination peripheral or from a source peripheral to the DW DMAC channel FIFO. Currently FIFO-mode is set to one for all DW DMAC channels. It means they are tuned to flush data out of FIFO (to a memory peripheral or by accepting the burst transaction requests) when FIFO is at least half-full (except at the end of the block transfer, when FIFO-flush mode is activated) and are configured to get data to the FIFO when it's at least half-empty.

Such configuration is a good choice when there is no slave device involved in the DMA transfers. In that case the number of bursts per block is less than when CFGx.FIFO_MODE = 0 and, hence, the bus utilization will improve. But the latency of DMA transfers may increase when CFGx.FIFO_MODE = 1, since DW DMAC will wait for the channel FIFO contents to be either half-full or half-empty depending on having the destination or the source transfers. Such latencies might be dangerous in case if the DMA transfers are expected to be performed from/to a slave device. Since normally peripheral devices keep data in internal FIFOs, any latency at some critical moment may cause one being overflown and consequently losing data. This especially concerns a case when either a peripheral device is relatively fast or the DW DMAC engine is relatively slow with respect to the incoming data pace.

In order to solve problems, which might be caused by the latencies described above, let's enable the FIFO half-full/half-empty "FIFO readiness" criterion only for DMA transfers with no slave device involved. Thanks to the commit 99ba8b9b0d97 ("dmaengine: dw: Initialize channel before each transfer") we can freely do that in the generic dw_dma_initialize_chan() method.

---
 drivers/dma/dw/dw.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma/dw/dw.c +1 -1
index 7a085b3c1854c..d9810980920a1 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 static void dw_dma_initialize_chan(struct dw_dma_chan *dwc)
 {
 	struct dw_dma *dw = to_dw_dma(dwc->chan.device);
-	u32 cfghi = DWC_CFGH_FIFO_MODE;
+	u32 cfghi = is_slave_direction(dwc->direction) ? 0 : DWC_CFGH_FIFO_MODE;
 	u32 cfglo = DWC_CFGL_CH_PRIOR(dwc->priority);
 	bool hs_polarity = dwc->dws.hs_polarity;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#100 lore raw

PATCH 101/101 ath10k: check idx validity in __ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Zekun Shen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bad60b8d1a7194df38fd7fe4b22f3f4dcf775099 ]

The idx in __ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n function lives in consistent dma region writable by the device. Malfunctional or malicious device could manipulate such idx to have a OOB write. Either by

    htt->rx_ring.netbufs_ring[idx] = skb;
or by
    ath10k_htt_set_paddrs_ring(htt, paddr, idx);

The idx can also be negative as it's signed, giving a large memory space to write to.

It's possibly exploitable by corruptting a legit pointer with a skb pointer. And then fill skb with payload as rougue object.

Part of the log here. Sometimes it appears as UAF when writing to a freed memory by chance.

 [   15.594376] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff887f5c1804f0
 [   15.595483] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
 [   15.596250] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
 [   15.597013] PGD 0 P4D 0
 [   15.597395] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
 [   15.597967] CPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/u2:2 Not tainted 5.6.0 #69
 [   15.598843] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
 BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
 [   15.600438] Workqueue: ath10k_wq ath10k_core_register_work [ath10k_core]
 [   15.601389] RIP: 0010:__ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n
 (linux/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c:173) ath10k_core
---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/htt_rx.c +8 -0
index d787cbead56ab..215ade6faf328 100644
@@ -142,6 +142,14 @@ static int __ath10k_htt_rx_ring_fill_n(struct ath10k_htt *htt, int num)
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(HTT_RX_RING_FILL_LEVEL >= HTT_RX_RING_SIZE / 2);
 
 	idx = __le32_to_cpu(*htt->rx_ring.alloc_idx.vaddr);
+
+	if (idx < 0 || idx >= htt->rx_ring.size) {
+		ath10k_err(htt->ar, "rx ring index is not valid, firmware malfunctioning?\n");
+		idx &= htt->rx_ring.size_mask;
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
 	while (num > 0) {
 		skb = dev_alloc_skb(HTT_RX_BUF_SIZE + HTT_RX_DESC_ALIGN);
 		if (!skb) {
Signature · 7 lines
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author maintainer
#89 lore raw

PATCH 90/101 ALSA: hda/ca0132 - Add AE-7 microphone selection commands.

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Connor McAdams <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ed93f9750c6c2ed371347d0aac3dcd31cb9cf256 ]

Add AE-7 quirk data for setting of microphone. The AE-7 has no front panel connector, so only rear-mic/line-in have new commands.

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c +21 -1
index 6dfa864d3fe7b..62a9be5b827eb 100644
@@ -4675,6 +4675,15 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_in(struct hda_codec *codec)
 			ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x30, 0x28, 0x00);
 			tmp = FLOAT_THREE;
 			break;
+		case QUIRK_AE7:
+			ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x30, 0x28, 0x00);
+			tmp = FLOAT_THREE;
+			chipio_set_conn_rate(codec, MEM_CONNID_MICIN2,
+					SR_96_000);
+			chipio_set_conn_rate(codec, MEM_CONNID_MICOUT2,
+					SR_96_000);
+			dspio_set_uint_param(codec, 0x80, 0x01, FLOAT_ZERO);
+			break;
 		default:
 			tmp = FLOAT_ONE;
 			break;
@@ -4720,6 +4729,14 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_in(struct hda_codec *codec)
 		case QUIRK_AE5:
 			ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x30, 0x28, 0x00);
 			break;
+		case QUIRK_AE7:
+			ca0113_mmio_command_set(codec, 0x30, 0x28, 0x3f);
+			chipio_set_conn_rate(codec, MEM_CONNID_MICIN2,
+					SR_96_000);
+			chipio_set_conn_rate(codec, MEM_CONNID_MICOUT2,
+					SR_96_000);
+			dspio_set_uint_param(codec, 0x80, 0x01, FLOAT_ZERO);
+			break;
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
@@ -4729,7 +4746,10 @@ static int ca0132_alt_select_in(struct hda_codec *codec)
 		if (ca0132_quirk(spec) == QUIRK_R3DI)
 			chipio_set_conn_rate(codec, 0x0F, SR_96_000);
 
-		tmp = FLOAT_ZERO;
+		if (ca0132_quirk(spec) == QUIRK_AE7)
+			tmp = FLOAT_THREE;
+		else
+			tmp = FLOAT_ZERO;
 		dspio_set_uint_param(codec, 0x80, 0x00, tmp);
 
 		switch (ca0132_quirk(spec)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 12/101 media: exynos4-is: Fix a reference count leak due to pm_runtime_get_sync

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qiushi Wu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c47f7c779ef0458a58583f00c9ed71b7f5a4d0a2 ]

On calling pm_runtime_get_sync() the reference count of the device is incremented. In case of failure, decrement the reference count before returning the error.

---
 drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/media-dev.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/platform/exynos4-is/media-dev.c +3 -1
index 9c31d950cddf7..29e12d57b12d7 100644
@@ -484,8 +484,10 @@ static int fimc_md_register_sensor_entities(struct fimc_md *fmd)
 		return -ENXIO;
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(fmd->pmf);
-	if (ret < 0)
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pm_runtime_put(fmd->pmf);
 		return ret;
+	}
 
 	fmd->num_sensors = 0;
 
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author maintainer
#96 lore raw

PATCH 97/101 scsi: ufs: ufs-qcom: Fix race conditions caused by ufs_qcom_testbus_config()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Can Guo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 89dd87acd40a44de8ff3358138aedf8f73f4efc6 ]

If ufs_qcom_dump_dbg_regs() calls ufs_qcom_testbus_config() from ufshcd_suspend/resume and/or clk gate/ungate context, pm_runtime_get_sync() and ufshcd_hold() will cause a race condition. Fix this by removing the unnecessary calls of pm_runtime_get_sync() and ufshcd_hold().

---
 drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs-qcom.c | 5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ufs/ufs-qcom.c +0 -5
index 2e6ddb5cdfc23..7da27eed1fe7b 100644
@@ -1604,9 +1604,6 @@ int ufs_qcom_testbus_config(struct ufs_qcom_host *host)
 	 */
 	}
 	mask <<= offset;
-
-	pm_runtime_get_sync(host->hba->dev);
-	ufshcd_hold(host->hba, false);
 	ufshcd_rmwl(host->hba, TEST_BUS_SEL,
 		    (u32)host->testbus.select_major << 19,
 		    REG_UFS_CFG1);
@@ -1619,8 +1616,6 @@ int ufs_qcom_testbus_config(struct ufs_qcom_host *host)
 	 * committed before returning.
 	 */
 	mb();
-	ufshcd_release(host->hba);
-	pm_runtime_put_sync(host->hba->dev);
 
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#90 lore raw

PATCH 91/101 ALSA: hda/ca0132 - Add new quirk ID for SoundBlaster AE-7.

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Connor McAdams <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 620f08eea6d6961b789af3fa3ea86725c8c93ece ]

Add a new PCI subsystem ID for the SoundBlaster AE-7 card.

---
 sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/pci/hda/patch_ca0132.c +2 -0
index 62a9be5b827eb..a49c322bdbe9d 100644
@@ -1065,6 +1065,7 @@ enum {
 	QUIRK_R3DI,
 	QUIRK_R3D,
 	QUIRK_AE5,
+	QUIRK_AE7,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PCI
@@ -1184,6 +1185,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk ca0132_quirks[] = {
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1102, 0x0013, "Recon3D", QUIRK_R3D),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1102, 0x0018, "Recon3D", QUIRK_R3D),
 	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1102, 0x0051, "Sound Blaster AE-5", QUIRK_AE5),
+	SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x1102, 0x0081, "Sound Blaster AE-7", QUIRK_AE7),
 	{}
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#91 lore raw

PATCH 92/101 ASoC: SOF: Add topology filename override based on dmi data match

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sathyanarayana Nujella <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5253a73d567dcd75e62834ff5f502ea9470e5722 ]

Add topology filename override based on system DMI data matching, typically to account for a different hardware layout.

In ACPI based systems, the tplg_filename is pre-defined in an ACPI machine table. When a DMI quirk is detected, the sof_pdata->tplg_filename is not set with the hard-coded ACPI value, and instead is set with the DMI-specific filename.

---
 sound/soc/sof/intel/hda.c   |  8 +++++++-
 sound/soc/sof/sof-pci-dev.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/sof/intel/hda.c +7 -1
index 63ca920c8e6e0..7152e6d1cf673 100644
@@ -1179,7 +1179,13 @@ void hda_machine_select(struct snd_sof_dev *sdev)
 
 	mach = snd_soc_acpi_find_machine(desc->machines);
 	if (mach) {
-		sof_pdata->tplg_filename = mach->sof_tplg_filename;
+		/*
+		 * If tplg file name is overridden, use it instead of
+		 * the one set in mach table
+		 */
+		if (!sof_pdata->tplg_filename)
+			sof_pdata->tplg_filename = mach->sof_tplg_filename;
+
 		sof_pdata->machine = mach;
 
 		if (mach->link_mask) {
sound/soc/sof/sof-pci-dev.c +24 -0
index aa3532ba14349..f3a8140773db5 100644
@@ -35,8 +35,28 @@ static int sof_pci_debug;
 module_param_named(sof_pci_debug, sof_pci_debug, int, 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(sof_pci_debug, "SOF PCI debug options (0x0 all off)");
 
+static const char *sof_override_tplg_name;
+
 #define SOF_PCI_DISABLE_PM_RUNTIME BIT(0)
 
+static int sof_tplg_cb(const struct dmi_system_id *id)
+{
+	sof_override_tplg_name = id->driver_data;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static const struct dmi_system_id sof_tplg_table[] = {
+	{
+		.callback = sof_tplg_cb,
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_FAMILY, "Google_Volteer"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Terrador"),
+		},
+		.driver_data = "sof-tgl-rt5682-ssp0-max98373-ssp2.tplg",
+	},
+	{}
+};
+
 static const struct dmi_system_id community_key_platforms[] = {
 	{
 		.ident = "Up Squared",
@@ -347,6 +367,10 @@ static int sof_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pci,
 		sof_pdata->tplg_filename_prefix =
 			sof_pdata->desc->default_tplg_path;
 
+	dmi_check_system(sof_tplg_table);
+	if (sof_override_tplg_name)
+		sof_pdata->tplg_filename = sof_override_tplg_name;
+
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SND_SOC_SOF_PROBE_WORK_QUEUE)
 	/* set callback to enable runtime_pm */
 	sof_pdata->sof_probe_complete = sof_pci_probe_complete;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#70 lore raw

PATCH 71/101 scsi: ibmvfc: Fix error return in ibmvfc_probe()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jing Xiangfeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5e48a084f4e824e1b624d3fd7ddcf53d2ba69e53 ]

Fix to return error code PTR_ERR() from the error handling case instead of 0.

---
 drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/scsi/ibmvscsi/ibmvfc.c +1 -0
index 635f6f9cffc40..ef91f3d01f989 100644
@@ -4928,6 +4928,7 @@ static int ibmvfc_probe(struct vio_dev *vdev, const struct vio_device_id *id)
 	if (IS_ERR(vhost->work_thread)) {
 		dev_err(dev, "Couldn't create kernel thread: %ld\n",
 			PTR_ERR(vhost->work_thread));
+		rc = PTR_ERR(vhost->work_thread);
 		goto free_host_mem;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#98 lore raw

PATCH 99/101 dmaengine: dw: Add DMA-channels mask cell support

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Serge Semin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e8ee6c8cb61b676f1a2d6b942329e98224bd8ee9 ]

DW DMA IP-core provides a way to synthesize the DMA controller with channels having different parameters like maximum burst-length, multi-block support, maximum data width, etc. Those parameters both explicitly and implicitly affect the channels performance. Since DMA slave devices might be very demanding to the DMA performance, let's provide a functionality for the slaves to be assigned with DW DMA channels, which performance according to the platform engineer fulfill their requirements. After this patch is applied it can be done by passing the mask of suitable DMA-channels either directly in the dw_dma_slave structure instance or as a fifth cell of the DMA DT-property. If mask is zero or not provided, then there is no limitation on the channels allocation.

For instance Baikal-T1 SoC is equipped with a DW DMAC engine, which first two channels are synthesized with max burst length of 16, while the rest of the channels have been created with max-burst-len=4. It would seem that the first two channels must be faster than the others and should be more preferable for the time-critical DMA slave devices. In practice it turned out that the situation is quite the opposite. The channels with max-burst-len=4 demonstrated a better performance than the channels with max-burst-len=16 even when they both had been initialized with the same settings. The performance drop of the first two DMA-channels made them unsuitable for the DW APB SSI slave device. No matter what settings they are configured with, full-duplex SPI transfers occasionally experience the Rx FIFO overflow. It means that the DMA-engine doesn't keep up with incoming data pace even though the SPI-bus is enabled with speed of 25MHz while the DW DMA controller is clocked with 50MHz signal. There is no such problem has been noticed for the channels synthesized with max-burst-len=4.

---
 drivers/dma/dw/core.c                | 4 ++++
 drivers/dma/dw/of.c                  | 7 +++++--
 include/linux/platform_data/dma-dw.h | 2 ++
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/dma/dw/core.c +4 -0
index a1b56f52db2f2..5e7fdc0b6e3db 100644
@@ -772,6 +772,10 @@ bool dw_dma_filter(struct dma_chan *chan, void *param)
 	if (dws->dma_dev != chan->device->dev)
 		return false;
 
+	/* permit channels in accordance with the channels mask */
+	if (dws->channels && !(dws->channels & dwc->mask))
+		return false;
+
 	/* We have to copy data since dws can be temporary storage */
 	memcpy(&dwc->dws, dws, sizeof(struct dw_dma_slave));
 
drivers/dma/dw/of.c +5 -2
index 9e27831dee324..43e975fb67142 100644
@@ -22,18 +22,21 @@ static struct dma_chan *dw_dma_of_xlate(struct of_phandle_args *dma_spec,
 	};
 	dma_cap_mask_t cap;
 
-	if (dma_spec->args_count != 3)
+	if (dma_spec->args_count < 3 || dma_spec->args_count > 4)
 		return NULL;
 
 	slave.src_id = dma_spec->args[0];
 	slave.dst_id = dma_spec->args[0];
 	slave.m_master = dma_spec->args[1];
 	slave.p_master = dma_spec->args[2];
+	if (dma_spec->args_count >= 4)
+		slave.channels = dma_spec->args[3];
 
 	if (WARN_ON(slave.src_id >= DW_DMA_MAX_NR_REQUESTS ||
 		    slave.dst_id >= DW_DMA_MAX_NR_REQUESTS ||
 		    slave.m_master >= dw->pdata->nr_masters ||
-		    slave.p_master >= dw->pdata->nr_masters))
+		    slave.p_master >= dw->pdata->nr_masters ||
+		    slave.channels >= BIT(dw->pdata->nr_channels)))
 		return NULL;
 
 	dma_cap_zero(cap);
include/linux/platform_data/dma-dw.h +2 -0
index f3eaf9ec00a1b..70078be166e3c 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  * @dst_id:	dst request line
  * @m_master:	memory master for transfers on allocated channel
  * @p_master:	peripheral master for transfers on allocated channel
+ * @channels:	mask of the channels permitted for allocation (zero value means any)
  * @hs_polarity:set active low polarity of handshake interface
  */
 struct dw_dma_slave {
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ struct dw_dma_slave {
 	u8			dst_id;
 	u8			m_master;
 	u8			p_master;
+	u8			channels;
 	bool			hs_polarity;
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#95 lore raw

PATCH 96/101 usb: core: Solve race condition in anchor cleanup functions

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Eli Billauer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fbc299437c06648afcc7891e6e2e6638dd48d4df ]

usb_kill_anchored_urbs() is commonly used to cancel all URBs on an anchor just before releasing resources which the URBs rely on. By doing so, users of this function rely on that no completer callbacks will take place from any URB on the anchor after it returns.

However if this function is called in parallel with __usb_hcd_giveback_urb processing a URB on the anchor, the latter may call the completer callback after usb_kill_anchored_urbs() returns. This can lead to a kernel panic due to use after release of memory in interrupt context.

The race condition is that __usb_hcd_giveback_urb() first unanchors the URB and then makes the completer callback. Such URB is hence invisible to usb_kill_anchored_urbs(), allowing it to return before the completer has been called, since the anchor's urb_list is empty.

Even worse, if the racing completer callback resubmits the URB, it may remain in the system long after usb_kill_anchored_urbs() returns.

Hence list_empty(&anchor->urb_list), which is used in the existing while-loop, doesn't reliably ensure that all URBs of the anchor are gone.

A similar problem exists with usb_poison_anchored_urbs() and usb_scuttle_anchored_urbs().

This patch adds an external do-while loop, which ensures that all URBs are indeed handled before these three functions return. This change has no effect at all unless the race condition occurs, in which case the loop will busy-wait until the racing completer callback has finished. This is a rare condition, so the CPU waste of this spinning is negligible.

The additional do-while loop relies on usb_anchor_check_wakeup(), which returns true iff the anchor list is empty, and there is no __usb_hcd_giveback_urb() in the system that is in the middle of the unanchor-before-complete phase. The @suspend_wakeups member of struct usb_anchor is used for this purpose, which was introduced to solve another problem which the same race condition causes, in commit 6ec4147e7bdb ("usb-anchor: Delay usb_wait_anchor_empty_timeout wake up till completion is done").

The surely_empty variable is necessary, because usb_anchor_check_wakeup() must be called with the lock held to prevent races. However the spinlock must be released and reacquired if the outer loop spins with an empty URB list while waiting for the unanchor-before-complete passage to finish:
The completer callback may very well attempt to take the very same lock.

To summarize, using usb_anchor_check_wakeup() means that the patched functions can return only when the anchor's list is empty, and there is no invisible URB being processed. Since the inner while loop finishes on the empty list condition, the new do-while loop will terminate as well, except for when the said race condition occurs.

---
 drivers/usb/core/urb.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/core/urb.c +54 -35
index da923ec176122..31ca5abb4c12a 100644
@@ -772,11 +772,12 @@ void usb_block_urb(struct urb *urb)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_block_urb);
 
 /**
- * usb_kill_anchored_urbs - cancel transfer requests en masse
+ * usb_kill_anchored_urbs - kill all URBs associated with an anchor
  * @anchor: anchor the requests are bound to
  *
- * this allows all outstanding URBs to be killed starting
- * from the back of the queue
+ * This kills all outstanding URBs starting from the back of the queue,
+ * with guarantee that no completer callbacks will take place from the
+ * anchor after this function returns.
  *
  * This routine should not be called by a driver after its disconnect
  * method has returned.
@@ -784,20 +785,26 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_block_urb);
 void usb_kill_anchored_urbs(struct usb_anchor *anchor)
 {
 	struct urb *victim;
+	int surely_empty;
 
-	spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-	while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
-		victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev, struct urb,
-				    anchor_list);
-		/* we must make sure the URB isn't freed before we kill it*/
-		usb_get_urb(victim);
-		spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-		/* this will unanchor the URB */
-		usb_kill_urb(victim);
-		usb_put_urb(victim);
+	do {
 		spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-	}
-	spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
+			victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev,
+					    struct urb, anchor_list);
+			/* make sure the URB isn't freed before we kill it */
+			usb_get_urb(victim);
+			spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+			/* this will unanchor the URB */
+			usb_kill_urb(victim);
+			usb_put_urb(victim);
+			spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		}
+		surely_empty = usb_anchor_check_wakeup(anchor);
+
+		spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		cpu_relax();
+	} while (!surely_empty);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_kill_anchored_urbs);
 
@@ -816,21 +823,27 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_kill_anchored_urbs);
 void usb_poison_anchored_urbs(struct usb_anchor *anchor)
 {
 	struct urb *victim;
+	int surely_empty;
 
-	spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-	anchor->poisoned = 1;
-	while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
-		victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev, struct urb,
-				    anchor_list);
-		/* we must make sure the URB isn't freed before we kill it*/
-		usb_get_urb(victim);
-		spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-		/* this will unanchor the URB */
-		usb_poison_urb(victim);
-		usb_put_urb(victim);
+	do {
 		spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
-	}
-	spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		anchor->poisoned = 1;
+		while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
+			victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev,
+					    struct urb, anchor_list);
+			/* make sure the URB isn't freed before we kill it */
+			usb_get_urb(victim);
+			spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+			/* this will unanchor the URB */
+			usb_poison_urb(victim);
+			usb_put_urb(victim);
+			spin_lock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		}
+		surely_empty = usb_anchor_check_wakeup(anchor);
+
+		spin_unlock_irq(&anchor->lock);
+		cpu_relax();
+	} while (!surely_empty);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_poison_anchored_urbs);
 
@@ -970,14 +983,20 @@ void usb_scuttle_anchored_urbs(struct usb_anchor *anchor)
 {
 	struct urb *victim;
 	unsigned long flags;
+	int surely_empty;
+
+	do {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&anchor->lock, flags);
+		while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
+			victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev,
+					    struct urb, anchor_list);
+			__usb_unanchor_urb(victim, anchor);
+		}
+		surely_empty = usb_anchor_check_wakeup(anchor);
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&anchor->lock, flags);
-	while (!list_empty(&anchor->urb_list)) {
-		victim = list_entry(anchor->urb_list.prev, struct urb,
-				    anchor_list);
-		__usb_unanchor_urb(victim, anchor);
-	}
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&anchor->lock, flags);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&anchor->lock, flags);
+		cpu_relax();
+	} while (!surely_empty);
 }
 
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(usb_scuttle_anchored_urbs);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#94 lore raw

PATCH 95/101 brcm80211: fix possible memleak in brcmf_proto_msgbuf_attach

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Wang Yufen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c151410d5b57e6bb0d91a735ac511459539a7bf ]

When brcmf_proto_msgbuf_attach fail and msgbuf->txflow_wq != NULL, we should destroy the workqueue.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/msgbuf.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/msgbuf.c +2 -0
index 8bb4f1fa790e7..1bb270e782ff2 100644
@@ -1619,6 +1619,8 @@ int brcmf_proto_msgbuf_attach(struct brcmf_pub *drvr)
 					  BRCMF_TX_IOCTL_MAX_MSG_SIZE,
 					  msgbuf->ioctbuf,
 					  msgbuf->ioctbuf_handle);
+		if (msgbuf->txflow_wq)
+			destroy_workqueue(msgbuf->txflow_wq);
 		kfree(msgbuf);
 	}
 	return -ENOMEM;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#78 lore raw

PATCH 79/101 scsi: qedi: Mark all connections for recovery on link down event

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4118879be3755b38171063dfd4a57611d4b20a83 ]

For short time cable pulls, the in-flight I/O to the firmware is never cleaned up, resulting in the behaviour of stale I/O completion causing list_del corruption and soft lockup of the system.

On link down event, mark all the connections for recovery, causing cleanup of all the in-flight I/O immediately.

---
 drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_main.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_main.c +10 -0
index 81a307695cc91..569fa4b28e4e2 100644
@@ -1127,6 +1127,15 @@ static void qedi_schedule_recovery_handler(void *dev)
 	schedule_delayed_work(&qedi->recovery_work, 0);
 }
 
+static void qedi_set_conn_recovery(struct iscsi_cls_session *cls_session)
+{
+	struct iscsi_session *session = cls_session->dd_data;
+	struct iscsi_conn *conn = session->leadconn;
+	struct qedi_conn *qedi_conn = conn->dd_data;
+
+	qedi_start_conn_recovery(qedi_conn->qedi, qedi_conn);
+}
+
 static void qedi_link_update(void *dev, struct qed_link_output *link)
 {
 	struct qedi_ctx *qedi = (struct qedi_ctx *)dev;
@@ -1138,6 +1147,7 @@ static void qedi_link_update(void *dev, struct qed_link_output *link)
 		QEDI_INFO(&qedi->dbg_ctx, QEDI_LOG_INFO,
 			  "Link Down event.\n");
 		atomic_set(&qedi->link_state, QEDI_LINK_DOWN);
+		iscsi_host_for_each_session(qedi->shost, qedi_set_conn_recovery);
 	}
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#80 lore raw

PATCH 81/101 scsi: qedi: Fix list_del corruption while removing active I/O

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Nilesh Javali <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 28b35d17f9f8573d4646dd8df08917a4076a6b63 ]

While aborting the I/O, the firmware cleanup task timed out and driver deleted the I/O from active command list. Some time later the firmware sent the cleanup task response and driver again deleted the I/O from active command list causing firmware to send completion for non-existent I/O and list_del corruption of active command list.

Add fix to check if I/O is present before deleting it from the active command list to ensure firmware sends valid I/O completion and protect against list_del corruption.

---
 drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_fw.c | 15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_fw.c +11 -4
index 32586800620bd..90aa64604ad78 100644
@@ -825,8 +825,11 @@ static void qedi_process_cmd_cleanup_resp(struct qedi_ctx *qedi,
 			qedi_clear_task_idx(qedi_conn->qedi, rtid);
 
 			spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
-			list_del_init(&dbg_cmd->io_cmd);
-			qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
+			if (likely(dbg_cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
+				dbg_cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
+				list_del_init(&dbg_cmd->io_cmd);
+				qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
+			}
 			spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 			qedi_cmd->state = CLEANUP_RECV;
 			wake_up_interruptible(&qedi_conn->wait_queue);
@@ -1244,6 +1247,7 @@ int qedi_cleanup_all_io(struct qedi_ctx *qedi, struct qedi_conn *qedi_conn,
 		qedi_conn->cmd_cleanup_req++;
 		qedi_iscsi_cleanup_task(ctask, true);
 
+		cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
 		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
 		qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
 		QEDI_WARN(&qedi->dbg_ctx,
@@ -1455,8 +1459,11 @@ static void qedi_tmf_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	spin_unlock_bh(&qedi_conn->tmf_work_lock);
 
 	spin_lock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
-	list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
-	qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
+	if (likely(cmd->io_cmd_in_list)) {
+		cmd->io_cmd_in_list = false;
+		list_del_init(&cmd->io_cmd);
+		qedi_conn->active_cmd_count--;
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&qedi_conn->list_lock);
 
 	clear_bit(QEDI_CONN_FW_CLEANUP, &qedi_conn->flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#77 lore raw

PATCH 78/101 scsi: qedf: Return SUCCESS if stale rport is encountered

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Saurav Kashyap <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 10aff62fab263ad7661780816551420cea956ebb ]

If SUCCESS is not returned, error handling will escalate. Return SUCCESS similar to other conditions in this function.

---
 drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_main.c +1 -1
index 51cfab9d1afdc..ed3054fffa344 100644
@@ -704,7 +704,7 @@ static int qedf_eh_abort(struct scsi_cmnd *sc_cmd)
 	rdata = fcport->rdata;
 	if (!rdata || !kref_get_unless_zero(&rdata->kref)) {
 		QEDF_ERR(&qedf->dbg_ctx, "stale rport, sc_cmd=%p\n", sc_cmd);
-		rc = 1;
+		rc = SUCCESS;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#76 lore raw

PATCH 77/101 HID: ite: Add USB id match for Acer One S1003 keyboard dock

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5bf2f2f331ad812c9b7eea6e14a3ea328acbffc0 ]

The Acer One S1003 2-in-1 keyboard dock uses a Synaptics S910xx touchpad which is connected to an ITE 8910 USB keyboard controller chip.

This keyboard has the same quirk for its rfkill / airplane mode hotkey as other keyboards with ITE keyboard chips, it only sends a single release event when pressed and released, it never sends a press event.

This commit adds this keyboards USB id to the hid-ite id-table, fixing the rfkill key not working on this keyboard. Note that like for the Acer Aspire Switch 10 (SW5-012) the id-table entry matches on the HID_GROUP_GENERIC generic group so that hid-ite only binds to the keyboard interface and the mouse/touchpad interface is left untouched so that hid-multitouch can bind to it.

---
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h | 1 +
 drivers/hid/hid-ite.c | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +1 -0
index 0ca8906a6f839..b269c792d25dc 100644
@@ -1123,6 +1123,7 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_DELL_K12A	0x2819
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_SWITCH5_012	0x2968
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_TP_V103	0x5710
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_ONE_S1003	0x73f5
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_SWITCH5	0x81a7
 
 #define USB_VENDOR_ID_TEXAS_INSTRUMENTS	0x2047
drivers/hid/hid-ite.c +4 -0
index 6c55682c59740..044a93f3c1178 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ static const struct hid_device_id ite_devices[] = {
 	{ HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,
 		     USB_VENDOR_ID_SYNAPTICS,
 		     USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_SWITCH5_012) },
+	/* ITE8910 USB kbd ctlr, with Synaptics touchpad connected to it. */
+	{ HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,
+		     USB_VENDOR_ID_SYNAPTICS,
+		     USB_DEVICE_ID_SYNAPTICS_ACER_ONE_S1003) },
 	{ }
 };
 MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(hid, ite_devices);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#74 lore raw

PATCH 75/101 rtl8xxxu: prevent potential memory leak

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Chris Chiu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 86279456a4d47782398d3cb8193f78f672e36cac ]

Free the skb if usb_submit_urb fails on rx_urb. And free the urb no matter usb_submit_urb succeeds or not in rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c +9 -1
index 19efae462a242..5cd7ef3625c5e 100644
@@ -5795,7 +5795,6 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 	ret = usb_submit_urb(urb, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (ret) {
 		usb_unanchor_urb(urb);
-		usb_free_urb(urb);
 		goto error;
 	}
 
@@ -5804,6 +5803,7 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_submit_int_urb(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 	rtl8xxxu_write32(priv, REG_USB_HIMR, val32);
 
 error:
+	usb_free_urb(urb);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -6318,6 +6318,7 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_start(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 	struct rtl8xxxu_priv *priv = hw->priv;
 	struct rtl8xxxu_rx_urb *rx_urb;
 	struct rtl8xxxu_tx_urb *tx_urb;
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret, i;
 
@@ -6368,6 +6369,13 @@ static int rtl8xxxu_start(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
 		rx_urb->hw = hw;
 
 		ret = rtl8xxxu_submit_rx_urb(priv, rx_urb);
+		if (ret) {
+			if (ret != -ENOMEM) {
+				skb = (struct sk_buff *)rx_urb->urb.context;
+				dev_kfree_skb(skb);
+			}
+			rtl8xxxu_queue_rx_urb(priv, rx_urb);
+		}
 	}
 
 	schedule_delayed_work(&priv->ra_watchdog, 2 * HZ);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#73 lore raw

PATCH 74/101 brcmsmac: fix memory leak in wlc_phy_attach_lcnphy

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Keita Suzuki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f4443293d741d1776b86ed1dd8c4e4285d0775fc ]

When wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy fails in wlc_phy_attach_lcnphy, the allocated pi->u.pi_lcnphy is leaked, since struct brcms_phy will be freed in the caller function.

Fix this by calling wlc_phy_detach_lcnphy in the error handler of wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy before returning.

---
 .../net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c    | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/phy/phy_lcn.c +3 -1
index 7ef36234a25dc..66797dc5e90d5 100644
@@ -5065,8 +5065,10 @@ bool wlc_phy_attach_lcnphy(struct brcms_phy *pi)
 	pi->pi_fptr.radioloftget = wlc_lcnphy_get_radio_loft;
 	pi->pi_fptr.detach = wlc_phy_detach_lcnphy;
 
-	if (!wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy(pi))
+	if (!wlc_phy_txpwr_srom_read_lcnphy(pi)) {
+		kfree(pi->u.pi_lcnphy);
 		return false;
+	}
 
 	if (LCNREV_IS(pi->pubpi.phy_rev, 1)) {
 		if (pi_lcn->lcnphy_tempsense_option == 3) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#71 lore raw

PATCH 72/101 scsi: qla2xxx: Warn if done() or free() are called on an already freed srb

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Daniel Wagner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c0014f94218ea3a312f6235febea0d626c5f2154 ]

Emit a warning when ->done or ->free are called on an already freed srb. There is a hidden use-after-free bug in the driver which corrupts the srb memory pool which originates from the cleanup callbacks.

An extensive search didn't bring any lights on the real problem. The initial fix was to set both pointers to NULL and try to catch invalid accesses. But instead the memory corruption was gone and the driver didn't crash. Since not all calling places check for NULL pointer, add explicitly default handlers. With this we workaround the memory corruption and add a debug help.

---
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c   | 10 ++++++++++
 drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_inline.h |  5 +++++
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_init.c +10 -0
index 2861c636dd651..f17ab22ad0e4a 100644
@@ -63,6 +63,16 @@ void qla2x00_sp_free(srb_t *sp)
 	qla2x00_rel_sp(sp);
 }
 
+void qla2xxx_rel_done_warning(srb_t *sp, int res)
+{
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "Calling done() of an already freed srb %p object\n", sp);
+}
+
+void qla2xxx_rel_free_warning(srb_t *sp)
+{
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "Calling free() of an already freed srb %p object\n", sp);
+}
+
 /* Asynchronous Login/Logout Routines -------------------------------------- */
 
 unsigned long
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_inline.h +5 -0
index 1fb6ccac07ccd..26d9c78d4c52c 100644
@@ -207,10 +207,15 @@ qla2xxx_get_qpair_sp(scsi_qla_host_t *vha, struct qla_qpair *qpair,
 	return sp;
 }
 
+void qla2xxx_rel_done_warning(srb_t *sp, int res);
+void qla2xxx_rel_free_warning(srb_t *sp);
+
 static inline void
 qla2xxx_rel_qpair_sp(struct qla_qpair *qpair, srb_t *sp)
 {
 	sp->qpair = NULL;
+	sp->done = qla2xxx_rel_done_warning;
+	sp->free = qla2xxx_rel_free_warning;
 	mempool_free(sp, qpair->srb_mempool);
 	QLA_QPAIR_MARK_NOT_BUSY(qpair);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#69 lore raw

PATCH 70/101 iomap: fix WARN_ON_ONCE() from unprivileged users

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qian Cai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a805c111650cdba6ee880f528abdd03c1af82089 ]

It is trivial to trigger a WARN_ON_ONCE(1) in iomap_dio_actor() by unprivileged users which would taint the kernel, or worse - panic if panic_on_warn or panic_on_taint is set. Hence, just convert it to pr_warn_ratelimited() to let users know their workloads are racing. Thank Dave Chinner for the initial analysis of the racing reproducers.

---
 fs/iomap/direct-io.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
fs/iomap/direct-io.c +10 -0
index ec7b78e6fecaf..28d656b15300b 100644
@@ -387,6 +387,16 @@ iomap_dio_actor(struct inode *inode, loff_t pos, loff_t length,
 		return iomap_dio_bio_actor(inode, pos, length, dio, iomap);
 	case IOMAP_INLINE:
 		return iomap_dio_inline_actor(inode, pos, length, dio, iomap);
+	case IOMAP_DELALLOC:
+		/*
+		 * DIO is not serialised against mmap() access at all, and so
+		 * if the page_mkwrite occurs between the writeback and the
+		 * iomap_apply() call in the DIO path, then it will see the
+		 * DELALLOC block that the page-mkwrite allocated.
+		 */
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("Direct I/O collision with buffered writes! File: %pD4 Comm: %.20s\n",
+				    dio->iocb->ki_filp, current->comm);
+		return -EIO;
 	default:
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
 		return -EIO;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#67 lore raw

PATCH 68/101 Bluetooth: Only mark socket zapped after unlocking

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Abhishek Pandit-Subedi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 20ae4089d0afeb24e9ceb026b996bfa55c983cc2 ]

Since l2cap_sock_teardown_cb doesn't acquire the channel lock before setting the socket as zapped, it could potentially race with l2cap_sock_release which frees the socket. Thus, wait until the cleanup is complete before marking the socket as zapped.

This race was reproduced on a JBL GO speaker after the remote device rejected L2CAP connection due to resource unavailability.

Here is a dmesg log with debug logs from a repro of this bug:

[ 3465.424086] Bluetooth: hci_core.c:hci_acldata_packet() hci0 len 16 handle 0x0003 flags 0x0002
[ 3465.424090] Bluetooth: hci_conn.c:hci_conn_enter_active_mode() hcon 00000000cfedd07d mode 0
[ 3465.424094] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_recv_acldata() conn 000000007eae8952 len 16 flags 0x2
[ 3465.424098] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_recv_frame() len 12, cid 0x0001
[ 3465.424102] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_raw_recv() conn 000000007eae8952
[ 3465.424175] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() code 0x03 len 8 id 0x0c
[ 3465.424180] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_connect_create_rsp() dcid 0x0045 scid 0x0000 result 0x02 status 0x00
[ 3465.424189] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_chan_put() chan 000000006acf9bff orig refcnt 4
[ 3465.424196] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_chan_del() chan 000000006acf9bff, conn 000000007eae8952, err 111, state BT_CONNECT
[ 3465.424203] Bluetooth: l2cap_sock.c:l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() chan 000000006acf9bff state BT_CONNECT
[ 3465.424221] Bluetooth: l2cap_core.c:l2cap_chan_put() chan 000000006acf9bff orig refcnt 3
[ 3465.424226] Bluetooth: hci_core.h:hci_conn_drop() hcon 00000000cfedd07d orig refcnt 6
[ 3465.424234] BUG: spinlock bad magic on CPU#2, kworker/u17:0/159
[ 3465.425626] Bluetooth: hci_sock.c:hci_sock_sendmsg() sock 000000002bb0cb64 sk 00000000a7964053
[ 3465.430330]  lock: 0xffffff804410aac0, .magic: 00000000, .owner: <none>/-1, .owner_cpu: 0
[ 3465.430332] Causing a watchdog bite!
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +4 -3
index a995d2c51fa7f..2ea6bcbe6f559 100644
@@ -1521,8 +1521,6 @@ static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
 
 	parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
 
-	sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
-
 	switch (chan->state) {
 	case BT_OPEN:
 	case BT_BOUND:
@@ -1549,8 +1547,11 @@ static void l2cap_sock_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
 
 		break;
 	}
-
 	release_sock(sk);
+
+	/* Only zap after cleanup to avoid use after free race */
+	sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED);
+
 }
 
 static void l2cap_sock_state_change_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int state,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#65 lore raw

PATCH 66/101 usb: ohci: Default to per-port over-current protection

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Hamish Martin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b77d2a0a223bc139ee8904991b2922d215d02636 ]

Some integrated OHCI controller hubs do not expose all ports of the hub to pins on the SoC. In some cases the unconnected ports generate spurious over-current events. For example the Broadcom 56060/Ranger 2 SoC contains a nominally 3 port hub but only the first port is wired.

Default behaviour for ohci-platform driver is to use global over-current protection mode (AKA "ganged"). This leads to the spurious over-current events affecting all ports in the hub.

We now alter the default to use per-port over-current protection.

This patch results in the following configuration changes depending on quirks:
- For quirk OHCI_QUIRK_SUPERIO no changes. These systems remain set up for ganged power switching and no over-current protection.
- For quirk OHCI_QUIRK_AMD756 or OHCI_QUIRK_HUB_POWER power switching remains at none, while over-current protection is now guaranteed to be set to per-port rather than the previous behaviour where it was either none or global over-current protection depending on the value at function entry.

---
 drivers/usb/host/ohci-hcd.c | 16 ++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/host/ohci-hcd.c +10 -6
index 4de91653a2c7b..5eb62240c7f87 100644
@@ -673,20 +673,24 @@ static int ohci_run (struct ohci_hcd *ohci)
 
 	/* handle root hub init quirks ... */
 	val = roothub_a (ohci);
-	val &= ~(RH_A_PSM | RH_A_OCPM);
+	/* Configure for per-port over-current protection by default */
+	val &= ~RH_A_NOCP;
+	val |= RH_A_OCPM;
 	if (ohci->flags & OHCI_QUIRK_SUPERIO) {
-		/* NSC 87560 and maybe others */
+		/* NSC 87560 and maybe others.
+		 * Ganged power switching, no over-current protection.
+		 */
 		val |= RH_A_NOCP;
-		val &= ~(RH_A_POTPGT | RH_A_NPS);
-		ohci_writel (ohci, val, &ohci->regs->roothub.a);
+		val &= ~(RH_A_POTPGT | RH_A_NPS | RH_A_PSM | RH_A_OCPM);
 	} else if ((ohci->flags & OHCI_QUIRK_AMD756) ||
 			(ohci->flags & OHCI_QUIRK_HUB_POWER)) {
 		/* hub power always on; required for AMD-756 and some
-		 * Mac platforms.  ganged overcurrent reporting, if any.
+		 * Mac platforms.
 		 */
 		val |= RH_A_NPS;
-		ohci_writel (ohci, val, &ohci->regs->roothub.a);
 	}
+	ohci_writel(ohci, val, &ohci->regs->roothub.a);
+
 	ohci_writel (ohci, RH_HS_LPSC, &ohci->regs->roothub.status);
 	ohci_writel (ohci, (val & RH_A_NPS) ? 0 : RH_B_PPCM,
 						&ohci->regs->roothub.b);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#63 lore raw

PATCH 64/101 opp: Prevent memory leak in dev_pm_opp_attach_genpd()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Viresh Kumar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cb60e9602cce1593eb1e9cdc8ee562815078a354 ]

If dev_pm_opp_attach_genpd() is called multiple times (once for each CPU sharing the table), then it would result in unwanted behavior like memory leak, attaching the domain multiple times, etc.

Handle that by checking and returning earlier if the domains are already attached. Now that dev_pm_opp_detach_genpd() can get called multiple times as well, we need to protect that too.

Note that the virtual device pointers aren't returned in this case, as they may become unavailable to some callers during the middle of the operation.

---
 drivers/opp/core.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/opp/core.c +6 -0
index 91dcad982d362..11d192fb2e813 100644
@@ -1918,6 +1918,9 @@ static void _opp_detach_genpd(struct opp_table *opp_table)
 {
 	int index;
 
+	if (!opp_table->genpd_virt_devs)
+		return;
+
 	for (index = 0; index < opp_table->required_opp_count; index++) {
 		if (!opp_table->genpd_virt_devs[index])
 			continue;
@@ -1964,6 +1967,9 @@ struct opp_table *dev_pm_opp_attach_genpd(struct device *dev,
 	if (!opp_table)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
+	if (opp_table->genpd_virt_devs)
+		return opp_table;
+
 	/*
 	 * If the genpd's OPP table isn't already initialized, parsing of the
 	 * required-opps fail for dev. We should retry this after genpd's OPP
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#54 lore raw

PATCH 55/101 can: flexcan: flexcan_chip_stop(): add error handling and propagate error value

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Joakim Zhang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9ad02c7f4f279504bdd38ab706fdc97d5f2b2a9c ]

This patch implements error handling and propagates the error value of flexcan_chip_stop(). This function will be called from flexcan_suspend() in an upcoming patch in some SoCs which support LPSR mode.

Add a new function flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error() that tries to disable the chip even in case of errors.

[mkl: introduce flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error() and use it in flexcan_close()]
---
 drivers/net/can/flexcan.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/can/flexcan.c +28 -6
index 94d10ec954a05..2ac7a667bde35 100644
@@ -1260,18 +1260,23 @@ static int flexcan_chip_start(struct net_device *dev)
 	return err;
 }
 
-/* flexcan_chip_stop
+/* __flexcan_chip_stop
  *
- * this functions is entered with clocks enabled
+ * this function is entered with clocks enabled
  */
-static void flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev)
+static int __flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev, bool disable_on_error)
 {
 	struct flexcan_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
 	struct flexcan_regs __iomem *regs = priv->regs;
+	int err;
 
 	/* freeze + disable module */
-	flexcan_chip_freeze(priv);
-	flexcan_chip_disable(priv);
+	err = flexcan_chip_freeze(priv);
+	if (err && !disable_on_error)
+		return err;
+	err = flexcan_chip_disable(priv);
+	if (err && !disable_on_error)
+		goto out_chip_unfreeze;
 
 	/* Disable all interrupts */
 	priv->write(0, &regs->imask2);
@@ -1281,6 +1286,23 @@ static void flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev)
 
 	flexcan_transceiver_disable(priv);
 	priv->can.state = CAN_STATE_STOPPED;
+
+	return 0;
+
+ out_chip_unfreeze:
+	flexcan_chip_unfreeze(priv);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static inline int flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	return __flexcan_chip_stop(dev, true);
+}
+
+static inline int flexcan_chip_stop(struct net_device *dev)
+{
+	return __flexcan_chip_stop(dev, false);
 }
 
 static int flexcan_open(struct net_device *dev)
@@ -1362,7 +1384,7 @@ static int flexcan_close(struct net_device *dev)
 
 	netif_stop_queue(dev);
 	can_rx_offload_disable(&priv->offload);
-	flexcan_chip_stop(dev);
+	flexcan_chip_stop_disable_on_error(dev);
 
 	can_rx_offload_del(&priv->offload);
 	free_irq(dev->irq, dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#50 lore raw

PATCH 51/101 selftests/bpf: Fix overflow tests to reflect iter size increase

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Alan Maguire <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eb58bbf2e5c7917aa30bf8818761f26bbeeb2290 ]

bpf iter size increase to PAGE_SIZE << 3 means overflow tests assuming page size need to be bumped also.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c | 14 +++++++-------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_iter.c +7 -7
index 87c29dde1cf96..669f195de2fa0 100644
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ static void test_overflow(bool test_e2big_overflow, bool ret1)
 	struct bpf_map_info map_info = {};
 	struct bpf_iter_test_kern4 *skel;
 	struct bpf_link *link;
-	__u32 page_size;
+	__u32 iter_size;
 	char *buf;
 
 	skel = bpf_iter_test_kern4__open();
@@ -271,19 +271,19 @@ static void test_overflow(bool test_e2big_overflow, bool ret1)
 		  "map_creation failed: %s\n", strerror(errno)))
 		goto free_map1;
 
-	/* bpf_seq_printf kernel buffer is one page, so one map
+	/* bpf_seq_printf kernel buffer is 8 pages, so one map
 	 * bpf_seq_write will mostly fill it, and the other map
 	 * will partially fill and then trigger overflow and need
 	 * bpf_seq_read restart.
 	 */
-	page_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE);
+	iter_size = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE) << 3;
 
 	if (test_e2big_overflow) {
-		skel->rodata->print_len = (page_size + 8) / 8;
-		expected_read_len = 2 * (page_size + 8);
+		skel->rodata->print_len = (iter_size + 8) / 8;
+		expected_read_len = 2 * (iter_size + 8);
 	} else if (!ret1) {
-		skel->rodata->print_len = (page_size - 8) / 8;
-		expected_read_len = 2 * (page_size - 8);
+		skel->rodata->print_len = (iter_size - 8) / 8;
+		expected_read_len = 2 * (iter_size - 8);
 	} else {
 		skel->rodata->print_len = 1;
 		expected_read_len = 2 * 8;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 48/101 udf: Limit sparing table size

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jan Kara <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 44ac6b829c4e173fdf6df18e6dd86aecf9a3dc99 ]

Although UDF standard allows it, we don't support sparing table larger than a single block. Check it during mount so that we don't try to access memory beyond end of buffer.

---
 fs/udf/super.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/udf/super.c +6 -0
index f747bf72edbe0..a6ce0ddb392c7 100644
@@ -1353,6 +1353,12 @@ static int udf_load_sparable_map(struct super_block *sb,
 			(int)spm->numSparingTables);
 		return -EIO;
 	}
+	if (le32_to_cpu(spm->sizeSparingTable) > sb->s_blocksize) {
+		udf_err(sb, "error loading logical volume descriptor: "
+			"Too big sparing table size (%u)\n",
+			le32_to_cpu(spm->sizeSparingTable));
+		return -EIO;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < spm->numSparingTables; i++) {
 		loc = le32_to_cpu(spm->locSparingTable[i]);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#51 lore raw

PATCH 52/101 USB: cdc-acm: handle broken union descriptors

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 960c7339de27c6d6fec13b54880501c3576bb08d ]

Handle broken union functional descriptors where the master-interface doesn't exist or where its class is of neither Communication or Data type (as required by the specification) by falling back to "combined-interface" probing.

Note that this still allows for handling union descriptors with switched interfaces.

This specifically makes the Whistler radio scanners TRX series devices work with the driver without adding further quirks to the device-id table.

---
 drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c +12 -0
index 7499ba118665a..c02488d469185 100644
@@ -1243,9 +1243,21 @@ static int acm_probe(struct usb_interface *intf,
 			}
 		}
 	} else {
+		int class = -1;
+
 		data_intf_num = union_header->bSlaveInterface0;
 		control_interface = usb_ifnum_to_if(usb_dev, union_header->bMasterInterface0);
 		data_interface = usb_ifnum_to_if(usb_dev, data_intf_num);
+
+		if (control_interface)
+			class = control_interface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceClass;
+
+		if (class != USB_CLASS_COMM && class != USB_CLASS_CDC_DATA) {
+			dev_dbg(&intf->dev, "Broken union descriptor, assuming single interface\n");
+			combined_interfaces = 1;
+			control_interface = data_interface = intf;
+			goto look_for_collapsed_interface;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (!control_interface || !data_interface) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 46/101 usb: gadget: function: printer: fix use-after-free in __lock_acquire

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Zqiang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e8d5f92b8d30bb4ade76494490c3c065e12411b1 ]

Fix this by increase object reference count.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x3fd4/0x4180
kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3831
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880683b0018 by task syz-executor.0/3377

CPU: 1 PID: 3377 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.11 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.4+0x21/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report+0x131/0x1b0 mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641
 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:135
 __lock_acquire+0x3fd4/0x4180 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3831
 lock_acquire+0x127/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4488
 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x35/0x50 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:159
 printer_ioctl+0x4a/0x110 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c:723
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:47 [inline]
 ksys_ioctl+0xfb/0x130 fs/ioctl.c:763
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:772 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:770 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:770
 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x510 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4531a9
Code: ed 60 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48

89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 bb 60 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007fd14ad72c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bfa8 RCX: 00000000004531a9
RDX: fffffffffffffff9 RSI: 000000000000009e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004bbd61
R13: 00000000004d0a98 R14: 00007fd14ad736d4 R15: 00000000ffffffff

Allocated by task 2393:
 save_stack+0x21/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa7/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:515
 kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:529
 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xfa/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2813
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:555 [inline]
 kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:669 [inline]
 gprinter_alloc+0xa1/0x870 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c:1416
 usb_get_function+0x58/0xc0 drivers/usb/gadget/functions.c:61
 config_usb_cfg_link+0x1ed/0x3e0 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:444
 configfs_symlink+0x527/0x11d0 fs/configfs/symlink.c:202
 vfs_symlink+0x33d/0x5b0 fs/namei.c:4201
 do_symlinkat+0x11b/0x1d0 fs/namei.c:4228
 __do_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4242 [inline]
 __se_sys_symlinkat fs/namei.c:4239 [inline]
 __x64_sys_symlinkat+0x73/0xb0 fs/namei.c:4239
 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x510 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

Freed by task 3368:
 save_stack+0x21/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:72
 set_track mm/kasan/common.c:80 [inline]
 kasan_set_free_info mm/kasan/common.c:337 [inline]
 __kasan_slab_free+0x135/0x190 mm/kasan/common.c:476
 kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:485
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1444 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1477 [inline]
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3034 [inline]
 kfree+0xf7/0x410 mm/slub.c:3995
 gprinter_free+0x49/0xd0 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c:1353
 usb_put_function+0x38/0x50 drivers/usb/gadget/functions.c:87
 config_usb_cfg_unlink+0x2db/0x3b0 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:485
 configfs_unlink+0x3b9/0x7f0 fs/configfs/symlink.c:250
 vfs_unlink+0x287/0x570 fs/namei.c:4073
 do_unlinkat+0x4f9/0x620 fs/namei.c:4137
 __do_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4184 [inline]
 __se_sys_unlink fs/namei.c:4182 [inline]
 __x64_sys_unlink+0x42/0x50 fs/namei.c:4182
 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x510 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880683b0000
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024
The buggy address is located 24 bytes inside of
 1024-byte region [ffff8880683b0000, ffff8880683b0400)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0001a0ec00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff88806c00e300
index:0xffff8880683b1800 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head)
raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 0000000600000001 ffff88806c00e300
raw: ffff8880683b1800 000000008010000a 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c +14 -2
index 9c7ed2539ff77..8ed1295d7e350 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/ctype.h>
 #include <linux/cdev.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
 
 #include <asm/byteorder.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
@@ -64,7 +65,7 @@ struct printer_dev {
 	struct usb_gadget	*gadget;
 	s8			interface;
 	struct usb_ep		*in_ep, *out_ep;
-
+	struct kref             kref;
 	struct list_head	rx_reqs;	/* List of free RX structs */
 	struct list_head	rx_reqs_active;	/* List of Active RX xfers */
 	struct list_head	rx_buffers;	/* List of completed xfers */
@@ -218,6 +219,13 @@ static inline struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *ep_desc(struct usb_gadget *gadget,
 
 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
 
+static void printer_dev_free(struct kref *kref)
+{
+	struct printer_dev *dev = container_of(kref, struct printer_dev, kref);
+
+	kfree(dev);
+}
+
 static struct usb_request *
 printer_req_alloc(struct usb_ep *ep, unsigned len, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
@@ -348,6 +356,7 @@ printer_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *fd)
 
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
 
+	kref_get(&dev->kref);
 	DBG(dev, "printer_open returned %x\n", ret);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -365,6 +374,7 @@ printer_close(struct inode *inode, struct file *fd)
 	dev->printer_status &= ~PRINTER_SELECTED;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&dev->lock, flags);
 
+	kref_put(&dev->kref, printer_dev_free);
 	DBG(dev, "printer_close\n");
 
 	return 0;
@@ -1350,7 +1360,8 @@ static void gprinter_free(struct usb_function *f)
 	struct f_printer_opts *opts;
 
 	opts = container_of(f->fi, struct f_printer_opts, func_inst);
-	kfree(dev);
+
+	kref_put(&dev->kref, printer_dev_free);
 	mutex_lock(&opts->lock);
 	--opts->refcnt;
 	mutex_unlock(&opts->lock);
@@ -1419,6 +1430,7 @@ static struct usb_function *gprinter_alloc(struct usb_function_instance *fi)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 
+	kref_init(&dev->kref);
 	++opts->refcnt;
 	dev->minor = opts->minor;
 	dev->pnp_string = opts->pnp_string;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#55 lore raw

PATCH 56/101 HID: multitouch: Lenovo X1 Tablet Gen3 trackpoint and buttons

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mikael Wikström <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 140958da9ab53a7df9e9ccc7678ea64655279ac1 ]

One more device that needs 40d5bb87 to resolve regression for the trackpoint and three mouse buttons on the type cover of the Lenovo X1 Tablet Gen3.

It is probably also needed for the Lenovo X1 Tablet Gen2 with PID 0x60a3

---
 drivers/hid/hid-ids.h        | 1 +
 drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c | 6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-ids.h +1 -0
index b49ec7dde6457..0ca8906a6f839 100644
@@ -726,6 +726,7 @@
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_SCROLLPOINT_OPTICAL	0x6049
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_TPPRODOCK	0x6067
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X1_COVER	0x6085
+#define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X1_TAB3	0x60b5
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_PIXART_USB_MOUSE_608D	0x608d
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_PIXART_USB_MOUSE_6019	0x6019
 #define USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_PIXART_USB_MOUSE_602E	0x602e
drivers/hid/hid-multitouch.c +6 -0
index e3152155c4b85..99f041afd5c0c 100644
@@ -1973,6 +1973,12 @@ static const struct hid_device_id mt_devices[] = {
 		HID_DEVICE(BUS_I2C, HID_GROUP_GENERIC,
 			USB_VENDOR_ID_LG, I2C_DEVICE_ID_LG_7010) },
 
+	/* Lenovo X1 TAB Gen 3 */
+	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_WIN_8_FORCE_MULTI_INPUT,
+		HID_DEVICE(BUS_USB, HID_GROUP_MULTITOUCH_WIN_8,
+			   USB_VENDOR_ID_LENOVO,
+			   USB_DEVICE_ID_LENOVO_X1_TAB3) },
+
 	/* MosArt panels */
 	{ .driver_data = MT_CLS_CONFIDENCE_MINUS_ONE,
 		MT_USB_DEVICE(USB_VENDOR_ID_ASUS,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#56 lore raw

PATCH 57/101 ath9k: hif_usb: fix race condition between usb_get_urb() and usb_kill_anchored_urbs()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Brooke Basile <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 03fb92a432ea5abe5909bca1455b7e44a9380480 ]

Calls to usb_kill_anchored_urbs() after usb_kill_urb() on multiprocessor systems create a race condition in which usb_kill_anchored_urbs() deallocates the URB before the completer callback is called in usb_kill_urb(), resulting in a use-after-free.
To fix this, add proper lock protection to usb_kill_urb() calls that can possibly run concurrently with usb_kill_anchored_urbs().

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/hif_usb.c +19 -0
index 3f563e02d17da..2ed98aaed6fb5 100644
@@ -449,10 +449,19 @@ static void hif_usb_stop(void *hif_handle)
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	/* The pending URBs have to be canceled. */
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(tx_buf, tx_buf_tmp,
 				 &hif_dev->tx.tx_pending, list) {
+		usb_get_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 		usb_kill_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		list_del(&tx_buf->list);
+		usb_free_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		kfree(tx_buf->buf);
+		kfree(tx_buf);
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&hif_dev->mgmt_submitted);
 }
@@ -762,27 +771,37 @@ static void ath9k_hif_usb_dealloc_tx_urbs(struct hif_device_usb *hif_dev)
 	struct tx_buf *tx_buf = NULL, *tx_buf_tmp = NULL;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(tx_buf, tx_buf_tmp,
 				 &hif_dev->tx.tx_buf, list) {
+		usb_get_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 		usb_kill_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		list_del(&tx_buf->list);
 		usb_free_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		kfree(tx_buf->buf);
 		kfree(tx_buf);
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	hif_dev->tx.flags |= HIF_USB_TX_FLUSH;
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
+	spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(tx_buf, tx_buf_tmp,
 				 &hif_dev->tx.tx_pending, list) {
+		usb_get_urb(tx_buf->urb);
+		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 		usb_kill_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		list_del(&tx_buf->list);
 		usb_free_urb(tx_buf->urb);
 		kfree(tx_buf->buf);
 		kfree(tx_buf);
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hif_dev->tx.tx_lock, flags);
 
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&hif_dev->mgmt_submitted);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#44 lore raw

PATCH 45/101 usb: dwc3: Add splitdisable quirk for Hisilicon Kirin Soc

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Yu Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f580170f135af14e287560d94045624d4242d712 ]

SPLIT_BOUNDARY_DISABLE should be set for DesignWare USB3 DRD Core of Hisilicon Kirin Soc when dwc3 core act as host.

[mchehab: dropped a dev_dbg() as only traces are now allowwed on this driver]

---
 drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/usb/dwc3/core.h |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c +25 -0
index 25c686a752b0f..e476e83308bc1 100644
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ static void __dwc3_set_mode(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct dwc3 *dwc = work_to_dwc(work);
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret;
+	u32 reg;
 
 	if (dwc->dr_mode != USB_DR_MODE_OTG)
 		return;
@@ -172,6 +173,11 @@ static void __dwc3_set_mode(struct work_struct *work)
 				otg_set_vbus(dwc->usb2_phy->otg, true);
 			phy_set_mode(dwc->usb2_generic_phy, PHY_MODE_USB_HOST);
 			phy_set_mode(dwc->usb3_generic_phy, PHY_MODE_USB_HOST);
+			if (dwc->dis_split_quirk) {
+				reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUCTL3);
+				reg |= DWC3_GUCTL3_SPLITDISABLE;
+				dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUCTL3, reg);
+			}
 		}
 		break;
 	case DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_DEVICE:
@@ -1357,6 +1363,9 @@ static void dwc3_get_properties(struct dwc3 *dwc)
 	dwc->dis_metastability_quirk = device_property_read_bool(dev,
 				"snps,dis_metastability_quirk");
 
+	dwc->dis_split_quirk = device_property_read_bool(dev,
+				"snps,dis-split-quirk");
+
 	dwc->lpm_nyet_threshold = lpm_nyet_threshold;
 	dwc->tx_de_emphasis = tx_de_emphasis;
 
@@ -1866,10 +1875,26 @@ static int dwc3_resume(struct device *dev)
 
 	return 0;
 }
+
+static void dwc3_complete(struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct dwc3	*dwc = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	u32		reg;
+
+	if (dwc->current_dr_role == DWC3_GCTL_PRTCAP_HOST &&
+			dwc->dis_split_quirk) {
+		reg = dwc3_readl(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUCTL3);
+		reg |= DWC3_GUCTL3_SPLITDISABLE;
+		dwc3_writel(dwc->regs, DWC3_GUCTL3, reg);
+	}
+}
+#else
+#define dwc3_complete NULL
 #endif /* CONFIG_PM_SLEEP */
 
 static const struct dev_pm_ops dwc3_dev_pm_ops = {
 	SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(dwc3_suspend, dwc3_resume)
+	.complete = dwc3_complete,
 	SET_RUNTIME_PM_OPS(dwc3_runtime_suspend, dwc3_runtime_resume,
 			dwc3_runtime_idle)
 };
drivers/usb/dwc3/core.h +7 -0
index 013f42a2b5dcc..af5533b097133 100644
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@
 #define DWC3_GEVNTCOUNT(n)	(0xc40c + ((n) * 0x10))
 
 #define DWC3_GHWPARAMS8		0xc600
+#define DWC3_GUCTL3		0xc60c
 #define DWC3_GFLADJ		0xc630
 
 /* Device Registers */
@@ -380,6 +381,9 @@
 /* Global User Control Register 2 */
 #define DWC3_GUCTL2_RST_ACTBITLATER		BIT(14)
 
+/* Global User Control Register 3 */
+#define DWC3_GUCTL3_SPLITDISABLE		BIT(14)
+
 /* Device Configuration Register */
 #define DWC3_DCFG_DEVADDR(addr)	((addr) << 3)
 #define DWC3_DCFG_DEVADDR_MASK	DWC3_DCFG_DEVADDR(0x7f)
@@ -1052,6 +1056,7 @@ struct dwc3_scratchpad_array {
  * 	2	- No de-emphasis
  * 	3	- Reserved
  * @dis_metastability_quirk: set to disable metastability quirk.
+ * @dis_split_quirk: set to disable split boundary.
  * @imod_interval: set the interrupt moderation interval in 250ns
  *                 increments or 0 to disable.
  */
@@ -1245,6 +1250,8 @@ struct dwc3 {
 
 	unsigned		dis_metastability_quirk:1;
 
+	unsigned		dis_split_quirk:1;
+
 	u16			imod_interval;
 };
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#43 lore raw

PATCH 44/101 misc: vop: add round_up(x,4) for vring_size to avoid kernel panic

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Sherry Sun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cc1a2679865a94b83804822996eed010a50a7c1d ]

Since struct _mic_vring_info and vring are allocated together and follow vring, if the vring_size() is not four bytes aligned, which will cause the start address of struct _mic_vring_info is not four byte aligned. For example, when vring entries is 128, the vring_size() will be 5126 bytes. The _mic_vring_info struct layout in ddr looks like:
0x90002400: 00000000 00390000 EE010000 0000C0FF
Here 0x39 is the avail_idx member, and 0xC0FFEE01 is the magic member.

When EP use ioread32(magic) to reads the magic in RC's share memory, it will cause kernel panic on ARM64 platform due to the cross-byte io read. Here read magic in user space use le32toh(vr0->info->magic) will meet the same issue.
So add round_up(x,4) for vring_size, then the struct _mic_vring_info will store in this way:
0x90002400: 00000000 00000000 00000039 C0FFEE01
Which will avoid kernel panic when read magic in struct _mic_vring_info.

---
 drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_main.c   | 2 +-
 drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_vringh.c | 4 ++--
 samples/mic/mpssd/mpssd.c         | 4 ++--
 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_main.c +1 -1
index 85942f6717c57..8aadc6055df17 100644
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static struct virtqueue *vop_find_vq(struct virtio_device *dev,
 	/* First assign the vring's allocated in host memory */
 	vqconfig = _vop_vq_config(vdev->desc) + index;
 	memcpy_fromio(&config, vqconfig, sizeof(config));
-	_vr_size = vring_size(le16_to_cpu(config.num), MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN);
+	_vr_size = round_up(vring_size(le16_to_cpu(config.num), MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN), 4);
 	vr_size = PAGE_ALIGN(_vr_size + sizeof(struct _mic_vring_info));
 	va = vpdev->hw_ops->remap(vpdev, le64_to_cpu(config.address), vr_size);
 	if (!va)
drivers/misc/mic/vop/vop_vringh.c +2 -2
index d069947b09345..7014ffe88632e 100644
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static int vop_virtio_add_device(struct vop_vdev *vdev,
 
 		num = le16_to_cpu(vqconfig[i].num);
 		mutex_init(&vvr->vr_mutex);
-		vr_size = PAGE_ALIGN(vring_size(num, MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN) +
+		vr_size = PAGE_ALIGN(round_up(vring_size(num, MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN), 4) +
 			sizeof(struct _mic_vring_info));
 		vr->va = (void *)
 			__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO,
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static int vop_virtio_add_device(struct vop_vdev *vdev,
 			goto err;
 		}
 		vr->len = vr_size;
-		vr->info = vr->va + vring_size(num, MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN);
+		vr->info = vr->va + round_up(vring_size(num, MIC_VIRTIO_RING_ALIGN), 4);
 		vr->info->magic = cpu_to_le32(MIC_MAGIC + vdev->virtio_id + i);
 		vr_addr = dma_map_single(&vpdev->dev, vr->va, vr_size,
 					 DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
samples/mic/mpssd/mpssd.c +2 -2
index a11bf6c5b53b4..cd3f16a6f5caf 100644
@@ -403,9 +403,9 @@ mic_virtio_copy(struct mic_info *mic, int fd,
 
 static inline unsigned _vring_size(unsigned int num, unsigned long align)
 {
-	return ((sizeof(struct vring_desc) * num + sizeof(__u16) * (3 + num)
+	return _ALIGN_UP(((sizeof(struct vring_desc) * num + sizeof(__u16) * (3 + num)
 				+ align - 1) & ~(align - 1))
-		+ sizeof(__u16) * 3 + sizeof(struct vring_used_elem) * num;
+		+ sizeof(__u16) * 3 + sizeof(struct vring_used_elem) * num, 4);
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 41/101 scsi: mvumi: Fix error return in mvumi_io_attach()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Jing Xiangfeng <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 055f15ab2cb4a5cbc4c0a775ef3d0066e0fa9b34 ]

Return PTR_ERR() from the error handling case instead of 0.

---
 drivers/scsi/mvumi.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/scsi/mvumi.c +1 -0
index 8906aceda4c43..0354898d7cac1 100644
@@ -2425,6 +2425,7 @@ static int mvumi_io_attach(struct mvumi_hba *mhba)
 	if (IS_ERR(mhba->dm_thread)) {
 		dev_err(&mhba->pdev->dev,
 			"failed to create device scan thread\n");
+		ret = PTR_ERR(mhba->dm_thread);
 		mutex_unlock(&mhba->sas_discovery_mutex);
 		goto fail_create_thread;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 39/101 bpf: Use raw_spin_trylock() for pcpu_freelist_push/pop in NMI

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Song Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 39d8f0d1026a990604770a658708f5845f7dbec0 ]

Recent improvements in LOCKDEP highlighted a potential A-A deadlock with pcpu_freelist in NMI:

./tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_progs -t stacktrace_build_id_nmi

[   18.984807] ================================
[   18.984807] WARNING: inconsistent lock state
[   18.984808] 5.9.0-rc6-01771-g1466de1330e1 #2967 Not tainted
[   18.984809] --------------------------------
[   18.984809] inconsistent {INITIAL USE} -> {IN-NMI} usage.
[   18.984810] test_progs/1990 [HC2[2]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes:
[   18.984810] ffffe8ffffc219c0 (&head->lock){....}-{2:2}, at: __pcpu_freelist_pop+0xe3/0x180
[   18.984813] {INITIAL USE} state was registered at:
[   18.984814]   lock_acquire+0x175/0x7c0
[   18.984814]   _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40
[   18.984815]   __pcpu_freelist_pop+0xe3/0x180
[   18.984815]   pcpu_freelist_pop+0x31/0x40
[   18.984816]   htab_map_alloc+0xbbf/0xf40
[   18.984816]   __do_sys_bpf+0x5aa/0x3ed0
[   18.984817]   do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x40
[   18.984818]   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[   18.984818] irq event stamp: 12
[...]
[   18.984822] other info that might help us debug this:
[   18.984823]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   18.984823]
[   18.984824]        CPU0
[   18.984824]        ----
[   18.984824]   lock(&head->lock);
[   18.984826]   <Interrupt>
[   18.984826]     lock(&head->lock);
[   18.984827]
[   18.984828]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   18.984828]
[   18.984829] 2 locks held by test_progs/1990:
[...]
[   18.984838]  <NMI>
[   18.984838]  dump_stack+0x9a/0xd0
[   18.984839]  lock_acquire+0x5c9/0x7c0
[   18.984839]  ? lock_release+0x6f0/0x6f0
[   18.984840]  ? __pcpu_freelist_pop+0xe3/0x180
[   18.984840]  _raw_spin_lock+0x2c/0x40
[   18.984841]  ? __pcpu_freelist_pop+0xe3/0x180
[   18.984841]  __pcpu_freelist_pop+0xe3/0x180
[   18.984842]  pcpu_freelist_pop+0x17/0x40
[   18.984842]  ? lock_release+0x6f0/0x6f0
[   18.984843]  __bpf_get_stackid+0x534/0xaf0
[   18.984843]  bpf_prog_1fd9e30e1438d3c5_oncpu+0x73/0x350
[   18.984844]  bpf_overflow_handler+0x12f/0x3f0

This is because pcpu_freelist_head.lock is accessed in both NMI and non-NMI context. Fix this issue by using raw_spin_trylock() in NMI.

Since NMI interrupts non-NMI context, when NMI context tries to lock the raw_spinlock, non-NMI context of the same CPU may already have locked a lock and is blocked from unlocking the lock. For a system with N CPUs, there could be N NMIs at the same time, and they may block N non-NMI raw_spinlocks. This is tricky for pcpu_freelist_push(), where unlike _pop(), failing _push() means leaking memory. This issue is more likely to trigger in non-SMP system.

Fix this issue with an extra list, pcpu_freelist.extralist. The extralist is primarily used to take _push() when raw_spin_trylock() failed on all the per CPU lists. It should be empty most of the time. The following table summarizes the behavior of pcpu_freelist in NMI and non-NMI:

non-NMI pop(): use _lock(); check per CPU lists first;
if all per CPU lists are empty, check extralist; if extralist is empty, return NULL.

non-NMI push(): use _lock(); only push to per CPU lists.

NMI pop(): use _trylock(); check per CPU lists first;
if all per CPU lists are locked or empty, check extralist; if extralist is locked or empty, return NULL.

NMI push(): use _trylock(); check per CPU lists first;
if all per CPU lists are locked; try push to extralist; if extralist is also locked, keep trying on per CPU lists.

---
 kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.h |   1 +
 2 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.c +96 -5
index b367430e611c7..3d897de890612 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ int pcpu_freelist_init(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
 		raw_spin_lock_init(&head->lock);
 		head->first = NULL;
 	}
+	raw_spin_lock_init(&s->extralist.lock);
+	s->extralist.first = NULL;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -40,12 +42,50 @@ static inline void ___pcpu_freelist_push(struct pcpu_freelist_head *head,
 	raw_spin_unlock(&head->lock);
 }
 
+static inline bool pcpu_freelist_try_push_extra(struct pcpu_freelist *s,
+						struct pcpu_freelist_node *node)
+{
+	if (!raw_spin_trylock(&s->extralist.lock))
+		return false;
+
+	pcpu_freelist_push_node(&s->extralist, node);
+	raw_spin_unlock(&s->extralist.lock);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void ___pcpu_freelist_push_nmi(struct pcpu_freelist *s,
+					     struct pcpu_freelist_node *node)
+{
+	int cpu, orig_cpu;
+
+	orig_cpu = cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	while (1) {
+		struct pcpu_freelist_head *head;
+
+		head = per_cpu_ptr(s->freelist, cpu);
+		if (raw_spin_trylock(&head->lock)) {
+			pcpu_freelist_push_node(head, node);
+			raw_spin_unlock(&head->lock);
+			return;
+		}
+		cpu = cpumask_next(cpu, cpu_possible_mask);
+		if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
+			cpu = 0;
+
+		/* cannot lock any per cpu lock, try extralist */
+		if (cpu == orig_cpu &&
+		    pcpu_freelist_try_push_extra(s, node))
+			return;
+	}
+}
+
 void __pcpu_freelist_push(struct pcpu_freelist *s,
 			struct pcpu_freelist_node *node)
 {
-	struct pcpu_freelist_head *head = this_cpu_ptr(s->freelist);
-
-	___pcpu_freelist_push(head, node);
+	if (in_nmi())
+		___pcpu_freelist_push_nmi(s, node);
+	else
+		___pcpu_freelist_push(this_cpu_ptr(s->freelist), node);
 }
 
 void pcpu_freelist_push(struct pcpu_freelist *s,
@@ -81,7 +121,7 @@ void pcpu_freelist_populate(struct pcpu_freelist *s, void *buf, u32 elem_size,
 	}
 }
 
-struct pcpu_freelist_node *__pcpu_freelist_pop(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
+static struct pcpu_freelist_node *___pcpu_freelist_pop(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
 {
 	struct pcpu_freelist_head *head;
 	struct pcpu_freelist_node *node;
@@ -102,8 +142,59 @@ struct pcpu_freelist_node *__pcpu_freelist_pop(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
 		if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
 			cpu = 0;
 		if (cpu == orig_cpu)
-			return NULL;
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/* per cpu lists are all empty, try extralist */
+	raw_spin_lock(&s->extralist.lock);
+	node = s->extralist.first;
+	if (node)
+		s->extralist.first = node->next;
+	raw_spin_unlock(&s->extralist.lock);
+	return node;
+}
+
+static struct pcpu_freelist_node *
+___pcpu_freelist_pop_nmi(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
+{
+	struct pcpu_freelist_head *head;
+	struct pcpu_freelist_node *node;
+	int orig_cpu, cpu;
+
+	orig_cpu = cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+	while (1) {
+		head = per_cpu_ptr(s->freelist, cpu);
+		if (raw_spin_trylock(&head->lock)) {
+			node = head->first;
+			if (node) {
+				head->first = node->next;
+				raw_spin_unlock(&head->lock);
+				return node;
+			}
+			raw_spin_unlock(&head->lock);
+		}
+		cpu = cpumask_next(cpu, cpu_possible_mask);
+		if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids)
+			cpu = 0;
+		if (cpu == orig_cpu)
+			break;
 	}
+
+	/* cannot pop from per cpu lists, try extralist */
+	if (!raw_spin_trylock(&s->extralist.lock))
+		return NULL;
+	node = s->extralist.first;
+	if (node)
+		s->extralist.first = node->next;
+	raw_spin_unlock(&s->extralist.lock);
+	return node;
+}
+
+struct pcpu_freelist_node *__pcpu_freelist_pop(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
+{
+	if (in_nmi())
+		return ___pcpu_freelist_pop_nmi(s);
+	return ___pcpu_freelist_pop(s);
 }
 
 struct pcpu_freelist_node *pcpu_freelist_pop(struct pcpu_freelist *s)
kernel/bpf/percpu_freelist.h +1 -0
index fbf8a8a289791..3c76553cfe571 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ struct pcpu_freelist_head {
 
 struct pcpu_freelist {
 	struct pcpu_freelist_head __percpu *freelist;
+	struct pcpu_freelist_head extralist;
 };
 
 struct pcpu_freelist_node {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 40/101 PM: hibernate: remove the bogus call to get_gendisk() in software_resume()

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 428805c0c5e76ef643b1fbc893edfb636b3d8aef ]

get_gendisk grabs a reference on the disk and file operation, so this code will leak both of them while having absolutely no use for the gendisk itself.

This effectively reverts commit 2df83fa4bce421f ("PM / Hibernate: Use get_gendisk to verify partition if resume_file is integer format")

---
 kernel/power/hibernate.c | 11 -----------
 1 file changed, 11 deletions(-)
kernel/power/hibernate.c +0 -11
index 02ec716a49271..0e60e10ed66a3 100644
@@ -851,17 +851,6 @@ static int software_resume(void)
 
 	/* Check if the device is there */
 	swsusp_resume_device = name_to_dev_t(resume_file);
-
-	/*
-	 * name_to_dev_t is ineffective to verify parition if resume_file is in
-	 * integer format. (e.g. major:minor)
-	 */
-	if (isdigit(resume_file[0]) && resume_wait) {
-		int partno;
-		while (!get_gendisk(swsusp_resume_device, &partno))
-			msleep(10);
-	}
-
 	if (!swsusp_resume_device) {
 		/*
 		 * Some device discovery might still be in progress; we need
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

PATCH 38/101 libbpf: Close map fd if init map slots failed

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a0f2b7acb4b1d29127ff99c714233b973afd1411 ]

Previously we forgot to close the map fd if bpf_map_update_elem() failed during map slot init, which will leak map fd.

Let's move map slot initialization to new function init_map_slots() to simplify the code. And close the map fd if init slot failed.

---
 tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +34 -21
index 236c91aff48f8..bafc0524a83a7 100644
@@ -3677,6 +3677,36 @@ static int bpf_object__create_map(struct bpf_object *obj, struct bpf_map *map)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int init_map_slots(struct bpf_map *map)
+{
+	const struct bpf_map *targ_map;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int fd, err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < map->init_slots_sz; i++) {
+		if (!map->init_slots[i])
+			continue;
+
+		targ_map = map->init_slots[i];
+		fd = bpf_map__fd(targ_map);
+		err = bpf_map_update_elem(map->fd, &i, &fd, 0);
+		if (err) {
+			err = -errno;
+			pr_warn("map '%s': failed to initialize slot [%d] to map '%s' fd=%d: %d\n",
+				map->name, i, targ_map->name,
+				fd, err);
+			return err;
+		}
+		pr_debug("map '%s': slot [%d] set to map '%s' fd=%d\n",
+			 map->name, i, targ_map->name, fd);
+	}
+
+	zfree(&map->init_slots);
+	map->init_slots_sz = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int
 bpf_object__create_maps(struct bpf_object *obj)
 {
@@ -3719,28 +3749,11 @@ bpf_object__create_maps(struct bpf_object *obj)
 		}
 
 		if (map->init_slots_sz) {
-			for (j = 0; j < map->init_slots_sz; j++) {
-				const struct bpf_map *targ_map;
-				int fd;
-
-				if (!map->init_slots[j])
-					continue;
-
-				targ_map = map->init_slots[j];
-				fd = bpf_map__fd(targ_map);
-				err = bpf_map_update_elem(map->fd, &j, &fd, 0);
-				if (err) {
-					err = -errno;
-					pr_warn("map '%s': failed to initialize slot [%d] to map '%s' fd=%d: %d\n",
-						map->name, j, targ_map->name,
-						fd, err);
-					goto err_out;
-				}
-				pr_debug("map '%s': slot [%d] set to map '%s' fd=%d\n",
-					 map->name, j, targ_map->name, fd);
+			err = init_map_slots(map);
+			if (err < 0) {
+				zclose(map->fd);
+				goto err_out;
 			}
-			zfree(&map->init_slots);
-			map->init_slots_sz = 0;
 		}
 
 		if (map->pin_path && !map->pinned) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#35 lore raw

PATCH 36/101 mac80211: handle lack of sband->bitrates in rates

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Thomas Pedersen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8b783d104e7f40684333d2ec155fac39219beb2f ]

Even though a driver or mac80211 shouldn't produce a legacy bitrate if sband->bitrates doesn't exist, don't crash if that is the case either.

This fixes a kernel panic if station dump is run before last_rate can be updated with a data frame when sband->bitrates is missing (eg. in S1G bands).

---
 net/mac80211/cfg.c      | 3 ++-
 net/mac80211/sta_info.c | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/mac80211/cfg.c +2 -1
index 1079a07e43e49..d74cfec685477 100644
@@ -709,7 +709,8 @@ void sta_set_rate_info_tx(struct sta_info *sta,
 		u16 brate;
 
 		sband = ieee80211_get_sband(sta->sdata);
-		if (sband) {
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(sband && !sband->bitrates);
+		if (sband && sband->bitrates) {
 			brate = sband->bitrates[rate->idx].bitrate;
 			rinfo->legacy = DIV_ROUND_UP(brate, 1 << shift);
 		}
net/mac80211/sta_info.c +4 -0
index 05e966f1609e2..b93916c382cdb 100644
@@ -2122,6 +2122,10 @@ static void sta_stats_decode_rate(struct ieee80211_local *local, u32 rate,
 		int rate_idx = STA_STATS_GET(LEGACY_IDX, rate);
 
 		sband = local->hw.wiphy->bands[band];
+
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sband->bitrates))
+			break;
+
 		brate = sband->bitrates[rate_idx].bitrate;
 		if (rinfo->bw == RATE_INFO_BW_5)
 			shift = 2;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 32/101 media: venus: core: Fix runtime PM imbalance in venus_probe

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bbe516e976fce538db96bd2b7287df942faa14a3 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced. For other error paths after this call, things are the same.

Fix this by adding pm_runtime_put_noidle() after 'err_runtime_disable' label. But in this case, the error path after pm_runtime_put_sync() will decrease PM usage counter twice. Thus add an extra pm_runtime_get_noresume() in this path to balance PM counter.

---
 drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/core.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/core.c +4 -1
index bfcaba37d60fe..321ad77cb6cf4 100644
@@ -289,8 +289,10 @@ static int venus_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		goto err_core_deinit;
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_put_sync(dev);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		pm_runtime_get_noresume(dev);
 		goto err_dev_unregister;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 
@@ -301,6 +303,7 @@ static int venus_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 err_venus_shutdown:
 	venus_shutdown(core);
 err_runtime_disable:
+	pm_runtime_put_noidle(dev);
 	pm_runtime_set_suspended(dev);
 	pm_runtime_disable(dev);
 	hfi_destroy(core);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 27/101 media: saa7134: avoid a shift overflow

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 15a36aae1ec1c1f17149b6113b92631791830740 ]

As reported by smatch:

	drivers/media/pci/saa7134//saa7134-tvaudio.c:686 saa_dsp_writel() warn: should 'reg << 2' be a 64 bit type?

On a 64-bits Kernel, the shift might be bigger than 32 bits.

In real, this should never happen, but let's shut up the warning.

---
 drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-tvaudio.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/pci/saa7134/saa7134-tvaudio.c +2 -1
index 79e1afb710758..5cc4ef21f9d37 100644
@@ -683,7 +683,8 @@ int saa_dsp_writel(struct saa7134_dev *dev, int reg, u32 value)
 {
 	int err;
 
-	audio_dbg(2, "dsp write reg 0x%x = 0x%06x\n", reg << 2, value);
+	audio_dbg(2, "dsp write reg 0x%x = 0x%06x\n",
+		  (reg << 2) & 0xffffffff, value);
 	err = saa_dsp_wait_bit(dev,SAA7135_DSP_RWSTATE_WRR);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#28 lore raw

PATCH 29/101 media: venus: fixes for list corruption

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Vikash Garodia <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e1c69c4eef61ffe295b747992c6fd849e6cd747d ]

There are few list handling issues while adding and deleting node in the registered buf list in the driver.
1. list addition - buffer added into the list during buf_init while not deleted during cleanup.
2. list deletion - In capture streamoff, the list was reinitialized. As a result, if any node was present in the list, it would lead to issue while cleaning up that node during buf_cleanup.

Corresponding call traces below:

[  165.751014] Call trace:
[  165.753541]  __list_add_valid+0x58/0x88
[  165.757532]  venus_helper_vb2_buf_init+0x74/0xa8 [venus_core]
[  165.763450]  vdec_buf_init+0x34/0xb4 [venus_dec]
[  165.768271]  __buf_prepare+0x598/0x8a0 [videobuf2_common]
[  165.773820]  vb2_core_qbuf+0xb4/0x334 [videobuf2_common]
[  165.779298]  vb2_qbuf+0x78/0xb8 [videobuf2_v4l2]
[  165.784053]  v4l2_m2m_qbuf+0x80/0xf8 [v4l2_mem2mem]
[  165.789067]  v4l2_m2m_ioctl_qbuf+0x2c/0x38 [v4l2_mem2mem]
[  165.794624]  v4l_qbuf+0x48/0x58
[ 1797.556001] Call trace:
[ 1797.558516]  __list_del_entry_valid+0x88/0x9c
[ 1797.562989]  vdec_buf_cleanup+0x54/0x228 [venus_dec]
[ 1797.568088]  __buf_prepare+0x270/0x8a0 [videobuf2_common]
[ 1797.573625]  vb2_core_qbuf+0xb4/0x338 [videobuf2_common]
[ 1797.579082]  vb2_qbuf+0x78/0xb8 [videobuf2_v4l2]
[ 1797.583830]  v4l2_m2m_qbuf+0x80/0xf8 [v4l2_mem2mem]
[ 1797.588843]  v4l2_m2m_ioctl_qbuf+0x2c/0x38 [v4l2_mem2mem]
[ 1797.594389]  v4l_qbuf+0x48/0x58
---
 drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/vdec.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/qcom/venus/vdec.c +8 -2
index 7c4c483d54389..76be14efbfb09 100644
@@ -1088,8 +1088,6 @@ static int vdec_stop_capture(struct venus_inst *inst)
 		break;
 	}
 
-	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&inst->registeredbufs);
-
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1189,6 +1187,14 @@ static int vdec_buf_init(struct vb2_buffer *vb)
 static void vdec_buf_cleanup(struct vb2_buffer *vb)
 {
 	struct venus_inst *inst = vb2_get_drv_priv(vb->vb2_queue);
+	struct vb2_v4l2_buffer *vbuf = to_vb2_v4l2_buffer(vb);
+	struct venus_buffer *buf = to_venus_buffer(vbuf);
+
+	mutex_lock(&inst->lock);
+	if (vb->type == V4L2_BUF_TYPE_VIDEO_CAPTURE_MPLANE)
+		if (!list_empty(&inst->registeredbufs))
+			list_del_init(&buf->reg_list);
+	mutex_unlock(&inst->lock);
 
 	inst->buf_count--;
 	if (!inst->buf_count)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 28/101 media: atomisp: fix memleak in ia_css_stream_create

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c1bca5b5ced0cbd779d56f60cdbc9f5e6f6449fe ]

When aspect_ratio_crop_init() fails, curr_stream needs to be freed just like what we've done in the following error paths. However, current code is returning directly and ends up leaking memory.

---
 drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/staging/media/atomisp/pci/sh_css.c +1 -1
index 54434c2dbaf90..8473e14370747 100644
@@ -9521,7 +9521,7 @@ ia_css_stream_create(const struct ia_css_stream_config *stream_config,
 	if (err)
 	{
 		IA_CSS_LEAVE_ERR(err);
-		return err;
+		goto ERR;
 	}
 #endif
 	for (i = 0; i < num_pipes; i++)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#23 lore raw

PATCH 24/101 media: uvcvideo: Ensure all probed info is returned to v4l2

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Adam Goode <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8a652a17e3c005dcdae31b6c8fdf14382a29cbbe ]

bFrameIndex and bFormatIndex can be negotiated by the camera during probing, resulting in the camera choosing a different format than expected. v4l2 can already accommodate such changes, but the code was not updating the proper fields.

Without such a change, v4l2 would potentially interpret the payload incorrectly, causing corrupted output. This was happening on the Elgato HD60 S+, which currently always renegotiates to format 1.

As an aside, the Elgato firmware is buggy and should not be renegotating, but it is still a valid thing for the camera to do. Both macOS and Windows will properly probe and read uncorrupted images from this camera.

With this change, both qv4l2 and chromium can now read uncorrupted video from the Elgato HD60 S+.

[Add blank lines, remove periods at the of messages]

---
 drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
drivers/media/usb/uvc/uvc_v4l2.c +30 -0
index 0335e69b70abe..5e6f3153b5ff8 100644
@@ -247,11 +247,41 @@ static int uvc_v4l2_try_format(struct uvc_streaming *stream,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto done;
 
+	/* After the probe, update fmt with the values returned from
+	 * negotiation with the device.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < stream->nformats; ++i) {
+		if (probe->bFormatIndex == stream->format[i].index) {
+			format = &stream->format[i];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (i == stream->nformats) {
+		uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_FORMAT, "Unknown bFormatIndex %u\n",
+			  probe->bFormatIndex);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < format->nframes; ++i) {
+		if (probe->bFrameIndex == format->frame[i].bFrameIndex) {
+			frame = &format->frame[i];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (i == format->nframes) {
+		uvc_trace(UVC_TRACE_FORMAT, "Unknown bFrameIndex %u\n",
+			  probe->bFrameIndex);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	fmt->fmt.pix.width = frame->wWidth;
 	fmt->fmt.pix.height = frame->wHeight;
 	fmt->fmt.pix.field = V4L2_FIELD_NONE;
 	fmt->fmt.pix.bytesperline = uvc_v4l2_get_bytesperline(format, frame);
 	fmt->fmt.pix.sizeimage = probe->dwMaxVideoFrameSize;
+	fmt->fmt.pix.pixelformat = format->fcc;
 	fmt->fmt.pix.colorspace = format->colorspace;
 
 	if (uvc_format != NULL)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

PATCH 25/101 seccomp: kill process instead of thread for unknown actions

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Rich Felker <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4d671d922d51907bc41f1f7f2dc737c928ae78fd ]

Asynchronous termination of a thread outside of the userspace thread library's knowledge is an unsafe operation that leaves the process in an inconsistent, corrupt, and possibly unrecoverable state. In order to make new actions that may be added in the future safe on kernels not aware of them, change the default action from SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD to SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS.

[kees: Fixed up coredump selection logic to match]
---
 kernel/seccomp.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/seccomp.c +4 -4
index 54cf84bac3c9b..af1e43ddb9401 100644
@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
 	default:
 		seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action, true);
 		/* Dump core only if this is the last remaining thread. */
-		if (action == SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS ||
+		if (action != SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD ||
 		    get_nr_threads(current) == 1) {
 			kernel_siginfo_t info;
 
@@ -918,10 +918,10 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
 			seccomp_init_siginfo(&info, this_syscall, data);
 			do_coredump(&info);
 		}
-		if (action == SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS)
-			do_group_exit(SIGSYS);
-		else
+		if (action == SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD)
 			do_exit(SIGSYS);
+		else
+			do_group_exit(SIGSYS);
 	}
 
 	unreachable();
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#21 lore raw

PATCH 22/101 x86/mce: Make mce_rdmsrl() panic on an inaccessible MSR

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e2def7d49d0812ea40a224161b2001b2e815dce2 ]

If an exception needs to be handled while reading an MSR - which is in most of the cases caused by a #GP on a non-existent MSR - then this is most likely the incarnation of a BIOS or a hardware bug. Such bug violates the architectural guarantee that MCA banks are present with all MSRs belonging to them.

The proper fix belongs in the hardware/firmware - not in the kernel.

Handling an #MC exception which is raised while an NMI is being handled would cause the nasty NMI nesting issue because of the shortcoming of IRET of reenabling NMIs when executed. And the machine is in an #MC context already so <Deity> be at its side.

Tracing MSR accesses while in #MC is another no-no due to tracing being inherently a bad idea in atomic context:

vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: do_machine_check()+0x4a: call to mce_rdmsrl() leaves .noinstr.text section

so remove all that "additional" functionality from mce_rdmsrl() and provide it with a special exception handler which panics the machine when that MSR is not accessible.

The exception handler prints a human-readable message explaining what the panic reason is but, what is more, it panics while in the #GP handler and latter won't have executed an IRET, thus opening the NMI nesting issue in the case when the #MC has happened while handling an NMI. (#MC itself won't be reenabled until MCG_STATUS hasn't been cleared).

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c     | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h | 10 +++++
 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c +60 -12
index d8dca24feccbe..07673a034d39c 100644
@@ -370,10 +370,28 @@ static int msr_to_offset(u32 msr)
 	return -1;
 }
 
+__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+				      unsigned long error_code,
+				      unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+	pr_emerg("MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
+		 (unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip);
+
+	show_stack_regs(regs);
+
+	panic("MCA architectural violation!\n");
+
+	while (true)
+		cpu_relax();
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 /* MSR access wrappers used for error injection */
 static noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
 {
-	u64 v;
+	DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
 
 	if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
 		int offset;
@@ -392,21 +410,43 @@ static noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	if (rdmsrl_safe(msr, &v)) {
-		WARN_ONCE(1, "mce: Unable to read MSR 0x%x!\n", msr);
-		/*
-		 * Return zero in case the access faulted. This should
-		 * not happen normally but can happen if the CPU does
-		 * something weird, or if the code is buggy.
-		 */
-		v = 0;
-	}
+	/*
+	 * RDMSR on MCA MSRs should not fault. If they do, this is very much an
+	 * architectural violation and needs to be reported to hw vendor. Panic
+	 * the box to not allow any further progress.
+	 */
+	asm volatile("1: rdmsr\n"
+		     "2:\n"
+		     _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_rdmsr_fault)
+		     : EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high) : "c" (msr));
 
-	return v;
+
+	return EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high);
+}
+
+__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+				      unsigned long error_code,
+				      unsigned long fault_addr)
+{
+	pr_emerg("MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
+		 (unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx, (unsigned int)regs->ax,
+		  regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip);
+
+	show_stack_regs(regs);
+
+	panic("MCA architectural violation!\n");
+
+	while (true)
+		cpu_relax();
+
+	return true;
 }
 
 static noinstr void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
 {
+	u32 low, high;
+
 	if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
 		int offset;
 
@@ -420,7 +460,15 @@ static noinstr void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
 
 		return;
 	}
-	wrmsrl(msr, v);
+
+	low  = (u32)v;
+	high = (u32)(v >> 32);
+
+	/* See comment in mce_rdmsrl() */
+	asm volatile("1: wrmsr\n"
+		     "2:\n"
+		     _ASM_EXTABLE_HANDLE(1b, 2b, ex_handler_wrmsr_fault)
+		     : : "c" (msr), "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
 }
 
 /*
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h +10 -0
index 6473070b5da49..b122610e9046a 100644
@@ -185,4 +185,14 @@ extern bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m);
 static inline bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m)			{ return false; };
 #endif
 
+__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+				      unsigned long error_code,
+				      unsigned long fault_addr);
+
+__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+				      struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+				      unsigned long error_code,
+				      unsigned long fault_addr);
+
 #endif /* __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__ */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#20 lore raw

PATCH 21/101 spi: fsi: Fix clock running too fast

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Brad Bishop <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0b546bbe9474ff23e6843916ad6d567f703b2396 ]

Use a clock divider tuned to a 200MHz FSI bus frequency (the maximum). Use of the previous divider at 200MHz results in corrupt data from endpoint devices. Ideally the clock divider would be calculated from the FSI clock, but that would require some significant work on the FSI driver. With FSI frequencies slower than 200MHz, the SPI clock will simply run slower, but safely.

---
 drivers/spi/spi-fsi.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/spi/spi-fsi.c +1 -1
index 37a3e0f8e7526..6e6b3c6437288 100644
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ static int fsi_spi_transfer_init(struct fsi_spi *ctx)
 	u64 status = 0ULL;
 	u64 wanted_clock_cfg = SPI_FSI_CLOCK_CFG_ECC_DISABLE |
 		SPI_FSI_CLOCK_CFG_SCK_NO_DEL |
-		FIELD_PREP(SPI_FSI_CLOCK_CFG_SCK_DIV, 4);
+		FIELD_PREP(SPI_FSI_CLOCK_CFG_SCK_DIV, 19);
 
 	end = jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(SPI_FSI_INIT_TIMEOUT_MS);
 	do {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 17/101 media: bdisp: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dbd2f2dc025f9be8ae063e4f270099677238f620 ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-v4l2.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-v4l2.c +1 -2
index af2d5eb782cee..e1d150584bdc2 100644
@@ -1371,7 +1371,7 @@ static int bdisp_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "failed to set PM\n");
-		goto err_dbg;
+		goto err_pm;
 	}
 
 	/* Filters */
@@ -1399,7 +1399,6 @@ static int bdisp_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	bdisp_hw_free_filters(bdisp->dev);
 err_pm:
 	pm_runtime_put(dev);
-err_dbg:
 	bdisp_debugfs_remove(bdisp);
 err_v4l2:
 	v4l2_device_unregister(&bdisp->v4l2_dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#19 lore raw

PATCH 20/101 crypto: hisilicon - fixed memory allocation error

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Longfang Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 24efcec2919afa7d56f848c83a605b46c8042a53 ]

1. Fix the bug of 'mac' memory leak as allocating 'pbuf' failing.
2. Fix the bug of 'qps' leak as allocating 'qp_ctx' failing.

---
 drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/hisilicon/sec2/sec_crypto.c +12 -4
index 64614a9bdf219..047826f18bd35 100644
@@ -332,11 +332,14 @@ static int sec_alg_resource_alloc(struct sec_ctx *ctx,
 		ret = sec_alloc_pbuf_resource(dev, res);
 		if (ret) {
 			dev_err(dev, "fail to alloc pbuf dma resource!\n");
-			goto alloc_fail;
+			goto alloc_pbuf_fail;
 		}
 	}
 
 	return 0;
+alloc_pbuf_fail:
+	if (ctx->alg_type == SEC_AEAD)
+		sec_free_mac_resource(dev, qp_ctx->res);
 alloc_fail:
 	sec_free_civ_resource(dev, res);
 
@@ -447,8 +450,10 @@ static int sec_ctx_base_init(struct sec_ctx *ctx)
 	ctx->fake_req_limit = QM_Q_DEPTH >> 1;
 	ctx->qp_ctx = kcalloc(sec->ctx_q_num, sizeof(struct sec_qp_ctx),
 			      GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!ctx->qp_ctx)
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!ctx->qp_ctx) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto err_destroy_qps;
+	}
 
 	for (i = 0; i < sec->ctx_q_num; i++) {
 		ret = sec_create_qp_ctx(&sec->qm, ctx, i, 0);
@@ -457,12 +462,15 @@ static int sec_ctx_base_init(struct sec_ctx *ctx)
 	}
 
 	return 0;
+
 err_sec_release_qp_ctx:
 	for (i = i - 1; i >= 0; i--)
 		sec_release_qp_ctx(ctx, &ctx->qp_ctx[i]);
 
-	sec_destroy_qps(ctx->qps, sec->ctx_q_num);
 	kfree(ctx->qp_ctx);
+err_destroy_qps:
+	sec_destroy_qps(ctx->qps, sec->ctx_q_num);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 14/101 media: vsp1: Fix runtime PM imbalance on error

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Dinghao Liu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 98fae901c8883640202802174a4bd70a1b9118bd ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code. Thus a pairing decrement is needed on the error handling path to keep the counter balanced.

---
 drivers/media/platform/vsp1/vsp1_drv.c | 11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/platform/vsp1/vsp1_drv.c +8 -3
index c650e45bb0ad1..dc62533cf32ce 100644
@@ -562,7 +562,12 @@ int vsp1_device_get(struct vsp1_device *vsp1)
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(vsp1->dev);
-	return ret < 0 ? ret : 0;
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		pm_runtime_put_noidle(vsp1->dev);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -845,12 +850,12 @@ static int vsp1_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	/* Configure device parameters based on the version register. */
 	pm_runtime_enable(&pdev->dev);
 
-	ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(&pdev->dev);
+	ret = vsp1_device_get(vsp1);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto done;
 
 	vsp1->version = vsp1_read(vsp1, VI6_IP_VERSION);
-	pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev);
+	vsp1_device_put(vsp1);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vsp1_device_infos); ++i) {
 		if ((vsp1->version & VI6_IP_VERSION_MODEL_MASK) ==
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 10/101 media: sti: Fix reference count leaks

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Qiushi Wu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6f4432bae9f2d12fc1815b5e26cc07e69bcad0df ]

pm_runtime_get_sync() increments the runtime PM usage counter even when it returns an error code, causing incorrect ref count if pm_runtime_put_noidle() is not called in error handling paths. Thus call pm_runtime_put_noidle() if pm_runtime_get_sync() fails.

---
 drivers/media/platform/sti/hva/hva-hw.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/media/platform/sti/hva/hva-hw.c +2 -0
index 401aaafa17109..bb13348be0832 100644
@@ -272,6 +272,7 @@ static unsigned long int hva_hw_get_ip_version(struct hva_dev *hva)
 
 	if (pm_runtime_get_sync(dev) < 0) {
 		dev_err(dev, "%s     failed to get pm_runtime\n", HVA_PREFIX);
+		pm_runtime_put_noidle(dev);
 		mutex_unlock(&hva->protect_mutex);
 		return -EFAULT;
 	}
@@ -553,6 +554,7 @@ void hva_hw_dump_regs(struct hva_dev *hva, struct seq_file *s)
 
 	if (pm_runtime_get_sync(dev) < 0) {
 		seq_puts(s, "Cannot wake up IP\n");
+		pm_runtime_put_noidle(dev);
 		mutex_unlock(&hva->protect_mutex);
 		return;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 9/101 media: st-delta: Fix reference count leak in delta_run_work

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Aditya Pakki <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 57cc666d36adc7b45e37ba4cd7bc4e44ec4c43d7 ]

delta_run_work() calls delta_get_sync() that increments the reference counter. In case of failure, decrement the reference count by calling delta_put_autosuspend().

---
 drivers/media/platform/sti/delta/delta-v4l2.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/platform/sti/delta/delta-v4l2.c +3 -1
index 2503224eeee51..c691b3d81549d 100644
@@ -954,8 +954,10 @@ static void delta_run_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	/* enable the hardware */
 	if (!dec->pm) {
 		ret = delta_get_sync(ctx);
-		if (ret)
+		if (ret) {
+			delta_put_autosuspend(ctx);
 			goto err;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/* decode this access unit */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 7/101 media: firewire: fix memory leak

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Pavel Machek <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b28e32798c78a346788d412f1958f36bb760ec03 ]

Fix memory leak in node_probe.

---
 drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-fw.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/media/firewire/firedtv-fw.c +4 -2
index 3f1ca40b9b987..8a8585261bb80 100644
@@ -272,8 +272,10 @@ static int node_probe(struct fw_unit *unit, const struct ieee1394_device_id *id)
 
 	name_len = fw_csr_string(unit->directory, CSR_MODEL,
 				 name, sizeof(name));
-	if (name_len < 0)
-		return name_len;
+	if (name_len < 0) {
+		err = name_len;
+		goto fail_free;
+	}
 	for (i = ARRAY_SIZE(model_names); --i; )
 		if (strlen(model_names[i]) <= name_len &&
 		    strncmp(name, model_names[i], name_len) == 0)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 5/101 x86/asm: Replace __force_order with a memory clobber

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Arvind Sankar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit aa5cacdc29d76a005cbbee018a47faa6e724dd2d ]

The CRn accessor functions use __force_order as a dummy operand to prevent the compiler from reordering CRn reads/writes with respect to each other.

The fact that the asm is volatile should be enough to prevent this:
volatile asm statements should be executed in program order. However GCC 4.9.x and 5.x have a bug that might result in reordering. This was fixed in 8.1, 7.3 and 6.5. Versions prior to these, including 5.x and 4.9.x, may reorder volatile asm statements with respect to each other.

There are some issues with __force_order as implemented:
- It is used only as an input operand for the write functions, and hence doesn't do anything additional to prevent reordering writes.
- It allows memory accesses to be cached/reordered across write functions, but CRn writes affect the semantics of memory accesses, so this could be dangerous.
- __force_order is not actually defined in the kernel proper, but the LLVM toolchain can in some cases require a definition: LLVM (as well as GCC 4.9) requires it for PIE code, which is why the compressed kernel has a definition, but also the clang integrated assembler may consider the address of __force_order to be significant, resulting in a reference that requires a definition.

Fix this by:
- Using a memory clobber for the write functions to additionally prevent caching/reordering memory accesses across CRn writes.
- Using a dummy input operand with an arbitrary constant address for the read functions, instead of a global variable. This will prevent reads from being reordered across writes, while allowing memory loads to be cached/reordered across CRn reads, which should be safe.

---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c |  9 ---------
 arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h  | 28 ++++++++++++++-------------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c          |  4 ++--
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable_64.c +0 -9
index c8862696a47b9..7d0394f4ebf97 100644
@@ -5,15 +5,6 @@
 #include "pgtable.h"
 #include "../string.h"
 
-/*
- * __force_order is used by special_insns.h asm code to force instruction
- * serialization.
- *
- * It is not referenced from the code, but GCC < 5 with -fPIE would fail
- * due to an undefined symbol. Define it to make these ancient GCCs work.
- */
-unsigned long __force_order;
-
 #define BIOS_START_MIN		0x20000U	/* 128K, less than this is insane */
 #define BIOS_START_MAX		0x9f000U	/* 640K, absolute maximum */
 
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h +15 -13
index eb8e781c43539..b8f7c9659ef6b 100644
@@ -11,45 +11,47 @@
 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
 
 /*
- * Volatile isn't enough to prevent the compiler from reordering the
- * read/write functions for the control registers and messing everything up.
- * A memory clobber would solve the problem, but would prevent reordering of
- * all loads stores around it, which can hurt performance. Solution is to
- * use a variable and mimic reads and writes to it to enforce serialization
+ * The compiler should not reorder volatile asm statements with respect to each
+ * other: they should execute in program order. However GCC 4.9.x and 5.x have
+ * a bug (which was fixed in 8.1, 7.3 and 6.5) where they might reorder
+ * volatile asm. The write functions are not affected since they have memory
+ * clobbers preventing reordering. To prevent reads from being reordered with
+ * respect to writes, use a dummy memory operand.
  */
-extern unsigned long __force_order;
+
+#define __FORCE_ORDER "m"(*(unsigned int *)0x1000UL)
 
 void native_write_cr0(unsigned long val);
 
 static inline unsigned long native_read_cr0(void)
 {
 	unsigned long val;
-	asm volatile("mov %%cr0,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
+	asm volatile("mov %%cr0,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val) : __FORCE_ORDER);
 	return val;
 }
 
 static __always_inline unsigned long native_read_cr2(void)
 {
 	unsigned long val;
-	asm volatile("mov %%cr2,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
+	asm volatile("mov %%cr2,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val) : __FORCE_ORDER);
 	return val;
 }
 
 static __always_inline void native_write_cr2(unsigned long val)
 {
-	asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr2": : "r" (val), "m" (__force_order));
+	asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr2": : "r" (val) : "memory");
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long __native_read_cr3(void)
 {
 	unsigned long val;
-	asm volatile("mov %%cr3,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
+	asm volatile("mov %%cr3,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val) : __FORCE_ORDER);
 	return val;
 }
 
 static inline void native_write_cr3(unsigned long val)
 {
-	asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr3": : "r" (val), "m" (__force_order));
+	asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr3": : "r" (val) : "memory");
 }
 
 static inline unsigned long native_read_cr4(void)
@@ -64,10 +66,10 @@ static inline unsigned long native_read_cr4(void)
 	asm volatile("1: mov %%cr4, %0\n"
 		     "2:\n"
 		     _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 2b)
-		     : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order) : "0" (0));
+		     : "=r" (val) : "0" (0), __FORCE_ORDER);
 #else
 	/* CR4 always exists on x86_64. */
-	asm volatile("mov %%cr4,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val), "=m" (__force_order));
+	asm volatile("mov %%cr4,%0\n\t" : "=r" (val) : __FORCE_ORDER);
 #endif
 	return val;
 }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +2 -2
index 95c090a45b4b4..d8ef789e00c15 100644
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ void native_write_cr0(unsigned long val)
 	unsigned long bits_missing = 0;
 
 set_register:
-	asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr0": "+r" (val), "+m" (__force_order));
+	asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr0": "+r" (val) : : "memory");
 
 	if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
 		if (unlikely((val & X86_CR0_WP) != X86_CR0_WP)) {
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ void native_write_cr4(unsigned long val)
 	unsigned long bits_changed = 0;
 
 set_register:
-	asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr4": "+r" (val), "+m" (cr4_pinned_bits));
+	asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr4": "+r" (val) : : "memory");
 
 	if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
 		if (unlikely((val & cr4_pinned_mask) != cr4_pinned_bits)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1

Sasha Levin

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/101 md/bitmap: fix memory leak of temporary bitmap

From: Zhao Heming <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1383b347a8ae4a69c04ae3746e6cb5c8d38e2585 ]

Callers of get_bitmap_from_slot() are responsible to free the bitmap.

---
 drivers/md/md-bitmap.c  | 3 ++-
 drivers/md/md-cluster.c | 1 +
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/md/md-bitmap.c +2 -1
index 95a5f3757fa30..19b2601be3c5e 100644
@@ -1949,6 +1949,7 @@ int md_bitmap_load(struct mddev *mddev)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(md_bitmap_load);
 
+/* caller need to free returned bitmap with md_bitmap_free() */
 struct bitmap *get_bitmap_from_slot(struct mddev *mddev, int slot)
 {
 	int rv = 0;
@@ -2012,6 +2013,7 @@ int md_bitmap_copy_from_slot(struct mddev *mddev, int slot,
 	md_bitmap_unplug(mddev->bitmap);
 	*low = lo;
 	*high = hi;
+	md_bitmap_free(bitmap);
 
 	return rv;
 }
@@ -2615,4 +2617,3 @@ struct attribute_group md_bitmap_group = {
 	.name = "bitmap",
 	.attrs = md_bitmap_attrs,
 };
-
drivers/md/md-cluster.c +1 -0
index d50737ec40394..afbbc552c3275 100644
@@ -1166,6 +1166,7 @@ static int resize_bitmaps(struct mddev *mddev, sector_t newsize, sector_t oldsiz
 			 * can't resize bitmap
 			 */
 			goto out;
+		md_bitmap_free(bitmap);
 	}
 
 	return 0;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 3/101 x86/dumpstack: Fix misleading instruction pointer error message

From: Mark Mossberg <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 238c91115cd05c71447ea071624a4c9fe661f970 ]

Printing "Bad RIP value" if copy_code() fails can be misleading for userspace pointers, since copy_code() can fail if the instruction pointer is valid but the code is paged out. This is because copy_code() calls copy_from_user_nmi() for userspace pointers, which disables page fault handling.

This is reproducible in OOM situations, where it's plausible that the code may be reclaimed in the time between entry into the kernel and when this message is printed. This leaves a misleading log in dmesg that suggests instruction pointer corruption has occurred, which may alarm users.

Change the message to state the error condition more precisely.

[ bp: Massage a bit. ]

---
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c +2 -1
index 7401cc12c3ccf..42679610c9bea 100644
@@ -115,7 +115,8 @@ void show_opcodes(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *loglvl)
 	unsigned long prologue = regs->ip - PROLOGUE_SIZE;
 
 	if (copy_code(regs, opcodes, prologue, sizeof(opcodes))) {
-		printk("%sCode: Bad RIP value.\n", loglvl);
+		printk("%sCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x%lx.\n",
+		       loglvl, prologue);
 	} else {
 		printk("%sCode: %" __stringify(PROLOGUE_SIZE) "ph <%02x> %"
 		       __stringify(EPILOGUE_SIZE) "ph\n", loglvl, opcodes,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/101 block: ratelimit handle_bad_sector() message

In reply to Sasha Levin

From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f4ac712e4fe009635344b9af5d890fe25fcc8c0d ]

syzbot is reporting unkillable task [1], for the caller is failing to handle a corrupted filesystem image which attempts to access beyond the end of the device. While we need to fix the caller, flooding the console with handle_bad_sector() message is unlikely useful.

[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f1f49fb971d7a3e01bd8ab8cff2ff4572ccf3092

---
 block/blk-core.c | 9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
block/blk-core.c +4 -5
index 619a3dcd3f5e7..8d6435b731186 100644
@@ -798,11 +798,10 @@ static void handle_bad_sector(struct bio *bio, sector_t maxsector)
 {
 	char b[BDEVNAME_SIZE];
 
-	printk(KERN_INFO "attempt to access beyond end of device\n");
-	printk(KERN_INFO "%s: rw=%d, want=%Lu, limit=%Lu\n",
-			bio_devname(bio, b), bio->bi_opf,
-			(unsigned long long)bio_end_sector(bio),
-			(long long)maxsector);
+	pr_info_ratelimited("attempt to access beyond end of device\n"
+			    "%s: rw=%d, want=%llu, limit=%llu\n",
+			    bio_devname(bio, b), bio->bi_opf,
+			    bio_end_sector(bio), maxsector);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_FAIL_MAKE_REQUEST
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1