overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix
Subsystems (36)
v18 cover overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix
Mark Salyzyn (3):
Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
Mark Salyzyn + John Stultz (1):
overlayfs: inode_owner_or_capable called during execv
The first three patches address fundamental security issues that should be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature.
The fourth adds the feature depends on these other fixes.
By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are checked against the caller's credentials.
If the principles of least privilege are applied for sepolicy, the mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature", existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds
---
v18
- rebase + fix minor cut and paste error for inode argument in __vfs_getxattr
v17
- correct some zero-day build failures.
- fix up documentation
v16
- rebase and merge of two patches.
- add adjustment to deal with execv when overrides is off.
v15
- Revert back to v4 with fixes from on the way from v5-v14. The single structure argument passing to address the complaints about too many arguments was rejected by the community.
- Drop the udner discussion fix for an additional CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH check. Can address that independently.
- ToDo: upstream test frame for thes security fixes (currently testing is all in Android).
v14:
- Rejoin, rebase and a few adjustments.
v13:
- Pull out first patch and try to get it in alone feedback, some Acks, and then <crickets> because people forgot why we were doing i.
v12:
- Restore squished out patch 2 and 3 in the series, then change algorithm to add flags argument. Per-thread flag is a large security surface.
v11:
- Squish out v10 introduced patch 2 and 3 in the series, then and use per-thread flag instead for nesting.
- Switch name to ovl_do_vds_getxattr for __vds_getxattr wrapper.
- Add sb argument to ovl_revert_creds to match future work.
v10:
- Return NULL on CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
- Add __get xattr method to solve sepolicy logging issue
- Drop unnecessary sys_admin sepolicy checking for administrative driver internal xattr functions.
v6:
- Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS.
- Do better with the documentation, drop rationalizations.
- pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences.
v5:
- beefed up the caveats in the Documentation
- Is dependent on
"overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh" "overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout"
- Added prwarn when override_creds=off
v4:
- spelling and grammar errors in text
v3:
- Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the boolean override_creds.
- Changed from creator to mounter credentials.
- Updated and fortified the documentation.
- Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS
v2:
- Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error.
- altered commit message.
Documentation/filesystems/locking.rst | 2 +- Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst | 26 +++++++++++++++++- fs/9p/acl.c | 3 ++- fs/9p/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/afs/xattr.c | 10 +++---- fs/btrfs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/cifs/xattr.c | 2 +- fs/ecryptfs/inode.c | 6 +++-- fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c | 2 +- fs/erofs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/ext2/xattr_security.c | 2 +- fs/ext2/xattr_trusted.c | 2 +- fs/ext2/xattr_user.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_hurd.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_security.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_trusted.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_user.c | 2 +- fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 4 +-- fs/fuse/xattr.c | 4 +-- fs/gfs2/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/hfs/attr.c | 2 +- fs/hfsplus/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/hfsplus/xattr_security.c | 3 ++- fs/hfsplus/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/hfsplus/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/security.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/jfs/xattr.c | 5 ++-- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 3 ++- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 9 ++++--- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 9 ++++--- fs/orangefs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +- fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 17 +++++++----- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 26 +++++++++--------- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 23 ++++++++-------- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 6 ++--- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 7 +++-- fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 8 +++--- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++----- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 13 +++++++-- fs/posix_acl.c | 2 +- fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c | 3 ++- fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/squashfs/xattr.c | 2 +- fs/ubifs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/xattr.c | 36 ++++++++++++------------- fs/xfs/xfs_xattr.c | 3 ++- include/linux/xattr.h | 9 ++++--- include/uapi/linux/xattr.h | 7 +++-- mm/shmem.c | 3 ++- net/socket.c | 3 ++- security/commoncap.c | 6 +++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 +++++--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ++-- 60 files changed, 242 insertions(+), 137 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
PATCH RESEND v18 1/4 Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr
Add a flag option to get xattr method that could have a bit flag of XATTR_NOSECURITY passed to it. XATTR_NOSECURITY is generally then set in the __vfs_getxattr path when called by security infrastructure.
This handles the case of a union filesystem driver that is being requested by the security layer to report back the xattr data.
For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then could be security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) -> handler->get(dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) -> __vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) -> lower_handler->get(lower_dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY) which would report back through the chain data and success as expected, the logging security layer at the top would have the data to determine the access permissions and report back the target context that was blocked.
Without the get handler flag, the path on a union filesystem would be the errant security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr(dentry) -> handler->get(dentry) -> vfs_getxattr(lower_dentry) -> nested -> security(lower_dentry, log off) -> lower_handler->get(lower_dentry) which would report back through the chain no data, and -EACCES.
For selinux for both cases, this would translate to a correctly determined blocked access. In the first case with this change a correct avc log would be reported, in the second legacy case an incorrect avc log would be reported against an uninitialized u:object_r:unlabeled:s0 context making the logs cosmetically useless for audit2allow.
This patch series is inert and is the wide-spread addition of the flags option for xattr functions, and a replacement of __vfs_getxattr with __vfs_getxattr(...XATTR_NOSECURITY).
v18
- rebase
v17
- rebase with additional change to fs/ext4/xattr_hurd.c
v16
- rebase
v15
- revert back to v4 as struct xattr_gs_args was not acceptable by the wider audience. Incorporate any relevant fixes on the way.
v14 (new series):
- Reincorporate back into the bugfix series for overlayfs
v8:
- Documentation reported 'struct xattr_gs_flags' rather than 'struct xattr_gs_flags *args' as argument to get and set methods.
v7:
- missed spots in fs/9p/acl.c, fs/afs/xattr.c, fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c, fs/ubifs/xattr.c, fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_attr.c, security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c and security/smack/smack_lsm.c.
v6:
- kernfs missed a spot
v5:
- introduce struct xattr_gs_args for get and set methods, __vfs_getxattr and __vfs_setxattr functions.
- cover a missing spot in ext2.
- switch from snprintf to scnprintf for correctness.
v4:
- ifdef __KERNEL__ around XATTR_NOSECURITY to
keep it colocated in uapi headers.
v3:
- poor aim on ubifs not ubifs_xattr_get, but static xattr_get
v2:
- Missed a spot: ubifs, erofs and afs.
v1:
- Removed from an overlayfs patch set, and made independent. Expect this to be the basis of some security improvements.
--- Documentation/filesystems/locking.rst | 2 +- fs/9p/acl.c | 3 ++- fs/9p/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/afs/xattr.c | 10 ++++---- fs/btrfs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/cifs/xattr.c | 2 +- fs/ecryptfs/inode.c | 6 +++-- fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c | 2 +- fs/erofs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/ext2/xattr_security.c | 2 +- fs/ext2/xattr_trusted.c | 2 +- fs/ext2/xattr_user.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_hurd.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_security.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_trusted.c | 2 +- fs/ext4/xattr_user.c | 2 +- fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 4 +-- fs/fuse/xattr.c | 4 +-- fs/gfs2/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/hfs/attr.c | 2 +- fs/hfsplus/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/hfsplus/xattr_security.c | 3 ++- fs/hfsplus/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/hfsplus/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/security.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/jffs2/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/jfs/xattr.c | 5 ++-- fs/kernfs/inode.c | 3 ++- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 9 ++++--- fs/ocfs2/xattr.c | 9 ++++--- fs/orangefs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 8 +++--- fs/posix_acl.c | 2 +- fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c | 3 ++- fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c | 3 ++- fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c | 3 ++- fs/squashfs/xattr.c | 2 +- fs/ubifs/xattr.c | 3 ++- fs/xattr.c | 36 +++++++++++++-------------- fs/xfs/xfs_xattr.c | 3 ++- include/linux/xattr.h | 9 ++++--- include/uapi/linux/xattr.h | 7 ++++-- mm/shmem.c | 3 ++- net/socket.c | 3 ++- security/commoncap.c | 6 +++-- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 3 ++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 +++++--- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 ++-- 50 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/locking.rst +1 -1
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ prototypes:: bool (*list)(struct dentry *dentry); int (*get)(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, - size_t size); + size_t size, int flags); int (*set)(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *buffer, size_t size, int flags);
fs/9p/acl.c +2 -1
@@ -214,7 +214,8 @@ int v9fs_acl_mode(struct inode *dir, umode_t *modep,static int v9fs_xattr_get_acl (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct v9fs_session_info *v9ses;struct posix_acl *acl;
fs/9p/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ ssize_t v9fs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)static int v9fs_xattr_handler_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {const char *full_name =xattr_full_name (handler, name);
fs/afs/xattr.c +5 -5
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static const struct afs_operation_ops afs_fetch_acl_operation = {static int afs_xattr_get_acl (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *buffer,size_t size) +void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct afs_operation *op;struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (inode);
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ static const struct afs_operation_ops yfs_fetch_opaque_acl_operation = {static int afs_xattr_get_yfs (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *buffer,size_t size) +void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct afs_operation *op;struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (inode);
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ static const struct xattr_handler afs_xattr_yfs_handler = {static int afs_xattr_get_cell (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *buffer,size_t size) +void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (inode);struct afs_cell *cell = vnode->volume->cell;
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static const struct xattr_handler afs_xattr_afs_cell_handler = {static int afs_xattr_get_fid (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *buffer,size_t size) +void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (inode);char text[16 +1 +24 +1 +8 +1 ];
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ static const struct xattr_handler afs_xattr_afs_fid_handler = {static int afs_xattr_get_volume (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *buffer,size_t size) +void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct afs_vnode *vnode =AFS_FS_I (inode);const char *volname = vnode->volume->name;
fs/btrfs/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -353,7 +353,8 @@ ssize_t btrfs_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *buffer, size_t size)static int btrfs_xattr_handler_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) { name =xattr_full_name (handler, name);return btrfs_getxattr (inode, name, buffer, size);
fs/ceph/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -1154,7 +1154,8 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,static int ceph_get_xattr_handler (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {if (!ceph_is_valid_xattr (name))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
fs/cifs/xattr.c +1 -1
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int cifs_creation_time_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,static int cifs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {ssize_t rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ;unsigned int xid;
fs/ecryptfs/inode.c +4 -2
@@ -1040,7 +1040,8 @@ ecryptfs_getxattr_lower(struct dentry *lower_dentry, struct inode *lower_inode, goto out; }inode_lock (lower_inode); - rc =__vfs_getxattr (lower_dentry, lower_inode, name, value, size); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (lower_dentry, lower_inode, name, value, size, +XATTR_NOSECURITY );inode_unlock (lower_inode); out:return rc;
@@ -1125,7 +1126,8 @@ const struct inode_operations ecryptfs_main_iops = {static int ecryptfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ecryptfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, name, buffer, size); }
fs/ecryptfs/mmap.c +1 -1
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static int ecryptfs_write_inode_size_to_xattr(struct inode *ecryptfs_inode) }inode_lock (lower_inode); size =__vfs_getxattr (lower_dentry, lower_inode,ECRYPTFS_XATTR_NAME , - xattr_virt,PAGE_SIZE ); + xattr_virt,PAGE_SIZE ,XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (size <0 ) size =8 ;put_unaligned_be64 (i_size_read (ecryptfs_inode), xattr_virt);
fs/erofs/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -463,7 +463,8 @@ int erofs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, int index,static int erofs_xattr_generic_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct erofs_sb_info *const sbi =EROFS_I_SB (inode);
fs/ext2/xattr_security.c +1 -1
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@static int ext2_xattr_security_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ext2_xattr_get (inode,EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , name, buffer, size);
fs/ext2/xattr_trusted.c +1 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ ext2_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext2_xattr_trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ext2_xattr_get (inode,EXT2_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);
fs/ext2/xattr_user.c +1 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ext2_xattr_user_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext2_xattr_user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {if (!test_opt (inode->i_sb,XATTR_USER ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
fs/ext4/xattr_hurd.c +1 -1
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ ext4_xattr_hurd_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext4_xattr_hurd_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {if (!test_opt (inode->i_sb,XATTR_USER ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
fs/ext4/xattr_security.c +1 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@static int ext4_xattr_security_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ext4_xattr_get (inode,EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , name, buffer, size);
fs/ext4/xattr_trusted.c +1 -1
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ ext4_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext4_xattr_trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ext4_xattr_get (inode,EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);
fs/ext4/xattr_user.c +1 -1
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ ext4_xattr_user_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int ext4_xattr_user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {if (!test_opt (inode->i_sb,XATTR_USER ))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
fs/f2fs/xattr.c +2 -2
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static void xattr_free(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, void *xattr_addr,static int f2fs_xattr_generic_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi =F2FS_SB (inode->i_sb);
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ static bool f2fs_xattr_trusted_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int f2fs_xattr_advise_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {if (buffer) *((char *)buffer) =F2FS_I (inode)->i_advise;
fs/fuse/xattr.c +2 -2
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ int fuse_removexattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name)static int fuse_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {return fuse_getxattr (inode, name, value, size); }
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static bool no_xattr_list(struct dentry *dentry)static int no_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
fs/gfs2/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -588,7 +588,8 @@ static int __gfs2_xattr_get(struct inode *inode, const char *name,static int gfs2_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct gfs2_inode *ip =GFS2_I (inode);struct gfs2_holder gh;
fs/hfs/attr.c +1 -1
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static ssize_t __hfs_getxattr(struct inode *inode, enum hfs_xattr_type type,static int hfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {return __hfs_getxattr (inode, handler->flags, value, size); }
fs/hfsplus/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -839,7 +839,8 @@ static int hfsplus_removexattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name)static int hfsplus_osx_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {/* * Don't allow retrieving properly prefixed attributes
fs/hfsplus/xattr_security.c +2 -1
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@static int hfsplus_security_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer, +size_t size,int flags) { return hfsplus_getxattr(inode, name, buffer, size, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
fs/hfsplus/xattr_trusted.c +2 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@static int hfsplus_trusted_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer, +size_t size,int flags) { return hfsplus_getxattr(inode, name, buffer, size, XATTR_TRUSTED_PREFIX,
fs/hfsplus/xattr_user.c +2 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@static int hfsplus_user_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) { return hfsplus_getxattr(inode, name, buffer, size,
fs/jffs2/security.c +2 -1
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ int jffs2_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,/* ---- XATTR Handler for "security.*" ----------------- */ static int jffs2_security_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return do_jffs2_getxattr (inode,JFFS2_XPREFIX_SECURITY , name, buffer, size);
fs/jffs2/xattr_trusted.c +2 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@static int jffs2_trusted_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return do_jffs2_getxattr (inode,JFFS2_XPREFIX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);
fs/jffs2/xattr_user.c +2 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@static int jffs2_user_getxattr (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return do_jffs2_getxattr (inode,JFFS2_XPREFIX_USER , name, buffer, size);
fs/jfs/xattr.c +3 -2
@@ -925,7 +925,7 @@ static int __jfs_xattr_set(struct inode *inode, const char *name,static int jfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) { name =xattr_full_name (handler, name);return __jfs_getxattr (inode, name, value, size);
@@ -942,7 +942,8 @@ static int jfs_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int jfs_xattr_get_os2 (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {if (is_known_namespace (name))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
fs/kernfs/inode.c +2 -1
@@ -310,7 +310,8 @@ int kernfs_xattr_set(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name,static int kernfs_vfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size) +const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {const char *name =xattr_full_name (handler, suffix);struct kernfs_node *kn = inode->i_private;
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +6 -3
@@ -7495,7 +7495,8 @@ static int nfs4_xattr_set_nfs4_acl(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int nfs4_xattr_get_nfs4_acl (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen) +const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen, +int flags) {return nfs4_proc_get_acl (inode, buf, buflen); }
@@ -7520,7 +7521,8 @@ static int nfs4_xattr_set_nfs4_label(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int nfs4_xattr_get_nfs4_label (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen) +const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen, +int flags) {if (security_ismaclabel (key))return nfs4_get_security_label (inode, buf, buflen);
@@ -7597,7 +7599,8 @@ static int nfs4_xattr_set_nfs4_user(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int nfs4_xattr_get_nfs4_user (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen) +const char *key,void *buf,size_t buflen, +int flags) {struct nfs_access_entry cache;ssize_t ret;
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c +6 -3
@@ -7242,7 +7242,8 @@ int ocfs2_init_security_and_acl(struct inode *dir,*/ static int ocfs2_xattr_security_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ocfs2_xattr_get (inode,OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY , name, buffer, size);
@@ -7314,7 +7315,8 @@ const struct xattr_handler ocfs2_xattr_security_handler = {*/ static int ocfs2_xattr_trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ocfs2_xattr_get (inode,OCFS2_XATTR_INDEX_TRUSTED , name, buffer, size);
@@ -7340,7 +7342,8 @@ const struct xattr_handler ocfs2_xattr_trusted_handler = {*/ static int ocfs2_xattr_user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct ocfs2_super *osb =OCFS2_SB (inode->i_sb);
fs/orangefs/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -541,7 +541,8 @@ static int orangefs_xattr_get_default(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, - size_t size) + size_t size, + int flags) { return orangefs_inode_getxattr(inode, name, buffer, size);
fs/overlayfs/super.c +5 -3
@@ -928,7 +928,7 @@ static unsigned int ovl_split_lowerdirs(char *str)static int __maybe_unused ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags) {return ovl_xattr_get (dentry, inode, handler->name, buffer, size); }
@@ -993,7 +993,8 @@ ovl_posix_acl_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int ovl_own_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
@@ -1008,7 +1009,8 @@ static int ovl_own_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,static int ovl_other_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {return ovl_xattr_get (dentry, inode, name, buffer, size); }
fs/posix_acl.c +1 -1
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL (posix_acl_to_xattr);static int posix_acl_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +const char *name,void *value,size_t size,int flags) {struct posix_acl *acl;int error;
fs/reiserfs/xattr_security.c +2 -1
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@static int security_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {if (IS_PRIVATE (inode))return -EPERM ;
fs/reiserfs/xattr_trusted.c +2 -1
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@static int trusted_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ) ||IS_PRIVATE (inode))return -EPERM ;
fs/reiserfs/xattr_user.c +2 -1
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@static int user_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {if (!reiserfs_xattrs_user (inode->i_sb))return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
fs/squashfs/xattr.c +1 -1
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static int squashfs_xattr_handler_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, struct inode *inode, const char *name, - void *buffer, size_t size) + void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { return squashfs_xattr_get(inode, handler->flags, name,buffer ,size );
fs/ubifs/xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -671,7 +671,8 @@ int ubifs_init_security(struct inode *dentry, struct inode *inode,static int xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {dbg_gen ("xattr '%s', ino %lu ('%pd'), buf size %zd" , name, inode->i_ino, dentry, size);
fs/xattr.c +18 -18
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, char **xattr_value,return PTR_ERR (handler);if (!handler->get)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name,NULL ,0 ); + error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name,NULL ,0 ,0 );if (error <0 )return error;
@@ -356,32 +356,20 @@ vfs_getxattr_alloc(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, char **xattr_value,memset (value,0 , error +1 ); } - error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, error); + error = handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, error,0 ); *xattr_value = value;return error; }ssize_t __vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *value,size_t size) +void *value,size_t size,int flags) {const struct xattr_handler *handler; - - handler =xattr_resolve_name (inode, &name); -if (IS_ERR (handler)) -return PTR_ERR (handler); -if (!handler->get) -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; -return handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, size); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL (__vfs_getxattr); - -ssize_t -vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) -{ -struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;int error; +if (flags &XATTR_NOSECURITY ) + goto nolsm; error =xattr_permission (inode, name,MAY_READ );if (error)return error;
@@ -403,7 +391,19 @@ vfs_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, void *value, size_t size)return ret; } nolsm: -return __vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, name, value, size); + handler =xattr_resolve_name (inode, &name); +if (IS_ERR (handler)) +return PTR_ERR (handler); +if (!handler->get) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return handler->get (handler, dentry, inode, name, value, size, flags); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__vfs_getxattr); + +ssize_t +vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +{ +return __vfs_getxattr (dentry, dentry->d_inode, name, value, size,0 ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (vfs_getxattr);
fs/xfs/xfs_xattr.c +2 -1
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@static int xfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused, -struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *value,size_t size) +struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {struct xfs_da_args args = { .dp =XFS_I (inode),
include/linux/xattr.h +5 -4
@@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ struct xattr_handler {const char *prefix;int flags;/* fs private flags */ bool (*list)(struct dentry *dentry); -int (*get)(const struct xattr_handler *,struct dentry *dentry, +int (*get)(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name,void *buffer, -size_t size); -int (*set)(const struct xattr_handler *,struct dentry *dentry, +size_t size,int flags); +int (*set)(const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *buffer,size_t size,int flags); };
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ struct xattr {size_t value_len; }; -ssize_t __vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *,struct inode *,const char *,void *,size_t ); +ssize_t __vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size,int flags);ssize_t vfs_getxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,void *,size_t );ssize_t vfs_listxattr (struct dentry *d,char *list,size_t size);int __vfs_setxattr (struct dentry *,struct inode *,const char *,const void *,size_t ,int );
include/uapi/linux/xattr.h +5 -2
@@ -18,8 +18,11 @@#if __UAPI_DEF_XATTR#define __USE_KERNEL_XATTR_DEFS -#define XATTR_CREATE 0x1/* set value, fail if attr already exists */ -#define XATTR_REPLACE 0x2/* set value, fail if attr does not exist */ +#define XATTR_CREATE 0x1/* set value, fail if attr already exists */ +#define XATTR_REPLACE 0x2/* set value, fail if attr does not exist */ +#ifdef __KERNEL__/* following is kernel internal, colocated for maintenance */ +#define XATTR_NOSECURITY 0x4/* get value, do not involve security check */ +#endif #endif /* Namespaces */
mm/shmem.c +2 -1
@@ -3269,7 +3269,8 @@ static int shmem_initxattrs(struct inode *inode,static int shmem_xattr_handler_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *unused,struct inode *inode, -const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size) +const char *name,void *buffer,size_t size, +int flags) {struct shmem_inode_info *info =SHMEM_I (inode);
net/socket.c +2 -1
@@ -314,7 +314,8 @@ static const struct dentry_operations sockfs_dentry_operations = {static int sockfs_xattr_get (const struct xattr_handler *handler,struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode, -const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size) +const char *suffix,void *value,size_t size, +int flags) {if (value) {if (dentry->d_name.len +1 > size)
security/commoncap.c +4 -2
@@ -297,7 +297,8 @@ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)struct inode *inode =d_backing_inode (dentry);int error; - error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_CAPS ,NULL ,0 ); + error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_CAPS ,NULL ,0 , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );return error >0 ; }
@@ -586,7 +587,8 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; size =__vfs_getxattr ((struct dentry *)dentry, inode, -XATTR_NAME_CAPS , &data,XATTR_CAPS_SZ ); +XATTR_NAME_CAPS , &data,XATTR_CAPS_SZ , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP )/* no data, that's ok */ return -ENODATA ;
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +2 -1
@@ -101,7 +101,8 @@ static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry)return -EOPNOTSUPP ;list_for_each_entry_lockless (xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) { - error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, xattr->name,NULL ,0 ); + error =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode, xattr->name,NULL ,0 , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (error <0 ) {if (error == -ENODATA )continue ;
security/selinux/hooks.c +7 -4
@@ -504,7 +504,8 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) goto out; } - rc =__vfs_getxattr (root, root_inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (root, root_inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL , +0 ,XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc <0 && rc != -ENODATA ) {if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ) pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type "
@@ -1332,12 +1333,14 @@ static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,return -ENOMEM ; context[len] ='\0' ; - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , context, len, +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc == -ERANGE ) {kfree (context);/* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 ); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX ,NULL ,0 , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc <0 )return rc;
@@ -1348,7 +1351,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, context[len] ='\0' ; rc =__vfs_getxattr (dentry, inode,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX , - context, len); + context, len,XATTR_NOSECURITY ); }if (rc <0 ) {kfree (context);
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -289,7 +289,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,if (buffer ==NULL )return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - rc =__vfs_getxattr (dp, ip, name, buffer,SMK_LONGLABEL ); + rc =__vfs_getxattr (dp, ip, name, buffer,SMK_LONGLABEL , +XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc <0 ) skp =ERR_PTR (rc);else if (rc ==0 )
@@ -3432,7 +3433,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) }else { rc =__vfs_getxattr (dp, inode,XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE , trattr, -TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ); +TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ,XATTR_NOSECURITY );if (rc >=0 &&strncmp (trattr,TRANS_TRUE ,TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ) !=0 ) rc = -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
PATCH RESEND v18 2/4 overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
In reply to Mark SalyzynBecause of the overlayfs getxattr recursion, the incoming inode fails to update the selinux sid resulting in avc denials being reported against a target context of u:object_r:unlabeled:s0.
Solution is to respond to the XATTR_NOSECURITY flag in get xattr method that calls the __vfs_getxattr handler instead so that the context can be read in, rather than being denied with an -EACCES when vfs_getxattr handler is called.
For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then would be security(dentry) -> __vfs_getxattr({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY}) -> handler->get({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY}) -> __vfs_getxattr({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY}) -> lower_handler->get({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY}) which would report back through the chain data and success as expected, the logging security layer at the top would have the data to determine the access permissions and report back to the logs and the caller that the target context was blocked.
For selinux this would solve the cosmetic issue of the selinux log and allow audit2allow to correctly report the rule needed to address the access problem.
Check impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit (using __vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data. This became an issue for credential override off since sys_admin would have been required by the caller; whereas would have been inherently present for the creator since it performed the mount.
This is a change in operations since we do not check in the new ovl_do_getxattr function if the credential override is off or not. Reasoning is that the sepolicy check is unnecessary overhead, especially since the check can be expensive.
Because for override credentials off, this affects _everyone_ that underneath performs private xattr calls without the appropriate sepolicy permissions and sys_admin capability. Providing blanket support for sys_admin would be bad for all possible callers.
For the override credentials on, this will affect only the mounter, should it lack sepolicy permissions. Not considered a security problem since mounting by definition has sys_admin capabilities, but sepolicy contexts would still need to be crafted.
It should be noted that there is precedence, __vfs_getxattr is used in other filesystems for their own internal trusted xattr management.
v18 - correct inode argument to __vfs_getxattr
v17 - rebase and add inode argument to __vfs_getxattr
v16 - rebase and merge internal getxattr operations patch
v15 - revert to v13 because xattr_gs_args rejected.
v14 - rebase to use xattr_gs_args.
v13 - rebase to use __vfs_getxattr flags option.
v12 - Added back to patch series as get xattr with flag option.
v11 - Squashed out of patch series and replaced with per-thread flag
solution.
v10 - Added to patch series as __get xattr method.
--- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 5 +++-- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 6 ++++-- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/overlayfs/inode.c +3 -2
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, }int ovl_xattr_get (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *value,size_t size) +void *value,size_t size,int flags) {ssize_t res;const struct cred *old_cred;
@@ -386,7 +386,8 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,ovl_i_dentry_upper (inode) ?:ovl_dentry_lower (dentry); old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); - res =vfs_getxattr (realdentry, name, value, size); + res =__vfs_getxattr (realdentry,d_inode (realdentry), name, + value, size, flags);revert_creds (old_cred);return res; }
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +4 -2
@@ -184,7 +184,9 @@ static inline ssize_t ovl_do_getxattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry, size_t size) {const char *name =ovl_xattr (ofs, ox); -return vfs_getxattr (dentry, name, value, size); +struct inode *ip =d_inode (dentry); + +return __vfs_getxattr (dentry, ip, name, value, size,XATTR_NOSECURITY ); } static inline int ovl_do_setxattr(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -439,7 +441,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);int ovl_xattr_set (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags);int ovl_xattr_get (struct dentry *dentry,struct inode *inode,const char *name, -void *value,size_t size); +void *value,size_t size,int flags);ssize_t ovl_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry,char *list,size_t size);struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl (struct inode *inode,int type);int ovl_update_time (struct inode *inode,struct timespec64 *ts,int flags);
fs/overlayfs/super.c +2 -2
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ ovl_posix_acl_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { - return ovl_xattr_get(dentry, inode, handler->name, buffer, size); + return ovl_xattr_get(dentry, inode, handler->name, buffer, size, flags); } static int __maybe_unused
@@ -1012,7 +1012,7 @@ static int ovl_other_xattr_get(const struct xattr_handler *handler, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int flags) { - return ovl_xattr_get(dentry, inode, name, buffer, size); + return ovl_xattr_get(dentry, inode, name, buffer, size, flags); } static int ovl_other_xattr_set(const struct xattr_handler *handler,
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
PATCH RESEND v18 4/4 overlayfs: inode_owner_or_capable called during execv
In reply to Mark SalyzynFrom: John Stultz <[email protected]>
Using old_creds as an indication that we are not overriding the credentials, bypass call to inode_owner_or_capable. This solves a problem with all execv calls being blocked when using the caller's credentials.
C: [email protected]
C: [email protected]
Cc: Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
v18 - rebase
v17 - rebase
v16 - introduced fix over rebased series
--- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/overlayfs/file.c +1 -1
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file, err =inode_permission (realinode,MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);if (err) { realfile =ERR_PTR (err); - }else if (!inode_owner_or_capable (realinode)) { + }else if (old_cred && !inode_owner_or_capable (realinode)) { realfile =ERR_PTR (-EPERM ); }else { realfile = open_with_fake_path(&file->f_path, flags, realinode,
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
PATCH RESEND v18 3/4 overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
In reply to Mark SalyzynBy default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are checked against the caller's credentials.
If the principles of least privilege are applied, the mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector.
We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature", existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/override_creds.
It was not always this way. Circa 4.6 there was no recorded mounter's credentials, instead privileged access to upper or work directories were temporarily increased to perform the operations. The MAC (selinux) policies were caller's in all cases. override_creds=off partially returns us to this older access model minus the insecure temporary credential increases. This is to permit use in a system with non-overlapping security models for each executable including the agent that mounts the overlayfs filesystem. In Android this is the case since init, which performs the mount operations, has a minimal MAC set of privileges to reduce any attack surface, and services that use the content have a different set of MAC privileges (eg: read, for vendor labelled configuration, execute for vendor libraries and modules). The caveats are not a problem in the Android usage model, however they should be fixed for completeness and for general use in time.
v18
- rebase
v17
- move credential section for override_creds=off as a level 3 heading subsection of the permissions section.
v16
- Rebase, cover a few more new ovl_revert_creds callpoints.
v15
- Rebase
v14:
- fix an issue in ovl_create_or_link which leaks credentials.
v12 + v13
- Rebase
v11:
- add sb argument to ovl_revert_creds to match future work in progress in other commiter's hands.
v10:
- Rebase (and expand because of increased revert_cred usage)
v9:
- Add to the caveats
v8:
- drop pr_warn message after straw poll to remove it.
- added a use case in the commit message
v7:
- change name of internal parameter to ovl_override_creds_def
- report override_creds only if different than default
v6:
- Drop CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS.
- Do better with the documentation.
- pr_warn message adjusted to report consequences.
v5:
- beefed up the caveats in the Documentation
- Is dependent on
"overlayfs: check CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH before issuing exportfs_decode_fh" "overlayfs: check CAP_MKNOD before issuing vfs_whiteout"
- Added prwarn when override_creds=off
v4:
- spelling and grammar errors in text
v3:
- Change name from caller_credentials / creator_credentials to the boolean override_creds.
- Changed from creator to mounter credentials.
- Updated and fortified the documentation.
- Added CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS
v2:
- Forward port changed attr to stat, resulting in a build error.
- altered commit message.
--- Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +- fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 17 +++++++++------- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 24 +++++++++++------------ fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 18 ++++++++--------- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 6 +++--- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 8 ++++---- fs/overlayfs/super.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 11 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.rst +25 -1
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ handle it in two different ways: 1. return EXDEV error: this error is returned by rename(2) when trying to move a file or directory across filesystem boundaries. Hence - applications are usually prepared to hande this error (mv(1) for example + applications are usually prepared to handle this error (mv(1) for example recursively copies the directory tree). This is the default behavior. 2. If the "redirect_dir" feature is enabled, then the directory will be
@@ -324,6 +324,30 @@ and The resulting access permissions should be the same. The difference is in the time of copy (on-demand vs. up-front). +### Non overlapping credentials + +As noted above, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the +recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are +checked against the caller's credentials. + +In the case where caller MAC or DAC credentials do not overlap the mounter, a +use case available in older versions of the driver, the override_creds mount +flag can be turned off. For when the use pattern has caller with legitimate +credentials where the mounter does not. For example init may have been the +mounter, but the caller would have execute or read MAC permissions where +init would not. override_creds off means all access, incoming, upper, lower +or working, will be tested against the caller. + +Several unintended side effects will occur though. The caller without certain +key capabilities or lower privilege will not always be able to delete files or +directories, create nodes, or search some restricted directories. The ability +to search and read a directory entry is spotty as a result of the cache +mechanism not re-testing the credentials because of the assumption, a +privileged caller can fill cache, then a lower privilege can read the directory +cache. The uneven security model where cache, upperdir and workdir are opened +at privilege, but accessed without creating a form of privilege escalation, +should only be used with strict understanding of the side effects and of the +security policies. Multiple lower layers ---------------------
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +1 -1
@@ -962,7 +962,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)dput (parent);dput (next); } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
fs/overlayfs/dir.c +10 -7
@@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct ovl_cattr *attr, bool origin) { int err; -const struct cred *old_cred; +const struct cred *old_cred, *hold_cred =NULL ;struct cred *override_cred;struct dentry *parent = dentry->d_parent;
@@ -592,14 +592,15 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;if (!attr->hardlink) { err =security_dentry_create_files_as (dentry, - attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred, + attr->mode, &dentry->d_name, + old_cred ? old_cred :current_cred (), override_cred);if (err) {put_cred (override_cred); goto out_revert_creds; } } -put_cred (override_creds (override_cred)); + hold_cred =override_creds (override_cred);put_cred (override_cred);if (!ovl_dentry_is_whiteout (dentry))
@@ -608,7 +609,9 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, err =ovl_create_over_whiteout (dentry, inode, attr); } out_revert_creds: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred ?: hold_cred); +if (old_cred && hold_cred) +put_cred (hold_cred);return err; }
@@ -684,7 +687,7 @@ static int ovl_set_link_redirect(struct dentry *dentry) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); err =ovl_set_redirect (dentry, false); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -903,7 +906,7 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir) err =ovl_remove_upper (dentry, is_dir, &list); else err =ovl_remove_and_whiteout (dentry, &list); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (!err) {if (is_dir)clear_nlink (dentry->d_inode);
@@ -1273,7 +1276,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct inode *olddir, struct dentry *old, out_unlock:unlock_rename (new_upperdir, old_upperdir); out_revert_creds: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (old->d_sb, old_cred);if (update_nlink)ovl_nlink_end (new); out_drop_write:
fs/overlayfs/file.c +12 -12
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file, realfile =open_with_fake_path (&file->f_path, flags, realinode,current_cred ()); } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred); pr_debug("open(%p[%pD2/%c], 0%o) -> (%p, 0%o)\n", file, file, ovl_whatisit(inode, realinode), file->f_flags,
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (inode->i_sb); ret =vfs_llseek (real.file, offset, whence); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred); file->f_pos = real.file->f_pos;ovl_inode_unlock (inode);
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_read_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)ovl_aio_cleanup_handler (aio_req); } out: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);ovl_file_accessed (file);fdput (real);
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)ovl_aio_cleanup_handler (aio_req); } out: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);fdput (real); out_unlock:
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (in)->i_sb); ret =generic_file_splice_read (real.file, ppos, pipe, len, flags); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (in)->i_sb, old_cred);ovl_file_accessed (in);fdput (real);
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ ovl_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (out)->i_sb); ret =iter_file_splice_write (pipe, real.file, ppos, len, flags); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (out)->i_sb, old_cred);ovl_file_accessed (out);fdput (real);
@@ -456,7 +456,7 @@ static int ovl_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)if (file_inode (real.file) ==ovl_inode_upper (file_inode (file))) { old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_fsync_range (real.file, start, end, datasync); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred); }fdput (real);
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ static int ovl_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =call_mmap (vma->vm_file, vma); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);if (ret) {/* Drop reference count from new vm_file value */
@@ -508,7 +508,7 @@ static long ovl_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_fallocate (real.file, mode, offset, len); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);/* Update size */ ovl_copyattr (ovl_inode_real (inode), inode);
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static int ovl_fadvise(struct file *file, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); ret =vfs_fadvise (real.file, offset, len, advice); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);fdput (real);
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ static long ovl_real_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, ret =security_file_ioctl (real.file, cmd, arg);if (!ret) ret =vfs_ioctl (real.file, cmd, arg); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);fdput (real);
@@ -741,7 +741,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, flags);break ; } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file_out)->i_sb, old_cred);/* Update size */ ovl_copyattr (ovl_inode_real (inode_out), inode_out);
fs/overlayfs/inode.c +9 -9
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)inode_lock (upperdentry->d_inode); old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); err =notify_change (upperdentry, attr,NULL ); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (!err)ovl_copyattr (upperdentry->d_inode, dentry->d_inode);inode_unlock (upperdentry->d_inode);
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ int ovl_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat, stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink; out: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -306,7 +306,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) mask |=MAY_READ ; } err =inode_permission (realinode, mask); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); p =vfs_get_link (ovl_dentry_real (dentry), done); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return p; }
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name,WARN_ON (flags !=XATTR_REPLACE ); err =vfs_removexattr (realdentry, name); } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);/* copy c/mtime */ ovl_copyattr (d_inode (realdentry), inode);
@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char *name, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); res =__vfs_getxattr (realdentry,d_inode (realdentry), name, value, size, flags); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return res; }
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); res =vfs_listxattr (realdentry, list, size); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (res <=0 || size ==0 )return res;
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ struct posix_acl *ovl_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (inode->i_sb); acl =get_acl (realinode, type); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred);return acl; }
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static int ovl_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (inode->i_sb); err = realinode->i_op->fiemap (realinode, fieinfo, start, len); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (inode->i_sb, old_cred);return err; }
fs/overlayfs/namei.c +3 -3
@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,ovl_dentry_update_reval (dentry, upperdentry,DCACHE_OP_REVALIDATE |DCACHE_OP_WEAK_REVALIDATE ); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (origin_path) {dput (origin_path->dentry);kfree (origin_path);
@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,kfree (upperredirect); out:kfree (d.redirect); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return ERR_PTR (err); }
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)dput (this); } } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return positive; }
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +1 -0
@@ -253,6 +253,7 @@ int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry);void ovl_drop_write (struct dentry *dentry);struct dentry *ovl_workdir (struct dentry *dentry);const struct cred *ovl_override_creds (struct super_block *sb); +void ovl_revert_creds (struct super_block *sb,const struct cred *oldcred);int ovl_can_decode_fh (struct super_block *sb);struct dentry *ovl_indexdir (struct super_block *sb);bool ovl_index_all (struct super_block *sb);
fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct ovl_config {int xino;bool metacopy;bool ovl_volatile; +bool override_creds; };struct ovl_sb {
fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +4 -4
@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(struct dentry *dir, struct ovl_readdir_data *rdd) }inode_unlock (dir->d_inode); } -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (rdd->dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ static int ovl_iterate(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) } err =0 ; out: -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);return err; }
@@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_dir_open_realfile(const struct file *file, old_cred =ovl_override_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb); res =ovl_path_open (realpath,O_RDONLY | (file->f_flags &O_LARGEFILE )); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (file_inode (file)->i_sb, old_cred);return res; }
@@ -986,7 +986,7 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb); err =ovl_dir_read_merged (dentry, list, &root); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred);if (err)return err;
fs/overlayfs/super.c +21 -1
@@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ module_param_named(xino_auto, ovl_xino_auto_def, bool, 0644);MODULE_PARM_DESC (xino_auto,"Auto enable xino feature" ); +static bool __read_mostly ovl_override_creds_def = true; +module_param_named (override_creds, ovl_override_creds_def, bool,0644 ); +MODULE_PARM_DESC (ovl_override_creds_def, +"Use mounter's credentials for accesses" ); +static void ovl_entry_stack_free (struct ovl_entry *oe) {unsigned int i;
@@ -366,6 +371,9 @@ static int ovl_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct dentry *dentry) ofs->config.metacopy ? "on" : "off");if (ofs->config.ovl_volatile)seq_puts (m,",volatile" ); +if (ofs->config.override_creds != ovl_override_creds_def) +seq_show_option (m,"override_creds" , + ofs->config.override_creds ?"on" :"off" );return 0 ; }
@@ -418,6 +426,8 @@ enum {OPT_METACOPY_ON ,OPT_METACOPY_OFF ,OPT_VOLATILE , +OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON , +OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF , OPT_ERR, };
@@ -437,6 +447,8 @@ static const match_table_t ovl_tokens = { {OPT_METACOPY_ON, "metacopy=on"}, {OPT_METACOPY_OFF, "metacopy=off"}, {OPT_VOLATILE, "volatile"}, + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON, "override_creds=on"}, + {OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF, "override_creds=off"}, {OPT_ERR, NULL} };
@@ -496,6 +508,7 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) config->redirect_mode =kstrdup (ovl_redirect_mode_def (),GFP_KERNEL );if (!config->redirect_mode)return -ENOMEM ; + config->override_creds = ovl_override_creds_def;while ((p =ovl_next_opt (&opt)) !=NULL ) {int token;
@@ -585,6 +598,14 @@ static int ovl_parse_opt(char *opt, struct ovl_config *config) config->ovl_volatile = true;break ; +case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_ON : + config->override_creds = true; +break ; + +case OPT_OVERRIDE_CREDS_OFF : + config->override_creds = false; +break ; +default :pr_err ("unrecognized mount option \"%s\" or missing value\n" , p);
@@ -2007,7 +2028,6 @@ static int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)kfree (splitlower); sb->s_root = root_dentry; -return 0 ; out_free_oe:
fs/overlayfs/util.c +11 -2
@@ -37,9 +37,18 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb) {struct ovl_fs *ofs = sb->s_fs_info; +if (!ofs->config.override_creds) +return NULL ;return override_creds (ofs->creator_cred); } +void ovl_revert_creds (struct super_block *sb,const struct cred *old_cred) +{ +if (old_cred) +revert_creds (old_cred); +} + +/* * Check if underlying fs supports file handles and try to determine encoding * type, in order to deduce maximum inode number used by fs.
@@ -823,7 +832,7 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry)* value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr. */ err =ovl_set_nlink_upper (dentry); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred); out:if (err)
@@ -841,7 +850,7 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry) old_cred =ovl_override_creds (dentry->d_sb);ovl_cleanup_index (dentry); -revert_creds (old_cred); +ovl_revert_creds (dentry->d_sb, old_cred); }ovl_inode_unlock (inode);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.0.rc1.297.gfa9743e501-goog
Quoted 5 lines · Mark Salyzyn
Mark Salyzyn (3):
Add flags option to get xattr method paired to__vfs_getxattr
overlayfs: handleXATTR_NOSECURITYflag for get xattr method
overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypasscreator_cred
Quoted 7 lines
Mark Salyzyn + John Stultz (1):
overlayfs:inode_owner_or_capablecalled during execvThe first three patches address fundamental security issues that should be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature.
The fourth adds the feature depends on these other fixes.
FYI, I didn't receive patch 4, and neither https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel
nor https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-unionfs have it either.
- Eric
Quoted 9 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 8 lines · Mark Salyzyn
Mark Salyzyn (3):
Add flags option to get xattr method paired to__vfs_getxattr
overlayfs: handleXATTR_NOSECURITYflag for get xattr method
overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypasscreator_credMark Salyzyn + John Stultz (1):
overlayfs:inode_owner_or_capablecalled during execv
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
The first three patches address fundamental security issues that should be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature.
The fourth adds the feature depends on these other fixes.
FYI, I didn't receive patch 4, and neither https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel
nor https://lkml.kernel.org/linux-unionfs have it either.- Eric
Resent again, thanks.
Miklos Szeredi
maintainerRe: [RESEND PATCH v18 2/4] overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
In reply to Mark SalyzynQuoted 43 lines · Mark Salyzyn
Because of the overlayfs getxattr recursion, the incoming inode fails to update the selinux sid resulting in avc denials being reported against a target context of u:object_r:unlabeled:s0.
Solution is to respond to the
XATTR_NOSECURITYflag in get xattr method that calls the__vfs_getxattrhandler instead so that the context can be read in, rather than being denied with an-EACCESwhenvfs_getxattrhandler is called.For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then would be security(dentry) ->
__vfs_getxattr({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->handler->get({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->__vfs_getxattr({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->lower_handler->get({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})which would report back through the chain data and success as expected, the logging security layer at the top would have the data to determine the access permissions and report back to the logs and the caller that the target context was blocked.For selinux this would solve the cosmetic issue of the selinux log and allow audit2allow to correctly report the rule needed to address the access problem.
Check impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit (using
__vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data. This became an issue for credential override off sincesys_adminwould have been required by the caller; whereas would have been inherently present for the creator since it performed the mount.This is a change in operations since we do not check in the new
ovl_do_getxattrfunction if the credential override is off or not. Reasoning is that the sepolicy check is unnecessary overhead, especially since the check can be expensive.Because for override credentials off, this affects _everyone_ that underneath performs private xattr calls without the appropriate sepolicy permissions and
sys_admincapability. Providing blanket support forsys_adminwould be bad for all possible callers.
Quoted 4 lines
For the override credentials on, this will affect only the mounter, should it lack sepolicy permissions. Not considered a security problem since mounting by definition has
sys_admincapabilities, but sepolicy contexts would still need to be crafted.
This would be a problem when unprivileged mounting of overlay is introduced. I'd really like to avoid weakening the current security model.
The big API churn in the 1/4 patch also seems excessive considering that this seems to be mostly a cosmetic issue for android. Am I missing something?
Thanks,
Miklos
Re: [RESEND PATCH v18 2/4] overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
Quoted 43 lines · Miklos Szeredi
Quoted 42 lines · Mark Salyzyn
Because of the overlayfs getxattr recursion, the incoming inode fails to update the selinux sid resulting in avc denials being reported against a target context of u:object_r:unlabeled:s0.
Solution is to respond to the
XATTR_NOSECURITYflag in get xattr method that calls the__vfs_getxattrhandler instead so that the context can be read in, rather than being denied with an-EACCESwhenvfs_getxattrhandler is called.For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then would be security(dentry) ->
__vfs_getxattr({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->handler->get({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->__vfs_getxattr({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->lower_handler->get({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})which would report back through the chain data and success as expected, the logging security layer at the top would have the data to determine the access permissions and report back to the logs and the caller that the target context was blocked.For selinux this would solve the cosmetic issue of the selinux log and allow audit2allow to correctly report the rule needed to address the access problem.
Check impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit (using
__vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data. This became an issue for credential override off sincesys_adminwould have been required by the caller; whereas would have been inherently present for the creator since it performed the mount.This is a change in operations since we do not check in the new
ovl_do_getxattrfunction if the credential override is off or not. Reasoning is that the sepolicy check is unnecessary overhead, especially since the check can be expensive.Because for override credentials off, this affects _everyone_ that underneath performs private xattr calls without the appropriate sepolicy permissions and
sys_admincapability. Providing blanket support forsys_adminwould be bad for all possible callers.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For the override credentials on, this will affect only the mounter, should it lack sepolicy permissions. Not considered a security problem since mounting by definition has
sys_admincapabilities, but sepolicy contexts would still need to be crafted.This would be a problem when unprivileged mounting of overlay is introduced. I'd really like to avoid weakening the current security model.
The current security model does not deal with non-overlapping security contexts between init (which on android has MAC permissions only when necessary, only enough permissions to perform the mount and other mundane operations, missing exec and read permissions in key spots) and user calls.
We are only weakening (that is actually an incorrect statement, security is there, just not double security of both mounter and caller) the security around calls that retrieve the xattr for administrative and internal purposes. No data is exposed to the caller that it would not otherwise have permissions for.
This patch becomes necessary when matched with the PATCH v18 3/4 of the series which fixes the user space break introduced in ~4.6 that formerly used the callers credentials for all accesses in all places. Security is weakened already as-is in overlayfs with all the overriding of the credentials for internal accesses to overlayfs mechanics based on the mounter credentials. Using the mounter credentials as a wider security hole is the problem, at least with PATCH v18 3/4 of the series we go back optionally to only using the caller's credentials to perform the operations. Admittedly some of the internal operations like mknod are privileged, but at least in Android's use case we are not using them with callers without the necessary credentials.
Android does not give the mounter more credentials than the callers, there is very little overlap in the MAC security.
Quoted 3 lines
The big API churn in the 1/4 patch also seems excessive considering that this seems to be mostly a cosmetic issue for android. Am I missing something?
Breaks sepolicy, it no longer has access to the context data at the overlayfs security boundary.
unknown is a symptom of being denied based on the denial to xattr data from the underlying filesystem layer. Being denied the security context of the target is not a good thing within the sepolicy security layer.
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks,
Miklos
Re: [RESEND PATCH v18 2/4] overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
Quoted 57 lines · Mark Salyzyn
Quoted 43 lines · Miklos Szeredi
Quoted 42 lines · Mark Salyzyn
Because of the overlayfs getxattr recursion, the incoming inode fails to update the selinux sid resulting in avc denials being reported against a target context of u:object_r:unlabeled:s0.
Solution is to respond to the
XATTR_NOSECURITYflag in get xattr method that calls the__vfs_getxattrhandler instead so that the context can be read in, rather than being denied with an-EACCESwhenvfs_getxattrhandler is called.For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then would be security(dentry) ->
__vfs_getxattr({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->handler->get({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->__vfs_getxattr({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->lower_handler->get({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})which would report back through the chain data and success as expected, the logging security layer at the top would have the data to determine the access permissions and report back to the logs and the caller that the target context was blocked.For selinux this would solve the cosmetic issue of the selinux log and allow audit2allow to correctly report the rule needed to address the access problem.
Check impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit (using
__vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data. This became an issue for credential override off sincesys_adminwould have been required by the caller; whereas would have been inherently present for the creator since it performed the mount.This is a change in operations since we do not check in the new
ovl_do_getxattrfunction if the credential override is off or not. Reasoning is that the sepolicy check is unnecessary overhead, especially since the check can be expensive.Because for override credentials off, this affects _everyone_ that underneath performs private xattr calls without the appropriate sepolicy permissions and
sys_admincapability. Providing blanket support forsys_adminwould be bad for all possible callers.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For the override credentials on, this will affect only the mounter, should it lack sepolicy permissions. Not considered a security problem since mounting by definition has
sys_admincapabilities, but sepolicy contexts would still need to be crafted.This would be a problem when unprivileged mounting of overlay is introduced. I'd really like to avoid weakening the current security model.
The current security model does not deal with non-overlapping security contexts between init (which on android has MAC permissions only when necessary, only enough permissions to perform the mount and other mundane operations, missing exec and read permissions in key spots) and user calls.
Quoted 5 lines
We are only weakening (that is actually an incorrect statement, security is there, just not double security of both mounter and caller) the security around calls that retrieve the xattr for administrative and internal purposes. No data is exposed to the caller that it would not otherwise have permissions for.
We've ran into the same issues that Mark is trying to solve with this series. I came across Mark's series while searching around before I wrote up a similar patch to Mark's patch #3.
We have a confined process that sets up Overlayfs mounts, then that process starts a service confined by another security context, then that service may execute binaries that run under a third security context. In this case, I'm talking about SELinux security contexts but it could be AppArmor or anything else that you use to separate out privileges/permissions at fine-grained detail.
We don't want to grant all the privileges/permissions required by the service (and its helper utilities) to the process that sets up the Overlayfs mounts because we've been very careful in separating them apart with security policy. However, we want to make use of Overlayfs and adding a mount option to bypass the check on the mounter's cred seems like a safe way of using Overlayfs without violating our principle of least privilege.
Tyler
Quoted 32 lines
This patch becomes necessary when matched with the PATCH v18 3/4 of the series which fixes the user space break introduced in ~4.6 that formerly used the callers credentials for all accesses in all places. Security is weakened already as-is in overlayfs with all the overriding of the credentials for internal accesses to overlayfs mechanics based on the mounter credentials. Using the mounter credentials as a wider security hole is the problem, at least with PATCH v18 3/4 of the series we go back optionally to only using the caller's credentials to perform the operations. Admittedly some of the internal operations like mknod are privileged, but at least in Android's use case we are not using them with callers without the necessary credentials.
Android does not give the mounter more credentials than the callers, there is very little overlap in the MAC security.
Quoted 3 lines
The big API churn in the 1/4 patch also seems excessive considering that this seems to be mostly a cosmetic issue for android. Am I missing something?
Breaks sepolicy, it no longer has access to the context data at the overlayfs security boundary.
unknown is a symptom of being denied based on the denial to xattr data from the underlying filesystem layer. Being denied the security context of the target is not a good thing within the sepolicy security layer.
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks,
Miklos
Re: [RESEND PATCH v18 2/4] overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method
Quoted 75 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 57 lines · Mark Salyzyn
Quoted 43 lines · Miklos Szeredi
Quoted 42 lines · Mark Salyzyn
Because of the overlayfs getxattr recursion, the incoming inode fails to update the selinux sid resulting in avc denials being reported against a target context of u:object_r:unlabeled:s0.
Solution is to respond to the
XATTR_NOSECURITYflag in get xattr method that calls the__vfs_getxattrhandler instead so that the context can be read in, rather than being denied with an-EACCESwhenvfs_getxattrhandler is called.For the use case where access is to be blocked by the security layer.
The path then would be security(dentry) ->
__vfs_getxattr({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->handler->get({dentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->__vfs_getxattr({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})->lower_handler->get({realdentry...XATTR_NOSECURITY})which would report back through the chain data and success as expected, the logging security layer at the top would have the data to determine the access permissions and report back to the logs and the caller that the target context was blocked.For selinux this would solve the cosmetic issue of the selinux log and allow audit2allow to correctly report the rule needed to address the access problem.
Check impure, opaque, origin & meta xattr with no sepolicy audit (using
__vfs_getxattr) since these operations are internal to overlayfs operations and do not disclose any data. This became an issue for credential override off sincesys_adminwould have been required by the caller; whereas would have been inherently present for the creator since it performed the mount.This is a change in operations since we do not check in the new
ovl_do_getxattrfunction if the credential override is off or not. Reasoning is that the sepolicy check is unnecessary overhead, especially since the check can be expensive.Because for override credentials off, this affects _everyone_ that underneath performs private xattr calls without the appropriate sepolicy permissions and
sys_admincapability. Providing blanket support forsys_adminwould be bad for all possible callers.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
For the override credentials on, this will affect only the mounter, should it lack sepolicy permissions. Not considered a security problem since mounting by definition has
sys_admincapabilities, but sepolicy contexts would still need to be crafted.This would be a problem when unprivileged mounting of overlay is introduced. I'd really like to avoid weakening the current security model.
The current security model does not deal with non-overlapping security contexts between init (which on android has MAC permissions only when necessary, only enough permissions to perform the mount and other mundane operations, missing exec and read permissions in key spots) and user calls.
Quoted 5 lines
We are only weakening (that is actually an incorrect statement, security is there, just not double security of both mounter and caller) the security around calls that retrieve the xattr for administrative and internal purposes. No data is exposed to the caller that it would not otherwise have permissions for.
We've ran into the same issues that Mark is trying to solve with this series. I came across Mark's series while searching around before I wrote up a similar patch to Mark's patch #3.
We have a confined process that sets up Overlayfs mounts, then that process starts a service confined by another security context, then that service may execute binaries that run under a third security context. In this case, I'm talking about SELinux security contexts but it could be AppArmor or anything else that you use to separate out privileges/permissions at fine-grained detail.
Quoted 7 lines
We don't want to grant all the privileges/permissions required by the service (and its helper utilities) to the process that sets up the Overlayfs mounts because we've been very careful in separating them apart with security policy. However, we want to make use of Overlayfs and adding a mount option to bypass the check on the mounter's cred seems like a safe way of using Overlayfs without violating our principle of least privilege.
I just realized that I missed one noteworthy aspect of our use case. We would be alright if this functionality to bypass the mounter's cred checks (conditional, based on a mount option) was only allowed for read-only overlays[1].
I'm not sure if that would meet the needs of Android. Can you comment on that, Mark?
Miklos, would that restriction make this series any more acceptable to you?
Thanks!
Tyler
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/filesystems/overlayfs.html#multiple-lower-layers
Quoted 35 lines
Tyler
Quoted 32 lines
This patch becomes necessary when matched with the PATCH v18 3/4 of the series which fixes the user space break introduced in ~4.6 that formerly used the callers credentials for all accesses in all places. Security is weakened already as-is in overlayfs with all the overriding of the credentials for internal accesses to overlayfs mechanics based on the mounter credentials. Using the mounter credentials as a wider security hole is the problem, at least with PATCH v18 3/4 of the series we go back optionally to only using the caller's credentials to perform the operations. Admittedly some of the internal operations like mknod are privileged, but at least in Android's use case we are not using them with callers without the necessary credentials.
Android does not give the mounter more credentials than the callers, there is very little overlap in the MAC security.
Quoted 3 lines
The big API churn in the 1/4 patch also seems excessive considering that this seems to be mostly a cosmetic issue for android. Am I missing something?
Breaks sepolicy, it no longer has access to the context data at the overlayfs security boundary.
unknown is a symptom of being denied based on the denial to xattr data from the underlying filesystem layer. Being denied the security context of the target is not a good thing within the sepolicy security layer.
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks,
Miklos