fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerPATCH 1/1 fix namespaced fscaps when !CONFIG_SECURITY
Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in 8db6c34f1dbc . When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up if CONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one.
To test this using libcap-bin (*1),
$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK
"setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail:
$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in []
Fix this bug by calling cap_inode_getsecurity() in security_inode_getsecurity() instead of returning -EOPNOTSUPP, when CONFIG_SECURITY=n.
*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431
Cc: Hervé Guillemet <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -1
@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)static inline int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc) { -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return cap_inode_getsecurity (inode, name, buffer, alloc); }static inline int security_inode_setsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Quoted 58 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
8db6c34f1dbc. When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up ifCONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one.To test this using libcap-bin (*1),
$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK"setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with
CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail:$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in []Fix this bug by calling
cap_inode_getsecurity()insecurity_inode_getsecurity()instead of returning-EOPNOTSUPP, whenCONFIG_SECURITY=n.*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead.
Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431
Cc: Hervé Guillemet <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/security.h +1
-2@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)static inline int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc) { -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return cap_inode_getsecurity (inode, name, buffer, alloc); }static inline int security_inode_setsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags) --2.25.1
Quoted 29 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
8db6c34f1dbc. When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up ifCONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one.To test this using libcap-bin (*1),
$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK"setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with
CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail:$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in []Fix this bug by calling
cap_inode_getsecurity()insecurity_inode_getsecurity()instead of returning-EOPNOTSUPP, whenCONFIG_SECURITY=n.
Quoted 8 lines
*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead.
Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431
Cc: Hervé Guillemet <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 17 lines
--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/security.h +1
-1@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)static inline int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc) { -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return cap_inode_getsecurity (inode, name, buffer, alloc); }static inline int security_inode_setsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags)
James Morris
maintainer[Adding LSM list]
Quoted 55 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
8db6c34f1dbc. When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up ifCONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one.To test this using libcap-bin (*1),
$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK"setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with
CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail:$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in []Fix this bug by calling
cap_inode_getsecurity()insecurity_inode_getsecurity()instead of returning-EOPNOTSUPP, whenCONFIG_SECURITY=n.*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead.
Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431
Cc: Hervé Guillemet <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/security.h +1
-1@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)static inline int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc) { -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return cap_inode_getsecurity (inode, name, buffer, alloc); }static inline int security_inode_setsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags)
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead.
Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431
"Perf fails to compile with python 3.7"
Wrong bug ID?
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Andrew G. Morgan
Signed-off-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
This should be Acked-by or Reviewed-by, unless this is your patch, or it came via your tree.
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Andrew G. Morgan
Reviewed-byWorks for me too.
Quoted 13 lines · James Morris
Quoted 1 line · Andrew G. Morgan
Signed-off-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>This should be Acked-by or Reviewed-by, unless this is your patch, or it came via your tree.
--
James Morris
<[email protected]>
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerHi James,
would you mind adding this to the security tree? (You can cherrypick
from https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/commit/?h=2020-11-29/fix-nscaps )
thanks,
-serge
Quoted 66 lines · Andrew G. Morgan
Signed-off-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>Quoted 61 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
8db6c34f1dbc. When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up ifCONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one.To test this using libcap-bin (*1),
$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK"setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with
CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail:$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in []Fix this bug by calling
cap_inode_getsecurity()insecurity_inode_getsecurity()instead of returning-EOPNOTSUPP, whenCONFIG_SECURITY=n.*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead.
Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431
Cc: Hervé Guillemet <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/security.h +1
-1@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)static inline int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc) { -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return cap_inode_getsecurity (inode, name, buffer, alloc); }static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const
char *name, const void *value,size_tsize, int flags)
--
2.25.1
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Hi James,
would you mind adding this to the security tree? (You can cherrypick
from https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/commit/?h=2020-11-29/fix-nscaps )
Sure.
Quoted 72 lines
thanks,
-sergeQuoted 66 lines · Andrew G. Morgan
Signed-off-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>Quoted 61 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
8db6c34f1dbc. When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up ifCONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one.To test this using libcap-bin (*1),
$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK"setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with
CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail:$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in []Fix this bug by calling
cap_inode_getsecurity()insecurity_inode_getsecurity()instead of returning-EOPNOTSUPP, whenCONFIG_SECURITY=n.*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead.
Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431
Cc: Hervé Guillemet <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/security.h +1
-1@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)static inline int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc) { -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return cap_inode_getsecurity (inode, name, buffer, alloc); }static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const
char *name, const void *value,size_tsize, int flags)
--
2.25.1
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Andrew G. Morgan
Reviewed-byThe correct bug reference for this patch is:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689
Quoted 86 lines · James Morris
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Hi James,
would you mind adding this to the security tree? (You can cherrypick
from https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/commit/?h=2020-11-29/fix-nscaps )Sure.
Quoted 65 lines
thanks,
-sergeQuoted 60 lines · Andrew G. Morgan
Signed-off-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>Quoted 55 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
8db6c34f1dbc. When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up ifCONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one.To test this using libcap-bin (*1),
$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK"setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with
CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail:$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in []Fix this bug by calling
cap_inode_getsecurity()insecurity_inode_getsecurity()instead of returning-EOPNOTSUPP, whenCONFIG_SECURITY=n.*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead.
Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431
Cc: Hervé Guillemet <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/security.h +1
-1@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)static inline int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc) { -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return cap_inode_getsecurity (inode, name, buffer, alloc); }Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const
char *name, const void *value,size_tsize, int flags)
--
2.25.1--
James Morris
<[email protected]>
James Morris
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Andrew G. Morgan
The correct bug reference for this patch is:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689
Reviewed-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
Thanks.
Applied togit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git fixes-5.10 and next-testing
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerHow odd - where did that come from?
James, I force-pushed that with corrected bugzilla link to 2020-11-29/fix-nscaps. Sorry about that.
Quoted 93 lines · Andrew G. Morgan
The correct bug reference for this patch is:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689
Reviewed-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>Quoted 86 lines · James Morris
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Hi James,
would you mind adding this to the security tree? (You can cherrypick
from https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/commit/?h=2020-11-29/fix-nscaps )Sure.
Quoted 65 lines
thanks,
-sergeQuoted 60 lines · Andrew G. Morgan
Signed-off-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>Quoted 55 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
8db6c34f1dbc. When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up ifCONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one.To test this using libcap-bin (*1),
$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK"setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with
CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail:$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in []Fix this bug by calling
cap_inode_getsecurity()insecurity_inode_getsecurity()instead of returning-EOPNOTSUPP, whenCONFIG_SECURITY=n.*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead.
Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431
Cc: Hervé Guillemet <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/security.h +1
-1@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)static inline int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc) { -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return cap_inode_getsecurity (inode, name, buffer, alloc); }Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const
char *name, const void *value,size_tsize, int flags)
--
2.25.1--
James Morris
<[email protected]>
Serge E. Hallyn
maintainerOh, I see you'd changed it inline :) Thanks
Quoted 99 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
How odd - where did that come from?
James, I force-pushed that with corrected bugzilla link to 2020-11-29/fix-nscaps. Sorry about that.
Quoted 93 lines · Andrew G. Morgan
The correct bug reference for this patch is:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=209689
Reviewed-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>Quoted 86 lines · James Morris
Quoted 4 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Hi James,
would you mind adding this to the security tree? (You can cherrypick
from https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux.git/commit/?h=2020-11-29/fix-nscaps )Sure.
Quoted 65 lines
thanks,
-sergeQuoted 60 lines · Andrew G. Morgan
Signed-off-by Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>Quoted 55 lines · Serge E. Hallyn
Namespaced file capabilities were introduced in
8db6c34f1dbc. When userspace reads an xattr for a namespaced capability, a virtualized representation of it is returned if the caller is in a user namespace owned by the capability's owning rootid. The function which performs this virtualization was not hooked up ifCONFIG_SECURITY=n. Therefore in that case the original xattr was shown instead of the virtualized one.To test this using libcap-bin (*1),
$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin-eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin-eip $v /tmp/tmp.lSiIFRvt8Y: OK"setcap -v" verifies the values instead of setting them, and will check whether the rootid value is set. Therefore, with this bug un-fixed, and with
CONFIG_SECURITY=n, setcap -v will fail:$ v=$(mktemp) $ unshare -Ur setcap cap_sys_admin=eip $v $ unshare -Ur setcap -v cap_sys_admin=eip $v nsowner[got=1000, want=0],/tmp/tmp.HHDiOOl9fY differs in []Fix this bug by calling
cap_inode_getsecurity()insecurity_inode_getsecurity()instead of returning-EOPNOTSUPP, whenCONFIG_SECURITY=n.*1 - note, if libcap is too old for getcap to have the '-n' option, then use verify-caps instead.
Signed-off-by Serge Hallyn <[email protected]>Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1593431
Cc: Hervé Guillemet <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <[email protected]>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/security.h +1
-1@@ -869,7 +869,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)static inline int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc) { -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return cap_inode_getsecurity (inode, name, buffer, alloc); }Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
static inline int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const
char *name, const void *value,size_tsize, int flags)
--
2.25.1--
James Morris
<[email protected]>