Next revision of the L1D flush patches
Subsystems (5)
v3 cover Next revision of the L1D flush patches
Implement a mechanism that allows tasks to conditionally flush their L1D cache (mitigation mechanism suggested in [2]). The previous posts of these patches were sent for inclusion (see [3]) and were not included due to the concern for the need for additional checks, those checks were:
1. Implement this mechanism only for CPUs affected by the L1TF bug
2. Disable the software fallback
3. Provide an override to disable this mechanism completely
4. Be SMT aware in the implementation
The patches support a use case where the entire system is not in non SMT mode, but rather a few CPUs can have their SMT turned off and processes that want to opt-in are expected to run on non SMT cores. This gives the administrator complete control over setting up the mitigation for the issue. In addition, the administrator has a boot time override (l1d_flush_out=off) to turn of the mechanism completely.
To implement these efficiently, a new per cpu view of whether the core is in SMT mode or not is implemented in patch 1. The code is refactored in patch 2 so that the existing code can allow for other speculation related checks when switching mm between tasks, this mechanism has not changed since the last post. The ability to flush L1D for tasks if the TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH bit is set and the task has context switched out of a non SMT core is provided by patch 3. Hooks for the user space API, for this feature to be invoked via prctl are provided in patch 4, along with the checks described above (1, 2, and 3). Documentation updates are in patch 5, with updates on l1d_flush, the prctl changes and updates to the kernel-parameters (l1d_flush_out).
The checks for opting into L1D flushing are:
a. If the CPU is affected by L1TF
b. Hardware L1D flush mechanism is available
A task running on a core with SMT enabled and opting into this feature will receive a SIGBUS.
References
[1] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/snoop-assisted-l1-data-sampling
[2] https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-snoop-assisted-l1-data-sampling
[3] https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/6/2/1150
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Changelog v3:
- Implement the SIGBUS mechansim
- Update and fix the documentation
Balbir Singh (5):
x86/mm: change l1d flush runtime prctl behaviour x86/mm: Refactor cond_ibpb() to support other use cases x86/mm: Optionally flush L1D on context switch
prctl: Hook L1D flushing in via prctl
Documentation: Add L1D flushing Documentation
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + .../admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst | 69 ++++++++++++ .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 17 +++ Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 8 ++ arch/Kconfig | 4 + arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 8 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 9 +- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 54 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 11 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 105 ++++++++++++++---- include/linux/sched.h | 10 ++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 + 15 files changed, 274 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v3 1/5 x86/mm: change l1d flush runtime prctl behaviour
Detection of task affinities at API opt-in time is not the best approach, the approach is to kill the task if it runs on a SMT enable core. This is better than not flushing the L1D cache when the task switches from a non-SMT core to an SMT enabled core.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 11 ++++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +2 -0
@@ -136,6 +136,8 @@ struct cpuinfo_x86 {u16 logical_die_id;/* Index into per_cpu list: */ u16 cpu_index; +/* Is SMT active on this core? */ +bool smt_active;u32 microcode;/* Address space bits used by the cache internally */ u8 x86_cache_bits;
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c +10 -1
@@ -635,6 +635,9 @@ void set_cpu_sibling_map(int cpu) threads =cpumask_weight (topology_sibling_cpumask (cpu));if (threads > __max_smt_threads) __max_smt_threads = threads; + +for_each_cpu (i,topology_sibling_cpumask (cpu)) +cpu_data (i).smt_active = threads >1 ; }/* maps the cpu to the sched domain representing multi-core */
@@ -1548,10 +1551,16 @@ static void remove_siblinginfo(int cpu)for_each_cpu (sibling,topology_die_cpumask (cpu))cpumask_clear_cpu (cpu,topology_die_cpumask (sibling)); -for_each_cpu (sibling,topology_sibling_cpumask (cpu)) + +for_each_cpu (sibling,topology_sibling_cpumask (cpu)) {cpumask_clear_cpu (cpu,topology_sibling_cpumask (sibling)); +if (cpumask_weight (topology_sibling_cpumask (sibling)) ==1 ) +cpu_data (sibling).smt_active = false; + } +for_each_cpu (sibling,cpu_llc_shared_mask (cpu))cpumask_clear_cpu (cpu,cpu_llc_shared_mask (sibling)); +cpumask_clear (cpu_llc_shared_mask (cpu));cpumask_clear (topology_sibling_cpumask (cpu));cpumask_clear (topology_core_cpumask (cpu));
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v3 2/5 x86/mm: Refactor cond_ibpb() to support other use cases
In reply to Balbir Singhcond_ibpb() has the necessary bits required to track the previous mm in switch_mm_irqs_off(). This can be reused for other use cases like L1D flushing on context switch.
[ tglx: Moved comment, added a separate define for state (re)initialization ]
--- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +1 -1
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ struct tlb_state {/* Last user mm for optimizing IBPB */ union {struct mm_struct *last_user_mm; -unsigned long last_user_mm_ibpb; +unsigned long last_user_mm_spec; };u16 loaded_mm_asid;
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +29 -24
116 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v3 4/5 prctl: Hook L1D flushing in via prctl
In reply to Balbir SinghUse the existing PR_GET/SET_SPECULATION_CTRL API to expose the L1D flush capability. For L1D flushing PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE and PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC are not supported.
Enabling L1D flush does not check if the task is running on an SMT enabled core, rather a check is done at runtime (at the time of flush), if the task runs on a non SMT enabled core then the task is sent a SIGBUS (this is done prior to the task executing on the core, so no data is leaked). This is better than the other alternatives of
a. Ensuring strict affinity of the task (hard to enforce without further changes in the scheduler)
b. Silently skipping flush for tasks that move to SMT enabled cores.
An arch config ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH has been added and struct task carries a callback_head for arch's that support this config (currently on x86), this callback head is used to schedule task work (SIGBUS delivery).
There is also no seccomp integration for the feature.
--- arch/Kconfig | 4 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++- include/linux/sched.h | 10 +++++++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/Kconfig +4 -0
@@ -311,6 +311,10 @@ config ARCH_32BIT_OFF_T still support 32-bit off_t. This option is enabled for all such architectures explicitly. +config ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH + bool + default n + config HAVE_ASM_MODVERSIONS bool help
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ config X86 select ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT select ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE select ARCH_WANTS_THP_SWAP if X86_64 + select ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH select BUILDTIME_TABLE_SORT select CLKEVT_I8253 select CLOCKSOURCE_VALIDATE_LAST_CYCLE
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +54 -0
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arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +29 -1
@@ -315,6 +315,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(leave_mm);int enable_l1d_flush_for_task (struct task_struct *tsk) { +/* +* Do not enable L1D_FLUSH_OUT if +* b. The CPU is not affected by the L1TF bug +* c. The CPU does not have L1D FLUSH feature support +*/ + +if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_L1TF ) || + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D )) +return -EINVAL ; +set_ti_thread_flag (&tsk->thread_info,TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH );return 0 ; }
@@ -335,13 +345,31 @@ void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,local_irq_restore (flags); } +/* +* Sent to a task that opts into L1D flushing via the prctl interface +* but ends up running on an SMT enabled core. +*/ +static void l1d_flush_kill (struct callback_head *ch) +{ +force_sig (SIGBUS ); +} +static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_bits (struct task_struct *next) {unsigned long next_tif =task_thread_info (next)->flags;unsigned long spec_bits = (next_tif >>TIF_SPEC_IB ) &LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK ; +unsigned long next_mm;BUILD_BUG_ON (TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH !=TIF_SPEC_IB +1 ); -return (unsigned long )next->mm | spec_bits; + next_mm = (unsigned long )next->mm | spec_bits; + +if ((next_mm &LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH ) &&this_cpu_read (cpu_info.smt_active)) { +clear_ti_thread_flag (&next->thread_info,TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH ); + next->l1d_flush_kill.func = l1d_flush_kill; +task_work_add (next, &next->l1d_flush_kill, true); + } + +return next_mm; }static void cond_mitigation (struct task_struct *next)
include/linux/sched.h +10 -0
@@ -1348,6 +1348,16 @@ struct task_struct {struct callback_head mce_kill_me;#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_L1D_FLUSH +/* +* If L1D flush is supported on mm context switch +* then we use this callback head to queue kill work +* to kill tasks that are not running on SMT disabled +* cores +*/ +struct callback_head l1d_flush_kill; +#endif +/* * New fields for task_struct should be added above here, so that * they are included in the randomized portion of task_struct.
include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +1 -0
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {/* Speculation control variants */ # define PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS 0# define PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH 1 +# define PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH_OUT 2/* Return and control values for PR_SET/GET_SPECULATION_CTRL */ # define PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED 0# define PR_SPEC_PRCTL (1UL << 0)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v3 3/5 x86/mm: Optionally flush L1D on context switch
In reply to Balbir SinghImplement a mechanism to selectively flush the L1D cache. The goal is to allow tasks that want to save sensitive information, found by the recent snoop assisted data sampling vulnerabilites, to flush their L1D on being switched out. This protects their data from being snooped or leaked via side channels after the task has context switched out.
There are two scenarios we might want to protect against, a task leaving the CPU with data still in L1D (which is the main concern of this patch), the second scenario is a malicious task coming in (not so well trusted) for which we want to clean up the cache before it starts. Only the case for the former is addressed.
A new thread_info flag TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH is added to track tasks which opt-into L1D flushing. cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec is used to convert the TIF flags into mm state (per cpu via last_user_mm_spec) in cond_mitigation(), which then used to do decide when to flush the L1D cache.
A new helper inline function l1d_flush_hw() has been introduced. Currently it returns an error code if hardware flushing is not supported. The caller currently does not check the return value, in the context of these patches, the routine is called only when HW assisted flushing is available.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 8 ++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h | 9 +++++++-- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h +8 -0
@@ -10,4 +10,12 @@void clflush_cache_range (void *addr,unsigned int size); +static inline int l1d_flush_hw (void ) +{ +if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D )) { +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD ,L1D_FLUSH ); +return 0 ; + } +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +}#endif /* _ASM_X86_CACHEFLUSH_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/thread_info.h +7 -2
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ struct thread_info {#define TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT 7/* syscall auditing active */ #define TIF_SECCOMP 8/* secure computing */ #define TIF_SPEC_IB 9/* Indirect branch speculation mitigation */ -#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE 10/* Force speculation MSR update in context switch */ +#define TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH 10/* Flush L1D on mm switches (processes) */ #define TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY 11/* notify kernel of userspace return */ #define TIF_UPROBE 12/* breakpointed or singlestepping */ #define TIF_PATCH_PENDING 13/* pending live patching update */
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ struct thread_info {#define TIF_MEMDIE 20/* is terminating due to OOM killer */ #define TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG 21/* idle is polling for TIF_NEED_RESCHED */ #define TIF_IO_BITMAP 22/* uses I/O bitmap */ +#define TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE 23/* Force speculation MSR update in context switch */ #define TIF_FORCED_TF 24/* true if TF in eflags artificially */ #define TIF_BLOCKSTEP 25/* set when we want DEBUGCTLMSR_BTF */ #define TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES 27/* task is updating the mmu lazily */
@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ struct thread_info {#define _TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT (1 << TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT)#define _TIF_SECCOMP (1 << TIF_SECCOMP)#define _TIF_SPEC_IB (1 << TIF_SPEC_IB) -#define _TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE (1 << TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE) +#define _TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH (1 << TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH)#define _TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY (1 << TIF_USER_RETURN_NOTIFY)#define _TIF_UPROBE (1 << TIF_UPROBE)#define _TIF_PATCH_PENDING (1 << TIF_PATCH_PENDING)
@@ -124,6 +125,7 @@ struct thread_info {#define _TIF_SLD (1 << TIF_SLD)#define _TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG (1 << TIF_POLLING_NRFLAG)#define _TIF_IO_BITMAP (1 << TIF_IO_BITMAP) +#define _TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE (1 << TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE)#define _TIF_FORCED_TF (1 << TIF_FORCED_TF)#define _TIF_BLOCKSTEP (1 << TIF_BLOCKSTEP)#define _TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES (1 << TIF_LAZY_MMU_UPDATES)
@@ -228,6 +230,9 @@ static inline int arch_within_stack_frames(const void * const stack, current_thread_info()->status & TS_COMPAT)#endif +extern int enable_l1d_flush_for_task (struct task_struct *tsk); +extern int disable_l1d_flush_for_task (struct task_struct *tsk); +extern void arch_task_cache_init (void );extern int arch_dup_task_struct (struct task_struct *dst,struct task_struct *src);extern void arch_release_task_struct (struct task_struct *tsk);
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +27 -3
@@ -8,11 +8,13 @@#include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/debugfs.h> +#include <linux/sched/smt.h> #include <asm/tlbflush.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/cache.h> +#include <asm/cacheflush.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include "mm_internal.h"
@@ -42,14 +44,15 @@*/ /* -* Bits to mangle the TIF_SPEC_IB state into the mm pointer which is +* Bits to mangle the TIF_SPEC_* state into the mm pointer which is * stored in cpu_tlb_state.last_user_mm_spec. */ #define LAST_USER_MM_IBPB 0x1UL -#define LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK (LAST_USER_MM_IBPB) +#define LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH 0x2UL +#define LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK (LAST_USER_MM_IBPB | LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH)/* Bits to set when tlbstate and flush is (re)initialized */ -#define LAST_USER_MM_INIT LAST_USER_MM_IBPB +#define LAST_USER_MM_INIT (LAST_USER_MM_IBPB | LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH)/* * The x86 feature is called PCID (Process Context IDentifier). It is similar
@@ -310,6 +313,18 @@ void leave_mm(int cpu) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (leave_mm); +int enable_l1d_flush_for_task (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +set_ti_thread_flag (&tsk->thread_info,TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH ); +return 0 ; +} + +int disable_l1d_flush_for_task (struct task_struct *tsk) +{ +clear_ti_thread_flag (&tsk->thread_info,TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH ); +return 0 ; +} +void switch_mm (struct mm_struct *prev,struct mm_struct *next,struct task_struct *tsk) {
@@ -325,6 +340,7 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_bits(struct task_struct *next)unsigned long next_tif =task_thread_info (next)->flags;unsigned long spec_bits = (next_tif >>TIF_SPEC_IB ) &LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK ; +BUILD_BUG_ON (TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH !=TIF_SPEC_IB +1 );return (unsigned long )next->mm | spec_bits; }
@@ -402,6 +418,14 @@ static void cond_mitigation(struct task_struct *next)indirect_branch_prediction_barrier (); } +/* +* Flush only if SMT is disabled as per the contract, which is checked +* when the feature is enabled. +*/ +if (sched_smt_active () && !this_cpu_read (cpu_info.smt_active) && + (prev_mm &LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH )) +l1d_flush_hw (); +this_cpu_write (cpu_tlbstate.last_user_mm_spec, next_mm); }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v3 5/5 Documentation: Add L1D flushing Documentation
In reply to Balbir SinghAdd documentation of l1d flushing, explain the need for the feature and how it can be used.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 + .../admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst | 69 +++++++++++++++++++ .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 17 +++++ Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst | 8 +++ 4 files changed, 95 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. tsx_async_abort multihit.rst special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst + l1d_flush.rst
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1d_flush.rst new file +69 -0
69 lines not on this page · raw message
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +17 -0
@@ -2320,6 +2320,23 @@ feature (tagged TLBs) on capable Intel chips. Default is 1 (enabled) + l1d_flush_out= [X86,INTEL] + Control mitigation for L1D based snooping vulnerability. + + Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU + internal buffers which can forward information to a + disclosure gadget under certain conditions. + + In vulnerable processors, the speculatively + forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel + attack, to access data to which the attacker does + not have direct access. + + This parameter controls the mitigation. The + options are: + + off - Unconditionally disable the mitigation + l1tf= [X86] Control mitigation of the L1TF vulnerability on affected CPUs
Documentation/userspace-api/spec_ctrl.rst +8 -0
@@ -106,3 +106,11 @@ Speculation misfeature controls * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0); * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE, 0, 0); + +- PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH_OUT: Flush L1D Cache on context switch out of the task + (works only when tasks run on non SMT cores) + + Invocations: + * prctl(PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH_OUT, 0, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH_OUT, PR_SPEC_ENABLE, 0, 0); + * prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL, PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH_OUT, PR_SPEC_DISABLE, 0, 0);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v3 1/5] x86/mm: change l1d flush runtime prctl behaviour
In reply to Balbir SinghQuoted 10 lines · Balbir Singh
Detection of task affinities at API opt-in time is not the best approach, the approach is to kill the task if it runs on a SMT enable core. This is better than not flushing the L1D cache when the task switches from a non-SMT core to an SMT enabled core.
Signed-off-by Balbir Singh <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 11 ++++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Subject, changelog match but patch content not so much :)
Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] x86/mm: Optionally flush L1D on context switch
In reply to Balbir Singharch/x86/mm/tlb.c static void cond_mitigation(struct task_struct *next) · line 427
Quoted 8 lines · Balbir Singh
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +7
-0+/* +* Flush only if SMT is disabled as per the contract, which is checked +* when the feature is enabled. +*/ +if (sched_smt_active () && !this_cpu_read (cpu_info.smt_active) && + (prev_mm &LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH )) +l1d_flush_hw ();
So if SMT is completely disabled then no flush? Shouldn't the logic be:
if ((!sched_smt_active() || !this_cpu_read(cpu_info.smt_active) &&
(prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH))Hmm?
But that's bad, because it's lot's of conditions to evaluate for every switch_mm where most of them are not interested in it at all.
Let me read through the rest of the pile.
Thanks,
tglx
Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] prctl: Hook L1D flushing in via prctl
In reply to Balbir SinghBalbir,
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c enum taa_mitigations { · line 304
Quoted 6 lines · Balbir Singh
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +6
-0+enum l1d_flush_out_mitigations { +L1D_FLUSH_OUT_OFF , +L1D_FLUSH_OUT_ON , +}; + +static enum l1d_flush_out_mitigations l1d_flush_out_mitigation__ro_after_init =L1D_FLUSH_OUT_ON ;
Why default on and why stays it on when the CPU is not affected by L1TF ...
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void) · line 392
Quoted 11 lines
/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
static enumtaa_mitigationstaa_mitigation__ro_after_init=TAA_MITIGATION_VERW; static booltaa_nosmt__ro_after_init;arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4
-0@@ -379,6 +386,18 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)pr_info ("%s\n" , taa_strings[taa_mitigation]); } +static int __init l1d_flush_out_parse_cmdline (char *str) +{ +if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_L1TF )) +return 0 ;
... while here you check for L1TF.
Also shouldn't it be default off and enabled via command line?
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task) · line 1388
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +8
-0+static int l1d_flush_out_prctl_get (struct task_struct *task) +{ +int ret; + +if (l1d_flush_out_mitigation ==L1D_FLUSH_OUT_OFF ) +return PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE ; + + ret =test_ti_thread_flag (&task->thread_info,TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH );
That ret indirection is pointless. Just make it if (test_....)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) · line 1241
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +5
-0+static int l1d_flush_out_prctl_set (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long ctrl) +{ + +if (l1d_flush_out_mitigation ==L1D_FLUSH_OUT_OFF ) +return -EPERM ;
So here you check for off and then...
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(leave_mm); · line 326
Quoted 11 lines
int
enable_l1d_flush_for_task(struct task_struct *tsk){arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +9
-0+/* +* Do not enable L1D_FLUSH_OUT if +* b. The CPU is not affected by the L1TF bug +* c. The CPU does not have L1D FLUSH feature support +*/ + +if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_L1TF ) || + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D )) +return -EINVAL ;
... you check for the feature bits with a malformatted condition at some other place. It's not supported when these conditions are not there. So why having this check here?
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(leave_mm); · line 330
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +1
-0+set_ti_thread_flag (&tsk->thread_info,TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH );return 0 ; }
Aside of that, why is this in tlb.c and not in bugs.c? There is nothing tlb specific in these enable/disable functions. They just fiddle with the TIF bit.
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +9
-0+/* +* Sent to a task that opts into L1D flushing via the prctl interface +* but ends up running on an SMT enabled core. +*/ +static void l1d_flush_kill (struct callback_head *ch) +{ +force_sig (SIGBUS ); +} +static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_bits (struct task_struct *next)
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, · line 366
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +4
-1{unsigned long next_tif =task_thread_info (next)->flags;unsigned long spec_bits = (next_tif >>TIF_SPEC_IB ) &LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK ; +unsigned long next_mm;BUILD_BUG_ON (TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH !=TIF_SPEC_IB +1 ); -return (unsigned long )next->mm | spec_bits; + next_mm = (unsigned long )next->mm | spec_bits; + +if ((next_mm &LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH ) &&this_cpu_read (cpu_info.smt_active)) {
Wheeee. Yet more unconditional checks on every context switch.
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, · line 369
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +3
-0+clear_ti_thread_flag (&next->thread_info,TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH ); + next->l1d_flush_kill.func = l1d_flush_kill; +task_work_add (next, &next->l1d_flush_kill, true);
int task_work_add(struct task_struct *task, struct callback_head *twork,
enum task_work_notify_mode mode);
true is truly not a valid enum constant ....
Review
Quoted 1 line
(quoted diff) +1
-0+ }
So you really want to have:
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(l1dflush_enabled);
static bool l1dflush_mitigation __init_data;
and then with the command line option you set l1dflush_mitigation and in check_bugs() you invoke l1dflush_select_mitigation() which does:
if (!l1dflush_mitigation || !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) ||
!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D))
return;
static_branch_enable(&l1dflush_enabled);and then in l1d_flush_out_prctl_set()
if (!static_branch_unlikely(&l1dflush_enabled))
return -ENOTSUPP;Then make the whole switch machinery do:
if (static_branch_unlikely(&l1dflush_enabled)) {
if (unlikely((next_mm | prev_mm) & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH))
l1dflush_evaluate(next_mm, prev_mm);
}and l1dflush_evaluate()
if (prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH)
l1d_flush();
if ((next_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH) &&
this_cpu_read(cpu_info.smt_active)) {
clear_ti_thread_flag(&next->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH);
next->l1d_flush_kill.func = l1d_flush_kill;
task_work_add(next, &next->l1d_flush_kill, TWA_RESUME);
}That way the overhead is on systems where the admin decides to enable it and if enabled the evaluation of prev_mm and next_mm is pushed out of line.
Hmm?
Thanks,
tglx
Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] x86/mm: Optionally flush L1D on context switch
In reply to Thomas GleixnerQuoted 19 lines · Thomas Gleixner
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arch/x86/mm/tlb.c static void cond_mitigation(struct task_struct *next) · line 427
Quoted 8 lines · Balbir Singh
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +7
-0+/* +* Flush only if SMT is disabled as per the contract, which is checked +* when the feature is enabled. +*/ +if (sched_smt_active () && !this_cpu_read (cpu_info.smt_active) && + (prev_mm &LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH )) +l1d_flush_hw ();So if SMT is completely disabled then no flush? Shouldn't the logic be:
if ((!sched_smt_active() || !this_cpu_read(cpu_info.smt_active) && (prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH))
Quoted 7 lines
Hmm?
But that's bad, because it's lot's of conditions to evaluate for every
switch_mmwhere most of them are not interested in it at all.Let me read through the rest of the pile.
We don't need this anymore with the new checks for preempting killing of the task, so it can be removed
Balbir
Re: [PATCH v3 1/5] x86/mm: change l1d flush runtime prctl behaviour
In reply to Thomas GleixnerQuoted 11 lines · Thomas Gleixner
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Quoted 5 lines · Balbir Singh
Detection of task affinities at API opt-in time is not the best approach, the approach is to kill the task if it runs on a SMT enable core. This is better than not flushing the L1D cache when the task switches from a non-SMT core to an SMT enabled core.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Signed-off-by Balbir Singh <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 11 ++++++++++- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)Subject, changelog match but patch content not so much :)
The changelog jumped between 1/3 of my fixup and 1/5 of my new post :)
The correct changelog is below, which I shall fix
x86/smp: Add a per-cpu view of SMT state
A new field smt_active in cpuinfo_x86 identifies if the current core/cpu is in SMT mode or not. This can be very helpful if the system has some of its cores with threads offlined and can be used for cases where action is taken based on the state of SMT. The follow up patches use this feature.
---
Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] prctl: Hook L1D flushing in via prctl
In reply to Thomas GleixnerQuoted 4 lines · Thomas Gleixner
Balbir,
On Fri, Nov 27 2020 at 17:59, Balbir Singh wrote:
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c enum taa_mitigations { · line 304
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +6
-0+enum l1d_flush_out_mitigations { +L1D_FLUSH_OUT_OFF , +L1D_FLUSH_OUT_ON , +}; + +static enum l1d_flush_out_mitigations l1d_flush_out_mitigation__ro_after_init =L1D_FLUSH_OUT_ON ;Why default on and why stays it on when the CPU is not affected by L1TF ...
Because we don't set the PRCTL is the processor is not affected by the bug
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
static enumtaa_mitigationstaa_mitigation__ro_after_init=TAA_MITIGATION_VERW; static booltaa_nosmt__ro_after_init;arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0
-0@@ -379,6 +386,18 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)pr_info ("%s\n" , taa_strings[taa_mitigation]); }
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void) · line 392
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4
-0+static int __init l1d_flush_out_parse_cmdline (char *str) +{ +if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_L1TF )) +return 0 ;... while here you check for L1TF.
Also shouldn't it be default off and enabled via command line?
I chose the other way because the prctl is an opt-in as well
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task) · line 1388
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +8
-0+static int l1d_flush_out_prctl_get (struct task_struct *task) +{ +int ret; + +if (l1d_flush_out_mitigation ==L1D_FLUSH_OUT_OFF ) +return PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE ; + + ret =test_ti_thread_flag (&task->thread_info,TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH );That ret indirection is pointless. Just make it if (
test_....)
Sure, will do
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk) · line 1241
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +5
-0+static int l1d_flush_out_prctl_set (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long ctrl) +{ + +if (l1d_flush_out_mitigation ==L1D_FLUSH_OUT_OFF ) +return -EPERM ;So here you check for off and then...
Yes
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(leave_mm); · line 326
Quoted 11 lines
int
enable_l1d_flush_for_task(struct task_struct *tsk){arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +9
-0+/* +* Do not enable L1D_FLUSH_OUT if +* b. The CPU is not affected by the L1TF bug +* c. The CPU does not have L1D FLUSH feature support +*/ + +if (!boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_L1TF ) || + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D )) +return -EINVAL ;... you check for the feature bits with a malformatted condition at some other place. It's not supported when these conditions are not there. So why having this check here?
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
+
set_ti_thread_flag(&tsk->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH); return 0;}
Aside of that, why is this in
tlb.cand not inbugs.c? There is nothing tlb specific in these enable/disable functions. They just fiddle with the TIF bit.
I can move them over.
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 15 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +10
-0+/* +* Sent to a task that opts into L1D flushing via the prctl interface +* but ends up running on an SMT enabled core. +*/ +static void l1d_flush_kill (struct callback_head *ch) +{ +force_sig (SIGBUS ); +} +static inline unsigned long mm_mangle_tif_spec_bits (struct task_struct *next) {unsigned long next_tif =task_thread_info (next)->flags;unsigned long spec_bits = (next_tif >>TIF_SPEC_IB ) &LAST_USER_MM_SPEC_MASK ; +unsigned long next_mm;
Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, · line 366
Quoted 5 lines
BUILD_BUG_ON(TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH != TIF_SPEC_IB + 1);arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +3
-1-return (unsigned long )next->mm | spec_bits; + next_mm = (unsigned long )next->mm | spec_bits; + +if ((next_mm &LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH ) &&this_cpu_read (cpu_info.smt_active)) {Wheeee. Yet more unconditional checks on every context switch.
A task can only get here if it is affected by the bug (processor has L1TF and L1D_FLUSH support) and the task opted in, I think what your suggesting is that we avoid the check for all tasks (the signgle next_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH) check as well?
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next, · line 369
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c +3
-0+clear_ti_thread_flag (&next->thread_info,TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH ); + next->l1d_flush_kill.func = l1d_flush_kill; +task_work_add (next, &next->l1d_flush_kill, true);int task_work_add(struct
task_struct*task, structcallback_head*twork,enum task_work_notify_mode mode);true is truly not a valid enum constant ....
:) I might really have added it when we were transitioning from true to TWA_RESUME, I am surprised the compiler did not catch it, I'll move it over.
Quoted 42 lines
Quoted 2 lines
+ }
So you really want to have:
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(l1dflush_enabled);
static booll1dflush_mitigation__init_data;and then with the command line option you set
l1dflush_mitigationand incheck_bugs()you invokel1dflush_select_mitigation()which does:if (!l1dflush_mitigation || !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) return; static_branch_enable(&l1dflush_enabled);and then in
l1d_flush_out_prctl_set()if (!static_branch_unlikely(&l1dflush_enabled)) return -ENOTSUPP;Then make the whole switch machinery do:
if (static_branch_unlikely(&l1dflush_enabled)) { if (unlikely((next_mm | prev_mm) & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH)) l1dflush_evaluate(next_mm, prev_mm); }and
l1dflush_evaluate()if (prev_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH) l1d_flush(); if ((next_mm & LAST_USER_MM_L1D_FLUSH) && this_cpu_read(cpu_info.smt_active)) { clear_ti_thread_flag(&next->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH); next->l1d_flush_kill.func = l1d_flush_kill; task_work_add(next, &next->l1d_flush_kill, TWA_RESUME); }
Quoted 4 lines
That way the overhead is on systems where the admin decides to enable it and if enabled the evaluation of
prev_mmandnext_mmis pushed out of line.
OK, I'll rewrite it and see how it looks
Thanks for the review,
Balbir Singh