IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data
Subsystems (7)
v8 cover IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data
IMA measures files and buffer data such as keys, command-line arguments passed to the kernel on kexec system call, etc. While these measurements are necessary for monitoring and validating the integrity of the system, they are not sufficient. Various data structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system. Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data - e.g. LSMs like SELinux, AppArmor etc. or device-mapper targets like dm-crypt, dm-verity, dm-integrity etc. These kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Their integrity critical data is not expected to change frequently during run-time. Some of these structures cannot be defined as __ro_after_init, because they are initialized later.
For a given device, various external services/infrastructure tools (including the attestation service) interact with it - both during the setup and during rest of the device run-time. They share sensitive data and/or execute critical workload on that device. The external services may want to verify the current run-time state of the relevant kernel subsystems before fully trusting the device with business critical data/workload. For instance, verifying that SELinux is in "enforce" mode along with the expected policy, disks are encrypted with a certain configuration, secure boot is enabled etc.
This series provides the necessary IMA functionality for kernel subsystems to ensure their configuration can be measured:
- by kernel subsystems themselves,
- in a tamper resistant way,
- and re-measured - triggered on state/configuration change.
This patch set:
- defines a new IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to measure integrity critical data,
- limits the critical data being measured based on a label,
- defines a builtin critical data measurement policy,
- and includes an SELinux consumer of the new IMA critical data hook.
This series is based on the following repo/branch:
repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git
branch: next-integrity
commit 207cdd565dfc ("ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly")
Change Log v8:
Incorporated feedback from Tyler on v7 of this series.
- Removed unnecessary 'else' clauses in ima_match_rule_data().
- Fixed ima_store_template() to pass the buffer hash in case the buffer is large.
- fixed function description for ima_measure_critical_data().
- Moved some usage of CRITICAL_DATA from Patch #3 to Patch #4.
- Moved IMA_DATA_SOURCE from Patch #4 to Patch #5.
- Removed unnecessary pr_err() from ima_measure_critical_data() and selinux_event_name().
- Fixed log formatting in selinux_measure_state() to be consistent with other messages in that file.
Change Log v7:
Incorporated feedback from Mimi on v6 of this series.
- Updated cover letter and patch descriptions as per Mimi's feedback.
- Changed references to variable names and policy documentation from plural "data_sources" to singular "data_source".
- Updated SELinux patch to measure only policy, instead of policy and state. The state measurement will be upstreamed through a separate patch.
- Updated admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt to document support for critical_data in builtin policy.
Change Log v6:
Incorporated feedback from Mimi on v5 of this series.
- Got rid of patch 5 from the v5 of the series.(the allow list for data sources)
- Updated function descriptions, changed variable names etc.
- Moved the input param event_data_source in ima_measure_critical_data() to a new patch. (patch 6/8 of this series)
- Split patch 4 from v5 of the series into two patches (patch 4/8 and patch 5/8)
- Updated cover letter and patch descriptions as per feedback.
Change Log v5:
(1) Incorporated feedback from Stephen on the last SeLinux patch. SeLinux Patch: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11801585/
- Freed memory in the reverse order of allocation in selinux_measure_state().
- Used scnprintf() instead of snprintf() to create the string for selinux state.
- Allocated event name passed to ima_measure_critical_data() before gathering selinux state and policy information for measuring.
(2) Incorporated feedback from Mimi on v4 of this series.
V4 of this Series: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-integrity/list/?series=354437
- Removed patch "[v4,2/6] IMA: conditionally allow empty rule data"
- Reversed the order of following patches.
[v4,4/6] IMA: add policy to measure critical data from kernel components [v4,5/6] IMA: add hook to measure critical data from kernel components
and renamed them to remove "from kernel components"
- Added a new patch to this series -
IMA: add critical_data to built-in policy rules
- Added the next version of SeLinux patch (mentioned above) to this series
selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA
- Updated cover-letter description to give broader perspective of the feature, rearranging paragraphs, removing unnecessary info, clarifying terms etc.
- Got rid of opt_list param from ima_match_rule_data().
- Updated the documentation to remove sources that don't yet exist.
- detailed IMA hook description added to ima_measure_critical_data(), as well as elaborating terms event_name, event_data_source.
- "data_sources:=" is not a mandatory policy option for func=CRITICAL_DATA anymore. If not present, all the data sources specified in __ima_supported_kernel_data_sources will be measured.
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (2):
IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy
selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
Tushar Sugandhi (6):
IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs
IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the measurement based on a
label
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 5 +- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +- include/linux/ima.h | 8 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 81 ++++++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 118 ++++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 3 +- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 11 +- security/selinux/measure.c | 81 ++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++-- 14 files changed, 354 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
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PATCH v8 5/8 IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data based on a label for the given subsystems.
Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_source:=" to the IMA func CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the measurement to the labels listed in "data_source:=".
Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_source:=". If "data_sources:=" is not provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the supported kernel subsystems is measured.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +2 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ Description: template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value + data_source:= [label] + label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data. default policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +28 -2
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@#define IMA_PCR 0x0100#define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200#define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCE 0x0800#define UNKNOWN 0#define MEASURE 0x0001/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -930,7 +931,7 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, - Opt_err + Opt_data_source, Opt_err }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -967,6 +968,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, + {Opt_data_source, "data_source=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} };
@@ -1134,7 +1136,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE ))return false; -if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_UID |IMA_PCR )) +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_UID |IMA_PCR | +IMA_DATA_SOURCE ))return false;if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))
@@ -1344,6 +1347,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->flags |=IMA_KEYRINGS ;break ; +case Opt_data_source: +ima_log_string (ab,"data_source" , args[0 ].from); + +if (entry->data_source) { + result = -EINVAL ; +break ; + } + + entry->data_source =ima_alloc_rule_opt_list (args); +if (IS_ERR (entry->data_source)) { + result =PTR_ERR (entry->data_source); + entry->data_source =NULL ; +break ; + } + + entry->flags |=IMA_DATA_SOURCE ; +break ;case Opt_fsuuid:ima_log_string (ab,"fsuuid" , args[0 ].from);
@@ -1724,6 +1744,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)seq_puts (m," " ); } +if (entry->flags &IMA_DATA_SOURCE ) { +seq_puts (m,"data_source=" ); +ima_show_rule_opt_list (m, entry->data_source); +seq_puts (m," " ); + } +if (entry->flags &IMA_PCR ) {snprintf (tbuf,sizeof (tbuf),"%d" , entry->pcr);seq_printf (m,pt (Opt_pcr), tbuf);
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PATCH v8 3/8 IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
In reply to Tushar SugandhiIMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer data. However, various data structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system. Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data. These kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Currently, IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure their integrity critical data.
Define a new IMA hook - ima_measure_critical_data to measure kernel integrity critical data.
--- include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/ima.h +6 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,extern void ima_post_path_mknod (struct dentry *dentry);extern int ima_file_hash (struct file *file,char *buf,size_t buf_size);extern void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size); +extern void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +const void *buf,int buf_len, +bool measure_buf_hash);#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline (void );
@@ -122,6 +125,9 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) }static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size) {} +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +const void *buf,int buf_len, +bool measure_buf_hash) {}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -0
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none)#define __ima_hook_enumify (ENUM , str) ENUM,
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1 -1
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK -* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK +* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value *
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +34 -0
@@ -922,6 +922,40 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)fdput (f); } +/** +* ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data +* @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry +* @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure +* @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) +* @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash +* +* Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, +* into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. +* +* Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. +* Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures, +* policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrity +* of the system. +* +* If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, +* else measure the buffer data itself. +* @measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured +* is too large. +* +* The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised. +*/ +void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +const void *buf,int buf_len, +bool measure_buf_hash) +{ +if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) +return ; + +process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, buf_len, event_name, +CRITICAL_DATA ,0 ,NULL , + measure_buf_hash); +} +static int __init init_ima (void ) {int error;
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PATCH v8 4/8 IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
In reply to Tushar SugandhiA new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements.
Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +1 -1
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Description: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK]MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] - [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +30 -4
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES ];char *fsname;struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings;/* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ +struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source;/* Measure data from this source */ struct ima_template_desc *template; };
@@ -479,6 +480,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, opt_list = rule->keyrings;break ; +case CRITICAL_DATA : +if (!rule->data_source) +return true; + + opt_list = rule->data_source; +break ;default :return false; }
@@ -515,13 +522,19 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; -if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) { -return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_rule_data (rule, func_data, cred); - }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false; + +switch (func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +case CRITICAL_DATA : +return ((rule->func == func) && +ima_match_rule_data (rule, func_data, cred)); +default : +break ; + } +if ((rule->flags &IMA_MASK ) && (rule->mask != mask && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;
@@ -1116,6 +1129,17 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))return false; +break ; +case CRITICAL_DATA : +if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE )) +return false; + +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_UID |IMA_PCR )) +return false; + +if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry)) +return false; +break ;default :return false;
@@ -1248,6 +1272,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS ) &&strcmp (args[0 ].from,"KEY_CHECK" ) ==0 ) entry->func =KEY_CHECK ; +else if (strcmp (args[0 ].from,"CRITICAL_DATA" ) ==0 ) + entry->func =CRITICAL_DATA ;else result = -EINVAL ;if (!result)
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PATCH v8 2/8 IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
In reply to Tushar SugandhiThe original IMA buffer data measurement sizes were small (e.g. boot command line), but the new buffer data measurement use cases have data sizes that are a lot larger. Just as IMA measures the file data hash, not the file data, IMA should similarly support the option for measuring the hash of the buffer data.
Measuring in-memory buffer-data/buffer-data-hash is different than measuring file-data/file-data-hash. For the file, IMA stores the measurements in both measurement log and the file's extended attribute - which can later be used for appraisal as well. For buffer, the measurements are only stored in the IMA log, since the buffer has no extended attributes associated with it.
Introduce a boolean parameter measure_buf_hash to support measuring hash of a buffer, which would be much smaller, instead of the buffer itself.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 3 +- 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -1
@@ -268,7 +268,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *func_data); +int pcr,const char *func_data, +bool measure_buf_hash);void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1 -1
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,if ((rc == -EPERM ) && (iint->flags &IMA_MEASURE ))process_buffer_measurement (NULL , digest, digestsize,"blacklisted-hash" ,NONE , - pcr,NULL ); + pcr,NULL , false); }return rc;
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +1 -1
@@ -60,5 +60,5 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,*/ process_buffer_measurement (NULL , payload, payload_len, keyring->description,KEY_CHECK ,0 , - keyring->description); + keyring->description, false); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +33 -5
@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, }/* -* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. +* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK) * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
@@ -787,12 +787,23 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,* @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. +* @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash * -* Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. +* Measure the buffer into the IMA log, and extend the @pcr. +* +* Determine what buffers are allowed to be measured, based on the policy rules +* and the IMA hook passed using @func. +* +* Use @func_data, if provided, to match against the measurement policy rule +* data for @func. +* +* If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, +* else measure the buffer data itself. */ void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *func_data) +int pcr,const char *func_data, +bool measure_buf_hash) {int ret =0 ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;
@@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,struct ima_digest_data hdr;char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; } hash = {}; +char buf_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +int buf_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];int violation =0 ;int action =0 ;u32 secid;
@@ -849,13 +862,27 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; } +if (measure_buf_hash) { +memcpy (buf_hash, hash.hdr.digest, buf_hash_len); + + ret =ima_calc_buffer_hash (buf_hash, buf_hash_len, + iint.ima_hash); +if (ret <0 ) { + audit_cause ="measure_buf_hash_error" ; + goto out; + } + + event_data.buf = buf_hash; + event_data.buf_len = buf_hash_len; + } + ret =ima_alloc_init_template (&event_data, &entry, template);if (ret <0 ) { audit_cause ="alloc_entry" ; goto out; } - ret =ima_store_template (entry, violation,NULL , buf, pcr); + ret =ima_store_template (entry, violation,NULL , event_data.buf, pcr);if (ret <0 ) { audit_cause ="store_entry" ;ima_free_template_entry (entry);
@@ -890,7 +917,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)return ;process_buffer_measurement (file_inode (f.file), buf, size, -"kexec-cmdline" ,KEXEC_CMDLINE ,0 ,NULL ); +"kexec-cmdline" ,KEXEC_CMDLINE ,0 ,NULL , + false);fdput (f); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +2 -1
@@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) entry->payload_len, entry->keyring_name,KEY_CHECK ,0 , - entry->keyring_name); + entry->keyring_name, + false);list_del (&entry->list);ima_free_key_entry (entry); }
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PATCH v8 6/8 IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the measurement based on a label
In reply to Tushar SugandhiThe IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to specify the source of the critical data provider. Thus, the data measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label in the IMA policy.
Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can be used to limit the measurements based on the label.
--- include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/linux/ima.h +4 -2
@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,extern void ima_post_path_mknod (struct dentry *dentry);extern int ima_file_hash (struct file *file,char *buf,size_t buf_size);extern void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size); -extern void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +extern void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_data_source, +const char *event_name,const void *buf,int buf_len,bool measure_buf_hash);
@@ -125,7 +126,8 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) }static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size) {} -static inline void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_data_source, +const char *event_name,const void *buf,int buf_len,bool measure_buf_hash) {}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +8 -3
@@ -924,6 +924,7 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)/** * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data +* @event_data_source: kernel data source being measured * @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes)
@@ -932,6 +933,9 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)* Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. * +* Use @event_data_source to describe the kernel data source for the buffer +* being measured. +* * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. * Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures, * policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrity
@@ -944,15 +948,16 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)* * The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised. */ -void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_data_source, +const char *event_name,const void *buf,int buf_len,bool measure_buf_hash) { -if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) +if (!event_name || !event_data_source || !buf || !buf_len)return ;process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, buf_len, event_name, -CRITICAL_DATA ,0 ,NULL , +CRITICAL_DATA ,0 , event_data_source, measure_buf_hash); }
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PATCH v8 8/8 selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
In reply to Tushar SugandhiFrom: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate the policy contents at runtime.
Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry.
Add "selinux" to the list of supported data sources maintained by IMA to enable measuring SELinux data.
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA data_source=selinux
Sample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy:
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1
grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6
Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get the expected hash.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 +- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 11 +++- security/selinux/measure.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++---- 5 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +2 -1
@@ -52,8 +52,9 @@ Description: template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value - data_source:= [label] + data_source:= [selinux]|[label] label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data. + For example, "selinux" to measure critical data for SELinux. default policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
security/selinux/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o + ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
security/selinux/include/security.h +10 -1
@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state, struct selinux_policy *policy);int security_read_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void **data,size_t *len); - +int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len);int security_policycap_supported (struct selinux_state *state,unsigned int req_cap);
@@ -446,4 +447,12 @@ extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);extern void hashtab_cache_init (void );extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats (struct selinux_state *state,char *page); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state); +#else +static inline void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state) +{ +} +#endif +#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
security/selinux/measure.c new file +81 -0
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security/selinux/ss/services.c +62 -9
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2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
PATCH v8 7/8 IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy
In reply to Tushar SugandhiFrom: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy is loaded.
Add critical data to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line contains "ima_policy=critical_data".
Update the documentation on kernel parameters to document the new critical data builtin policy.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +4 -1
@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ ima_policy= [IMA] The builtin policies to load during IMA setup. Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot | - fail_securely" + fail_securely | critical_data" The "tcb" policy measures all programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files opened with the read
@@ -1765,6 +1765,9 @@ filesystems with the SB_I_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE flag. + The "critical_data" policy measures kernel integrity + critical data. + ima_tcb [IMA] Deprecated. Use ima_policy= instead. Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted Computing Base. This means IMA will measure all
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +12 -0
@@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[]__ro_after_init = { + {.action =MEASURE , .func =CRITICAL_DATA , .flags =IMA_FUNC }, +}; +/* An array of architecture specific rules */ static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry__ro_after_init ;
@@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb__initdata ;static bool ima_use_secure_boot__initdata ; +static bool ima_use_critical_data__initdata ;static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs__ro_after_init ;static int __init policy_setup (char *str) {
@@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; + else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0) + ima_use_critical_data = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; else
@@ -872,6 +879,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)ARRAY_SIZE (default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +if (ima_use_critical_data) +add_rules (critical_data_rules, +ARRAY_SIZE (critical_data_rules), +IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY ); +ima_update_policy_flag (); }
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PATCH v8 1/8 IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs
In reply to Tushar SugandhiIMA functions such as ima_match_keyring(), process_buffer_measurement(), ima_match_policy() etc. handle data specific to keyrings. Currently, these constructs are not generic to handle any func specific data. This makes it harder to extend them without code duplication.
Refactor the keyring specific measurement constructs to be generic and reusable in other measurement scenarios.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +3 -3
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, -const char *keyring); +const char *func_data);int ima_must_measure (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring); +int pcr,const char *func_data);void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, -const char *keyring); +const char *func_data);void ima_init_policy (void );void ima_update_policy (void );void ima_update_policy_flag (void );
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +3 -3
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* @func: caller identifier * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr= * @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template= -* @keyring: keyring name used to determine the action +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -186,14 +186,14 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, -const char *keyring) +const char *func_data) {int flags =IMA_MEASURE |IMA_AUDIT |IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ; flags &= ima_policy_flag;return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, - template_desc, keyring); + template_desc, func_data); }/*
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +3 -3
@@ -786,13 +786,13 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. * @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement -* @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. * * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. */ void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring) +int pcr,const char *func_data) {int ret =0 ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;
@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,if (func) {security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); action =ima_get_action (inode,current_cred (), secid,0 , func, - &pcr, &template, keyring); + &pcr, &template, func_data);if (!(action &IMA_MEASURE ))return ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +28 -18
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2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
Re: [PATCH v8 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
In reply to Tushar SugandhiQuoted 8 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
IMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer data. However, various data structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system. Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data. These kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Currently, IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure their integrity critical data.
Quoted 4 lines
Define a new IMA hook -
ima_measure_critical_datato measure kernel integrity critical data.Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>
Tyler
Quoted 104 lines
--- include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)include/linux/ima.h +6
-0@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,extern void ima_post_path_mknod (struct dentry *dentry);extern int ima_file_hash (struct file *file,char *buf,size_t buf_size);extern void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size); +extern void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +const void *buf,int buf_len, +bool measure_buf_hash);#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline (void );@@ -122,6 +125,9 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) }static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size) {} +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +const void *buf,int buf_len, +bool measure_buf_hash) {}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1
-0@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none)#define __ima_hook_enumify (ENUM , str) ENUM,security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1
-1@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK -* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK +* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +34
-0@@ -922,6 +922,40 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)fdput (f); } +/** +* ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data +* @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry +* @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure +* @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) +* @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash +* +* Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, +* into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. +* +* Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. +* Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures, +* policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrity +* of the system. +* +* If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, +* else measure the buffer data itself. +* @measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured +* is too large. +* +* The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised. +*/ +void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +const void *buf,int buf_len, +bool measure_buf_hash) +{ +if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) +return ; + +process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, buf_len, event_name, +CRITICAL_DATA ,0 ,NULL , + measure_buf_hash); +} +static int __init init_ima (void ) {int error;Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v8 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
In reply to Tushar SugandhiQuoted 34 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data()and the corresponding funcCRITICAL_DATAfor measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements.Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements.
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +1
-1@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Description: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK]MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] - [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex valuesecurity/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-0
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c struct ima_rule_entry { · line 88
Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-0@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES ];char *fsname;struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings;/* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ +struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source;/* Measure data from this source */
Argh, there are still some more instances of data_source sneaking into this patch too early instead of waiting until the next patch.
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, · line 488
Quoted 13 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6
-0struct ima_template_desc *template; };@@ -479,6 +480,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, opt_list = rule->keyrings;break ; +case CRITICAL_DATA : +if (!rule->data_source) +return true; + + opt_list = rule->data_source; +break ;
I guess this case should unconditionally return true in this patch and then the include this additional logic in the next patch.
Sorry, I missed these on my last review.
Tyler
Quoted 57 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +23
-4default :return false; }@@ -515,13 +522,19 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; -if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) { -return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_rule_data (rule, func_data, cred); - }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false; + +switch (func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +case CRITICAL_DATA : +return ((rule->func == func) && +ima_match_rule_data (rule, func_data, cred)); +default : +break ; + } +if ((rule->flags &IMA_MASK ) && (rule->mask != mask && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;@@ -1116,6 +1129,17 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))return false; +break ; +case CRITICAL_DATA : +if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE )) +return false; + +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_UID |IMA_PCR )) +return false; + +if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry)) +return false; +break ;default :return false;@@ -1248,6 +1272,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS ) &&strcmp (args[0 ].from,"KEY_CHECK" ) ==0 ) entry->func =KEY_CHECK ; +else if (strcmp (args[0 ].from,"CRITICAL_DATA" ) ==0 ) + entry->func =CRITICAL_DATA ;else result = -EINVAL ;if (!result)Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v8 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
In reply to Tushar SugandhiQuoted 35 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate the policy contents at runtime.
Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry.Add "selinux" to the list of supported data sources maintained by IMA to enable measuring SELinux data.
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data2, Add the following rule to
/etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA data_source=selinuxSample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy:
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum
/sys/fs/selinux/policy| cut -d' ' -f 1grep "selinux-policy-hash"
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements| tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6
Quoted 7 lines
Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe system and run the sha256sum
/sys/kernel/selinux/policythere to get the expected hash.Signed-off-by Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>Suggested-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
This looks good but I've got one small suggestion below if you roll a v9. Feel free to add:
Quoted 32 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +26
-0@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* +* Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. +*/ +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include "security.h" + +/* +* This function creates a unique name by appending the timestamp to +* the given string. This string is passed as "event_name" to the IMA +* hook to measure the given SELinux data. +* +* The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have +* already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). +* But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence +* needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass a unique "event_name" +* to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. +* +* For example, +* At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. +* At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. +* At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it +* (since it was already measured) unless the event_name, for instance, +* is different in this call.
security/selinux/measure.c line 36
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +10
-0+*/ +static char *selinux_event_name (const char *name_prefix) +{ +char *event_name =NULL ; +struct timespec64 cur_time; + +ktime_get_real_ts64 (&cur_time); + event_name =kasprintf (GFP_KERNEL ,"%s-%lld:%09ld" , name_prefix, + cur_time.tv_sec, cur_time.tv_nsec); +return event_name;
There's no longer a need to store the return of kasprintf() in a variable. Just 'return kasprint(...);' and get rid of the event_name variable.
Tyler
Re: [PATCH v8 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
Quoted 87 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 35 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate the policy contents at runtime.
Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry.Add "selinux" to the list of supported data sources maintained by IMA to enable measuring SELinux data.
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data2, Add the following rule to
/etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA data_source=selinuxSample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy:
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum
/sys/fs/selinux/policy| cut -d' ' -f 1grep "selinux-policy-hash"
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements| tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6Quoted 7 lines
Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe system and run the sha256sum
/sys/kernel/selinux/policythere to get the expected hash.Signed-off-by Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>Suggested-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>This looks good but I've got one small suggestion below if you roll a v9. Feel free to add:
Reviewed-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>Quoted 38 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +32
-0@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* +* Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. +*/ +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include "security.h" + +/* +* This function creates a unique name by appending the timestamp to +* the given string. This string is passed as "event_name" to the IMA +* hook to measure the given SELinux data. +* +* The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have +* already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). +* But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence +* needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass a unique "event_name" +* to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. +* +* For example, +* At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. +* At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. +* At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it +* (since it was already measured) unless the event_name, for instance, +* is different in this call. +*/ +static char *selinux_event_name (const char *name_prefix) +{ +char *event_name =NULL ; +struct timespec64 cur_time; +
Quoted 9 lines
security/selinux/measure.c line 36
Quoted 4 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +4
-0+ktime_get_real_ts64 (&cur_time); + event_name =kasprintf (GFP_KERNEL ,"%s-%lld:%09ld" , name_prefix, + cur_time.tv_sec, cur_time.tv_nsec); +return event_name;There's no longer a need to store the return of
kasprintf()in a variable. Just 'return kasprint(...);' and get rid of theevent_namevariable.
Sure - I'll make the change.
-lakshmi
Re: [PATCH v8 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs
In reply to Tushar SugandhiQuoted 10 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
IMA functions such as
ima_match_keyring(),process_buffer_measurement(),ima_match_policy()etc. handle data specific to keyrings. Currently, these constructs are not generic to handle any func specific data. This makes it harder to extend them without code duplication.Refactor the keyring specific measurement constructs to be generic and reusable in other measurement scenarios.
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
This looks good to me. Thanks!
Tyler
Quoted 209 lines
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)security/integrity/ima/ima.h +3
-3@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, -const char *keyring); +const char *func_data);int ima_must_measure (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring); +int pcr,const char *func_data);void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, -const char *keyring); +const char *func_data);void ima_init_policy (void );void ima_update_policy (void );void ima_update_policy_flag (void );security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +3
-3@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* @func: caller identifier * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr= * @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template= -* @keyring: keyring name used to determine the action +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= @@ -186,14 +186,14 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, -const char *keyring) +const char *func_data) {int flags =IMA_MEASURE |IMA_AUDIT |IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ; flags &= ima_policy_flag;return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, - template_desc, keyring); + template_desc, func_data); }/* security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +3
-3@@ -786,13 +786,13 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. * @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement -* @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. * * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. */ void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring) +int pcr,const char *func_data) {int ret =0 ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,if (func) {security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); action =ima_get_action (inode,current_cred (), secid,0 , func, - &pcr, &template, keyring); + &pcr, &template, func_data);if (!(action &IMA_MEASURE ))return ; }security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +28
-18@@ -453,30 +453,41 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, }/** -* ima_match_keyring - determine whether the keyring matches the measure rule -* @rule: a pointer to a rule -* @keyring: name of the keyring to match against the measure rule +* ima_match_rule_data - determine whether the given func_data matches +* the measure rule data +* @rule: IMA policy rule +* @func_data: data to match against the measure rule data * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation * -* Returns true if keyring matches one in the rule, false otherwise. +* Returns true if func_data matches one in the rule, false otherwise. */ -static bool ima_match_keyring (struct ima_rule_entry *rule, -const char *keyring,const struct cred *cred) +static bool ima_match_rule_data (struct ima_rule_entry *rule, +const char *func_data, +const struct cred *cred) { +const struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list =NULL ;bool matched = false;size_t i;if ((rule->flags &IMA_UID ) && !rule->uid_op (cred->uid, rule->uid))return false; -if (!rule->keyrings) -return true; +switch (rule->func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +if (!rule->keyrings) +return true; + + opt_list = rule->keyrings; +break ; +default : +return false; + } -if (!keyring) +if (!func_data)return false; -for (i =0 ; i < rule->keyrings->count; i++) { -if (!strcmp (rule->keyrings->items[i], keyring)) { +for (i =0 ; i < opt_list->count; i++) { +if (!strcmp (opt_list->items[i], func_data)) { matched = true;break ; }@@ -493,20 +504,20 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,* @secid: the secid of the task to be validated * @func: LIM hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) -* @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. * * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules (struct ima_rule_entry *rule,struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, -const char *keyring) +const char *func_data) {int i;if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) {return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); +ima_match_rule_data (rule, func_data, cred); }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))@@ -610,8 +621,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend * @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule -* @keyring: the keyring name, if given, to be used to check in the policy. -* keyring can be NULL if func is anything other than KEY_CHECK. +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. * * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type) * conditions. @@ -623,7 +633,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, -const char *keyring) +const char *func_data) {struct ima_rule_entry *entry;int action =0 , actmask = flags | (flags <<1 );@@ -638,7 +648,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,continue ;if (!ima_match_rules (entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, - keyring)) + func_data))continue ; action |= entry->flags &IMA_ACTION_FLAGS ;Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v8 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
In reply to Tushar SugandhiQuoted 13 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
The original IMA buffer data measurement sizes were small (e.g. boot command line), but the new buffer data measurement use cases have data sizes that are a lot larger. Just as IMA measures the file data hash, not the file data, IMA should similarly support the option for measuring the hash of the buffer data.
Measuring in-memory buffer-data/buffer-data-hash is different than measuring file-data/file-data-hash. For the file, IMA stores the measurements in both measurement log and the file's extended attribute - which can later be used for appraisal as well. For buffer, the measurements are only stored in the IMA log, since the buffer has no extended attributes associated with it.
Quoted 5 lines
Introduce a boolean parameter
measure_buf_hashto support measuring hash of a buffer, which would be much smaller, instead of the buffer itself.Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>
Tyler
Quoted 150 lines
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 3 +- 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2
-1@@ -268,7 +268,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *func_data); +int pcr,const char *func_data, +bool measure_buf_hash);void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1
-1@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,if ((rc == -EPERM ) && (iint->flags &IMA_MEASURE ))process_buffer_measurement (NULL , digest, digestsize,"blacklisted-hash" ,NONE , - pcr,NULL ); + pcr,NULL , false); }return rc;security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +1
-1@@ -60,5 +60,5 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,*/ process_buffer_measurement (NULL , payload, payload_len, keyring->description,KEY_CHECK ,0 , - keyring->description); + keyring->description, false); }security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +33
-5@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, }/* -* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. +* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK) * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. * @size: size of buffer(in bytes). @@ -787,12 +787,23 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,* @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. +* @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash * -* Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. +* Measure the buffer into the IMA log, and extend the @pcr. +* +* Determine what buffers are allowed to be measured, based on the policy rules +* and the IMA hook passed using @func. +* +* Use @func_data, if provided, to match against the measurement policy rule +* data for @func. +* +* If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, +* else measure the buffer data itself. */ void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *func_data) +int pcr,const char *func_data, +bool measure_buf_hash) {int ret =0 ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;@@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,struct ima_digest_data hdr;char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; } hash = {}; +char buf_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +int buf_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];int violation =0 ;int action =0 ;u32 secid;@@ -849,13 +862,27 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; } +if (measure_buf_hash) { +memcpy (buf_hash, hash.hdr.digest, buf_hash_len); + + ret =ima_calc_buffer_hash (buf_hash, buf_hash_len, + iint.ima_hash); +if (ret <0 ) { + audit_cause ="measure_buf_hash_error" ; + goto out; + } + + event_data.buf = buf_hash; + event_data.buf_len = buf_hash_len; + } + ret =ima_alloc_init_template (&event_data, &entry, template);if (ret <0 ) { audit_cause ="alloc_entry" ; goto out; } - ret =ima_store_template (entry, violation,NULL , buf, pcr); + ret =ima_store_template (entry, violation,NULL , event_data.buf, pcr);if (ret <0 ) { audit_cause ="store_entry" ;ima_free_template_entry (entry);@@ -890,7 +917,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)return ;process_buffer_measurement (file_inode (f.file), buf, size, -"kexec-cmdline" ,KEXEC_CMDLINE ,0 ,NULL ); +"kexec-cmdline" ,KEXEC_CMDLINE ,0 ,NULL , + false);fdput (f); }security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +2
-1@@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) entry->payload_len, entry->keyring_name,KEY_CHECK ,0 , - entry->keyring_name); + entry->keyring_name, + false);list_del (&entry->list);ima_free_key_entry (entry); }Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v8 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
In reply to Tyler HicksQuoted 34 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 33 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data()and the corresponding funcCRITICAL_DATAfor measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements.Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements.
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +1
-1@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Description: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK]MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] - [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex valuesecurity/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-0
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c struct ima_rule_entry { · line 88
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-0@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES ];char *fsname;struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings;/* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ +struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source;/* Measure data from this source */ Argh, there are still some more instances of
data_sourcesneaking into this patch too early instead of waiting until the next patch.
I kept it purposefully in this patch so that the
"case CRITICAL_DATA:" could be properly defined.
Also, my impression was rule->data_source is not part of the user facing policy.
Whereas IMA_DATA_SOURCE, Opt_data_source, data_source=%s are. That's why they are part of Patch #5.
Patch #5 IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
Quoted 17 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, · line 488
Quoted 13 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6
-0struct ima_template_desc *template; };@@ -479,6 +480,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, opt_list = rule->keyrings;break ; +case CRITICAL_DATA : +if (!rule->data_source) +return true; + + opt_list = rule->data_source; +break ;I guess this case should unconditionally return true in this patch and then the include this additional logic in the next patch.
Quoted 2 lines
Sorry, I missed these on my last review.
No worries.
As I mentioned above, I kept it purposefully in this patch since my impression was rule->data_source is not part of the user facing policy.
But I can simply return true here as you suggested, and move the logic to the next patch.
+ case CRITICAL_DATA:
+ if (!rule->data_source)
+ return true;
+
+ opt_list = rule->data_source;
+ break;
~Tushar
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Re: [PATCH v8 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
Quoted 74 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
Quoted 34 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 33 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data()and the corresponding funcCRITICAL_DATAfor measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements.Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements.
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +1
-1@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Description: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK]MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] - [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex valuesecurity/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-0Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c struct ima_rule_entry { · line 88
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-0@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES ];char *fsname;struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings;/* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ +struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source;/* Measure data from this source */ Argh, there are still some more instances of
data_sourcesneaking into this patch too early instead of waiting until the next patch.I kept it purposefully in this patch so that the
"caseCRITICAL_DATA:" could be properly defined.Also, my impression was
rule->data_sourceis not part of the user facing policy.Whereas
IMA_DATA_SOURCE,Opt_data_source, data_source=%s are. That's why they are part of Patch #5.Patch #5 IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
Quoted 15 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, · line 487
Quoted 11 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6
-0struct ima_template_desc *template; };@@ -479,6 +480,12 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, opt_list = rule->keyrings;break ; +case CRITICAL_DATA : +if (!rule->data_source) +return true; + + opt_list = rule->data_source; +break ;I guess this case should unconditionally return true in this patch and then the include this additional logic in the next patch.
Quoted 2 lines
Sorry, I missed these on my last review.
Quoted 8 lines
No worries.
As I mentioned above, I kept it purposefully in this patch since my impression was
rule->data_sourceis not part of the user facing policy.But I can simply return true here as you suggested, and move the logic to the next patch.
I understand the thinking that it isn't harmful in this patch but I think it is a bit cleaner to introduce the data_source policy language element and all of its backend support in the same patch. Please move it to the next patch. Thanks!
Tyler
Quoted 11 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6
-0+case CRITICAL_DATA : +if (!rule->data_source) +return true; + + opt_list = rule->data_source; +break ;~Tushar
Re: [PATCH v8 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 11 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, · line 488
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +6
-0+case CRITICAL_DATA : +if (!rule->data_source) +return true; + + opt_list = rule->data_source; +break ;I guess this case should unconditionally return true in this patch and then the include this additional logic in the next patch.
Quoted 2 lines
Sorry, I missed these on my last review.
Quoted 8 lines
No worries.
As I mentioned above, I kept it purposefully in this patch since my impression was
rule->data_sourceis not part of the user facing policy.But I can simply return true here as you suggested, and move the logic to the next patch.
Quoted 7 lines
I understand the thinking that it isn't harmful in this patch but I think it is a bit cleaner to introduce the
data_sourcepolicy language element and all of its backend support in the same patch. Please move it to the next patch. Thanks!Tyler
Will do.
Thanks a lot Tyler for a detailed review. Appreciate it.
~Tushar
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