fs-verity: add an ioctl to read verity metadata
Subsystems (7)
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH 4/6 fs-verity: support reading Merkle tree with ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add support for FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE to FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA. This allows a userspace server program to retrieve the Merkle tree of a verity file for serving to a client which implements fs-verity compatible verification. See the patch which introduced FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA for more details.
This has been tested using a new xfstest which calls this ioctl via a new subcommand for the 'fsverity' program from fsverity-utils.
--- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 10 +++- fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 2 + 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +9 -1
@@ -234,6 +234,8 @@ need this ioctl. This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: + #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1 + struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg { __u64 metadata_type; __u64 offset;
@@ -242,7 +244,13 @@ This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: __u64 __reserved; }; -``metadata_type`` specifies the type of metadata to read. +``metadata_type`` specifies the type of metadata to read: + +- ``FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE`` reads the blocks of the + Merkle tree. The blocks are returned in order from the root level + to the leaf level. Within each level, the blocks are returned in + the same order that their hashes are themselves hashed. + See `Merkle tree`_ for more information. The semantics are similar to those of ``pread()``. ``offset`` specifies the offset in bytes into the metadata item to read from, and
fs/verity/read_metadata.c +70 -0
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include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h +2 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ struct fsverity_formatted_digest {__u8 digest[]; }; +#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1 +struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg {__u64 metadata_type;__u64 offset;
Signature · 8 lines
2.30.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH 1/6 fs-verity: factor out fsverity_get_descriptor()
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
The FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl will need to return the fs-verity descriptor (and signature) to userspace.
There are a few ways we could implement this:
- Save a copy of the descriptor (and signature) in the fsverity_info struct that hangs off of the in-memory inode. However, this would waste memory since most of the time it wouldn't be needed.
- Regenerate the descriptor from the merkle_tree_params in the fsverity_info. However, this wouldn't work for the signature, nor for the salt which the merkle_tree_params only contains indirectly as part of the 'hashstate'. It would also be error-prone.
- Just get them from the filesystem again. The disadvantage is that in general we can't trust that they haven't been maliciously changed since the file has opened. However, the use cases for FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA don't require that it verifies the chain of trust. So this is okay as long as we do some basic validation.
In preparation for implementing the third option, factor out a helper function fsverity_get_descriptor() which gets the descriptor (and appended signature) from the filesystem and does some basic validation.
As part of this, start checking the sig_size field for overflow. Currently fsverity_verify_signature() does this. But the new ioctl will need this too, so do it earlier.
--- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 7 +- fs/verity/open.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +6 -1
@@ -122,12 +122,17 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params, const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size);struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info (const struct inode *inode, -void *desc,size_t desc_size); +struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, +size_t desc_size);void fsverity_set_info (struct inode *inode,struct fsverity_info *vi);void fsverity_free_info (struct fsverity_info *vi); +int fsverity_get_descriptor (struct inode *inode, +struct fsverity_descriptor **desc_ret, +size_t *desc_size_ret); +int __init fsverity_init_info_cache (void );void __init fsverity_exit_info_cache (void );
fs/verity/open.c +85 -45
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Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH 3/6 fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add an ioctl FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA which will allow reading verity metadata from a file that has fs-verity enabled, including:
- The Merkle tree
- The fsverity_descriptor (not including the signature if present)
- The built-in signature, if present
This ioctl has similar semantics to pread(). It is passed the type of metadata to read (one of the above three), and a buffer, offset, and size. It returns the number of bytes read or an error.
Separate patches will add support for each of the above metadata types. This patch just adds the ioctl itself.
This ioctl doesn't make any assumption about where the metadata is stored on-disk. It does assume the metadata is in a stable format, but that's basically already the case:
- The Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor are defined by how fs-verity file digests are computed; see the "File digest computation" section of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst. Technically, the way in which the levels of the tree are ordered relative to each other wasn't previously specified, but it's logical to put the root level first.
- The built-in signature is the value passed to FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
This ioctl is useful because it allows writing a server program that takes a verity file and serves it to a client program, such that the client can do its own fs-verity compatible verification of the file. This only makes sense if the client doesn't trust the server and if the server needs to provide the storage for the client.
More concretely, there is interest in using this ability in Android to export APK files (which are protected by fs-verity) to "protected VMs". This would use Protected KVM (https://lwn.net/Articles/836693), which provides an isolated execution environment without having to trust the traditional "host". A "guest" VM can boot from a signed image and perform specific tasks in a minimum trusted environment using files that have fs-verity enabled on the host, without trusting the host or requiring that the guest has its own trusted storage.
Technically, it would be possible to duplicate the metadata and store it in separate files for serving. However, that would be less efficient and would require extra care in userspace to maintain file consistency.
In addition to the above, the ability to read the built-in signatures is useful because it allows a system that is using the in-kernel signature verification to migrate to userspace signature verification.
--- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 7 ++++ fs/f2fs/file.c | 11 +++++ fs/verity/Makefile | 1 + fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fsverity.h | 12 ++++++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 10 +++++ 7 files changed, 153 insertions(+) create mode 100644 fs/verity/read_metadata.c
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +57 -0
@@ -217,6 +217,63 @@ FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY can fail with the following errors: - ``EOVERFLOW``: the digest is longer than the specified ``digest_size`` bytes. Try providing a larger buffer. +FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA +--------------------------- + +The FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl reads verity metadata from a +verity file. This ioctl is available since Linux v5.12. + +This ioctl allows writing a server program that takes a verity file +and serves it to a client program, such that the client can do its own +fs-verity compatible verification of the file. This only makes sense +if the client doesn't trust the server and if the server needs to +provide the storage for the client. + +This is a fairly specialized use case, and most fs-verity users won't +need this ioctl. + +This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: + + struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg { + __u64 metadata_type; + __u64 offset; + __u64 length; + __u64 buf_ptr; + __u64 __reserved; + }; + +``metadata_type`` specifies the type of metadata to read. + +The semantics are similar to those of ``pread()``. ``offset`` +specifies the offset in bytes into the metadata item to read from, and +``length`` specifies the maximum number of bytes to read from the +metadata item. ``buf_ptr`` is the pointer to the buffer to read into, +cast to a 64-bit integer. ``__reserved`` must be 0. On success, the +number of bytes read is returned. 0 is returned at the end of the +metadata item. The returned length may be less than ``length``, for +example if the ioctl is interrupted. + +The metadata returned by FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA isn't guaranteed +to be authenticated against the file digest that would be returned by +`FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_, as the metadata is expected to be used to +implement fs-verity compatible verification anyway (though absent a +malicious disk, the metadata will indeed match). E.g. to implement +this ioctl, the filesystem is allowed to just read the Merkle tree +blocks from disk without actually verifying the path to the root node. + +FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA can fail with the following errors: + +- ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory +- ``EINTR``: the ioctl was interrupted before any data was read +- ``EINVAL``: reserved fields were set, or ``offset + length`` + overflowed +- ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file +- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity, or + this ioctl is not yet implemented on it +- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verity + support, or the filesystem superblock has not had the 'verity' + feature enabled on it. (See `Filesystem support`_.) + FS_IOC_GETFLAGS ---------------
fs/ext4/ioctl.c +7 -0
@@ -1306,6 +1306,12 @@ static long __ext4_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)return -EOPNOTSUPP ;return fsverity_ioctl_measure (filp, (void __user *)arg); +case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA : +if (!ext4_has_feature_verity (sb)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (filp, + (const void __user *)arg); +default :return -ENOTTY ; }
@@ -1388,6 +1394,7 @@ long ext4_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case FS_IOC_GETFSMAP :case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY :case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY : +case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA :case EXT4_IOC_CLEAR_ES_CACHE :case EXT4_IOC_GETSTATE :case EXT4_IOC_GET_ES_CACHE :
fs/f2fs/file.c +11 -0
@@ -3357,6 +3357,14 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)return fsverity_ioctl_measure (filp, (void __user *)arg); } +static int f2fs_ioc_read_verity_metadata (struct file *filp,unsigned long arg) +{ +if (!f2fs_sb_has_verity (F2FS_I_SB (file_inode (filp)))) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + +return fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (filp, (const void __user *)arg); +} +static int f2fs_ioc_getfslabel (struct file *filp,unsigned long arg) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (filp);
@@ -4272,6 +4280,8 @@ static long __f2fs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)return f2fs_ioc_enable_verity (filp, arg);case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY :return f2fs_ioc_measure_verity (filp, arg); +case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA : +return f2fs_ioc_read_verity_metadata (filp, arg);case FS_IOC_GETFSLABEL :return f2fs_ioc_getfslabel (filp, arg);case FS_IOC_SETFSLABEL :
@@ -4523,6 +4533,7 @@ long f2fs_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case F2FS_IOC_RESIZE_FS :case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY :case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY : +case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA :case FS_IOC_GETFSLABEL :case FS_IOC_SETFSLABEL :case F2FS_IOC_GET_COMPRESS_BLOCKS :
fs/verity/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += enable.o \ init.o \ measure.o \ open.o \ + read_metadata.o \ verify.o obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES) += signature.o
fs/verity/read_metadata.c new file +55 -0
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include/linux/fsverity.h +12 -0
@@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp);int fsverity_prepare_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *attr);void fsverity_cleanup_inode (struct inode *inode); +/* read_metadata.c */ + +int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (struct file *filp,const void __user *uarg); +/* verify.c */ bool fsverity_verify_page (struct page *page);
@@ -183,6 +187,14 @@ static inline void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode) { } +/* read_metadata.c */ + +static inline int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (struct file *filp, +const void __user *uarg) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +/* verify.c */ static inline bool fsverity_verify_page (struct page *page)
include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h +10 -0
@@ -83,7 +83,17 @@ struct fsverity_formatted_digest { __u8 digest[]; }; +struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg { +__u64 metadata_type; +__u64 offset; +__u64 length; +__u64 buf_ptr; +__u64 __reserved; +}; +#define FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY _IOW('f', 133, struct fsverity_enable_arg)#define FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY _IOWR('f', 134, struct fsverity_digest) +#define FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA \ + _IOWR('f', 135, struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg)#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH 2/6 fs-verity: don't pass whole descriptor to fsverity_verify_signature()
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Now that fsverity_get_descriptor() validates the sig_size field, fsverity_verify_signature() doesn't need to do it.
Just change the prototype of fsverity_verify_signature() to take the signature directly rather than take a fsverity_descriptor.
--- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 6 ++---- fs/verity/open.c | 3 ++- fs/verity/signature.c | 20 ++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +2 -4
@@ -140,15 +140,13 @@ void __init fsverity_exit_info_cache(void);#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES int fsverity_verify_signature (const struct fsverity_info *vi, -const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, -size_t desc_size); +const u8 *signature,size_t sig_size);int __init fsverity_init_signature (void );#else /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES */ static inline int fsverity_verify_signature (const struct fsverity_info *vi, -const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, -size_t desc_size) +const u8 *signature,size_t sig_size) {return 0 ; }
fs/verity/open.c +2 -1
@@ -181,7 +181,8 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, vi->tree_params.digest_size, vi->file_digest); - err =fsverity_verify_signature (vi, desc, desc_size); + err =fsverity_verify_signature (vi, desc->signature, +le32_to_cpu (desc->sig_size)); out:if (err) {fsverity_free_info (vi);
fs/verity/signature.c +6 -14
@@ -29,21 +29,19 @@ static struct key *fsverity_keyring;/** * fsverity_verify_signature() - check a verity file's signature * @vi: the file's fsverity_info -* @desc: the file's fsverity_descriptor -* @desc_size: size of @desc +* @signature: the file's built-in signature +* @sig_size: size of signature in bytes, or 0 if no signature * -* If the file's fs-verity descriptor includes a signature of the file digest, -* verify it against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. +* If the file includes a signature of its fs-verity file digest, verify it +* against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. * * Return: 0 on success (signature valid or not required); -errno on failure */ int fsverity_verify_signature (const struct fsverity_info *vi, -const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, -size_t desc_size) +const u8 *signature,size_t sig_size) {const struct inode *inode = vi->inode;const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg; -const u32 sig_size =le32_to_cpu (desc->sig_size);struct fsverity_formatted_digest *d;int err;
@@ -56,11 +54,6 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,return 0 ; } -if (sig_size > desc_size -sizeof (*desc)) { -fsverity_err (inode,"Signature overflows verity descriptor" ); -return -EBADMSG ; - } - d =kzalloc (sizeof (*d) + hash_alg->digest_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!d)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -70,8 +63,7 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,memcpy (d->digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size); err =verify_pkcs7_signature (d,sizeof (*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, - desc->signature, sig_size, - fsverity_keyring, + signature, sig_size, fsverity_keyring,VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE ,NULL ,NULL );kfree (d);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Eric Biggers
maintainercover fs-verity: add an ioctl to read verity metadata
[This patchset applies to v5.11-rc3]
Add an ioctl FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA which allows reading verity metadata from a file that has fs-verity enabled, including:
- The Merkle tree
- The fsverity_descriptor (not including the signature if present)
- The built-in signature, if present
This ioctl has similar semantics to pread(). It is passed the type of metadata to read (one of the above three), and a buffer, offset, and size. It returns the number of bytes read or an error.
This ioctl doesn't make any assumption about where the metadata is stored on-disk. It does assume the metadata is in a stable format, but that's basically already the case:
- The Merkle tree and fsverity_descriptor are defined by how fs-verity file digests are computed; see the "File digest computation" section of Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst. Technically, the way in which the levels of the tree are ordered relative to each other wasn't previously specified, but it's logical to put the root level first.
- The built-in signature is the value passed to FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.
This ioctl is useful because it allows writing a server program that takes a verity file and serves it to a client program, such that the client can do its own fs-verity compatible verification of the file. This only makes sense if the client doesn't trust the server and if the server needs to provide the storage for the client.
More concretely, there is interest in using this ability in Android to export APK files (which are protected by fs-verity) to "protected VMs". This would use Protected KVM (https://lwn.net/Articles/836693), which provides an isolated execution environment without having to trust the traditional "host". A "guest" VM can boot from a signed image and perform specific tasks in a minimum trusted environment using files that have fs-verity enabled on the host, without trusting the host or requiring that the guest has its own trusted storage.
Technically, it would be possible to duplicate the metadata and store it in separate files for serving. However, that would be less efficient and would require extra care in userspace to maintain file consistency.
In addition to the above, the ability to read the built-in signatures is useful because it allows a system that is using the in-kernel signature verification to migrate to userspace signature verification.
This patchset has been tested by new xfstests which call this new ioctl via a new subcommand for the 'fsverity' program from fsverity-utils.
Eric Biggers (6):
fs-verity: factor out fsverity_get_descriptor()
fs-verity: don't pass whole descriptor to fsverity_verify_signature()
fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl
fs-verity: support reading Merkle tree with ioctl
fs-verity: support reading descriptor with ioctl
fs-verity: support reading signature with ioctl
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 76 ++++++++++ fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 7 + fs/f2fs/file.c | 11 ++ fs/verity/Makefile | 1 + fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 13 +- fs/verity/open.c | 133 +++++++++++------ fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 195 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/verity/signature.c | 20 +-- include/linux/fsverity.h | 12 ++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 14 ++ 10 files changed, 417 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/verity/read_metadata.c
base-commit: 7c53f6b671f4aba70ff15e1b05148b10d58c2837
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH 5/6 fs-verity: support reading descriptor with ioctl
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add support for FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR to FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA. This allows a userspace server program to retrieve the fs-verity descriptor of a file for serving to a client which implements fs-verity compatible verification. See the patch which introduced FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA for more details.
"fs-verity descriptor" here means only the part that userspace cares about because it is hashed to produce the file digest. It doesn't include the signature which ext4 and f2fs append to the fsverity_descriptor struct when storing it on-disk, since that way of storing the signature is an implementation detail. The next patch adds a separate metadata_type value for retrieving the signature separately.
This has been tested using a new xfstest which calls this ioctl via a new subcommand for the 'fsverity' program from fsverity-utils.
--- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 4 +++ fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +4 -0
@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ need this ioctl. This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1 + #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 2 struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg { __u64 metadata_type;
@@ -252,6 +253,9 @@ This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: the same order that their hashes are themselves hashed. See `Merkle tree`_ for more information. +- ``FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR`` reads the fs-verity + descriptor. See `fs-verity descriptor`_. + The semantics are similar to those of ``pread()``. ``offset`` specifies the offset in bytes into the metadata item to read from, and ``length`` specifies the maximum number of bytes to read from the
fs/verity/read_metadata.c +40 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,44 @@ static int fsverity_read_merkle_tree(struct inode *inode, }return retval ? retval : err; } + +/* Copy the requested portion of the buffer to userspace. */ +static int fsverity_read_buffer (void __user *dst,u64 offset,int length, +const void *src,size_t src_length) +{ +if (offset >= src_length) +return 0 ; + src += offset; + src_length -= offset; + + length =min_t (size_t, length, src_length); + +if (copy_to_user (dst, src, length)) +return -EFAULT ; + +return length; +} + +static int fsverity_read_descriptor (struct inode *inode, +void __user *buf,u64 offset,int length) +{ +struct fsverity_descriptor *desc; +size_t desc_size; +int res; + + res =fsverity_get_descriptor (inode, &desc, &desc_size); +if (res) +return res; + +/* don't include the signature */ + desc_size = offsetof(struct fsverity_descriptor , signature); + desc->sig_size =0 ; + + res =fsverity_read_buffer (buf, offset, length, desc, desc_size); + +kfree (desc); +return res; +}/** * fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata() - read verity metadata from a file * @filp: file to read the metadata from
@@ -118,6 +156,8 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)case FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE :return fsverity_read_merkle_tree (inode, vi, buf, arg.offset, length); +case FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR : +return fsverity_read_descriptor (inode, buf, arg.offset, length);default :return -EINVAL ; }
include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h +1 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct fsverity_formatted_digest { };#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1 +#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 2struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg {__u64 metadata_type;
Signature · 8 lines
2.30.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel
Eric Biggers
maintainerPATCH 6/6 fs-verity: support reading signature with ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add support for FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE to FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA. This allows a userspace server program to retrieve the built-in signature (if present) of a verity file for serving to a client which implements fs-verity compatible verification. See the patch which introduced FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA for more details.
The ability for userspace to read the built-in signatures is also useful because it allows a system that is using the in-kernel signature verification to migrate to userspace signature verification.
This has been tested using a new xfstest which calls this ioctl via a new subcommand for the 'fsverity' program from fsverity-utils.
--- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 9 +++++++- fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +8 -1
@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1 #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 2 + #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE 3 struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg { __u64 metadata_type;
@@ -256,6 +257,10 @@ This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: - ``FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR`` reads the fs-verity descriptor. See `fs-verity descriptor`_. +- ``FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE`` reads the signature which was + passed to FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY, if any. See `Built-in signature + verification`_. + The semantics are similar to those of ``pread()``. ``offset`` specifies the offset in bytes into the metadata item to read from, and ``length`` specifies the maximum number of bytes to read from the
@@ -279,7 +284,9 @@ FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA can fail with the following errors: - ``EINTR``: the ioctl was interrupted before any data was read - ``EINVAL``: reserved fields were set, or ``offset + length`` overflowed -- ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file +- ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file, or + FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE was requested but the file doesn't + have a built-in signature - ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity, or this ioctl is not yet implemented on it - ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verity
fs/verity/read_metadata.c +30 -0
@@ -114,6 +114,34 @@ static int fsverity_read_descriptor(struct inode *inode,kfree (desc);return res; } + +static int fsverity_read_signature (struct inode *inode, +void __user *buf,u64 offset,int length) +{ +struct fsverity_descriptor *desc; +size_t desc_size; +int res; + + res =fsverity_get_descriptor (inode, &desc, &desc_size); +if (res) +return res; + +if (desc->sig_size ==0 ) { + res = -ENODATA ; + goto out; + } + +/* +* Include only the signature. Note that fsverity_get_descriptor() +* already verified that sig_size is in-bounds. +*/ + res =fsverity_read_buffer (buf, offset, length, desc->signature, +le32_to_cpu (desc->sig_size)); +out: +kfree (desc); +return res; +} +/** * fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata() - read verity metadata from a file * @filp: file to read the metadata from
@@ -158,6 +186,8 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg) length);case FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR :return fsverity_read_descriptor (inode, buf, arg.offset, length); +case FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE : +return fsverity_read_signature (inode, buf, arg.offset, length);default :return -EINVAL ; }
include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h +1 -0
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct fsverity_formatted_digest {#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 2 +#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE 3struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg {__u64 metadata_type;
Signature · 8 lines
2.30.0 _______________________________________________ Linux-f2fs-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/linux-f2fs-devel
LGTM. Thanks!
Quoted 78 lines · Eric Biggers
[This patchset applies to v5.11-rc3]
Add an ioctl
FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAwhich allows reading verity metadata from a file that has fs-verity enabled, including:- The Merkle tree
- Thefsverity_descriptor(not including the signature if present)
- The built-in signature, if presentThis ioctl has similar semantics to
pread(). It is passed the type of metadata to read (one of the above three), and a buffer, offset, and size. It returns the number of bytes read or an error.This ioctl doesn't make any assumption about where the metadata is stored on-disk. It does assume the metadata is in a stable format, but that's basically already the case:
- The Merkle tree and
fsverity_descriptorare defined by how fs-verity file digests are computed; see the "File digest computation" section ofDocumentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst. Technically, the way in which the levels of the tree are ordered relative to each other wasn't previously specified, but it's logical to put the root level first.- The built-in signature is the value passed to
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.This ioctl is useful because it allows writing a server program that takes a verity file and serves it to a client program, such that the client can do its own fs-verity compatible verification of the file. This only makes sense if the client doesn't trust the server and if the server needs to provide the storage for the client.
More concretely, there is interest in using this ability in Android to export APK files (which are protected by fs-verity) to "protected VMs". This would use Protected KVM (https://lwn.net/Articles/836693), which provides an isolated execution environment without having to trust the traditional "host". A "guest" VM can boot from a signed image and perform specific tasks in a minimum trusted environment using files that have fs-verity enabled on the host, without trusting the host or requiring that the guest has its own trusted storage.
Technically, it would be possible to duplicate the metadata and store it in separate files for serving. However, that would be less efficient and would require extra care in userspace to maintain file consistency.
In addition to the above, the ability to read the built-in signatures is useful because it allows a system that is using the in-kernel signature verification to migrate to userspace signature verification.
This patchset has been tested by new xfstests which call this new ioctl via a new subcommand for the 'fsverity' program from fsverity-utils.
Eric Biggers (6):
fs-verity: factor outfsverity_get_descriptor()
fs-verity: don't pass whole descriptor tofsverity_verify_signature()
fs-verity: addFS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAioctl
fs-verity: support reading Merkle tree with ioctl
fs-verity: support reading descriptor with ioctl
fs-verity: support reading signature with ioctlDocumentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 76 ++++++++++ fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 7 + fs/f2fs/file.c | 11 ++ fs/verity/Makefile | 1 + fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 13 +- fs/verity/open.c | 133 +++++++++++------ fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 195 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/verity/signature.c | 20 +-- include/linux/fsverity.h | 12 ++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 14 ++ 10 files changed, 417 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/verity/read_metadata.cbase-commit:
7c53f6b671f4aba70ff15e1b05148b10d58c2837--
2.30.0
Eric Biggers
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Victor Hsieh
LGTM. Thanks!
Reviewed-by Victor Hsieh <[email protected]>Quoted 5 lines · Eric Biggers
[This patchset applies to v5.11-rc3]
Add an ioctl
FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAwhich allows reading verity metadata from a file that has fs-verity enabled, including:
Thanks Victor. Does anyone else have comments on this patchset?
- Eric
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Re: [PATCH 6/6] fs-verity: support reading signature with ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 9 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add support for
FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATUREtoFS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA. This allows a userspace server program to retrieve the built-in signature (if present) of a verity file for serving to a client which implements fs-verity compatible verification. See the patch which introducedFS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAfor more details.
Quoted 8 lines
The ability for userspace to read the built-in signatures is also useful because it allows a system that is using the in-kernel signature verification to migrate to userspace signature verification.
This has been tested using a new xfstest which calls this ioctl via a new subcommand for the 'fsverity' program from fsverity-utils.
Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Quoted 102 lines
--- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 9 +++++++- fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +8
-1@@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1 #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 2 + #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE 3 struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg { __u64 metadata_type;@@ -256,6 +257,10 @@ This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: - ``FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR`` reads the fs-verity descriptor. See `fs-verity descriptor`_. +- ``FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE`` reads the signature which was + passed to FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY, if any. See `Built-in signature + verification`_. + The semantics are similar to those of ``pread()``. ``offset`` specifies the offset in bytes into the metadata item to read from, and ``length`` specifies the maximum number of bytes to read from the@@ -279,7 +284,9 @@ FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA can fail with the following errors: - ``EINTR``: the ioctl was interrupted before any data was read - ``EINVAL``: reserved fields were set, or ``offset + length`` overflowed -- ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file +- ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file, or + FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE was requested but the file doesn't + have a built-in signature - ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity, or this ioctl is not yet implemented on it - ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verityfs/verity/read_metadata.c +30
-0@@ -114,6 +114,34 @@ static int fsverity_read_descriptor(struct inode *inode,kfree (desc);return res; } + +static int fsverity_read_signature (struct inode *inode, +void __user *buf,u64 offset,int length) +{ +struct fsverity_descriptor *desc; +size_t desc_size; +int res; + + res =fsverity_get_descriptor (inode, &desc, &desc_size); +if (res) +return res; + +if (desc->sig_size ==0 ) { + res = -ENODATA ; + goto out; + } + +/* +* Include only the signature. Note that fsverity_get_descriptor() +* already verified that sig_size is in-bounds. +*/ + res =fsverity_read_buffer (buf, offset, length, desc->signature, +le32_to_cpu (desc->sig_size)); +out: +kfree (desc); +return res; +} +/** * fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata() - read verity metadata from a file * @filp: file to read the metadata from @@ -158,6 +186,8 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg) length);case FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR :return fsverity_read_descriptor (inode, buf, arg.offset, length); +case FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE : +return fsverity_read_signature (inode, buf, arg.offset, length);default :return -EINVAL ; }include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h +1
-0@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct fsverity_formatted_digest {#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 2 +#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_SIGNATURE 3struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg {__u64 metadata_type;Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
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Re: [PATCH 2/6] fs-verity: don't pass whole descriptor to fsverity_verify_signature()
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 9 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Now that
fsverity_get_descriptor()validates thesig_sizefield,fsverity_verify_signature()doesn't need to do it.Just change the prototype of
fsverity_verify_signature()to take the signature directly rather than take afsverity_descriptor.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Quoted 97 lines
--- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 6 ++---- fs/verity/open.c | 3 ++- fs/verity/signature.c | 20 ++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +2
-4@@ -140,15 +140,13 @@ void __init fsverity_exit_info_cache(void);#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES int fsverity_verify_signature (const struct fsverity_info *vi, -const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, -size_t desc_size); +const u8 *signature,size_t sig_size);int __init fsverity_init_signature (void );#else /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES */ static inline int fsverity_verify_signature (const struct fsverity_info *vi, -const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, -size_t desc_size) +const u8 *signature,size_t sig_size) {return 0 ; }fs/verity/open.c +2
-1@@ -181,7 +181,8 @@ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(const struct inode *inode, vi->tree_params.hash_alg->name, vi->tree_params.digest_size, vi->file_digest); - err =fsverity_verify_signature (vi, desc, desc_size); + err =fsverity_verify_signature (vi, desc->signature, +le32_to_cpu (desc->sig_size)); out:if (err) {fsverity_free_info (vi);fs/verity/signature.c +6
-14@@ -29,21 +29,19 @@ static struct key *fsverity_keyring;/** * fsverity_verify_signature() - check a verity file's signature * @vi: the file's fsverity_info -* @desc: the file's fsverity_descriptor -* @desc_size: size of @desc +* @signature: the file's built-in signature +* @sig_size: size of signature in bytes, or 0 if no signature * -* If the file's fs-verity descriptor includes a signature of the file digest, -* verify it against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. +* If the file includes a signature of its fs-verity file digest, verify it +* against the certificates in the fs-verity keyring. * * Return: 0 on success (signature valid or not required); -errno on failure */ int fsverity_verify_signature (const struct fsverity_info *vi, -const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, -size_t desc_size) +const u8 *signature,size_t sig_size) {const struct inode *inode = vi->inode;const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg = vi->tree_params.hash_alg; -const u32 sig_size =le32_to_cpu (desc->sig_size);struct fsverity_formatted_digest *d;int err;@@ -56,11 +54,6 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,return 0 ; } -if (sig_size > desc_size -sizeof (*desc)) { -fsverity_err (inode,"Signature overflows verity descriptor" ); -return -EBADMSG ; - } - d =kzalloc (sizeof (*d) + hash_alg->digest_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!d)return -ENOMEM ;@@ -70,8 +63,7 @@ int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,memcpy (d->digest, vi->file_digest, hash_alg->digest_size); err =verify_pkcs7_signature (d,sizeof (*d) + hash_alg->digest_size, - desc->signature, sig_size, - fsverity_keyring, + signature, sig_size, fsverity_keyring,VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE ,NULL ,NULL );kfree (d);Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Re: [PATCH 1/6] fs-verity: factor out fsverity_get_descriptor()
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 26 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
The
FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAioctl will need to return the fs-verity descriptor (and signature) to userspace.There are a few ways we could implement this:
- Save a copy of the descriptor (and signature) in the
fsverity_infostruct that hangs off of the in-memory inode. However, this would waste memory since most of the time it wouldn't be needed.- Regenerate the descriptor from the
merkle_tree_paramsin thefsverity_info. However, this wouldn't work for the signature, nor for the salt which themerkle_tree_paramsonly contains indirectly as part of the 'hashstate'. It would also be error-prone.- Just get them from the filesystem again. The disadvantage is that in general we can't trust that they haven't been maliciously changed since the file has opened. However, the use cases for
FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAdon't require that it verifies the chain of trust. So this is okay as long as we do some basic validation.In preparation for implementing the third option, factor out a helper function
fsverity_get_descriptor()which gets the descriptor (and appended signature) from the filesystem and does some basic validation.
Quoted 5 lines
As part of this, start checking the
sig_sizefield for overflow. Currentlyfsverity_verify_signature()does this. But the new ioctl will need this too, so do it earlier.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Quoted 202 lines
--- fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 7 +- fs/verity/open.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 2 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)fs/verity/fsverity_private.h +6
-1@@ -122,12 +122,17 @@ int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params, const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size);struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info (const struct inode *inode, -void *desc,size_t desc_size); +struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, +size_t desc_size);void fsverity_set_info (struct inode *inode,struct fsverity_info *vi);void fsverity_free_info (struct fsverity_info *vi); +int fsverity_get_descriptor (struct inode *inode, +struct fsverity_descriptor **desc_ret, +size_t *desc_size_ret); +int __init fsverity_init_info_cache (void );void __init fsverity_exit_info_cache (void );fs/verity/open.c +85
-45@@ -142,45 +142,17 @@ static int compute_file_digest(struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg, }/* -* Validate the given fsverity_descriptor and create a new fsverity_info from -* it. The signature (if present) is also checked. +* Create a new fsverity_info from the given fsverity_descriptor (with optional +* appended signature), and check the signature if present. The +* fsverity_descriptor must have already undergone basic validation. */ struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info (const struct inode *inode, -void *_desc,size_t desc_size) +struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, +size_t desc_size) { -struct fsverity_descriptor *desc = _desc;struct fsverity_info *vi;int err; -if (desc_size <sizeof (*desc)) { -fsverity_err (inode,"Unrecognized descriptor size: %zu bytes" , - desc_size); -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); - } - -if (desc->version !=1 ) { -fsverity_err (inode,"Unrecognized descriptor version: %u" , - desc->version); -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); - } - -if (memchr_inv (desc->__reserved,0 ,sizeof (desc->__reserved))) { -fsverity_err (inode,"Reserved bits set in descriptor" ); -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); - } - -if (desc->salt_size >sizeof (desc->salt)) { -fsverity_err (inode,"Invalid salt_size: %u" , desc->salt_size); -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); - } - -if (le64_to_cpu (desc->data_size) != inode->i_size) { -fsverity_err (inode, -"Wrong data_size: %llu (desc) != %lld (inode)" , -le64_to_cpu (desc->data_size), inode->i_size); -return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); - } - vi =kmem_cache_zalloc (fsverity_info_cachep,GFP_KERNEL );if (!vi)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM );@@ -245,15 +217,57 @@ void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi)kmem_cache_free (fsverity_info_cachep, vi); } -/* Ensure the inode has an ->i_verity_info */ -static int ensure_verity_info (struct inode *inode) +static bool validate_fsverity_descriptor (struct inode *inode, +const struct fsverity_descriptor *desc, +size_t desc_size) { -struct fsverity_info *vi =fsverity_get_info (inode); -struct fsverity_descriptor *desc; -int res; +if (desc_size <sizeof (*desc)) { +fsverity_err (inode,"Unrecognized descriptor size: %zu bytes" , + desc_size); +return false; + } -if (vi) -return 0 ; +if (desc->version !=1 ) { +fsverity_err (inode,"Unrecognized descriptor version: %u" , + desc->version); +return false; + } + +if (memchr_inv (desc->__reserved,0 ,sizeof (desc->__reserved))) { +fsverity_err (inode,"Reserved bits set in descriptor" ); +return false; + } + +if (desc->salt_size >sizeof (desc->salt)) { +fsverity_err (inode,"Invalid salt_size: %u" , desc->salt_size); +return false; + } + +if (le64_to_cpu (desc->data_size) != inode->i_size) { +fsverity_err (inode, +"Wrong data_size: %llu (desc) != %lld (inode)" , +le64_to_cpu (desc->data_size), inode->i_size); +return false; + } + +if (le32_to_cpu (desc->sig_size) > desc_size -sizeof (*desc)) { +fsverity_err (inode,"Signature overflows verity descriptor" ); +return false; + } + +return true; +} + +/* +* Read the inode's fsverity_descriptor (with optional appended signature) from +* the filesystem, and do basic validation of it. +*/ +int fsverity_get_descriptor (struct inode *inode, +struct fsverity_descriptor **desc_ret, +size_t *desc_size_ret) +{ +int res; +struct fsverity_descriptor *desc; res = inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_verity_descriptor (inode,NULL ,0 );if (res <0 ) {@@ -272,20 +286,46 @@ static int ensure_verity_info(struct inode *inode) res = inode->i_sb->s_vop->get_verity_descriptor (inode, desc, res);if (res <0 ) {fsverity_err (inode,"Error %d reading verity descriptor" , res); - goto out_free_desc; +kfree (desc); +return res; + } + +if (!validate_fsverity_descriptor (inode, desc, res)) { +kfree (desc); +return -EINVAL ; } - vi =fsverity_create_info (inode, desc, res); + *desc_ret = desc; + *desc_size_ret = res; +return 0 ; +} + +/* Ensure the inode has an ->i_verity_info */ +static int ensure_verity_info (struct inode *inode) +{ +struct fsverity_info *vi =fsverity_get_info (inode); +struct fsverity_descriptor *desc; +size_t desc_size; +int err; + +if (vi) +return 0 ; + + err =fsverity_get_descriptor (inode, &desc, &desc_size); +if (err) +return err; + + vi =fsverity_create_info (inode, desc, desc_size);if (IS_ERR (vi)) { - res =PTR_ERR (vi); + err =PTR_ERR (vi); goto out_free_desc; }fsverity_set_info (inode, vi); - res =0 ; + err =0 ; out_free_desc:kfree (desc); -return res; +return err; }/** Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Re: [PATCH 4/6] fs-verity: support reading Merkle tree with ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 111 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add support for
FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREEtoFS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA. This allows a userspace server program to retrieve the Merkle tree of a verity file for serving to a client which implements fs-verity compatible verification. See the patch which introducedFS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAfor more details.This has been tested using a new xfstest which calls this ioctl via a new subcommand for the 'fsverity' program from fsverity-utils.
Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>--- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 10 +++- fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 2 + 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +9
-1@@ -234,6 +234,8 @@ need this ioctl. This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: + #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1 + struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg { __u64 metadata_type; __u64 offset;@@ -242,7 +244,13 @@ This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: __u64 __reserved; }; -``metadata_type`` specifies the type of metadata to read. +``metadata_type`` specifies the type of metadata to read: + +- ``FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE`` reads the blocks of the + Merkle tree. The blocks are returned in order from the root level + to the leaf level. Within each level, the blocks are returned in + the same order that their hashes are themselves hashed. + See `Merkle tree`_ for more information. The semantics are similar to those of ``pread()``. ``offset`` specifies the offset in bytes into the metadata item to read from, andfs/verity/read_metadata.c +55
-0@@ -7,8 +7,75 @@#include "fsverity_private.h" +#include <linux/backing-dev.h> +#include <linux/highmem.h> +#include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +static int fsverity_read_merkle_tree (struct inode *inode, +const struct fsverity_info *vi, +void __user *buf,u64 offset,int length) +{ +const struct fsverity_operations *vops = inode->i_sb->s_vop; +u64 end_offset; +unsigned int offs_in_page; +pgoff_t index, last_index; +int retval =0 ; +int err =0 ; + + end_offset =min (offset + length, vi->tree_params.tree_size); +if (offset >= end_offset) +return 0 ; + offs_in_page =offset_in_page (offset); + last_index = (end_offset -1 ) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; + +/* +* Iterate through each Merkle tree page in the requested range and copy +* the requested portion to userspace. Note that the Merkle tree block +* size isn't important here, as we are returning a byte stream; i.e., +* we can just work with pages even if the tree block size != PAGE_SIZE. +*/ +for (index = offset >>PAGE_SHIFT ; index <= last_index; index++) { +unsigned long num_ra_pages = + min_t(unsigned long, last_index - index + 1, + inode->i_sb->s_bdi->io_pages); +unsigned int bytes_to_copy =min_t (u64, end_offset - offset, +PAGE_SIZE - offs_in_page); +struct page *page; +const void *virt; + + page = vops->read_merkle_tree_page (inode, index, num_ra_pages); +if (IS_ERR (page)) { + err =PTR_ERR (page); +fsverity_err (inode, +"Error %d reading Merkle tree page %lu" , + err, index); +break ; + } + + virt =kmap (page); +if (copy_to_user (buf, virt + offs_in_page, bytes_to_copy)) { +kunmap (page); +put_page (page); + err = -EFAULT ; +break ; + } +kunmap (page); +put_page (page); + + retval += bytes_to_copy;
fs/verity/read_metadata.c line 76
Quoted 10 lines
fs/verity/read_metadata.c +10
-0+ buf += bytes_to_copy; + offset += bytes_to_copy; + +if (fatal_signal_pending (current)) { + err = -EINTR ; +break ; + } +cond_resched (); + offs_in_page =0 ; + }
Minor thought:
How about invalidating or truncating merkel tree pages?
Quoted 30 lines
fs/verity/read_metadata.c +5
-0+return retval ? retval : err; +}/** * fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata() - read verity metadata from a file * @filp: file to read the metadata from @@ -48,6 +115,9 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg) buf =u64_to_user_ptr (arg.buf_ptr);switch (arg.metadata_type) { +case FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE : +return fsverity_read_merkle_tree (inode, vi, buf, arg.offset, + length);default :return -EINVAL ; }include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h +2
-0@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ struct fsverity_formatted_digest {__u8 digest[]; }; +#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1 +struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg {__u64 metadata_type;__u64 offset;Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Re: [PATCH 5/6] fs-verity: support reading descriptor with ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 15 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add support for
FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTORtoFS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA. This allows a userspace server program to retrieve the fs-verity descriptor of a file for serving to a client which implements fs-verity compatible verification. See the patch which introducedFS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAfor more details."fs-verity descriptor" here means only the part that userspace cares about because it is hashed to produce the file digest. It doesn't include the signature which ext4 and f2fs append to the
fsverity_descriptorstruct when storing it on-disk, since that way of storing the signature is an implementation detail. The next patch adds a separatemetadata_typevalue for retrieving the signature separately.
Quoted 4 lines
This has been tested using a new xfstest which calls this ioctl via a new subcommand for the 'fsverity' program from fsverity-utils.
Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Quoted 100 lines
--- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 4 +++ fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+)Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +4
-0@@ -235,6 +235,7 @@ need this ioctl. This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1 + #define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 2 struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg { __u64 metadata_type;@@ -252,6 +253,9 @@ This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: the same order that their hashes are themselves hashed. See `Merkle tree`_ for more information. +- ``FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR`` reads the fs-verity + descriptor. See `fs-verity descriptor`_. + The semantics are similar to those of ``pread()``. ``offset`` specifies the offset in bytes into the metadata item to read from, and ``length`` specifies the maximum number of bytes to read from thefs/verity/read_metadata.c +40
-0@@ -76,6 +76,44 @@ static int fsverity_read_merkle_tree(struct inode *inode, }return retval ? retval : err; } + +/* Copy the requested portion of the buffer to userspace. */ +static int fsverity_read_buffer (void __user *dst,u64 offset,int length, +const void *src,size_t src_length) +{ +if (offset >= src_length) +return 0 ; + src += offset; + src_length -= offset; + + length =min_t (size_t, length, src_length); + +if (copy_to_user (dst, src, length)) +return -EFAULT ; + +return length; +} + +static int fsverity_read_descriptor (struct inode *inode, +void __user *buf,u64 offset,int length) +{ +struct fsverity_descriptor *desc; +size_t desc_size; +int res; + + res =fsverity_get_descriptor (inode, &desc, &desc_size); +if (res) +return res; + +/* don't include the signature */ + desc_size = offsetof(struct fsverity_descriptor , signature); + desc->sig_size =0 ; + + res =fsverity_read_buffer (buf, offset, length, desc, desc_size); + +kfree (desc); +return res; +}/** * fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata() - read verity metadata from a file * @filp: file to read the metadata from @@ -118,6 +156,8 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg)case FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE :return fsverity_read_merkle_tree (inode, vi, buf, arg.offset, length); +case FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR : +return fsverity_read_descriptor (inode, buf, arg.offset, length);default :return -EINVAL ; }include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h +1
-0@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct fsverity_formatted_digest { };#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_MERKLE_TREE 1 +#define FS_VERITY_METADATA_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR 2struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg {__u64 metadata_type;Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Re: [PATCH 3/6] fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 47 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Add an ioctl
FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAwhich will allow reading verity metadata from a file that has fs-verity enabled, including:- The Merkle tree
- Thefsverity_descriptor(not including the signature if present)
- The built-in signature, if presentThis ioctl has similar semantics to
pread(). It is passed the type of metadata to read (one of the above three), and a buffer, offset, and size. It returns the number of bytes read or an error.Separate patches will add support for each of the above metadata types. This patch just adds the ioctl itself.
This ioctl doesn't make any assumption about where the metadata is stored on-disk. It does assume the metadata is in a stable format, but that's basically already the case:
- The Merkle tree and
fsverity_descriptorare defined by how fs-verity file digests are computed; see the "File digest computation" section ofDocumentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst. Technically, the way in which the levels of the tree are ordered relative to each other wasn't previously specified, but it's logical to put the root level first.- The built-in signature is the value passed to
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.This ioctl is useful because it allows writing a server program that takes a verity file and serves it to a client program, such that the client can do its own fs-verity compatible verification of the file. This only makes sense if the client doesn't trust the server and if the server needs to provide the storage for the client.
More concretely, there is interest in using this ability in Android to export APK files (which are protected by fs-verity) to "protected VMs". This would use Protected KVM (https://lwn.net/Articles/836693), which provides an isolated execution environment without having to trust the traditional "host". A "guest" VM can boot from a signed image and perform specific tasks in a minimum trusted environment using files that have fs-verity enabled on the host, without trusting the host or requiring that the guest has its own trusted storage.
Technically, it would be possible to duplicate the metadata and store it in separate files for serving. However, that would be less efficient and would require extra care in userspace to maintain file consistency.
Quoted 5 lines
In addition to the above, the ability to read the built-in signatures is useful because it allows a system that is using the in-kernel signature verification to migrate to userspace signature verification.
Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Quoted 267 lines
--- Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 7 ++++ fs/f2fs/file.c | 11 +++++ fs/verity/Makefile | 1 + fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/linux/fsverity.h | 12 ++++++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 10 +++++ 7 files changed, 153 insertions(+) create mode 100644 fs/verity/read_metadata.cDocumentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst +57
-0@@ -217,6 +217,63 @@ FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY can fail with the following errors: - ``EOVERFLOW``: the digest is longer than the specified ``digest_size`` bytes. Try providing a larger buffer. +FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA +--------------------------- + +The FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl reads verity metadata from a +verity file. This ioctl is available since Linux v5.12. + +This ioctl allows writing a server program that takes a verity file +and serves it to a client program, such that the client can do its own +fs-verity compatible verification of the file. This only makes sense +if the client doesn't trust the server and if the server needs to +provide the storage for the client. + +This is a fairly specialized use case, and most fs-verity users won't +need this ioctl. + +This ioctl takes in a pointer to the following structure:: + + struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg { + __u64 metadata_type; + __u64 offset; + __u64 length; + __u64 buf_ptr; + __u64 __reserved; + }; + +``metadata_type`` specifies the type of metadata to read. + +The semantics are similar to those of ``pread()``. ``offset`` +specifies the offset in bytes into the metadata item to read from, and +``length`` specifies the maximum number of bytes to read from the +metadata item. ``buf_ptr`` is the pointer to the buffer to read into, +cast to a 64-bit integer. ``__reserved`` must be 0. On success, the +number of bytes read is returned. 0 is returned at the end of the +metadata item. The returned length may be less than ``length``, for +example if the ioctl is interrupted. + +The metadata returned by FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA isn't guaranteed +to be authenticated against the file digest that would be returned by +`FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY`_, as the metadata is expected to be used to +implement fs-verity compatible verification anyway (though absent a +malicious disk, the metadata will indeed match). E.g. to implement +this ioctl, the filesystem is allowed to just read the Merkle tree +blocks from disk without actually verifying the path to the root node. + +FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA can fail with the following errors: + +- ``EFAULT``: the caller provided inaccessible memory +- ``EINTR``: the ioctl was interrupted before any data was read +- ``EINVAL``: reserved fields were set, or ``offset + length`` + overflowed +- ``ENODATA``: the file is not a verity file +- ``ENOTTY``: this type of filesystem does not implement fs-verity, or + this ioctl is not yet implemented on it +- ``EOPNOTSUPP``: the kernel was not configured with fs-verity + support, or the filesystem superblock has not had the 'verity' + feature enabled on it. (See `Filesystem support`_.) + FS_IOC_GETFLAGS ---------------fs/ext4/ioctl.c +7
-0@@ -1306,6 +1306,12 @@ static long __ext4_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)return -EOPNOTSUPP ;return fsverity_ioctl_measure (filp, (void __user *)arg); +case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA : +if (!ext4_has_feature_verity (sb)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (filp, + (const void __user *)arg); +default :return -ENOTTY ; }@@ -1388,6 +1394,7 @@ long ext4_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case FS_IOC_GETFSMAP :case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY :case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY : +case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA :case EXT4_IOC_CLEAR_ES_CACHE :case EXT4_IOC_GETSTATE :case EXT4_IOC_GET_ES_CACHE :fs/f2fs/file.c +11
-0@@ -3357,6 +3357,14 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)return fsverity_ioctl_measure (filp, (void __user *)arg); } +static int f2fs_ioc_read_verity_metadata (struct file *filp,unsigned long arg) +{ +if (!f2fs_sb_has_verity (F2FS_I_SB (file_inode (filp)))) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + +return fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (filp, (const void __user *)arg); +} +static int f2fs_ioc_getfslabel (struct file *filp,unsigned long arg) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (filp);@@ -4272,6 +4280,8 @@ static long __f2fs_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)return f2fs_ioc_enable_verity (filp, arg);case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY :return f2fs_ioc_measure_verity (filp, arg); +case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA : +return f2fs_ioc_read_verity_metadata (filp, arg);case FS_IOC_GETFSLABEL :return f2fs_ioc_getfslabel (filp, arg);case FS_IOC_SETFSLABEL :@@ -4523,6 +4533,7 @@ long f2fs_compat_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case F2FS_IOC_RESIZE_FS :case FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY :case FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY : +case FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA :case FS_IOC_GETFSLABEL :case FS_IOC_SETFSLABEL :case F2FS_IOC_GET_COMPRESS_BLOCKS :fs/verity/Makefile +1
-0@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += enable.o \ init.o \ measure.o \ open.o \ + read_metadata.o \ verify.o obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES) += signature.ofs/verity/read_metadata.c new file +55
-0@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* +* Ioctl to read verity metadata +* +* Copyright 2021 Google LLC +*/ + +#include "fsverity_private.h" + +#include <linux/uaccess.h> + +/** +* fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata() - read verity metadata from a file +* @filp: file to read the metadata from +* @uarg: user pointer to fsverity_read_metadata_arg +* +* Return: length read on success, 0 on EOF, -errno on failure +*/ +int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (struct file *filp,const void __user *uarg) +{ +struct inode *inode =file_inode (filp); +const struct fsverity_info *vi; +struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg arg; +int length; +void __user *buf; + + vi =fsverity_get_info (inode); +if (!vi) +return -ENODATA ;/* not a verity file */ +/* +* Note that we don't have to explicitly check that the file is open for +* reading, since verity files can only be opened for reading. +*/ + +if (copy_from_user (&arg, uarg,sizeof (arg))) +return -EFAULT ; + +if (arg.__reserved) +return -EINVAL ; + +/* offset + length must not overflow. */ +if (arg.offset + arg.length < arg.offset) +return -EINVAL ; + +/* Ensure that the return value will fit in INT_MAX. */ + length =min_t (u64, arg.length,INT_MAX ); + + buf =u64_to_user_ptr (arg.buf_ptr); + +switch (arg.metadata_type) { +default : +return -EINVAL ; + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata);include/linux/fsverity.h +12
-0@@ -138,6 +138,10 @@ int fsverity_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp);int fsverity_prepare_setattr (struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *attr);void fsverity_cleanup_inode (struct inode *inode); +/* read_metadata.c */ + +int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (struct file *filp,const void __user *uarg); +/* verify.c */ bool fsverity_verify_page (struct page *page);@@ -183,6 +187,14 @@ static inline void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode) { } +/* read_metadata.c */ + +static inline int fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (struct file *filp, +const void __user *uarg) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +/* verify.c */ static inline bool fsverity_verify_page (struct page *page)include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h +10
-0@@ -83,7 +83,17 @@ struct fsverity_formatted_digest { __u8 digest[]; }; +struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg { +__u64 metadata_type; +__u64 offset; +__u64 length; +__u64 buf_ptr; +__u64 __reserved; +}; +#define FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY _IOW('f', 133, struct fsverity_enable_arg)#define FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY _IOWR('f', 134, struct fsverity_digest) +#define FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA \ + _IOWR('f', 135, struct fsverity_read_metadata_arg)#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_FSVERITY_H */ Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
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Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [PATCH 4/6] fs-verity: support reading Merkle tree with ioctl
In reply to Jaegeuk KimQuoted 6 lines · Jaegeuk Kim
Minor thought:
How about invalidating or truncating merkel tree pages?Reviewed-by Jaegeuk Kim <[email protected]>
Removing them from the page cache after the read, you mean? I'm not sure we can assume that users of this ioctl would want the pages to *not* be cached, any more than we could assume that for any regular read(). I think we should just leave the pages cached (like a regular read) and not do anything special. Like other pagecache pages, the kernel will evict the Merkle tree pages eventually if they aren't being accessed anymore and memory needs to be reclaimed.
- Eric
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Re: [PATCH 2/6] fs-verity: don't pass whole descriptor to fsverity_verify_signature()
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 10 lines · Eric Biggers
From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
Now that
fsverity_get_descriptor()validates thesig_sizefield,fsverity_verify_signature()doesn't need to do it.Just change the prototype of
fsverity_verify_signature()to take the signature directly rather than take afsverity_descriptor.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
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Eric Biggers
maintainerQuoted 59 lines · Eric Biggers
[This patchset applies to v5.11-rc3]
Add an ioctl
FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAwhich allows reading verity metadata from a file that has fs-verity enabled, including:- The Merkle tree
- Thefsverity_descriptor(not including the signature if present)
- The built-in signature, if presentThis ioctl has similar semantics to
pread(). It is passed the type of metadata to read (one of the above three), and a buffer, offset, and size. It returns the number of bytes read or an error.This ioctl doesn't make any assumption about where the metadata is stored on-disk. It does assume the metadata is in a stable format, but that's basically already the case:
- The Merkle tree and
fsverity_descriptorare defined by how fs-verity file digests are computed; see the "File digest computation" section ofDocumentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst. Technically, the way in which the levels of the tree are ordered relative to each other wasn't previously specified, but it's logical to put the root level first.- The built-in signature is the value passed to
FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY.This ioctl is useful because it allows writing a server program that takes a verity file and serves it to a client program, such that the client can do its own fs-verity compatible verification of the file. This only makes sense if the client doesn't trust the server and if the server needs to provide the storage for the client.
More concretely, there is interest in using this ability in Android to export APK files (which are protected by fs-verity) to "protected VMs". This would use Protected KVM (https://lwn.net/Articles/836693), which provides an isolated execution environment without having to trust the traditional "host". A "guest" VM can boot from a signed image and perform specific tasks in a minimum trusted environment using files that have fs-verity enabled on the host, without trusting the host or requiring that the guest has its own trusted storage.
Technically, it would be possible to duplicate the metadata and store it in separate files for serving. However, that would be less efficient and would require extra care in userspace to maintain file consistency.
In addition to the above, the ability to read the built-in signatures is useful because it allows a system that is using the in-kernel signature verification to migrate to userspace signature verification.
This patchset has been tested by new xfstests which call this new ioctl via a new subcommand for the 'fsverity' program from fsverity-utils.
Eric Biggers (6):
fs-verity: factor outfsverity_get_descriptor()
fs-verity: don't pass whole descriptor tofsverity_verify_signature()
fs-verity: addFS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATAioctl
fs-verity: support reading Merkle tree with ioctl
fs-verity: support reading descriptor with ioctl
fs-verity: support reading signature with ioctl
Quoted 12 lines
Documentation/filesystems/fsverity.rst | 76 ++++++++++ fs/ext4/ioctl.c | 7 + fs/f2fs/file.c | 11 ++ fs/verity/Makefile | 1 + fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 13 +- fs/verity/open.c | 133 +++++++++++------ fs/verity/read_metadata.c | 195 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/verity/signature.c | 20 +-- include/linux/fsverity.h | 12 ++ include/uapi/linux/fsverity.h | 14 ++ 10 files changed, 417 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/verity/read_metadata.c
All applied to fscrypt.git#fsverity for 5.12.
- Eric
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Re: [f2fs-dev] [PATCH 3/6] fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl
In reply to Eric BiggersHi Eric,
fs/f2fs/file.c static int f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg) · line 3363
Quoted 4 lines · Eric Biggers
fs/f2fs/file.c +4
-0+static int f2fs_ioc_read_verity_metadata (struct file *filp,unsigned long arg) +{ +if (!f2fs_sb_has_verity (F2FS_I_SB (file_inode (filp)))) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
One case is after we update kernel image, f2fs module may no longer support compress algorithm which current file was compressed with, to avoid triggering IO with empty compress engine (struct f2fs_compress_ops pointer):
It needs to add f2fs_is_compress_backend_ready() check condition here?
Thanks,
fs/f2fs/file.c static int f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg) · line 3366
Quoted 3 lines
fs/f2fs/file.c +3
-0+ +return fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (filp, (const void __user *)arg); +}
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Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [PATCH 3/6] fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl
Quoted 12 lines · Chao Yu
Hi Eric,
fs/f2fs/file.c static int f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg) · line 3363
Quoted 4 lines · Eric Biggers
fs/f2fs/file.c +4
-0+static int f2fs_ioc_read_verity_metadata (struct file *filp,unsigned long arg) +{ +if (!f2fs_sb_has_verity (F2FS_I_SB (file_inode (filp)))) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;One case is after we update kernel image, f2fs module may no longer support compress algorithm which current file was compressed with, to avoid triggering IO with empty compress engine (struct
f2fs_compress_opspointer):
Quoted 7 lines
It needs to add
f2fs_is_compress_backend_ready()check condition here?Thanks,
fs/f2fs/file.c static int f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg) · line 3366
Quoted 3 lines
fs/f2fs/file.c +3
-0+ +return fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (filp, (const void __user *)arg); +}
In that case it wouldn't have been possible to open the file, because f2fs_file_open() checks for it. So it's not necessary to repeat the same check in every operation on the file descriptor.
- Eric
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Chao Yu
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCH 3/6] fs-verity: add FS_IOC_READ_VERITY_METADATA ioctl
Quoted 17 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 16 lines · Chao Yu
Hi Eric,
fs/f2fs/file.c static int f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg) · line 3363
Quoted 4 lines · Eric Biggers
fs/f2fs/file.c +4
-0+static int f2fs_ioc_read_verity_metadata (struct file *filp,unsigned long arg) +{ +if (!f2fs_sb_has_verity (F2FS_I_SB (file_inode (filp)))) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;One case is after we update kernel image, f2fs module may no longer support compress algorithm which current file was compressed with, to avoid triggering IO with empty compress engine (struct
f2fs_compress_opspointer):It needs to add
f2fs_is_compress_backend_ready()check condition here?Thanks,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
fs/f2fs/file.c static int f2fs_ioc_measure_verity(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg) · line 3366
Quoted 3 lines
fs/f2fs/file.c +3
-0+ +return fsverity_ioctl_read_metadata (filp, (const void __user *)arg); +}In that case it wouldn't have been possible to open the file, because
f2fs_file_open()checks for it. So it's not necessary to repeat the same check in every operation on the file descriptor.
Oh, yes, it's safe now.
I'm thinking we need to remove the check in f2fs_file_open(), because the check will fail metadata access/update (via f{g,s}etxattr/ioctl), however original intention of that check is only to avoid syscalls to touch compressed data w/o the engine, anyway this is another topic.
The whole patchset looks fine to me, feel free to add:
Thanks,
Quoted 4 lines
- Eric
.
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