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kfence: make reporting sensitive information configurable

PATCH In review Marco Elver 2 participants 3 messages Feb 9, 2021

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Marco Elver

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 kfence: make reporting sensitive information configurable

We cannot rely on CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL to decide if we're running a "debug kernel" where we can safely show potentially sensitive information in the kernel log.

Therefore, add the option CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE to decide if we should add potentially sensitive information to KFENCE reports. The default behaviour remains unchanged.

---
 Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst | 6 +++---
 lib/Kconfig.kfence                 | 8 ++++++++
 mm/kfence/core.c                   | 2 +-
 mm/kfence/kfence.h                 | 3 +--
 mm/kfence/report.c                 | 6 +++---
 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst +3 -3
index 58a0a5fa1ddc..5280d644f826 100644
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ A typical out-of-bounds access looks like this::
 The header of the report provides a short summary of the function involved in
 the access. It is followed by more detailed information about the access and
 its origin. Note that, real kernel addresses are only shown for
-``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds.
+``CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE=y`` builds.
 
 Use-after-free accesses are reported as::
 
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ invalidly written bytes (offset from the address) are shown; in this
 representation, '.' denote untouched bytes. In the example above ``0xac`` is
 the value written to the invalid address at offset 0, and the remaining '.'
 denote that no following bytes have been touched. Note that, real values are
-only shown for ``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds; to avoid information
-disclosure for non-debug builds, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
+only shown for ``CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE=y`` builds; to avoid
+information disclosure otherwise, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
 written bytes.
 
 And finally, KFENCE may also report on invalid accesses to any protected page
lib/Kconfig.kfence +8 -0
index 78f50ccb3b45..141494a5f530 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,14 @@ config KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS
 	  pages are required; with one containing the object and two adjacent
 	  ones used as guard pages.
 
+config KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE
+	bool "Show potentially sensitive information in reports"
+	default y if DEBUG_KERNEL
+	help
+	  Show potentially sensitive information such as unhashed pointers,
+	  context bytes on memory corruptions, as well as dump registers in
+	  KFENCE reports.
+
 config KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS
 	int "Stress testing of fault handling and error reporting" if EXPERT
 	default 0
mm/kfence/core.c +1 -1
index cfe3d32ac5b7..5f7e02db5f53 100644
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ void __init kfence_init(void)
 	schedule_delayed_work(&kfence_timer, 0);
 	pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE,
 		CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS);
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE))
 		pr_cont(" at 0x%px-0x%px\n", (void *)__kfence_pool,
 			(void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE));
 	else
mm/kfence/kfence.h +1 -2
index 1accc840dbbe..48a8196b947b 100644
@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@
 
 #include "../slab.h" /* for struct kmem_cache */
 
-/* For non-debug builds, avoid leaking kernel pointers into dmesg. */
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL
+#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE
 #define PTR_FMT "%px"
 #else
 #define PTR_FMT "%p"
mm/kfence/report.c +3 -3
index 901bd7ee83d8..5e2dbabbab1d 100644
@@ -148,9 +148,9 @@ static void print_diff_canary(unsigned long address, size_t bytes_to_show,
 	for (cur = (const u8 *)address; cur < end; cur++) {
 		if (*cur == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(cur))
 			pr_cont(" .");
-		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
+		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE))
 			pr_cont(" 0x%02x", *cur);
-		else /* Do not leak kernel memory in non-debug builds. */
+		else /* Do not leak kernel memory. */
 			pr_cont(" !");
 	}
 	pr_cont(" ]");
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
 
 	/* Print report footer. */
 	pr_err("\n");
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL) && regs)
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE) && regs)
 		show_regs(regs);
 	else
 		dump_stack_print_info(KERN_ERR);
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0.478.g8a0d178c01-goog
#1 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Marco Elver

We cannot rely on CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL to decide if we're running a "debug kernel" where we can safely show potentially sensitive information in the kernel log.

Therefore, add the option CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE to decide if we should add potentially sensitive information to KFENCE reports. The default behaviour remains unchanged.

Hi,

could we drop this kconfig approach in favour of the boot option proposed here?
[1] Just do the prints with %p unconditionally and the boot option takes care of it? Also Linus mentioned dislike of controlling potential memory leak to be a config option [2]

Thanks,
Vlastimil

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
[2]
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAHk-=wgaK4cz=K-JB4p-KPXBV73m9bja2w1W1Lr3iu8+NEPk7A@mail.gmail.com/

Quoted 104 lines
---
 Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst | 6 +++---
 lib/Kconfig.kfence                 | 8 ++++++++
 mm/kfence/core.c                   | 2 +-
 mm/kfence/kfence.h                 | 3 +--
 mm/kfence/report.c                 | 6 +++---
 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Documentation/dev-tools/kfence.rst +3 -3
index 58a0a5fa1ddc..5280d644f826 100644
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ A typical out-of-bounds access looks like this::
 The header of the report provides a short summary of the function involved in
 the access. It is followed by more detailed information about the access and
 its origin. Note that, real kernel addresses are only shown for
-``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds.
+``CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE=y`` builds.
 
 Use-after-free accesses are reported as::
 
@@ -184,8 +184,8 @@ invalidly written bytes (offset from the address) are shown; in this
 representation, '.' denote untouched bytes. In the example above ``0xac`` is
 the value written to the invalid address at offset 0, and the remaining '.'
 denote that no following bytes have been touched. Note that, real values are
-only shown for ``CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y`` builds; to avoid information
-disclosure for non-debug builds, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
+only shown for ``CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE=y`` builds; to avoid
+information disclosure otherwise, '!' is used instead to denote invalidly
 written bytes.
 
 And finally, KFENCE may also report on invalid accesses to any protected page
lib/Kconfig.kfence +8 -0
index 78f50ccb3b45..141494a5f530 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,14 @@ config KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS
 	  pages are required; with one containing the object and two adjacent
 	  ones used as guard pages.
 
+config KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE
+	bool "Show potentially sensitive information in reports"
+	default y if DEBUG_KERNEL
+	help
+	  Show potentially sensitive information such as unhashed pointers,
+	  context bytes on memory corruptions, as well as dump registers in
+	  KFENCE reports.
+
 config KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS
 	int "Stress testing of fault handling and error reporting" if EXPERT
 	default 0
mm/kfence/core.c +1 -1
index cfe3d32ac5b7..5f7e02db5f53 100644
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ void __init kfence_init(void)
 	schedule_delayed_work(&kfence_timer, 0);
 	pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE,
 		CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS);
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE))
 		pr_cont(" at 0x%px-0x%px\n", (void *)__kfence_pool,
 			(void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE));
 	else
mm/kfence/kfence.h +1 -2
index 1accc840dbbe..48a8196b947b 100644
@@ -16,8 +16,7 @@
 
 #include "../slab.h" /* for struct kmem_cache */
 
-/* For non-debug builds, avoid leaking kernel pointers into dmesg. */
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL
+#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE
 #define PTR_FMT "%px"
 #else
 #define PTR_FMT "%p"
mm/kfence/report.c +3 -3
index 901bd7ee83d8..5e2dbabbab1d 100644
@@ -148,9 +148,9 @@ static void print_diff_canary(unsigned long address, size_t bytes_to_show,
 	for (cur = (const u8 *)address; cur < end; cur++) {
 		if (*cur == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(cur))
 			pr_cont(" .");
-		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL))
+		else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE))
 			pr_cont(" 0x%02x", *cur);
-		else /* Do not leak kernel memory in non-debug builds. */
+		else /* Do not leak kernel memory. */
 			pr_cont(" !");
 	}
 	pr_cont(" ]");
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
 
 	/* Print report footer. */
 	pr_err("\n");
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL) && regs)
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE) && regs)
 		show_regs(regs);
 	else
 		dump_stack_print_info(KERN_ERR);
author maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 18 lines · Vlastimil Babka
Quoted 9 lines · Marco Elver

We cannot rely on CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL to decide if we're running a "debug kernel" where we can safely show potentially sensitive information in the kernel log.

Therefore, add the option CONFIG_KFENCE_REPORT_SENSITIVE to decide if we should add potentially sensitive information to KFENCE reports. The default behaviour remains unchanged.

Hi,

could we drop this kconfig approach in favour of the boot option proposed here?
[1] Just do the prints with %p unconditionally and the boot option takes care of it? Also Linus mentioned dislike of controlling potential memory leak to be a config option [2]

Quoted 6 lines

Thanks,
Vlastimil

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/[email protected]/
[2]
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAHk-=wgaK4cz=K-JB4p-KPXBV73m9bja2w1W1Lr3iu8+NEPk7A@mail.gmail.com/

Is the patch at [1] already in -next? If not I'll wait until it is, because otherwise KFENCE reports will be pretty useless.

I think it is reasonable to switch to '%p' once we have the boot option, but doing so while we do not yet have the option doesn't work for us. We can potentially drop this patch if the boot option patch will make it into mainline soon. Otherwise my preference would be to take this patch and revert it with the switch to '%p' when the boot option has landed.

Thanks,
-- Marco