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IMA: Add test for selinux measurement

PATCH In review Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2 participants 6 messages Feb 22, 2021 – Mar 16, 2021

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 IMA: Add test for selinux measurement

New functionality has been added in IMA to measure data that is critical to the integrity of the system. SELinux uses this feature to measure the hash of the SELinux policy loaded in kernel memory, and the current state of various SELinux configuration. This new functionality needs test automation in LTP.

Add test cases which verify that the IMA subsystem correctly measures the data provided by SELinux.

---
This patch is based on commit c7c4cd5e7f3b ("tst_security.sh: Add SELinux helpers")
in https://github.com/pevik/ltp/commits/ima/selinux.v2.draft
in branch ima/selinux.v2.draft.

 runtest/ima                                   |   1 +
 .../kernel/security/integrity/ima/README.md   |  19 ++
 .../security/integrity/ima/datafiles/Makefile |   2 +-
 .../ima/datafiles/ima_selinux/Makefile        |  11 ++
 .../ima/datafiles/ima_selinux/selinux.policy  |   1 +
 .../integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh        | 180 ++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 213 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/ima_selinux/Makefile
 create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/ima_selinux/selinux.policy
 create mode 100755 testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh
runtest/ima +1 -0
index 5f4b4a7a1..29caa034a 100644
@@ -5,4 +5,5 @@ ima_tpm ima_tpm.sh
 ima_violations ima_violations.sh
 ima_keys ima_keys.sh
 ima_kexec ima_kexec.sh
+ima_selinux ima_selinux.sh
 evm_overlay evm_overlay.sh
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/README.md +19 -0
index 68d046678..8f2249767 100644
@@ -37,6 +37,25 @@ see example in `kexec.policy`.
 The test attempts to kexec the existing running kernel image.
 To kexec a different kernel image export `IMA_KEXEC_IMAGE=<pathname>`.
 
+### IMA SELinux test
+
+To enable IMA to measure SELinux state and policy, `ima_selinux.sh`
+requires a readable IMA policy, as well as a loaded measure policy with
+`measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux`,
+see example in `selinux.policy`.
+
+As well as what's required for the IMA tests, SELinux tests require reading
+the IMA policy allowed in the kernel configuration:
+```
+CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY=y
+```
+
+The following kernel configuration is also required. It enables compiling
+the Linux Security Module (LSM) namely SELinux.
+```
+CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y
+```
+
 ## EVM tests
 
 `evm_overlay.sh` requires a builtin IMA appraise tcb policy (e.g. `ima_policy=appraise_tcb`
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/Makefile +1 -1
index 47a470416..280175b17 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,6 @@ top_srcdir	?= ../../../../../..
 
 include	$(top_srcdir)/include/mk/env_pre.mk
 
-SUBDIRS	:= ima_kexec ima_keys ima_policy
+SUBDIRS	:= ima_kexec ima_keys ima_policy ima_selinux
 
 include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/generic_trunk_target.mk
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/ima_selinux/Makefile new file +11 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..35088fdbc
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+# Copyright (c) Linux Test Project, 2021
+
+top_srcdir	?= ../../../../../../..
+
+include	$(top_srcdir)/include/mk/env_pre.mk
+
+INSTALL_DIR		:= testcases/data/ima_selinux
+INSTALL_TARGETS	:= *.policy
+
+include $(top_srcdir)/include/mk/generic_leaf_target.mk
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/datafiles/ima_selinux/selinux.policy new file +1 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7cbe9352d
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh new file +180 -0

180 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Reviewed-by on v1 1/1
#1 lore raw

Hi Lakshmi,

Quoted 1 line

+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh

...

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +6 -0
+validate_policy_capabilities()
+{
+	local measured_cap measured_value expected_value
+	local result=1
+	local inx=7
+

Review

Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+	# Policy capabilities flags start from "network_peer_controls"
+	# in the measured SELinux state at offset 7 for 'awk'
+	while [ $inx -lt 20 ]; do
+		measured_cap=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
+		inx=$(( $inx + 1 ))
+
+		measured_value=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
+		expected_value=$(cat "$SELINUX_DIR/policy_capabilities/$measured_cap")
+		if [ "$measured_value" != "$expected_value" ];then
+			tst_res TWARN "$measured_cap: expected: $expected_value, got: $digest"

We rarely use TWARN in the tests, only when the error is not related to the test result. Otherwise we use TFAIL.

The rest LGTM.

I did few formatting and style changes:
https://github.com/pevik/ltp/commits/ima/selinux.v2.fixes
(branch ima/selinux.v2.fixes), see diff below.

As we discuss, I'm going tom merge test when patchset is merged in maintainers tree, please ping me. And ideally we should mention kernel commit hash as a comment in the test.

Thanks a lot!

Kind regards,
Petr

kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh +11 -16
index e5060a5e3..ed758631b 100755
@@ -13,16 +13,14 @@ TST_SETUP="setup"
 . ima_setup.sh
 
 FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA='func=CRITICAL_DATA'
-REQUIRED_POLICY="^measure.*($FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA)"
+REQUIRED_POLICY="^measure.*$FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA"
 
 setup()
 {
-	SELINUX_DIR=$(tst_get_selinux_dir)
-	if [ -z "$SELINUX_DIR" ]; then
-		tst_brk TCONF "SELinux is not enabled"
-		return
-	fi
+	tst_require_selinux_enabled
 	require_ima_policy_content "$REQUIRED_POLICY" '-E' > $TST_TMPDIR/policy.txt
+
+	SELINUX_DIR=$(tst_get_selinux_dir)
 }
 
 # Format of the measured SELinux state data.
@@ -41,16 +39,16 @@ validate_policy_capabilities()
 	# in the measured SELinux state at offset 7 for 'awk'
 	while [ $inx -lt 20 ]; do
 		measured_cap=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
-		inx=$(( $inx + 1 ))
+		inx=$(($inx + 1))
 
 		measured_value=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
 		expected_value=$(cat "$SELINUX_DIR/policy_capabilities/$measured_cap")
-		if [ "$measured_value" != "$expected_value" ];then
+		if [ "$measured_value" != "$expected_value" ]; then
 			tst_res TWARN "$measured_cap: expected: $expected_value, got: $digest"
 			result=0
 		fi
 
-		inx=$(( $inx + 1 ))
+		inx=$(($inx + 1))
 	done
 
 	return $result
@@ -109,7 +107,6 @@ test2()
 	local initialized_value
 	local enforced_value expected_enforced_value
 	local checkreqprot_value expected_checkreqprot_value
-	local result
 
 	tst_res TINFO "verifying SELinux state measurement"
 
@@ -149,27 +146,25 @@ test2()
 	measured_data=$(cat $state_file)
 	enforced_value=$(echo $measured_data | awk -F'[=;]' '{print $4}')
 	expected_enforced_value=$(cat $SELINUX_DIR/enforce)
-	if [ "$expected_enforced_value" != "$enforced_value" ];then
+	if [ "$expected_enforced_value" != "$enforced_value" ]; then
 		tst_res TFAIL "enforce: expected: $expected_enforced_value, got: $enforced_value"
 		return
 	fi
 
 	checkreqprot_value=$(echo $measured_data | awk -F'[=;]' '{print $6}')
 	expected_checkreqprot_value=$(cat $SELINUX_DIR/checkreqprot)
-	if [ "$expected_checkreqprot_value" != "$checkreqprot_value" ];then
+	if [ "$expected_checkreqprot_value" != "$checkreqprot_value" ]; then
 		tst_res TFAIL "checkreqprot: expected: $expected_checkreqprot_value, got: $checkreqprot_value"
 		return
 	fi
 
 	initialized_value=$(echo $measured_data | awk -F'[=;]' '{print $2}')
-	if [ "$initialized_value" != "1" ];then
+	if [ "$initialized_value" != "1" ]; then
 		tst_res TFAIL "initialized: expected 1, got: $initialized_value"
 		return
 	fi
 
-	validate_policy_capabilities $measured_data
-	result=$?
-	if [ $result = 0 ]; then
+	if validate_policy_capabilities $measured_data; then
 		tst_res TFAIL "policy capabilities did not match"
 		return
 	fi
#2 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · Petr Vorel
Quoted 2 lines

+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh

...

Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+validate_policy_capabilities()
+{
+	local measured_cap measured_value expected_value
+	local result=1
+	local inx=7
+
+	# Policy capabilities flags start from "network_peer_controls"
+	# in the measured SELinux state at offset 7 for 'awk'
+	while [ $inx -lt 20 ]; do
+		measured_cap=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
Quoted 8 lines

Review

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +6 -0
+		inx=$(( $inx + 1 ))
+
+		measured_value=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
+		expected_value=$(cat "$SELINUX_DIR/policy_capabilities/$measured_cap")
+		if [ "$measured_value" != "$expected_value" ];then
+			tst_res TWARN "$measured_cap: expected: $expected_value, got: $digest"

We rarely use TWARN in the tests, only when the error is not related to the test result. Otherwise we use TFAIL.

ok - I will change it to TFAIL.

Quoted 7 lines

The rest LGTM.

I did few formatting and style changes:
https://github.com/pevik/ltp/commits/ima/selinux.v2.fixes
(branch ima/selinux.v2.fixes), see diff below.

The changes look. Thanks Petr.
I do have one comment - please see below.

Quoted 4 lines

As we discuss, I'm going tom merge test when patchset is merged in maintainers tree, please ping me. And ideally we should mention kernel commit hash as a comment in the test.

Will do. Thank you.

Quoted 15 lines

Thanks a lot!

Kind regards,
Petr

kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh +0 -1
index e5060a5e3..ed758631b 100755
@@ -13,16 +13,14 @@ TST_SETUP="setup"
  . ima_setup.sh
 
  FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA='func=CRITICAL_DATA'
-REQUIRED_POLICY="^measure.*($FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA)"

kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh TST_SETUP="setup" · line 20

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh +2 -5
+REQUIRED_POLICY="^measure.*$FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA"
 
  setup()
  {
-	SELINUX_DIR=$(tst_get_selinux_dir)
-	if [ -z "$SELINUX_DIR" ]; then
-		tst_brk TCONF "SELinux is not enabled"
-		return
-	fi
+	tst_require_selinux_enabled

Please correct me if I have misunderstood this one:

tst_require_selinux_enabled is checking if SELinux is enabled in "enforce" mode. Would this check fail if SELinux is enabled in "permissive" mode?

For running the test, we just need SELinux to be enabled. I verify that by checking for the presence of SELINUX_DIR.

thanks,
-lakshmi

Quoted 67 lines
kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh +9 -10
  	require_ima_policy_content "$REQUIRED_POLICY" '-E' > $TST_TMPDIR/policy.txt
+
+	SELINUX_DIR=$(tst_get_selinux_dir)
  }
 
  # Format of the measured SELinux state data.
@@ -41,16 +39,16 @@ validate_policy_capabilities()
  	# in the measured SELinux state at offset 7 for 'awk'
  	while [ $inx -lt 20 ]; do
  		measured_cap=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
-		inx=$(( $inx + 1 ))
+		inx=$(($inx + 1))
 
  		measured_value=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
  		expected_value=$(cat "$SELINUX_DIR/policy_capabilities/$measured_cap")
-		if [ "$measured_value" != "$expected_value" ];then
+		if [ "$measured_value" != "$expected_value" ]; then
  			tst_res TWARN "$measured_cap: expected: $expected_value, got: $digest"
  			result=0
  		fi
 
-		inx=$(( $inx + 1 ))
+		inx=$(($inx + 1))
  	done
 
  	return $result
@@ -109,7 +107,6 @@ test2()
  	local initialized_value
  	local enforced_value expected_enforced_value
  	local checkreqprot_value expected_checkreqprot_value
-	local result
 
  	tst_res TINFO "verifying SELinux state measurement"
 
@@ -149,27 +146,25 @@ test2()
  	measured_data=$(cat $state_file)
  	enforced_value=$(echo $measured_data | awk -F'[=;]' '{print $4}')
  	expected_enforced_value=$(cat $SELINUX_DIR/enforce)
-	if [ "$expected_enforced_value" != "$enforced_value" ];then
+	if [ "$expected_enforced_value" != "$enforced_value" ]; then
  		tst_res TFAIL "enforce: expected: $expected_enforced_value, got: $enforced_value"
  		return
  	fi
 
  	checkreqprot_value=$(echo $measured_data | awk -F'[=;]' '{print $6}')
  	expected_checkreqprot_value=$(cat $SELINUX_DIR/checkreqprot)
-	if [ "$expected_checkreqprot_value" != "$checkreqprot_value" ];then
+	if [ "$expected_checkreqprot_value" != "$checkreqprot_value" ]; then
  		tst_res TFAIL "checkreqprot: expected: $expected_checkreqprot_value, got: $checkreqprot_value"
  		return
  	fi
 
  	initialized_value=$(echo $measured_data | awk -F'[=;]' '{print $2}')
-	if [ "$initialized_value" != "1" ];then
+	if [ "$initialized_value" != "1" ]; then
  		tst_res TFAIL "initialized: expected 1, got: $initialized_value"
  		return
  	fi
 
-	validate_policy_capabilities $measured_data
-	result=$?
-	if [ $result = 0 ]; then
+	if validate_policy_capabilities $measured_data; then
  		tst_res TFAIL "policy capabilities did not match"
  		return
  	fi
#3 lore raw
Quoted 23 lines · Petr Vorel
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 3 lines

+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh

...

Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+validate_policy_capabilities()
+{
+	local measured_cap measured_value expected_value
+	local result=1
+	local inx=7
+
+	# Policy capabilities flags start from "network_peer_controls"
+	# in the measured SELinux state at offset 7 for 'awk'
+	while [ $inx -lt 20 ]; do
+		measured_cap=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
Quoted 8 lines

Review

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +6 -0
+		inx=$(( $inx + 1 ))
+
+		measured_value=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
+		expected_value=$(cat "$SELINUX_DIR/policy_capabilities/$measured_cap")
+		if [ "$measured_value" != "$expected_value" ];then
+			tst_res TWARN "$measured_cap: expected: $expected_value, got: $digest"

We rarely use TWARN in the tests, only when the error is not related to the test result. Otherwise we use TFAIL.

Quoted 1 line

ok - I will change it to TFAIL.

Thanks!
But I've noticed that this error is handled twice, first in validate_policy_capabilities() as TWARN (or TFAIL) and then in test2(). Let's use TPASS/TFAIL in validate_policy_capabilities():

validate_policy_capabilities()

{
	local measured_cap measured_value expected_value
	local inx=7

	# Policy capabilities flags start from "network_peer_controls"
	# in the measured SELinux state at offset 7 for 'awk'
	while [ $inx -lt 20 ]; do
		measured_cap=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
		inx=$(($inx + 1))

		measured_value=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
		expected_value=$(cat "$SELINUX_DIR/policy_capabilities/$measured_cap")
		if [ "$measured_value" != "$expected_value" ]; then
			tst_res TFAIL "$measured_cap: expected: $expected_value, got: $digest"
			return
		fi

		inx=$(($inx + 1))
	done

	tst_res TPASS "SELinux state measured correctly"
}

test2()

{
	...
	validate_policy_capabilities $measured_data
}

...

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines

As we discuss, I'm going tom merge test when patchset is merged in maintainers tree, please ping me. And ideally we should mention kernel commit hash as a comment in the test.

Will do. Thank you.

Thanks!

...

Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 4 lines

+++ testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh

kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh +0 -0
@@ -13,16 +13,14 @@ TST_SETUP="setup"
  . ima_setup.sh
  FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA='func=CRITICAL_DATA'

kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh TST_SETUP="setup" · line 18

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh +2 -6
-REQUIRED_POLICY="^measure.*($FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA)"
+REQUIRED_POLICY="^measure.*$FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA"
  setup()
  {
-	SELINUX_DIR=$(tst_get_selinux_dir)
-	if [ -z "$SELINUX_DIR" ]; then
-		tst_brk TCONF "SELinux is not enabled"
-		return
-	fi
+	tst_require_selinux_enabled

Please correct me if I have misunderstood this one:

Quoted 5 lines

tst_require_selinux_enabled is checking if SELinux is enabled in "enforce" mode. Would this check fail if SELinux is enabled in "permissive" mode?

For running the test, we just need SELinux to be enabled. I verify that by checking for the presence of SELINUX_DIR.

Good catch. Your original version is correct (put it back into ima/selinux.v2.fixes). I didn't put a helper for it, because you need $SELINUX_DIR anyway. Thus removed tst_require_selinux_enabled() as not needed.

I renamed tst_selinux_enabled() to tst_selinux_enforced() to make the purpose clearer (commit 82b598ea1 IMA: Add test for selinux measurement).

I've updated branch ima/selinux.v2.fixes with all mentioned changes
https://github.com/pevik/ltp/commits/ima/selinux.v2.fixes

Kind regards,
Petr

Quoted 2 lines

thanks,
-lakshmi

#4 lore raw
Quoted 23 lines · Petr Vorel
Quoted 23 lines · Petr Vorel
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 3 lines

+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh

...

Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +6 -0
+validate_policy_capabilities()
+{
+	local measured_cap measured_value expected_value
+	local result=1
+	local inx=7
+

Review

Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10 -0
+	# Policy capabilities flags start from "network_peer_controls"
+	# in the measured SELinux state at offset 7 for 'awk'
+	while [ $inx -lt 20 ]; do
+		measured_cap=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
+		inx=$(( $inx + 1 ))
+
+		measured_value=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
+		expected_value=$(cat "$SELINUX_DIR/policy_capabilities/$measured_cap")
+		if [ "$measured_value" != "$expected_value" ];then
+			tst_res TWARN "$measured_cap: expected: $expected_value, got: $digest"

We rarely use TWARN in the tests, only when the error is not related to the test result. Otherwise we use TFAIL.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line

ok - I will change it to TFAIL.

Thanks!
But I've noticed that this error is handled twice, first in validate_policy_capabilities() as TWARN (or TFAIL) and then in test2(). Let's use TPASS/TFAIL in validate_policy_capabilities():

Sure - will make that change.

Quoted 58 lines

validate_policy_capabilities()

{
	local measured_cap measured_value expected_value
	local inx=7

	# Policy capabilities flags start from "network_peer_controls"
	# in the measured SELinux state at offset 7 for 'awk'
	while [ $inx -lt 20 ]; do
		measured_cap=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
		inx=$(($inx + 1))

		measured_value=$(echo $1 | awk -F'[=;]' -v inx="$inx" '{print $inx}')
		expected_value=$(cat "$SELINUX_DIR/policy_capabilities/$measured_cap")
		if [ "$measured_value" != "$expected_value" ]; then
			tst_res TFAIL "$measured_cap: expected: $expected_value, got: $digest"
			return
		fi

		inx=$(($inx + 1))
	done

	tst_res TPASS "SELinux state measured correctly"
}

test2()

{
	...
	validate_policy_capabilities $measured_data
}

...

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines

As we discuss, I'm going tom merge test when patchset is merged in maintainers tree, please ping me. And ideally we should mention kernel commit hash as a comment in the test.

Will do. Thank you.

Thanks!

...

Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 4 lines

+++ testcases/kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh

kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh +0 -0
@@ -13,16 +13,14 @@ TST_SETUP="setup"
   . ima_setup.sh
   FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA='func=CRITICAL_DATA'

kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh TST_SETUP="setup" · line 18

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/security/integrity/ima/tests/ima_selinux.sh +2 -6
-REQUIRED_POLICY="^measure.*($FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA)"
+REQUIRED_POLICY="^measure.*$FUNC_CRITICAL_DATA"
   setup()
   {
-	SELINUX_DIR=$(tst_get_selinux_dir)
-	if [ -z "$SELINUX_DIR" ]; then
-		tst_brk TCONF "SELinux is not enabled"
-		return
-	fi
+	tst_require_selinux_enabled

Please correct me if I have misunderstood this one:

tst_require_selinux_enabled is checking if SELinux is enabled in "enforce" mode. Would this check fail if SELinux is enabled in "permissive" mode?

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

For running the test, we just need SELinux to be enabled. I verify that by checking for the presence of SELINUX_DIR.

Good catch. Your original version is correct (put it back into ima/selinux.v2.fixes). I didn't put a helper for it, because you need $SELINUX_DIR anyway. Thus removed tst_require_selinux_enabled() as not needed.

Thanks

Quoted 7 lines

I renamed tst_selinux_enabled() to tst_selinux_enforced() to make the purpose clearer (commit 82b598ea1 IMA: Add test for selinux measurement).

I've updated branch ima/selinux.v2.fixes with all mentioned changes
https://github.com/pevik/ltp/commits/ima/selinux.v2.fixes

Thanks again. I'll make my changes in this branch and post the patches later this week.

-lakshmi

#5 lore raw
In reply to Lakshmi Ramasubramanian

Hi Lakshmi, Mimi,

Quoted 8 lines

New functionality has been added in IMA to measure data that is critical to the integrity of the system. SELinux uses this feature to measure the hash of the SELinux policy loaded in kernel memory, and the current state of various SELinux configuration. This new functionality needs test automation in LTP.

Add test cases which verify that the IMA subsystem correctly measures the data provided by SELinux.

I finally merged this patchset, noted both kernel commits. Thanks for this test!

Kind regards,
Petr

* fdd1ffe8a812 ("selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook") (v5.12-rc1-dontuse)
* 2554a48f4437 ("selinux: measure state and policy capabilities") (to be in v5.13