Enable CET support for guest
v7 cover Enable CET support for guest
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) provides protection against Return/Jump-Oriented Programming (ROP/JOP). It includes two features:
Shadow Stack(SHSTK) and Indirect Branch Tracking(IBT).
This patch series is to enable CET related CPUID report, XSAVES/XRSTORS support and MSR access etc. for guest.
Change in v7:
- Reverted part of XSAVE feature-word naming change per review feedback.
- Fixed an issue blocking SHSTK and IBT used as two independent features if OS just enables either of them.
- Other minor changes during testing and review.
- Rebased to 5.2.0 base.
CET KVM patches:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
CET kernel patches:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Yang Weijiang (6):
target/i386: Change XSAVE related feature-word names target/i386: Enable XSS feature enumeration for CPUID target/i386: Enable CET components support for XSAVES target/i386: Add user-space MSR access interface for CET target/i386: Add CET state support for guest migration target/i386: Advise CET bits in CPU/MSR feature words
target/i386/cpu.c | 113 +++++++++++++++++++++++------ target/i386/cpu.h | 55 ++++++++++++++- target/i386/kvm.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/machine.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 379 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v7 1/6 target/i386: Change XSAVE related feature-word names
Rename XSAVE related feature-words for introducing XSAVES related feature-words.
--- target/i386/cpu.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ target/i386/cpu.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
target/i386/cpu.c +12 -12
@@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = { .cpuid = { .eax = 6, .reg = R_EAX, }, .tcg_features = TCG_6_EAX_FEATURES, }, - [FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_LO] = { + [FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO] = { .type = CPUID_FEATURE_WORD, .cpuid = { .eax = 0xD,
@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = {XSTATE_OPMASK_MASK | XSTATE_ZMM_Hi256_MASK | XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_MASK | XSTATE_PKRU_MASK, }, - [FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI] = { + [FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI] = { .type = CPUID_FEATURE_WORD, .cpuid = { .eax = 0xD,
@@ -1491,8 +1491,8 @@ static inline bool accel_uses_host_cpuid(void)static inline uint64_t x86_cpu_xsave_components (X86CPU *cpu) { -return ((uint64_t )cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI ]) <<32 | - cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_LO ]; +return ((uint64_t )cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ]) <<32 | + cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ]; }const char *get_register_name_32 (unsigned int reg)
@@ -4663,8 +4663,8 @@ static const char *x86_cpu_feature_name(FeatureWord w, int bitnr)/* XSAVE components are automatically enabled by other features, * so return the original feature name instead */ -if (w ==FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_LO || w ==FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI ) { -int comp = (w ==FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI ) ? bitnr +32 : bitnr; +if (w ==FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO || w ==FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ) { +int comp = (w ==FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ) ? bitnr +32 : bitnr;if (comp <ARRAY_SIZE (x86_ext_save_areas) && x86_ext_save_areas[comp].bits) {
@@ -5717,8 +5717,8 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count,if (count ==0 ) { *ecx =xsave_area_size (x86_cpu_xsave_components (cpu)); - *eax = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_LO ]; - *edx = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI ]; + *eax = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ]; + *edx = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ];/* * The initial value of xcr0 and ebx == 0, On host without kvm * commit 412a3c41(e.g., CentOS 6), the ebx's value always == 0
@@ -6282,8 +6282,8 @@ static void x86_cpu_enable_xsave_components(X86CPU *cpu)uint64_t mask;if (!(env->features[FEAT_1_ECX ] &CPUID_EXT_XSAVE )) { - env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_LO ] =0 ; - env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI ] =0 ; + env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ] =0 ; + env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ] =0 ;return ; }
@@ -6295,8 +6295,8 @@ static void x86_cpu_enable_xsave_components(X86CPU *cpu) } } - env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_LO ] = mask; - env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI ] = mask >>32 ; + env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ] = mask; + env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ] = mask >>32 ; }/***** Steps involved on loading and filtering CPUID data
target/i386/cpu.h +2 -2
@@ -527,8 +527,8 @@ typedef enum FeatureWord {FEAT_SVM ,/* CPUID[8000_000A].EDX */ FEAT_XSAVE ,/* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=1].EAX */ FEAT_6_EAX ,/* CPUID[6].EAX */ -FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_LO ,/* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EAX */ -FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI ,/* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EDX */ +FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ,/* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EAX */ +FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ,/* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EDX */ FEAT_ARCH_CAPABILITIES ,FEAT_CORE_CAPABILITY , FEAT_PERF_CAPABILITIES,
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v7 2/6 target/i386: Enable XSS feature enumeration for CPUID
In reply to Yang WeijiangCurrently, CPUID.(EAX=0DH,ECX=01H) doesn't enumerate features in XSS properly, add the support here. XCR0 bits indicate user-mode XSAVE components, and XSS bits indicate supervisor-mode XSAVE components.
--- target/i386/cpu.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- target/i386/cpu.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
target/i386/cpu.c +43 -5
@@ -1058,6 +1058,24 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = { }, .tcg_features = TCG_XSAVE_FEATURES, }, + [FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO] = { + .type = CPUID_FEATURE_WORD, + .cpuid = { + .eax = 0xD, + .needs_ecx = true, + .ecx = 1, + .reg = R_ECX, + }, + }, + [FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI] = { + .type = CPUID_FEATURE_WORD, + .cpuid = { + .eax = 0xD, + .needs_ecx = true, + .ecx = 1, + .reg =R_EDX + }, + }, [FEAT_6_EAX] = { .type = CPUID_FEATURE_WORD, .feat_names = {
@@ -1478,6 +1496,9 @@ static uint32_t xsave_area_size(uint64_t mask)for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (x86_ext_save_areas); i++) {const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[i];if ((mask >> i) &1 ) { +if (i >=2 && !esa->offset) { +continue ; + } ret =MAX (ret, esa->offset + esa->size); } }
@@ -1489,12 +1510,18 @@ static inline bool accel_uses_host_cpuid(void)return kvm_enabled () ||hvf_enabled (); } -static inline uint64_t x86_cpu_xsave_components (X86CPU *cpu) +static inline uint64_t x86_cpu_xsave_xcr0_components (X86CPU *cpu) {return ((uint64_t )cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ]) <<32 | cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ]; } +static inline uint64_t x86_cpu_xsave_xss_components (X86CPU *cpu) +{ +return ((uint64_t )cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI ]) <<32 | + cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO ]; +} +const char *get_register_name_32 (unsigned int reg) {if (reg >=CPU_NB_REGS32 ) {
@@ -5716,7 +5743,7 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, }if (count ==0 ) { - *ecx =xsave_area_size (x86_cpu_xsave_components (cpu)); + *ecx =xsave_area_size (x86_cpu_xsave_xcr0_components (cpu)); *eax = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ]; *edx = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ];/*
@@ -5728,11 +5755,17 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, *ebx =kvm_enabled () ? *ecx :xsave_area_size (env->xcr0); }else if (count ==1 ) { *eax = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE ]; + *ecx = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO ]; + *edx = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI ]; }else if (count <ARRAY_SIZE (x86_ext_save_areas)) { -if ((x86_cpu_xsave_components (cpu) >> count) &1 ) { -const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[count]; +const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[count]; +if ((x86_cpu_xsave_xcr0_components (cpu) >> count) &1 ) { *eax = esa->size; *ebx = esa->offset; + }else if ((x86_cpu_xsave_xss_components (cpu) >> count) &1 ) { + *eax = esa->size; + *ebx =0 ; + *ecx =1 ; } }break ;
@@ -6059,6 +6092,9 @@ static void x86_cpu_reset(DeviceState *dev) }for (i =2 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (x86_ext_save_areas); i++) {const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[i]; +if (!esa->offset) { +continue ; + }if (env->features[esa->feature] & esa->bits) { xcr0 |=1ull << i; }
@@ -6295,8 +6331,10 @@ static void x86_cpu_enable_xsave_components(X86CPU *cpu) } } - env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ] = mask; + env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ] = mask &CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK ; env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ] = mask >>32 ; + env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO ] = mask &CPUID_XSTATE_XSS_MASK ; + env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI ] = mask >>32 ; }/***** Steps involved on loading and filtering CPUID data
target/i386/cpu.h +12 -0
@@ -504,6 +504,16 @@ typedef enum X86Seg {#define XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_MASK (1ULL << XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_BIT)#define XSTATE_PKRU_MASK (1ULL << XSTATE_PKRU_BIT) +/* CPUID feature bits available in XCR0 */ +#define CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK (XSTATE_FP_MASK | XSTATE_SSE_MASK | \ + XSTATE_YMM_MASK | XSTATE_BNDREGS_MASK | \ + XSTATE_BNDCSR_MASK | XSTATE_OPMASK_MASK | \ + XSTATE_ZMM_Hi256_MASK | \ + XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_MASK | XSTATE_PKRU_MASK) + +/* CPUID feature bits available in XSS */ +#define CPUID_XSTATE_XSS_MASK 0 +/* CPUID feature words */ typedef enum FeatureWord { FEAT_1_EDX, /* CPUID[1].EDX */
@@ -541,6 +551,8 @@ typedef enum FeatureWord {FEAT_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAPS ,FEAT_VMX_BASIC ,FEAT_VMX_VMFUNC , +FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO ,/* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=1].ECX */ +FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI ,/* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=1].EDX */ FEATURE_WORDS , } FeatureWord;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH v7 2/6] target/i386: Enable XSS feature enumeration for CPUID
Quoted 40 lines · Yang Weijiang
Currently, CPUID.(EAX=0DH,ECX=01H) doesn't enumerate features in XSS properly, add the support here. XCR0 bits indicate user-mode XSAVE components, and XSS bits indicate supervisor-mode XSAVE components.
Signed-off-by Yang Weijiang <[email protected]>--- target/i386/cpu.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- target/i386/cpu.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)target/i386/cpu.c +18
-0@@ -1058,6 +1058,24 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = { }, .tcg_features = TCG_XSAVE_FEATURES, }, + [FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO] = { + .type = CPUID_FEATURE_WORD, + .cpuid = { + .eax = 0xD, + .needs_ecx = true, + .ecx = 1, + .reg = R_ECX, + }, + }, + [FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI] = { + .type = CPUID_FEATURE_WORD, + .cpuid = { + .eax = 0xD, + .needs_ecx = true, + .ecx = 1, + .reg =R_EDX + }, + }, [FEAT_6_EAX] = { .type = CPUID_FEATURE_WORD, .feat_names = {
target/i386/cpu.c static uint32_t xsave_area_size(uint64_t mask) · line 1499
Quoted 4 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +1
-0@@ -1478,6 +1496,9 @@ static uint32_t xsave_area_size(uint64_t mask)for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (x86_ext_save_areas); i++) {const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[i];if ((mask >> i) &1 ) { +if (i >=2 && !esa->offset) {
Maybe a few comments at the definition of ExtSaveArea to explain that offset can now be zero (and what it means when it's zero) would be helpful. I took a while to understand why this is safe.
Would it be valid to say "ExtSaveArea.offset has a valid offset only if the component is in CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK"? If so, can't this check be simply replaced with:
if ((1 << i) & CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK)
?
Or maybe this function should just contain a:
assert(!(mask & CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK));
at the beginning?
Quoted 35 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +10
-2+continue ; + } ret =MAX (ret, esa->offset + esa->size); } }@@ -1489,12 +1510,18 @@ static inline bool accel_uses_host_cpuid(void)return kvm_enabled () ||hvf_enabled (); } -static inline uint64_t x86_cpu_xsave_components (X86CPU *cpu) +static inline uint64_t x86_cpu_xsave_xcr0_components (X86CPU *cpu) {return ((uint64_t )cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ]) <<32 | cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ]; } +static inline uint64_t x86_cpu_xsave_xss_components (X86CPU *cpu) +{ +return ((uint64_t )cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI ]) <<32 | + cpu->env.features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO ]; +} +const char *get_register_name_32 (unsigned int reg) {if (reg >=CPU_NB_REGS32 ) {@@ -5716,7 +5743,7 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, }if (count ==0 ) { - *ecx =xsave_area_size (x86_cpu_xsave_components (cpu)); + *ecx =xsave_area_size (x86_cpu_xsave_xcr0_components (cpu)); *eax = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ]; *edx = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ];/*
target/i386/cpu.c void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, · line 5759
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +2
-0@@ -5728,11 +5755,17 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, *ebx =kvm_enabled () ? *ecx :xsave_area_size (env->xcr0); }else if (count ==1 ) { *eax = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE ]; + *ecx = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO ]; + *edx = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI ];
What about EBX? It is documented as "The size in bytes of the XSAVE area containing all states enabled by XCRO | IA32_XSS".
The Intel SDM is not clear, but I assume this would be necessarily the size of the area in compacted format?
Quoted 15 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +6
-2}else if (count <ARRAY_SIZE (x86_ext_save_areas)) { -if ((x86_cpu_xsave_components (cpu) >> count) &1 ) { -const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[count]; +const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[count]; +if ((x86_cpu_xsave_xcr0_components (cpu) >> count) &1 ) { *eax = esa->size; *ebx = esa->offset; + }else if ((x86_cpu_xsave_xss_components (cpu) >> count) &1 ) { + *eax = esa->size; + *ebx =0 ; + *ecx =1 ; } }break ;
target/i386/cpu.c static void x86_cpu_reset(DeviceState *dev) · line 6096
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +2
-0@@ -6059,6 +6092,9 @@ static void x86_cpu_reset(DeviceState *dev) }for (i =2 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (x86_ext_save_areas); i++) {const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[i]; +if (!esa->offset) { +continue ;
Most of the comments at the xsave_area_size() hunk would apply here. I miss some clarity on what esa->offset==0 really means.
Would it be valid to replace this with a check for
((1 << i) & CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK)
?
Quoted 23 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +4
-1+ }if (env->features[esa->feature] & esa->bits) { xcr0 |=1ull << i; }@@ -6295,8 +6331,10 @@ static void x86_cpu_enable_xsave_components(X86CPU *cpu) } } - env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ] = mask; + env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ] = mask &CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK ; env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ] = mask >>32 ; + env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO ] = mask &CPUID_XSTATE_XSS_MASK ; + env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI ] = mask >>32 ; }/***** Steps involved on loading and filtering CPUID data target/i386/cpu.h +0
-0@@ -504,6 +504,16 @@ typedef enum X86Seg {#define XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_MASK (1ULL << XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_BIT)#define XSTATE_PKRU_MASK (1ULL << XSTATE_PKRU_BIT)
target/i386/cpu.h typedef enum X86Seg { · line 515
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/cpu.h +9
-0+/* CPUID feature bits available in XCR0 */ +#define CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK (XSTATE_FP_MASK | XSTATE_SSE_MASK | \ + XSTATE_YMM_MASK | XSTATE_BNDREGS_MASK | \ + XSTATE_BNDCSR_MASK | XSTATE_OPMASK_MASK | \ + XSTATE_ZMM_Hi256_MASK | \ + XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_MASK | XSTATE_PKRU_MASK) + +/* CPUID feature bits available in XSS */ +#define CPUID_XSTATE_XSS_MASK 0
Do you expect this to be used outside target/i386/cpu.c? If not, maybe it could be moved close to the x86_ext_save_areas[] definition, as any updates to x86_ext_save_areas will require an update to these macros.
Quoted 17 lines
target/i386/cpu.h +3
-0+/* CPUID feature words */ typedef enum FeatureWord { FEAT_1_EDX, /* CPUID[1].EDX */@@ -541,6 +551,8 @@ typedef enum FeatureWord {FEAT_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAPS ,FEAT_VMX_BASIC ,FEAT_VMX_VMFUNC , +FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO ,/* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=1].ECX */ +FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI ,/* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=1].EDX */ FEATURE_WORDS , } FeatureWord;Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Signature · 1 line
Eduardo
Re: [PATCH v7 2/6] target/i386: Enable XSS feature enumeration for CPUID
Quoted 11 lines · Eduardo Habkost
Quoted 10 lines · Yang Weijiang
Currently, CPUID.(EAX=0DH,ECX=01H) doesn't enumerate features in XSS properly, add the support here. XCR0 bits indicate user-mode XSAVE components, and XSS bits indicate supervisor-mode XSAVE components.
Signed-off-by Yang Weijiang <[email protected]>--- target/i386/cpu.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- target/i386/cpu.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
[...]
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/cpu.c static uint32_t xsave_area_size(uint64_t mask) · line 1499
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +1
-0@@ -1478,6 +1496,9 @@ static uint32_t xsave_area_size(uint64_t mask)for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (x86_ext_save_areas); i++) {const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[i];if ((mask >> i) &1 ) { +if (i >=2 && !esa->offset) {Maybe a few comments at the definition of ExtSaveArea to explain that offset can now be zero (and what it means when it's zero) would be helpful. I took a while to understand why this is safe.
Thanks Eduardo!
Sure, I'll add some comments in next version.
Quoted 10 lines
Would it be valid to say "ExtSaveArea.offset has a valid offset only if the component is in
CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK"? If so, can't this check be simply replaced with:
if ((1 << i) &CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK)
?Or maybe this function should just contain a:
assert(!(mask & CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK));
at the beginning?
Maybe I need to modifiy the function a bit to accommodate compacted format size calculation for CPUID(0xD,1).EBX.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +2
-0+continue ; + } ret =MAX (ret, esa->offset + esa->size); } }@@ -1489,12 +1510,18 @@ static inline bool accel_uses_host_cpuid(void)return kvm_enabled () ||hvf_enabled (); }
[...]
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 11 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +1
-1@@ -5716,7 +5743,7 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, }if (count ==0 ) { - *ecx =xsave_area_size (x86_cpu_xsave_components (cpu)); + *ecx =xsave_area_size (x86_cpu_xsave_xcr0_components (cpu)); *eax = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ]; *edx = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_HI ];/* target/i386/cpu.c void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, · line 5759
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +2
-0@@ -5728,11 +5755,17 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count, *ebx =kvm_enabled () ? *ecx :xsave_area_size (env->xcr0); }else if (count ==1 ) { *eax = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE ]; + *ecx = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO ]; + *edx = env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI ];What about EBX? It is documented as "The size in bytes of the XSAVE area containing all states enabled by XCRO |
IA32_XSS".
Quoted 2 lines
The Intel SDM is not clear, but I assume this would be necessarily the size of the area in compacted format?
Yes, I'll add ebx assignment.
Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 17 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +6
-2}else if (count <ARRAY_SIZE (x86_ext_save_areas)) { -if ((x86_cpu_xsave_components (cpu) >> count) &1 ) { -const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[count]; +const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[count]; +if ((x86_cpu_xsave_xcr0_components (cpu) >> count) &1 ) { *eax = esa->size; *ebx = esa->offset; + }else if ((x86_cpu_xsave_xss_components (cpu) >> count) &1 ) { + *eax = esa->size; + *ebx =0 ; + *ecx =1 ; } }break ;target/i386/cpu.c static void x86_cpu_reset(DeviceState *dev) · line 6096
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +2
-0@@ -6059,6 +6092,9 @@ static void x86_cpu_reset(DeviceState *dev) }for (i =2 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (x86_ext_save_areas); i++) {const ExtSaveArea *esa = &x86_ext_save_areas[i]; +if (!esa->offset) { +continue ;Most of the comments at the
xsave_area_size()hunk would apply here. I miss some clarity on what esa->offset==0 really means.
Quoted 3 lines
Would it be valid to replace this with a check for
((1 << i) &CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK)
?
Sure, I'll use this check to make things clearer, thanks for the comments!
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/cpu.c +1
-0+ }if (env->features[esa->feature] & esa->bits) { xcr0 |=1ull << i; }
[...]
Quoted 35 lines
target/i386/cpu.h typedef enum X86Seg { · line 515
Quoted 9 lines
target/i386/cpu.h +9
-0+/* CPUID feature bits available in XCR0 */ +#define CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK (XSTATE_FP_MASK | XSTATE_SSE_MASK | \ + XSTATE_YMM_MASK | XSTATE_BNDREGS_MASK | \ + XSTATE_BNDCSR_MASK | XSTATE_OPMASK_MASK | \ + XSTATE_ZMM_Hi256_MASK | \ + XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_MASK | XSTATE_PKRU_MASK) + +/* CPUID feature bits available in XSS */ +#define CPUID_XSTATE_XSS_MASK 0Do you expect this to be used outside
target/i386/cpu.c? If not, maybe it could be moved close to the x86_ext_save_areas[] definition, as any updates tox86_ext_save_areaswill require an update to these macros.Quoted 17 lines
target/i386/cpu.h +3
-0+/* CPUID feature words */ typedef enum FeatureWord { FEAT_1_EDX, /* CPUID[1].EDX */@@ -541,6 +551,8 @@ typedef enum FeatureWord {FEAT_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAPS ,FEAT_VMX_BASIC ,FEAT_VMX_VMFUNC , +FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO ,/* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=1].ECX */ +FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_HI ,/* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=1].EDX */ FEATURE_WORDS , } FeatureWord;Signature · 1 line
2.26.2Signature · 1 line
Eduardo
PATCH v7 3/6 target/i386: Enable CET components support for XSAVES
In reply to Yang WeijiangCET Shadow Stack(SHSTK) and Indirect Branch Tracking(IBT) are enumerated via CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):ECX[bit 7] and EDX[bit 20] respectively. Two CET bits (bit 11 and 12) are defined in MSR_IA32_XSS for XSAVES. They correspond to CET states in user and supervisor mode respectively.
--- target/i386/cpu.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ target/i386/cpu.h | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
target/i386/cpu.c +35 -0
@@ -1060,6 +1060,16 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = { }, [FEAT_XSAVE_XSS_LO] = { .type = CPUID_FEATURE_WORD, + .feat_names = { +NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL , +NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL , +NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,"cet-u" , +"cet-s" ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL , +NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL , +NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL , +NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL , + NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + }, .cpuid = { .eax =0xD , .needs_ecx = true,
@@ -1486,6 +1496,14 @@ static const ExtSaveArea x86_ext_save_areas[] = { { .feature = FEAT_7_0_ECX, .bits = CPUID_7_0_ECX_PKU, .offset = offsetof(X86XSaveArea, pkru_state), .size = sizeof(XSavePKRU) }, + [XSTATE_CET_U_BIT ] = { + .feature =FEAT_7_0_ECX , .bits =CPUID_7_0_ECX_CET_SHSTK , + .offset =0 , + .size = sizeof(XSavesCETU) }, + [XSTATE_CET_S_BIT ] = { + .feature =FEAT_7_0_ECX , .bits =CPUID_7_0_ECX_CET_SHSTK , + .offset =0 , + .size = sizeof(XSavesCETS) }, };static uint32_t xsave_area_size (uint64_t mask)
@@ -6329,6 +6347,23 @@ static void x86_cpu_enable_xsave_components(X86CPU *cpu)if (env->features[esa->feature] & esa->bits) { mask |= (1ULL << i); } + +/* +* Both CET SHSTK and IBT feature requires XSAVES support, but two +* features can be controlled independently by kernel, and we only +* have one correlated bit set in x86_ext_save_areas, so if either +* of two features is enabled, we set the XSAVES support bit to make +* the enabled feature work. +*/ +if (i ==XSTATE_CET_U_BIT || i ==XSTATE_CET_S_BIT ) { +uint64_t ecx = env->features[FEAT_7_0_ECX ]; +uint64_t edx = env->features[FEAT_7_0_EDX ]; + +if ((ecx &CPUID_7_0_ECX_CET_SHSTK ) || + (edx &CPUID_7_0_EDX_CET_IBT )) { + mask |= (1ULL << i); + } + } } env->features[FEAT_XSAVE_XCR0_LO ] = mask &CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK ;
target/i386/cpu.h +22 -1
@@ -493,6 +493,8 @@ typedef enum X86Seg {#define XSTATE_ZMM_Hi256_BIT 6#define XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_BIT 7#define XSTATE_PKRU_BIT 9 +#define XSTATE_CET_U_BIT 11 +#define XSTATE_CET_S_BIT 12#define XSTATE_FP_MASK (1ULL << XSTATE_FP_BIT)#define XSTATE_SSE_MASK (1ULL << XSTATE_SSE_BIT)
@@ -503,6 +505,8 @@ typedef enum X86Seg {#define XSTATE_ZMM_Hi256_MASK (1ULL << XSTATE_ZMM_Hi256_BIT)#define XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_MASK (1ULL << XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_BIT)#define XSTATE_PKRU_MASK (1ULL << XSTATE_PKRU_BIT) +#define XSTATE_CET_U_MASK (1ULL << XSTATE_CET_U_BIT) +#define XSTATE_CET_S_MASK (1ULL << XSTATE_CET_S_BIT)/* CPUID feature bits available in XCR0 */ #define CPUID_XSTATE_XCR0_MASK (XSTATE_FP_MASK | XSTATE_SSE_MASK | \
@@ -512,7 +516,7 @@ typedef enum X86Seg { XSTATE_Hi16_ZMM_MASK | XSTATE_PKRU_MASK)/* CPUID feature bits available in XSS */ -#define CPUID_XSTATE_XSS_MASK 0 +#define CPUID_XSTATE_XSS_MASK (XSTATE_CET_U_MASK)/* CPUID feature words */ typedef enum FeatureWord {
@@ -760,6 +764,8 @@ typedef uint64_t FeatureWordArray[FEATURE_WORDS];#define CPUID_7_0_ECX_WAITPKG (1U << 5)/* Additional AVX-512 Vector Byte Manipulation Instruction */ #define CPUID_7_0_ECX_AVX512_VBMI2 (1U << 6) +/* CET SHSTK feature */ +#define CPUID_7_0_ECX_CET_SHSTK (1U << 7)/* Galois Field New Instructions */ #define CPUID_7_0_ECX_GFNI (1U << 8)/* Vector AES Instructions */
@@ -795,6 +801,8 @@ typedef uint64_t FeatureWordArray[FEATURE_WORDS];#define CPUID_7_0_EDX_SERIALIZE (1U << 14)/* TSX Suspend Load Address Tracking instruction */ #define CPUID_7_0_EDX_TSX_LDTRK (1U << 16) +/* CET IBT feature */ +#define CPUID_7_0_EDX_CET_IBT (1U << 20)/* Speculation Control */ #define CPUID_7_0_EDX_SPEC_CTRL (1U << 26)/* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors */
@@ -1285,6 +1293,19 @@ typedef struct XSavePKRU {uint32_t padding; } XSavePKRU; +/* Ext. save area 11: User mode CET state */ +typedef struct XSavesCETU { +uint64_t u_cet; +uint64_t user_ssp; +}XSavesCETU ; + +/* Ext. save area 12: Supervisor mode CET state */ +typedef struct XSavesCETS { +uint64_t kernel_ssp; +uint64_t pl1_ssp; +uint64_t pl2_ssp; +}XSavesCETS ; + typedef struct X86XSaveArea { X86LegacyXSaveArea legacy; X86XSaveHeader header;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v7 4/6 target/i386: Add user-space MSR access interface for CET
In reply to Yang WeijiangCET states are divided into user-mode and supervisor-mode states, MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP holds current SHSTK pointer in use, MSR_IA32_U_CET and MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP are for user-mode states, others are for supervisor-mode states. Expose access according to current CET supported bits in CPUID and XSS.
--- target/i386/cpu.h | 18 ++++++++++++ target/i386/kvm.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+)
target/i386/cpu.h +18 -0
@@ -484,6 +484,15 @@ typedef enum X86Seg {#define MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_ENTRY_CTLS 0x00000490#define MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC 0x00000491 +#define MSR_IA32_U_CET 0x000006a0 +#define MSR_IA32_S_CET 0x000006a2 +#define MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP 0x000006a4 +#define MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP 0x000006a5 +#define MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP 0x000006a6 +#define MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP 0x000006a7 +#define MSR_IA32_SSP_TBL 0x000006a8 +#define MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP 0x4b564d08 +#define XSTATE_FP_BIT 0#define XSTATE_SSE_BIT 1#define XSTATE_YMM_BIT 2
@@ -1584,6 +1593,15 @@ typedef struct CPUX86State {uintptr_t retaddr; +uint64_t u_cet; +uint64_t s_cet; +uint64_t pl0_ssp; +uint64_t pl1_ssp; +uint64_t pl2_ssp; +uint64_t pl3_ssp; +uint64_t ssp_tbl; +uint64_t guest_ssp; +/* Fields up to this point are cleared by a CPU reset */ struct {} end_reset_fields;
target/i386/kvm.c +72 -0
90 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v7 5/6 target/i386: Add CET state support for guest migration
In reply to Yang WeijiangSave the MSRs being used on source machine and restore them on destination machine.
--- target/i386/machine.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 161 insertions(+)
target/i386/machine.c +161 -0
@@ -980,6 +980,159 @@ static const VMStateDescription vmstate_umwait = { } }; +static bool u_cet_needed (void *opaque) +{ +X86CPU *cpu = opaque; +CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env; + +return env->u_cet !=0 ; +} + +static const VMStateDescription vmstate_u_cet = { + .name ="cpu/u_cet" , + .version_id =1 , + .minimum_version_id =1 , + .needed = u_cet_needed, + .fields = (VMStateField []) { +VMSTATE_UINT64 (env.u_cet,X86CPU ), +VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST () + } +}; + +static bool s_cet_needed (void *opaque) +{ +X86CPU *cpu = opaque; +CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env; + +return env->s_cet !=0 ; +} + +static const VMStateDescription vmstate_s_cet = { + .name ="cpu/s_cet" , + .version_id =1 , + .minimum_version_id =1 , + .needed = s_cet_needed, + .fields = (VMStateField []) { +VMSTATE_UINT64 (env.s_cet,X86CPU ), +VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST () + } +}; + +static bool pl0_ssp_needed (void *opaque) +{ +X86CPU *cpu = opaque; +CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env; + +return env->pl0_ssp !=0 ; +} + +static const VMStateDescription vmstate_pl0_ssp = { + .name ="cpu/pl0_ssp" , + .version_id =1 , + .minimum_version_id =1 , + .needed = pl0_ssp_needed, + .fields = (VMStateField []) { +VMSTATE_UINT64 (env.pl0_ssp,X86CPU ), +VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST () + } +}; + +static bool pl1_ssp_needed (void *opaque) +{ +X86CPU *cpu = opaque; +CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env; + +return env->pl1_ssp !=0 ; +} + +static const VMStateDescription vmstate_pl1_ssp = { + .name ="cpu/pl1_ssp" , + .version_id =1 , + .minimum_version_id =1 , + .needed = pl1_ssp_needed, + .fields = (VMStateField []) { +VMSTATE_UINT64 (env.pl1_ssp,X86CPU ), +VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST () + } +}; + +static bool pl2_ssp_needed (void *opaque) +{ +X86CPU *cpu = opaque; +CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env; + +return env->pl2_ssp !=0 ; +} + +static const VMStateDescription vmstate_pl2_ssp = { + .name ="cpu/pl2_ssp" , + .version_id =1 , + .minimum_version_id =1 , + .needed = pl2_ssp_needed, + .fields = (VMStateField []) { +VMSTATE_UINT64 (env.pl2_ssp,X86CPU ), +VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST () + } +}; + + +static bool pl3_ssp_needed (void *opaque) +{ +X86CPU *cpu = opaque; +CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env; + +return env->pl3_ssp !=0 ; +} + +static const VMStateDescription vmstate_pl3_ssp = { + .name ="cpu/pl3_ssp" , + .version_id =1 , + .minimum_version_id =1 , + .needed = pl3_ssp_needed, + .fields = (VMStateField []) { +VMSTATE_UINT64 (env.pl3_ssp,X86CPU ), +VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST () + } +}; + +static bool ssp_tbl_needed (void *opaque) +{ +X86CPU *cpu = opaque; +CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env; + +return env->ssp_tbl !=0 ; +} + +static const VMStateDescription vmstate_ssp_tbl = { + .name ="cpu/ssp_tbl" , + .version_id =1 , + .minimum_version_id =1 , + .needed = ssp_tbl_needed, + .fields = (VMStateField []) { +VMSTATE_UINT64 (env.ssp_tbl,X86CPU ), +VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST () + } +}; + +static bool guest_ssp_needed (void *opaque) +{ +X86CPU *cpu = opaque; +CPUX86State *env = &cpu->env; + +return env->guest_ssp !=0 ; +} + +static const VMStateDescription vmstate_guest_ssp = { + .name ="cpu/guest_ssp" , + .version_id =1 , + .minimum_version_id =1 , + .needed = guest_ssp_needed, + .fields = (VMStateField []) { +VMSTATE_UINT64 (env.guest_ssp,X86CPU ), +VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST () + } +}; +#ifdef TARGET_X86_64 static bool pkru_needed (void *opaque) {
@@ -1495,6 +1648,14 @@ VMStateDescription vmstate_x86_cpu = { &vmstate_nested_state, #endif &vmstate_msr_tsx_ctrl, + &vmstate_u_cet, + &vmstate_s_cet, + &vmstate_pl0_ssp, + &vmstate_pl1_ssp, + &vmstate_pl2_ssp, + &vmstate_pl3_ssp, + &vmstate_ssp_tbl, + &vmstate_guest_ssp,NULL } };
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v7 6/6 target/i386: Advise CET bits in CPU/MSR feature words
In reply to Yang WeijiangCET SHSTK and IBT feature are enumerated via CPUID.(EAX=07H,ECX=0H):ECX[bit 7] and EDX[bit 20]. CET state load/restore at vmentry/vmexit are enabled via VMX_ENTRY_CTLS[bit 20] and VMX_EXIT_CTLS[bit 28].
--- target/i386/cpu.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
target/i386/cpu.c +4 -4
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = { .type = CPUID_FEATURE_WORD, .feat_names = {NULL ,"avx512vbmi" ,"umip" ,"pku" , -NULL /* ospke */ ,"waitpkg" ,"avx512vbmi2" ,NULL , +NULL /* ospke */ ,"waitpkg" ,"avx512vbmi2" ,"shstk" ,"gfni" ,"vaes" ,"vpclmulqdq" ,"avx512vnni" ,"avx512bitalg" ,NULL ,"avx512-vpopcntdq" ,NULL , "la57", NULL, NULL, NULL,
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = {"avx512-vp2intersect" ,NULL ,"md-clear" ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,"serialize" ,NULL ,"tsx-ldtrk" ,NULL ,NULL /* pconfig */ ,NULL , -NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL , +"ibt" ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,"spec-ctrl" ,"stibp" , NULL, "arch-capabilities", "core-capability", "ssbd", },
@@ -1239,7 +1239,7 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = {"vmx-exit-save-efer" ,"vmx-exit-load-efer" ,"vmx-exit-save-preemption-timer" ,"vmx-exit-clear-bndcfgs" ,NULL ,"vmx-exit-clear-rtit-ctl" ,NULL ,NULL , - NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, + "vmx-exit-save-cet-ctl", NULL, NULL, NULL, }, .msr = { .index = MSR_IA32_VMX_TRUE_EXIT_CTLS,
@@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = {NULL ,"vmx-entry-ia32e-mode" ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,"vmx-entry-load-perf-global-ctrl" ,"vmx-entry-load-pat" ,"vmx-entry-load-efer" ,"vmx-entry-load-bndcfgs" ,NULL ,"vmx-entry-load-rtit-ctl" ,NULL , -NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL , +"vmx-entry-load-cet-ctl" ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL , NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, },
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2