netfilter: nft_exthdr: Search chunks in SCTP packets only
Subsystems (2)
Phil Sutter
reviewerPATCH 1/1 netfilter: nft_exthdr: Search chunks in SCTP packets only
Since user space does not generate a payload dependency, plain sctp chunk matches cause searching in non-SCTP packets, too. Avoid this potential mis-interpretation of packet data by checking pkt->tprot.
--- net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +4 -1
@@ -312,6 +312,9 @@ static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,const struct sctp_chunkhdr *sch;struct sctp_chunkhdr _sch; +if (!pkt->tprot_set || pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_SCTP ) + goto err; + do { sch = skb_header_pointer(pkt->skb, offset, sizeof(_sch), &_sch); if (!sch || !sch->length)
@@ -334,7 +337,7 @@ static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, } offset +=SCTP_PAD4 (ntohs (sch->length)); }while (offset < pkt->skb->len); - +err:if (priv->flags &NFT_EXTHDR_F_PRESENT )nft_reg_store8 (dest, false);else
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerHi Phil,
Quoted 15 lines · Phil Sutter
Since user space does not generate a payload dependency, plain sctp chunk matches cause searching in non-SCTP packets, too. Avoid this potential mis-interpretation of packet data by checking
pkt->tprot.Fixes 133dc203d77df ("netfilter: nft_exthdr: Support SCTP chunks")Signed-off-by Phil Sutter <[email protected]>--- net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +0
-0
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, · line 316
Quoted 5 lines
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +2
-0@@ -312,6 +312,9 @@ static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,const struct sctp_chunkhdr *sch;struct sctp_chunkhdr _sch; +if (!pkt->tprot_set || pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_SCTP ) + goto err;
nft_set_pktinfo_unspec() already initializes pkt->tprot to zero.
I think it's safe to simplify this to:
if (pkt->tprot != IPPROTO_SCTP)
Phil Sutter
reviewerQuoted 19 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 18 lines · Phil Sutter
Since user space does not generate a payload dependency, plain sctp chunk matches cause searching in non-SCTP packets, too. Avoid this potential mis-interpretation of packet data by checking
pkt->tprot.Fixes 133dc203d77df ("netfilter: nft_exthdr: Support SCTP chunks")Signed-off-by Phil Sutter <[email protected]>--- net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +0
-0@@ -312,6 +312,9 @@ static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,const struct sctp_chunkhdr *sch;struct sctp_chunkhdr _sch;
Quoted 8 lines
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, · line 316
Quoted 2 lines
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +2
-0+if (!pkt->tprot_set || pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_SCTP ) + goto err;
nft_set_pktinfo_unspec()already initializespkt->tprotto zero.I think it's safe to simplify this to:
if (pkt->tprot != IPPROTO_SCTP)
Are you sure? Checking the spots that (should) initialize tprot/tprot_set, in nft_do_chain_inet() it seems that if state->pf is neither NFPROTO_IPV4 nor NFPROTO_IPV6, nft_do_chain() is called without prior init. Maybe default case should call nft_set_pktinfo_unspec()?
BTW: The final return call in nft_do_chain_inet_ingress() is dead code, right?
Thanks, Phil
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 25 lines · Phil Sutter
Quoted 24 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 15 lines · Phil Sutter
Since user space does not generate a payload dependency, plain sctp chunk matches cause searching in non-SCTP packets, too. Avoid this potential mis-interpretation of packet data by checking
pkt->tprot.Fixes 133dc203d77df ("netfilter: nft_exthdr: Support SCTP chunks")Signed-off-by Phil Sutter <[email protected]>--- net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +0
-0net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, · line 316
Quoted 5 lines
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +2
-0@@ -312,6 +312,9 @@ static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,const struct sctp_chunkhdr *sch;struct sctp_chunkhdr _sch; +if (!pkt->tprot_set || pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_SCTP ) + goto err;
nft_set_pktinfo_unspec()already initializespkt->tprotto zero.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I think it's safe to simplify this to:
if (pkt->tprot != IPPROTO_SCTP)Are you sure? Checking the spots that (should) initialize tprot/tprot_set, in
nft_do_chain_inet()it seems that ifstate->pfis neitherNFPROTO_IPV4norNFPROTO_IPV6,nft_do_chain()is called without prior init. Maybe default case should callnft_set_pktinfo_unspec()?
state->pf in nft_do_chain_inet() can only be either NFPROTO_IPV4 or NFPROTO_IPV6.
pkt->tprot_set is there to deal with a corner case: IPPROTO_IP (0). If pkt->tprot_set == true and pkt->tprot == 0, it means: "match on IPPROTO_IP". For other IPPROTO_*, checking pkt->tprot looks safe to me.
Quoted 2 lines
BTW: The final return call in
nft_do_chain_inet_ingress()is dead code, right?
You mean the default case of nft_do_chain_inet_ingress()? inet/ingress is special, it allows you to filter IPv4 and IPv6 traffic only. Anything else from ingress is accepted (you should filter it via netdev family).
Phil Sutter
reviewerQuoted 30 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 29 lines · Phil Sutter
Quoted 27 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 15 lines · Phil Sutter
Since user space does not generate a payload dependency, plain sctp chunk matches cause searching in non-SCTP packets, too. Avoid this potential mis-interpretation of packet data by checking
pkt->tprot.Fixes 133dc203d77df ("netfilter: nft_exthdr: Support SCTP chunks")Signed-off-by Phil Sutter <[email protected]>--- net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +0
-0net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, · line 316
Quoted 5 lines
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +2
-0@@ -312,6 +312,9 @@ static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,const struct sctp_chunkhdr *sch;struct sctp_chunkhdr _sch; +if (!pkt->tprot_set || pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_SCTP ) + goto err;
nft_set_pktinfo_unspec()already initializespkt->tprotto zero.I think it's safe to simplify this to:
if (pkt->tprot != IPPROTO_SCTP)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Are you sure? Checking the spots that (should) initialize tprot/tprot_set, in
nft_do_chain_inet()it seems that ifstate->pfis neitherNFPROTO_IPV4norNFPROTO_IPV6,nft_do_chain()is called without prior init. Maybe default case should callnft_set_pktinfo_unspec()?
state->pfinnft_do_chain_inet()can only be eitherNFPROTO_IPV4orNFPROTO_IPV6.
Shouldn't there be a WARN_ON_ONCE or something in the default case then? Looking at nf_hook(), it seems entirely possible to me that state->pf might be NFPROTO_ARP, for instance. That's probably just me not getting it, but things we rely upon shouldn't be hidden that well, right?
Quoted 3 lines
pkt->tprot_setis there to deal with a corner case:IPPROTO_IP(0). Ifpkt->tprot_set== true andpkt->tprot== 0, it means: "match onIPPROTO_IP". For other IPPROTO_*, checkingpkt->tprotlooks safe to me.
Ah, thanks for clarifying! So whenever I check a specific value that's non-zero, tprot_set doesn't matter. Should I send a patch for the same change in nft_tcp_header_pointer(), too? (That's where I copied the code from. ;)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
BTW: The final return call in
nft_do_chain_inet_ingress()is dead code, right?You mean the default case of
nft_do_chain_inet_ingress()? inet/ingress is special, it allows you to filter IPv4 and IPv6 traffic only. Anything else from ingress is accepted (you should filter it via netdev family).
Oh, sorry. Looks like I had tomatoes on the eyes[1]: I missed that the non-default cases just 'break' and therefore hit the function's last line.
Thanks, Phil
[1] Famous German idiom.
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 36 lines · Phil Sutter
Quoted 35 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 33 lines · Phil Sutter
Quoted 19 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 18 lines · Phil Sutter
Since user space does not generate a payload dependency, plain sctp chunk matches cause searching in non-SCTP packets, too. Avoid this potential mis-interpretation of packet data by checking
pkt->tprot.Fixes 133dc203d77df ("netfilter: nft_exthdr: Support SCTP chunks")Signed-off-by Phil Sutter <[email protected]>--- net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +0
-0@@ -312,6 +312,9 @@ static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,const struct sctp_chunkhdr *sch;struct sctp_chunkhdr _sch;Quoted 8 lines
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c static void nft_exthdr_sctp_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, · line 316
Quoted 2 lines
net/netfilter/nft_exthdr.c +2
-0+if (!pkt->tprot_set || pkt->tprot !=IPPROTO_SCTP ) + goto err;
nft_set_pktinfo_unspec()already initializespkt->tprotto zero.I think it's safe to simplify this to:
if (pkt->tprot != IPPROTO_SCTP)Are you sure? Checking the spots that (should) initialize tprot/tprot_set, in
nft_do_chain_inet()it seems that ifstate->pfis neitherNFPROTO_IPV4norNFPROTO_IPV6,nft_do_chain()is called without prior init. Maybe default case should callnft_set_pktinfo_unspec()?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
state->pfinnft_do_chain_inet()can only be eitherNFPROTO_IPV4orNFPROTO_IPV6.Shouldn't there be a
WARN_ON_ONCEor something in the default case then? Looking atnf_hook(), it seems entirely possible to me thatstate->pfmight beNFPROTO_ARP, for instance. That's probably just me not getting it, but things we rely upon shouldn't be hidden that well, right?
nft_do_chain_inet() is called from the NFPROTO_INET hook, which results in either NFPROTO_IPV4 or NFPROTO_IPV6.
This is hot path, I would not add more code there. The default case is just there to avoid a warning from gcc.
Probably a comment like /* Should not ever happen */ for the default case in nft_do_chain_inet() is fine with you? :)
Quoted 8 lines
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pkt->tprot_setis there to deal with a corner case:IPPROTO_IP(0). Ifpkt->tprot_set== true andpkt->tprot== 0, it means: "match onIPPROTO_IP". For other IPPROTO_*, checkingpkt->tprotlooks safe to me.Ah, thanks for clarifying! So whenever I check a specific value that's non-zero,
tprot_setdoesn't matter. Should I send a patch for the same change innft_tcp_header_pointer(), too? (That's where I copied the code from. ;)
I think so, that's fine indeed.