docs: describe the security considerations with virtiofsd xattr mapping
PATCH 1/1 docs: describe the security considerations with virtiofsd xattr mapping
Different guest xattr prefixes have distinct access control rules applied by the guest. When remapping a guest xattr care must be taken that the remapping does not allow the a guest user to bypass guest kernel access control rules.
For example if 'trusted.*' which requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN is remapped to 'user.virtiofs.trusted.*', an unprivileged guest user which can write to 'user.*' can bypass the CAP_SYS_ADMIN control. Thus the target of any remapping must be explicitly blocked from read/writes by the guest, to prevent access control bypass.
The examples shown in the virtiofsd man page already do the right thing and ensure safety, but the security implications of getting this wrong were not made explicit. This could lead to host admins and apps unwittingly creating insecure configurations.
--- docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +50 -5
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ Options timeout. ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of coherency. The default is ``auto``. -xattr-mapping -------------- +Extended attribute (xattr) mapping +---------------------------------- By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to the server file system. This can be a problem where either those xattr names are used
@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/server confusion) or if the virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it cannot access some attributes. +Mapping syntax +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=mapping where the ``mapping`` string consists of a series of rules.
@@ -232,8 +235,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally does itself. -xattr-mapping Examples ----------------------- +Security considerations +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using +well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different +access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple +partitions + + * ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem + * ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership + +While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes +and access control rules. + +When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to +ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to +evade the guest access control rules. + +Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to +``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged +user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrs +under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access +control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing +to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``. + +As noted above, the partitions used and access controls +applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to +try to predict what the guest OS will use. + +The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is +to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix. +This is shown in example (1) below. + +If selectively mapping only a subset of xattr prefixes, +then rules must be added to explicitly block direct +access to the target of the remapping. This is shown +in example (2) below. + +Mapping examples +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1) Prefix all attributes with 'user.virtiofs.'
@@ -270,7 +313,9 @@ stripping of 'user.virtiofs.'. The second rule hides unprefixed 'trusted.' attributes on the host. The third rule stops a guest from explicitly setting -the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly. +the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly to prevent access +control bypass on the target of the earlier prefix +remapping. Finally, the fourth rule lets all remaining attributes through.
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Quoted 75 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Different guest xattr prefixes have distinct access control rules applied by the guest. When remapping a guest xattr care must be taken that the remapping does not allow the a guest user to bypass guest kernel access control rules.
For example if 'trusted.*' which requires
CAP_SYS_ADMINis remapped to 'user.virtiofs.trusted.*', an unprivileged guest user which can write to 'user.*' can bypass theCAP_SYS_ADMINcontrol. Thus the target of any remapping must be explicitly blocked from read/writes by the guest, to prevent access control bypass.The examples shown in the virtiofsd man page already do the right thing and ensure safety, but the security implications of getting this wrong were not made explicit. This could lead to host admins and apps unwittingly creating insecure configurations.
Signed-off-by Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>--- docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +28
-4@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ Options timeout. ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of coherency. The default is ``auto``. -xattr-mapping -------------- +Extended attribute (xattr) mapping +---------------------------------- By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to the server file system. This can be a problem where either those xattr names are used@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/server confusion) or if the virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it cannot access some attributes. +Mapping syntax +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=mapping where the ``mapping`` string consists of a series of rules.@@ -232,8 +235,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally does itself. -xattr-mapping Examples ----------------------- +Security considerations +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using +well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different +access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple +partitions + + * ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem + * ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership + +While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes +and access control rules. + +When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to +ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to +evade the guest access control rules. + +Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to +``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged +user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrs
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do · line 270
Quoted 10 lines
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +10
-0+under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access +control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing +to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``. + +As noted above, the partitions used and access controls +applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to +try to predict what the guest OS will use. + +The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is +to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix.
Remapping all xattrs seem to make sense. It probably will lead to less confusion. Nested guests add another level of redirection.
BTW, remapping xattr has limitation that it does not work on symlinks. So "user.*" can't be set on symlink. And that means selinux relabeling of symlinks fails with remapped xattrs.
Not sure how to address this limitation. Host kernel imposes this limit. (man xattr).
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do · line 276
Quoted 6 lines
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +6
-0+This is shown in example (1) below. + +If selectively mapping only a subset of xattr prefixes, +then rules must be added to explicitly block direct +access to the target of the remapping. This is shown +in example (2) below.
Example (2) seems to block all the xattrs with prefix even if only one xattr has been remapped.
So if we remapped "trusted." to "user.virtiofs.trusted.", then client can't set any xattr starting with "user.virtiofs". I am wondering should it be limted to only blocking only "user.virtiofs.trusted.".
Thanks
Vivek
Quoted 24 lines
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +6
-1+ +Mapping examples +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1) Prefix all attributes with 'user.virtiofs.'@@ -270,7 +313,9 @@ stripping of 'user.virtiofs.'. The second rule hides unprefixed 'trusted.' attributes on the host. The third rule stops a guest from explicitly setting -the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly. +the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly to prevent access +control bypass on the target of the earlier prefix +remapping. Finally, the fourth rule lets all remaining attributes through.Signature · 6 lines
2.31.1 _______________________________________________ Virtio-fs mailing list [email protected] https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/virtio-fs
Quoted 90 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 75 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Different guest xattr prefixes have distinct access control rules applied by the guest. When remapping a guest xattr care must be taken that the remapping does not allow the a guest user to bypass guest kernel access control rules.
For example if 'trusted.*' which requires
CAP_SYS_ADMINis remapped to 'user.virtiofs.trusted.*', an unprivileged guest user which can write to 'user.*' can bypass theCAP_SYS_ADMINcontrol. Thus the target of any remapping must be explicitly blocked from read/writes by the guest, to prevent access control bypass.The examples shown in the virtiofsd man page already do the right thing and ensure safety, but the security implications of getting this wrong were not made explicit. This could lead to host admins and apps unwittingly creating insecure configurations.
Signed-off-by Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>--- docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +28
-4@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ Options timeout. ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of coherency. The default is ``auto``. -xattr-mapping -------------- +Extended attribute (xattr) mapping +---------------------------------- By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to the server file system. This can be a problem where either those xattr names are used@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/server confusion) or if the virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it cannot access some attributes. +Mapping syntax +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=mapping where the ``mapping`` string consists of a series of rules.@@ -232,8 +235,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally does itself. -xattr-mapping Examples ----------------------- +Security considerations +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using +well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different +access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple +partitions + + * ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem + * ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership + +While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes +and access control rules. + +When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to +ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to +evade the guest access control rules. + +Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to +``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged +user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrsdocs/tools/virtiofsd.rst Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do · line 270
Quoted 10 lines
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +10
-0+under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access +control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing +to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``. + +As noted above, the partitions used and access controls +applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to +try to predict what the guest OS will use. + +The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is +to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix.Remapping all xattrs seem to make sense. It probably will lead to less confusion. Nested guests add another level of redirection.
Quoted 6 lines
BTW, remapping xattr has limitation that it does not work on symlinks. So "user.*" can't be set on symlink. And that means selinux relabeling of symlinks fails with remapped xattrs.
Not sure how to address this limitation. Host kernel imposes this limit. (man xattr).
Oh fun, I had not noticed this limitation before :-(
Here are some ideas I had, none especially nice
- Use 'trusted.*' namespace for remapping instead of 'user.'
virtiofsd needs to have CAP_SYS_ADMIN though which is quite horrible if your goal is to confine its privileges in any meaningful way
- Store a symlinks' xattr on the target of the symlink
if the symlink has dev:inode 54:224, and points to a file 'foo', then on 'foo' create an xattr "user.virtiofs.link:54:224.<original xattrpath>"
This gets quite horrendous when you have symlinks pointing to symlinks pointing to symlinks. Does not work too well if the 'st_dev' value is not stable across reboots either.
- Don't use xattrs at all for remapping, instead use hidden files.
eg for a file 'foo', if an xattr is set then create a file '.foo.xattr' in the same directory and store the xattrs in that file in some format. Need to hide this lookaside files from the guest of course.
Quoted 10 lines
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do · line 276
Quoted 6 lines
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +6
-0+This is shown in example (1) below. + +If selectively mapping only a subset of xattr prefixes, +then rules must be added to explicitly block direct +access to the target of the remapping. This is shown +in example (2) below.Example (2) seems to block all the xattrs with prefix even if only one xattr has been remapped.
Quoted 4 lines
So if we remapped "trusted." to "user.virtiofs.trusted.", then client can't set any xattr starting with "user.virtiofs". I am wondering should it be limted to only blocking only "user.virtiofs.trusted.".
Or maybe illustrate with two mappings, so we can show how blocking the parent xattr covers both
Regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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On 6/15/21 10:46 AM, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote, in part:
Quoted 2 lines
- Don't use xattrs at all for remapping, instead use hidden files.
As not every host filesystem will have xattrs, or have xattrs enabled:
Isn't something like the above required of virtiofsd anyway?
Also, for security, you might consider creating a parallel hidden directory tree 'beside' the shared root (so not exposed to the guest) then put the xattrs in files there. So if /var/shared/foo is visible to the guest, /var/shared/.foo.guest_xattrs/ parallels that.
Quoted 119 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 90 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 75 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Different guest xattr prefixes have distinct access control rules applied by the guest. When remapping a guest xattr care must be taken that the remapping does not allow the a guest user to bypass guest kernel access control rules.
For example if 'trusted.*' which requires
CAP_SYS_ADMINis remapped to 'user.virtiofs.trusted.*', an unprivileged guest user which can write to 'user.*' can bypass theCAP_SYS_ADMINcontrol. Thus the target of any remapping must be explicitly blocked from read/writes by the guest, to prevent access control bypass.The examples shown in the virtiofsd man page already do the right thing and ensure safety, but the security implications of getting this wrong were not made explicit. This could lead to host admins and apps unwittingly creating insecure configurations.
Signed-off-by Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>--- docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +28
-4@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ Options timeout. ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of coherency. The default is ``auto``. -xattr-mapping -------------- +Extended attribute (xattr) mapping +---------------------------------- By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to the server file system. This can be a problem where either those xattr names are used@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/server confusion) or if the virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it cannot access some attributes. +Mapping syntax +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=mapping where the ``mapping`` string consists of a series of rules.@@ -232,8 +235,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally does itself. -xattr-mapping Examples ----------------------- +Security considerations +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using +well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different +access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple +partitions + + * ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem + * ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership + +While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes +and access control rules. + +When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to +ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to +evade the guest access control rules. + +Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to +``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged +user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrsdocs/tools/virtiofsd.rst Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do · line 270
Quoted 10 lines
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +10
-0+under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access +control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing +to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``. + +As noted above, the partitions used and access controls +applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to +try to predict what the guest OS will use. + +The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is +to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix.Remapping all xattrs seem to make sense. It probably will lead to less confusion. Nested guests add another level of redirection.
Quoted 6 lines
BTW, remapping xattr has limitation that it does not work on symlinks. So "user.*" can't be set on symlink. And that means selinux relabeling of symlinks fails with remapped xattrs.
Not sure how to address this limitation. Host kernel imposes this limit. (man xattr).
Oh fun, I had not noticed this limitation before :-(
Here are some ideas I had, none especially nice
- Use 'trusted.*' namespace for remapping instead of 'user.'
virtiofsd needs to have
CAP_SYS_ADMINthough which is quite horrible if your goal is to confine its privileges in any meaningful way- Store a symlinks' xattr on the target of the symlink
if the symlink has dev:inode 54:224, and points to a file 'foo', then on 'foo' create an xattr "user.virtiofs.link:54:224.<original xattrpath>"
This gets quite horrendous when you have symlinks pointing to symlinks pointing to symlinks. Does not work too well if the '
st_dev' value is not stable across reboots either.
Quoted 7 lines
- Don't use xattrs at all for remapping, instead use hidden files.
eg for a file 'foo', if an xattr is set then create a file '.foo.xattr' in the same directory and store the xattrs in that file in some format. Need to hide this lookaside files from the guest of course.
I kind of like this idea of creating a regular file, say .user.virtiofs.foo.xattr. So any file prefixed by ".user.virtiofs" will be hidden from guest.
And probably same can be done for selinux labels for special files (device nodes, pipes, sockets etc).
Thanks
Vivek
Quoted 5 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
- Store a symlinks' xattr on the target of the symlink
if the symlink has dev:inode 54:224, and points to a file 'foo', then on 'foo' create an xattr "user.virtiofs.link:54:224.<original xattrpath>"
Atomicity issues here. If you do this, virtiofsd will need a 'xattr write intent journal' somewhere....
Quoted 128 lines · * Vivek Goyal ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 119 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 90 lines · Vivek Goyal
Quoted 75 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Different guest xattr prefixes have distinct access control rules applied by the guest. When remapping a guest xattr care must be taken that the remapping does not allow the a guest user to bypass guest kernel access control rules.
For example if 'trusted.*' which requires
CAP_SYS_ADMINis remapped to 'user.virtiofs.trusted.*', an unprivileged guest user which can write to 'user.*' can bypass theCAP_SYS_ADMINcontrol. Thus the target of any remapping must be explicitly blocked from read/writes by the guest, to prevent access control bypass.The examples shown in the virtiofsd man page already do the right thing and ensure safety, but the security implications of getting this wrong were not made explicit. This could lead to host admins and apps unwittingly creating insecure configurations.
Signed-off-by Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>--- docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +28
-4@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ Options timeout. ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of coherency. The default is ``auto``. -xattr-mapping -------------- +Extended attribute (xattr) mapping +---------------------------------- By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to the server file system. This can be a problem where either those xattr names are used@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/server confusion) or if the virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it cannot access some attributes. +Mapping syntax +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=mapping where the ``mapping`` string consists of a series of rules.@@ -232,8 +235,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally does itself. -xattr-mapping Examples ----------------------- +Security considerations +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using +well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different +access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple +partitions + + * ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem + * ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership + +While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes +and access control rules. + +When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to +ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to +evade the guest access control rules. + +Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to +``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged +user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrsdocs/tools/virtiofsd.rst Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do · line 270
Quoted 10 lines
docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +10
-0+under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access +control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing +to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``. + +As noted above, the partitions used and access controls +applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to +try to predict what the guest OS will use. + +The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is +to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix.Remapping all xattrs seem to make sense. It probably will lead to less confusion. Nested guests add another level of redirection.
Quoted 6 lines
BTW, remapping xattr has limitation that it does not work on symlinks. So "user.*" can't be set on symlink. And that means selinux relabeling of symlinks fails with remapped xattrs.
Not sure how to address this limitation. Host kernel imposes this limit. (man xattr).
Oh fun, I had not noticed this limitation before :-(
Here are some ideas I had, none especially nice
- Use 'trusted.*' namespace for remapping instead of 'user.'
virtiofsd needs to have
CAP_SYS_ADMINthough which is quite horrible if your goal is to confine its privileges in any meaningful way- Store a symlinks' xattr on the target of the symlink
if the symlink has dev:inode 54:224, and points to a file 'foo', then on 'foo' create an xattr "user.virtiofs.link:54:224.<original xattrpath>"
This gets quite horrendous when you have symlinks pointing to symlinks pointing to symlinks. Does not work too well if the '
st_dev' value is not stable across reboots either.Quoted 7 lines
- Don't use xattrs at all for remapping, instead use hidden files.
eg for a file 'foo', if an xattr is set then create a file '.foo.xattr' in the same directory and store the xattrs in that file in some format. Need to hide this lookaside files from the guest of course.
Quoted 6 lines
I kind of like this idea of creating a regular file, say .user.virtiofs.foo.xattr. So any file prefixed by ".user.virtiofs" will be hidden from guest.
And probably same can be done for selinux labels for special files (device nodes, pipes, sockets etc).
Except that splitting the attrs from the file makes it a nightmare to deal with renames and anything else that might be expected to happen atomically.
Dave
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks
Vivek
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Quoted 11 lines · * Daniel P. Berrangé ([email protected]) wrote:
Different guest xattr prefixes have distinct access control rules applied by the guest. When remapping a guest xattr care must be taken that the remapping does not allow the a guest user to bypass guest kernel access control rules.
For example if 'trusted.*' which requires
CAP_SYS_ADMINis remapped to 'user.virtiofs.trusted.*', an unprivileged guest user which can write to 'user.*' can bypass theCAP_SYS_ADMINcontrol. Thus the target of any remapping must be explicitly blocked from read/writes by the guest, to prevent access control bypass.
Quoted 6 lines
The examples shown in the virtiofsd man page already do the right thing and ensure safety, but the security implications of getting this wrong were not made explicit. This could lead to host admins and apps unwittingly creating insecure configurations.
Signed-off-by Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>
Vivek's point about symlinks is something we should add but that's kind of separate to the clarification you've explained here.
Dave
Quoted 94 lines
--- docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +50
-5@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ Options timeout. ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of coherency. The default is ``auto``. -xattr-mapping -------------- +Extended attribute (xattr) mapping +---------------------------------- By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to the server file system. This can be a problem where either those xattr names are used@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/server confusion) or if the virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it cannot access some attributes. +Mapping syntax +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=mapping where the ``mapping`` string consists of a series of rules.@@ -232,8 +235,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally does itself. -xattr-mapping Examples ----------------------- +Security considerations +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using +well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different +access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple +partitions + + * ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem + * ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership + +While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes +and access control rules. + +When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to +ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to +evade the guest access control rules. + +Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to +``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged +user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrs +under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access +control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing +to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``. + +As noted above, the partitions used and access controls +applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to +try to predict what the guest OS will use. + +The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is +to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix. +This is shown in example (1) below. + +If selectively mapping only a subset of xattr prefixes, +then rules must be added to explicitly block direct +access to the target of the remapping. This is shown +in example (2) below. + +Mapping examples +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1) Prefix all attributes with 'user.virtiofs.'@@ -270,7 +313,9 @@ stripping of 'user.virtiofs.'. The second rule hides unprefixed 'trusted.' attributes on the host. The third rule stops a guest from explicitly setting -the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly. +the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly to prevent access +control bypass on the target of the earlier prefix +remapping. Finally, the fourth rule lets all remaining attributes through.Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Quoted 11 lines · * Daniel P. Berrangé ([email protected]) wrote:
Different guest xattr prefixes have distinct access control rules applied by the guest. When remapping a guest xattr care must be taken that the remapping does not allow the a guest user to bypass guest kernel access control rules.
For example if 'trusted.*' which requires
CAP_SYS_ADMINis remapped to 'user.virtiofs.trusted.*', an unprivileged guest user which can write to 'user.*' can bypass theCAP_SYS_ADMINcontrol. Thus the target of any remapping must be explicitly blocked from read/writes by the guest, to prevent access control bypass.
Quoted 6 lines
The examples shown in the virtiofsd man page already do the right thing and ensure safety, but the security implications of getting this wrong were not made explicit. This could lead to host admins and apps unwittingly creating insecure configurations.
Signed-off-by Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>
Queued
Quoted 95 lines
--- docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)docs/tools/virtiofsd.rst +50
-5@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ Options timeout. ``always`` sets a long cache lifetime at the expense of coherency. The default is ``auto``. -xattr-mapping -------------- +Extended attribute (xattr) mapping +---------------------------------- By default the name of xattr's used by the client are passed through to the server file system. This can be a problem where either those xattr names are used@@ -136,6 +136,9 @@ by something on the server (e.g. selinux client/server confusion) or if the virtiofsd is running in a container with restricted privileges where it cannot access some attributes. +Mapping syntax +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + A mapping of xattr names can be made using -o xattrmap=mapping where the ``mapping`` string consists of a series of rules.@@ -232,8 +235,48 @@ Note: When the 'security.capability' xattr is remapped, the daemon has to do extra work to remove it during many operations, which the host kernel normally does itself. -xattr-mapping Examples ----------------------- +Security considerations +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Operating systems typically partition the xattr namespace using +well defined name prefixes. Each partition may have different +access controls applied. For example, on Linux there are multiple +partitions + + * ``system.*`` - access varies depending on attribute & filesystem + * ``security.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``trusted.*`` - only processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN + * ``user.*`` - any process granted by file permissions / ownership + +While other OS such as FreeBSD have different name prefixes +and access control rules. + +When remapping attributes on the host, it is important to +ensure that the remapping does not allow a guest user to +evade the guest access control rules. + +Consider if ``trusted.*`` from the guest was remapped to +``user.virtiofs.trusted*`` in the host. An unprivileged +user in a Linux guest has the ability to write to xattrs +under ``user.*``. Thus the user can evade the access +control restriction on ``trusted.*`` by instead writing +to ``user.virtiofs.trusted.*``. + +As noted above, the partitions used and access controls +applied, will vary across guest OS, so it is not wise to +try to predict what the guest OS will use. + +The simplest way to avoid an insecure configuration is +to remap all xattrs at once, to a given fixed prefix. +This is shown in example (1) below. + +If selectively mapping only a subset of xattr prefixes, +then rules must be added to explicitly block direct +access to the target of the remapping. This is shown +in example (2) below. + +Mapping examples +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1) Prefix all attributes with 'user.virtiofs.'@@ -270,7 +313,9 @@ stripping of 'user.virtiofs.'. The second rule hides unprefixed 'trusted.' attributes on the host. The third rule stops a guest from explicitly setting -the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly. +the 'user.virtiofs.' path directly to prevent access +control bypass on the target of the earlier prefix +remapping. Finally, the fourth rule lets all remaining attributes through.Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK