ceph+fscrypt: context, filename and symlink support
Subsystems (4)
v7 cover ceph+fscrypt: context, filename and symlink support
This patchset is a fairly substantial rework since the last set. Rather than storing the crypto context in an xattr, this one stores it in a new field associated with AUTH caps. That ensures that it's always available whenever an inode is instantiated, and should prevent the deadlock that Luis reported. This means that we need to do a setattr request to set the context now, so support for that is also added.
The required MDS patches are currently here:
https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/41284
...but it's marked as draft for now. I don't want to merge this until the content encryption piece is more clearly defined. These patches are also available in my git tree under the ceph-fscrypt-fnames-v7 tag:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jlayton/linux.git/
This seems to be reasonably robust in testing. The next step is content encryption. I have a start on some of those patches, but it's still very much a WIP.
Jeff Layton (24):
vfs: export new_inode_pseudo
fscrypt: export fscrypt_base64_encode and fscrypt_base64_decode
fscrypt: export fscrypt_fname_encrypt and fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size
fscrypt: add fscrypt_context_for_new_inode
ceph: preallocate inode for ops that may create one
ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
ceph: add fscrypt_* handling to caps.c
ceph: add ability to set fscrypt_auth via setattr
ceph: crypto context handling for ceph
ceph: implement -o test_dummy_encryption mount option
ceph: add routine to create fscrypt context prior to RPC
ceph: add fscrypt ioctls
ceph: decode alternate_name in lease info
ceph: make ceph_msdc_build_path use ref-walk
ceph: add encrypted fname handling to ceph_mdsc_build_path
ceph: send altname in MClientRequest
ceph: properly set DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME flag in lookup
ceph: make d_revalidate call fscrypt revalidator for encrypted
dentries
ceph: add helpers for converting names for userland presentation
ceph: add fscrypt support to ceph_fill_trace
ceph: add support to readdir for encrypted filenames
ceph: create symlinks with encrypted and base64-encoded targets
ceph: make ceph_get_name decrypt filenames
ceph: add a new ceph.fscrypt.auth vxattr
fs/ceph/Makefile | 1 + fs/ceph/acl.c | 4 +- fs/ceph/caps.c | 62 +++++-- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 206 +++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 119 ++++++++++++ fs/ceph/dir.c | 198 +++++++++++++++----- fs/ceph/export.c | 44 +++-- fs/ceph/file.c | 64 ++++--- fs/ceph/inode.c | 302 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/ceph/ioctl.c | 83 +++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 345 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 22 ++- fs/ceph/super.c | 80 +++++++- fs/ceph/super.h | 32 +++- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 20 ++ fs/crypto/fname.c | 53 ++++-- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 9 +- fs/crypto/hooks.c | 6 +- fs/crypto/policy.c | 34 +++- fs/inode.c | 1 + include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 21 ++- include/linux/fscrypt.h | 10 + 22 files changed, 1498 insertions(+), 218 deletions(-) create mode 100644 fs/ceph/crypto.c create mode 100644 fs/ceph/crypto.h
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 1/24 vfs: export new_inode_pseudo
Ceph needs to be able to allocate inodes ahead of a create that might involve a fscrypt-encrypted inode. new_inode() almost fits the bill, but it puts the inode on the sb->s_inodes list and when we go to hash it, that might be done again.
We could work around that by setting I_CREATING on the new inode, but that causes ilookup5 to return -ESTALE if something tries to find it before I_NEW is cleared. This is desirable behavior for most filesystems, but doesn't work for ceph.
To work around all of this, just use new_inode_pseudo which doesn't add it to the sb->s_inodes list.
--- fs/inode.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/inode.c +1 -0
@@ -941,6 +941,7 @@ struct inode *new_inode_pseudo(struct super_block *sb) }return inode; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (new_inode_pseudo);/** * new_inode - obtain an inode
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 2/24 fscrypt: export fscrypt_base64_encode and fscrypt_base64_decode
In reply to Jeff LaytonCeph is going to add fscrypt support, but we still want encrypted filenames to be composed of printable characters, so we can maintain compatibility with clients that don't support fscrypt.
We could just adopt fscrypt's current nokey name format, but that is subject to change in the future, and it also contains dirhash fields that we don't need for cephfs. Because of this, we're going to concoct our own scheme for encoding encrypted filenames. It's very similar to fscrypt's current scheme, but doesn't bother with the dirhash fields.
The ceph encoding scheme will use base64 encoding as well, and we also want it to avoid characters that are illegal in filenames. Export the fscrypt base64 encoding/decoding routines so we can use them in ceph's fscrypt implementation.
--- fs/crypto/fname.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- include/linux/fscrypt.h | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
fs/crypto/fname.c +24 -10
@@ -178,10 +178,8 @@ static int fname_decrypt(const struct inode *inode,static const char lookup_table[65 ] ="ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+," ; -#define BASE64_CHARS (nbytes) DIV_ROUND_UP((nbytes) * 4, 3) -/** -* base64_encode() - base64-encode some bytes +* fscrypt_base64_encode() - base64-encode some bytes * @src: the bytes to encode * @len: number of bytes to encode * @dst: (output) the base64-encoded string. Not NUL-terminated.
@@ -191,7 +189,7 @@ static const char lookup_table[65] =* * Return: length of the encoded string */ -static int base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst) +int fscrypt_base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst) {int i, bits =0 , ac =0 ;char *cp = dst;
@@ -209,8 +207,20 @@ static int base64_encode(const u8 *src, int len, char *dst) *cp++ = lookup_table[ac &0x3f ];return cp - dst; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (fscrypt_base64_encode); -static int base64_decode (const char *src,int len,u8 *dst) +/** +* fscrypt_base64_decode() - base64-decode some bytes +* @src: the bytes to decode +* @len: number of bytes to decode +* @dst: (output) decoded binary data +* +* Decode an input string that was previously encoded using +* fscrypt_base64_encode. +* +* Return: length of the decoded binary data +*/ +int fscrypt_base64_decode (const char *src,int len,u8 *dst) {int i, bits =0 , ac =0 ;const char *p;
@@ -232,6 +242,7 @@ static int base64_decode(const char *src, int len, u8 *dst)return -1 ;return cp - dst; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (fscrypt_base64_decode); bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const union fscrypt_policy *policy, u32 orig_len, u32 max_len,
@@ -263,8 +274,9 @@ bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,int fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer (u32 max_encrypted_len,struct fscrypt_str *crypto_str) { -const u32 max_encoded_len =BASE64_CHARS (FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX );u32 max_presented_len; +const u32 max_encoded_len = +FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS (FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX ); max_presented_len =max (max_encoded_len, max_encrypted_len);
@@ -342,7 +354,7 @@ int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(const struct inode *inode, offsetof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, bytes)); BUILD_BUG_ON(offsetofend(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, bytes) != offsetof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, sha256)); -BUILD_BUG_ON (BASE64_CHARS (FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX ) >NAME_MAX ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS (FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX ) >NAME_MAX );if (hash) { nokey_name.dirhash[0 ] = hash;
@@ -362,7 +374,8 @@ int fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(const struct inode *inode, nokey_name.sha256); size =FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX ; } - oname->len =base64_encode ((const u8 *)&nokey_name, size, oname->name); + oname->len =fscrypt_base64_encode ((const u8 *)&nokey_name, size, + oname->name);return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr);
@@ -436,14 +449,15 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,* user-supplied name */ -if (iname->len >BASE64_CHARS (FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX )) +if (iname->len >FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS (FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX ))return -ENOENT ; fname->crypto_buf.name =kmalloc (FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX ,GFP_KERNEL );if (fname->crypto_buf.name ==NULL )return -ENOMEM ; - ret =base64_decode (iname->name, iname->len, fname->crypto_buf.name); + ret =fscrypt_base64_decode (iname->name, iname->len, + fname->crypto_buf.name); if (ret < (int)offsetof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, bytes[1]) || (ret > offsetof(struct fscrypt_nokey_name, sha256) && ret != FSCRYPT_NOKEY_NAME_MAX)) {
include/linux/fscrypt.h +5 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@ struct fscrypt_name {/* Maximum value for the third parameter of fscrypt_operations.set_context(). */ #define FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE 40 +/* Calculate worst-case base64 encoding inflation */ +#define FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS (nbytes) DIV_ROUND_UP((nbytes) * 4, 3) +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION /* * fscrypt superblock flags
@@ -207,6 +210,8 @@ void fscrypt_free_inode(struct inode *inode);int fscrypt_drop_inode (struct inode *inode);/* fname.c */ +int fscrypt_base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst); +int fscrypt_base64_decode (const char *src,int len,u8 *dst);int fscrypt_setup_filename (struct inode *inode,const struct qstr *iname,int lookup,struct fscrypt_name *fname);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 3/24 fscrypt: export fscrypt_fname_encrypt and fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size
In reply to Jeff LaytonFor ceph, we want to use our own scheme for handling filenames that are are longer than NAME_MAX after encryption and base64 encoding. This allows us to have a consistent view of the encrypted filenames for clients that don't support fscrypt and clients that do but that don't have the key.
Currently, fs/crypto only supports encrypting filenames using fscrypt_setup_filename, but that also handles encoding nokey names. Ceph can't use that because it handles nokey names in a different way.
Export fscrypt_fname_encrypt. Rename fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size to __fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size and add a new wrapper called fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size that takes an inode argument rather than a pointer to a fscrypt_policy union.
--- fs/crypto/fname.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 9 +++------ fs/crypto/hooks.c | 6 +++--- include/linux/fscrypt.h | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
fs/crypto/fname.c +14 -5
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ int fscrypt_fname_encrypt(const struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *iname,return 0 ; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (fscrypt_fname_encrypt);/** * fname_decrypt() - decrypt a filename
@@ -244,9 +245,9 @@ int fscrypt_base64_decode(const char *src, int len, u8 *dst) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (fscrypt_base64_decode); -bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (const union fscrypt_policy *policy, -u32 orig_len,u32 max_len, -u32 *encrypted_len_ret) +bool __fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (const union fscrypt_policy *policy, +u32 orig_len,u32 max_len, +u32 *encrypted_len_ret) {int padding =4 << (fscrypt_policy_flags (policy) &FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_MASK );
@@ -260,6 +261,15 @@ bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,return true; } +bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (const struct inode *inode,u32 orig_len, +u32 max_len,u32 *encrypted_len_ret) +{ +return __fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (&inode->i_crypt_info->ci_policy, + orig_len, max_len, + encrypted_len_ret); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size); +/** * fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer() - allocate a buffer for presented filenames * @max_encrypted_len: maximum length of encrypted filenames the buffer will be
@@ -422,8 +432,7 @@ int fscrypt_setup_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *iname,return ret;if (fscrypt_has_encryption_key (dir)) { -if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (&dir->i_crypt_info->ci_policy, - iname->len, +if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (dir, iname->len, dir->i_sb->s_cop->max_namelen, &fname->crypto_buf.len))return -ENAMETOOLONG ;
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +3 -6
@@ -292,14 +292,11 @@ void fscrypt_generate_iv(union fscrypt_iv *iv, u64 lblk_num, const struct fscrypt_info *ci);/* fname.c */ -int fscrypt_fname_encrypt (const struct inode *inode,const struct qstr *iname, -u8 *out,unsigned int olen); -bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (const union fscrypt_policy *policy, -u32 orig_len,u32 max_len, -u32 *encrypted_len_ret); +bool __fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (const union fscrypt_policy *policy, +u32 orig_len,u32 max_len, +u32 *encrypted_len_ret);/* hkdf.c */ -struct fscrypt_hkdf {struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; };
fs/crypto/hooks.c +3 -3
@@ -228,9 +228,9 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, const char *target,* counting it (even though it is meaningless for ciphertext) is simpler * for now since filesystems will assume it is there and subtract it. */ -if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (policy, len, - max_len -sizeof (struct fscrypt_symlink_data ), - &disk_link->len)) +if (!__fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (policy, len, + max_len -sizeof (struct fscrypt_symlink_data ), + &disk_link->len))return -ENAMETOOLONG ; disk_link->len +=sizeof (struct fscrypt_symlink_data );
include/linux/fscrypt.h +4 -0
@@ -212,6 +212,10 @@ int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode);/* fname.c */ int fscrypt_base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst);int fscrypt_base64_decode (const char *src,int len,u8 *dst); +bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (const struct inode *inode,u32 orig_len, +u32 max_len,u32 *encrypted_len_ret); +int fscrypt_fname_encrypt (const struct inode *inode,const struct qstr *iname, +u8 *out,unsigned int olen);int fscrypt_setup_filename (struct inode *inode,const struct qstr *iname,int lookup,struct fscrypt_name *fname);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 4/24 fscrypt: add fscrypt_context_for_new_inode
In reply to Jeff LaytonMost filesystems just call fscrypt_set_context on new inodes, which usually causes a setxattr. That's a bit late for ceph, which can send along a full set of attributes with the create request.
Doing so allows it to avoid race windows that where the new inode could be seen by other clients without the crypto context attached. It also avoids the separate round trip to the server.
Refactor the fscrypt code a bit to allow us to create a new crypto context, attach it to the inode, and write it to the buffer, but without calling set_context on it. ceph can later use this to marshal the context into the attributes we send along with the create request.
--- fs/crypto/policy.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ include/linux/fscrypt.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/crypto/policy.c +28 -6
@@ -664,6 +664,31 @@ const union fscrypt_policy *fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(struct inode *dir)return fscrypt_get_dummy_policy (dir->i_sb); } +/** +* fscrypt_context_for_new_inode() - create an encryption context for a new inode +* @ctx: where context should be written +* @inode: inode from which to fetch policy and nonce +* +* Given an in-core "prepared" (via fscrypt_prepare_new_inode) inode, +* generate a new context and write it to ctx. ctx _must_ be at least +* FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE bytes. +* +* Returns size of the resulting context or a negative error code. +*/ +int fscrypt_context_for_new_inode (void *ctx,struct inode *inode) +{ +struct fscrypt_info *ci = inode->i_crypt_info; + +BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (union fscrypt_context ) !=FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE ); + +/* fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() should have set up the key already. */ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!ci)) +return -ENOKEY ; + +return fscrypt_new_context (ctx, &ci->ci_policy, ci->ci_nonce); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (fscrypt_context_for_new_inode); +/** * fscrypt_set_context() - Set the fscrypt context of a new inode * @inode: a new inode
@@ -680,12 +705,9 @@ int fscrypt_set_context(struct inode *inode, void *fs_data)union fscrypt_context ctx;int ctxsize; -/* fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() should have set up the key already. */ -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!ci)) -return -ENOKEY ; - -BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (ctx) !=FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE ); - ctxsize =fscrypt_new_context (&ctx, &ci->ci_policy, ci->ci_nonce); + ctxsize =fscrypt_context_for_new_inode (&ctx, inode); +if (ctxsize <0 ) +return ctxsize;/* * This may be the first time the inode number is available, so do any
include/linux/fscrypt.h +1 -0
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy(struct file *filp, void __user *arg);int fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex (struct file *filp,void __user *arg);int fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce (struct file *filp,void __user *arg);int fscrypt_has_permitted_context (struct inode *parent,struct inode *child); +int fscrypt_context_for_new_inode (void *ctx,struct inode *inode);int fscrypt_set_context (struct inode *inode,void *fs_data);struct fscrypt_dummy_policy {
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 5/24 ceph: preallocate inode for ops that may create one
In reply to Jeff LaytonWhen creating a new inode, we need to determine the crypto context before we can transmit the RPC. The fscrypt API has a routine for getting a crypto context before a create occurs, but it requires an inode.
Change the ceph code to preallocate an inode in advance of a create of any sort (open(), mknod(), symlink(), etc). Move the existing code that generates the ACL and SELinux blobs into this routine since that's mostly common across all the different codepaths.
In most cases, we just want to allow ceph_fill_trace to use that inode after the reply comes in, so add a new field to the MDS request for it (r_new_inode).
The async create codepath is a bit different though. In that case, we want to hash the inode in advance of the RPC so that it can be used before the reply comes in. If the call subsequently fails with -EJUKEBOX, then just put the references and clean up the as_ctx. Note that with this change, we now need to regenerate the as_ctx when this occurs, but it's quite rare for it to happen.
--- fs/ceph/dir.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- fs/ceph/file.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ceph/inode.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 3 +- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 1 + fs/ceph/super.h | 7 +++- 6 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/dir.c +38 -32
@@ -852,13 +852,6 @@ static int ceph_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, goto out; } - err =ceph_pre_init_acls (dir, &mode, &as_ctx); -if (err <0 ) - goto out; - err =ceph_security_init_secctx (dentry, mode, &as_ctx); -if (err <0 ) - goto out; -dout ("mknod in dir %p dentry %p mode 0%ho rdev %d\n" , dir, dentry, mode, rdev); req =ceph_mdsc_create_request (mdsc,CEPH_MDS_OP_MKNOD ,USE_AUTH_MDS );
@@ -866,6 +859,14 @@ static int ceph_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, err =PTR_ERR (req); goto out; } + + req->r_new_inode =ceph_new_inode (dir, dentry, &mode, &as_ctx); +if (IS_ERR (req->r_new_inode)) { + err =PTR_ERR (req->r_new_inode); + req->r_new_inode =NULL ; + goto out_req; + } + req->r_dentry =dget (dentry); req->r_num_caps =2 ; req->r_parent = dir;
@@ -875,13 +876,13 @@ static int ceph_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, req->r_args.mknod.rdev =cpu_to_le32 (rdev); req->r_dentry_drop =CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED |CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ; req->r_dentry_unless =CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL ; -if (as_ctx.pagelist) { - req->r_pagelist = as_ctx.pagelist; - as_ctx.pagelist =NULL ; - } + +ceph_as_ctx_to_req (req, &as_ctx); + err =ceph_mdsc_do_request (mdsc, dir, req);if (!err && !req->r_reply_info.head->is_dentry) err =ceph_handle_notrace_create (dir, dentry); +out_req:ceph_mdsc_put_request (req); out:if (!err)
@@ -904,6 +905,7 @@ static int ceph_symlink(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc =ceph_sb_to_mdsc (dir->i_sb);struct ceph_mds_request *req;struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx as_ctx = {}; +umode_t mode =S_IFLNK |0777 ;int err;if (ceph_snap (dir) !=CEPH_NOSNAP )
@@ -914,21 +916,24 @@ static int ceph_symlink(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, goto out; } - err =ceph_security_init_secctx (dentry,S_IFLNK |0777 , &as_ctx); -if (err <0 ) - goto out; -dout ("symlink in dir %p dentry %p to '%s'\n" , dir, dentry, dest); req =ceph_mdsc_create_request (mdsc,CEPH_MDS_OP_SYMLINK ,USE_AUTH_MDS );if (IS_ERR (req)) { err =PTR_ERR (req); goto out; } + + req->r_new_inode =ceph_new_inode (dir, dentry, &mode, &as_ctx); +if (IS_ERR (req->r_new_inode)) { + err =PTR_ERR (req->r_new_inode); + req->r_new_inode =NULL ; + goto out_req; + } + req->r_path2 =kstrdup (dest,GFP_KERNEL );if (!req->r_path2) { err = -ENOMEM ; -ceph_mdsc_put_request (req); - goto out; + goto out_req; } req->r_parent = dir;ihold (dir);
@@ -938,13 +943,13 @@ static int ceph_symlink(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, req->r_num_caps =2 ; req->r_dentry_drop =CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED |CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ; req->r_dentry_unless =CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL ; -if (as_ctx.pagelist) { - req->r_pagelist = as_ctx.pagelist; - as_ctx.pagelist =NULL ; - } + +ceph_as_ctx_to_req (req, &as_ctx); + err =ceph_mdsc_do_request (mdsc, dir, req);if (!err && !req->r_reply_info.head->is_dentry) err =ceph_handle_notrace_create (dir, dentry); +out_req:ceph_mdsc_put_request (req); out:if (err)
@@ -980,13 +985,6 @@ static int ceph_mkdir(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, goto out; } - mode |=S_IFDIR ; - err =ceph_pre_init_acls (dir, &mode, &as_ctx); -if (err <0 ) - goto out; - err =ceph_security_init_secctx (dentry, mode, &as_ctx); -if (err <0 ) - goto out; req =ceph_mdsc_create_request (mdsc, op,USE_AUTH_MDS );if (IS_ERR (req)) {
@@ -994,6 +992,14 @@ static int ceph_mkdir(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, goto out; } + mode |=S_IFDIR ; + req->r_new_inode =ceph_new_inode (dir, dentry, &mode, &as_ctx); +if (IS_ERR (req->r_new_inode)) { + err =PTR_ERR (req->r_new_inode); + req->r_new_inode =NULL ; + goto out_req; + } + req->r_dentry =dget (dentry); req->r_num_caps =2 ; req->r_parent = dir;
@@ -1002,15 +1008,15 @@ static int ceph_mkdir(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, req->r_args.mkdir.mode =cpu_to_le32 (mode); req->r_dentry_drop =CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED |CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ; req->r_dentry_unless =CEPH_CAP_FILE_EXCL ; -if (as_ctx.pagelist) { - req->r_pagelist = as_ctx.pagelist; - as_ctx.pagelist =NULL ; - } + +ceph_as_ctx_to_req (req, &as_ctx); + err =ceph_mdsc_do_request (mdsc, dir, req);if (!err && !req->r_reply_info.head->is_target && !req->r_reply_info.head->is_dentry) err =ceph_handle_notrace_create (dir, dentry); +out_req:ceph_mdsc_put_request (req); out:if (!err)
fs/ceph/file.c +38 -24
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fs/ceph/inode.c +75 -7
113 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +2 -1
@@ -831,6 +831,7 @@ void ceph_mdsc_release_request(struct kref *kref)iput (req->r_parent); }iput (req->r_target_inode); +iput (req->r_new_inode);if (req->r_dentry)dput (req->r_dentry);if (req->r_old_dentry)
@@ -3237,7 +3238,7 @@ static void handle_reply(struct ceph_mds_session *session, struct ceph_msg *msg) .snap = le64_to_cpu(rinfo->targeti.in->snapid) }; - in =ceph_get_inode (mdsc->fsc->sb, tvino); + in =ceph_get_inode (mdsc->fsc->sb, tvino,xchg (&req->r_new_inode,NULL ));if (IS_ERR (in)) { err =PTR_ERR (in);mutex_lock (&session->s_mutex);
fs/ceph/mds_client.h +1 -0
@@ -259,6 +259,7 @@ struct ceph_mds_request {struct inode *r_parent;/* parent dir inode */ struct inode *r_target_inode;/* resulting inode */ +struct inode *r_new_inode;/* new inode (for creates) */ #define CEPH_MDS_R_DIRECT_IS_HASH (1)/* r_direct_hash is valid */ #define CEPH_MDS_R_ABORTED (2)/* call was aborted */
fs/ceph/super.h +6 -1
@@ -958,6 +958,7 @@ static inline bool __ceph_have_pending_cap_snap(struct ceph_inode_info *ci)/* inode.c */ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in ;struct ceph_mds_reply_dirfrag ; +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx ;extern const struct inode_operations ceph_file_iops;
@@ -965,8 +966,12 @@ extern struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb);extern void ceph_evict_inode (struct inode *inode);extern void ceph_free_inode (struct inode *inode); +struct inode *ceph_new_inode (struct inode *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +umode_t *mode,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx); +void ceph_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx); +extern struct inode *ceph_get_inode (struct super_block *sb, -struct ceph_vino vino); +struct ceph_vino vino,struct inode *newino);extern struct inode *ceph_get_snapdir (struct inode *parent);extern int ceph_fill_file_size (struct inode *inode,int issued,u32 truncate_seq,u64 truncate_size,u64 size);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 6/24 ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
In reply to Jeff Layton...and store them in the ceph_inode_info.
--- fs/ceph/file.c | 2 ++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+)
fs/ceph/file.c +2 -0
@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, iinfo.xattr_data = xattr_buf;memset (iinfo.xattr_data,0 , iinfo.xattr_len); +/* FIXME: set fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + in.ino =cpu_to_le64 (vino.ino); in.snapid =cpu_to_le64 (CEPH_NOSNAP ); in.version =cpu_to_le64 (1 );// ???
fs/ceph/inode.c +18 -0
@@ -611,6 +611,13 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_meta_err =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + ci->fscrypt_file =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +#endif +return &ci->vfs_inode; }
@@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode)struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);kfree (ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free (ceph_inode_cachep, ci); }
@@ -1021,6 +1031,14 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, xattr_blob =NULL ; } +if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && !ci->fscrypt_auth) { + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; +inode_set_flags (inode,S_ENCRYPTED ,S_ENCRYPTED ); + } +/* finally update i_version */ if (le64_to_cpu (info->version) > ci->i_version) ci->i_version =le64_to_cpu (info->version);
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +44 -0
58 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/ceph/mds_client.h +4 -0
@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in {s32 dir_pin;struct ceph_timespec btime;struct ceph_timespec snap_btime; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len;u64 rsnaps;u64 change_attr; };
fs/ceph/super.h +6 -0
@@ -429,6 +429,12 @@ struct ceph_inode_info {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE struct fscache_cookie *fscache; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file;#endif errseq_t i_meta_err;
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 7/24 ceph: add fscrypt_* handling to caps.c
In reply to Jeff Layton--- fs/ceph/caps.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/caps.c +49 -13
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include <linux/ceph/decode.h> #include <linux/ceph/messenger.h>
@@ -1229,15 +1230,12 @@ struct cap_msg_args {umode_t mode;bool inline_data;bool wake; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 fscrypt_auth[sizeof (struct ceph_fscrypt_auth )];// for context +u8 fscrypt_file[sizeof (u64)];// for size }; -/* -* cap struct size + flock buffer size + inline version + inline data size + -* osd_epoch_barrier + oldest_flush_tid -*/ -#define CAP_MSG_SIZE (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ - 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4) -/* Marshal up the cap msg to the MDS */ static void encode_cap_msg (struct ceph_msg *msg,struct cap_msg_args *arg) {
@@ -1253,7 +1251,7 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) arg->size, arg->max_size, arg->xattr_version, arg->xattr_buf ? (int)arg->xattr_buf->vec.iov_len : 0); - msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (10 ); + msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (12 ); msg->hdr.tid =cpu_to_le64 (arg->flush_tid); fc = msg->front.iov_base;
@@ -1324,6 +1322,16 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg)/* Advisory flags (version 10) */ ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->flags); + +/* dirstats (version 11) - these are r/o on the client */ +ceph_encode_64 (&p,0 ); +ceph_encode_64 (&p,0 ); + +/* fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file (version 12) */ +ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); +ceph_encode_copy (&p, arg->fscrypt_auth, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); +ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->fscrypt_file_len); +ceph_encode_copy (&p, arg->fscrypt_file, arg->fscrypt_file_len); }/*
@@ -1445,6 +1453,26 @@ static void __prep_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_cap *cap, } } arg->flags = flags; +if (ci->fscrypt_auth_len && +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth_len !=sizeof (struct ceph_fscrypt_auth ))) { +/* Don't set this if it isn't right size */ + arg->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + }else { + arg->fscrypt_auth_len = ci->fscrypt_auth_len; +memcpy (arg->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth, +min_t (size_t, ci->fscrypt_auth_len,sizeof (arg->fscrypt_auth))); + } +/* FIXME: use this to track "real" size */ + arg->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +} + +#define CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 4) + +static inline int cap_msg_size (struct cap_msg_args *arg) +{ +return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS + arg->fscrypt_auth_len + + arg->fscrypt_file_len; }/*
@@ -1457,7 +1485,7 @@ static void __send_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_inode_info *ci)struct ceph_msg *msg;struct inode *inode = &ci->vfs_inode; - msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,CAP_MSG_SIZE ,GFP_NOFS , false); + msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,cap_msg_size (arg),GFP_NOFS , false);if (!msg) { pr_err("error allocating cap msg: ino (%llx.%llx) flushing %s tid %llu, requeuing cap.\n", ceph_vinop(inode), ceph_cap_string(arg->dirty),
@@ -1483,10 +1511,6 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode,struct cap_msg_args arg;struct ceph_msg *msg; - msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,CAP_MSG_SIZE ,GFP_NOFS , false); -if (!msg) -return -ENOMEM ; - arg.session = session; arg.ino =ceph_vino (inode).ino; arg.cid =0 ;
@@ -1524,6 +1548,18 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode, arg.flags =0 ; arg.wake = false; +/* +* No fscrypt_auth changes from a capsnap. It will need +* to update fscrypt_file on size changes (TODO). +*/ + arg.fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + arg.fscrypt_file_len =0 ; + + msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,cap_msg_size (&arg), +GFP_NOFS , false); +if (!msg) +return -ENOMEM ; +encode_cap_msg (msg, &arg);ceph_con_send (&arg.session->s_con, msg);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 8/24 ceph: add ability to set fscrypt_auth via setattr
In reply to Jeff Layton--- fs/ceph/acl.c | 4 ++-- fs/ceph/inode.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 3 +++ fs/ceph/super.h | 7 ++++++- include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/acl.c +2 -2
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, newattrs.ia_ctime =current_time (inode); newattrs.ia_mode = new_mode; newattrs.ia_valid =ATTR_MODE |ATTR_CTIME ; - ret =__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs); + ret =__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs,NULL );if (ret) goto out_free; }
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, newattrs.ia_ctime = old_ctime; newattrs.ia_mode = old_mode; newattrs.ia_valid =ATTR_MODE |ATTR_CTIME ; -__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs); +__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs,NULL ); } goto out_free; }
fs/ceph/inode.c +28 -2
@@ -2086,7 +2086,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations ceph_symlink_iops = { .listxattr = ceph_listxattr, }; -int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr) +int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr,struct ceph_iattr *cia) {struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
@@ -2127,6 +2127,32 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)dout ("setattr %p issued %s\n" , inode,ceph_cap_string (issued)); +if (cia && cia->fscrypt_auth) { +u32 len = offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob) + +le32_to_cpu (cia->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + +if (len >sizeof (*cia->fscrypt_auth)) +return -EINVAL ; + +dout ("setattr %llx:%llx fscrypt_auth len %u to %u)\n" , +ceph_vinop (inode), ci->fscrypt_auth_len, len); + +/* It should never be re-set once set */ +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth); + +if (issued &CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ) { + dirtied |=CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ; +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); + ci->fscrypt_auth = (u8 *)cia->fscrypt_auth; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = len; + }else if ((issued &CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED ) ==0 ) { + req->r_fscrypt_auth = cia->fscrypt_auth; + mask |=CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH ; + release |=CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED ; + } + cia->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + } +if (ia_valid &ATTR_UID ) { dout("setattr %p uid %d -> %d\n", inode, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid),
@@ -2324,7 +2350,7 @@ int ceph_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, ceph_quota_is_max_bytes_exceeded(inode, attr->ia_size))return -EDQUOT ; - err =__ceph_setattr (inode, attr); + err =__ceph_setattr (inode, attr,NULL );if (err >=0 && (attr->ia_valid &ATTR_MODE )) err =posix_acl_chmod (&init_user_ns, inode, attr->ia_mode);
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +26 -5
@@ -2529,8 +2529,7 @@ static int set_request_path_attr(struct inode *rinode, struct dentry *rdentry,return r; } -static void encode_timestamp_and_gids (void **p, -const struct ceph_mds_request *req) +static void encode_mclientrequest_tail (void **p,const struct ceph_mds_request *req) {struct ceph_timespec ts;int i;
@@ -2543,6 +2542,21 @@ static void encode_timestamp_and_gids(void **p,for (i =0 ; i < req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups; i++)ceph_encode_64 (p,from_kgid (&init_user_ns, req->r_cred->group_info->gid[i])); + +/* v5: altname (TODO: skip for now) */ +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 ); + +/* v6: fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ +if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { +u32 authlen =le32_to_cpu (req->r_fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + + authlen += offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob); +ceph_encode_32 (p, authlen); +ceph_encode_copy (p, req->r_fscrypt_auth, authlen); + }else { +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 ); + } +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 );// fscrypt_file for now }/*
@@ -2591,6 +2605,13 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, len += pathlen1 + pathlen2 +2 *(1 +sizeof (u32) +sizeof (u64)) +sizeof (struct ceph_timespec ); len +=sizeof (u32) + (sizeof (u64) * req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); + len +=sizeof (u32);// altname + len +=sizeof (u32);// fscrypt_auth +if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { + len += offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob); + len +=le32_to_cpu (req->r_fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + } + len +=sizeof (u32);// fscrypt_file /* calculate (max) length for cap releases */ len += sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_release) *
@@ -2621,7 +2642,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, }else {struct ceph_mds_request_head *new_head = msg->front.iov_base; - msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (4 ); + msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (6 ); new_head->version =cpu_to_le16 (CEPH_MDS_REQUEST_HEAD_VERSION ); head = (struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *)&new_head->oldest_client_tid; p = msg->front.iov_base +sizeof (*new_head);
@@ -2672,7 +2693,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, head->num_releases =cpu_to_le16 (releases); -encode_timestamp_and_gids (&p, req); +encode_mclientrequest_tail (&p, req);if (WARN_ON_ONCE (p > end)) {ceph_msg_put (msg);
@@ -2781,7 +2802,7 @@ static int __prepare_send_request(struct ceph_mds_session *session, rhead->num_releases =0 ; p = msg->front.iov_base + req->r_request_release_offset; -encode_timestamp_and_gids (&p, req); +encode_mclientrequest_tail (&p, req); msg->front.iov_len = p - msg->front.iov_base; msg->hdr.front_len =cpu_to_le32 (msg->front.iov_len);
fs/ceph/mds_client.h +3 -0
@@ -278,6 +278,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_request {struct mutex r_fill_mutex;union ceph_mds_request_args r_args; + +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *r_fscrypt_auth; +int r_fmode;/* file mode, if expecting cap */ const struct cred *r_cred;int r_request_release_offset;
fs/ceph/super.h +6 -1
@@ -1035,7 +1035,12 @@ static inline int ceph_do_getattr(struct inode *inode, int mask, bool force) }extern int ceph_permission (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct inode *inode,int mask); -extern int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr); + +struct ceph_iattr { +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fscrypt_auth; +}; + +extern int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr,struct ceph_iattr *cia);extern int ceph_setattr (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *attr); extern int ceph_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h +13 -8
@@ -355,14 +355,19 @@ enum {extern const char *ceph_mds_op_name (int op); - -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE 1 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID 2 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID 4 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME 8 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME 16 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE 32 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME 64 +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE (1 << 0) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID (1 << 1) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID (1 << 2) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME (1 << 3) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME (1 << 4) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE (1 << 5) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME (1 << 6) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME_NOW (1 << 7) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME_NOW (1 << 8) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_BTIME (1 << 9) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_KILL_SGUID (1 << 10) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH (1 << 11) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_FILE (1 << 12)/* * Ceph setxattr request flags.
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 9/24 ceph: crypto context handling for ceph
In reply to Jeff LaytonHave set_context do a setattr that sets the fscrypt_auth value, and get_context just return the contents of that field.
--- fs/ceph/Makefile | 1 + fs/ceph/crypto.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 3 ++ fs/ceph/super.c | 3 ++ 5 files changed, 116 insertions(+) create mode 100644 fs/ceph/crypto.c create mode 100644 fs/ceph/crypto.h
fs/ceph/Makefile +1 -0
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ ceph-y := super.o inode.o dir.o file.o locks.o addr.o ioctl.o \ ceph-$(CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE) += cache.o ceph-$(CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL) += acl.o +ceph-$(CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) += crypto.o
fs/ceph/crypto.c new file +77 -0
77 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/ceph/crypto.h new file +32 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* +* Ceph fscrypt functionality +*/ + +#ifndef _CEPH_CRYPTO_H +#define _CEPH_CRYPTO_H + +#include <linux/fscrypt.h> + +#define CEPH_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "encryption.ctx" + +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + +#define CEPH_FSCRYPT_AUTH_VERSION 1 +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth { +__le32 cfa_version; +__le32 cfa_blob_len; +u8 cfa_blob[FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE ]; +} __packed; + +void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (struct super_block *sb); + +#else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ + +static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (struct super_block *sb) +{ +} + +#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ + +#endif
fs/ceph/inode.c +3 -0
@@ -14,10 +14,12 @@#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/sort.h> #include <linux/iversion.h> +#include <linux/fscrypt.h> #include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include <linux/ceph/decode.h> /*
@@ -647,6 +649,7 @@ void ceph_evict_inode(struct inode *inode)clear_inode (inode);ceph_fscache_unregister_inode_cookie (ci); +fscrypt_put_encryption_info (inode);__ceph_remove_caps (ci);
fs/ceph/super.c +3 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include <linux/ceph/ceph_features.h> #include <linux/ceph/decode.h>
@@ -988,6 +989,8 @@ static int ceph_set_super(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc) s->s_time_min =0 ; s->s_time_max =U32_MAX ; +ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (s); + ret =set_anon_super_fc (s, fc);if (ret !=0 ) fsc->sb =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 10/24 ceph: implement -o test_dummy_encryption mount option
In reply to Jeff Layton--- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 11 +++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 5 ++++ fs/ceph/super.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/super.h | 7 ++++- 4 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/crypto.c +11 -0
@@ -64,9 +64,20 @@ static bool ceph_crypt_empty_dir(struct inode *inode)return ci->i_rsubdirs + ci->i_rfiles ==1 ; } +void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) +{ +fscrypt_free_dummy_policy (&fsc->dummy_enc_policy); +} + +static const union fscrypt_policy *ceph_get_dummy_policy (struct super_block *sb) +{ +return ceph_sb_to_client (sb)->dummy_enc_policy.policy; +} +static struct fscrypt_operations ceph_fscrypt_ops = { .get_context = ceph_crypt_get_context, .set_context = ceph_crypt_set_context, + .get_dummy_policy = ceph_get_dummy_policy, .empty_dir = ceph_crypt_empty_dir, .max_namelen =NAME_MAX , };
fs/ceph/crypto.h +5 -0
@@ -21,12 +21,17 @@ struct ceph_fscrypt_auth {void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (struct super_block *sb); +void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc); +#else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (struct super_block *sb) { } +static inline void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) +{ +}#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ #endif
fs/ceph/super.c +75 -2
139 lines not on this page · raw message
fs/ceph/super.h +6 -1
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <linux/posix_acl.h> #include <linux/refcount.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/fscrypt.h> #include <linux/ceph/libceph.h>
@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@#define CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_NOQUOTADF (1<<13)/* no root dir quota in statfs */ #define CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_NOCOPYFROM (1<<14)/* don't use RADOS 'copy-from' op */ #define CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_ASYNC_DIROPS (1<<15)/* allow async directory ops */ +#define CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_TEST_DUMMY_ENC (1<<16)/* enable dummy encryption (for testing) */ #define CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_DEFAULT \ (CEPH_MOUNT_OPT_DCACHE | \
@@ -97,6 +99,7 @@ struct ceph_mount_options {char *mds_namespace;/* default NULL */ char *server_path;/* default NULL (means "/") */ char *fscache_uniq;/* default NULL */ +char *test_dummy_encryption;/* default NULL */ };struct ceph_fs_client {
@@ -136,9 +139,11 @@ struct ceph_fs_client {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE struct fscache_cookie *fscache;#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +struct fscrypt_dummy_policy dummy_enc_policy; +#endif }; -/* * File i/o capability. This tracks shared state with the metadata * server that allows us to cache or writeback attributes or to read
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 11/24 ceph: add routine to create fscrypt context prior to RPC
In reply to Jeff LaytonAfter pre-creating a new inode, do an fscrypt prepare on it, fetch a new encryption context and then marshal that into the security context to be sent along with the RPC. Call the new function from ceph_new_inode.
--- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 10 ++++++++-- fs/ceph/super.h | 5 +++++ fs/ceph/xattr.c | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/crypto.c +42 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#include <linux/fscrypt.h> #include "super.h" +#include "mds_client.h" #include "crypto.h" static int ceph_crypt_get_context (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,size_t len)
@@ -86,3 +87,44 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) {fscrypt_set_ops (sb, &ceph_fscrypt_ops); } + +int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (struct inode *dir,struct inode *inode, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ +int ret, ctxsize; +bool encrypted = false; +struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode); + + ret =fscrypt_prepare_new_inode (dir, inode, &encrypted); +if (ret) +return ret; +if (!encrypted) +return 0 ; + + as->fscrypt_auth =kzalloc (sizeof (*as->fscrypt_auth),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!as->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ; + + ctxsize =fscrypt_context_for_new_inode (as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob, inode); +if (ctxsize <0 ) +return ctxsize; + + as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_version =cpu_to_le32 (CEPH_FSCRYPT_AUTH_VERSION ); + as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len =cpu_to_le32 (ctxsize); + +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth); +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =ceph_fscrypt_auth_size (ctxsize); + ci->fscrypt_auth =kmemdup (as->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ci->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ; + + inode->i_flags |=S_ENCRYPTED ; + +return 0 ; +} + +void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ +swap (req->r_fscrypt_auth, as->fscrypt_auth); +}
fs/ceph/crypto.h +25 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@#define CEPH_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "encryption.ctx"#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +struct ceph_fs_client ; +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx ; +struct ceph_mds_request ;#define CEPH_FSCRYPT_AUTH_VERSION 1 struct ceph_fscrypt_auth {
@@ -19,10 +22,19 @@ struct ceph_fscrypt_auth { u8 cfa_blob[FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE]; } __packed; +static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_size (u32 ctxsize) +{ +return offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob) + ctxsize; +} +void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (struct super_block *sb);void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc); +int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (struct inode *dir,struct inode *inode, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); +void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); +#else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (struct super_block *sb)
@@ -32,6 +44,19 @@ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb)static inline void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) { } + +static inline int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (struct inode *dir,struct inode *inode, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ +if (IS_ENCRYPTED (dir)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return 0 ; +} + +static inline void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) +{ +}#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ #endif
fs/ceph/inode.c +8 -2
@@ -83,12 +83,17 @@ struct inode *ceph_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, goto out_err; } + inode->i_state =0 ; + inode->i_mode = *mode; + err =ceph_security_init_secctx (dentry, *mode, as_ctx);if (err <0 ) goto out_err; - inode->i_state =0 ; - inode->i_mode = *mode; + err =ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (dir, inode, as_ctx); +if (err) + goto out_err; +return inode; out_err:iput (inode);
@@ -101,6 +106,7 @@ void ceph_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *a req->r_pagelist = as_ctx->pagelist; as_ctx->pagelist =NULL ; } +ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (req, as_ctx); }/**
fs/ceph/super.h +5 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@#include <linux/fscache.h> #endif +#include "crypto.h" +/* f_type in struct statfs */ #define CEPH_SUPER_MAGIC 0x00c36400
@@ -1068,6 +1070,9 @@ struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL void *sec_ctx;u32 sec_ctxlen; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fscrypt_auth;#endif struct ceph_pagelist *pagelist; };
fs/ceph/xattr.c +3 -0
@@ -1362,6 +1362,9 @@ void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx)#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL security_release_secctx (as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (as_ctx->fscrypt_auth);#endif if (as_ctx->pagelist)ceph_pagelist_release (as_ctx->pagelist);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 12/24 ceph: add fscrypt ioctls
In reply to Jeff LaytonWe gate most of the ioctls on MDS feature support. The exception is the key removal and status functions that we still want to work if the MDS's were to (inexplicably) lose the feature.
For the set_policy ioctl, we take Fcx caps to ensure that nothing can create files in the directory while the ioctl is running. That should be enough to ensure that the "empty_dir" check is reliable.
--- fs/ceph/ioctl.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+)
fs/ceph/ioctl.c +83 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#include "mds_client.h" #include "ioctl.h" #include <linux/ceph/striper.h> +#include <linux/fscrypt.h> /* * ioctls
@@ -268,8 +269,54 @@ static long ceph_ioctl_syncio(struct file *file)return 0 ; } +static int vet_mds_for_fscrypt (struct file *file) +{ +int i, ret = -EOPNOTSUPP ; +struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc =ceph_sb_to_mdsc (file_inode (file)->i_sb); + +mutex_lock (&mdsc->mutex); +for (i =0 ; i < mdsc->max_sessions; i++) { +struct ceph_mds_session *s = mdsc->sessions[i]; + +if (!s) +continue ; +if (test_bit (CEPHFS_FEATURE_ALTERNATE_NAME , &s->s_features)) + ret =0 ; +break ; + } +mutex_unlock (&mdsc->mutex); +return ret; +} + +static long ceph_set_encryption_policy (struct file *file,unsigned long arg) +{ +int ret, got =0 ; +struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode); + + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; + +/* +* Ensure we hold these caps so that we _know_ that the rstats check +* in the empty_dir check is reliable. +*/ + ret =ceph_get_caps (file,CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED ,0 ,-1 , &got); +if (ret) +return ret; + + ret =fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy (file, (const void __user *)arg); +if (got) +ceph_put_cap_refs (ci, got); + +return ret; +} +long ceph_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg) { +int ret; +dout ("ioctl file %p cmd %u arg %lu\n" , file, cmd, arg);switch (cmd) {case CEPH_IOC_GET_LAYOUT :
@@ -289,6 +336,42 @@ long ceph_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case CEPH_IOC_SYNCIO :return ceph_ioctl_syncio (file); + +case FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY : +return ceph_set_encryption_policy (file, arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_add_key (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY : +return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS : +return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS : +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_NONCE : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce (file, (void __user *)arg); }return -ENOTTY ;
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2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 13/24 ceph: decode alternate_name in lease info
In reply to Jeff LaytonCeph is a bit different from local filesystems, in that we don't want to store filenames as raw binary data, since we may also be dealing with clients that don't support fscrypt.
We could just base64-encode the encrypted filenames, but that could leave us with filenames longer than NAME_MAX. It turns out that the MDS doesn't care much about filename length, but the clients do.
To manage this, we've added a new "alternate name" field that can be optionally added to any dentry that we'll use to store the binary crypttext of the filename if its base64-encoded value will be longer than NAME_MAX. When a dentry has one of these names attached, the MDS will send it along in the lease info, which we can then store for later usage.
--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 11 +++++++---- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +30 -10
@@ -302,27 +302,44 @@ static int parse_reply_info_dir(void **p, void *end,static int parse_reply_info_lease (void **p,void *end,struct ceph_mds_reply_lease **lease, -u64 features) +u64 features,u32 *altname_len,u8 **altname) { +u8 struct_v; +u32 struct_len; +if (features == (u64)-1 ) { -u8 struct_v, struct_compat; -u32 struct_len; +u8 struct_compat; +ceph_decode_8_safe (p, end, struct_v, bad);ceph_decode_8_safe (p, end, struct_compat, bad); +/* struct_v is expected to be >= 1. we only understand * encoding whose struct_compat == 1. */ if (!struct_v || struct_compat !=1 ) goto bad; +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, struct_len, bad); -ceph_decode_need (p, end, struct_len, bad); - end = *p + struct_len; + }else { + struct_len =sizeof (**lease); + *altname_len =0 ; + *altname =NULL ; } -ceph_decode_need (p, end,sizeof (**lease), bad); +ceph_decode_need (p, end, struct_len, bad); *lease = *p; *p +=sizeof (**lease); -if (features == (u64)-1 ) - *p = end; + +if (features == (u64)-1 ) { +if (struct_v >=2 ) { +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, *altname_len, bad); +ceph_decode_need (p, end, *altname_len, bad); + *altname = *p; + *p += *altname_len; + }else { + *altname =NULL ; + *altname_len =0 ; + } + }return 0 ; bad:return -EIO ;
@@ -352,7 +369,8 @@ static int parse_reply_info_trace(void **p, void *end, info->dname = *p; *p += info->dname_len; - err =parse_reply_info_lease (p, end, &info->dlease, features); + err =parse_reply_info_lease (p, end, &info->dlease, features, + &info->altname_len, &info->altname);if (err <0 ) goto out_bad; }
@@ -419,9 +437,11 @@ static int parse_reply_info_readdir(void **p, void *end,dout ("parsed dir dname '%.*s'\n" , rde->name_len, rde->name);/* dentry lease */ - err =parse_reply_info_lease (p, end, &rde->lease, features); + err =parse_reply_info_lease (p, end, &rde->lease, features, + &rde->altname_len, &rde->altname);if (err) goto out_bad; +/* inode */ err =parse_reply_info_in (p, end, &rde->inode, features);if (err <0 )
fs/ceph/mds_client.h +7 -4
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ enum ceph_feature_type {CEPHFS_FEATURE_MULTI_RECONNECT ,CEPHFS_FEATURE_DELEG_INO ,CEPHFS_FEATURE_METRIC_COLLECT , - - CEPHFS_FEATURE_MAX = CEPHFS_FEATURE_METRIC_COLLECT, +CEPHFS_FEATURE_ALTERNATE_NAME , + CEPHFS_FEATURE_MAX = CEPHFS_FEATURE_ALTERNATE_NAME, };/*
@@ -45,8 +45,7 @@ enum ceph_feature_type {CEPHFS_FEATURE_MULTI_RECONNECT , \CEPHFS_FEATURE_DELEG_INO , \CEPHFS_FEATURE_METRIC_COLLECT , \ - \ -CEPHFS_FEATURE_MAX , \ +CEPHFS_FEATURE_ALTERNATE_NAME , \ } #define CEPHFS_FEATURES_CLIENT_REQUIRED {}
@@ -98,7 +97,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in {struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry {char *name; +u8 *altname;u32 name_len; +u32 altname_len;struct ceph_mds_reply_lease *lease;struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in inode;loff_t offset;
@@ -117,7 +118,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed {struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in diri, targeti;struct ceph_mds_reply_dirfrag *dirfrag;char *dname; +u8 *altname;u32 dname_len; +u32 altname_len;struct ceph_mds_reply_lease *dlease;/* extra */
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 14/24 ceph: make ceph_msdc_build_path use ref-walk
In reply to Jeff LaytonEncryption potentially requires allocation, at which point we'll need to be in a non-atomic context. Convert ceph_msdc_build_path to take dentry spinlocks and references instead of using rcu_read_lock to walk the path.
This is slightly less efficient, and we may want to eventually allow using RCU when the leaf dentry isn't encrypted.
--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +19 -16
@@ -2396,7 +2396,8 @@ static inline u64 __get_oldest_tid(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc)char *ceph_mdsc_build_path (struct dentry *dentry,int *plen,u64 *pbase,int stop_on_nosnap) { -struct dentry *temp; +struct dentry *cur; +struct inode *inode;char *path;int pos;unsigned seq;
@@ -2413,34 +2414,35 @@ char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct dentry *dentry, int *plen, u64 *pbase, path[pos] ='\0' ; seq =read_seqbegin (&rename_lock); -rcu_read_lock (); - temp = dentry; + cur =dget (dentry);for (;;) { -struct inode *inode; +struct dentry *temp; -spin_lock (&temp->d_lock); - inode =d_inode (temp); +spin_lock (&cur->d_lock); + inode =d_inode (cur);if (inode &&ceph_snap (inode) ==CEPH_SNAPDIR ) {dout ("build_path path+%d: %p SNAPDIR\n" , - pos, temp); - }else if (stop_on_nosnap && inode && dentry != temp && + pos, cur); + }else if (stop_on_nosnap && inode && dentry != cur &&ceph_snap (inode) ==CEPH_NOSNAP ) { -spin_unlock (&temp->d_lock); +spin_unlock (&cur->d_lock); pos++;/* get rid of any prepended '/' */ break ; }else { - pos -= temp->d_name.len; + pos -= cur->d_name.len;if (pos <0 ) { -spin_unlock (&temp->d_lock); +spin_unlock (&cur->d_lock);break ; } -memcpy (path + pos, temp->d_name.name, temp->d_name.len); +memcpy (path + pos, cur->d_name.name, cur->d_name.len); } + temp = cur;spin_unlock (&temp->d_lock); - temp =READ_ONCE (temp->d_parent); + cur =dget_parent (temp); +dput (temp);/* Are we at the root? */ -if (IS_ROOT (temp)) +if (IS_ROOT (cur))break ;/* Are we out of buffer? */
@@ -2449,8 +2451,9 @@ char *ceph_mdsc_build_path(struct dentry *dentry, int *plen, u64 *pbase, path[pos] ='/' ; } - base =ceph_ino (d_inode (temp)); -rcu_read_unlock (); + inode =d_inode (cur); + base = inode ?ceph_ino (inode) :0 ; +dput (cur);if (read_seqretry (&rename_lock, seq)) goto retry;
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 15/24 ceph: add encrypted fname handling to ceph_mdsc_build_path
In reply to Jeff LaytonAllow ceph_mdsc_build_path to encrypt and base64 encode the filename when the parent is encrypted and we're sending the path to the MDS.
In most cases, we just encrypt the filenames and base64 encode them, but when the name is longer than CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX, we use a similar scheme to fscrypt proper, and hash the remaning bits with sha256.
When doing this, we then send along the full crypttext of the name in the new alternate_name field of the MClientRequest. The MDS can then send that along in readdir responses and traces.
--- fs/ceph/crypto.h | 15 +++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/crypto.h +15 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#ifndef _CEPH_CRYPTO_H#define _CEPH_CRYPTO_H +#include <crypto/sha2.h> #include <linux/fscrypt.h> #define CEPH_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "encryption.ctx"
@@ -27,6 +28,20 @@ static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_size(u32 ctxsize)return offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob) + ctxsize; } +/* +* We want to encrypt filenames when creating them, but the encrypted +* versions of those names may have illegal characters in them. To mitigate +* that, we base64 encode them, but that gives us a result that can exceed +* NAME_MAX. +* +* Follow a similar scheme to fscrypt itself, and cap the filename to a +* smaller size. If the cleartext name is longer than the value below, then +* sha256 hash the remaining bytes. +* +* 189 bytes => 252 bytes base64-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255) +*/ +#define CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX (189 - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) +void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (struct super_block *sb);void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc);
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +120 -18
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2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 16/24 ceph: send altname in MClientRequest
In reply to Jeff LaytonIn the event that we have a filename longer than CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX, we'll need to hash the tail of the filename. The client however will still need to know the full name of the file if it has a key.
To support this, the MClientRequest field has grown a new alternate_name field that we populate with the full (binary) crypttext of the filename. This is then transmitted to the clients in readdir or traces as part of the dentry lease.
Add support for populating this field when the filenames are very long.
--- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 3 ++ 2 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +68 -4
@@ -917,6 +917,7 @@ void ceph_mdsc_release_request(struct kref *kref)put_cred (req->r_cred);if (req->r_pagelist)ceph_pagelist_release (req->r_pagelist); +kfree (req->r_altname);put_request_session (req);ceph_unreserve_caps (req->r_mdsc, &req->r_caps_reservation);WARN_ON_ONCE (!list_empty (&req->r_wait));
@@ -2435,11 +2436,66 @@ static int encode_encrypted_fname(const struct inode *parent, struct dentry *dendout ("base64-encoded ciphertext name = %.*s\n" , len, buf);return elen; } + +static u8 *get_fscrypt_altname (const struct ceph_mds_request *req,u32 *plen) +{ +struct inode *dir = req->r_parent; +struct dentry *dentry = req->r_dentry; +u8 *cryptbuf =NULL ; +u32 len =0 ; +int ret =0 ; + +/* only encode if we have parent and dentry */ +if (!dir || !dentry) + goto success; + +/* No-op unless this is encrypted */ +if (!IS_ENCRYPTED (dir)) + goto success; + + ret =__fscrypt_prepare_readdir (dir); +if (ret) +return ERR_PTR (ret); + +/* No key? Just ignore it. */ +if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key (dir)) + goto success; + +if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (dir, dentry->d_name.len,NAME_MAX , &len)) { +WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); +return ERR_PTR (-ENAMETOOLONG ); + } + +/* No need to append altname if name is short enough */ +if (len <=CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ) { + len =0 ; + goto success; + } + + cryptbuf =kmalloc (len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!cryptbuf) +return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + + ret =fscrypt_fname_encrypt (dir, &dentry->d_name, cryptbuf, len); +if (ret) { +kfree (cryptbuf); +return ERR_PTR (ret); + } +success: + *plen = len; +return cryptbuf; +}#else static int encode_encrypted_fname (const struct inode *parent,struct dentry *dentry,char *buf) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } + +static u8 *get_fscrypt_altname (const struct ceph_mds_request *req,u32 *plen) +{ + *plen =0 ; +return NULL ; +}#endif /**
@@ -2662,14 +2718,15 @@ static void encode_mclientrequest_tail(void **p, const struct ceph_mds_request *ceph_encode_timespec64 (&ts, &req->r_stamp);ceph_encode_copy (p, &ts,sizeof (ts)); -/* gid_list */ +/* v4: gid_list */ ceph_encode_32 (p, req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups);for (i =0 ; i < req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups; i++)ceph_encode_64 (p,from_kgid (&init_user_ns, req->r_cred->group_info->gid[i])); -/* v5: altname (TODO: skip for now) */ -ceph_encode_32 (p,0 ); +/* v5: altname */ +ceph_encode_32 (p, req->r_altname_len); +ceph_encode_copy (p, req->r_altname, req->r_altname_len);/* v6: fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) {
@@ -2726,11 +2783,18 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, goto out_free1; } + req->r_altname =get_fscrypt_altname (req, &req->r_altname_len); +if (IS_ERR (req->r_altname)) { + msg =ERR_CAST (req->r_altname); + req->r_altname =NULL ; + goto out_free2; + } + len = legacy ?sizeof (*head) :sizeof (struct ceph_mds_request_head ); len += pathlen1 + pathlen2 +2 *(1 +sizeof (u32) +sizeof (u64)) +sizeof (struct ceph_timespec ); len +=sizeof (u32) + (sizeof (u64) * req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); - len +=sizeof (u32);// altname + len +=sizeof (u32) + req->r_altname_len; len +=sizeof (u32);// fscrypt_auth if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { len += offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob);
fs/ceph/mds_client.h +3 -0
@@ -284,6 +284,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_request {struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *r_fscrypt_auth; +u8 *r_altname;/* fscrypt binary crypttext for long filenames */ +u32 r_altname_len;/* length of r_altname */ +int r_fmode;/* file mode, if expecting cap */ const struct cred *r_cred;int r_request_release_offset;
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 17/24 ceph: properly set DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME flag in lookup
In reply to Jeff LaytonThis is required so that we know to invalidate these dentries when the directory is unlocked.
--- fs/ceph/dir.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
fs/ceph/dir.c +11 -0
@@ -751,6 +751,17 @@ static struct dentry *ceph_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,if (dentry->d_name.len >NAME_MAX )return ERR_PTR (-ENAMETOOLONG ); +if (IS_ENCRYPTED (dir)) { + err =__fscrypt_prepare_readdir (dir); +if (err) +return ERR_PTR (err); +if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key (dir)) { +spin_lock (&dentry->d_lock); + dentry->d_flags |=DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME ; +spin_unlock (&dentry->d_lock); + } + } +/* can we conclude ENOENT locally? */ if (d_really_is_negative (dentry)) {struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (dir);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 18/24 ceph: make d_revalidate call fscrypt revalidator for encrypted dentries
In reply to Jeff LaytonIf we have a dentry which represents a no-key name, then we need to test whether the parent directory's encryption key has since been added. Do that before we test anything else about the dentry.
--- fs/ceph/dir.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/dir.c +6 -2
@@ -1700,6 +1700,10 @@ static int ceph_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)struct inode *dir, *inode;struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc; + valid =fscrypt_d_revalidate (dentry, flags); +if (valid <=0 ) +return valid; +if (flags &LOOKUP_RCU ) { parent =READ_ONCE (dentry->d_parent); dir =d_inode_rcu (parent);
@@ -1712,8 +1716,8 @@ static int ceph_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) inode =d_inode (dentry); } -dout ("d_revalidate %p '%pd' inode %p offset 0x%llx\n" , dentry, - dentry, inode,ceph_dentry (dentry)->offset); +dout ("d_revalidate %p '%pd' inode %p offset 0x%llx nokey %d\n" , dentry, + dentry, inode,ceph_dentry (dentry)->offset, !!(dentry->d_flags &DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME )); mdsc =ceph_sb_to_client (dir->i_sb)->mdsc;
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 19/24 ceph: add helpers for converting names for userland presentation
In reply to Jeff Layton--- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 118 insertions(+)
fs/ceph/crypto.c +76 -0
@@ -128,3 +128,79 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_se {swap (req->r_fscrypt_auth, as->fscrypt_auth); } + +/** +* ceph_fname_to_usr - convert a filename for userland presentation +* @fname: ceph_fname to be converted +* @tname: temporary name buffer to use for conversion (may be NULL) +* @oname: where converted name should be placed +* @is_nokey: set to true if key wasn't available during conversion (may be NULL) +* +* Given a filename (usually from the MDS), format it for presentation to +* userland. If @parent is not encrypted, just pass it back as-is. +* +* Otherwise, base64 decode the string, and then ask fscrypt to format it +* for userland presentation. +* +* Returns 0 on success or negative error code on error. +*/ +int ceph_fname_to_usr (const struct ceph_fname *fname,struct fscrypt_str *tname, +struct fscrypt_str *oname,bool *is_nokey) +{ +int ret; +struct fscrypt_str _tname =FSTR_INIT (NULL ,0 ); +struct fscrypt_str iname; + +if (!IS_ENCRYPTED (fname->dir)) { + oname->name = fname->name; + oname->len = fname->name_len; +return 0 ; + } + +/* Sanity check that the resulting name will fit in the buffer */ +if (fname->name_len >FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS (NAME_MAX )) +return -EIO ; + + ret =__fscrypt_prepare_readdir (fname->dir); +if (ret) +return ret; + +/* +* Use the raw dentry name as sent by the MDS instead of +* generating a nokey name via fscrypt. +*/ +if (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key (fname->dir)) { +memcpy (oname->name, fname->name, fname->name_len); + oname->len = fname->name_len; +if (is_nokey) + *is_nokey = true; +return 0 ; + } + +if (fname->ctext_len ==0 ) { +int declen; + +if (!tname) { + ret =fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer (NAME_MAX , &_tname); +if (ret) +return ret; + tname = &_tname; + } + + declen =fscrypt_base64_decode (fname->name, fname->name_len, tname->name); +if (declen <=0 ) { + ret = -EIO ; + goto out; + } + iname.name = tname->name; + iname.len = declen; + }else { + iname.name = fname->ctext; + iname.len = fname->ctext_len; + } + + ret =fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr (fname->dir,0 ,0 , &iname, oname); +out: +fscrypt_fname_free_buffer (&_tname); +return ret; +}
fs/ceph/crypto.h +42 -0
60 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 20/24 ceph: add fscrypt support to ceph_fill_trace
In reply to Jeff LaytonWhen we get a dentry in a trace, decrypt the name so we can properly instantiate the dentry.
--- fs/ceph/inode.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/inode.c +28 -2
@@ -1401,8 +1401,15 @@ int ceph_fill_trace(struct super_block *sb, struct ceph_mds_request *req)if (dir && req->r_op ==CEPH_MDS_OP_LOOKUPNAME &&test_bit (CEPH_MDS_R_PARENT_LOCKED , &req->r_req_flags) && !test_bit (CEPH_MDS_R_ABORTED , &req->r_req_flags)) { +bool is_nokey = false;struct qstr dname;struct dentry *dn, *parent; +struct fscrypt_str oname =FSTR_INIT (NULL ,0 ); +struct ceph_fname fname = { .dir = dir, + .name = rinfo->dname, + .ctext = rinfo->altname, + .name_len = rinfo->dname_len, + .ctext_len = rinfo->altname_len };BUG_ON (!rinfo->head->is_target);BUG_ON (req->r_dentry);
@@ -1410,8 +1417,20 @@ int ceph_fill_trace(struct super_block *sb, struct ceph_mds_request *req) parent =d_find_any_alias (dir);BUG_ON (!parent); - dname.name = rinfo->dname; - dname.len = rinfo->dname_len; + err =ceph_fname_alloc_buffer (dir, &oname); +if (err <0 ) { +dput (parent); + goto done; + } + + err =ceph_fname_to_usr (&fname,NULL , &oname, &is_nokey); +if (err <0 ) { +dput (parent); +ceph_fname_free_buffer (dir, &oname); + goto done; + } + dname.name = oname.name; + dname.len = oname.len; dname.hash =full_name_hash (parent, dname.name, dname.len); tvino.ino =le64_to_cpu (rinfo->targeti.in->ino); tvino.snap =le64_to_cpu (rinfo->targeti.in->snapid);
@@ -1426,9 +1445,15 @@ int ceph_fill_trace(struct super_block *sb, struct ceph_mds_request *req) dname.len, dname.name, dn);if (!dn) {dput (parent); +ceph_fname_free_buffer (dir, &oname); err = -ENOMEM ; goto done; } +if (is_nokey) { +spin_lock (&dn->d_lock); + dn->d_flags |=DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME ; +spin_unlock (&dn->d_lock); + } err =0 ; } else if (d_really_is_positive(dn) && (ceph_ino(d_inode(dn)) != tvino.ino ||
@@ -1440,6 +1465,7 @@ int ceph_fill_trace(struct super_block *sb, struct ceph_mds_request *req)dput (dn); goto retry_lookup; } +ceph_fname_free_buffer (dir, &oname); req->r_dentry = dn;dput (parent);
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 21/24 ceph: add support to readdir for encrypted filenames
In reply to Jeff LaytonAdd helper functions for buffer management and for decrypting filenames returned by the MDS. Wire those into the readdir codepaths.
--- fs/ceph/dir.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- fs/ceph/inode.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/dir.c +50 -12
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" +#include "crypto.h" /* * Directory operations: readdir, lookup, create, link, unlink,
@@ -241,7 +242,9 @@ static int __dcache_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx, di =ceph_dentry (dentry);if (d_unhashed (dentry) ||d_really_is_negative (dentry) || - di->lease_shared_gen != shared_gen) { + di->lease_shared_gen != shared_gen || + ((dentry->d_flags &DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME ) && +fscrypt_has_encryption_key (dir))) {spin_unlock (&dentry->d_lock);dput (dentry); err = -EAGAIN ;
@@ -313,6 +316,8 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)int err;unsigned frag =-1 ;struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *rinfo; +struct fscrypt_str tname =FSTR_INIT (NULL ,0 ); +struct fscrypt_str oname =FSTR_INIT (NULL ,0 );dout ("readdir %p file %p pos %llx\n" , inode, file, ctx->pos);if (dfi->file_info.flags &CEPH_F_ATEND )
@@ -340,6 +345,10 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) ctx->pos =2 ; } + err =fscrypt_prepare_readdir (inode); +if (err) + goto out; +spin_lock (&ci->i_ceph_lock);/* request Fx cap. if have Fx, we don't need to release Fs cap * for later create/unlink. */
@@ -360,6 +369,14 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)spin_unlock (&ci->i_ceph_lock); } + err =ceph_fname_alloc_buffer (inode, &tname); +if (err <0 ) + goto out; + + err =ceph_fname_alloc_buffer (inode, &oname); +if (err <0 ) + goto out; +/* proceed with a normal readdir */ more:/* do we have the correct frag content buffered? */
@@ -387,12 +404,14 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)dout ("readdir fetching %llx.%llx frag %x offset '%s'\n" ,ceph_vinop (inode), frag, dfi->last_name); req =ceph_mdsc_create_request (mdsc, op,USE_AUTH_MDS ); -if (IS_ERR (req)) -return PTR_ERR (req); +if (IS_ERR (req)) { + err =PTR_ERR (req); + goto out; + } err =ceph_alloc_readdir_reply_buffer (req, inode);if (err) {ceph_mdsc_put_request (req); -return err; + goto out; }/* hints to request -> mds selection code */ req->r_direct_mode =USE_AUTH_MDS ;
@@ -405,7 +424,8 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) req->r_path2 =kstrdup (dfi->last_name,GFP_KERNEL );if (!req->r_path2) {ceph_mdsc_put_request (req); -return -ENOMEM ; + err = -ENOMEM ; + goto out; } }else if (is_hash_order (ctx->pos)) { req->r_args.readdir.offset_hash =
@@ -426,7 +446,7 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) err =ceph_mdsc_do_request (mdsc,NULL , req);if (err <0 ) {ceph_mdsc_put_request (req); -return err; + goto out; } dout("readdir got and parsed readdir result=%d on " "frag %x, end=%d, complete=%d, hash_order=%d\n",
@@ -479,7 +499,7 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) err =note_last_dentry (dfi, rde->name, rde->name_len, next_offset);if (err) -return err; + goto out; }else if (req->r_reply_info.dir_end) { dfi->next_offset =2 ;/* keep last name */
@@ -507,22 +527,37 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) }for (; i < rinfo->dir_nr; i++) {struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry *rde = rinfo->dir_entries + i; +struct ceph_fname fname = { .dir = inode, + .name = rde->name, + .name_len = rde->name_len, + .ctext = rde->altname, + .ctext_len = rde->altname_len }; +u32 olen = oname.len;BUG_ON (rde->offset < ctx->pos); +BUG_ON (!rde->inode.in); ctx->pos = rde->offset;dout ("readdir (%d/%d) -> %llx '%.*s' %p\n" , i, rinfo->dir_nr, ctx->pos, rde->name_len, rde->name, &rde->inode.in); -BUG_ON (!rde->inode.in); + err =ceph_fname_to_usr (&fname, &tname, &oname,NULL ); +if (err) { +dout ("Unable to decode %.*s. Skipping it.\n" , rde->name_len, rde->name); +continue ; + } -if (!dir_emit (ctx, rde->name, rde->name_len, +if (!dir_emit (ctx, oname.name, oname.len,ceph_present_ino (inode->i_sb,le64_to_cpu (rde->inode.in->ino)),le32_to_cpu (rde->inode.in->mode) >>12 )) {dout ("filldir stopping us...\n" ); -return 0 ; + err =0 ; + goto out; } + +/* Reset the lengths to their original allocated vals */ + oname.len = olen; ctx->pos++; }
@@ -577,9 +612,12 @@ static int ceph_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) dfi->dir_ordered_count);spin_unlock (&ci->i_ceph_lock); } - + err =0 ;dout ("readdir %p file %p done.\n" , inode, file); -return 0 ; +out: +ceph_fname_free_buffer (inode, &tname); +ceph_fname_free_buffer (inode, &oname); +return err; }static void reset_readdir (struct ceph_dir_file_info *dfi)
fs/ceph/inode.c +35 -3
@@ -1745,7 +1745,8 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_mds_session *session) {struct dentry *parent = req->r_dentry; -struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (d_inode (parent)); +struct inode *inode =d_inode (parent); +struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *rinfo = &req->r_reply_info;struct qstr dname;struct dentry *dn;
@@ -1755,6 +1756,8 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req,u32 last_hash =0 ;u32 fpos_offset;struct ceph_readdir_cache_control cache_ctl = {}; +struct fscrypt_str tname =FSTR_INIT (NULL ,0 ); +struct fscrypt_str oname =FSTR_INIT (NULL ,0 );if (test_bit (CEPH_MDS_R_ABORTED , &req->r_req_flags))return readdir_prepopulate_inodes_only (req, session);
@@ -1806,14 +1809,36 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req, cache_ctl.index = req->r_readdir_cache_idx; fpos_offset = req->r_readdir_offset; + err =ceph_fname_alloc_buffer (inode, &tname); +if (err <0 ) + goto out; + + err =ceph_fname_alloc_buffer (inode, &oname); +if (err <0 ) + goto out; +/* FIXME: release caps/leases if error occurs */ for (i =0 ; i < rinfo->dir_nr; i++) { +bool is_nokey = false;struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry *rde = rinfo->dir_entries + i;struct ceph_vino tvino; +u32 olen = oname.len; +struct ceph_fname fname = { .dir = inode, + .name = rde->name, + .name_len = rde->name_len, + .ctext = rde->altname, + .ctext_len = rde->altname_len }; + + err =ceph_fname_to_usr (&fname, &tname, &oname, &is_nokey); +if (err) { +dout ("Unable to decode %.*s. Skipping it." , rde->name_len, rde->name); +continue ; + } - dname.name = rde->name; - dname.len = rde->name_len; + dname.name = oname.name; + dname.len = oname.len; dname.hash =full_name_hash (parent, dname.name, dname.len); + oname.len = olen; tvino.ino =le64_to_cpu (rde->inode.in->ino); tvino.snap =le64_to_cpu (rde->inode.in->snapid);
@@ -1844,6 +1869,11 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req, err = -ENOMEM ; goto out; } +if (is_nokey) { +spin_lock (&dn->d_lock); + dn->d_flags |=DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME ; +spin_unlock (&dn->d_lock); + } }else if (d_really_is_positive (dn) && (ceph_ino (d_inode (dn)) != tvino.ino ||ceph_snap (d_inode (dn)) != tvino.snap)) {
@@ -1932,6 +1962,8 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req, req->r_readdir_cache_idx = cache_ctl.index; }ceph_readdir_cache_release (&cache_ctl); +ceph_fname_free_buffer (inode, &tname); +ceph_fname_free_buffer (inode, &oname);dout ("readdir_prepopulate done\n" );return err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 22/24 ceph: create symlinks with encrypted and base64-encoded targets
In reply to Jeff LaytonWhen creating symlinks in encrypted directories, encrypt and base64-encode the target with the new inode's key before sending to the MDS.
When filling a symlinked inode, base64-decode it into a buffer that we'll keep in ci->i_symlink. When get_link is called, decrypt the buffer into a new one that will hang off i_link.
--- fs/ceph/dir.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- fs/ceph/inode.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/dir.c +46 -5
@@ -948,6 +948,40 @@ static int ceph_create(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,return ceph_mknod (mnt_userns, dir, dentry, mode,0 ); } +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION ) +static int prep_encrypted_symlink_target (struct ceph_mds_request *req,const char *dest) +{ +int err; +int len =strlen (dest); +struct fscrypt_str osd_link =FSTR_INIT (NULL ,0 ); + + err =fscrypt_prepare_symlink (req->r_parent, dest, len,PATH_MAX , &osd_link); +if (err) + goto out; + + err =fscrypt_encrypt_symlink (req->r_new_inode, dest, len, &osd_link); +if (err) + goto out; + + req->r_path2 =kmalloc (FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS (osd_link.len) +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!req->r_path2) { + err = -ENOMEM ; + goto out; + } + + len =fscrypt_base64_encode (osd_link.name, osd_link.len, req->r_path2); + req->r_path2[len] ='\0' ; +out: +fscrypt_fname_free_buffer (&osd_link); +return err; +} +#else +static int prep_encrypted_symlink_target (struct ceph_mds_request *req,const char *dest) +{ +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +} +#endif +static int ceph_symlink (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct inode *dir,struct dentry *dentry,const char *dest) {
@@ -979,14 +1013,21 @@ static int ceph_symlink(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, goto out_req; } - req->r_path2 =kstrdup (dest,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!req->r_path2) { - err = -ENOMEM ; - goto out_req; - } req->r_parent = dir;ihold (dir); +if (IS_ENCRYPTED (req->r_new_inode)) { + err =prep_encrypted_symlink_target (req, dest); +if (err) + goto out_req; + }else { + req->r_path2 =kstrdup (dest,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!req->r_path2) { + err = -ENOMEM ; + goto out_req; + } + } +set_bit (CEPH_MDS_R_PARENT_LOCKED , &req->r_req_flags); req->r_dentry =dget (dentry); req->r_num_caps =2 ;
fs/ceph/inode.c +83 -12
146 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 23/24 ceph: make ceph_get_name decrypt filenames
In reply to Jeff LaytonWhen we do a lookupino to the MDS, we get a filename in the trace. ceph_get_name uses that name directly, so we must properly decrypt it before copying it to the name buffer.
--- fs/ceph/export.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
fs/ceph/export.c +32 -12
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@#include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" +#include "crypto.h" /* * Basic fh
@@ -524,7 +525,9 @@ static int ceph_get_name(struct dentry *parent, char *name, {struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc;struct ceph_mds_request *req; +struct inode *dir =d_inode (parent);struct inode *inode =d_inode (child); +struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *rinfo;int err;if (ceph_snap (inode) !=CEPH_NOSNAP )
@@ -536,30 +539,47 @@ static int ceph_get_name(struct dentry *parent, char *name,if (IS_ERR (req))return PTR_ERR (req); -inode_lock (d_inode (parent)); - +inode_lock (dir); req->r_inode = inode;ihold (inode); req->r_ino2 =ceph_vino (d_inode (parent)); - req->r_parent =d_inode (parent); -ihold (req->r_parent); + req->r_parent = dir; +ihold (dir);set_bit (CEPH_MDS_R_PARENT_LOCKED , &req->r_req_flags); req->r_num_caps =2 ; err =ceph_mdsc_do_request (mdsc,NULL , req); +inode_unlock (dir); -inode_unlock (d_inode (parent)); +if (err) + goto out; -if (!err) { -struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *rinfo = &req->r_reply_info; + rinfo = &req->r_reply_info; +if (!IS_ENCRYPTED (dir)) {memcpy (name, rinfo->dname, rinfo->dname_len); name[rinfo->dname_len] =0 ; -dout ("get_name %p ino %llx.%llx name %s\n" , - child,ceph_vinop (inode), name); }else { -dout ("get_name %p ino %llx.%llx err %d\n" , - child,ceph_vinop (inode), err); - } +struct fscrypt_str oname =FSTR_INIT (NULL ,0 ); +struct ceph_fname fname = { .dir = dir, + .name = rinfo->dname, + .ctext = rinfo->altname, + .name_len = rinfo->dname_len, + .ctext_len = rinfo->altname_len }; + + err =ceph_fname_alloc_buffer (dir, &oname); +if (err <0 ) + goto out; + err =ceph_fname_to_usr (&fname,NULL , &oname,NULL ); +if (!err) { +memcpy (name, oname.name, oname.len); + name[oname.len] =0 ; + } +ceph_fname_free_buffer (dir, &oname); + } +out: +dout ("get_name %p ino %llx.%llx err %d %s%s\n" , + child,ceph_vinop (inode), err, + err ?"" :"name " , err ?"" : name);ceph_mdsc_put_request (req);return err; }
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
RFC PATCH v7 24/24 ceph: add a new ceph.fscrypt.auth vxattr
In reply to Jeff Layton--- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
fs/ceph/xattr.c +17 -0
@@ -340,6 +340,16 @@ static ssize_t ceph_vxattrcb_caps(struct ceph_inode_info *ci, char *val, ceph_cap_string(issued), issued); } +static ssize_t ceph_vxattrcb_fscrypt_auth (struct ceph_inode_info *ci,char *val,size_t size) +{ +if (size) { +if (size < ci->fscrypt_auth_len) +return -ERANGE ; +memcpy (val, ci->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth_len); + } +return ci->fscrypt_auth_len; +} +#define CEPH_XATTR_NAME (_type, _name) XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX #_type "." #_name#define CEPH_XATTR_NAME2 (_type, _name, _name2) \ XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX #_type "." #_name "." #_name2
@@ -473,6 +483,13 @@ static struct ceph_vxattr ceph_common_vxattrs[] = { .exists_cb = NULL, .flags = VXATTR_FLAG_READONLY, }, + { + .name = "ceph.fscrypt.auth", + .name_size = sizeof("ceph.fscrypt.auth"), + .getxattr_cb = ceph_vxattrcb_fscrypt_auth, + .exists_cb = NULL, + .flags = VXATTR_FLAG_READONLY, + }, { .name = NULL, 0 } /* Required table terminator */ };
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 05/24] ceph: preallocate inode for ops that may create one
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 30 lines · Jeff Layton
When creating a new inode, we need to determine the crypto context before we can transmit the RPC. The fscrypt API has a routine for getting a crypto context before a create occurs, but it requires an inode.
Change the ceph code to preallocate an inode in advance of a create of any sort (
open(),mknod(),symlink(), etc). Move the existing code that generates the ACL and SELinux blobs into this routine since that's mostly common across all the different codepaths.In most cases, we just want to allow
ceph_fill_traceto use that inode after the reply comes in, so add a new field to the MDS request for it (r_new_inode).The async create codepath is a bit different though. In that case, we want to hash the inode in advance of the RPC so that it can be used before the reply comes in. If the call subsequently fails with
-EJUKEBOX, then just put the references and clean up theas_ctx. Note that with this change, we now need to regenerate theas_ctxwhen this occurs, but it's quite rare for it to happen.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/dir.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- fs/ceph/file.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ceph/inode.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 3 +- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 1 + fs/ceph/super.h | 7 +++- 6 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
[...]
Quoted 95 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +72
-4@@ -52,17 +52,85 @@ static int ceph_set_ino_cb(struct inode *inode, void *data)return 0 ; } -struct inode *ceph_get_inode (struct super_block *sb,struct ceph_vino vino) +/** +* ceph_new_inode - allocate a new inode in advance of an expected create +* @dir: parent directory for new inode +* @dentry: dentry that may eventually point to new inode +* @mode: mode of new inode +* @as_ctx: pointer to inherited security context +* +* Allocate a new inode in advance of an operation to create a new inode. +* This allocates the inode and sets up the acl_sec_ctx with appropriate +* info for the new inode. +* +* Returns a pointer to the new inode or an ERR_PTR. +*/ +struct inode *ceph_new_inode (struct inode *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +umode_t *mode,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) +{ +int err; +struct inode *inode; + + inode =new_inode_pseudo (dir->i_sb); +if (!inode) +return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + +if (!S_ISLNK (*mode)) { + err =ceph_pre_init_acls (dir, mode, as_ctx); +if (err <0 ) + goto out_err; + } + + err =ceph_security_init_secctx (dentry, *mode, as_ctx); +if (err <0 ) + goto out_err; + + inode->i_state =0 ; + inode->i_mode = *mode; +return inode; +out_err: +iput (inode); +return ERR_PTR (err); +} + +void ceph_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) +{ +if (as_ctx->pagelist) { + req->r_pagelist = as_ctx->pagelist; + as_ctx->pagelist =NULL ; + } +} + +/** +* ceph_get_inode - find or create/hash a new inode +* @sb: superblock to search and allocate in +* @vino: vino to search for +* @newino: optional new inode to insert if one isn't found (may be NULL) +* +* Search for or insert a new inode into the hash for the given vino, and return a +* reference to it. If new is non-NULL, its reference is consumed. +*/ +struct inode *ceph_get_inode (struct super_block *sb,struct ceph_vino vino,struct inode *newino) {struct inode *inode;if (ceph_vino_is_reserved (vino))return ERR_PTR (-EREMOTEIO ); - inode =iget5_locked (sb, (unsigned long )vino.ino, ceph_ino_compare, - ceph_set_ino_cb, &vino); -if (!inode) +if (newino) { + inode =inode_insert5 (newino, (unsigned long )vino.ino, ceph_ino_compare, + ceph_set_ino_cb, &vino); +if (inode != newino) +iput (newino); + }else { + inode =iget5_locked (sb, (unsigned long )vino.ino, ceph_ino_compare, + ceph_set_ino_cb, &vino); + } + +if (!inode) { +dout ("No inode found for %llx.%llx\n" , vino.ino, vino.snap);return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + }dout ("get_inode on %llu=%llx.%llx got %p new %d\n" ,ceph_present_inode (inode),ceph_vinop (inode), inode, !!(inode->i_state &I_NEW ));
fs/ceph/inode.c struct inode *ceph_get_snapdir(struct inode *parent) · line 152
Quoted 8 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +1
-1@@ -78,7 +146,7 @@ struct inode *ceph_get_snapdir(struct inode *parent) .ino = ceph_ino(parent), .snap = CEPH_SNAPDIR, }; -struct inode *inode =ceph_get_inode (parent->i_sb, vino); +struct inode *inode =ceph_get_inode (parent->i_sb, vino,NULL );struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);if (IS_ERR (inode))
Should we always check this just before using it before 'struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode);' ?
But it seems the 'ceph_inode()' won't introduce any issue here.
Thanks,
Quoted 18 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +2
-2@@ -1546,7 +1614,7 @@ static int readdir_prepopulate_inodes_only(struct ceph_mds_request *req, vino.ino =le64_to_cpu (rde->inode.in->ino); vino.snap =le64_to_cpu (rde->inode.in->snapid); - in =ceph_get_inode (req->r_dentry->d_sb, vino); + in =ceph_get_inode (req->r_dentry->d_sb, vino,NULL );if (IS_ERR (in)) { err =PTR_ERR (in);dout ("new_inode badness got %d\n" , err);@@ -1748,7 +1816,7 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req,if (d_really_is_positive (dn)) { in =d_inode (dn); }else { - in =ceph_get_inode (parent->d_sb, tvino); + in =ceph_get_inode (parent->d_sb, tvino,NULL );if (IS_ERR (in)) {dout ("new_inode badness\n" );d_drop (dn);
[...]
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 06/24] ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 100 lines · Jeff Layton
...and store them in the
ceph_inode_info.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/file.c | 2 ++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+)fs/ceph/file.c +2
-0@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, iinfo.xattr_data = xattr_buf;memset (iinfo.xattr_data,0 , iinfo.xattr_len); +/* FIXME: set fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + in.ino =cpu_to_le64 (vino.ino); in.snapid =cpu_to_le64 (CEPH_NOSNAP ); in.version =cpu_to_le64 (1 );// ??? fs/ceph/inode.c +18
-0@@ -611,6 +611,13 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_meta_err =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + ci->fscrypt_file =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +#endif +return &ci->vfs_inode; }@@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode)struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);kfree (ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free (ceph_inode_cachep, ci); }@@ -1021,6 +1031,14 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, xattr_blob =NULL ; } +if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && !ci->fscrypt_auth) { + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; +inode_set_flags (inode,S_ENCRYPTED ,S_ENCRYPTED ); + } +/* finally update i_version */ if (le64_to_cpu (info->version) > ci->i_version) ci->i_version =le64_to_cpu (info->version);fs/ceph/mds_client.c +25
-0@@ -183,8 +183,48 @@ static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, info->rsnaps =0 ; } +if (struct_v >=5 ) { +u32 alen; + +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, alen, bad); + +while (alen--) { +u32 len; + +/* key */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); +/* value */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); + } + } + +/* fscrypt flag -- ignore */ +if (struct_v >=6 ) +ceph_decode_skip_8 (p, end, bad); + +if (struct_v >=7 ) { +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_auth_len) { + info->fscrypt_auth =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_auth_len,GFP_KERNEL );
fs/ceph/mds_client.c static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, · line 220
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +10
-0+if (!info->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ; +ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth, + info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + } +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_file_len) { + info->fscrypt_file =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_file_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!info->fscrypt_file) +return -ENOMEM ;
Should we kfree(info->fscrypt_auth) before return ?
I didn't anywhere is freeing it.
Thanks.
Quoted 53 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +9
-0+ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file, + info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); + } + } *p = end; }else { +/* legacy (unversioned) struct */ if (features &CEPH_FEATURE_MDS_INLINE_DATA ) {ceph_decode_64_safe (p, end, info->inline_version, bad);ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->inline_len, bad);@@ -625,6 +665,10 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg,static void destroy_reply_info (struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info) { +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_file); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_file);if (!info->dir_entries)return ;free_pages ((unsigned long )info->dir_entries,get_order (info->dir_buf_size));fs/ceph/mds_client.h +4
-0@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in {s32 dir_pin;struct ceph_timespec btime;struct ceph_timespec snap_btime; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len;u64 rsnaps;u64 change_attr; };fs/ceph/super.h +6
-0@@ -429,6 +429,12 @@ struct ceph_inode_info {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE struct fscache_cookie *fscache; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file;#endif errseq_t i_meta_err;
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 07/24] ceph: add fscrypt_* handling to caps.c
In reply to Jeff LaytonHi Jeff,
There has some following patches in your "fscrypt" branch, which is not posted yet, the commit is:
"3161d2f549db ceph: size handling for encrypted inodes in cap updates"
It seems buggy.
In the encode_cap_msg() you have removed the 'fscrypt_file_len' and and added a new 8 bytes' data encoding:
ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); ceph_encode_copy(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); - ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->fscrypt_file_len);
- ceph_encode_copy(&p, arg->fscrypt_file, arg->fscrypt_file_len); + ceph_encode_32(&p, sizeof(__le64));
+ ceph_encode_64(&p, fc->size);
That means no matter the 'arg->encrypted' is true or not, here it will always encode extra 8 bytes' data ?
But in cap_msg_size(), you are making it optional:
static inline int cap_msg_size(struct cap_msg_args *arg) {
return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS + arg->fscrypt_auth_len + - arg->fscrypt_file_len;
+ arg->encrypted ? sizeof(__le64) : 0; }
Have I missed something important here ?
Thanks
Quoted 129 lines · Jeff Layton
Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/caps.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)fs/ceph/caps.c +49
-13@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include <linux/ceph/decode.h> #include <linux/ceph/messenger.h> @@ -1229,15 +1230,12 @@ struct cap_msg_args {umode_t mode;bool inline_data;bool wake; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 fscrypt_auth[sizeof (struct ceph_fscrypt_auth )];// for context +u8 fscrypt_file[sizeof (u64)];// for size }; -/* -* cap struct size + flock buffer size + inline version + inline data size + -* osd_epoch_barrier + oldest_flush_tid -*/ -#define CAP_MSG_SIZE (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ - 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4) -/* Marshal up the cap msg to the MDS */ static void encode_cap_msg (struct ceph_msg *msg,struct cap_msg_args *arg) {@@ -1253,7 +1251,7 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) arg->size, arg->max_size, arg->xattr_version, arg->xattr_buf ? (int)arg->xattr_buf->vec.iov_len : 0); - msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (10 ); + msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (12 ); msg->hdr.tid =cpu_to_le64 (arg->flush_tid); fc = msg->front.iov_base;@@ -1324,6 +1322,16 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg)/* Advisory flags (version 10) */ ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->flags); + +/* dirstats (version 11) - these are r/o on the client */ +ceph_encode_64 (&p,0 ); +ceph_encode_64 (&p,0 ); + +/* fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file (version 12) */ +ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); +ceph_encode_copy (&p, arg->fscrypt_auth, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); +ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->fscrypt_file_len); +ceph_encode_copy (&p, arg->fscrypt_file, arg->fscrypt_file_len); }/* @@ -1445,6 +1453,26 @@ static void __prep_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_cap *cap, } } arg->flags = flags; +if (ci->fscrypt_auth_len && +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth_len !=sizeof (struct ceph_fscrypt_auth ))) { +/* Don't set this if it isn't right size */ + arg->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + }else { + arg->fscrypt_auth_len = ci->fscrypt_auth_len; +memcpy (arg->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth, +min_t (size_t, ci->fscrypt_auth_len,sizeof (arg->fscrypt_auth))); + } +/* FIXME: use this to track "real" size */ + arg->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +} + +#define CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 4) + +static inline int cap_msg_size (struct cap_msg_args *arg) +{ +return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS + arg->fscrypt_auth_len + + arg->fscrypt_file_len; }/* @@ -1457,7 +1485,7 @@ static void __send_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_inode_info *ci)struct ceph_msg *msg;struct inode *inode = &ci->vfs_inode; - msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,CAP_MSG_SIZE ,GFP_NOFS , false); + msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,cap_msg_size (arg),GFP_NOFS , false);if (!msg) { pr_err("error allocating cap msg: ino (%llx.%llx) flushing %s tid %llu, requeuing cap.\n", ceph_vinop(inode), ceph_cap_string(arg->dirty),@@ -1483,10 +1511,6 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode,struct cap_msg_args arg;struct ceph_msg *msg; - msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,CAP_MSG_SIZE ,GFP_NOFS , false); -if (!msg) -return -ENOMEM ; - arg.session = session; arg.ino =ceph_vino (inode).ino; arg.cid =0 ;@@ -1524,6 +1548,18 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode, arg.flags =0 ; arg.wake = false; +/* +* No fscrypt_auth changes from a capsnap. It will need +* to update fscrypt_file on size changes (TODO). +*/ + arg.fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + arg.fscrypt_file_len =0 ; + + msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,cap_msg_size (&arg), +GFP_NOFS , false); +if (!msg) +return -ENOMEM ; +encode_cap_msg (msg, &arg);ceph_con_send (&arg.session->s_con, msg);return 0 ;
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 08/24] ceph: add ability to set fscrypt_auth via setattr
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 46 lines · Jeff Layton
Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/acl.c | 4 ++-- fs/ceph/inode.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 3 +++ fs/ceph/super.h | 7 ++++++- include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)fs/ceph/acl.c +2
-2@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, newattrs.ia_ctime =current_time (inode); newattrs.ia_mode = new_mode; newattrs.ia_valid =ATTR_MODE |ATTR_CTIME ; - ret =__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs); + ret =__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs,NULL );if (ret) goto out_free; }@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, newattrs.ia_ctime = old_ctime; newattrs.ia_mode = old_mode; newattrs.ia_valid =ATTR_MODE |ATTR_CTIME ; -__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs); +__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs,NULL ); } goto out_free; }fs/ceph/inode.c +1
-1@@ -2086,7 +2086,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations ceph_symlink_iops = { .listxattr = ceph_listxattr, }; -int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr) +int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr,struct ceph_iattr *cia) {struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
fs/ceph/inode.c int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) · line 2136
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +7
-0@@ -2127,6 +2127,32 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)dout ("setattr %p issued %s\n" , inode,ceph_cap_string (issued)); +if (cia && cia->fscrypt_auth) { +u32 len = offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob) + +le32_to_cpu (cia->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + +if (len >sizeof (*cia->fscrypt_auth)) +return -EINVAL ; +
Possibly we can remove this check here since in the patch followed will make sure the 'cia' is valid.
Quoted 48 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +20
-1+dout ("setattr %llx:%llx fscrypt_auth len %u to %u)\n" , +ceph_vinop (inode), ci->fscrypt_auth_len, len); + +/* It should never be re-set once set */ +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth); + +if (issued &CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ) { + dirtied |=CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ; +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); + ci->fscrypt_auth = (u8 *)cia->fscrypt_auth; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = len; + }else if ((issued &CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED ) ==0 ) { + req->r_fscrypt_auth = cia->fscrypt_auth; + mask |=CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH ; + release |=CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED ; + } + cia->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + } +if (ia_valid &ATTR_UID ) { dout("setattr %p uid %d -> %d\n", inode, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid),@@ -2324,7 +2350,7 @@ int ceph_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, ceph_quota_is_max_bytes_exceeded(inode, attr->ia_size))return -EDQUOT ; - err =__ceph_setattr (inode, attr); + err =__ceph_setattr (inode, attr,NULL );if (err >=0 && (attr->ia_valid &ATTR_MODE )) err =posix_acl_chmod (&init_user_ns, inode, attr->ia_mode);fs/ceph/mds_client.c +1
-2@@ -2529,8 +2529,7 @@ static int set_request_path_attr(struct inode *rinode, struct dentry *rdentry,return r; } -static void encode_timestamp_and_gids (void **p, -const struct ceph_mds_request *req) +static void encode_mclientrequest_tail (void **p,const struct ceph_mds_request *req) {struct ceph_timespec ts;int i;@@ -2543,6 +2542,21 @@ static void encode_timestamp_and_gids(void **p,for (i =0 ; i < req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups; i++) ceph_encode_64(p, from_kgid(&init_user_ns,
fs/ceph/mds_client.c static void encode_timestamp_and_gids(void **p, · line 2553
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +9
-0req->r_cred->group_info->gid[i])); + +/* v5: altname (TODO: skip for now) */ +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 ); + +/* v6: fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ +if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { +u32 authlen =le32_to_cpu (req->r_fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + + authlen += offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob);
For the authlen calculating, maybe we could add one helper ? I found there have some other places are also doing this.
Quoted 114 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +16
-3+ceph_encode_32 (p, authlen); +ceph_encode_copy (p, req->r_fscrypt_auth, authlen); + }else { +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 ); + } +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 );// fscrypt_file for now }/* @@ -2591,6 +2605,13 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, len += pathlen1 + pathlen2 +2 *(1 +sizeof (u32) +sizeof (u64)) +sizeof (struct ceph_timespec ); len +=sizeof (u32) + (sizeof (u64) * req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); + len +=sizeof (u32);// altname + len +=sizeof (u32);// fscrypt_auth +if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { + len += offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob); + len +=le32_to_cpu (req->r_fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + } + len +=sizeof (u32);// fscrypt_file /* calculate (max) length for cap releases */ len += sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_release) *@@ -2621,7 +2642,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, }else {struct ceph_mds_request_head *new_head = msg->front.iov_base; - msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (4 ); + msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (6 ); new_head->version =cpu_to_le16 (CEPH_MDS_REQUEST_HEAD_VERSION ); head = (struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *)&new_head->oldest_client_tid; p = msg->front.iov_base +sizeof (*new_head);@@ -2672,7 +2693,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, head->num_releases =cpu_to_le16 (releases); -encode_timestamp_and_gids (&p, req); +encode_mclientrequest_tail (&p, req);if (WARN_ON_ONCE (p > end)) {ceph_msg_put (msg);@@ -2781,7 +2802,7 @@ static int __prepare_send_request(struct ceph_mds_session *session, rhead->num_releases =0 ; p = msg->front.iov_base + req->r_request_release_offset; -encode_timestamp_and_gids (&p, req); +encode_mclientrequest_tail (&p, req); msg->front.iov_len = p - msg->front.iov_base; msg->hdr.front_len =cpu_to_le32 (msg->front.iov_len);fs/ceph/mds_client.h +3
-0@@ -278,6 +278,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_request {struct mutex r_fill_mutex;union ceph_mds_request_args r_args; + +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *r_fscrypt_auth; +int r_fmode;/* file mode, if expecting cap */ const struct cred *r_cred;int r_request_release_offset;fs/ceph/super.h +6
-1@@ -1035,7 +1035,12 @@ static inline int ceph_do_getattr(struct inode *inode, int mask, bool force) }extern int ceph_permission (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct inode *inode,int mask); -extern int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr); + +struct ceph_iattr { +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fscrypt_auth; +}; + +extern int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr,struct ceph_iattr *cia);extern int ceph_setattr (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *attr); extern int ceph_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h +13
-8@@ -355,14 +355,19 @@ enum {extern const char *ceph_mds_op_name (int op); - -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE 1 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID 2 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID 4 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME 8 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME 16 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE 32 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME 64 +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE (1 << 0) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID (1 << 1) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID (1 << 2) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME (1 << 3) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME (1 << 4) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE (1 << 5) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME (1 << 6) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME_NOW (1 << 7) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME_NOW (1 << 8) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_BTIME (1 << 9) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_KILL_SGUID (1 << 10) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH (1 << 11) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_FILE (1 << 12)/* * Ceph setxattr request flags.
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 06/24] ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 53 lines · Jeff Layton
...and store them in the
ceph_inode_info.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/file.c | 2 ++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+)fs/ceph/file.c +2
-0@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, iinfo.xattr_data = xattr_buf;memset (iinfo.xattr_data,0 , iinfo.xattr_len); +/* FIXME: set fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + in.ino =cpu_to_le64 (vino.ino); in.snapid =cpu_to_le64 (CEPH_NOSNAP ); in.version =cpu_to_le64 (1 );// ??? fs/ceph/inode.c +10
-0@@ -611,6 +611,13 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_meta_err =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + ci->fscrypt_file =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +#endif +return &ci->vfs_inode; }@@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode)struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);kfree (ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free (ceph_inode_cachep, ci); }
fs/ceph/inode.c int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, · line 1040
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +7
-0@@ -1021,6 +1031,14 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, xattr_blob =NULL ; } +if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && !ci->fscrypt_auth) { + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; +inode_set_flags (inode,S_ENCRYPTED ,S_ENCRYPTED ); + }
I think we also need to free iinfo->fscrypt_auth here if ci->fscrypt_auth is already set. Something like:
if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len) {
if (!ci->fscrypt_auth) {
...
} else {
kfree(iinfo->fscrypt_auth);
iinfo->fscrypt_auth = NULL;
}
}Quoted 37 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +1
-0+/* finally update i_version */ if (le64_to_cpu (info->version) > ci->i_version) ci->i_version =le64_to_cpu (info->version);fs/ceph/mds_client.c +25
-0@@ -183,8 +183,48 @@ static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, info->rsnaps =0 ; } +if (struct_v >=5 ) { +u32 alen; + +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, alen, bad); + +while (alen--) { +u32 len; + +/* key */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); +/* value */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); + } + } + +/* fscrypt flag -- ignore */ +if (struct_v >=6 ) +ceph_decode_skip_8 (p, end, bad); + +if (struct_v >=7 ) { +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_auth_len) { + info->fscrypt_auth =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_auth_len,GFP_KERNEL );
fs/ceph/mds_client.c static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, · line 220
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +10
-0+if (!info->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ; +ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth, + info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + } +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_file_len) { + info->fscrypt_file =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_file_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!info->fscrypt_file) +return -ENOMEM ;
As Xiubo already pointed out, there's a kfree(info->fscrypt_auth) missing in this error path.
Cheers,
--
Luís
Quoted 56 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +9
-0+ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file, + info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); + } + } *p = end; }else { +/* legacy (unversioned) struct */ if (features &CEPH_FEATURE_MDS_INLINE_DATA ) {ceph_decode_64_safe (p, end, info->inline_version, bad);ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->inline_len, bad);@@ -625,6 +665,10 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg,static void destroy_reply_info (struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info) { +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_file); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_file);if (!info->dir_entries)return ;free_pages ((unsigned long )info->dir_entries,get_order (info->dir_buf_size));fs/ceph/mds_client.h +4
-0@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in {s32 dir_pin;struct ceph_timespec btime;struct ceph_timespec snap_btime; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len;u64 rsnaps;u64 change_attr; };fs/ceph/super.h +6
-0@@ -429,6 +429,12 @@ struct ceph_inode_info {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE struct fscache_cookie *fscache; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file;#endif errseq_t i_meta_err;Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 08/24] ceph: add ability to set fscrypt_auth via setattr
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 46 lines · Jeff Layton
Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/acl.c | 4 ++-- fs/ceph/inode.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 3 +++ fs/ceph/super.h | 7 ++++++- include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)fs/ceph/acl.c +2
-2@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, newattrs.ia_ctime =current_time (inode); newattrs.ia_mode = new_mode; newattrs.ia_valid =ATTR_MODE |ATTR_CTIME ; - ret =__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs); + ret =__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs,NULL );if (ret) goto out_free; }@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, newattrs.ia_ctime = old_ctime; newattrs.ia_mode = old_mode; newattrs.ia_valid =ATTR_MODE |ATTR_CTIME ; -__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs); +__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs,NULL ); } goto out_free; }fs/ceph/inode.c +1
-1@@ -2086,7 +2086,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations ceph_symlink_iops = { .listxattr = ceph_listxattr, }; -int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr) +int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr,struct ceph_iattr *cia) {struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;
fs/ceph/inode.c int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) · line 2135
Quoted 9 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +6
-0@@ -2127,6 +2127,32 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)dout ("setattr %p issued %s\n" , inode,ceph_cap_string (issued)); +if (cia && cia->fscrypt_auth) { +u32 len = offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob) + +le32_to_cpu (cia->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + +if (len >sizeof (*cia->fscrypt_auth)) +return -EINVAL ;
This error path needs to be handled differently. We have 'req' and 'prealloc_cf' allocated and, more importantly, we're holding ci->i_ceph_lock.
fs/ceph/inode.c int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) · line 2145
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +10
-0+ +dout ("setattr %llx:%llx fscrypt_auth len %u to %u)\n" , +ceph_vinop (inode), ci->fscrypt_auth_len, len); + +/* It should never be re-set once set */ +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth); + +if (issued &CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ) { + dirtied |=CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ; +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth);
If the WARN_ON_ONCE above is correct, we shouldn't need this kfree.
Cheers,
--
Luís
Quoted 166 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +11
-1+ ci->fscrypt_auth = (u8 *)cia->fscrypt_auth; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = len; + }else if ((issued &CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED ) ==0 ) { + req->r_fscrypt_auth = cia->fscrypt_auth; + mask |=CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH ; + release |=CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED ; + } + cia->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + } +if (ia_valid &ATTR_UID ) { dout("setattr %p uid %d -> %d\n", inode, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid),@@ -2324,7 +2350,7 @@ int ceph_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, ceph_quota_is_max_bytes_exceeded(inode, attr->ia_size))return -EDQUOT ; - err =__ceph_setattr (inode, attr); + err =__ceph_setattr (inode, attr,NULL );if (err >=0 && (attr->ia_valid &ATTR_MODE )) err =posix_acl_chmod (&init_user_ns, inode, attr->ia_mode);fs/ceph/mds_client.c +26
-5@@ -2529,8 +2529,7 @@ static int set_request_path_attr(struct inode *rinode, struct dentry *rdentry,return r; } -static void encode_timestamp_and_gids (void **p, -const struct ceph_mds_request *req) +static void encode_mclientrequest_tail (void **p,const struct ceph_mds_request *req) {struct ceph_timespec ts;int i;@@ -2543,6 +2542,21 @@ static void encode_timestamp_and_gids(void **p,for (i =0 ; i < req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups; i++)ceph_encode_64 (p,from_kgid (&init_user_ns, req->r_cred->group_info->gid[i])); + +/* v5: altname (TODO: skip for now) */ +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 ); + +/* v6: fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ +if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { +u32 authlen =le32_to_cpu (req->r_fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + + authlen += offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob); +ceph_encode_32 (p, authlen); +ceph_encode_copy (p, req->r_fscrypt_auth, authlen); + }else { +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 ); + } +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 );// fscrypt_file for now }/* @@ -2591,6 +2605,13 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, len += pathlen1 + pathlen2 +2 *(1 +sizeof (u32) +sizeof (u64)) +sizeof (struct ceph_timespec ); len +=sizeof (u32) + (sizeof (u64) * req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); + len +=sizeof (u32);// altname + len +=sizeof (u32);// fscrypt_auth +if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { + len += offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob); + len +=le32_to_cpu (req->r_fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + } + len +=sizeof (u32);// fscrypt_file /* calculate (max) length for cap releases */ len += sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_release) *@@ -2621,7 +2642,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, }else {struct ceph_mds_request_head *new_head = msg->front.iov_base; - msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (4 ); + msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (6 ); new_head->version =cpu_to_le16 (CEPH_MDS_REQUEST_HEAD_VERSION ); head = (struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *)&new_head->oldest_client_tid; p = msg->front.iov_base +sizeof (*new_head);@@ -2672,7 +2693,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, head->num_releases =cpu_to_le16 (releases); -encode_timestamp_and_gids (&p, req); +encode_mclientrequest_tail (&p, req);if (WARN_ON_ONCE (p > end)) {ceph_msg_put (msg);@@ -2781,7 +2802,7 @@ static int __prepare_send_request(struct ceph_mds_session *session, rhead->num_releases =0 ; p = msg->front.iov_base + req->r_request_release_offset; -encode_timestamp_and_gids (&p, req); +encode_mclientrequest_tail (&p, req); msg->front.iov_len = p - msg->front.iov_base; msg->hdr.front_len =cpu_to_le32 (msg->front.iov_len);fs/ceph/mds_client.h +3
-0@@ -278,6 +278,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_request {struct mutex r_fill_mutex;union ceph_mds_request_args r_args; + +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *r_fscrypt_auth; +int r_fmode;/* file mode, if expecting cap */ const struct cred *r_cred;int r_request_release_offset;fs/ceph/super.h +6
-1@@ -1035,7 +1035,12 @@ static inline int ceph_do_getattr(struct inode *inode, int mask, bool force) }extern int ceph_permission (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct inode *inode,int mask); -extern int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr); + +struct ceph_iattr { +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fscrypt_auth; +}; + +extern int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr,struct ceph_iattr *cia);extern int ceph_setattr (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *attr); extern int ceph_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h +13
-8@@ -355,14 +355,19 @@ enum {extern const char *ceph_mds_op_name (int op); - -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE 1 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID 2 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID 4 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME 8 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME 16 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE 32 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME 64 +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE (1 << 0) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID (1 << 1) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID (1 << 2) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME (1 << 3) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME (1 << 4) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE (1 << 5) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME (1 << 6) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME_NOW (1 << 7) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME_NOW (1 << 8) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_BTIME (1 << 9) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_KILL_SGUID (1 << 10) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH (1 << 11) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_FILE (1 << 12)/* * Ceph setxattr request flags. Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 11/24] ceph: add routine to create fscrypt context prior to RPC
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 47 lines · Jeff Layton
After pre-creating a new inode, do an fscrypt prepare on it, fetch a new encryption context and then marshal that into the security context to be sent along with the RPC. Call the new function from
ceph_new_inode.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 10 ++++++++-- fs/ceph/super.h | 5 +++++ fs/ceph/xattr.c | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)fs/ceph/crypto.c +18
-0@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#include <linux/fscrypt.h> #include "super.h" +#include "mds_client.h" #include "crypto.h" static int ceph_crypt_get_context (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,size_t len)@@ -86,3 +87,44 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) {fscrypt_set_ops (sb, &ceph_fscrypt_ops); } + +int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (struct inode *dir,struct inode *inode, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ +int ret, ctxsize; +bool encrypted = false; +struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode); + + ret =fscrypt_prepare_new_inode (dir, inode, &encrypted); +if (ret) +return ret; +if (!encrypted) +return 0 ; + + as->fscrypt_auth =kzalloc (sizeof (*as->fscrypt_auth),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!as->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ;
fs/ceph/crypto.c void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) · line 116
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/crypto.c +10
-0+ + ctxsize =fscrypt_context_for_new_inode (as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob, inode); +if (ctxsize <0 ) +return ctxsize; + + as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_version =cpu_to_le32 (CEPH_FSCRYPT_AUTH_VERSION ); + as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len =cpu_to_le32 (ctxsize); + +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth); +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth);
It's odd to have again a kfree() after a WARN_ON_ONCE() :-)
Quoted 4 lines
fs/ceph/crypto.c +4
-0+ ci->fscrypt_auth_len =ceph_fscrypt_auth_size (ctxsize); + ci->fscrypt_auth =kmemdup (as->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ci->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ;
fs/ceph/crypto.c void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) · line 130
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/crypto.c +10
-0+ + inode->i_flags |=S_ENCRYPTED ; + +return 0 ; +} + +void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ +swap (req->r_fscrypt_auth, as->fscrypt_auth); +}
This means that req->r_fscrypt_auth will need to be freed in ceph_mdsc_release_request(). (I believe you've moved this function to some other commit in your experimental branch).
Cheers,
--
Luís
Quoted 126 lines
fs/ceph/crypto.h +25
-0@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@#define CEPH_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "encryption.ctx"#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +struct ceph_fs_client ; +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx ; +struct ceph_mds_request ;#define CEPH_FSCRYPT_AUTH_VERSION 1 struct ceph_fscrypt_auth {@@ -19,10 +22,19 @@ struct ceph_fscrypt_auth { u8 cfa_blob[FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE]; } __packed; +static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_size (u32 ctxsize) +{ +return offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob) + ctxsize; +} +void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (struct super_block *sb);void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc); +int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (struct inode *dir,struct inode *inode, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); +void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); +#else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (struct super_block *sb)@@ -32,6 +44,19 @@ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb)static inline void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) { } + +static inline int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (struct inode *dir,struct inode *inode, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ +if (IS_ENCRYPTED (dir)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return 0 ; +} + +static inline void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) +{ +}#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ #endif fs/ceph/inode.c +8
-2@@ -83,12 +83,17 @@ struct inode *ceph_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, goto out_err; } + inode->i_state =0 ; + inode->i_mode = *mode; + err =ceph_security_init_secctx (dentry, *mode, as_ctx);if (err <0 ) goto out_err; - inode->i_state =0 ; - inode->i_mode = *mode; + err =ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (dir, inode, as_ctx); +if (err) + goto out_err; +return inode; out_err:iput (inode);@@ -101,6 +106,7 @@ void ceph_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *a req->r_pagelist = as_ctx->pagelist; as_ctx->pagelist =NULL ; } +ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (req, as_ctx); }/** fs/ceph/super.h +5
-0@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@#include <linux/fscache.h> #endif +#include "crypto.h" +/* f_type in struct statfs */ #define CEPH_SUPER_MAGIC 0x00c36400@@ -1068,6 +1070,9 @@ struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL void *sec_ctx;u32 sec_ctxlen; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fscrypt_auth;#endif struct ceph_pagelist *pagelist; };fs/ceph/xattr.c +3
-0@@ -1362,6 +1362,9 @@ void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx)#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL security_release_secctx (as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (as_ctx->fscrypt_auth);#endif if (as_ctx->pagelist)ceph_pagelist_release (as_ctx->pagelist);Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 06/24] ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
In reply to Luis HenriquesQuoted 67 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 53 lines · Jeff Layton
...and store them in the
ceph_inode_info.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/file.c | 2 ++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+)fs/ceph/file.c +2
-0@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, iinfo.xattr_data = xattr_buf;memset (iinfo.xattr_data,0 , iinfo.xattr_len); +/* FIXME: set fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + in.ino =cpu_to_le64 (vino.ino); in.snapid =cpu_to_le64 (CEPH_NOSNAP ); in.version =cpu_to_le64 (1 );// ??? fs/ceph/inode.c +10
-0@@ -611,6 +611,13 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_meta_err =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + ci->fscrypt_file =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +#endif +return &ci->vfs_inode; }@@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode)struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);kfree (ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free (ceph_inode_cachep, ci); }fs/ceph/inode.c int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, · line 1040
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +7
-0@@ -1021,6 +1031,14 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, xattr_blob =NULL ; } +if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && !ci->fscrypt_auth) { + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; +inode_set_flags (inode,S_ENCRYPTED ,S_ENCRYPTED ); + }I think we also need to free
iinfo->fscrypt_authhere ifci->fscrypt_authis already set. Something like:
Quoted 9 lines
if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len) {
if (!ci->fscrypt_auth) {
...
} else {
kfree(iinfo->fscrypt_auth);
iinfo->fscrypt_auth = NULL;
}
}IMO, this should be okay because it will be freed in destroy_reply_info() when putting the request.
Quoted 110 lines
Quoted 37 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +1
-0+/* finally update i_version */ if (le64_to_cpu (info->version) > ci->i_version) ci->i_version =le64_to_cpu (info->version);fs/ceph/mds_client.c +25
-0@@ -183,8 +183,48 @@ static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, info->rsnaps =0 ; } +if (struct_v >=5 ) { +u32 alen; + +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, alen, bad); + +while (alen--) { +u32 len; + +/* key */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); +/* value */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); + } + } + +/* fscrypt flag -- ignore */ +if (struct_v >=6 ) +ceph_decode_skip_8 (p, end, bad); + +if (struct_v >=7 ) { +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_auth_len) { + info->fscrypt_auth =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_auth_len,GFP_KERNEL );fs/ceph/mds_client.c static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, · line 220
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +10
-0+if (!info->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ; +ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth, + info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + } +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_file_len) { + info->fscrypt_file =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_file_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!info->fscrypt_file) +return -ENOMEM ;As Xiubo already pointed out, there's a
kfree(info->fscrypt_auth)missing in this error path.Cheers,
--
LuísQuoted 56 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +9
-0+ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file, + info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); + } + } *p = end; }else { +/* legacy (unversioned) struct */ if (features &CEPH_FEATURE_MDS_INLINE_DATA ) {ceph_decode_64_safe (p, end, info->inline_version, bad);ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->inline_len, bad);@@ -625,6 +665,10 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg,static void destroy_reply_info (struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info) { +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_file); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_file);if (!info->dir_entries)return ;free_pages ((unsigned long )info->dir_entries,get_order (info->dir_buf_size));fs/ceph/mds_client.h +4
-0@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in {s32 dir_pin;struct ceph_timespec btime;struct ceph_timespec snap_btime; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len;u64 rsnaps;u64 change_attr; };fs/ceph/super.h +6
-0@@ -429,6 +429,12 @@ struct ceph_inode_info {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE struct fscache_cookie *fscache; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file;#endif errseq_t i_meta_err;Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 07/24] ceph: add fscrypt_* handling to caps.c
In reply to Xiubo LiQuoted 9 lines · Xiubo Li
Hi Jeff,
There has some following patches in your "fscrypt" branch, which is not posted yet, the commit is:
"
3161d2f549dbceph: size handling for encrypted inodes in cap updates"It seems buggy.
Yes. Those are still quite rough. If I haven't posted them, then YMMV. I often push them to -experimental branches just for backup purposes. You may want to wait on reviewing those until I've had a chance to clean them up and post them.
Quoted 25 lines
In the
encode_cap_msg()you have removed the 'fscrypt_file_len' and and added a new 8 bytes' data encoding:
ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth_len);ceph_encode_copy(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth, arg->fscrypt_auth_len);
-ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->fscrypt_file_len);
-ceph_encode_copy(&p, arg->fscrypt_file, arg->fscrypt_file_len); +ceph_encode_32(&p, sizeof(__le64));
+ceph_encode_64(&p, fc->size);That means no matter the '
arg->encrypted' is true or not, here it will always encode extra 8 bytes' data ?But in
cap_msg_size(), you are making it optional:static inline int
cap_msg_size(struct cap_msg_args *arg){
returnCAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS+arg->fscrypt_auth_len+
-arg->fscrypt_file_len;
+arg->encrypted?sizeof(__le64): 0;
}
Quoted 4 lines
Have I missed something important here ?
Thanks
Nope, you're right. I had fixed that one in my local branch already, and just hadn't yet pushed it to the repo. I'll plan to clean this up a bit later today and push an updated branch.
Quoted 132 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 129 lines
Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/caps.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)fs/ceph/caps.c +49
-13@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include <linux/ceph/decode.h> #include <linux/ceph/messenger.h> @@ -1229,15 +1230,12 @@ struct cap_msg_args {umode_t mode;bool inline_data;bool wake; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 fscrypt_auth[sizeof (struct ceph_fscrypt_auth )];// for context +u8 fscrypt_file[sizeof (u64)];// for size }; -/* -* cap struct size + flock buffer size + inline version + inline data size + -* osd_epoch_barrier + oldest_flush_tid -*/ -#define CAP_MSG_SIZE (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ - 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4) -/* Marshal up the cap msg to the MDS */ static void encode_cap_msg (struct ceph_msg *msg,struct cap_msg_args *arg) {@@ -1253,7 +1251,7 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) arg->size, arg->max_size, arg->xattr_version, arg->xattr_buf ? (int)arg->xattr_buf->vec.iov_len : 0); - msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (10 ); + msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (12 ); msg->hdr.tid =cpu_to_le64 (arg->flush_tid); fc = msg->front.iov_base;@@ -1324,6 +1322,16 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg)/* Advisory flags (version 10) */ ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->flags); + +/* dirstats (version 11) - these are r/o on the client */ +ceph_encode_64 (&p,0 ); +ceph_encode_64 (&p,0 ); + +/* fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file (version 12) */ +ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); +ceph_encode_copy (&p, arg->fscrypt_auth, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); +ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->fscrypt_file_len); +ceph_encode_copy (&p, arg->fscrypt_file, arg->fscrypt_file_len); }/* @@ -1445,6 +1453,26 @@ static void __prep_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_cap *cap, } } arg->flags = flags; +if (ci->fscrypt_auth_len && +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth_len !=sizeof (struct ceph_fscrypt_auth ))) { +/* Don't set this if it isn't right size */ + arg->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + }else { + arg->fscrypt_auth_len = ci->fscrypt_auth_len; +memcpy (arg->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth, +min_t (size_t, ci->fscrypt_auth_len,sizeof (arg->fscrypt_auth))); + } +/* FIXME: use this to track "real" size */ + arg->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +} + +#define CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 4) + +static inline int cap_msg_size (struct cap_msg_args *arg) +{ +return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS + arg->fscrypt_auth_len + + arg->fscrypt_file_len; }/* @@ -1457,7 +1485,7 @@ static void __send_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_inode_info *ci)struct ceph_msg *msg;struct inode *inode = &ci->vfs_inode; - msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,CAP_MSG_SIZE ,GFP_NOFS , false); + msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,cap_msg_size (arg),GFP_NOFS , false);if (!msg) { pr_err("error allocating cap msg: ino (%llx.%llx) flushing %s tid %llu, requeuing cap.\n", ceph_vinop(inode), ceph_cap_string(arg->dirty),@@ -1483,10 +1511,6 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode,struct cap_msg_args arg;struct ceph_msg *msg; - msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,CAP_MSG_SIZE ,GFP_NOFS , false); -if (!msg) -return -ENOMEM ; - arg.session = session; arg.ino =ceph_vino (inode).ino; arg.cid =0 ;@@ -1524,6 +1548,18 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode, arg.flags =0 ; arg.wake = false; +/* +* No fscrypt_auth changes from a capsnap. It will need +* to update fscrypt_file on size changes (TODO). +*/ + arg.fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + arg.fscrypt_file_len =0 ; + + msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,cap_msg_size (&arg), +GFP_NOFS , false); +if (!msg) +return -ENOMEM ; +encode_cap_msg (msg, &arg);ceph_con_send (&arg.session->s_con, msg);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 05/24] ceph: preallocate inode for ops that may create one
In reply to Xiubo LiQuoted 135 lines · Xiubo Li
Quoted 30 lines · Jeff Layton
When creating a new inode, we need to determine the crypto context before we can transmit the RPC. The fscrypt API has a routine for getting a crypto context before a create occurs, but it requires an inode.
Change the ceph code to preallocate an inode in advance of a create of any sort (
open(),mknod(),symlink(), etc). Move the existing code that generates the ACL and SELinux blobs into this routine since that's mostly common across all the different codepaths.In most cases, we just want to allow
ceph_fill_traceto use that inode after the reply comes in, so add a new field to the MDS request for it (r_new_inode).The async create codepath is a bit different though. In that case, we want to hash the inode in advance of the RPC so that it can be used before the reply comes in. If the call subsequently fails with
-EJUKEBOX, then just put the references and clean up theas_ctx. Note that with this change, we now need to regenerate theas_ctxwhen this occurs, but it's quite rare for it to happen.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/dir.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++----------------- fs/ceph/file.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++------------- fs/ceph/inode.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 3 +- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 1 + fs/ceph/super.h | 7 +++- 6 files changed, 160 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)[...]
Quoted 102 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +73
-5@@ -52,17 +52,85 @@ static int ceph_set_ino_cb(struct inode *inode, void *data)return 0 ; } -struct inode *ceph_get_inode (struct super_block *sb,struct ceph_vino vino) +/** +* ceph_new_inode - allocate a new inode in advance of an expected create +* @dir: parent directory for new inode +* @dentry: dentry that may eventually point to new inode +* @mode: mode of new inode +* @as_ctx: pointer to inherited security context +* +* Allocate a new inode in advance of an operation to create a new inode. +* This allocates the inode and sets up the acl_sec_ctx with appropriate +* info for the new inode. +* +* Returns a pointer to the new inode or an ERR_PTR. +*/ +struct inode *ceph_new_inode (struct inode *dir,struct dentry *dentry, +umode_t *mode,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) +{ +int err; +struct inode *inode; + + inode =new_inode_pseudo (dir->i_sb); +if (!inode) +return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + +if (!S_ISLNK (*mode)) { + err =ceph_pre_init_acls (dir, mode, as_ctx); +if (err <0 ) + goto out_err; + } + + err =ceph_security_init_secctx (dentry, *mode, as_ctx); +if (err <0 ) + goto out_err; + + inode->i_state =0 ; + inode->i_mode = *mode; +return inode; +out_err: +iput (inode); +return ERR_PTR (err); +} + +void ceph_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) +{ +if (as_ctx->pagelist) { + req->r_pagelist = as_ctx->pagelist; + as_ctx->pagelist =NULL ; + } +} + +/** +* ceph_get_inode - find or create/hash a new inode +* @sb: superblock to search and allocate in +* @vino: vino to search for +* @newino: optional new inode to insert if one isn't found (may be NULL) +* +* Search for or insert a new inode into the hash for the given vino, and return a +* reference to it. If new is non-NULL, its reference is consumed. +*/ +struct inode *ceph_get_inode (struct super_block *sb,struct ceph_vino vino,struct inode *newino) {struct inode *inode;if (ceph_vino_is_reserved (vino))return ERR_PTR (-EREMOTEIO ); - inode =iget5_locked (sb, (unsigned long )vino.ino, ceph_ino_compare, - ceph_set_ino_cb, &vino); -if (!inode) +if (newino) { + inode =inode_insert5 (newino, (unsigned long )vino.ino, ceph_ino_compare, + ceph_set_ino_cb, &vino); +if (inode != newino) +iput (newino); + }else { + inode =iget5_locked (sb, (unsigned long )vino.ino, ceph_ino_compare, + ceph_set_ino_cb, &vino); + } + +if (!inode) { +dout ("No inode found for %llx.%llx\n" , vino.ino, vino.snap);return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); + }dout ("get_inode on %llu=%llx.%llx got %p new %d\n" ,ceph_present_inode (inode),ceph_vinop (inode), inode, !!(inode->i_state &I_NEW ));@@ -78,7 +146,7 @@ struct inode *ceph_get_snapdir(struct inode *parent) .ino = ceph_ino(parent), .snap = CEPH_SNAPDIR, }; -struct inode *inode =ceph_get_inode (parent->i_sb, vino); +struct inode *inode =ceph_get_inode (parent->i_sb, vino,NULL );struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);
Quoted 9 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c struct inode *ceph_get_snapdir(struct inode *parent) · line 152
Quoted 1 line
fs/ceph/inode.c +0
-0if (IS_ERR (inode))Should we always check this just before using it before 'struct
ceph_inode_info*ci =ceph_inode(inode);' ?But it seems the '
ceph_inode()' won't introduce any issue here.Thanks,
Yeah, it's just doing pointer math. If it turns out to be an error, it'll exit before it ever dereferences "ci".
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 18 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +2
-2@@ -1546,7 +1614,7 @@ static int readdir_prepopulate_inodes_only(struct ceph_mds_request *req, vino.ino =le64_to_cpu (rde->inode.in->ino); vino.snap =le64_to_cpu (rde->inode.in->snapid); - in =ceph_get_inode (req->r_dentry->d_sb, vino); + in =ceph_get_inode (req->r_dentry->d_sb, vino,NULL );if (IS_ERR (in)) { err =PTR_ERR (in);dout ("new_inode badness got %d\n" , err);@@ -1748,7 +1816,7 @@ int ceph_readdir_prepopulate(struct ceph_mds_request *req,if (d_really_is_positive (dn)) { in =d_inode (dn); }else { - in =ceph_get_inode (parent->d_sb, tvino); + in =ceph_get_inode (parent->d_sb, tvino,NULL );if (IS_ERR (in)) {dout ("new_inode badness\n" );d_drop (dn);[...]
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 06/24] ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
In reply to Xiubo LiQuoted 114 lines · Xiubo Li
Quoted 100 lines · Jeff Layton
...and store them in the
ceph_inode_info.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/file.c | 2 ++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+)fs/ceph/file.c +2
-0@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, iinfo.xattr_data = xattr_buf;memset (iinfo.xattr_data,0 , iinfo.xattr_len); +/* FIXME: set fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + in.ino =cpu_to_le64 (vino.ino); in.snapid =cpu_to_le64 (CEPH_NOSNAP ); in.version =cpu_to_le64 (1 );// ??? fs/ceph/inode.c +18
-0@@ -611,6 +611,13 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_meta_err =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + ci->fscrypt_file =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +#endif +return &ci->vfs_inode; }@@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode)struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);kfree (ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free (ceph_inode_cachep, ci); }@@ -1021,6 +1031,14 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, xattr_blob =NULL ; } +if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && !ci->fscrypt_auth) { + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; +inode_set_flags (inode,S_ENCRYPTED ,S_ENCRYPTED ); + } +/* finally update i_version */ if (le64_to_cpu (info->version) > ci->i_version) ci->i_version =le64_to_cpu (info->version);fs/ceph/mds_client.c +25
-0@@ -183,8 +183,48 @@ static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, info->rsnaps =0 ; } +if (struct_v >=5 ) { +u32 alen; + +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, alen, bad); + +while (alen--) { +u32 len; + +/* key */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); +/* value */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); + } + } + +/* fscrypt flag -- ignore */ +if (struct_v >=6 ) +ceph_decode_skip_8 (p, end, bad); + +if (struct_v >=7 ) { +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_auth_len) { + info->fscrypt_auth =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_auth_len,GFP_KERNEL );fs/ceph/mds_client.c static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, · line 220
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +10
-0+if (!info->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ; +ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth, + info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + } +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_file_len) { + info->fscrypt_file =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_file_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!info->fscrypt_file) +return -ENOMEM ;Should we
kfree(info->fscrypt_auth)before return ?
Quoted 2 lines
I didn't anywhere is freeing it.
It'll get freed in destroy_reply_info(). We could do it here, but it should be fine to wait until we're tearing the "info" structure down.
Quoted 56 lines
Quoted 55 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +9
-0+ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file, + info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); + } + } *p = end; }else { +/* legacy (unversioned) struct */ if (features &CEPH_FEATURE_MDS_INLINE_DATA ) {ceph_decode_64_safe (p, end, info->inline_version, bad);ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->inline_len, bad);@@ -625,6 +665,10 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg,static void destroy_reply_info (struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info) { +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_file); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_file);if (!info->dir_entries)return ;free_pages ((unsigned long )info->dir_entries,get_order (info->dir_buf_size));fs/ceph/mds_client.h +4
-0@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in {s32 dir_pin;struct ceph_timespec btime;struct ceph_timespec snap_btime; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len;u64 rsnaps;u64 change_attr; };fs/ceph/super.h +6
-0@@ -429,6 +429,12 @@ struct ceph_inode_info {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE struct fscache_cookie *fscache; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file;#endif errseq_t i_meta_err;
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 08/24] ceph: add ability to set fscrypt_auth via setattr
In reply to Xiubo LiQuoted 50 lines · Xiubo Li
Quoted 49 lines · Jeff Layton
Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/acl.c | 4 ++-- fs/ceph/inode.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 3 +++ fs/ceph/super.h | 7 ++++++- include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)fs/ceph/acl.c +2
-2@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, newattrs.ia_ctime =current_time (inode); newattrs.ia_mode = new_mode; newattrs.ia_valid =ATTR_MODE |ATTR_CTIME ; - ret =__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs); + ret =__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs,NULL );if (ret) goto out_free; }@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, newattrs.ia_ctime = old_ctime; newattrs.ia_mode = old_mode; newattrs.ia_valid =ATTR_MODE |ATTR_CTIME ; -__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs); +__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs,NULL ); } goto out_free; }fs/ceph/inode.c +1
-1@@ -2086,7 +2086,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations ceph_symlink_iops = { .listxattr = ceph_listxattr, }; -int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr) +int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr,struct ceph_iattr *cia) {struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;@@ -2127,6 +2127,32 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)dout ("setattr %p issued %s\n" , inode,ceph_cap_string (issued));
Quoted 12 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) · line 2136
Quoted 7 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +7
-0+if (cia && cia->fscrypt_auth) { +u32 len = offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob) + +le32_to_cpu (cia->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + +if (len >sizeof (*cia->fscrypt_auth)) +return -EINVAL ; +Possibly we can remove this check here since in the patch followed will make sure the 'cia' is valid.
Good point. I'll plan to clean that up.
Quoted 54 lines
Quoted 54 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +20
-1+dout ("setattr %llx:%llx fscrypt_auth len %u to %u)\n" , +ceph_vinop (inode), ci->fscrypt_auth_len, len); + +/* It should never be re-set once set */ +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth); + +if (issued &CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ) { + dirtied |=CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ; +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); + ci->fscrypt_auth = (u8 *)cia->fscrypt_auth; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = len; + }else if ((issued &CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED ) ==0 ) { + req->r_fscrypt_auth = cia->fscrypt_auth; + mask |=CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH ; + release |=CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED ; + } + cia->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + } +if (ia_valid &ATTR_UID ) { dout("setattr %p uid %d -> %d\n", inode, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid),@@ -2324,7 +2350,7 @@ int ceph_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, ceph_quota_is_max_bytes_exceeded(inode, attr->ia_size))return -EDQUOT ; - err =__ceph_setattr (inode, attr); + err =__ceph_setattr (inode, attr,NULL );if (err >=0 && (attr->ia_valid &ATTR_MODE )) err =posix_acl_chmod (&init_user_ns, inode, attr->ia_mode);fs/ceph/mds_client.c +5
-2@@ -2529,8 +2529,7 @@ static int set_request_path_attr(struct inode *rinode, struct dentry *rdentry,return r; } -static void encode_timestamp_and_gids (void **p, -const struct ceph_mds_request *req) +static void encode_mclientrequest_tail (void **p,const struct ceph_mds_request *req) {struct ceph_timespec ts;int i;@@ -2543,6 +2542,21 @@ static void encode_timestamp_and_gids(void **p,for (i =0 ; i < req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups; i++)ceph_encode_64 (p,from_kgid (&init_user_ns, req->r_cred->group_info->gid[i])); + +/* v5: altname (TODO: skip for now) */ +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 ); +
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c static void encode_timestamp_and_gids(void **p, · line 2553
Quoted 5 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +5
-0+/* v6: fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ +if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { +u32 authlen =le32_to_cpu (req->r_fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + + authlen += offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob);For the authlen calculating, maybe we could add one helper ? I found there have some other places are also doing this.
Yes. I'll plan to do that.
Quoted 115 lines
Quoted 114 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +16
-3+ceph_encode_32 (p, authlen); +ceph_encode_copy (p, req->r_fscrypt_auth, authlen); + }else { +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 ); + } +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 );// fscrypt_file for now }/* @@ -2591,6 +2605,13 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, len += pathlen1 + pathlen2 +2 *(1 +sizeof (u32) +sizeof (u64)) +sizeof (struct ceph_timespec ); len +=sizeof (u32) + (sizeof (u64) * req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); + len +=sizeof (u32);// altname + len +=sizeof (u32);// fscrypt_auth +if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { + len += offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob); + len +=le32_to_cpu (req->r_fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + } + len +=sizeof (u32);// fscrypt_file /* calculate (max) length for cap releases */ len += sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_release) *@@ -2621,7 +2642,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, }else {struct ceph_mds_request_head *new_head = msg->front.iov_base; - msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (4 ); + msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (6 ); new_head->version =cpu_to_le16 (CEPH_MDS_REQUEST_HEAD_VERSION ); head = (struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *)&new_head->oldest_client_tid; p = msg->front.iov_base +sizeof (*new_head);@@ -2672,7 +2693,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, head->num_releases =cpu_to_le16 (releases); -encode_timestamp_and_gids (&p, req); +encode_mclientrequest_tail (&p, req);if (WARN_ON_ONCE (p > end)) {ceph_msg_put (msg);@@ -2781,7 +2802,7 @@ static int __prepare_send_request(struct ceph_mds_session *session, rhead->num_releases =0 ; p = msg->front.iov_base + req->r_request_release_offset; -encode_timestamp_and_gids (&p, req); +encode_mclientrequest_tail (&p, req); msg->front.iov_len = p - msg->front.iov_base; msg->hdr.front_len =cpu_to_le32 (msg->front.iov_len);fs/ceph/mds_client.h +3
-0@@ -278,6 +278,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_request {struct mutex r_fill_mutex;union ceph_mds_request_args r_args; + +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *r_fscrypt_auth; +int r_fmode;/* file mode, if expecting cap */ const struct cred *r_cred;int r_request_release_offset;fs/ceph/super.h +6
-1@@ -1035,7 +1035,12 @@ static inline int ceph_do_getattr(struct inode *inode, int mask, bool force) }extern int ceph_permission (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct inode *inode,int mask); -extern int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr); + +struct ceph_iattr { +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fscrypt_auth; +}; + +extern int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr,struct ceph_iattr *cia);extern int ceph_setattr (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *attr); extern int ceph_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h +13
-8@@ -355,14 +355,19 @@ enum {extern const char *ceph_mds_op_name (int op); - -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE 1 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID 2 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID 4 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME 8 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME 16 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE 32 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME 64 +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE (1 << 0) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID (1 << 1) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID (1 << 2) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME (1 << 3) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME (1 << 4) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE (1 << 5) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME (1 << 6) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME_NOW (1 << 7) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME_NOW (1 << 8) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_BTIME (1 << 9) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_KILL_SGUID (1 << 10) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH (1 << 11) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_FILE (1 << 12)/* * Ceph setxattr request flags.
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 06/24] ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
In reply to Xiubo LiQuoted 77 lines · Xiubo Li
Quoted 67 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 53 lines · Jeff Layton
...and store them in the
ceph_inode_info.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/file.c | 2 ++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+)fs/ceph/file.c +2
-0@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, iinfo.xattr_data = xattr_buf;memset (iinfo.xattr_data,0 , iinfo.xattr_len); +/* FIXME: set fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + in.ino =cpu_to_le64 (vino.ino); in.snapid =cpu_to_le64 (CEPH_NOSNAP ); in.version =cpu_to_le64 (1 );// ??? fs/ceph/inode.c +10
-0@@ -611,6 +611,13 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_meta_err =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + ci->fscrypt_file =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +#endif +return &ci->vfs_inode; }@@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode)struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);kfree (ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free (ceph_inode_cachep, ci); }fs/ceph/inode.c int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, · line 1040
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +7
-0@@ -1021,6 +1031,14 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, xattr_blob =NULL ; } +if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && !ci->fscrypt_auth) { + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; +inode_set_flags (inode,S_ENCRYPTED ,S_ENCRYPTED ); + }I think we also need to free
iinfo->fscrypt_authhere ifci->fscrypt_authis already set. Something like:Quoted 9 lines
if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len) { if (!ci->fscrypt_auth) { ... } else { kfree(iinfo->fscrypt_auth); iinfo->fscrypt_auth = NULL; } }
Quoted 4 lines
IMO, this should be okay because it will be freed in
destroy_reply_info()when putting the request.
Yes. All of that should get cleaned up with the request.
Quoted 111 lines
Quoted 110 lines
Quoted 37 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +1
-0+/* finally update i_version */ if (le64_to_cpu (info->version) > ci->i_version) ci->i_version =le64_to_cpu (info->version);fs/ceph/mds_client.c +25
-0@@ -183,8 +183,48 @@ static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, info->rsnaps =0 ; } +if (struct_v >=5 ) { +u32 alen; + +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, alen, bad); + +while (alen--) { +u32 len; + +/* key */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); +/* value */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); + } + } + +/* fscrypt flag -- ignore */ +if (struct_v >=6 ) +ceph_decode_skip_8 (p, end, bad); + +if (struct_v >=7 ) { +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_auth_len) { + info->fscrypt_auth =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_auth_len,GFP_KERNEL );fs/ceph/mds_client.c static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, · line 220
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +10
-0+if (!info->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ; +ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth, + info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + } +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_file_len) { + info->fscrypt_file =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_file_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!info->fscrypt_file) +return -ENOMEM ;As Xiubo already pointed out, there's a
kfree(info->fscrypt_auth)missing in this error path.Cheers,
--
LuísQuoted 56 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +9
-0+ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file, + info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); + } + } *p = end; }else { +/* legacy (unversioned) struct */ if (features &CEPH_FEATURE_MDS_INLINE_DATA ) {ceph_decode_64_safe (p, end, info->inline_version, bad);ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->inline_len, bad);@@ -625,6 +665,10 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg,static void destroy_reply_info (struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info) { +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_file); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_file);if (!info->dir_entries)return ;free_pages ((unsigned long )info->dir_entries,get_order (info->dir_buf_size));fs/ceph/mds_client.h +4
-0@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in {s32 dir_pin;struct ceph_timespec btime;struct ceph_timespec snap_btime; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len;u64 rsnaps;u64 change_attr; };fs/ceph/super.h +6
-0@@ -429,6 +429,12 @@ struct ceph_inode_info {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE struct fscache_cookie *fscache; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file;#endif errseq_t i_meta_err;Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 08/24] ceph: add ability to set fscrypt_auth via setattr
In reply to Luis HenriquesQuoted 50 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 49 lines · Jeff Layton
Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/acl.c | 4 ++-- fs/ceph/inode.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 3 +++ fs/ceph/super.h | 7 ++++++- include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)fs/ceph/acl.c +2
-2@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, newattrs.ia_ctime =current_time (inode); newattrs.ia_mode = new_mode; newattrs.ia_valid =ATTR_MODE |ATTR_CTIME ; - ret =__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs); + ret =__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs,NULL );if (ret) goto out_free; }@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ int ceph_set_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, newattrs.ia_ctime = old_ctime; newattrs.ia_mode = old_mode; newattrs.ia_valid =ATTR_MODE |ATTR_CTIME ; -__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs); +__ceph_setattr (inode, &newattrs,NULL ); } goto out_free; }fs/ceph/inode.c +1
-1@@ -2086,7 +2086,7 @@ static const struct inode_operations ceph_symlink_iops = { .listxattr = ceph_listxattr, }; -int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr) +int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr,struct ceph_iattr *cia) {struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid;@@ -2127,6 +2127,32 @@ int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr)dout ("setattr %p issued %s\n" , inode,ceph_cap_string (issued));
Quoted 11 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) · line 2135
Quoted 6 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +6
-0+if (cia && cia->fscrypt_auth) { +u32 len = offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob) + +le32_to_cpu (cia->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + +if (len >sizeof (*cia->fscrypt_auth)) +return -EINVAL ;This error path needs to be handled differently. We have 'req' and '
prealloc_cf' allocated and, more importantly, we're holdingci->i_ceph_lock.
Good catch. I'll fix that.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +4
-0+ +dout ("setattr %llx:%llx fscrypt_auth len %u to %u)\n" , +ceph_vinop (inode), ci->fscrypt_auth_len, len); +
Quoted 9 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c int __ceph_setattr(struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) · line 2145
Quoted 6 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +6
-0+/* It should never be re-set once set */ +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth); + +if (issued &CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ) { + dirtied |=CEPH_CAP_AUTH_EXCL ; +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth);If the
WARN_ON_ONCEabove is correct, we shouldn't need this kfree.
It's a bit odd here actually...
We have to allow this to be set via setattr, so what's the right thing to do when someone tries to set fscrypt_auth on an inode that already has it set?
In principle we should probably ignore it, but maybe we need to allow admins a way to fix up inodes with a corrupted context? For now, I'm planning to allow you to override it but throw the warning in this case. It's not ideal though and we may want to change this before merging.
Quoted 167 lines
Quoted 167 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +11
-1+ ci->fscrypt_auth = (u8 *)cia->fscrypt_auth; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = len; + }else if ((issued &CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED ) ==0 ) { + req->r_fscrypt_auth = cia->fscrypt_auth; + mask |=CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH ; + release |=CEPH_CAP_AUTH_SHARED ; + } + cia->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + } +if (ia_valid &ATTR_UID ) { dout("setattr %p uid %d -> %d\n", inode, from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid),@@ -2324,7 +2350,7 @@ int ceph_setattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct dentry *dentry, ceph_quota_is_max_bytes_exceeded(inode, attr->ia_size))return -EDQUOT ; - err =__ceph_setattr (inode, attr); + err =__ceph_setattr (inode, attr,NULL );if (err >=0 && (attr->ia_valid &ATTR_MODE )) err =posix_acl_chmod (&init_user_ns, inode, attr->ia_mode);fs/ceph/mds_client.c +26
-5@@ -2529,8 +2529,7 @@ static int set_request_path_attr(struct inode *rinode, struct dentry *rdentry,return r; } -static void encode_timestamp_and_gids (void **p, -const struct ceph_mds_request *req) +static void encode_mclientrequest_tail (void **p,const struct ceph_mds_request *req) {struct ceph_timespec ts;int i;@@ -2543,6 +2542,21 @@ static void encode_timestamp_and_gids(void **p,for (i =0 ; i < req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups; i++)ceph_encode_64 (p,from_kgid (&init_user_ns, req->r_cred->group_info->gid[i])); + +/* v5: altname (TODO: skip for now) */ +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 ); + +/* v6: fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ +if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { +u32 authlen =le32_to_cpu (req->r_fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + + authlen += offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob); +ceph_encode_32 (p, authlen); +ceph_encode_copy (p, req->r_fscrypt_auth, authlen); + }else { +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 ); + } +ceph_encode_32 (p,0 );// fscrypt_file for now }/* @@ -2591,6 +2605,13 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, len += pathlen1 + pathlen2 +2 *(1 +sizeof (u32) +sizeof (u64)) +sizeof (struct ceph_timespec ); len +=sizeof (u32) + (sizeof (u64) * req->r_cred->group_info->ngroups); + len +=sizeof (u32);// altname + len +=sizeof (u32);// fscrypt_auth +if (req->r_fscrypt_auth) { + len += offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob); + len +=le32_to_cpu (req->r_fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len); + } + len +=sizeof (u32);// fscrypt_file /* calculate (max) length for cap releases */ len += sizeof(struct ceph_mds_request_release) *@@ -2621,7 +2642,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, }else {struct ceph_mds_request_head *new_head = msg->front.iov_base; - msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (4 ); + msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (6 ); new_head->version =cpu_to_le16 (CEPH_MDS_REQUEST_HEAD_VERSION ); head = (struct ceph_mds_request_head_old *)&new_head->oldest_client_tid; p = msg->front.iov_base +sizeof (*new_head);@@ -2672,7 +2693,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *create_request_message(struct ceph_mds_session *session, head->num_releases =cpu_to_le16 (releases); -encode_timestamp_and_gids (&p, req); +encode_mclientrequest_tail (&p, req);if (WARN_ON_ONCE (p > end)) {ceph_msg_put (msg);@@ -2781,7 +2802,7 @@ static int __prepare_send_request(struct ceph_mds_session *session, rhead->num_releases =0 ; p = msg->front.iov_base + req->r_request_release_offset; -encode_timestamp_and_gids (&p, req); +encode_mclientrequest_tail (&p, req); msg->front.iov_len = p - msg->front.iov_base; msg->hdr.front_len =cpu_to_le32 (msg->front.iov_len);fs/ceph/mds_client.h +3
-0@@ -278,6 +278,9 @@ struct ceph_mds_request {struct mutex r_fill_mutex;union ceph_mds_request_args r_args; + +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *r_fscrypt_auth; +int r_fmode;/* file mode, if expecting cap */ const struct cred *r_cred;int r_request_release_offset;fs/ceph/super.h +6
-1@@ -1035,7 +1035,12 @@ static inline int ceph_do_getattr(struct inode *inode, int mask, bool force) }extern int ceph_permission (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct inode *inode,int mask); -extern int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr); + +struct ceph_iattr { +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fscrypt_auth; +}; + +extern int __ceph_setattr (struct inode *inode,struct iattr *attr,struct ceph_iattr *cia);extern int ceph_setattr (struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,struct dentry *dentry,struct iattr *attr); extern int ceph_getattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,include/linux/ceph/ceph_fs.h +13
-8@@ -355,14 +355,19 @@ enum {extern const char *ceph_mds_op_name (int op); - -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE 1 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID 2 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID 4 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME 8 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME 16 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE 32 -#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME 64 +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MODE (1 << 0) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_UID (1 << 1) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_GID (1 << 2) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME (1 << 3) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME (1 << 4) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_SIZE (1 << 5) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_CTIME (1 << 6) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_MTIME_NOW (1 << 7) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_ATIME_NOW (1 << 8) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_BTIME (1 << 9) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_KILL_SGUID (1 << 10) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_AUTH (1 << 11) +#define CEPH_SETATTR_FSCRYPT_FILE (1 << 12)/* * Ceph setxattr request flags. Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 11/24] ceph: add routine to create fscrypt context prior to RPC
In reply to Luis HenriquesQuoted 52 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 51 lines · Jeff Layton
After pre-creating a new inode, do an fscrypt prepare on it, fetch a new encryption context and then marshal that into the security context to be sent along with the RPC. Call the new function from
ceph_new_inode.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/crypto.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/crypto.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 10 ++++++++-- fs/ceph/super.h | 5 +++++ fs/ceph/xattr.c | 3 +++ 5 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)fs/ceph/crypto.c +22
-0@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#include <linux/fscrypt.h> #include "super.h" +#include "mds_client.h" #include "crypto.h" static int ceph_crypt_get_context (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,size_t len)@@ -86,3 +87,44 @@ void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) {fscrypt_set_ops (sb, &ceph_fscrypt_ops); } + +int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (struct inode *dir,struct inode *inode, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ +int ret, ctxsize; +bool encrypted = false; +struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode); + + ret =fscrypt_prepare_new_inode (dir, inode, &encrypted); +if (ret) +return ret; +if (!encrypted) +return 0 ; + + as->fscrypt_auth =kzalloc (sizeof (*as->fscrypt_auth),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!as->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ; + + ctxsize =fscrypt_context_for_new_inode (as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob, inode); +if (ctxsize <0 ) +return ctxsize;
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fs/ceph/crypto.c void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) · line 116
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fs/ceph/crypto.c +6
-0+ + as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_version =cpu_to_le32 (CEPH_FSCRYPT_AUTH_VERSION ); + as->fscrypt_auth->cfa_blob_len =cpu_to_le32 (ctxsize); + +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth); +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth);It's odd to have again a
kfree()after aWARN_ON_ONCE():-)
Throw a warning but handle the case sanely? That seems normal to me :)
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/crypto.c +10
-0+ ci->fscrypt_auth_len =ceph_fscrypt_auth_size (ctxsize); + ci->fscrypt_auth =kmemdup (as->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ci->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ; + + inode->i_flags |=S_ENCRYPTED ; + +return 0 ; +} +
Quoted 9 lines
fs/ceph/crypto.c void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb) · line 130
Quoted 4 lines
fs/ceph/crypto.c +4
-0+void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ +swap (req->r_fscrypt_auth, as->fscrypt_auth); +}This means that
req->r_fscrypt_authwill need to be freed inceph_mdsc_release_request(). (I believe you've moved this function to some other commit in your experimental branch).
Ahh yes. Good catch. I'll fix that up too.
Quoted 126 lines
Quoted 126 lines
fs/ceph/crypto.h +25
-0@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@#define CEPH_XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_CONTEXT "encryption.ctx"#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +struct ceph_fs_client ; +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx ; +struct ceph_mds_request ;#define CEPH_FSCRYPT_AUTH_VERSION 1 struct ceph_fscrypt_auth {@@ -19,10 +22,19 @@ struct ceph_fscrypt_auth { u8 cfa_blob[FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE]; } __packed; +static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_size (u32 ctxsize) +{ +return offsetof(struct ceph_fscrypt_auth , cfa_blob) + ctxsize; +} +void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (struct super_block *sb);void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc); +int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (struct inode *dir,struct inode *inode, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); +void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req,struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as); +#else /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops (struct super_block *sb)@@ -32,6 +44,19 @@ static inline void ceph_fscrypt_set_ops(struct super_block *sb)static inline void ceph_fscrypt_free_dummy_policy (struct ceph_fs_client *fsc) { } + +static inline int ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (struct inode *dir,struct inode *inode, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as) +{ +if (IS_ENCRYPTED (dir)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +return 0 ; +} + +static inline void ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (struct ceph_mds_request *req, +struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) +{ +}#endif /* CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION */ #endif fs/ceph/inode.c +8
-2@@ -83,12 +83,17 @@ struct inode *ceph_new_inode(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, goto out_err; } + inode->i_state =0 ; + inode->i_mode = *mode; + err =ceph_security_init_secctx (dentry, *mode, as_ctx);if (err <0 ) goto out_err; - inode->i_state =0 ; - inode->i_mode = *mode; + err =ceph_fscrypt_prepare_context (dir, inode, as_ctx); +if (err) + goto out_err; +return inode; out_err:iput (inode);@@ -101,6 +106,7 @@ void ceph_as_ctx_to_req(struct ceph_mds_request *req, struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *a req->r_pagelist = as_ctx->pagelist; as_ctx->pagelist =NULL ; } +ceph_fscrypt_as_ctx_to_req (req, as_ctx); }/** fs/ceph/super.h +5
-0@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@#include <linux/fscache.h> #endif +#include "crypto.h" +/* f_type in struct statfs */ #define CEPH_SUPER_MAGIC 0x00c36400@@ -1068,6 +1070,9 @@ struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL void *sec_ctx;u32 sec_ctxlen; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +struct ceph_fscrypt_auth *fscrypt_auth;#endif struct ceph_pagelist *pagelist; };fs/ceph/xattr.c +3
-0@@ -1362,6 +1362,9 @@ void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx(struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx)#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL security_release_secctx (as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen); +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (as_ctx->fscrypt_auth);#endif if (as_ctx->pagelist)ceph_pagelist_release (as_ctx->pagelist);Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 06/24] ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 114 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 113 lines · Xiubo Li
Quoted 100 lines · Jeff Layton
...and store them in the
ceph_inode_info.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/file.c | 2 ++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+)fs/ceph/file.c +2
-0@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, iinfo.xattr_data = xattr_buf;memset (iinfo.xattr_data,0 , iinfo.xattr_len); +/* FIXME: set fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + in.ino =cpu_to_le64 (vino.ino); in.snapid =cpu_to_le64 (CEPH_NOSNAP ); in.version =cpu_to_le64 (1 );// ??? fs/ceph/inode.c +18
-0@@ -611,6 +611,13 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_meta_err =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + ci->fscrypt_file =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +#endif +return &ci->vfs_inode; }@@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode)struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);kfree (ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free (ceph_inode_cachep, ci); }@@ -1021,6 +1031,14 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, xattr_blob =NULL ; } +if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && !ci->fscrypt_auth) { + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; +inode_set_flags (inode,S_ENCRYPTED ,S_ENCRYPTED ); + } +/* finally update i_version */ if (le64_to_cpu (info->version) > ci->i_version) ci->i_version =le64_to_cpu (info->version);fs/ceph/mds_client.c +25
-0@@ -183,8 +183,48 @@ static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, info->rsnaps =0 ; } +if (struct_v >=5 ) { +u32 alen; + +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, alen, bad); + +while (alen--) { +u32 len; + +/* key */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); +/* value */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); + } + } + +/* fscrypt flag -- ignore */ +if (struct_v >=6 ) +ceph_decode_skip_8 (p, end, bad); + +if (struct_v >=7 ) { +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_auth_len) { + info->fscrypt_auth =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_auth_len,GFP_KERNEL );fs/ceph/mds_client.c static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, · line 220
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +10
-0+if (!info->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ; +ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth, + info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + } +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_file_len) { + info->fscrypt_file =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_file_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!info->fscrypt_file) +return -ENOMEM ;Should we
kfree(info->fscrypt_auth)before return ?
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I didn't anywhere is freeing it.
It'll get freed in
destroy_reply_info(). We could do it here, but it should be fine to wait until we're tearing the "info" structure down.
Yeah, I just missed the destory_reply_info() code that time.
Quoted 54 lines
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Quoted 54 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +9
-0+ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file, + info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); + } + } *p = end; }else { +/* legacy (unversioned) struct */ if (features &CEPH_FEATURE_MDS_INLINE_DATA ) {ceph_decode_64_safe (p, end, info->inline_version, bad);ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->inline_len, bad);@@ -625,6 +665,10 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg,static void destroy_reply_info (struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info) { +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_file); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_file);if (!info->dir_entries)return ;free_pages ((unsigned long )info->dir_entries,get_order (info->dir_buf_size));fs/ceph/mds_client.h +4
-0@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in {s32 dir_pin;struct ceph_timespec btime;struct ceph_timespec snap_btime; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len;u64 rsnaps;u64 change_attr; };fs/ceph/super.h +6
-0@@ -429,6 +429,12 @@ struct ceph_inode_info {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE struct fscache_cookie *fscache; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file;#endif errseq_t i_meta_err;
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 07/24] ceph: add fscrypt_* handling to caps.c
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 6 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 5 lines · Xiubo Li
Hi Jeff,
There has some following patches in your "fscrypt" branch, which is not posted yet, the commit is:
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"
3161d2f549dbceph: size handling for encrypted inodes in cap updates"It seems buggy.
Yes. Those are still quite rough. If I haven't posted them, then YMMV. I often push them to -experimental branches just for backup purposes. You may want to wait on reviewing those until I've had a chance to clean them up and post them.
Yeah, sure.
I am reviewing the code from you experimental branch.
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 25 lines
In the
encode_cap_msg()you have removed the 'fscrypt_file_len' and and added a new 8 bytes' data encoding:
ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth_len);ceph_encode_copy(&p, arg->fscrypt_auth, arg->fscrypt_auth_len);
-ceph_encode_32(&p, arg->fscrypt_file_len);
-ceph_encode_copy(&p, arg->fscrypt_file, arg->fscrypt_file_len); +ceph_encode_32(&p, sizeof(__le64));
+ceph_encode_64(&p, fc->size);That means no matter the '
arg->encrypted' is true or not, here it will always encode extra 8 bytes' data ?But in
cap_msg_size(), you are making it optional:static inline int
cap_msg_size(struct cap_msg_args *arg){
returnCAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS+arg->fscrypt_auth_len+
-arg->fscrypt_file_len;
+arg->encrypted?sizeof(__le64): 0;
}
Quoted 7 lines
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Have I missed something important here ?
Thanks
Nope, you're right. I had fixed that one in my local branch already, and just hadn't yet pushed it to the repo. I'll plan to clean this up a bit later today and push an updated branch.
Cool.
Thanks.
Quoted 131 lines
Quoted 131 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 129 lines
Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/caps.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)fs/ceph/caps.c +49
-13@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include <linux/ceph/decode.h> #include <linux/ceph/messenger.h> @@ -1229,15 +1230,12 @@ struct cap_msg_args {umode_t mode;bool inline_data;bool wake; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 fscrypt_auth[sizeof (struct ceph_fscrypt_auth )];// for context +u8 fscrypt_file[sizeof (u64)];// for size }; -/* -* cap struct size + flock buffer size + inline version + inline data size + -* osd_epoch_barrier + oldest_flush_tid -*/ -#define CAP_MSG_SIZE (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ - 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4) -/* Marshal up the cap msg to the MDS */ static void encode_cap_msg (struct ceph_msg *msg,struct cap_msg_args *arg) {@@ -1253,7 +1251,7 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg) arg->size, arg->max_size, arg->xattr_version, arg->xattr_buf ? (int)arg->xattr_buf->vec.iov_len : 0); - msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (10 ); + msg->hdr.version =cpu_to_le16 (12 ); msg->hdr.tid =cpu_to_le64 (arg->flush_tid); fc = msg->front.iov_base;@@ -1324,6 +1322,16 @@ static void encode_cap_msg(struct ceph_msg *msg, struct cap_msg_args *arg)/* Advisory flags (version 10) */ ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->flags); + +/* dirstats (version 11) - these are r/o on the client */ +ceph_encode_64 (&p,0 ); +ceph_encode_64 (&p,0 ); + +/* fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file (version 12) */ +ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); +ceph_encode_copy (&p, arg->fscrypt_auth, arg->fscrypt_auth_len); +ceph_encode_32 (&p, arg->fscrypt_file_len); +ceph_encode_copy (&p, arg->fscrypt_file, arg->fscrypt_file_len); }/* @@ -1445,6 +1453,26 @@ static void __prep_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_cap *cap, } } arg->flags = flags; +if (ci->fscrypt_auth_len && +WARN_ON_ONCE (ci->fscrypt_auth_len !=sizeof (struct ceph_fscrypt_auth ))) { +/* Don't set this if it isn't right size */ + arg->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + }else { + arg->fscrypt_auth_len = ci->fscrypt_auth_len; +memcpy (arg->fscrypt_auth, ci->fscrypt_auth, +min_t (size_t, ci->fscrypt_auth_len,sizeof (arg->fscrypt_auth))); + } +/* FIXME: use this to track "real" size */ + arg->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +} + +#define CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS (sizeof(struct ceph_mds_caps) + \ + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 4 + 4 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 8 + 8 + 4 + 4) + +static inline int cap_msg_size (struct cap_msg_args *arg) +{ +return CAP_MSG_FIXED_FIELDS + arg->fscrypt_auth_len + + arg->fscrypt_file_len; }/* @@ -1457,7 +1485,7 @@ static void __send_cap(struct cap_msg_args *arg, struct ceph_inode_info *ci)struct ceph_msg *msg;struct inode *inode = &ci->vfs_inode; - msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,CAP_MSG_SIZE ,GFP_NOFS , false); + msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,cap_msg_size (arg),GFP_NOFS , false);if (!msg) { pr_err("error allocating cap msg: ino (%llx.%llx) flushing %s tid %llu, requeuing cap.\n", ceph_vinop(inode), ceph_cap_string(arg->dirty),@@ -1483,10 +1511,6 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode,struct cap_msg_args arg;struct ceph_msg *msg; - msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,CAP_MSG_SIZE ,GFP_NOFS , false); -if (!msg) -return -ENOMEM ; - arg.session = session; arg.ino =ceph_vino (inode).ino; arg.cid =0 ;@@ -1524,6 +1548,18 @@ static inline int __send_flush_snap(struct inode *inode, arg.flags =0 ; arg.wake = false; +/* +* No fscrypt_auth changes from a capsnap. It will need +* to update fscrypt_file on size changes (TODO). +*/ + arg.fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + arg.fscrypt_file_len =0 ; + + msg =ceph_msg_new (CEPH_MSG_CLIENT_CAPS ,cap_msg_size (&arg), +GFP_NOFS , false); +if (!msg) +return -ENOMEM ; +encode_cap_msg (msg, &arg);ceph_con_send (&arg.session->s_con, msg);return 0 ;
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 06/24] ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 78 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 77 lines · Xiubo Li
Quoted 76 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 53 lines · Jeff Layton
...and store them in the
ceph_inode_info.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/file.c | 2 ++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+)fs/ceph/file.c +2
-0@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, iinfo.xattr_data = xattr_buf;memset (iinfo.xattr_data,0 , iinfo.xattr_len); +/* FIXME: set fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + in.ino =cpu_to_le64 (vino.ino); in.snapid =cpu_to_le64 (CEPH_NOSNAP ); in.version =cpu_to_le64 (1 );// ??? fs/ceph/inode.c +10
-0@@ -611,6 +611,13 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_meta_err =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + ci->fscrypt_file =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +#endif +return &ci->vfs_inode; }@@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode)struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);kfree (ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free (ceph_inode_cachep, ci); }fs/ceph/inode.c int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, · line 1040
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +7
-0@@ -1021,6 +1031,14 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, xattr_blob =NULL ; } +if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && !ci->fscrypt_auth) { + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; +inode_set_flags (inode,S_ENCRYPTED ,S_ENCRYPTED ); + }I think we also need to free
iinfo->fscrypt_authhere ifci->fscrypt_authis already set. Something like:if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len) { if (!ci->fscrypt_auth) { ... } else { kfree(iinfo->fscrypt_auth); iinfo->fscrypt_auth = NULL; } }
Quoted 6 lines
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IMO, this should be okay because it will be freed in
destroy_reply_info()when putting the request.Yes. All of that should get cleaned up with the request.
Hmm... ok, so maybe I missed something because I *did* saw kmemleak complaining. Maybe it was on the READDIR path. /me goes look again.
Cheers,
--
Luís
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fs/ceph/inode.c +1
-0+/* finally update i_version */ if (le64_to_cpu (info->version) > ci->i_version) ci->i_version =le64_to_cpu (info->version);fs/ceph/mds_client.c +25
-0@@ -183,8 +183,48 @@ static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, info->rsnaps =0 ; } +if (struct_v >=5 ) { +u32 alen; + +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, alen, bad); + +while (alen--) { +u32 len; + +/* key */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); +/* value */ +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_skip_n (p, end, len, bad); + } + } + +/* fscrypt flag -- ignore */ +if (struct_v >=6 ) +ceph_decode_skip_8 (p, end, bad); + +if (struct_v >=7 ) { +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_auth_len) { + info->fscrypt_auth =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_auth_len,GFP_KERNEL );fs/ceph/mds_client.c static int parse_reply_info_in(void **p, void *end, · line 220
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +10
-0+if (!info->fscrypt_auth) +return -ENOMEM ; +ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_auth, + info->fscrypt_auth_len, bad); + } +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); +if (info->fscrypt_file_len) { + info->fscrypt_file =kmalloc (info->fscrypt_file_len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!info->fscrypt_file) +return -ENOMEM ;As Xiubo already pointed out, there's a
kfree(info->fscrypt_auth)missing in this error path.Cheers,
--
LuísQuoted 56 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +9
-0+ceph_decode_copy_safe (p, end, info->fscrypt_file, + info->fscrypt_file_len, bad); + } + } *p = end; }else { +/* legacy (unversioned) struct */ if (features &CEPH_FEATURE_MDS_INLINE_DATA ) {ceph_decode_64_safe (p, end, info->inline_version, bad);ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, info->inline_len, bad);@@ -625,6 +665,10 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg,static void destroy_reply_info (struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info) { +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->diri.fscrypt_file); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_auth); +kfree (info->targeti.fscrypt_file);if (!info->dir_entries)return ;free_pages ((unsigned long )info->dir_entries,get_order (info->dir_buf_size));fs/ceph/mds_client.h +4
-0@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@ struct ceph_mds_reply_info_in {s32 dir_pin;struct ceph_timespec btime;struct ceph_timespec snap_btime; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len;u64 rsnaps;u64 change_attr; };fs/ceph/super.h +6
-0@@ -429,6 +429,12 @@ struct ceph_inode_info {#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FSCACHE struct fscache_cookie *fscache; +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 *fscrypt_auth; +u8 *fscrypt_file;#endif errseq_t i_meta_err;Signature · 1 line
2.31.1Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 06/24] ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
Quoted 84 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 83 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 81 lines · Xiubo Li
Quoted 67 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 53 lines · Jeff Layton
...and store them in the
ceph_inode_info.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/file.c | 2 ++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+)fs/ceph/file.c +2
-0@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, iinfo.xattr_data = xattr_buf;memset (iinfo.xattr_data,0 , iinfo.xattr_len); +/* FIXME: set fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + in.ino =cpu_to_le64 (vino.ino); in.snapid =cpu_to_le64 (CEPH_NOSNAP ); in.version =cpu_to_le64 (1 );// ??? fs/ceph/inode.c +10
-0@@ -611,6 +611,13 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_meta_err =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + ci->fscrypt_file =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +#endif +return &ci->vfs_inode; }@@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode)struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);kfree (ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free (ceph_inode_cachep, ci); }fs/ceph/inode.c int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, · line 1040
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +7
-0@@ -1021,6 +1031,14 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, xattr_blob =NULL ; } +if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && !ci->fscrypt_auth) { + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; +inode_set_flags (inode,S_ENCRYPTED ,S_ENCRYPTED ); + }I think we also need to free
iinfo->fscrypt_authhere ifci->fscrypt_authis already set. Something like:Quoted 9 lines
if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len) { if (!ci->fscrypt_auth) { ... } else { kfree(iinfo->fscrypt_auth); iinfo->fscrypt_auth = NULL; } }IMO, this should be okay because it will be freed in
destroy_reply_info()when putting the request.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes. All of that should get cleaned up with the request.
Hmm... ok, so maybe I missed something because I *did* saw kmemleak complaining. Maybe it was on the READDIR path. /me goes look again.
Ah, that was indeed the problem. So, here's a quick hack to fix destroy_reply_info() so that it also frees the extra memory from READDIR:
@@ -686,12 +686,23 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg,
static void destroy_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info) {
+ int i = 0;
+
kfree(info->diri.fscrypt_auth); kfree(info->diri.fscrypt_file); kfree(info->targeti.fscrypt_auth); kfree(info->targeti.fscrypt_file);
if (!info->dir_entries)
return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < info->dir_nr; i++) {
+ struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry *rde = info->dir_entries + i;
+ if (rde->inode.fscrypt_auth_len)
+ kfree(rde->inode.fscrypt_auth);
+ }
+
free_pages((unsigned long)info->dir_entries, get_order(info->dir_buf_size));
}
Cheers,
--
Luís
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 06/24] ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
Quoted 102 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 79 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 78 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 77 lines · Xiubo Li
Quoted 76 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 53 lines · Jeff Layton
...and store them in the
ceph_inode_info.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/file.c | 2 ++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+)fs/ceph/file.c +2
-0@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, iinfo.xattr_data = xattr_buf;memset (iinfo.xattr_data,0 , iinfo.xattr_len); +/* FIXME: set fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + in.ino =cpu_to_le64 (vino.ino); in.snapid =cpu_to_le64 (CEPH_NOSNAP ); in.version =cpu_to_le64 (1 );// ??? fs/ceph/inode.c +10
-0@@ -611,6 +611,13 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_meta_err =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + ci->fscrypt_file =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +#endif +return &ci->vfs_inode; }@@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode)struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);kfree (ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free (ceph_inode_cachep, ci); }fs/ceph/inode.c int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, · line 1040
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +7
-0@@ -1021,6 +1031,14 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, xattr_blob =NULL ; } +if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && !ci->fscrypt_auth) { + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; +inode_set_flags (inode,S_ENCRYPTED ,S_ENCRYPTED ); + }I think we also need to free
iinfo->fscrypt_authhere ifci->fscrypt_authis already set. Something like:if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len) { if (!ci->fscrypt_auth) { ... } else { kfree(iinfo->fscrypt_auth); iinfo->fscrypt_auth = NULL; } }Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
IMO, this should be okay because it will be freed in
destroy_reply_info()when putting the request.Yes. All of that should get cleaned up with the request.
Hmm... ok, so maybe I missed something because I *did* saw kmemleak complaining. Maybe it was on the READDIR path. /me goes look again.
Ah, that was indeed the problem. So, here's a quick hack to fix
destroy_reply_info()so that it also frees the extra memory from READDIR:(quoted diff) +2
-0@@ -686,12 +686,23 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg, static void destroy_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info) { + int i = 0; + kfree(info->diri.fscrypt_auth); kfree(info->diri.fscrypt_file); kfree(info->targeti.fscrypt_auth); kfree(info->targeti.fscrypt_file); if (!info->dir_entries) return;
Review static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg, · line 706
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +7
-0+ + for (i = 0; i < info->dir_nr; i++) { + struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry *rde = info->dir_entries + i; + if (rde->inode.fscrypt_auth_len) + kfree(rde->inode.fscrypt_auth); + } + free_pages((unsigned long)info->dir_entries, get_order(info->dir_buf_size)); }
Yeah, this looks nice.
Quoted 4 lines
Cheers,
--
Luís
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 12/24] ceph: add fscrypt ioctls
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 53 lines · Jeff Layton
We gate most of the ioctls on MDS feature support. The exception is the key removal and status functions that we still want to work if the MDS's were to (inexplicably) lose the feature.
For the
set_policyioctl, we take Fcx caps to ensure that nothing can create files in the directory while the ioctl is running. That should be enough to ensure that the "empty_dir" check is reliable.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/ioctl.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+)fs/ceph/ioctl.c +25
-0@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#include "mds_client.h" #include "ioctl.h" #include <linux/ceph/striper.h> +#include <linux/fscrypt.h> /* * ioctls @@ -268,8 +269,54 @@ static long ceph_ioctl_syncio(struct file *file)return 0 ; } +static int vet_mds_for_fscrypt (struct file *file) +{ +int i, ret = -EOPNOTSUPP ; +struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc =ceph_sb_to_mdsc (file_inode (file)->i_sb); + +mutex_lock (&mdsc->mutex); +for (i =0 ; i < mdsc->max_sessions; i++) { +struct ceph_mds_session *s = mdsc->sessions[i]; + +if (!s) +continue ; +if (test_bit (CEPHFS_FEATURE_ALTERNATE_NAME , &s->s_features)) + ret =0 ; +break ; + } +mutex_unlock (&mdsc->mutex); +return ret; +} + +static long ceph_set_encryption_policy (struct file *file,unsigned long arg) +{ +int ret, got =0 ; +struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);
fs/ceph/ioctl.c static long ceph_ioctl_syncio(struct file *file) · line 305
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/ioctl.c +10
-0+ + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; + +/* +* Ensure we hold these caps so that we _know_ that the rstats check +* in the empty_dir check is reliable. +*/ + ret =ceph_get_caps (file,CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED ,0 ,-1 , &got);
In the commit comment said it will host the Fsx, but here it is only trying to hold the Fs. Will the Fx really needed ?
Thanks
Quoted 60 lines
fs/ceph/ioctl.c +48
-0+if (ret) +return ret; + + ret =fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy (file, (const void __user *)arg); +if (got) +ceph_put_cap_refs (ci, got); + +return ret; +} +long ceph_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg) { +int ret; +dout ("ioctl file %p cmd %u arg %lu\n" , file, cmd, arg);switch (cmd) {case CEPH_IOC_GET_LAYOUT :@@ -289,6 +336,42 @@ long ceph_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case CEPH_IOC_SYNCIO :return ceph_ioctl_syncio (file); + +case FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY : +return ceph_set_encryption_policy (file, arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_add_key (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY : +return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS : +return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS : +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_NONCE : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce (file, (void __user *)arg); }return -ENOTTY ;
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 12/24] ceph: add fscrypt ioctls
Quoted 59 lines · Xiubo Li
Quoted 58 lines · Jeff Layton
We gate most of the ioctls on MDS feature support. The exception is the key removal and status functions that we still want to work if the MDS's were to (inexplicably) lose the feature.
For the
set_policyioctl, we take Fcx caps to ensure that nothing can create files in the directory while the ioctl is running. That should be enough to ensure that the "empty_dir" check is reliable.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/ioctl.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+)fs/ceph/ioctl.c +30
-0@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#include "mds_client.h" #include "ioctl.h" #include <linux/ceph/striper.h> +#include <linux/fscrypt.h> /* * ioctls @@ -268,8 +269,54 @@ static long ceph_ioctl_syncio(struct file *file)return 0 ; } +static int vet_mds_for_fscrypt (struct file *file) +{ +int i, ret = -EOPNOTSUPP ; +struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc =ceph_sb_to_mdsc (file_inode (file)->i_sb); + +mutex_lock (&mdsc->mutex); +for (i =0 ; i < mdsc->max_sessions; i++) { +struct ceph_mds_session *s = mdsc->sessions[i]; + +if (!s) +continue ; +if (test_bit (CEPHFS_FEATURE_ALTERNATE_NAME , &s->s_features)) + ret =0 ; +break ; + } +mutex_unlock (&mdsc->mutex); +return ret; +} + +static long ceph_set_encryption_policy (struct file *file,unsigned long arg) +{ +int ret, got =0 ; +struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode); + + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +
Quoted 9 lines
fs/ceph/ioctl.c static long ceph_ioctl_syncio(struct file *file) · line 305
Quoted 5 lines
fs/ceph/ioctl.c +5
-0+/* +* Ensure we hold these caps so that we _know_ that the rstats check +* in the empty_dir check is reliable. +*/ + ret =ceph_get_caps (file,CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED ,0 ,-1 , &got);In the commit comment said it will host the Fsx, but here it is only trying to hold the Fs. Will the Fx really needed ?
No. What we're interested in here is that the directory remains empty while we're encrypting it. If we hold Fs caps, then no one else can modify the directory, so this is enough to ensure that.
Quoted 63 lines
Quoted 62 lines
fs/ceph/ioctl.c +48
-0+if (ret) +return ret; + + ret =fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy (file, (const void __user *)arg); +if (got) +ceph_put_cap_refs (ci, got); + +return ret; +} +long ceph_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg) { +int ret; +dout ("ioctl file %p cmd %u arg %lu\n" , file, cmd, arg);switch (cmd) {case CEPH_IOC_GET_LAYOUT :@@ -289,6 +336,42 @@ long ceph_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case CEPH_IOC_SYNCIO :return ceph_ioctl_syncio (file); + +case FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY : +return ceph_set_encryption_policy (file, arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_add_key (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY : +return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS : +return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS : +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_NONCE : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce (file, (void __user *)arg); }return -ENOTTY ;
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 06/24] ceph: parse new fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file fields in inode traces
In reply to Luis HenriquesQuoted 106 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 84 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 83 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 81 lines · Xiubo Li
Quoted 67 lines · Luis Henriques
Quoted 53 lines · Jeff Layton
...and store them in the
ceph_inode_info.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/file.c | 2 ++ fs/ceph/inode.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/ceph/mds_client.h | 4 ++++ fs/ceph/super.h | 6 ++++++ 5 files changed, 74 insertions(+)fs/ceph/file.c +2
-0@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ static int ceph_finish_async_create(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode, iinfo.xattr_data = xattr_buf;memset (iinfo.xattr_data,0 , iinfo.xattr_len); +/* FIXME: set fscrypt_auth and fscrypt_file */ + in.ino =cpu_to_le64 (vino.ino); in.snapid =cpu_to_le64 (CEPH_NOSNAP ); in.version =cpu_to_le64 (1 );// ??? fs/ceph/inode.c +10
-0@@ -611,6 +611,13 @@ struct inode *ceph_alloc_inode(struct super_block *sb) ci->i_meta_err =0 ; +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION + ci->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; + ci->fscrypt_file =NULL ; + ci->fscrypt_file_len =0 ; +#endif +return &ci->vfs_inode; }@@ -619,6 +626,9 @@ void ceph_free_inode(struct inode *inode)struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode);kfree (ci->i_symlink); +#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION +kfree (ci->fscrypt_auth); +#endif kmem_cache_free (ceph_inode_cachep, ci); }fs/ceph/inode.c int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, · line 1040
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/inode.c +7
-0@@ -1021,6 +1031,14 @@ int ceph_fill_inode(struct inode *inode, struct page *locked_page, xattr_blob =NULL ; } +if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len && !ci->fscrypt_auth) { + ci->fscrypt_auth_len = iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len; + ci->fscrypt_auth = iinfo->fscrypt_auth; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth =NULL ; + iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len =0 ; +inode_set_flags (inode,S_ENCRYPTED ,S_ENCRYPTED ); + }I think we also need to free
iinfo->fscrypt_authhere ifci->fscrypt_authis already set. Something like:Quoted 9 lines
if (iinfo->fscrypt_auth_len) { if (!ci->fscrypt_auth) { ... } else { kfree(iinfo->fscrypt_auth); iinfo->fscrypt_auth = NULL; } }IMO, this should be okay because it will be freed in
destroy_reply_info()when putting the request.Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes. All of that should get cleaned up with the request.
Hmm... ok, so maybe I missed something because I *did* saw kmemleak complaining. Maybe it was on the READDIR path. /me goes look again.
Ah, that was indeed the problem. So, here's a quick hack to fix
destroy_reply_info()so that it also frees the extra memory from READDIR:(quoted diff) +2
-0@@ -686,12 +686,23 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg, static void destroy_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_reply_info_parsed *info) { + int i = 0; + kfree(info->diri.fscrypt_auth); kfree(info->diri.fscrypt_file); kfree(info->targeti.fscrypt_auth); kfree(info->targeti.fscrypt_file); if (!info->dir_entries) return;
Review static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_mds_session *s, struct ceph_msg *msg, · line 706
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +7
-0+ + for (i = 0; i < info->dir_nr; i++) { + struct ceph_mds_reply_dir_entry *rde = info->dir_entries + i; + if (rde->inode.fscrypt_auth_len) + kfree(rde->inode.fscrypt_auth); + } + free_pages((unsigned long)info->dir_entries, get_order(info->dir_buf_size)); }
Well spotted! I'll plan to incorporate a fix like that soon.
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 12/24] ceph: add fscrypt ioctls
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 68 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 58 lines · Xiubo Li
Quoted 57 lines · Jeff Layton
We gate most of the ioctls on MDS feature support. The exception is the key removal and status functions that we still want to work if the MDS's were to (inexplicably) lose the feature.
For the
set_policyioctl, we take Fcx caps to ensure that nothing can create files in the directory while the ioctl is running. That should be enough to ensure that the "empty_dir" check is reliable.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/ioctl.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+)fs/ceph/ioctl.c +29
-0@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#include "mds_client.h" #include "ioctl.h" #include <linux/ceph/striper.h> +#include <linux/fscrypt.h> /* * ioctls @@ -268,8 +269,54 @@ static long ceph_ioctl_syncio(struct file *file)return 0 ; } +static int vet_mds_for_fscrypt (struct file *file) +{ +int i, ret = -EOPNOTSUPP ; +struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc =ceph_sb_to_mdsc (file_inode (file)->i_sb); + +mutex_lock (&mdsc->mutex); +for (i =0 ; i < mdsc->max_sessions; i++) { +struct ceph_mds_session *s = mdsc->sessions[i]; + +if (!s) +continue ; +if (test_bit (CEPHFS_FEATURE_ALTERNATE_NAME , &s->s_features)) + ret =0 ; +break ; + } +mutex_unlock (&mdsc->mutex); +return ret; +} + +static long ceph_set_encryption_policy (struct file *file,unsigned long arg) +{ +int ret, got =0 ; +struct inode *inode =file_inode (file); +struct ceph_inode_info *ci =ceph_inode (inode); + + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret;Quoted 9 lines
fs/ceph/ioctl.c static long ceph_ioctl_syncio(struct file *file) · line 305
Quoted 6 lines
fs/ceph/ioctl.c +6
-0+ +/* +* Ensure we hold these caps so that we _know_ that the rstats check +* in the empty_dir check is reliable. +*/ + ret =ceph_get_caps (file,CEPH_CAP_FILE_SHARED ,0 ,-1 , &got);In the commit comment said it will host the Fsx, but here it is only trying to hold the Fs. Will the Fx really needed ?
Quoted 3 lines
No. What we're interested in here is that the directory remains empty while we're encrypting it. If we hold Fs caps, then no one else can modify the directory, so this is enough to ensure that.
Yeah, this is what I thought.
Thanks
Quoted 61 lines
Quoted 61 lines
Quoted 61 lines
fs/ceph/ioctl.c +48
-0+if (ret) +return ret; + + ret =fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy (file, (const void __user *)arg); +if (got) +ceph_put_cap_refs (ci, got); + +return ret; +} +long ceph_ioctl (struct file *file,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg) { +int ret; +dout ("ioctl file %p cmd %u arg %lu\n" , file, cmd, arg);switch (cmd) {case CEPH_IOC_GET_LAYOUT :@@ -289,6 +336,42 @@ long ceph_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)case CEPH_IOC_SYNCIO :return ceph_ioctl_syncio (file); + +case FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY : +return ceph_set_encryption_policy (file, arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_policy_ex (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_add_key (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY : +return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ALL_USERS : +return fscrypt_ioctl_remove_key_all_users (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_KEY_STATUS : +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_key_status (file, (void __user *)arg); + +case FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_NONCE : + ret =vet_mds_for_fscrypt (file); +if (ret) +return ret; +return fscrypt_ioctl_get_nonce (file, (void __user *)arg); }return -ENOTTY ;
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v7 02/24] fscrypt: export fscrypt_base64_encode and fscrypt_base64_decode
In reply to Jeff LaytonSome nits about comments:
Quoted 22 lines · Jeff Layton
fs/crypto/fname.c +1
-3@@ -178,10 +178,8 @@ static int fname_decrypt(const struct inode *inode,static const char lookup_table[65 ] ="ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+," ; -#define BASE64_CHARS (nbytes) DIV_ROUND_UP((nbytes) * 4, 3) -/** -* base64_encode() - base64-encode some bytes +* fscrypt_base64_encode() - base64-encode some bytes * @src: the bytes to encode * @len: number of bytes to encode * @dst: (output) the base64-encoded string. Not NUL-terminated. *
* Encodes the input string using characters from the set [A-Za-z0-9+,].
* The encoded string is roughly 4/3 times the size of the input string. *
* Return: length of the encoded string
*/
fs/crypto/fname.c static const char lookup_table[65] = · line 192
Quoted 2 lines
fs/crypto/fname.c +1
-1-static int base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst) +int fscrypt_base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst)
As this function will be used more widely, this comment should be fixed to be more precise. "Roughly 4/3" isn't precise; it's actually exactly FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS(len), right? The following would be better:
* Encode the input bytes using characters from the set [A-Za-z0-9+,]. *
* Return: length of the encoded string. This will be equal to
* FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS(len).
Quoted 5 lines
+/**
+ *fscrypt_base64_decode()- base64-decode some bytes
+ * @src: the bytes to decode
+ * @len: number of bytes to decode
+ * @dst: (output) decoded binary data
It's a bit confusing to talk about decoding "bytes"; it's really a string. How about:
* fscrypt_base64_decode() - base64-decode a string
* @src: the string to decode
* @len: length of the source string, in bytes
* @dst: (output) decoded binary data
*
* Decode a string that was previously encoded using fscrypt_base64_encode().
* The string doesn't need to be NUL-terminated.
Quoted 1 line
+ * Return: length of the decoded binary data
Also the error return values should be documented, e.g.:
* Return: length of the decoded binary data, or a negative number if the source
* string isn't a valid base64-encoded string.
- Eric
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v7 03/24] fscrypt: export fscrypt_fname_encrypt and fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size
In reply to Jeff Laytonfs/crypto/fname.c bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(const union fscrypt_policy *policy, · line 271
Quoted 8 lines · Jeff Layton
fs/crypto/fname.c +8
-0+bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (const struct inode *inode,u32 orig_len, +u32 max_len,u32 *encrypted_len_ret) +{ +return __fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (&inode->i_crypt_info->ci_policy, + orig_len, max_len, + encrypted_len_ret); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size);
This function could use a kerneldoc comment now that it will be exported.
Quoted 5 lines
include/linux/fscrypt.h +0
-0
include/linux/fscrypt.h int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode); · line 220
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/fscrypt.h +4
-0@@ -212,6 +212,10 @@ int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode);/* fname.c */ int fscrypt_base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst);int fscrypt_base64_decode (const char *src,int len,u8 *dst); +bool fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (const struct inode *inode,u32 orig_len, +u32 max_len,u32 *encrypted_len_ret); +int fscrypt_fname_encrypt (const struct inode *inode,const struct qstr *iname, +u8 *out,unsigned int olen);int fscrypt_setup_filename (struct inode *inode,const struct qstr *iname,int lookup,struct fscrypt_name *fname);
Generally I try to keep declarations in .h files in the same order as the corresponding definitions in .c files.
- Eric
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v7 04/24] fscrypt: add fscrypt_context_for_new_inode
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 29 lines · Jeff Layton
Most filesystems just call
fscrypt_set_contexton new inodes, which usually causes a setxattr. That's a bit late for ceph, which can send along a full set of attributes with the create request.Doing so allows it to avoid race windows that where the new inode could be seen by other clients without the crypto context attached. It also avoids the separate round trip to the server.
Refactor the fscrypt code a bit to allow us to create a new crypto context, attach it to the inode, and write it to the buffer, but without calling
set_contexton it. ceph can later use this to marshal the context into the attributes we send along with the create request.Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/crypto/policy.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ include/linux/fscrypt.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)fs/crypto/policy.c +2
-0@@ -664,6 +664,31 @@ const union fscrypt_policy *fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(struct inode *dir)return fscrypt_get_dummy_policy (dir->i_sb); } +/** +* fscrypt_context_for_new_inode() - create an encryption context for a new inode
fs/crypto/policy.c const union fscrypt_policy *fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(struct inode *dir) · line 678
Quoted 10 lines
fs/crypto/policy.c +10
-0+* @ctx: where context should be written +* @inode: inode from which to fetch policy and nonce +* +* Given an in-core "prepared" (via fscrypt_prepare_new_inode) inode, +* generate a new context and write it to ctx. ctx _must_ be at least +* FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE bytes. +* +* Returns size of the resulting context or a negative error code. +*/ +int fscrypt_context_for_new_inode (void *ctx,struct inode *inode)
This generates a kerneldoc warning because "Returns" should be "Return:".
- Eric
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v7 15/24] ceph: add encrypted fname handling to ceph_mdsc_build_path
In reply to Jeff Laytonfs/ceph/crypto.h static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_size(u32 ctxsize) · line 43
Quoted 13 lines · Jeff Layton
fs/ceph/crypto.h +13
-0+/* +* We want to encrypt filenames when creating them, but the encrypted +* versions of those names may have illegal characters in them. To mitigate +* that, we base64 encode them, but that gives us a result that can exceed +* NAME_MAX. +* +* Follow a similar scheme to fscrypt itself, and cap the filename to a +* smaller size. If the cleartext name is longer than the value below, then +* sha256 hash the remaining bytes. +* +* 189 bytes => 252 bytes base64-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255) +*/ +#define CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX (189 - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
Shouldn't this say "If the ciphertext name is longer than the value below", not "If the cleartext name is longer than the value below"?
It would also be helpful if the above comment mentioned that when the hashing is done, the real encrypted name is stored separately.
Quoted 34 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +34
-0+#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION ) +static int encode_encrypted_fname (const struct inode *parent,struct dentry *dentry,char *buf) +{ +u32 len; +int elen; +int ret; +u8 *cryptbuf; + +WARN_ON_ONCE (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key (parent)); + +/* +* convert cleartext dentry name to ciphertext +* if result is longer than CEPH_NOKEY_NAME_MAX, +* sha256 the remaining bytes +* +* See: fscrypt_setup_filename +*/ +if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (parent, dentry->d_name.len,NAME_MAX , &len)) +return -ENAMETOOLONG ; + +/* If we have to hash the end, then we need a full-length buffer */ +if (len >CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ) + len =NAME_MAX ; + + cryptbuf =kmalloc (len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!cryptbuf) +return -ENOMEM ; + + ret =fscrypt_fname_encrypt (parent, &dentry->d_name, cryptbuf, len); +if (ret) { +kfree (cryptbuf); +return ret; + } +
fs/ceph/mds_client.c static inline u64 __get_oldest_tid(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) · line 2430
Quoted 10 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +10
-0+/* hash the end if the name is long enough */ +if (len >CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ) { +u8 hash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +u8 *extra = cryptbuf +CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ; + +/* hash the extra bytes and overwrite crypttext beyond that point with it */ +sha256 (extra, len -CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX , hash); +memcpy (extra, hash,SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ); + len =CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX +SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ; + }
When the ciphertext name is longer than CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX, why is the filename being padded all the way to NAME_MAX? That can produce a totally different ciphertext from that produced by get_fscrypt_altname() in the next patch.
The logical thing to do would be to do the encryption in the same way as get_fscrypt_altname(), and then replace any bytes beyond CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX with their hash.
fs/ceph/mds_client.c static inline u64 __get_oldest_tid(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) · line 2436
Quoted 6 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +6
-0+ +/* base64 encode the encrypted name */ + elen =fscrypt_base64_encode (cryptbuf, len, buf); +kfree (cryptbuf); +dout ("base64-encoded ciphertext name = %.*s\n" , len, buf); +return elen;
The argument to dout() should be elen, not len.
- Eric
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v7 07/24] ceph: add fscrypt_* handling to caps.c
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 18 lines · Jeff Layton
Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/caps.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)fs/ceph/caps.c +1
-0@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include <linux/ceph/decode.h> #include <linux/ceph/messenger.h>
fs/ceph/caps.c struct cap_msg_args { · line 1237
Quoted 8 lines
fs/ceph/caps.c +4
-0@@ -1229,15 +1230,12 @@ struct cap_msg_args {umode_t mode;bool inline_data;bool wake; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 fscrypt_auth[sizeof (struct ceph_fscrypt_auth )];// for context +u8 fscrypt_file[sizeof (u64)];// for size };
The naming of these is confusing to me. If these are the fscrypt context and the original file size, why aren't they called something like fscrypt_context and fscrypt_file_size?
Also does the file size really need to be variable-length, or could it just be a 64-bit integer?
- Eric
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 02/24] fscrypt: export fscrypt_base64_encode and fscrypt_base64_decode
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 32 lines · Eric Biggers
Some nits about comments:
Quoted 22 lines · Jeff Layton
fs/crypto/fname.c +1
-3@@ -178,10 +178,8 @@ static int fname_decrypt(const struct inode *inode,static const char lookup_table[65 ] ="ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+," ; -#define BASE64_CHARS (nbytes) DIV_ROUND_UP((nbytes) * 4, 3) -/** -* base64_encode() - base64-encode some bytes +* fscrypt_base64_encode() - base64-encode some bytes * @src: the bytes to encode * @len: number of bytes to encode * @dst: (output) the base64-encoded string. Not NUL-terminated. *
* Encodes the input string using characters from the set [A-Za-z0-9+,].
* The encoded string is roughly 4/3 times the size of the input string. *
* Return: length of the encoded string
*/fs/crypto/fname.c static const char lookup_table[65] = · line 192
Quoted 2 lines
fs/crypto/fname.c +1
-1-static int base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst) +int fscrypt_base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst)As this function will be used more widely, this comment should be fixed to be more precise. "Roughly 4/3" isn't precise; it's actually exactly
FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS(len), right? The following would be better:
Quoted 5 lines
* Encode the input bytes using characters from the set [A-Za-z0-9+,]. *
* Return: length of the encoded string. This will be equal to
*FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS(len).
I'm not certain, but I thought that FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS gave you a worst-case estimate of the inflation. This returns the actual length of the resulting encoded string, which may be less than FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS(len).
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 5 lines
+/**
+ *fscrypt_base64_decode()- base64-decode some bytes
+ * @src: the bytes to decode
+ * @len: number of bytes to decode
+ * @dst: (output) decoded binary dataIt's a bit confusing to talk about decoding "bytes"; it's really a string. How about:
*
fscrypt_base64_decode()- base64-decode a string
* @src: the string to decode
* @len: length of the source string, in bytes
* @dst: (output) decoded binary data
*
* Decode a string that was previously encoded usingfscrypt_base64_encode().
* The string doesn't need to be NUL-terminated.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
+ * Return: length of the decoded binary data
Also the error return values should be documented, e.g.:
* Return: length of the decoded binary data, or a negative number if the source
* string isn't a valid base64-encoded string.
That update looks reasonable.
Thanks,
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 15/24] ceph: add encrypted fname handling to ceph_mdsc_build_path
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 62 lines · Eric Biggers
fs/ceph/crypto.h static inline u32 ceph_fscrypt_auth_size(u32 ctxsize) · line 43
Quoted 13 lines · Jeff Layton
fs/ceph/crypto.h +13
-0+/* +* We want to encrypt filenames when creating them, but the encrypted +* versions of those names may have illegal characters in them. To mitigate +* that, we base64 encode them, but that gives us a result that can exceed +* NAME_MAX. +* +* Follow a similar scheme to fscrypt itself, and cap the filename to a +* smaller size. If the cleartext name is longer than the value below, then +* sha256 hash the remaining bytes. +* +* 189 bytes => 252 bytes base64-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255) +*/ +#define CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX (189 - SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)Shouldn't this say "If the ciphertext name is longer than the value below", not "If the cleartext name is longer than the value below"?
It would also be helpful if the above comment mentioned that when the hashing is done, the real encrypted name is stored separately.
Quoted 41 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +41
-0+#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION ) +static int encode_encrypted_fname (const struct inode *parent,struct dentry *dentry,char *buf) +{ +u32 len; +int elen; +int ret; +u8 *cryptbuf; + +WARN_ON_ONCE (!fscrypt_has_encryption_key (parent)); + +/* +* convert cleartext dentry name to ciphertext +* if result is longer than CEPH_NOKEY_NAME_MAX, +* sha256 the remaining bytes +* +* See: fscrypt_setup_filename +*/ +if (!fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size (parent, dentry->d_name.len,NAME_MAX , &len)) +return -ENAMETOOLONG ; + +/* If we have to hash the end, then we need a full-length buffer */ +if (len >CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ) + len =NAME_MAX ; + + cryptbuf =kmalloc (len,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!cryptbuf) +return -ENOMEM ; + + ret =fscrypt_fname_encrypt (parent, &dentry->d_name, cryptbuf, len); +if (ret) { +kfree (cryptbuf); +return ret; + } + +/* hash the end if the name is long enough */ +if (len >CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ) { +u8 hash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +u8 *extra = cryptbuf +CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX ; + +/* hash the extra bytes and overwrite crypttext beyond that point with it */ +sha256 (extra, len -CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX , hash);
Quoted 9 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c static inline u64 __get_oldest_tid(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) · line 2430
Quoted 3 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +3
-0+memcpy (extra, hash,SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ); + len =CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX +SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE ; + }When the ciphertext name is longer than
CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX, why is the filename being padded all the way toNAME_MAX? That can produce a totally different ciphertext from that produced byget_fscrypt_altname()in the next patch.
Oh, I misunderstood the meaning of the last parameter to fscrypt_fname_encrypt. I had thought that was the length of the target buffer, but it's not -- it's the length of the resulting filename (which we need to precompute). I'll fix that up.
Quoted 4 lines
The logical thing to do would be to do the encryption in the same way as
get_fscrypt_altname(), and then replace any bytes beyondCEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAXwith their hash.
That might make more sense.
Quoted 9 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c static inline u64 __get_oldest_tid(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc) · line 2436
Quoted 6 lines
fs/ceph/mds_client.c +6
-0+ +/* base64 encode the encrypted name */ + elen =fscrypt_base64_encode (cryptbuf, len, buf); +kfree (cryptbuf); +dout ("base64-encoded ciphertext name = %.*s\n" , len, buf); +return elen;The argument to
dout()should be elen, not len.
Will fix, thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 07/24] ceph: add fscrypt_* handling to caps.c
In reply to Eric BiggersQuoted 32 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 18 lines · Jeff Layton
Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/ceph/caps.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)fs/ceph/caps.c +1
-0@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include "super.h" #include "mds_client.h" #include "cache.h" +#include "crypto.h" #include <linux/ceph/decode.h> #include <linux/ceph/messenger.h> fs/ceph/caps.c struct cap_msg_args { · line 1237
Quoted 8 lines
fs/ceph/caps.c +4
-0@@ -1229,15 +1230,12 @@ struct cap_msg_args {umode_t mode;bool inline_data;bool wake; +u32 fscrypt_auth_len; +u32 fscrypt_file_len; +u8 fscrypt_auth[sizeof (struct ceph_fscrypt_auth )];// for context +u8 fscrypt_file[sizeof (u64)];// for size };The naming of these is confusing to me. If these are the fscrypt context and the original file size, why aren't they called something like
fscrypt_contextandfscrypt_file_size?
Quoted 3 lines
Also does the file size really need to be variable-length, or could it just be a 64-bit integer?
Fscrypt is really a kernel client-side feature. Both of these new fields are treated as opaque by the MDS and are wholly managed by the client.
We need two fields because they are governed by different cephfs capabilities (aka "caps"). AUTH caps for the context and FILE caps for the size. So we have two new fields -- fscrypt_file and fscrypt_auth.
The size could be a __le64 or something, but I think it makes sense to allow it to be opaque as we aren't certain what other info we might want to keep in there. We might also want to encrypt the fscrypt_file field to cloak the true size of a file from anyone without the key.
Now, all that said, the fact that the MDS largely handles truncation poses some special challenges for the content encryption piece. We may ultimately end up making this more special-purpose than it is now.
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Eric Biggers
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH v7 02/24] fscrypt: export fscrypt_base64_encode and fscrypt_base64_decode
In reply to Jeff LaytonQuoted 39 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 32 lines · Eric Biggers
Some nits about comments:
Quoted 22 lines · Jeff Layton
fs/crypto/fname.c +1
-3@@ -178,10 +178,8 @@ static int fname_decrypt(const struct inode *inode,static const char lookup_table[65 ] ="ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+," ; -#define BASE64_CHARS (nbytes) DIV_ROUND_UP((nbytes) * 4, 3) -/** -* base64_encode() - base64-encode some bytes +* fscrypt_base64_encode() - base64-encode some bytes * @src: the bytes to encode * @len: number of bytes to encode * @dst: (output) the base64-encoded string. Not NUL-terminated. *
* Encodes the input string using characters from the set [A-Za-z0-9+,].
* The encoded string is roughly 4/3 times the size of the input string. *
* Return: length of the encoded string
*/fs/crypto/fname.c static const char lookup_table[65] = · line 192
Quoted 2 lines
fs/crypto/fname.c +1
-1-static int base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst) +int fscrypt_base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst)As this function will be used more widely, this comment should be fixed to be more precise. "Roughly 4/3" isn't precise; it's actually exactly
FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS(len), right? The following would be better:Quoted 5 lines
* Encode the input bytes using characters from the set [A-Za-z0-9+,]. *
* Return: length of the encoded string. This will be equal to
*FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS(len).
Quoted 5 lines
I'm not certain, but I thought that
FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARSgave you a worst-case estimate of the inflation. This returns the actual length of the resulting encoded string, which may be less thanFSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS(len).
As far as I can tell, it's the exact amount.
- Eric
Re: [RFC PATCH v7 02/24] fscrypt: export fscrypt_base64_encode and fscrypt_base64_decode
Quoted 40 lines · Eric Biggers
Quoted 39 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 37 lines · Eric Biggers
Some nits about comments:
Quoted 22 lines · Jeff Layton
fs/crypto/fname.c +1
-3@@ -178,10 +178,8 @@ static int fname_decrypt(const struct inode *inode,static const char lookup_table[65 ] ="ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+," ; -#define BASE64_CHARS (nbytes) DIV_ROUND_UP((nbytes) * 4, 3) -/** -* base64_encode() - base64-encode some bytes +* fscrypt_base64_encode() - base64-encode some bytes * @src: the bytes to encode * @len: number of bytes to encode * @dst: (output) the base64-encoded string. Not NUL-terminated. *
* Encodes the input string using characters from the set [A-Za-z0-9+,].
* The encoded string is roughly 4/3 times the size of the input string. *
* Return: length of the encoded string
*/fs/crypto/fname.c static const char lookup_table[65] = · line 192
Quoted 2 lines
fs/crypto/fname.c +1
-1-static int base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst) +int fscrypt_base64_encode (const u8 *src,int len,char *dst)As this function will be used more widely, this comment should be fixed to be more precise. "Roughly 4/3" isn't precise; it's actually exactly
FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS(len), right? The following would be better:* Encode the input bytes using characters from the set [A-Za-z0-9+,]. *
* Return: length of the encoded string. This will be equal to
*FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS(len).
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I'm not certain, but I thought that
FSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARSgave you a worst-case estimate of the inflation. This returns the actual length of the resulting encoded string, which may be less thanFSCRYPT_BASE64_CHARS(len).As far as I can tell, it's the exact amount.
Yeah, now that I went back and re-read the code, I think you're right. I'll fix the comment.
Thanks,
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>