Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
cover Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) support
SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory encryption environment.
The patches to support the SEV-SNP in Linux kernel and OVMF are available:
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/77335?p=,,,20,0,0,0::Created,,posterid%3A5969970,20,2,20,83891508
The Qemu patches uses the command id added by the SEV-SNP hypervisor patches to bootstrap the SEV-SNP VMs.
TODO:
* Add support to filter CPUID values through the PSP.
Additional resources
---------------------
SEV-SNP whitepaper
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdf
APM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36)
GHCB spec:
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
SEV-SNP firmware specification:
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf
Brijesh Singh (6):
linux-header: add the SNP specific command
i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP i386/sev: initialize SNP context
i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context
i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch
docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 81 +++++- linux-headers/linux/kvm.h | 47 ++++ qapi/qom.json | 6 + target/i386/sev.c | 498 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 + target/i386/trace-events | 4 + 6 files changed, 628 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
RFC PATCH 1/6 linux-header: add the SNP specific command
Sync the kvm.h with the kernel to include the SNP specific commands.
--- linux-headers/linux/kvm.h | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+)
linux-headers/linux/kvm.h +47 -0
@@ -1679,6 +1679,12 @@ enum sev_cmd_id {/* Guest Migration Extension */ KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL , +/* SNP specific commands */ +KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT =256 , +KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START , +KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE , +KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH , + KVM_SEV_NR_MAX, };
@@ -1775,6 +1781,47 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data {__u32 trans_len; }; +struct kvm_snp_init { +__u64 flags; +}; + +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start { +__u64 policy; +__u64 ma_uaddr; +__u8 ma_en; +__u8 imi_en; +__u8 gosvw[16 ]; +}; + +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL 0x1 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA 0x2 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO 0x3 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED 0x4 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS 0x5 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID 0x6 + +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update { +__u64 uaddr; +__u32 len; +__u8 imi_page; +__u8 page_type; +__u8 vmpl3_perms; +__u8 vmpl2_perms; +__u8 vmpl1_perms; +}; + +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE 96 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE 4096 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_FINISH_DATA_SIZE 32 + +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish { +__u64 id_block_uaddr; +__u64 id_auth_uaddr; +__u8 id_block_en; +__u8 auth_key_en; +__u8 host_data[KVM_SEV_SNP_FINISH_DATA_SIZE ]; +}; +#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] linux-header: add the SNP specific command
Quoted 3 lines · Brijesh Singh
Sync the
kvm.hwith the kernel to include the SNP specific commands.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
Pls specify which kernel version you used for the sync.
Quoted 71 lines
--- linux-headers/linux/kvm.h | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+)linux-headers/linux/kvm.h +47
-0@@ -1679,6 +1679,12 @@ enum sev_cmd_id {/* Guest Migration Extension */ KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL , +/* SNP specific commands */ +KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT =256 , +KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START , +KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE , +KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH , + KVM_SEV_NR_MAX, };@@ -1775,6 +1781,47 @@ struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data {__u32 trans_len; }; +struct kvm_snp_init { +__u64 flags; +}; + +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start { +__u64 policy; +__u64 ma_uaddr; +__u8 ma_en; +__u8 imi_en; +__u8 gosvw[16 ]; +}; + +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL 0x1 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_VMSA 0x2 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_ZERO 0x3 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED 0x4 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS 0x5 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID 0x6 + +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update { +__u64 uaddr; +__u32 len; +__u8 imi_page; +__u8 page_type; +__u8 vmpl3_perms; +__u8 vmpl2_perms; +__u8 vmpl1_perms; +}; + +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE 96 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE 4096 +#define KVM_SEV_SNP_FINISH_DATA_SIZE 32 + +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish { +__u64 id_block_uaddr; +__u64 id_auth_uaddr; +__u8 id_block_en; +__u8 auth_key_en; +__u8 host_data[KVM_SEV_SNP_FINISH_DATA_SIZE ]; +}; +#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU (1 << 0)#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3 (1 << 1)#define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX (1 << 2)Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] linux-header: add the SNP specific command
Quoted 7 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 3 lines · Brijesh Singh
Sync the
kvm.hwith the kernel to include the SNP specific commands.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>Pls specify which kernel version you used for the sync.
This sync is based on the my guest kernel rfc patches (5.13-rc6). After the guest patches are accepted then will include the exact linux kernel version.
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] linux-header: add the SNP specific command
In reply to Brijesh SinghHi Brijesh,
Quoted 5 lines · Brijesh Singh
Sync the
kvm.hwith the kernel to include the SNP specific commands.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- linux-headers/linux/kvm.h | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
What about psp-sev.h ? I see that kernel patch "[PATCH Part2 RFC v4 11/40] crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands" adds some new PSP return codes.
The QEMU user-friendly string list sev_fw_errlist (in sev.c) should be updated accordingly.
-Dov
Re: [RFC PATCH 1/6] linux-header: add the SNP specific command
Hi Dov,
Quoted 10 lines · Dov Murik
Hi Brijesh,
Quoted 5 lines · Brijesh Singh
Sync the
kvm.hwith the kernel to include the SNP specific commands.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- linux-headers/linux/kvm.h | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Quoted 7 lines
What about
psp-sev.h? I see that kernel patch "[PATCH Part2 RFC v4 11/40] crypto:ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands" adds some new PSP return codes.The QEMU user-friendly string list
sev_fw_errlist(insev.c) should be updated accordingly.
thanks for reminding me, I will sync the psp-sev.h and include the new error code as well in the sev.c.
RFC PATCH 2/6 i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
In reply to Brijesh SinghTo launch the SEV-SNP guest, a user can specify up to 8 parameters. Passing all parameters through command line can be difficult. To simplify the launch parameter passing, introduce a .ini-like config file that can be used for passing the parameters to the launch flow.
The contents of the config file will look like this:
$ cat snp-launch.init
# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags = 0
policy = 0x1000id_block = "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="
Add 'snp' property that can be used to indicate that SEV guest launch should enable the SNP support.
SEV-SNP guest launch examples:
1) launch without additional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on2) launch with optional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on,launch-config=<file>
--- docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 81 +++++++++++- qapi/qom.json | 6 + target/i386/sev.c | 227 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt +79 -2
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ support for notifying a guest's operating system when certain types of VMEXITs are about to occur. This allows the guest to selectively share information with the hypervisor to satisfy the requested function. -Launching ---------- +Launching (SEV and SEV-ES) +-------------------------- Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before a guest can be booted. The MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: LAUNCH_START, LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, LAUNCH_MEASURE and LAUNCH_FINISH. These four commands
@@ -113,6 +113,83 @@ a SEV-ES guest: - Requires in-kernel irqchip - the burden is placed on the hypervisor to manage booting APs. +Launching (SEV-SNP) +------------------- +Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before a guest can be booted. The +MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: +KVM_SNP_INIT, SNP_LAUNCH_START, SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, and SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH. These +four commands together generate a fresh memory encryption key for the VM, +encrypt the boot images for a successful launch. + +KVM_SNP_INIT is called first to initialize the SEV-SNP firmware and SNP +features in the KVM. The feature flags value can be provided through the +launch-config file. + ++------------+-------+----------+---------------------------------+ +| key | type | default | meaning | ++------------+-------+----------+---------------------------------+ +| init_flags | hex | 0 | SNP feature flags | ++-----------------------------------------------------------------+ + +Note: currently the init_flags must be zero. + +SNP_LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch context +within the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provide a guest +policy and other parameters as described in the SEV-SNP firmware +specification. The launch parameters should be specified in the launch-config +ini file and should be treated as a binary blob and must be passed as-is to +the SEV-SNP firmware. + +The SNP_LAUNCH_START uses the following parameters from the launch-config +file. See the SEV-SNP specification for more details. + ++--------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| key | type | default | meaning | ++--------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| policy | hex | 0x30000 | a 64-bit guest policy | +| imi_en | bool | 0 | 1 when IMI is enabled | +| ma_end | bool | 0 | 1 when migration agent is used | +| gosvw | string| 0 | 16-byte base64 encoded string for the guest | +| | | | OS visible workaround. | ++--------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ + +SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context +created via the SNP_LAUNCH_START command. If required, this command can be called +multiple times to encrypt different memory regions. The command also calculates +the measurement of the memory contents as it encrypts. + +SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH finalizes the guest launch flow. Optionally, while finalizing +the launch the firmware can perform checks on the launch digest computing +through the SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE. To perform the check the user must supply +the id block, authentication blob and host data that should be included in the +attestation report. See the SEV-SNP spec for further details. + +The SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH uses the following parameters from the launch-config file. + ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| key | type | default | meaning | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| id_block | string| none | base64 encoded ID block | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| id_auth | string| none | base64 encoded authentication information | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| auth_key_en| bool | 0 | auth block contains author key | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| host_data | string| none | host provided data | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ + +To launch a SEV-SNP guest + +# ${QEMU} \ + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ + -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,snp=on + +To launch a SEV-SNP guest with launch configuration + +# ${QEMU} \ + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ + -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,snp=on,launch-config=<config> + Debugging ----------- Since the memory contents of a SEV guest are encrypted, hypervisor access to
qapi/qom.json +6 -0
@@ -749,6 +749,10 @@ # @reduced-phys-bits: number of bits in physical addresses that become # unavailable when SEV is enabled # +# @snp: SEV-SNP is enabled (default: 0) +# +# @launch-config: launch config file to use +# # Since: 2.12 ## { 'struct': 'SevGuestProperties',
@@ -758,6 +762,8 @@ '*policy': 'uint32', '*handle': 'uint32', '*cbitpos': 'uint32', + '*snp': 'bool', + '*launch-config': 'str', 'reduced-phys-bits': 'uint32' } } ##
target/i386/sev.c +227 -0
267 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
Quoted 21 lines · Brijesh Singh
To launch the SEV-SNP guest, a user can specify up to 8 parameters. Passing all parameters through command line can be difficult. To simplify the launch parameter passing, introduce a .ini-like config file that can be used for passing the parameters to the launch flow.
The contents of the config file will look like this:
$ cat snp-launch.init# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags= 0
policy =0x1000id_block= "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="Add 'snp' property that can be used to indicate that SEV guest launch should enable the SNP support.
SEV-SNP guest launch examples:
Quoted 9 lines
1) launch without additional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on2) launch with optional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on,launch-config=<file>
Not directly SNP-related, but in an internal communication Connor told me he wants to allow the SEV configuration (like dh-cert-file etc.) to be set using QMP commands when the machine launches instead (or in addition to) setting them via QEMU command-line parameters.
Whatever the configuration solution decided for the SEV parameters should also apply to these new SNP settings (policy, id_block, etc.).
-Dov
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
In reply to Brijesh Singhcc'ing in armbru, since he knows about our command line - have we got a neater way of doing this, or something else that reads config file? Could the existing -readconfig work?
Although this is a fairly large chunk of data, I don't think it's any larger than our block device configs on a bad day.
Dave
Quoted 7 lines · * Brijesh Singh ([email protected]) wrote:
To launch the SEV-SNP guest, a user can specify up to 8 parameters. Passing all parameters through command line can be difficult. To simplify the launch parameter passing, introduce a .ini-like config file that can be used for passing the parameters to the launch flow.
The contents of the config file will look like this:
Quoted 7 lines
$ cat snp-launch.init# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags= 0
policy =0x1000id_block= "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="
Wouldn't the 'gosvw' and 'hostdata' also be in there?
Dave
Quoted 425 lines
Add 'snp' property that can be used to indicate that SEV guest launch should enable the SNP support.
SEV-SNP guest launch examples:
1) launch without additional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on2) launch with optional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on,launch-config=<file>Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 81 +++++++++++- qapi/qom.json | 6 + target/i386/sev.c | 227 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt +79
-2@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ support for notifying a guest's operating system when certain types of VMEXITs are about to occur. This allows the guest to selectively share information with the hypervisor to satisfy the requested function. -Launching ---------- +Launching (SEV and SEV-ES) +-------------------------- Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before a guest can be booted. The MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: LAUNCH_START, LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, LAUNCH_MEASURE and LAUNCH_FINISH. These four commands@@ -113,6 +113,83 @@ a SEV-ES guest: - Requires in-kernel irqchip - the burden is placed on the hypervisor to manage booting APs. +Launching (SEV-SNP) +------------------- +Boot images (such as bios) must be encrypted before a guest can be booted. The +MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP ioctl provides commands to encrypt the images: +KVM_SNP_INIT, SNP_LAUNCH_START, SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE, and SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH. These +four commands together generate a fresh memory encryption key for the VM, +encrypt the boot images for a successful launch. + +KVM_SNP_INIT is called first to initialize the SEV-SNP firmware and SNP +features in the KVM. The feature flags value can be provided through the +launch-config file. + ++------------+-------+----------+---------------------------------+ +| key | type | default | meaning | ++------------+-------+----------+---------------------------------+ +| init_flags | hex | 0 | SNP feature flags | ++-----------------------------------------------------------------+ + +Note: currently the init_flags must be zero. + +SNP_LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch context +within the firmware. To create this context, guest owner must provide a guest +policy and other parameters as described in the SEV-SNP firmware +specification. The launch parameters should be specified in the launch-config +ini file and should be treated as a binary blob and must be passed as-is to +the SEV-SNP firmware. + +The SNP_LAUNCH_START uses the following parameters from the launch-config +file. See the SEV-SNP specification for more details. + ++--------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| key | type | default | meaning | ++--------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| policy | hex | 0x30000 | a 64-bit guest policy | +| imi_en | bool | 0 | 1 when IMI is enabled | +| ma_end | bool | 0 | 1 when migration agent is used | +| gosvw | string| 0 | 16-byte base64 encoded string for the guest | +| | | | OS visible workaround. | ++--------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ + +SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts the memory region using the cryptographic context +created via the SNP_LAUNCH_START command. If required, this command can be called +multiple times to encrypt different memory regions. The command also calculates +the measurement of the memory contents as it encrypts. + +SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH finalizes the guest launch flow. Optionally, while finalizing +the launch the firmware can perform checks on the launch digest computing +through the SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE. To perform the check the user must supply +the id block, authentication blob and host data that should be included in the +attestation report. See the SEV-SNP spec for further details. + +The SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH uses the following parameters from the launch-config file. + ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| key | type | default | meaning | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| id_block | string| none | base64 encoded ID block | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| id_auth | string| none | base64 encoded authentication information | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| auth_key_en| bool | 0 | auth block contains author key | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ +| host_data | string| none | host provided data | ++------------+-------+----------+----------------------------------------------+ + +To launch a SEV-SNP guest + +# ${QEMU} \ + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ + -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,snp=on + +To launch a SEV-SNP guest with launch configuration + +# ${QEMU} \ + -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=sev0 \ + -object sev-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,snp=on,launch-config=<config> + Debugging ----------- Since the memory contents of a SEV guest are encrypted, hypervisor access toqapi/qom.json +6
-0@@ -749,6 +749,10 @@ # @reduced-phys-bits: number of bits in physical addresses that become # unavailable when SEV is enabled # +# @snp: SEV-SNP is enabled (default: 0) +# +# @launch-config: launch config file to use +# # Since: 2.12 ## { 'struct': 'SevGuestProperties',@@ -758,6 +762,8 @@ '*policy': 'uint32', '*handle': 'uint32', '*cbitpos': 'uint32', + '*snp': 'bool', + '*launch-config': 'str', 'reduced-phys-bits': 'uint32' } } ##target/i386/sev.c +227
-0@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@#define TYPE_SEV_GUEST "sev-guest" OBJECT_DECLARE_SIMPLE_TYPE(SevGuestState, SEV_GUEST) +struct snp_launch_config { +struct kvm_snp_init init; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start start; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish finish; +};/** * SevGuestState: @@ -58,6 +63,8 @@ struct SevGuestState {char *session_file;uint32_t cbitpos;uint32_t reduced_phys_bits; +char *launch_config_file; +bool snp;/* runtime state */ uint32_t handle;@@ -72,10 +79,13 @@ struct SevGuestState {uint32_t reset_cs;uint32_t reset_ip;bool reset_data_valid; + +struct snp_launch_config snp_config; };#define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1/* disable debug */ #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev" +#define DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY 0x30000#define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID "00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e" typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock {@@ -298,6 +308,212 @@ sev_guest_set_sev_device(Object *obj, const char *value, Error **errp) sev->sev_device =g_strdup (value); } +static void +sev_guest_set_snp (Object *obj,bool value,Error **errp) +{ +SevGuestState *sev =SEV_GUEST (obj); + + sev->snp = value; +} + +static bool +sev_guest_get_snp (Object *obj,Error **errp) +{ +SevGuestState *sev =SEV_GUEST (obj); + +return sev->snp; +} + + +static char * +sev_guest_get_launch_config_file (Object *obj,Error **errp) +{ +SevGuestState *s =SEV_GUEST (obj); + +return g_strdup (s->launch_config_file); +} + +static int +config_read_uint64 (GKeyFile *f,const char *key,uint64_t *value,Error **errp) +{ +g_autoptr (GError) error =NULL ; + g_autofree gchar *str = NULL; +uint64_t res; + + str =g_key_file_get_string (f,"SEV-SNP" , key, &error); +if (!str) { +/* key not found */ +return 0 ; + } + + res =g_ascii_strtoull (str,NULL ,16 ); +if (res ==G_MAXUINT64 ) { +error_setg (errp,"Failed to convert %s" , str); +return 1 ; + } + + *value = res; +return 0 ; +} + +static int +config_read_bool (GKeyFile *f,const char *key,bool *value,Error **errp) +{ +g_autoptr (GError) error =NULL ; +gboolean val; + + val =g_key_file_get_boolean (f,"SEV-SNP" , key, &error); +if (!val &&g_error_matches (error,G_KEY_FILE_ERROR , +G_KEY_FILE_ERROR_INVALID_VALUE )) { +error_setg (errp,"%s" , error->message); +return 1 ; + } + + *value = val; +return 0 ; +} + +static int +config_read_blob (GKeyFile *f,const char *key,uint8_t *blob,uint32_t len, +Error **errp) +{ +g_autoptr (GError) error =NULL ; + g_autofree guchar *data = NULL; + g_autofree gchar *base64 = NULL; +gsize size; + + base64 =g_key_file_get_string (f,"SEV-SNP" , key, &error); +if (!base64) { +/* key not found */ +return 0 ; + } + +/* lets decode the value string */ + data =g_base64_decode (base64, &size); +if (!data) { +error_setg (errp,"failed to decode '%s'" , key); +return 1 ; + } + +/* verify the length */ +if (len != size) { +error_setg (errp,"invalid length for key '%s' (expected %d got %ld)" , + key, len, size); +return 1 ; + } + +memcpy (blob, data, size); +return 0 ; +} + +static int +snp_parse_launch_config (SevGuestState *sev,const char *file,Error **errp) +{ +g_autoptr (GError) error =NULL ; +g_autoptr (GKeyFile) key_file =g_key_file_new (); +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start *start = &sev->snp_config.start; +struct kvm_snp_init *init = &sev->snp_config.init; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev->snp_config.finish; +uint8_t *id_block =NULL , *id_auth =NULL ; + +if (!g_key_file_load_from_file (key_file, file,G_KEY_FILE_NONE , &error)) { +error_setg (errp,"Error loading config file: %s" , error->message); +return 1 ; + } + +/* Check the group first */ +if (!g_key_file_has_group (key_file,"SEV-SNP" )) { +error_setg (errp,"Error parsing config file, group SEV-SNP not found" ); +return 1 ; + } + +/* Get the init_flags used in KVM_SNP_INIT */ +if (config_read_uint64 (key_file,"init_flags" , + (uint64_t *)&init->flags, errp)) { + goto err; + } + +/* Get the policy used in LAUNCH_START */ +if (config_read_uint64 (key_file,"policy" , + (uint64_t *)&start->policy, errp)) { + goto err; + } + +/* Get IMI_EN used in LAUNCH_START */ +if (config_read_bool (key_file,"imi_en" , (bool *)&start->imi_en, errp)) { + goto err; + } + +/* Get MA_EN used in LAUNCH_START */ +if (config_read_bool (key_file,"imi_en" , (bool *)&start->ma_en, errp)) { + goto err; + } + +/* Get GOSVW used in LAUNCH_START */ +if (config_read_blob (key_file,"gosvw" , (uint8_t *)&start->gosvw, +sizeof (start->gosvw), errp)) { + goto err; + } + +/* Get ID block used in LAUNCH_FINISH */ +if (g_key_file_has_key (key_file,"SEV-SNP" ,"id_block" , &error)) { + + id_block =g_malloc (KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE ); + +if (config_read_blob (key_file,"id_block" , id_block, +KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_BLOCK_SIZE , errp)) { + goto err; + } + + finish->id_block_uaddr = (unsigned long )id_block; + finish->id_block_en =1 ; + } + +/* Get authentication block used in LAUNCH_FINISH */ +if (g_key_file_has_key (key_file,"SEV-SNP" ,"id_auth" , &error)) { + + id_auth =g_malloc (KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE ); + +if (config_read_blob (key_file,"auth_block" , id_auth, +KVM_SEV_SNP_ID_AUTH_SIZE , errp)) { + goto err; + } + + finish->id_auth_uaddr = (unsigned long )id_auth; + +/* Get AUTH_KEY_EN used in LAUNCH_FINISH */ +if (config_read_bool (key_file,"auth_key_en" , + (bool *)&finish->auth_key_en, errp)) { + goto err; + } + } + +/* Get host_data used in LAUNCH_FINISH */ +if (config_read_blob (key_file,"host_data" , (uint8_t *)&finish->host_data, +sizeof (finish->host_data), errp)) { + goto err; + } + +return 0 ; + +err: +g_free (id_block); +g_free (id_auth); +return 1 ; +} + +static void +sev_guest_set_launch_config_file (Object *obj,const char *value,Error **errp) +{ +SevGuestState *s =SEV_GUEST (obj); + +if (snp_parse_launch_config (s, value, errp)) { +return ; + } + + s->launch_config_file =g_strdup (value); +} +static void sev_guest_class_init (ObjectClass *oc,void *data) {@@ -316,6 +532,16 @@ sev_guest_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, void *data) sev_guest_set_session_file);object_class_property_set_description (oc,"session-file" ,"guest owners session parameters (encoded with base64)" ); +object_class_property_add_bool (oc,"snp" , + sev_guest_get_snp, + sev_guest_set_snp); +object_class_property_set_description (oc,"snp" , +"enable SEV-SNP support" ); +object_class_property_add_str (oc,"launch-config" , + sev_guest_get_launch_config_file, + sev_guest_set_launch_config_file); +object_class_property_set_description (oc,"launch-config" , +"the file provides the SEV-SNP guest launch parameters" ); } static void@@ -325,6 +551,7 @@ sev_guest_instance_init(Object *obj) sev->sev_device =g_strdup (DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE ); sev->policy =DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY ; + sev->snp_config.start.policy =DEFAULT_SEV_SNP_POLICY ;object_property_add_uint32_ptr (obj,"policy" , &sev->policy,OBJ_PROP_FLAG_READWRITE ); object_property_add_uint32_ptr(obj, "handle", &sev->handle,Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
Quoted 11 lines · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
Quoted 8 lines
$ cat snp-launch.init# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags= 0
policy =0x1000id_block= "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="Wouldn't the 'gosvw' and 'hostdata' also be in there?
I did not included all the 8 parameters in the commit messages, mainly because some of them are big. I just picked 3 smaller ones.
-Brijesh
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
Quoted 12 lines · * Brijesh Singh ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 9 lines · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
Quoted 8 lines
$ cat snp-launch.init# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags= 0
policy =0x1000id_block= "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Wouldn't the 'gosvw' and 'hostdata' also be in there?
I did not included all the 8 parameters in the commit messages, mainly because some of them are big. I just picked 3 smaller ones.
It would be good to have a full example, even if one of them was something like:
stuff = ".....<upto 4096 bytes>...."
so we'd just be able to get more of an idea.
Dave
Quoted 2 lines
-Brijesh
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
In reply to Brijesh SinghQuoted 2 lines · Brijesh Singh
To launch the SEV-SNP guest, a user can specify up to 8 parameters. Passing all parameters through command line can be difficult.
This sentence applies to pretty much everything in QEMU and the SEV-SNP example is nowhere near an extreme example IMHO.
Quoted 3 lines
To simplify
the launch parameter passing, introduce a .ini-like config file that can be used for passing the parameters to the launch flow.
Inventing a new config file format for usage by just one specific niche feature in QEMU is something I'd say we do not want.
Our long term goal in QEMU is to move to a world where 100% of QEMU configuration is provided in JSON format, using the QAPI schema to define the accepted input set.
Quoted 10 lines
The contents of the config file will look like this:
$ cat snp-launch.init# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags= 0
policy =0x1000id_block= "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="
These parameters are really tiny and trivial to provide on the command line, so I'm not finding this config file compelling.
Quoted 16 lines
Add 'snp' property that can be used to indicate that SEV guest launch should enable the SNP support.
SEV-SNP guest launch examples:
1) launch without additional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on2) launch with optional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on,launch-config=<file>
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 81 +++++++++++- qapi/qom.json | 6 + target/i386/sev.c | 227 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
Quoted 11 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 2 lines · Brijesh Singh
To launch the SEV-SNP guest, a user can specify up to 8 parameters. Passing all parameters through command line can be difficult.
This sentence applies to pretty much everything in QEMU and the SEV-SNP example is nowhere near an extreme example IMHO.
Quoted 3 lines
To simplify
the launch parameter passing, introduce a .ini-like config file that can be used for passing the parameters to the launch flow.
Quoted 7 lines
Inventing a new config file format for usage by just one specific niche feature in QEMU is something I'd say we do not want.
Our long term goal in QEMU is to move to a world where 100% of QEMU configuration is provided in JSON format, using the QAPI schema to define the accepted input set.
I am open to all suggestions. I was trying to avoid passing all these parameters through the command line because some of them can be huge (up to a page size)
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
The contents of the config file will look like this:
$ cat snp-launch.init
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags= 0
policy =0x1000id_block= "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="These parameters are really tiny and trivial to provide on the command line, so I'm not finding this config file compelling.
I have only included 3 small parameters. Other parameters can be up to a page size. The breakdown looks like this:
policy: 8 bytes
flags: 8 bytesid_block: 96 bytesid_auth: 4096 byteshost_data: 32 bytes
gosvw: 16 bytes
Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 16 lines
Add 'snp' property that can be used to indicate that SEV guest launch should enable the SNP support.
SEV-SNP guest launch examples:
1) launch without additional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on2) launch with optional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on,launch-config=<file>Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 81 +++++++++++- qapi/qom.json | 6 + target/i386/sev.c | 227 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)Regards,
Daniel
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
Quoted 45 lines · Brijesh Singh
Quoted 11 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 2 lines · Brijesh Singh
To launch the SEV-SNP guest, a user can specify up to 8 parameters. Passing all parameters through command line can be difficult.
This sentence applies to pretty much everything in QEMU and the SEV-SNP example is nowhere near an extreme example IMHO.
Quoted 3 lines
To simplify
the launch parameter passing, introduce a .ini-like config file that can be used for passing the parameters to the launch flow.Quoted 7 lines
Inventing a new config file format for usage by just one specific niche feature in QEMU is something I'd say we do not want.
Our long term goal in QEMU is to move to a world where 100% of QEMU configuration is provided in JSON format, using the QAPI schema to define the accepted input set.
I am open to all suggestions. I was trying to avoid passing all these parameters through the command line because some of them can be huge (up to a page size)
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
The contents of the config file will look like this:
$ cat snp-launch.initQuoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags= 0
policy =0x1000id_block= "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="These parameters are really tiny and trivial to provide on the command line, so I'm not finding this config file compelling.
I have only included 3 small parameters. Other parameters can be up to a page size. The breakdown looks like this:
Quoted 6 lines
policy: 8 bytes
flags: 8 bytesid_block: 96 bytesid_auth: 4096 byteshost_data: 32 bytes
gosvw: 16 bytes
Only the id_auth parameter is really considered large here.
When you say "up to a page size", that implies that the size is actually variable. Is that correct, and if so, what is a real world common size going to be ? Is the common size much smaller than this upper limit ? If so I'd just ignore the issue entirely.
If not, then, 4k on the command line is certainly ugly, but isn't technically impossible. It would be similarly ugly to have this value stuffed into a libvirt XML configuration for that matter.
One option is to supply only that one parameter via an external file, with the file being an opaque blob whose context is the parameter value thus avoiding inventing a custom file format parser.
When "id_auth" is described as "authentication data", are there any secrecy requirements around this ?
QEMU does have the '-object secret' framework for passing blobs of sensitive data to QEMU and can allow passing via a file:
https://qemu-project.gitlab.io/qemu/system/secrets.html
Even if this doesn't actually need to be kept private, we could decide to simply (ab)use the 'secret' object anyway as a way to let it be passed in out of band via a file.
Libvirt also has a 'secret' concept for passing blobs of sensitive data out of band from the main XML config, which could again be leveraged.
It does feel a little dirty to be using 'secrets' in libvirt and QEMU for data that doesn't actually need to be secret, just as a way to avoid huge config files. So we could just ignore the secrets and directly have 'id_auth_file' as a parameter and directly reference a file.
Regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
On 7/12/21 11:24 AM, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:>>
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
policy: 8 bytes
flags: 8 bytesid_block: 96 bytesid_auth: 4096 byteshost_data: 32 bytes
gosvw: 16 bytes
Quoted 6 lines
Only the
id_authparameter is really considered large here.When you say "up to a page size", that implies that the size is actually variable. Is that correct, and if so, what is a real world common size going to be ? Is the common size much smaller than this upper limit ? If so I'd just ignore the issue entirely.
Looking at the recent spec, it appears that id_auth is fixed to 4K.
Quoted 5 lines
If not, then, 4k on the command line is certainly ugly, but isn't technically impossible. It would be similarly ugly to have this value stuffed into a libvirt XML configuration for that matter.
Quoted 8 lines
One option is to supply only that one parameter via an external file, with the file being an opaque blob whose context is the parameter value thus avoiding inventing a custom file format parser.
When "
id_auth" is described as "authentication data", are there any secrecy requirements around this ?
Yes this sounds much better, we have been using the similar approach for the SEV in which we pass the PDH and session blob through the file.
Quoted 9 lines
QEMU does have the '-object secret' framework for passing blobs of sensitive data to QEMU and can allow passing via a file:
https://nam11.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fqemu-project.gitlab.io%2Fqemu%2Fsystem%2Fsecrets.html&data=04%7C01%7Cbrijesh.singh%40amd.com%7C891fdc1ab0d8483aecb808d945519054%7C3dd8961fe4884e608e11a82d994e183d%7C0%7C0%7C637617038899405482%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C1000&sdata=8AHUC3DeyauxT4Pd2ZkUJkDyu9XHtexybM0BgdRlego%3D&reserved=0Even if this doesn't actually need to be kept private, we could decide to simply (ab)use the 'secret' object anyway as a way to let it be passed in out of band via a file.
The content of the field does not need to be protected. It's a public information, so I am not sure the secrets object fits here.
thanks
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
In reply to Brijesh SinghQuoted 23 lines · Brijesh Singh
To launch the SEV-SNP guest, a user can specify up to 8 parameters. Passing all parameters through command line can be difficult. To simplify the launch parameter passing, introduce a .ini-like config file that can be used for passing the parameters to the launch flow.
The contents of the config file will look like this:
$ cat snp-launch.init# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags= 0
policy =0x1000id_block= "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="Add 'snp' property that can be used to indicate that SEV guest launch should enable the SNP support.
SEV-SNP guest launch examples:
1) launch without additional parameters
Quoted 8 lines
$(QEMU_CLI) \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on2) launch with optional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on,launch-config=<file>Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
I acknowledge doing complex configuration on the command line can be awkward. But if we added a separate configuration file for every configurable thing where that's the case, we'd have too many already, and we'd constantly grow more. I don't think this is a viable solution.
In my opinion, much of what we do on the command line should be done in configuration files instead. Not in several different configuration languages, mind, but using one common language for all our configuration needs.
Some of us argue this language already exists: QMP. It can't do everything the command line can do, but that's a matter of putting in the work. However, JSON isn't a good configuration language[1]. To get a decent one, we'd have to to extend JSON[2], or wrap another concrete syntax around QMP's abstract syntax.
But this doesn't help you at all *now*.
I recommend to do exactly what we've done before for complex
configuration: define it in the QAPI schema, so we can use both dotted keys and JSON on the command line, and can have QMP, too. Examples:
-blockdev, -display, -compat.
Questions?
[1] https://www.lucidchart.com/techblog/2018/07/16/why-json-isnt-a-good-configuration-language/
[2] Thanks, but no thanks. Let's make new and interesting mistakes instead of repeating old and tired ones.
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
Quoted 49 lines · Markus Armbruster
Quoted 23 lines · Brijesh Singh
To launch the SEV-SNP guest, a user can specify up to 8 parameters. Passing all parameters through command line can be difficult. To simplify the launch parameter passing, introduce a .ini-like config file that can be used for passing the parameters to the launch flow.
The contents of the config file will look like this:
$ cat snp-launch.init# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags= 0
policy =0x1000id_block= "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="Add 'snp' property that can be used to indicate that SEV guest launch should enable the SNP support.
SEV-SNP guest launch examples:
1) launch without additional parameters
Quoted 8 lines
$(QEMU_CLI) \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on2) launch with optional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on,launch-config=<file>Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>I acknowledge doing complex configuration on the command line can be awkward. But if we added a separate configuration file for every configurable thing where that's the case, we'd have too many already, and we'd constantly grow more. I don't think this is a viable solution.
In my opinion, much of what we do on the command line should be done in configuration files instead. Not in several different configuration languages, mind, but using one common language for all our configuration needs.
Some of us argue this language already exists: QMP. It can't do everything the command line can do, but that's a matter of putting in the work. However, JSON isn't a good configuration language[1]. To get a decent one, we'd have to to extend JSON[2], or wrap another concrete syntax around QMP's abstract syntax.
Quoted 8 lines
But this doesn't help you at all *now*.
I recommend to do exactly what we've done before for complex
configuration: define it in the QAPI schema, so we can use both dotted keys and JSON on the command line, and can have QMP, too. Examples:
-blockdev, -display, -compat.Questions?
I will take a look at the blockdev and try modeling after that. if I run into any questions then I will ask. thanks for the pointer Markus.
-Brijesh
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
In reply to Markus ArmbrusterQuoted 50 lines · Markus Armbruster
Quoted 23 lines · Brijesh Singh
To launch the SEV-SNP guest, a user can specify up to 8 parameters. Passing all parameters through command line can be difficult. To simplify the launch parameter passing, introduce a .ini-like config file that can be used for passing the parameters to the launch flow.
The contents of the config file will look like this:
$ cat snp-launch.init# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags= 0
policy =0x1000id_block= "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="Add 'snp' property that can be used to indicate that SEV guest launch should enable the SNP support.
SEV-SNP guest launch examples:
1) launch without additional parameters
Quoted 8 lines
$(QEMU_CLI) \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on2) launch with optional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on,launch-config=<file>Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>I acknowledge doing complex configuration on the command line can be awkward. But if we added a separate configuration file for every configurable thing where that's the case, we'd have too many already, and we'd constantly grow more. I don't think this is a viable solution.
In my opinion, much of what we do on the command line should be done in configuration files instead. Not in several different configuration languages, mind, but using one common language for all our configuration needs.
Some of us argue this language already exists: QMP. It can't do everything the command line can do, but that's a matter of putting in the work. However, JSON isn't a good configuration language[1]. To get a decent one, we'd have to to extend JSON[2], or wrap another concrete syntax around QMP's abstract syntax.
Quoted 8 lines
But this doesn't help you at all *now*.
I recommend to do exactly what we've done before for complex
configuration: define it in the QAPI schema, so we can use both dotted keys and JSON on the command line, and can have QMP, too. Examples:
-blockdev, -display, -compat.Questions?
Hi Markus, Daniel,
I'm dealing with similar considerations with some SNP config options relating to CPUID enforcement, so I've started looking into this as well, but am still a little confused on the best way to proceed.
I see that -blockdev supports both JSON command-line arguments (via qobject_input_visitor_new) and dotted keys
(via qobject_input_vistior_new_keyval).
We could introduce a new config group do the same, maybe something specific to ConfidentialGuestSupport objects, e.g.:
-confidential-guest-support sev-guest,id=sev0,key_a.subkey_b=...
and use the same mechanisms to parse the options, but this seems to either involve adding a layer of option translations between command-line and the underlying object properties, or, if we keep the 1:1 mapping between QAPI-defined keys and object properties, it basically becomes a way to pass a different Visitor implementation into object_property_set(), in this case one created by object_input_visitor_new_keyval() instead of opts_visitor_new().
In either case, genericizing it beyond CGS/SEV would basically be introducing:
-object2 sev-guest,id=sev0,key_a.subkey_b=...
Which one seems preferable? Or is the answer neither?
I've also been looking at whether this could all be handled via -object, and it seems -object already supports JSON command-line arguments, and that switching it from using OptsVisitor to QObjectVisitor for non-JSON case would be enough to have it handle dotted keys, but I'm not sure what the fall-out would be compatibility-wise.
All lot of that falls under making sure the QObject/keyval parser is compatible with existing command-lines parsed via OptsVisitor. One example where there still seems to be a difference is lack of support for ranges such as "cpus=1-4" in keyval parser. Daniel had a series that addressed this:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-09/msg08248.html
but it doesn't seem to have made it into the tree, which is why I feel like maybe there are complications with this approach I haven't considered?
Thanks!
-Mike
Quoted 7 lines
[1] https://www.lucidchart.com/techblog/2018/07/16/why-json-isnt-a-good-configuration-language/
[2] Thanks, but no thanks. Let's make new and interesting mistakes instead of repeating old and tired ones.
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
Quoted 66 lines · Michael Roth
Quoted 50 lines · Markus Armbruster
Quoted 23 lines · Brijesh Singh
To launch the SEV-SNP guest, a user can specify up to 8 parameters. Passing all parameters through command line can be difficult. To simplify the launch parameter passing, introduce a .ini-like config file that can be used for passing the parameters to the launch flow.
The contents of the config file will look like this:
$ cat snp-launch.init# SNP launch parameters
[SEV-SNP]init_flags= 0
policy =0x1000id_block= "YWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhYWFhCg=="Add 'snp' property that can be used to indicate that SEV guest launch should enable the SNP support.
SEV-SNP guest launch examples:
1) launch without additional parameters
Quoted 8 lines
$(QEMU_CLI) \ -object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on2) launch with optional parameters
$(QEMU_CLI) \
-object sev-guest,id=sev0,snp=on,launch-config=<file>Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>I acknowledge doing complex configuration on the command line can be awkward. But if we added a separate configuration file for every configurable thing where that's the case, we'd have too many already, and we'd constantly grow more. I don't think this is a viable solution.
In my opinion, much of what we do on the command line should be done in configuration files instead. Not in several different configuration languages, mind, but using one common language for all our configuration needs.
Some of us argue this language already exists: QMP. It can't do everything the command line can do, but that's a matter of putting in the work. However, JSON isn't a good configuration language[1]. To get a decent one, we'd have to to extend JSON[2], or wrap another concrete syntax around QMP's abstract syntax.
Quoted 8 lines
But this doesn't help you at all *now*.
I recommend to do exactly what we've done before for complex
configuration: define it in the QAPI schema, so we can use both dotted keys and JSON on the command line, and can have QMP, too. Examples:
-blockdev, -display, -compat.Questions?
Hi Markus, Daniel,
I'm dealing with similar considerations with some SNP config options relating to CPUID enforcement, so I've started looking into this as well, but am still a little confused on the best way to proceed.
Quoted 8 lines
I see that -blockdev supports both JSON command-line arguments (via
qobject_input_visitor_new) and dotted keys
(viaqobject_input_vistior_new_keyval).We could introduce a new config group do the same, maybe something specific to ConfidentialGuestSupport objects, e.g.:
-confidential-guest-support sev-guest,id=sev0,key_a.subkey_b=...
We don't wnt to be adding new CLI options anymore. -object with json syntx should ultimately be able to cover everything we'll ever need to do.
Quoted 9 lines
and use the same mechanisms to parse the options, but this seems to either involve adding a layer of option translations between command-line and the underlying object properties, or, if we keep the 1:1 mapping between QAPI-defined keys and object properties, it basically becomes a way to pass a different Visitor implementation into
object_property_set(), in this case one created byobject_input_visitor_new_keyval()instead ofopts_visitor_new().
Quoted 6 lines
In either case, genericizing it beyond CGS/SEV would basically be introducing:
-object2 sev-guest,id=sev0,key_a.subkey_b=...
Which one seems preferable? Or is the answer neither?
Yep, neither is the answer.
Quoted 13 lines
I've also been looking at whether this could all be handled via -object, and it seems -object already supports JSON command-line arguments, and that switching it from using OptsVisitor to QObjectVisitor for non-JSON case would be enough to have it handle dotted keys, but I'm not sure what the fall-out would be compatibility-wise.
All lot of that falls under making sure the QObject/keyval parser is compatible with existing command-lines parsed via OptsVisitor. One example where there still seems to be a difference is lack of support for ranges such as "cpus=1-4" in keyval parser. Daniel had a series that addressed this:
Quoted 4 lines
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-09/msg08248.html
but it doesn't seem to have made it into the tree, which is why I feel like maybe there are complications with this approach I haven't considered?
The core problem with QemuOpts is that it has hacked various hacks grafted onto it to cope with non-scalar data. My patch was adding yet another hack. It very hard to introduce new hacks without risk of causing incompatibility with other existing hacks, or introducing unexpected edge cases that we don't anticipate.
Ultimately I think we've come to the conclusion that QemuOpts is an unfixable dead end that should be left alone. Our future is trending towards being entirely JSON, configured via the QMP monitor not the CLI. As such the json support for -object is a step towards the pure JSON world.
IOW, if you have things that work today with QemuOpts that's fine.
If, however, you're coming across situations that need non-scalar data and it doesn't work with QemuOpts, then just declare that -object json syntax is mandatory for that scenario. Don't invest time trying to improve QemuOpts for non-scalar data, nor inventing new CLI args.
FWIW, specificallly in the case of parameters that take an integer range, like cores=1-4, in JSON we'd end up representing that as a array of integers and having to specify all values explicitly. This is quite verbose, but functionally works.
I think it would have been nice if we defined an explicit 'bitmap' scalar data type in QAPI for these kind of things, but at this point in time I think that ship has sailed, and trying to add that now would create an inconsistent representation across different places.
Regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
|: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
Quoted 2 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 1 line · Michael Roth
On Tue, Jul 13, 2021 at 03:46:19PM +0200, Markus Armbruster wrote:
[...]
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I recommend to do exactly what we've done before for complex
configuration: define it in the QAPI schema, so we can use both dotted keys and JSON on the command line, and can have QMP, too. Examples:
-blockdev, -display, -compat.Questions?
Hi Markus, Daniel,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
I'm dealing with similar considerations with some SNP config options relating to CPUID enforcement, so I've started looking into this as well, but am still a little confused on the best way to proceed.
I see that -blockdev supports both JSON command-line arguments (via
qobject_input_visitor_new) and dotted keys
(viaqobject_input_vistior_new_keyval).
Yes. Convenience function qobject_input_visitor_new_str() provides this.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
We could introduce a new config group do the same, maybe something specific to ConfidentialGuestSupport objects, e.g.:
-confidential-guest-support sev-guest,id=sev0,key_a.subkey_b=...
We don't wnt to be adding new CLI options anymore. -object with json syntx should ultimately be able to cover everything we'll ever need to do.
Depends. When you want a CLI option to create a single QOM object, then -object is commonly the way to go.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
and use the same mechanisms to parse the options, but this seems to either involve adding a layer of option translations between command-line and the underlying object properties, or, if we keep the 1:1 mapping between QAPI-defined keys and object properties, it basically becomes a way to pass a different Visitor implementation into
object_property_set(), in this case one created byobject_input_visitor_new_keyval()instead ofopts_visitor_new().
qobject_input_visitor_new_str() provides 1:1, i.e. common abstract syntax, and concrete syntax either JSON or dotted keys. Note that the latter is slightly less expressive (can't do empty arrays and objects, may fall apart for type 'any'). If you run into these limitations, use JSON. Machines should always use JSON.
qobject_input_visitor_new_str() works by wrapping the "right" visitor around the option argument. Another way to provide a human-friendly interface in addition to a machine-friendly one is to translate from human to the machine interface. HMP works that way: HMP commands wrap around QMP commands. The QMP commands are generated from the QAPI schema. The HMP commands are written by hand, which is maximally flexible, but also laborious.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
In either case, genericizing it beyond CGS/SEV would basically be introducing:
-object2 sev-guest,id=sev0,key_a.subkey_b=...
That's because existing -object doesn't use keyval_parse() + the keyval QObjct input visitor, it uses QemuOpts and the options visitor, for backward compatibility with all their (barely understood) features and warts.
Unfortunate, because even new user-creatable objects can't escape QemuOpts.
QemuOpts needs to go. But replacing it is difficult and scary in places. -object is such a place.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Which one seems preferable? Or is the answer neither?
Yep, neither is the answer.
Welcome to the QemuOpts swamp, here's your waders and a leaky bucket.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
I've also been looking at whether this could all be handled via -object, and it seems -object already supports JSON command-line arguments, and that switching it from using OptsVisitor to QObjectVisitor for non-JSON case would be enough to have it handle dotted keys, but I'm not sure what the fall-out would be compatibility-wise.
It's complicated, and nobody knows for sure. That's why we didn't dare to take the jump, and instead grafted on JSON syntax without changing the old syntax. Excuse me while I sacrifice another rubber chicken to the backward compatibility idol.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
All lot of that falls under making sure the QObject/keyval parser is compatible with existing command-lines parsed via OptsVisitor. One example where there still seems to be a difference is lack of support for ranges such as "cpus=1-4" in keyval parser. Daniel had a series that addressed this:
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2016-09/msg08248.html
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
but it doesn't seem to have made it into the tree, which is why I feel like maybe there are complications with this approach I haven't considered?
The core problem with QemuOpts is that it has hacked various hacks grafted onto it to cope with non-scalar data. My patch was adding yet another hack. It very hard to introduce new hacks without risk of causing incompatibility with other existing hacks, or introducing unexpected edge cases that we don't anticipate.
Some of the thornier compatibility issues with QemuOpts are due to unforeseen edge cases of, and interactions between features.
Quoted 5 lines
Ultimately I think we've come to the conclusion that QemuOpts is an unfixable dead end that should be left alone. Our future is trending towards being entirely JSON, configured via the QMP monitor not the CLI. As such the json support for -object is a step towards the pure JSON world.
QemuOpts served us well for a while, but we've long grown out of its limitations. It needs to go.
QemuOpts not providing an adequate CLI language does not imply we can't have an adequate CLI language. The "everything QMP" movement is due to other factors. I have serious reservations about the idea, actually.
Quoted 7 lines
IOW, if you have things that work today with QemuOpts that's fine.
If, however, you're coming across situations that need non-scalar data and it doesn't work with QemuOpts, then just declare that -object json syntax is mandatory for that scenario. Don't invest time trying to improve QemuOpts for non-scalar data, nor inventing new CLI args.
I agree 100% with "don't mess with QemuOpts". That mess is complete.
Whether a new CLI option makes sense should be decided case by case.
"Must use JSON" feels acceptable for things basically only management applications use.
Quoted 9 lines
FWIW, specificallly in the case of parameters that take an integer range, like cores=1-4, in JSON we'd end up representing that as a array of integers and having to specify all values explicitly. This is quite verbose, but functionally works.
I think it would have been nice if we defined an explicit 'bitmap' scalar data type in QAPI for these kind of things, but at this point in time I think that ship has sailed, and trying to add that now would create an inconsistent representation across different places.
External representation (i.e. JSON) should be as consistent as we can make it. Multiple different internal representations can be okay. So far, we represent JSON arrays as linked lists. Optionally representing certain arrays of small integers as bit vectors feels feasible. Whether it's worth the effort is another question.
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
Quoted 30 lines · Markus Armbruster
Quoted 2 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 1 line · Michael Roth
On Tue, Jul 13, 2021 at 03:46:19PM +0200, Markus Armbruster wrote:
[...]
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I recommend to do exactly what we've done before for complex
configuration: define it in the QAPI schema, so we can use both dotted keys and JSON on the command line, and can have QMP, too. Examples:
-blockdev, -display, -compat.Questions?
Hi Markus, Daniel,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
I'm dealing with similar considerations with some SNP config options relating to CPUID enforcement, so I've started looking into this as well, but am still a little confused on the best way to proceed.
I see that -blockdev supports both JSON command-line arguments (via
qobject_input_visitor_new) and dotted keys
(viaqobject_input_vistior_new_keyval).Yes. Convenience function
qobject_input_visitor_new_str()provides this.Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
We could introduce a new config group do the same, maybe something specific to ConfidentialGuestSupport objects, e.g.:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 1 line
-confidential-guest-support sev-guest,id=sev0,key_a.subkey_b=...
We don't wnt to be adding new CLI options anymore. -object with json syntx should ultimately be able to cover everything we'll ever need to do.
Depends. When you want a CLI option to create a single QOM object, then -object is commonly the way to go.
So if I've read things correctly the fact that this is a question of how to define properties of a single QOM object lends itself to using -object rather than attempting a new -blockdev-like option group, and as such if we want to allow structured parameters we should use pure JSON instead of attempting to layer anything on top of the current keyval parser.
Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
and use the same mechanisms to parse the options, but this seems to either involve adding a layer of option translations between command-line and the underlying object properties, or, if we keep the 1:1 mapping between QAPI-defined keys and object properties, it basically becomes a way to pass a different Visitor implementation into
object_property_set(), in this case one created byobject_input_visitor_new_keyval()instead ofopts_visitor_new().
qobject_input_visitor_new_str()provides 1:1, i.e. common abstract syntax, and concrete syntax either JSON or dotted keys. Note that the latter is slightly less expressive (can't do empty arrays and objects, may fall apart for type 'any'). If you run into these limitations, use JSON. Machines should always use JSON.
qobject_input_visitor_new_str()works by wrapping the "right" visitor around the option argument. Another way to provide a human-friendly interface in addition to a machine-friendly one is to translate from human to the machine interface. HMP works that way: HMP commands wrap around QMP commands. The QMP commands are generated from the QAPI schema. The HMP commands are written by hand, which is maximally flexible, but also laborious.Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
In either case, genericizing it beyond CGS/SEV would basically be introducing:
-object2 sev-guest,id=sev0,key_a.subkey_b=...
That's because existing -object doesn't use
keyval_parse()+ the keyval QObjct input visitor, it uses QemuOpts and the options visitor, for backward compatibility with all their (barely understood) features and warts.Unfortunate, because even new user-creatable objects can't escape QemuOpts.
Quoted 8 lines
QemuOpts needs to go. But replacing it is difficult and scary in places. -object is such a place.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Which one seems preferable? Or is the answer neither?
Yep, neither is the answer.
Welcome to the QemuOpts swamp, here's your waders and a leaky bucket.
*backs slowly away from swamp* :)
So back to the question of whether we need structured parameters. The main driver for this seems to be that the options are currently defined via a config file, which was originally introduced to cope with:
a) lots of parameters (8)
- not really that significant compared to some other objects/options.
b) large page-size parameters
- mainly applies to 'id_auth', which could be broken out as individual files/blobs and passed in via normal file path string arguments
- already how we handle dh-cert-file and session-file
c) separating SNP-specific parameters from the base sev-guest object properties
- could possibly be done with a new 'sev-snp-guest' object, which would also help disambiguate stuff like the 32-bit sev/sev-es 'policy' arguments from the 64-bit version in SNP, and can still re-use common properties like 'cbitpos' via some base object
- maybe some other benefits, need to look into it more.
If they aren't any objections I'll take a stab at this early next week. Will be on PTO until then, but will follow-up soon as I'm back in office.
Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Ultimately I think we've come to the conclusion that QemuOpts is an unfixable dead end that should be left alone. Our future is trending towards being entirely JSON, configured via the QMP monitor not the CLI. As such the json support for -object is a step towards the pure JSON world.
QemuOpts served us well for a while, but we've long grown out of its limitations. It needs to go.
QemuOpts not providing an adequate CLI language does not imply we can't have an adequate CLI language. The "everything QMP" movement is due to other factors. I have serious reservations about the idea, actually.
Quoted 7 lines
IOW, if you have things that work today with QemuOpts that's fine.
If, however, you're coming across situations that need non-scalar data and it doesn't work with QemuOpts, then just declare that -object json syntax is mandatory for that scenario. Don't invest time trying to improve QemuOpts for non-scalar data, nor inventing new CLI args.
Quoted 6 lines
I agree 100% with "don't mess with QemuOpts". That mess is complete.
Whether a new CLI option makes sense should be decided case by case.
"Must use JSON" feels acceptable for things basically only management applications use.
Yah, it's great that QAPI/object_add already takes care of the management side of things, but giving up the option of using human-readable/non-JSON command-line args is still a tough pill to swallow, at least as a developer where I know some significant portion of my life will be spent debugging parser errors from bash.
*backs up too far, walks into adjacent swamp with no waders*
If more cases where structured arguments for Objects really make sense and thus necessitate JSON-only, it would be great if there was some developer tool, e.g. scripts/qemu-cmdline-helper-devs-only that could handle this translation to JSON or QMP and maybe serve as a test-bed for this awesome new cmdline syntax that provides all the expressiveness of QAPI and could abstract away the QemuOpts-specific option formats while still allowing for periodic reworks.
Or maybe -readconfig is the better starting point? Or is it too late for that already? -x-readconfig2 ? :)
*disappears into swamp*
Re: [RFC PATCH 2/6] i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP
In reply to Brijesh SinghQuoted 4 lines · Brijesh Singh
To launch the SEV-SNP guest, a user can specify up to 8 parameters. Passing all parameters through command line can be difficult. To simplify the launch parameter passing, introduce a .ini-like config file that can be used for passing the parameters to the launch flow.
I agree with Markus' assessment that we are probably going to be better off reusing what we already have for other complex options rather than inventing yet another ini file.
Additional things I noted:
qapi/qom.json line 752
Quoted 6 lines
+++
b/qapi/qom.jsonqapi/qom.json +1
-0@@ -749,6 +749,10 @@ # @reduced-phys-bits: number of bits in physical addresses that become # unavailable when SEV is enabled # +# @snp: SEV-SNP is enabled (default: 0)
Here you list 0...
qapi/qom.json line 754
Quoted 2 lines
qapi/qom.json +2
-0+# +# @launch-config: launch config file to use
Both additions (if we keep the launch-config addition) are missing '(since 6.1)' notations.
qapi/qom.json line 765
Quoted 9 lines
qapi/qom.json +2
-0+# # Since: 2.12 ## { 'struct': 'SevGuestProperties',@@ -758,6 +762,8 @@ '*policy': 'uint32', '*handle': 'uint32', '*cbitpos': 'uint32', + '*snp': 'bool',
...but here you state snp is bool. That means the default is 'false', not '0'.
Quoted 3 lines
qapi/qom.json +1
-0+ '*launch-config': 'str', 'reduced-phys-bits': 'uint32' } }
Signature · 3 lines
Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3266 Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
RFC PATCH 3/6 i386/sev: initialize SNP context
In reply to Brijesh SinghWhen SEV-SNP is enabled, the KVM_SNP_INIT command is used to initialize the platform. The command checks whether SNP is enabled in the KVM, if enabled then it allocate a new ASID from the SNP pool and calls the firmware to initialize the all the resources.
--- target/i386/sev.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
target/i386/sev.c +21 -3
@@ -583,10 +583,17 @@ sev_enabled(void)return !!sev_guest; } +bool +sev_snp_enabled (void ) +{ +return sev_guest->snp; +} +bool sev_es_enabled (void ) { -return sev_enabled () && (sev_guest->policy &SEV_POLICY_ES ); +return sev_snp_enabled () || + (sev_enabled () && (sev_guest->policy &SEV_POLICY_ES )); }uint64_t
@@ -1008,6 +1015,7 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)uint32_t ebx;uint32_t host_cbitpos;struct sev_user_data_status status = {}; +void *init_args =NULL ;if (!sev) {return 0 ;
@@ -1061,7 +1069,17 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) sev->api_major = status.api_major; sev->api_minor = status.api_minor; -if (sev_es_enabled ()) { +if (sev_snp_enabled ()) { +if (!kvm_kernel_irqchip_allowed ()) { +error_report ("%s: SEV-SNP guests require in-kernel irqchip support" , + __func__); + goto err; + } + + cmd =KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT ; + init_args = (void *)&sev->snp_config.init; + + }else if (sev_es_enabled ()) {if (!kvm_kernel_irqchip_allowed ()) {error_report ("%s: SEV-ES guests require in-kernel irqchip support" , __func__);
@@ -1080,7 +1098,7 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) }trace_kvm_sev_init (); - ret =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd, cmd,NULL , &fw_error); + ret =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd, cmd, init_args, &fw_error);if (ret) {error_setg (errp,"%s: failed to initialize ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'" , __func__, ret, fw_error,fw_error_to_str (fw_error));
target/i386/sev_i386.h +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@#define SEV_POLICY_SEV 0x20extern bool sev_es_enabled (void ); +extern bool sev_snp_enabled (void );extern uint64_t sev_get_me_mask (void );extern SevInfo *sev_get_info (void );extern uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position (void );
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 3/6] i386/sev: initialize SNP context
Hi Brijesh,
Quoted 3 lines · Brijesh Singh
When SEV-SNP is enabled, the
KVM_SNP_INITcommand is used to initialize the platform. The command checks whether SNP is enabled in the KVM, if enabled then it allocate a new ASID from the SNP pool and calls the
s/allocate/allocates/
Quoted 20 lines
firmware to initialize the all the resources.
Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- target/i386/sev.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++--- target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)target/i386/sev.c +4
-0@@ -583,10 +583,17 @@ sev_enabled(void)return !!sev_guest; } +bool +sev_snp_enabled (void ) +{ +return sev_guest->snp;
target/i386/sev.c sev_enabled(void) · line 598
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c +4
-1+} +bool sev_es_enabled (void ) { -return sev_enabled () && (sev_guest->policy &SEV_POLICY_ES ); +return sev_snp_enabled () || + (sev_enabled () && (sev_guest->policy &SEV_POLICY_ES )); }
Just making sure I understand:
* sev_enabled() returns true for SEV or newer (SEV or SEV-ES or SEV-SNP).
* sev_es_enabled() returns true for SEV-ES or newer (SEV-ES or SEV-SNP).
* sev_snp_enabled() returns true for SEV-SNP or newer (currently only SEV-SNP).
Is that indeed the intention?
-Dov
Quoted 50 lines
target/i386/sev.c +13
-2uint64_t @@ -1008,6 +1015,7 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)uint32_t ebx;uint32_t host_cbitpos;struct sev_user_data_status status = {}; +void *init_args =NULL ;if (!sev) {return 0 ;@@ -1061,7 +1069,17 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) sev->api_major = status.api_major; sev->api_minor = status.api_minor; -if (sev_es_enabled ()) { +if (sev_snp_enabled ()) { +if (!kvm_kernel_irqchip_allowed ()) { +error_report ("%s: SEV-SNP guests require in-kernel irqchip support" , + __func__); + goto err; + } + + cmd =KVM_SEV_SNP_INIT ; + init_args = (void *)&sev->snp_config.init; + + }else if (sev_es_enabled ()) {if (!kvm_kernel_irqchip_allowed ()) {error_report ("%s: SEV-ES guests require in-kernel irqchip support" , __func__);@@ -1080,7 +1098,7 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) }trace_kvm_sev_init (); - ret =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd, cmd,NULL , &fw_error); + ret =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd, cmd, init_args, &fw_error);if (ret) {error_setg (errp,"%s: failed to initialize ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'" , __func__, ret, fw_error,fw_error_to_str (fw_error));target/i386/sev_i386.h +1
-0@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@#define SEV_POLICY_SEV 0x20extern bool sev_es_enabled (void ); +extern bool sev_snp_enabled (void );extern uint64_t sev_get_me_mask (void );extern SevInfo *sev_get_info (void );extern uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position (void );
Re: [RFC PATCH 3/6] i386/sev: initialize SNP context
Quoted 11 lines · Dov Murik
Just making sure I understand:
*
sev_enabled()returns true for SEV or newer (SEV or SEV-ES or SEV-SNP).
*sev_es_enabled()returns true for SEV-ES or newer (SEV-ES or SEV-SNP).
*sev_snp_enabled()returns true for SEV-SNP or newer (currently only SEV-SNP).Is that indeed the intention?
Yes. The SEV-SNP support requires the SEV and SEV-ES to be enabled. See the text from the APM vol2 section 15.36.
The SEV-SNP features enable additional protection for encrypted VMs designed to achieve stronger isolation from the hypervisor. SEV-SNP is used with the SEV and SEV-ES features described in Section 15.34 and Section 15.35 respectively and requires the enablement and use of these features.
thanks
RFC PATCH 4/6 i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context
In reply to Brijesh SinghThe SNP_LAUNCH_START is called first to create a cryptographic launch context within the firmware.
--- target/i386/sev.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
target/i386/sev.c +29 -1
@@ -812,6 +812,29 @@ sev_read_file_base64(const char *filename, guchar **data, gsize *len)return 0 ; } +static int +sev_snp_launch_start (SevGuestState *sev) +{ +int ret =1 ; +int fw_error, rc; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start *start = &sev->snp_config.start; + +trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_start (start->policy); + + rc =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START , start, &fw_error); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_report ("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'" , + __func__, ret, fw_error,fw_error_to_str (fw_error)); + goto out; + } + +sev_set_guest_state (sev,SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE ); + ret =0 ; + +out: +return ret; +} +static int sev_launch_start (SevGuestState *sev) {
@@ -1105,7 +1128,12 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) goto err; } - ret =sev_launch_start (sev); +if (sev_snp_enabled ()) { + ret =sev_snp_launch_start (sev); + }else { + ret =sev_launch_start (sev); + } +if (ret) {error_setg (errp,"%s: failed to create encryption context" , __func__); goto err;
target/i386/trace-events +1 -0
@@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s" kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) "" kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d" kvm_sev_attestation_report(const char *mnonce, const char *data) "mnonce %s data %s" +kvm_sev_snp_launch_start(uint64_t policy) "policy 0x%" PRIx64
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/6] i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context
Hi Brijesh,
Quoted 20 lines · Brijesh Singh
The
SNP_LAUNCH_STARTis called first to create a cryptographic launch context within the firmware.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- target/i386/sev.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)target/i386/sev.c +3
-0@@ -812,6 +812,29 @@ sev_read_file_base64(const char *filename, guchar **data, gsize *len)return 0 ; } +static int +sev_snp_launch_start (SevGuestState *sev) +{
target/i386/sev.c sev_read_file_base64(const char *filename, guchar **data, gsize *len) · line 827
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c +10
-0+int ret =1 ; +int fw_error, rc; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start *start = &sev->snp_config.start; + +trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_start (start->policy); + + rc =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START , start, &fw_error); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_report ("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'" , + __func__, ret, fw_error,fw_error_to_str (fw_error));
Did you mean to report the value of ret or rc?
target/i386/sev.c sev_read_file_base64(const char *filename, guchar **data, gsize *len) · line 828
Quoted 1 line
target/i386/sev.c +1
-0+ goto out;
Suggestion:
Remove the ret variable.
Here: simply return 1.
At the end: remove the out: label; simply return 0.
Quoted 36 lines
target/i386/sev.c +15
-1+ } + +sev_set_guest_state (sev,SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE ); + ret =0 ; + +out: +return ret; +} +static int sev_launch_start (SevGuestState *sev) {@@ -1105,7 +1128,12 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) goto err; } - ret =sev_launch_start (sev); +if (sev_snp_enabled ()) { + ret =sev_snp_launch_start (sev); + }else { + ret =sev_launch_start (sev); + } +if (ret) {error_setg (errp,"%s: failed to create encryption context" , __func__); goto err;target/i386/trace-events +1
-0@@ -11,3 +11,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_measurement(const char *value) "data %s" kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) "" kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d" kvm_sev_attestation_report(const char *mnonce, const char *data) "mnonce %s data %s" +kvm_sev_snp_launch_start(uint64_t policy) "policy 0x%" PRIx64
Re: [RFC PATCH 4/6] i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context
Quoted 20 lines · Dov Murik
Hi Brijesh,
Quoted 17 lines · Brijesh Singh
The
SNP_LAUNCH_STARTis called first to create a cryptographic launch context within the firmware.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- target/i386/sev.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)target/i386/sev.c +0
-0@@ -812,6 +812,29 @@ sev_read_file_base64(const char *filename, guchar **data, gsize *len)return 0 ; }
Quoted 15 lines
target/i386/sev.c sev_read_file_base64(const char *filename, guchar **data, gsize *len) · line 827
Quoted 13 lines
target/i386/sev.c +13
-0+static int +sev_snp_launch_start (SevGuestState *sev) +{ +int ret =1 ; +int fw_error, rc; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_start *start = &sev->snp_config.start; + +trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_start (start->policy); + + rc =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START , start, &fw_error); +if (rc <0 ) { +error_report ("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_START ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'" , + __func__, ret, fw_error,fw_error_to_str (fw_error));Did you mean to report the value of ret or rc?
Ah, I was meaning the rc.
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c sev_read_file_base64(const char *filename, guchar **data, gsize *len) · line 828
Quoted 3 lines
target/i386/sev.c +1
-0+ goto out;Suggestion:
Remove the
retvariable.
Here: simplyreturn 1.
At the end: remove theout:label; simplyreturn 0.
Noted.
thanks
RFC PATCH 5/6 i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled
In reply to Brijesh SinghThe KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command is used for encrypting the bios image used for booting the SEV-SNP guest.
--- target/i386/sev.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
target/i386/sev.c +32 -1
@@ -883,6 +883,30 @@ out:return ret; } +static int +sev_snp_launch_update (SevGuestState *sev,uint8_t *addr,uint64_t len,int type) +{ +int ret, fw_error; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update update = {}; + +if (!addr || !len) { +return 1 ; + } + + update.uaddr = (__u64 )(unsigned long )addr; + update.len = len; + update.page_type = type; +trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_update (addr, len, type); + ret =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE , + &update, &fw_error); +if (ret) { +error_report ("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'" , + __func__, ret, fw_error,fw_error_to_str (fw_error)); + } + +return ret; +} +static int sev_launch_update_data (SevGuestState *sev,uint8_t *addr,uint64_t len) {
@@ -1161,7 +1185,14 @@ sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)/* if SEV is in update state then encrypt the data else do nothing */ if (sev_check_state (sev_guest,SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE )) { -int ret =sev_launch_update_data (sev_guest, ptr, len); +int ret; + +if (sev_snp_enabled ()) { + ret =sev_snp_launch_update (sev_guest, ptr, len, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL ); + }else { + ret =sev_launch_update_data (sev_guest, ptr, len); + }if (ret <0 ) {error_setg (errp,"failed to encrypt pflash rom" );return ret;
target/i386/trace-events +1 -0
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) "" kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d" kvm_sev_attestation_report(const char *mnonce, const char *data) "mnonce %s data %s" kvm_sev_snp_launch_start(uint64_t policy) "policy 0x%" PRIx64 +kvm_sev_snp_launch_update(void *addr, uint64_t len, int type) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIx64 " type %d"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 5/6] i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled
Quoted 15 lines · Brijesh Singh
The
KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATEcommand is used for encrypting the bios image used for booting the SEV-SNP guest.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- target/i386/sev.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)target/i386/sev.c +0
-0@@ -883,6 +883,30 @@ out:return ret;
target/i386/sev.c out: · line 893
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c +8
-0} +static int +sev_snp_launch_update (SevGuestState *sev,uint8_t *addr,uint64_t len,int type) +{ +int ret, fw_error; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update update = {}; + +if (!addr || !len) { +return 1 ;
Should this be a -1? It looks like the caller checks if this function returns < 0, but doesn't check for res == 1.
Alternatively, invoking error_report might provide more useful information that the preconditions to this function were violated.
Connor
Re: [RFC PATCH 5/6] i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled
Quoted 18 lines · Connor Kuehl
Quoted 17 lines · Brijesh Singh
The
KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATEcommand is used for encrypting the bios image used for booting the SEV-SNP guest.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- target/i386/sev.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)target/i386/sev.c +0
-0@@ -883,6 +883,30 @@ out:return ret; }
Quoted 11 lines
target/i386/sev.c out: · line 893
Quoted 8 lines
target/i386/sev.c +8
-0+static int +sev_snp_launch_update (SevGuestState *sev,uint8_t *addr,uint64_t len,int type) +{ +int ret, fw_error; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update update = {}; + +if (!addr || !len) { +return 1 ;Should this be a -1? It looks like the caller checks if this function returns < 0, but doesn't check for res == 1.
Ah, it should be -1.
Quoted 4 lines
Alternatively, invoking
error_reportmight provide more useful information that the preconditions to this function were violated.
Sure, I will add error_report.
thanks
Re: [RFC PATCH 5/6] i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled
Quoted 33 lines · Brijesh Singh
Quoted 21 lines · Connor Kuehl
Quoted 20 lines · Brijesh Singh
The
KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATEcommand is used for encrypting the bios image used for booting the SEV-SNP guest.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>---
target/i386/sev.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 1 +2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)target/i386/sev.c +0
-0@@ -883,6 +883,30 @@ out: return ret; }+static int
+sev_snp_launch_update(SevGuestState *sev,uint8_t*addr,uint64_tlen, int type)
+{Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
+ int ret,
fw_error;
+ structkvm_sev_snp_launch_updateupdate = {}; +
+ if (!addr || !len) {
+ return 1;Should this be a -1? It looks like the caller checks if this function returns < 0, but doesn't check for res == 1.
Quoted 8 lines
Ah, it should be -1.
Quoted 4 lines
Alternatively, invoking
error_reportmight provide more useful information that the preconditions to this function were violated.Sure, I will add
error_report.
Maybe even simpler:
assert(addr); assert(len > 0);
The assertion failure will show the developer what is wrong. This should not happen for the end-user (unless I'm missing something).
-Dov
Re: [RFC PATCH 5/6] i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled
In reply to Brijesh SinghQuoted 14 lines · Brijesh Singh
The
KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATEcommand is used for encrypting the bios image used for booting the SEV-SNP guest.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- target/i386/sev.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 1 + 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)target/i386/sev.c +0
-0
target/i386/sev.c out: · line 887
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/sev.c +2
-0@@ -883,6 +883,30 @@ out:return ret; } +static int +sev_snp_launch_update (SevGuestState *sev,uint8_t *addr,uint64_t len,int type)
This seems similar to the SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA API (with the added type argument). In SEV API these are the limitations (from the SEV API document):
* PADDR - System physical address of the data to be encrypted. Must be 16 B aligned.
* LENGTH - Length of the data to be encrypted.
Must be a multiple of 16 B.
But in SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE it is my understanding that addr must be page aligned (4KB) and length must be in whole pages (because the underlying types are PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL, PAGE_TYPE_ZERO, ...).
So what happens if we call sev_encrypt_flash with a non-page-aligned addr / length?
Or maybe I misunderstood the SNP ABI document?
-Dov
Quoted 51 lines
target/i386/sev.c +30
-1+{ +int ret, fw_error; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_update update = {}; + +if (!addr || !len) { +return 1 ; + } + + update.uaddr = (__u64 )(unsigned long )addr; + update.len = len; + update.page_type = type; +trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_update (addr, len, type); + ret =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE , + &update, &fw_error); +if (ret) { +error_report ("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'" , + __func__, ret, fw_error,fw_error_to_str (fw_error)); + } + +return ret; +} +static int sev_launch_update_data (SevGuestState *sev,uint8_t *addr,uint64_t len) {@@ -1161,7 +1185,14 @@ sev_encrypt_flash(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)/* if SEV is in update state then encrypt the data else do nothing */ if (sev_check_state (sev_guest,SEV_STATE_LAUNCH_UPDATE )) { -int ret =sev_launch_update_data (sev_guest, ptr, len); +int ret; + +if (sev_snp_enabled ()) { + ret =sev_snp_launch_update (sev_guest, ptr, len, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_NORMAL ); + }else { + ret =sev_launch_update_data (sev_guest, ptr, len); + }if (ret <0 ) {error_setg (errp,"failed to encrypt pflash rom" );return ret;target/i386/trace-events +1
-0@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@ kvm_sev_launch_finish(void) "" kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa 0x%" PRIx64 " hva 0x%" PRIx64 " data 0x%" PRIx64 " len %d" kvm_sev_attestation_report(const char *mnonce, const char *data) "mnonce %s data %s" kvm_sev_snp_launch_start(uint64_t policy) "policy 0x%" PRIx64 +kvm_sev_snp_launch_update(void *addr, uint64_t len, int type) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIx64 " type %d"
RFC PATCH 6/6 i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch
In reply to Brijesh SinghDuring the SNP guest launch sequence, a special secrets and cpuid page needs to be populated by the SEV-SNP firmware. The secrets page contains the VM Platform Communication Key (VMPCKs) used by the guest to send and receive secure messages to the PSP. And CPUID page will contain the CPUID value filtered through the PSP.
The guest BIOS (OVMF) reserves these pages in MEMFD and location of it is available through the SNP boot block GUID. While finalizing the guest boot flow, lookup for the boot block and call the SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command to populate secrets and cpuid pages.
In order to support early boot code, the OVMF may ask hypervisor to request the pre-validation of certain memory range. If such range is present the call LAUNCH_UPDATE command to validate those address range without affecting the measurement. See the SEV-SNP specification for further details.
Finally, call the SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH to finalize the guest boot.
--- target/i386/sev.c | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 2 + 2 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
target/i386/sev.c +182 -2
@@ -93,6 +93,19 @@ typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock {uint32_t reset_addr; } SevInfoBlock; +#define SEV_SNP_BOOT_BLOCK_GUID "bd39c0c2-2f8e-4243-83e8-1b74cebcb7d9" +typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__ ))SevSnpBootInfoBlock { +/* Prevalidate range address */ +uint32_t pre_validated_start; +uint32_t pre_validated_end; +/* Secrets page address */ +uint32_t secrets_addr; +uint32_t secrets_len; +/* CPUID page address */ +uint32_t cpuid_addr; +uint32_t cpuid_len; +}SevSnpBootInfoBlock ; +static SevGuestState *sev_guest;static Error *sev_mig_blocker;
@@ -1014,6 +1027,158 @@ static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { .notify = sev_launch_get_measure, }; +static int +sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (uint32_t hwaddr,uint32_t size,uint8_t type) +{ +void *hva; +MemoryRegion *mr =NULL ; + + hva =gpa2hva (&mr, hwaddr, size,NULL ); +if (!hva) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP failed to get HVA for GPA 0x%x" , hwaddr); +return 1 ; + } + +return sev_snp_launch_update (sev_guest, hva, size, type); +} + +struct snp_pre_validated_range { +uint32_t start; +uint32_t end; +}; + +static struct snp_pre_validated_range pre_validated[2 ]; + +static bool +detectoverlap (uint32_t start,uint32_t end, +struct snp_pre_validated_range *overlap) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (pre_validated); i++) { +if (pre_validated[i].start < end && start < pre_validated[i].end) { +memcpy (overlap, &pre_validated[i],sizeof (*overlap)); +return true; + } + } + +return false; +} + +static void snp_ovmf_boot_block_setup (void ) +{ +struct snp_pre_validated_range overlap; +SevSnpBootInfoBlock *info; +uint32_t start, end, sz; +int ret; + +/* +* Extract the SNP boot block for the SEV-SNP guests by locating the +* SNP_BOOT GUID. The boot block contains the information such as location +* of secrets and CPUID page, additionaly it may contain the range of +* memory that need to be pre-validated for the boot. +*/ +if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find (SEV_SNP_BOOT_BLOCK_GUID , + (uint8_t **)&info,NULL )) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to find the SNP boot block" ); +exit (1 ); + } + +trace_kvm_sev_snp_ovmf_boot_block_info (info->secrets_addr, + info->secrets_len, info->cpuid_addr, + info->cpuid_len, + info->pre_validated_start, + info->pre_validated_end); + +/* Populate the secrets page */ + ret =sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (info->secrets_addr, info->secrets_len, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS ); +if (ret) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to insert secret page GPA 0x%x" , + info->secrets_addr); +exit (1 ); + } + +/* Populate the cpuid page */ + ret =sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (info->cpuid_addr, info->cpuid_len, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID ); +if (ret) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to insert cpuid page GPA 0x%x" , + info->cpuid_addr); +exit (1 ); + } + +/* +* Pre-validate the range using the LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, if the +* pre-validation range contains the CPUID and Secret page GPA then skip +* it. This is because SEV-SNP firmware pre-validates those pages as part +* of adding secrets and cpuid LAUNCH_UPDATE type. +*/ + pre_validated[0 ].start = info->secrets_addr; + pre_validated[0 ].end = info->secrets_addr + info->secrets_len; + pre_validated[1 ].start = info->cpuid_addr; + pre_validated[1 ].end = info->cpuid_addr + info->cpuid_len; + start = info->pre_validated_start; + end = info->pre_validated_end; + +while (start < end) { +/* Check if the requested range overlaps with Secrets and CPUID page */ +if (detectoverlap (start, end, &overlap)) { +if (start < overlap.start) { + sz = overlap.start - start; +if (sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (start, sz, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED )) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to validate gpa 0x%x sz %d" , + start, sz); +exit (1 ); + } + } + + start = overlap.end; +continue ; + } + +/* Validate the remaining range */ +if (sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (start, end - start, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED )) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to validate gpa 0x%x sz %d" , + start, end - start); +exit (1 ); + } + + start = end; + } +} + +static void +sev_snp_launch_finish (SevGuestState *sev) +{ +int ret, error; +Error *local_err =NULL ; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev->snp_config.finish; + +trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish (); + ret =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH , finish, &error); +if (ret) { +error_report ("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'" , + __func__, ret, error,fw_error_to_str (error)); +exit (1 ); + } + +sev_set_guest_state (sev,SEV_STATE_RUNNING ); + +/* add migration blocker */ +error_setg (&sev_mig_blocker, +"SEV: Migration is not implemented" ); + ret =migrate_add_blocker (sev_mig_blocker, &local_err); +if (local_err) { +error_report_err (local_err); +error_free (sev_mig_blocker); +exit (1 ); + } +} + +static void sev_launch_finish (SevGuestState *sev) {
@@ -1048,7 +1213,12 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, bool running, RunState state)if (running) {if (!sev_check_state (sev,SEV_STATE_RUNNING )) { -sev_launch_finish (sev); +if (sev_snp_enabled ()) { +snp_ovmf_boot_block_setup (); +sev_snp_launch_finish (sev); + }else { +sev_launch_finish (sev); + } } } }
@@ -1164,7 +1334,17 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) }ram_block_notifier_add (&sev_ram_notifier); -qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier (&sev_machine_done_notify); + +/* +* The machine done notify event is used by the SEV guest to get the +* measurement of the encrypted images. When SEV-SNP is enabled then +* measurement is part of the attestation report and the measurement +* command does not exist. So skip registering the notifier. +*/ +if (!sev_snp_enabled ()) { +qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier (&sev_machine_done_notify); + } +qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler (sev_vm_state_change, sev); cgs->ready = true;
target/i386/trace-events +2 -0
@@ -13,3 +13,5 @@ kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa kvm_sev_attestation_report(const char *mnonce, const char *data) "mnonce %s data %s" kvm_sev_snp_launch_start(uint64_t policy) "policy 0x%" PRIx64 kvm_sev_snp_launch_update(void *addr, uint64_t len, int type) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIx64 " type %d" +kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish(void) "" +kvm_sev_snp_ovmf_boot_block_info(uint32_t secrets_gpa, uint32_t slen, uint32_t cpuid_gpa, uint32_t clen, uint32_t s, uint32_t e) "secrets 0x%x+0x%x cpuid 0x%x+0x%x pre-validate 0x%x+0x%x"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [RFC PATCH 6/6] i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch
Quoted 62 lines · * Brijesh Singh ([email protected]) wrote:
During the SNP guest launch sequence, a special secrets and cpuid page needs to be populated by the SEV-SNP firmware. The secrets page contains the VM Platform Communication Key (VMPCKs) used by the guest to send and receive secure messages to the PSP. And CPUID page will contain the CPUID value filtered through the PSP.
The guest BIOS (OVMF) reserves these pages in MEMFD and location of it is available through the SNP boot block GUID. While finalizing the guest boot flow, lookup for the boot block and call the
SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATEcommand to populate secrets and cpuid pages.In order to support early boot code, the OVMF may ask hypervisor to request the pre-validation of certain memory range. If such range is present the call
LAUNCH_UPDATEcommand to validate those address range without affecting the measurement. See the SEV-SNP specification for further details.Finally, call the
SNP_LAUNCH_FINISHto finalize the guest boot.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- target/i386/sev.c | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 2 + 2 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)target/i386/sev.c +22
-0@@ -93,6 +93,19 @@ typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock {uint32_t reset_addr; } SevInfoBlock; +#define SEV_SNP_BOOT_BLOCK_GUID "bd39c0c2-2f8e-4243-83e8-1b74cebcb7d9" +typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__ ))SevSnpBootInfoBlock { +/* Prevalidate range address */ +uint32_t pre_validated_start; +uint32_t pre_validated_end; +/* Secrets page address */ +uint32_t secrets_addr; +uint32_t secrets_len; +/* CPUID page address */ +uint32_t cpuid_addr; +uint32_t cpuid_len; +}SevSnpBootInfoBlock ; +static SevGuestState *sev_guest;static Error *sev_mig_blocker;@@ -1014,6 +1027,158 @@ static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { .notify = sev_launch_get_measure, }; +static int +sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (uint32_t hwaddr,uint32_t size,uint8_t type) +{ +void *hva; +MemoryRegion *mr =NULL ; + + hva =gpa2hva (&mr, hwaddr, size,NULL ); +if (!hva) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP failed to get HVA for GPA 0x%x" , hwaddr);
target/i386/sev.c static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { · line 1048
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c +10
-0+return 1 ; + } + +return sev_snp_launch_update (sev_guest, hva, size, type); +} + +struct snp_pre_validated_range { +uint32_t start; +uint32_t end; +};
Just a thought, but maybe use a 'Range' from include/qemu/range.h ?
Dave
Quoted 181 lines
target/i386/sev.c +149
-2+static struct snp_pre_validated_range pre_validated[2 ]; + +static bool +detectoverlap (uint32_t start,uint32_t end, +struct snp_pre_validated_range *overlap) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (pre_validated); i++) { +if (pre_validated[i].start < end && start < pre_validated[i].end) { +memcpy (overlap, &pre_validated[i],sizeof (*overlap)); +return true; + } + } + +return false; +} + +static void snp_ovmf_boot_block_setup (void ) +{ +struct snp_pre_validated_range overlap; +SevSnpBootInfoBlock *info; +uint32_t start, end, sz; +int ret; + +/* +* Extract the SNP boot block for the SEV-SNP guests by locating the +* SNP_BOOT GUID. The boot block contains the information such as location +* of secrets and CPUID page, additionaly it may contain the range of +* memory that need to be pre-validated for the boot. +*/ +if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find (SEV_SNP_BOOT_BLOCK_GUID , + (uint8_t **)&info,NULL )) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to find the SNP boot block" ); +exit (1 ); + } + +trace_kvm_sev_snp_ovmf_boot_block_info (info->secrets_addr, + info->secrets_len, info->cpuid_addr, + info->cpuid_len, + info->pre_validated_start, + info->pre_validated_end); + +/* Populate the secrets page */ + ret =sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (info->secrets_addr, info->secrets_len, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS ); +if (ret) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to insert secret page GPA 0x%x" , + info->secrets_addr); +exit (1 ); + } + +/* Populate the cpuid page */ + ret =sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (info->cpuid_addr, info->cpuid_len, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID ); +if (ret) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to insert cpuid page GPA 0x%x" , + info->cpuid_addr); +exit (1 ); + } + +/* +* Pre-validate the range using the LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, if the +* pre-validation range contains the CPUID and Secret page GPA then skip +* it. This is because SEV-SNP firmware pre-validates those pages as part +* of adding secrets and cpuid LAUNCH_UPDATE type. +*/ + pre_validated[0 ].start = info->secrets_addr; + pre_validated[0 ].end = info->secrets_addr + info->secrets_len; + pre_validated[1 ].start = info->cpuid_addr; + pre_validated[1 ].end = info->cpuid_addr + info->cpuid_len; + start = info->pre_validated_start; + end = info->pre_validated_end; + +while (start < end) { +/* Check if the requested range overlaps with Secrets and CPUID page */ +if (detectoverlap (start, end, &overlap)) { +if (start < overlap.start) { + sz = overlap.start - start; +if (sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (start, sz, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED )) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to validate gpa 0x%x sz %d" , + start, sz); +exit (1 ); + } + } + + start = overlap.end; +continue ; + } + +/* Validate the remaining range */ +if (sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (start, end - start, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED )) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to validate gpa 0x%x sz %d" , + start, end - start); +exit (1 ); + } + + start = end; + } +} + +static void +sev_snp_launch_finish (SevGuestState *sev) +{ +int ret, error; +Error *local_err =NULL ; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev->snp_config.finish; + +trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish (); + ret =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH , finish, &error); +if (ret) { +error_report ("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'" , + __func__, ret, error,fw_error_to_str (error)); +exit (1 ); + } + +sev_set_guest_state (sev,SEV_STATE_RUNNING ); + +/* add migration blocker */ +error_setg (&sev_mig_blocker, +"SEV: Migration is not implemented" ); + ret =migrate_add_blocker (sev_mig_blocker, &local_err); +if (local_err) { +error_report_err (local_err); +error_free (sev_mig_blocker); +exit (1 ); + } +} + +static void sev_launch_finish (SevGuestState *sev) {@@ -1048,7 +1213,12 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, bool running, RunState state)if (running) {if (!sev_check_state (sev,SEV_STATE_RUNNING )) { -sev_launch_finish (sev); +if (sev_snp_enabled ()) { +snp_ovmf_boot_block_setup (); +sev_snp_launch_finish (sev); + }else { +sev_launch_finish (sev); + } } } }@@ -1164,7 +1334,17 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) }ram_block_notifier_add (&sev_ram_notifier); -qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier (&sev_machine_done_notify); + +/* +* The machine done notify event is used by the SEV guest to get the +* measurement of the encrypted images. When SEV-SNP is enabled then +* measurement is part of the attestation report and the measurement +* command does not exist. So skip registering the notifier. +*/ +if (!sev_snp_enabled ()) { +qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier (&sev_machine_done_notify); + } +qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler (sev_vm_state_change, sev); cgs->ready = true;target/i386/trace-events +2
-0@@ -13,3 +13,5 @@ kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa kvm_sev_attestation_report(const char *mnonce, const char *data) "mnonce %s data %s" kvm_sev_snp_launch_start(uint64_t policy) "policy 0x%" PRIx64 kvm_sev_snp_launch_update(void *addr, uint64_t len, int type) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIx64 " type %d" +kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish(void) "" +kvm_sev_snp_ovmf_boot_block_info(uint32_t secrets_gpa, uint32_t slen, uint32_t cpuid_gpa, uint32_t clen, uint32_t s, uint32_t e) "secrets 0x%x+0x%x cpuid 0x%x+0x%x pre-validate 0x%x+0x%x"Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Re: [RFC PATCH 6/6] i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch
On 7/14/21 12:29 PM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:>> +struct snp_pre_validated_range {
Quoted 6 lines
target/i386/sev.c static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { · line 1048
Quoted 3 lines
target/i386/sev.c +3
-0+uint32_t start; +uint32_t end; +};Just a thought, but maybe use a 'Range' from
include/qemu/range.h?
I will look into it.
thanks
Re: [RFC PATCH 6/6] i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch
In reply to Brijesh SinghHi Brijesh,
Quoted 6 lines · Brijesh Singh
During the SNP guest launch sequence, a special secrets and cpuid page needs to be populated by the SEV-SNP firmware. The secrets page contains the VM Platform Communication Key (VMPCKs) used by the guest to send and receive secure messages to the PSP. And CPUID page will contain the CPUID value filtered through the PSP.
Quoted 8 lines
The guest BIOS (OVMF) reserves these pages in MEMFD and location of it is available through the SNP boot block GUID. While finalizing the guest boot flow, lookup for the boot block and call the
SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATEcommand to populate secrets and cpuid pages.In order to support early boot code, the OVMF may ask hypervisor to request the pre-validation of certain memory range. If such range is present the call
LAUNCH_UPDATEcommand to validate those address range
s/LAUNCH_UPDATE/SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE/
(to show it's the same command you refer to above)
Quoted 36 lines
without affecting the measurement. See the SEV-SNP specification for further details.
Finally, call the
SNP_LAUNCH_FINISHto finalize the guest boot.Signed-off-by Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>--- target/i386/sev.c | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/trace-events | 2 + 2 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)target/i386/sev.c +13
-0@@ -93,6 +93,19 @@ typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock {uint32_t reset_addr; } SevInfoBlock; +#define SEV_SNP_BOOT_BLOCK_GUID "bd39c0c2-2f8e-4243-83e8-1b74cebcb7d9" +typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__ ))SevSnpBootInfoBlock { +/* Prevalidate range address */ +uint32_t pre_validated_start; +uint32_t pre_validated_end; +/* Secrets page address */ +uint32_t secrets_addr; +uint32_t secrets_len; +/* CPUID page address */ +uint32_t cpuid_addr; +uint32_t cpuid_len; +}SevSnpBootInfoBlock ; +static SevGuestState *sev_guest;static Error *sev_mig_blocker;
target/i386/sev.c static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { · line 1031
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/sev.c +2
-0@@ -1014,6 +1027,158 @@ static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { .notify = sev_launch_get_measure, }; +static int +sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (uint32_t hwaddr,uint32_t size,uint8_t type)
hwaddr is a confusing name here because it is also a typedef (which is most likely uint64_t...). Maybe call this argument gpa ?
Quoted 13 lines
target/i386/sev.c +13
-0+{ +void *hva; +MemoryRegion *mr =NULL ; + + hva =gpa2hva (&mr, hwaddr, size,NULL ); +if (!hva) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP failed to get HVA for GPA 0x%x" , hwaddr); +return 1 ; + } + +return sev_snp_launch_update (sev_guest, hva, size, type); +} +
target/i386/sev.c static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { · line 1054
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c +10
-0+struct snp_pre_validated_range { +uint32_t start; +uint32_t end; +}; + +static struct snp_pre_validated_range pre_validated[2 ]; + +static bool +detectoverlap (uint32_t start,uint32_t end, +struct snp_pre_validated_range *overlap)
naming conventions dictate: detect_overlap
target/i386/sev.c static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { · line 1060
Quoted 6 lines
target/i386/sev.c +6
-0+{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (pre_validated); i++) { +if (pre_validated[i].start < end && start < pre_validated[i].end) { +memcpy (overlap, &pre_validated[i],sizeof (*overlap));
Maybe simpler than memcpy:
*overlap = pre_validated[i];
Quoted 90 lines
target/i386/sev.c +90
-0+return true; + } + } + +return false; +} + +static void snp_ovmf_boot_block_setup (void ) +{ +struct snp_pre_validated_range overlap; +SevSnpBootInfoBlock *info; +uint32_t start, end, sz; +int ret; + +/* +* Extract the SNP boot block for the SEV-SNP guests by locating the +* SNP_BOOT GUID. The boot block contains the information such as location +* of secrets and CPUID page, additionaly it may contain the range of +* memory that need to be pre-validated for the boot. +*/ +if (!pc_system_ovmf_table_find (SEV_SNP_BOOT_BLOCK_GUID , + (uint8_t **)&info,NULL )) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to find the SNP boot block" ); +exit (1 ); + } + +trace_kvm_sev_snp_ovmf_boot_block_info (info->secrets_addr, + info->secrets_len, info->cpuid_addr, + info->cpuid_len, + info->pre_validated_start, + info->pre_validated_end); + +/* Populate the secrets page */ + ret =sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (info->secrets_addr, info->secrets_len, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_SECRETS ); +if (ret) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to insert secret page GPA 0x%x" , + info->secrets_addr); +exit (1 ); + } + +/* Populate the cpuid page */ + ret =sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (info->cpuid_addr, info->cpuid_len, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_CPUID ); +if (ret) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to insert cpuid page GPA 0x%x" , + info->cpuid_addr); +exit (1 ); + } + +/* +* Pre-validate the range using the LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, if the +* pre-validation range contains the CPUID and Secret page GPA then skip +* it. This is because SEV-SNP firmware pre-validates those pages as part +* of adding secrets and cpuid LAUNCH_UPDATE type. +*/ + pre_validated[0 ].start = info->secrets_addr; + pre_validated[0 ].end = info->secrets_addr + info->secrets_len; + pre_validated[1 ].start = info->cpuid_addr; + pre_validated[1 ].end = info->cpuid_addr + info->cpuid_len; + start = info->pre_validated_start; + end = info->pre_validated_end; + +while (start < end) { +/* Check if the requested range overlaps with Secrets and CPUID page */ +if (detectoverlap (start, end, &overlap)) { +if (start < overlap.start) { + sz = overlap.start - start; +if (sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (start, sz, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED )) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to validate gpa 0x%x sz %d" , + start, sz); +exit (1 ); + } + } + + start = overlap.end; +continue ; + } + +/* Validate the remaining range */ +if (sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (start, end - start, +KVM_SEV_SNP_PAGE_TYPE_UNMEASURED )) { +error_report ("SEV-SNP: failed to validate gpa 0x%x sz %d" , + start, end - start); +exit (1 ); + } + + start = end; + }
target/i386/sev.c static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { · line 1160
Quoted 10 lines
target/i386/sev.c +10
-0+} + +static void +sev_snp_launch_finish (SevGuestState *sev) +{ +int ret, error; +Error *local_err =NULL ; +struct kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish *finish = &sev->snp_config.finish; + +trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish ();
Maybe the trace should show some info about the snp_config.finish fields?
Quoted 62 lines
target/i386/sev.c +38
-2+ ret =sev_ioctl (sev->sev_fd,KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH , finish, &error); +if (ret) { +error_report ("%s: SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'" , + __func__, ret, error,fw_error_to_str (error)); +exit (1 ); + } + +sev_set_guest_state (sev,SEV_STATE_RUNNING ); + +/* add migration blocker */ +error_setg (&sev_mig_blocker, +"SEV: Migration is not implemented" ); + ret =migrate_add_blocker (sev_mig_blocker, &local_err); +if (local_err) { +error_report_err (local_err); +error_free (sev_mig_blocker); +exit (1 ); + } +} + +static void sev_launch_finish (SevGuestState *sev) {@@ -1048,7 +1213,12 @@ sev_vm_state_change(void *opaque, bool running, RunState state)if (running) {if (!sev_check_state (sev,SEV_STATE_RUNNING )) { -sev_launch_finish (sev); +if (sev_snp_enabled ()) { +snp_ovmf_boot_block_setup (); +sev_snp_launch_finish (sev); + }else { +sev_launch_finish (sev); + } } } }@@ -1164,7 +1334,17 @@ int sev_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp) }ram_block_notifier_add (&sev_ram_notifier); -qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier (&sev_machine_done_notify); + +/* +* The machine done notify event is used by the SEV guest to get the +* measurement of the encrypted images. When SEV-SNP is enabled then +* measurement is part of the attestation report and the measurement +* command does not exist. So skip registering the notifier. +*/ +if (!sev_snp_enabled ()) { +qemu_add_machine_init_done_notifier (&sev_machine_done_notify); + } +qemu_add_vm_change_state_handler (sev_vm_state_change, sev); cgs->ready = true;target/i386/trace-events +0
-0
target/i386/trace-events kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa · line 17
Quoted 5 lines
target/i386/trace-events +2
-0@@ -13,3 +13,5 @@ kvm_sev_launch_secret(uint64_t hpa, uint64_t hva, uint64_t secret, int len) "hpa kvm_sev_attestation_report(const char *mnonce, const char *data) "mnonce %s data %s" kvm_sev_snp_launch_start(uint64_t policy) "policy 0x%" PRIx64 kvm_sev_snp_launch_update(void *addr, uint64_t len, int type) "addr %p len 0x%" PRIx64 " type %d" +kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish(void) "" +kvm_sev_snp_ovmf_boot_block_info(uint32_t secrets_gpa, uint32_t slen, uint32_t cpuid_gpa, uint32_t clen, uint32_t s, uint32_t e) "secrets 0x%x+0x%x cpuid 0x%x+0x%x pre-validate 0x%x+0x%x"
The last argument is an end-addr (not a length), so maybe the format string should end with:
".... pre-validate 0x%x - 0x%x"
Also I'd prefer to log the SevSnpBootInfoBlock fields in the order they appear in the struct.
-Dov
Re: [RFC PATCH 6/6] i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch
Hi Dov,
Quoted 4 lines · Dov Murik
s/LAUNCH_UPDATE/SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE/
(to show it's the same command you refer to above)
Noted.
Quoted 7 lines
target/i386/sev.c static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { · line 1031
Quoted 3 lines
target/i386/sev.c +2
-0+static int +sev_snp_launch_update_gpa (uint32_t hwaddr,uint32_t size,uint8_t type)hwaddr is a confusing name here because it is also a typedef (which is most likely
uint64_t...). Maybe call this argumentgpa?
Noted, 'gpa' sounds much better.
Quoted 6 lines
target/i386/sev.c static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { · line 1054
Quoted 3 lines
target/i386/sev.c +3
-0+static bool +detectoverlap (uint32_t start,uint32_t end, +struct snp_pre_validated_range *overlap)naming conventions dictate:
detect_overlap
Noted.
Quoted 11 lines
target/i386/sev.c static Notifier sev_machine_done_notify = { · line 1060
Quoted 6 lines
target/i386/sev.c +6
-0+{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (pre_validated); i++) { +if (pre_validated[i].start < end && start < pre_validated[i].end) { +memcpy (overlap, &pre_validated[i],sizeof (*overlap));Maybe simpler than memcpy:
*overlap = pre_validated[i];
Noted.
Quoted 5 lines
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+ + trace_kvm_sev_snp_launch_finish();Maybe the trace should show some info about the snp_config.finish fields?
I did thought about it, but one of the field in the snp_config.finish is 4K in size and may fill the trace buffer quickly.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 1 line
+kvm_sev_snp_ovmf_boot_block_info(uint32_t
secrets_gpa,uint32_tslen,uint32_tcpuid_gpa,uint32_tclen,uint32_ts,uint32_te) "secrets 0x%x+0x%x cpuid 0x%x+0x%x pre-validate 0x%x+0x%x"The last argument is an end-addr (not a length), so maybe the format string should end with:
".... pre-validate 0x%x - 0x%x"Also I'd prefer to log the SevSnpBootInfoBlock fields in the order they appear in the struct.
Noted.
thanks
Quoted 38 lines · Brijesh Singh
SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory encryption environment.
The patches to support the SEV-SNP in Linux kernel and OVMF are available:
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/77335?p=,,,20,0,0,0::Created,,posterid%3A5969970,20,2,20,83891508The Qemu patches uses the command id added by the SEV-SNP hypervisor patches to bootstrap the SEV-SNP VMs.
TODO:
* Add support to filter CPUID values through the PSP.Additional resources
---------------------
SEV-SNP whitepaper
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdfAPM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36)
GHCB spec:
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdfSEV-SNP firmware specification:
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdfBrijesh Singh (6):
linux-header: add the SNP specific command
i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP i386/sev: initialize SNP context
i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context
i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch
Quoted 7 lines
docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 81 +++++- linux-headers/linux/kvm.h | 47 ++++ qapi/qom.json | 6 + target/i386/sev.c | 498 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 + target/i386/trace-events | 4 + 6 files changed, 628 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Don't forget to update target/i386/sev-stub.c as appropriate, too.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 1 line
Brijesh,
Quoted 38 lines · Brijesh Singh
SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory encryption environment.
The patches to support the SEV-SNP in Linux kernel and OVMF are available:
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/77335?p=,,,20,0,0,0::Created,,posterid%3A5969970,20,2,20,83891508The Qemu patches uses the command id added by the SEV-SNP hypervisor patches to bootstrap the SEV-SNP VMs.
TODO:
* Add support to filter CPUID values through the PSP.Additional resources
---------------------
SEV-SNP whitepaper
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdfAPM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36)
GHCB spec:
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdfSEV-SNP firmware specification:
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdfBrijesh Singh (6):
linux-header: add the SNP specific command
i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP i386/sev: initialize SNP context
i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context
i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launch
Quoted 8 lines
docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 81 +++++- linux-headers/linux/kvm.h | 47 ++++ qapi/qom.json | 6 + target/i386/sev.c | 498 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 + target/i386/trace-events | 4 + 6 files changed, 628 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
It might be useful to allow the user to view SNP-related status/settings in HMP's info sev and QMP's qom-list/qom-get under /machine/confidential-guest-support .
(Not sure whether HMP is deprecated and new stuff should not be added there.)
Particularly confusing is the policy attribute which is only relevant for SEV / SEV-ES, while there's a new snp.policy attribute for SNP... Maybe the irrelevant attributes should not be added to the tree when not in SNP.
-Dov
Quoted 50 lines · * Dov Murik ([email protected]) wrote:
Brijesh,
Quoted 38 lines · Brijesh Singh
SEV-SNP builds upon existing SEV and SEV-ES functionality while adding new hardware-based memory protections. SEV-SNP adds strong memory integrity protection to help prevent malicious hypervisor-based attacks like data replay, memory re-mapping and more in order to create an isolated memory encryption environment.
The patches to support the SEV-SNP in Linux kernel and OVMF are available:
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/77335?p=,,,20,0,0,0::Created,,posterid%3A5969970,20,2,20,83891508The Qemu patches uses the command id added by the SEV-SNP hypervisor patches to bootstrap the SEV-SNP VMs.
TODO:
* Add support to filter CPUID values through the PSP.Additional resources
---------------------
SEV-SNP whitepaper
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more.pdfAPM 2: https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf (section 15.36)
GHCB spec:
https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdfSEV-SNP firmware specification:
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdfBrijesh Singh (6):
linux-header: add the SNP specific command
i386/sev: extend sev-guest property to include SEV-SNP i386/sev: initialize SNP context
i386/sev: add the SNP launch start context
i386/sev: add support to encrypt BIOS when SEV-SNP is enabled i386/sev: populate secrets and cpuid page and finalize the SNP launchQuoted 8 lines
docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 81 +++++- linux-headers/linux/kvm.h | 47 ++++ qapi/qom.json | 6 + target/i386/sev.c | 498 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 + target/i386/trace-events | 4 + 6 files changed, 628 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Quoted 6 lines
It might be useful to allow the user to view SNP-related status/settings in HMP's
info sevand QMP's qom-list/qom-get under /machine/confidential-guest-support .(Not sure whether HMP is deprecated and new stuff should not be added there.)
It's still fine to add stuff to HMP, although generally you should be adding it to QMP as well (unles sit's purely for debug and may change).
Dave
Quoted 7 lines
Particularly confusing is the
policyattribute which is only relevant for SEV / SEV-ES, while there's a newsnp.policyattribute for SNP... Maybe the irrelevant attributes should not be added to the tree when not in SNP.-Dov
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Quoted 1 line · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
adding it to QMP as well (unles sit's purely for debug and may change).
We have query-sev QMP, I will extend to add a new 'snp: bool' field.
thanks
On 7/13/21 3:05 AM, Dov Murik wrote:>
Quoted 4 lines
Particularly confusing is the
policyattribute which is only relevant for SEV / SEV-ES, while there's a newsnp.policyattribute for SNP... Maybe the irrelevant attributes should not be added to the tree when not in SNP.
The policy fields are also applicable to the SNP. The main difference are:
- in SEV/SEV-ES the policy is 32-bit compare to 64-bit value in SEV-SNP. However, for SEV-SNP spec uses lower 32-bit value and higher bits are marked reserved.
- the bit field meaning are different
Based on this, we can introduce a new filed 'snp-policy'.
-Brijesh
Quoted 8 lines · * Brijesh Singh ([email protected]) wrote:
On 7/13/21 3:05 AM, Dov Murik wrote:>
Quoted 4 lines
Particularly confusing is the
policyattribute which is only relevant for SEV / SEV-ES, while there's a newsnp.policyattribute for SNP... Maybe the irrelevant attributes should not be added to the tree when not in SNP.
Quoted 7 lines
The policy fields are also applicable to the SNP. The main difference are:
- in SEV/SEV-ES the policy is 32-bit compare to 64-bit value in SEV-SNP. However, for SEV-SNP spec uses lower 32-bit value and higher bits are marked reserved.
- the bit field meaning are different
Ah, I see that from the SNP ABI spec (section 4.3).
That's a bit subtle; in that at the moment we select SEV or SEV-ES based on the existing guest policy flags; I think you're saying that SEV-SNP is enabled by the user explicitly.
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Based on this, we can introduce a new filed 'snp-policy'.
Yes, people are bound to confuse them if they're not clearly separated; although I guess whatever comes after SNP will probably share that longer field?
Dave
Quoted 2 lines
-Brijesh
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Quoted 13 lines · Dr. David Alan Gilbert
Quoted 12 lines · * Brijesh Singh ([email protected]) wrote:
On 7/13/21 3:05 AM, Dov Murik wrote:>
Quoted 4 lines
Particularly confusing is the
policyattribute which is only relevant for SEV / SEV-ES, while there's a newsnp.policyattribute for SNP... Maybe the irrelevant attributes should not be added to the tree when not in SNP.The policy fields are also applicable to the SNP. The main difference are:
- in SEV/SEV-ES the policy is 32-bit compare to 64-bit value in SEV-SNP. However, for SEV-SNP spec uses lower 32-bit value and higher bits are marked reserved.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
- the bit field meaning are different
Ah, I see that from the SNP ABI spec (section 4.3).
That's a bit subtle; in that at the moment we select SEV or SEV-ES based on the existing guest policy flags; I think you're saying that SEV-SNP is enabled by the user explicitly.
Correct. This is one of the reason that I added the "snp" property.
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Based on this, we can introduce a new filed 'snp-policy'.
Yes, people are bound to confuse them if they're not clearly separated; although I guess whatever comes after SNP will probably share that longer field?
I am keeping my finger crossed on it. I hope that in future they will share it.
-Brijesh