Skip to contentSkip to conversation

eap-aka: round to nearest word on message buffers

PATCH Applied James Prestwood 2 participants 4 messages Jul 30, 2021

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 eap-aka: round to nearest word on message buffers

One of these message buffers was overflowing due to padding not being taken into account (caught by sanitizers). Wrapped the length of all message buffers with EAP_SIM_ROUND as to account for any padding that attributes may add.

---
 src/eap-aka.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
src/eap-aka.c +3 -3
index 3ac0b662..9b693875 100644
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ static void check_milenage_cb(const uint8_t *res, const uint8_t *ck,
 	struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
 
 	size_t resp_len = aka->protected ? 44 : 40;
-	uint8_t response[resp_len + 4];
+	uint8_t response[EAP_SIM_ROUND(resp_len + 4)];
 	uint8_t *pos = response;
 
 	if (auts) {
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ static void handle_notification(struct eap_state *eap, const uint8_t *pkt,
 	if (value == EAP_SIM_SUCCESS && aka->protected &&
 			aka->state == EAP_AKA_STATE_CHALLENGE) {
 		/* header + MAC + MAC header */
-		uint8_t response[8 + EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN + 4];
+		uint8_t response[EAP_SIM_ROUND(8 + EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN + 4)];
 		uint8_t *pos = response;
 
 		/*
@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ static void handle_identity(struct eap_state *eap, const uint8_t *pkt,
 		size_t len)
 {
 	struct eap_aka_handle *aka = eap_get_data(eap);
-	uint8_t response[8 + strlen(aka->identity) + 4];
+	uint8_t response[EAP_SIM_ROUND(8 + strlen(aka->identity) + 4)];
 	uint8_t *pos = response;
 
 	if (aka->state != EAP_AKA_STATE_UNCONNECTED) {
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 p2p: fix out of scope read

The authorized macs pointer was being set to either the wsc_beacon or wsc_probe_response structures, which were initialized out of scope to where 'amacs' was being used. This resulted in an out of scope read, caught by address sanitizers.

---
 src/p2p.c | 22 ++++++++++------------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
src/p2p.c +10 -12
index abdb69d2..4c059173 100644
@@ -1817,6 +1817,8 @@ static bool p2p_provision_scan_notify(int err, struct l_queue *bss_list,
 		struct p2p_capability_attr *capability;
 		enum wsc_device_password_id device_password_id;
 		const uint8_t *amacs;
+		struct wsc_probe_response wsc_probe_info;
+		struct wsc_beacon wsc_beacon_info;
 
 		/*
 		 * Check if we found our target GO, some of these checks may
@@ -1844,15 +1846,13 @@ static bool p2p_provision_scan_notify(int err, struct l_queue *bss_list,
 		}
 
 		if (bss->source_frame == SCAN_BSS_PROBE_RESP) {
-			struct wsc_probe_response wsc_info;
-
 			if (!bss->p2p_probe_resp_info) {
 				l_error("SSID matched but no valid P2P IE");
 				continue;
 			}
 
 			if (wsc_parse_probe_response(bss->wsc, bss->wsc_size,
-							&wsc_info) < 0) {
+							&wsc_probe_info) < 0) {
 				l_error("SSID matched but can't parse WSC "
 					"Probe Response info");
 				continue;
@@ -1860,30 +1860,28 @@ static bool p2p_provision_scan_notify(int err, struct l_queue *bss_list,
 
 			group_id = bss->p2p_probe_resp_info->
 				device_info.device_addr;
-			selected_reg = wsc_info.selected_registrar;
+			selected_reg = wsc_probe_info.selected_registrar;
 			capability = &bss->p2p_probe_resp_info->capability;
-			device_password_id = wsc_info.device_password_id;
-			amacs = wsc_info.authorized_macs;
+			device_password_id = wsc_probe_info.device_password_id;
+			amacs = wsc_probe_info.authorized_macs;
 		} else if (bss->source_frame == SCAN_BSS_BEACON) {
-			struct wsc_beacon wsc_info;
-
 			if (!bss->p2p_beacon_info) {
 				l_error("SSID matched but no valid P2P IE");
 				continue;
 			}
 
 			if (wsc_parse_beacon(bss->wsc, bss->wsc_size,
-						&wsc_info) < 0) {
+						&wsc_beacon_info) < 0) {
 				l_error("SSID matched but can't parse WSC "
 					"Beacon info");
 				continue;
 			}
 
 			group_id = bss->p2p_beacon_info->device_addr;
-			selected_reg = wsc_info.selected_registrar;
+			selected_reg = wsc_beacon_info.selected_registrar;
 			capability = &bss->p2p_beacon_info->capability;
-			device_password_id = wsc_info.device_password_id;
-			amacs = wsc_info.authorized_macs;
+			device_password_id = wsc_beacon_info.device_password_id;
+			amacs = wsc_beacon_info.authorized_macs;
 		} else
 			continue;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
#3 lore raw
In reply to James Prestwood

Hi James,

Quoted 7 lines · James Prestwood

One of these message buffers was overflowing due to padding not being taken into account (caught by sanitizers). Wrapped the length of all message buffers with EAP_SIM_ROUND as to account for any padding that attributes may add.

---
  src/eap-aka.c | 6 +++---
  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

Applied, thanks.

Regards,
-Denis

#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/2] p2p: fix out of scope read

In reply to James Prestwood

Hi James,

Quoted 8 lines · James Prestwood

The authorized macs pointer was being set to either the wsc_beacon or wsc_probe_response structures, which were initialized out of scope to where 'amacs' was being used. This resulted in an out of scope read, caught by address sanitizers.

---
  src/p2p.c | 22 ++++++++++------------
  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

Applied, thanks.

Regards,
-Denis