4.4.278-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.278 release. There are 26 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 04 Aug 2021 13:43:24 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.278-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.4.278-rc1

Wang Hai <[email protected]>
sis900: Fix missing pci_disable_device() in probe and remove

Wang Hai <[email protected]>
tulip: windbond-840: Fix missing pci_disable_device() in probe and remove

Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>
net: llc: fix skb_over_panic

Jiapeng Chong <[email protected]>
mlx4: Fix missing error code in mlx4_load_one()

Hoang Le <[email protected]>
tipc: fix sleeping in tipc accept routine

Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
netfilter: nft_nat: allow to specify layer 4 protocol NAT only

Nguyen Dinh Phi <[email protected]>
cfg80211: Fix possible memory leak in function cfg80211_bss_update

Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
x86/asm: Ensure asm/proto.h can be included stand-alone

Paul Jakma <[email protected]>
NIU: fix incorrect error return, missed in previous revert

Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>
can: esd_usb2: fix memory leak

Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>
can: ems_usb: fix memory leak

Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>
can: usb_8dev: fix memory leak

Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
ocfs2: issue zeroout to EOF blocks

Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>
ocfs2: fix zero out valid data

Russell King <[email protected]>
ARM: ensure the signal page contains defined contents

Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>
lib/string.c: add multibyte memset functions

Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: versatile: Fix up interrupt controller node names

Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>
hfs: add lock nesting notation to hfs_find_init

Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>
hfs: fix high memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read

Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>
hfs: add missing clean-up in hfs_fill_super

Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
net/802/garp: fix memleak in garp_request_join()

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
net/802/mrp: fix memleak in mrp_request_join()

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
workqueue: fix UAF in pwq_unbound_release_workfn()

Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK

Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
net: split out functions related to registering inflight socket files

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                     |   4 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts           |   5 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts           |   2 +-
 arch/arm/kernel/signal.c                     |  14 ++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h                 |   2 +
 drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c                |  14 ++-
 drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb2.c               |  16 ++-
 drivers/net/can/usb/usb_8dev.c               |  15 ++-
 drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/winbond-840.c |   7 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c    |   1 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c            |   7 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c               |   3 +-
 fs/hfs/bfind.c                               |  14 ++-
 fs/hfs/bnode.c                               |  25 ++++-
 fs/hfs/btree.h                               |   7 ++
 fs/hfs/super.c                               |  10 +-
 fs/ocfs2/file.c                              | 103 ++++++++++-------
 include/linux/string.h                       |  30 +++++
 include/net/af_unix.h                        |   1 +
 include/net/llc_pdu.h                        |  31 ++++--
 include/net/sctp/constants.h                 |   4 +-
 kernel/workqueue.c                           |  20 ++--
 lib/string.c                                 |  66 +++++++++++
 net/802/garp.c                               |  14 +++
 net/802/mrp.c                                |  14 +++
 net/Makefile                                 |   2 +-
 net/llc/af_llc.c                             |  10 +-
 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c                           |   2 +-
 net/netfilter/nft_nat.c                      |   4 +-
 net/sctp/protocol.c                          |   3 +-
 net/tipc/socket.c                            |   9 +-
 net/unix/Kconfig                             |   5 +
 net/unix/Makefile                            |   2 +
 net/unix/af_unix.c                           | 115 ++++++++-----------
 net/unix/garbage.c                           |  68 +----------
 net/unix/scm.c                               | 161 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/unix/scm.h                               |  10 ++
 net/wireless/scan.c                          |   6 +-
 38 files changed, 579 insertions(+), 247 deletions(-)

From: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>

commit f4e65870e5cede5ca1ec0006b6c9803994e5f7b8 upstream.

We need this functionality for the io_uring file registration, but we cannot rely on it since CONFIG_UNIX can be modular. Move the helpers to a separate file, that's always builtin to the kernel if CONFIG_UNIX is m/y.

No functional changes in this patch, just moving code around.

---
 include/net/af_unix.h |    1 
 net/Makefile          |    2 
 net/unix/Kconfig      |    5 +
 net/unix/Makefile     |    2 
 net/unix/af_unix.c    |   76 -----------------------
 net/unix/garbage.c    |   68 ---------------------
 net/unix/scm.c        |  161 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 net/unix/scm.h        |   10 +++
 8 files changed, 184 insertions(+), 141 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 net/unix/scm.c
 create mode 100644 net/unix/scm.h

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 
 void unix_inflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
 void unix_notinflight(struct user_struct *user, struct file *fp);
+void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb);
 void unix_gc(void);
 void wait_for_unix_gc(void);
 struct sock *unix_get_socket(struct file *filp);

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NET)		+= ethernet/ 802/ sch
 obj-$(CONFIG_NETFILTER)		+= netfilter/
 obj-$(CONFIG_INET)		+= ipv4/
 obj-$(CONFIG_XFRM)		+= xfrm/
-obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX)		+= unix/
+obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX_SCM)		+= unix/
 obj-$(CONFIG_NET)		+= ipv6/
 obj-$(CONFIG_PACKET)		+= packet/
 obj-$(CONFIG_NET_KEY)		+= key/

@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ config UNIX
 
 	  Say Y unless you know what you are doing.
 
+config UNIX_SCM
+	bool
+	depends on UNIX
+	default y
+
 config UNIX_DIAG
 	tristate "UNIX: socket monitoring interface"
 	depends on UNIX

@@ -9,3 +9,5 @@ unix-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL)	+= sysctl_net_unix
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG)	+= unix_diag.o
 unix_diag-y		:= diag.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_UNIX_SCM)	+= scm.o

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+#ifndef NET_UNIX_SCM_H
+#define NET_UNIX_SCM_H
+
+extern struct list_head gc_inflight_list;
+extern spinlock_t unix_gc_lock;
+
+int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb);
+void unix_detach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb);
+
+#endif

From: Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>

commit cbcf01128d0a92e131bd09f1688fe032480b65ca upstream.

unix_gc() assumes that candidate sockets can never gain an external reference (i.e. be installed into an fd) while the unix_gc_lock is held. Except for MSG_PEEK this is guaranteed by modifying inflight count under the unix_gc_lock.

MSG_PEEK does not touch any variable protected by unix_gc_lock (file count is not), yet it needs to be serialized with garbage collection. Do this by locking/unlocking unix_gc_lock:

1) increment file count

2) lock/unlock barrier to make sure incremented file count is visible to garbage collection

3) install file into fd

This is a lock barrier (unlike smp_mb()) that ensures that garbage collection is run completely before or completely after the barrier.

---
 net/unix/af_unix.c |   51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1506,6 +1506,53 @@ out:
 	return err;
 }
 
+static void unix_peek_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	scm->fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
+
+	/*
+	 * Garbage collection of unix sockets starts by selecting a set of
+	 * candidate sockets which have reference only from being in flight
+	 * (total_refs == inflight_refs).  This condition is checked once during
+	 * the candidate collection phase, and candidates are marked as such, so
+	 * that non-candidates can later be ignored.  While inflight_refs is
+	 * protected by unix_gc_lock, total_refs (file count) is not, hence this
+	 * is an instantaneous decision.
+	 *
+	 * Once a candidate, however, the socket must not be reinstalled into a
+	 * file descriptor while the garbage collection is in progress.
+	 *
+	 * If the above conditions are met, then the directed graph of
+	 * candidates (*) does not change while unix_gc_lock is held.
+	 *
+	 * Any operations that changes the file count through file descriptors
+	 * (dup, close, sendmsg) does not change the graph since candidates are
+	 * not installed in fds.
+	 *
+	 * Dequeing a candidate via recvmsg would install it into an fd, but
+	 * that takes unix_gc_lock to decrement the inflight count, so it's
+	 * serialized with garbage collection.
+	 *
+	 * MSG_PEEK is special in that it does not change the inflight count,
+	 * yet does install the socket into an fd.  The following lock/unlock
+	 * pair is to ensure serialization with garbage collection.  It must be
+	 * done between incrementing the file count and installing the file into
+	 * an fd.
+	 *
+	 * If garbage collection starts after the barrier provided by the
+	 * lock/unlock, then it will see the elevated refcount and not mark this
+	 * as a candidate.  If a garbage collection is already in progress
+	 * before the file count was incremented, then the lock/unlock pair will
+	 * ensure that garbage collection is finished before progressing to
+	 * installing the fd.
+	 *
+	 * (*) A -> B where B is on the queue of A or B is on the queue of C
+	 * which is on the queue of listening socket A.
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&unix_gc_lock);
+	spin_unlock(&unix_gc_lock);
+}
+
 static int unix_scm_to_skb(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb, bool send_fds)
 {
 	int err = 0;

@@ -2131,7 +2178,7 @@ static int unix_dgram_recvmsg(struct soc
 		sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, size);
 
 		if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
-			scm.fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
+			unix_peek_fds(&scm, skb);
 	}
 	err = (flags & MSG_TRUNC) ? skb->len - skip : size;
 

@@ -2376,7 +2423,7 @@ unlock:
 			/* It is questionable, see note in unix_dgram_recvmsg.
 			 */
 			if (UNIXCB(skb).fp)
-				scm.fp = scm_fp_dup(UNIXCB(skb).fp);
+				unix_peek_fds(&scm, skb);
 
 			sk_peek_offset_fwd(sk, chunk);
 

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

commit b42b0bddcbc87b4c66f6497f66fc72d52b712aa7 upstream.

I got a UAF report when doing fuzz test:

[  152.880091][ T8030] ==================================================================
[  152.881240][ T8030] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.882442][ T8030] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810d31bd00 by task kworker/3:2/8030
[  152.883578][ T8030]
[  152.883932][ T8030] CPU: 3 PID: 8030 Comm: kworker/3:2 Not tainted 5.13.0+ #249
[  152.885014][ T8030] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
[  152.886442][ T8030] Workqueue: events pwq_unbound_release_workfn
[  152.887358][ T8030] Call Trace:
[  152.887837][ T8030]  dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0x9b
[  152.888525][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.889371][ T8030]  print_address_description.constprop.10+0x48/0x70
[  152.890326][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.891163][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.891999][ T8030]  kasan_report.cold.15+0x82/0xdb
[  152.892740][ T8030]  ? pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.893594][ T8030]  __asan_load4+0x69/0x90
[  152.894243][ T8030]  pwq_unbound_release_workfn+0x50/0x190
[  152.895057][ T8030]  process_one_work+0x47b/0x890
[  152.895778][ T8030]  worker_thread+0x5c/0x790
[  152.896439][ T8030]  ? process_one_work+0x890/0x890
[  152.897163][ T8030]  kthread+0x223/0x250
[  152.897747][ T8030]  ? set_kthread_struct+0xb0/0xb0
[  152.898471][ T8030]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[  152.899114][ T8030]
[  152.899446][ T8030] Allocated by task 8884:
[  152.900084][ T8030]  kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[  152.900769][ T8030]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x88/0xb0
[  152.901416][ T8030]  __kmalloc+0x29c/0x460
[  152.902014][ T8030]  alloc_workqueue+0x111/0x8e0
[  152.902690][ T8030]  __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[  152.903459][ T8030]  btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[  152.904198][ T8030]  scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[  152.904929][ T8030]  btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[  152.905599][ T8030]  btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[  152.906247][ T8030]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[  152.906916][ T8030]  do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[  152.907535][ T8030]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  152.908365][ T8030]
[  152.908688][ T8030] Freed by task 8884:
[  152.909243][ T8030]  kasan_save_stack+0x21/0x50
[  152.909893][ T8030]  kasan_set_track+0x20/0x30
[  152.910541][ T8030]  kasan_set_free_info+0x24/0x40
[  152.911265][ T8030]  __kasan_slab_free+0xf7/0x140
[  152.911964][ T8030]  kfree+0x9e/0x3d0
[  152.912501][ T8030]  alloc_workqueue+0x7d7/0x8e0
[  152.913182][ T8030]  __btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x11e/0x2a0
[  152.913949][ T8030]  btrfs_alloc_workqueue+0x6d/0x1d0
[  152.914703][ T8030]  scrub_workers_get+0x1e8/0x490
[  152.915402][ T8030]  btrfs_scrub_dev+0x1b9/0x9c0
[  152.916077][ T8030]  btrfs_ioctl+0x122c/0x4e50
[  152.916729][ T8030]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x137/0x190
[  152.917414][ T8030]  do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
[  152.918034][ T8030]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[  152.918872][ T8030]
[  152.919203][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810d31bc00
[  152.919203][ T8030]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
[  152.921155][ T8030] The buggy address is located 256 bytes inside of
[  152.921155][ T8030]  512-byte region [ffff88810d31bc00, ffff88810d31be00)
[  152.922993][ T8030] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[  152.923800][ T8030] page:ffffea000434c600 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10d318
[  152.925249][ T8030] head:ffffea000434c600 order:2 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0
[  152.926399][ T8030] flags: 0x57ff00000010200(slab|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[  152.927515][ T8030] raw: 057ff00000010200 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff888009c42c80
[  152.928716][ T8030] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[  152.929890][ T8030] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  152.930759][ T8030]
[  152.931076][ T8030] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  152.931851][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bc00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.932967][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bc80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.934068][ T8030] >ffff88810d31bd00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.935189][ T8030]                    ^
[  152.935763][ T8030]  ffff88810d31bd80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  152.936847][ T8030]  ffff88810d31be00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  152.937940][ T8030] ==================================================================

If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails in alloc_workqueue(), it will call put_pwq() which invoke a work queue to call pwq_unbound_release_workfn() and use the 'wq'. The 'wq' allocated in alloc_workqueue() will be freed in error path when apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails. So it will lead a UAF.

CPU0 CPU1
alloc_workqueue()
alloc_and_link_pwqs()
apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails
apply_wqattrs_cleanup()
schedule_work(&pwq->unbound_release_work)
kfree(wq)
worker_thread() pwq_unbound_release_workfn() <- trigger uaf here

If apply_wqattrs_prepare() fails, the new pwq are not linked, it doesn't hold any reference to the 'wq', 'wq' is invalid to access in the worker, so add check pwq if linked to fix this.

---
 kernel/workqueue.c |   20 +++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

@@ -3309,15 +3309,21 @@ static void pwq_unbound_release_workfn(s
 						  unbound_release_work);
 	struct workqueue_struct *wq = pwq->wq;
 	struct worker_pool *pool = pwq->pool;
-	bool is_last;
+	bool is_last = false;
 
-	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(wq->flags & WQ_UNBOUND)))
-		return;
+	/*
+	 * when @pwq is not linked, it doesn't hold any reference to the
+	 * @wq, and @wq is invalid to access.
+	 */
+	if (!list_empty(&pwq->pwqs_node)) {
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(wq->flags & WQ_UNBOUND)))
+			return;
 
-	mutex_lock(&wq->mutex);
-	list_del_rcu(&pwq->pwqs_node);
-	is_last = list_empty(&wq->pwqs);
-	mutex_unlock(&wq->mutex);
+		mutex_lock(&wq->mutex);
+		list_del_rcu(&pwq->pwqs_node);
+		is_last = list_empty(&wq->pwqs);
+		mutex_unlock(&wq->mutex);
+	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&wq_pool_mutex);
 	put_unbound_pool(pool);

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 996af62167d0e0ec69b938a3561e96f84ffff1aa ]

I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test:

BUG: memory leak

unreferenced object 0xffff88810c239500 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor940", pid 882, jiffies 4294712870 (age 14.631s) hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................ backtrace:

[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2972 [inline]
[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2980 [inline]
[<00000000a323afa4>] __kmalloc+0x167/0x340 mm/slub.c:4130
[<000000005034ca11>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:595 [inline]
[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_attr_create net/802/mrp.c:276 [inline]
[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_request_join+0x265/0x550 net/802/mrp.c:530
[<00000000fcfd81f3>] vlan_mvrp_request_join+0x145/0x170 net/8021q/vlan_mvrp.c:40
[<000000009258546e>] vlan_dev_open+0x477/0x890 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:292
[<0000000059acd82b>] __dev_open+0x281/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1609
[<000000004e6dc695>] __dev_change_flags+0x424/0x560 net/core/dev.c:8767
[<00000000471a09af>] rtnl_configure_link+0xd9/0x210 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3122
[<0000000037a4672b>] __rtnl_newlink+0xe08/0x13e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3448
[<000000008d5d0fda>] rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3488
[<000000004882fe39>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x369/0xa10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5552
[<00000000907e6c54>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast+0x4a0/0x6a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
[<00000000e0645d50>] netlink_sendmsg+0x78e/0xc90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg+0x139/0x170 net/socket.c:674
[<00000000fc210bc2>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x658/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2350
[<00000000be4577b5>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2404

Calling mrp_request_leave() after mrp_request_join(), the attr->state is set to MRP_APPLICANT_VO, mrp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last TX event in mrp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before rerturning from mrp_uninit_applicant().

---
 net/802/mrp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

index 72db2785ef2c..4ee3af3d400b 100644
@@ -295,6 +295,19 @@ static void mrp_attr_destroy(struct mrp_applicant *app, struct mrp_attr *attr)
 	kfree(attr);
 }
 
+static void mrp_attr_destroy_all(struct mrp_applicant *app)
+{
+	struct rb_node *node, *next;
+	struct mrp_attr *attr;
+
+	for (node = rb_first(&app->mad);
+	     next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL;
+	     node = next) {
+		attr = rb_entry(node, struct mrp_attr, node);
+		mrp_attr_destroy(app, attr);
+	}
+}
+
 static int mrp_pdu_init(struct mrp_applicant *app)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;

@@ -900,6 +913,7 @@ void mrp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct mrp_application *appl)
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&app->lock);
 	mrp_mad_event(app, MRP_EVENT_TX);
+	mrp_attr_destroy_all(app);
 	mrp_pdu_queue(app);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock);
 

2.30.2

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 42ca63f980842918560b25f0244307fd83b4777c ]

I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test:

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810c909b80 (size 64):
  comm "syz", pid 957, jiffies 4295220394 (age 399.090s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 02 00 04  ................
  backtrace:
    [<00000000ca1f2e2e>] garp_request_join+0x285/0x3d0
    [<00000000bf153351>] vlan_gvrp_request_join+0x15b/0x190
    [<0000000024005e72>] vlan_dev_open+0x706/0x980
    [<00000000dc20c4d4>] __dev_open+0x2bb/0x460
    [<0000000066573004>] __dev_change_flags+0x501/0x650
    [<0000000035b42f83>] rtnl_configure_link+0xee/0x280
    [<00000000a5e69de0>] __rtnl_newlink+0xed5/0x1550
    [<00000000a5258f4a>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90
    [<00000000506568ee>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x439/0xbd0
    [<00000000b7eaeae1>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x420
    [<00000000c373ce66>] netlink_unicast+0x550/0x750
    [<00000000ec74ce74>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xda0
    [<00000000381ff246>] sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120
    [<000000008f6a2db3>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x820
    [<000000008d9c1735>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x145/0x1c0
    [<00000000aa39dd8b>] __sys_sendmsg+0xfe/0x1d0

Calling garp_request_leave() after garp_request_join(), the attr->state is set to GARP_APPLICANT_VO, garp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last transmit event in garp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before rerturning from garp_uninit_applicant().

---
 net/802/garp.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

index b38ee6dcba45..5239b8f244e7 100644
@@ -206,6 +206,19 @@ static void garp_attr_destroy(struct garp_applicant *app, struct garp_attr *attr
 	kfree(attr);
 }
 
+static void garp_attr_destroy_all(struct garp_applicant *app)
+{
+	struct rb_node *node, *next;
+	struct garp_attr *attr;
+
+	for (node = rb_first(&app->gid);
+	     next = node ? rb_next(node) : NULL, node != NULL;
+	     node = next) {
+		attr = rb_entry(node, struct garp_attr, node);
+		garp_attr_destroy(app, attr);
+	}
+}
+
 static int garp_pdu_init(struct garp_applicant *app)
 {
 	struct sk_buff *skb;

@@ -612,6 +625,7 @@ void garp_uninit_applicant(struct net_device *dev, struct garp_application *appl
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&app->lock);
 	garp_gid_event(app, GARP_EVENT_TRANSMIT_PDU);
+	garp_attr_destroy_all(app);
 	garp_pdu_queue(app);
 	spin_unlock_bh(&app->lock);
 

2.30.2

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1d11fa231cabeae09a95cb3e4cf1d9dd34e00f08 ]

The doc draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00 that restricts 198 addresses was never published. These addresses as private addresses should be allowed to use in SCTP.

As Michael Tuexen suggested, this patch is to move 198 addresses from unusable to private scope.

---
 include/net/sctp/constants.h | 4 +---
 net/sctp/protocol.c          | 3 ++-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index bf03bab93d9e..15cfec311500 100644
@@ -344,8 +344,7 @@ typedef enum {
 } sctp_scope_policy_t;
 
 /* Based on IPv4 scoping <draft-stewart-tsvwg-sctp-ipv4-00.txt>,
- * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 198.18.0.0/24,
- * 192.88.99.0/24.
+ * SCTP IPv4 unusable addresses: 0.0.0.0/8, 224.0.0.0/4, 192.88.99.0/24.
  * Also, RFC 8.4, non-unicast addresses are not considered valid SCTP
  * addresses.
  */

@@ -353,7 +352,6 @@ typedef enum {
 	((htonl(INADDR_BROADCAST) == a) ||  \
 	 ipv4_is_multicast(a) ||	    \
 	 ipv4_is_zeronet(a) ||		    \
-	 ipv4_is_test_198(a) ||		    \
 	 ipv4_is_anycast_6to4(a))
 
 /* Flags used for the bind address copy functions.  */

index b0e401dfe160..8c62792658b6 100644
@@ -411,7 +411,8 @@ static sctp_scope_t sctp_v4_scope(union sctp_addr *addr)
 		retval = SCTP_SCOPE_LINK;
 	} else if (ipv4_is_private_10(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
 		   ipv4_is_private_172(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
-		   ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) {
+		   ipv4_is_private_192(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr) ||
+		   ipv4_is_test_198(addr->v4.sin_addr.s_addr)) {
 		retval = SCTP_SCOPE_PRIVATE;
 	} else {
 		retval = SCTP_SCOPE_GLOBAL;

2.30.2

From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 16ee572eaf0d09daa4c8a755fdb71e40dbf8562d ]

Patch series "hfs: fix various errors", v2.

This series ultimately aims to address a lockdep warning in hfs_find_init reported by Syzbot [1].

The work done for this led to the discovery of another bug, and the Syzkaller repro test also reveals an invalid memory access error after clearing the lockdep warning. Hence, this series is broken up into three patches:

1. Add a missing call to hfs_find_exit for an error path in hfs_fill_super

2. Fix memory mapping in hfs_bnode_read by fixing calls to kmap

3. Add lock nesting notation to tell lockdep that the observed locking hierarchy is safe

This patch (of 3):

Before exiting hfs_fill_super, the struct hfs_find_data used in hfs_find_init should be passed to hfs_find_exit to be cleaned up, and to release the lock held on the btree.

The call to hfs_find_exit is missing from an error path. We add it back in by consolidating calls to hfs_find_exit for error paths.

---
 fs/hfs/super.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index 4574fdd3d421..3eb815bb2c78 100644
@@ -426,14 +426,12 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	if (!res) {
 		if (fd.entrylength > sizeof(rec) || fd.entrylength < 0) {
 			res =  -EIO;
-			goto bail;
+			goto bail_hfs_find;
 		}
 		hfs_bnode_read(fd.bnode, &rec, fd.entryoffset, fd.entrylength);
 	}
-	if (res) {
-		hfs_find_exit(&fd);
-		goto bail_no_root;
-	}
+	if (res)
+		goto bail_hfs_find;
 	res = -EINVAL;
 	root_inode = hfs_iget(sb, &fd.search_key->cat, &rec);
 	hfs_find_exit(&fd);

@@ -449,6 +447,8 @@ static int hfs_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	/* everything's okay */
 	return 0;
 
+bail_hfs_find:
+	hfs_find_exit(&fd);
 bail_no_root:
 	pr_err("get root inode failed\n");
 bail:

2.30.2

From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 54a5ead6f5e2b47131a7385d0c0af18e7b89cb02 ]

Pages that we read in hfs_bnode_read need to be kmapped into kernel address space. However, currently only the 0th page is kmapped. If the given offset + length exceeds this 0th page, then we have an invalid memory access.

To fix this, we kmap relevant pages one by one and copy their relevant portions of data.

An example of invalid memory access occurring without this fix can be seen in the following crash report:

==================================================================

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26
  Read of size 2 at addr ffff888125fdcffe by task syz-executor5/4634

  CPU: 0 PID: 4634 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 5.13.0-syzkaller #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
   dump_stack+0x195/0x1f8 lib/dump_stack.c:120
   print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1d/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:233
   __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline]
   kasan_report.cold+0x7b/0xd4 mm/kasan/report.c:436
   check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:180 [inline]
   kasan_check_range+0x154/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:186
   memcpy+0x24/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65
   memcpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:191 [inline]
   hfs_bnode_read+0xc4/0xe0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:26
   hfs_bnode_read_u16 fs/hfs/bnode.c:34 [inline]
   hfs_bnode_find+0x880/0xcc0 fs/hfs/bnode.c:365
   hfs_brec_find+0x2d8/0x540 fs/hfs/bfind.c:126
   hfs_brec_read+0x27/0x120 fs/hfs/bfind.c:165
   hfs_cat_find_brec+0x19a/0x3b0 fs/hfs/catalog.c:194
   hfs_fill_super+0xc13/0x1460 fs/hfs/super.c:419
   mount_bdev+0x331/0x3f0 fs/super.c:1368
   hfs_mount+0x35/0x40 fs/hfs/super.c:457
   legacy_get_tree+0x10c/0x220 fs/fs_context.c:592
   vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x300 fs/super.c:1498
   do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:2905 [inline]
   path_mount+0x13f5/0x20e0 fs/namespace.c:3235
   do_mount fs/namespace.c:3248 [inline]
   __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3456 [inline]
   __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3433 [inline]
   __x64_sys_mount+0x2b8/0x340 fs/namespace.c:3433
   do_syscall_64+0x37/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
  RIP: 0033:0x45e63a
  Code: 48 c7 c2 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb d2 e8 88 04 00 00 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  RSP: 002b:00007f9404d410d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000020000248 RCX: 000000000045e63a
  RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 00007f9404d41120
  RBP: 00007f9404d41120 R08: 00000000200002c0 R09: 0000000020000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
  R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 00000000004ad5d8 R15: 0000000000000000

  The buggy address belongs to the page:
  page:00000000dadbcf3e refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x1 pfn:0x125fdc
  flags: 0x2fffc0000000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fff)
  raw: 02fffc0000000000 ffffea000497f748 ffffea000497f6c8 0000000000000000
  raw: 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   ffff888125fdce80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
   ffff888125fdcf00: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  >ffff888125fdcf80: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
                                                                  ^
   ffff888125fdd000: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
   ffff888125fdd080: ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff
  ==================================================================

---
 fs/hfs/bnode.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index 221719eac5de..2cda99e61cae 100644
@@ -14,16 +14,31 @@
 
 #include "btree.h"
 
-void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf,
-		int off, int len)
+void hfs_bnode_read(struct hfs_bnode *node, void *buf, int off, int len)
 {
 	struct page *page;
+	int pagenum;
+	int bytes_read;
+	int bytes_to_read;
+	void *vaddr;
 
 	off += node->page_offset;
-	page = node->page[0];
+	pagenum = off >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	off &= ~PAGE_MASK; /* compute page offset for the first page */
 
-	memcpy(buf, kmap(page) + off, len);
-	kunmap(page);
+	for (bytes_read = 0; bytes_read < len; bytes_read += bytes_to_read) {
+		if (pagenum >= node->tree->pages_per_bnode)
+			break;
+		page = node->page[pagenum];
+		bytes_to_read = min_t(int, len - bytes_read, PAGE_SIZE - off);
+
+		vaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
+		memcpy(buf + bytes_read, vaddr + off, bytes_to_read);
+		kunmap_atomic(vaddr);
+
+		pagenum++;
+		off = 0; /* page offset only applies to the first page */
+	}
 }
 
 u16 hfs_bnode_read_u16(struct hfs_bnode *node, int off)

2.30.2

From: Desmond Cheong Zhi Xi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b3b2177a2d795e35dc11597b2609eb1e7e57e570 ]

Syzbot reports a possible recursive lock in [1].

This happens due to missing lock nesting information. From the logs, we see that a call to hfs_fill_super is made to mount the hfs filesystem. While searching for the root inode, the lock on the catalog btree is grabbed. Then, when the parent of the root isn't found, a call to __hfs_bnode_create is made to create the parent of the root. This eventually leads to a call to hfs_ext_read_extent which grabs a lock on the extents btree.

Since the order of locking is catalog btree -> extents btree, this lock hierarchy does not lead to a deadlock.

To tell lockdep that this locking is safe, we add nesting notation to distinguish between catalog btrees, extents btrees, and attributes btrees (for HFS+). This has already been done in hfsplus.

---
 fs/hfs/bfind.c | 14 +++++++++++++-
 fs/hfs/btree.h |  7 +++++++
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index de69d8a24f6d..7f2ef95dcd05 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,19 @@ int hfs_find_init(struct hfs_btree *tree, struct hfs_find_data *fd)
 	fd->key = ptr + tree->max_key_len + 2;
 	hfs_dbg(BNODE_REFS, "find_init: %d (%p)\n",
 		tree->cnid, __builtin_return_address(0));
-	mutex_lock(&tree->tree_lock);
+	switch (tree->cnid) {
+	case HFS_CAT_CNID:
+		mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX);
+		break;
+	case HFS_EXT_CNID:
+		mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX);
+		break;
+	case HFS_ATTR_CNID:
+		mutex_lock_nested(&tree->tree_lock, ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	return 0;
 }
 

index 2715f416b5a8..308b5f1af65b 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,13 @@ typedef int (*btree_keycmp)(const btree_key *, const btree_key *);
 
 #define NODE_HASH_SIZE  256
 
+/* B-tree mutex nested subclasses */
+enum hfs_btree_mutex_classes {
+	CATALOG_BTREE_MUTEX,
+	EXTENTS_BTREE_MUTEX,
+	ATTR_BTREE_MUTEX,
+};
+
 /* A HFS BTree held in memory */
 struct hfs_btree {
 	struct super_block *sb;

2.30.2

From: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 82a1c67554dff610d6be4e1982c425717b3c6a23 ]

Once the new schema interrupt-controller/arm,vic.yaml is added, we get the below warnings:

        arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml:
        intc@10140000: $nodename:0: 'intc@10140000' does not match
        '^interrupt-controller(@[0-9a-f,]+)*$'

	arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dt.yaml:
	intc@10140000: 'clear-mask' does not match any of the regexes

Fix the node names for the interrupt controller to conform to the standard node name interrupt-controller@.. Also drop invalid clear-mask property.

---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-ab.dts |    5 ++---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/versatile-pb.dts |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -93,16 +93,15 @@
 		#size-cells = <1>;
 		ranges;
 
-		vic: intc@10140000 {
+		vic: interrupt-controller@10140000 {
 			compatible = "arm,versatile-vic";
 			interrupt-controller;
 			#interrupt-cells = <1>;
 			reg = <0x10140000 0x1000>;
-			clear-mask = <0xffffffff>;
 			valid-mask = <0xffffffff>;
 		};
 
-		sic: intc@10003000 {
+		sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 {
 			compatible = "arm,versatile-sic";
 			interrupt-controller;
 			#interrupt-cells = <1>;

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 
 	amba {
 		/* The Versatile PB is using more SIC IRQ lines than the AB */
-		sic: intc@10003000 {
+		sic: interrupt-controller@10003000 {
 			clear-mask = <0xffffffff>;
 			/*
 			 * Valid interrupt lines mask according to

From: Matthew Wilcox <[email protected]>

commit 3b3c4babd898715926d24ae10aa64778ace33aae upstream.

Patch series "Multibyte memset variations", v4.

A relatively common idiom we're missing is a function to fill an area of memory with a pattern which is larger than a single byte. I first noticed this with a zram patch which wanted to fill a page with an 'unsigned long' value. There turn out to be quite a few places in the kernel which can benefit from using an optimised function rather than a loop; sometimes text size, sometimes speed, and sometimes both. The optimised PowerPC version (not included here) improves performance by about 30% on POWER8 on just the raw memset_l().

Most of the extra lines of code come from the three testcases I added.

This patch (of 8):

memset16(), memset32() and memset64() are like memset(), but allow the caller to fill the destination with a value larger than a single byte. memset_l() and memset_p() allow the caller to use unsigned long and pointer values respectively.

---
 include/linux/string.h |   30 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 lib/string.c           |   66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 96 insertions(+)

@@ -102,6 +102,36 @@ extern __kernel_size_t strcspn(const cha
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET
 extern void * memset(void *,int,__kernel_size_t);
 #endif
+
+#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET16
+extern void *memset16(uint16_t *, uint16_t, __kernel_size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET32
+extern void *memset32(uint32_t *, uint32_t, __kernel_size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET64
+extern void *memset64(uint64_t *, uint64_t, __kernel_size_t);
+#endif
+
+static inline void *memset_l(unsigned long *p, unsigned long v,
+		__kernel_size_t n)
+{
+	if (BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
+		return memset32((uint32_t *)p, v, n);
+	else
+		return memset64((uint64_t *)p, v, n);
+}
+
+static inline void *memset_p(void **p, void *v, __kernel_size_t n)
+{
+	if (BITS_PER_LONG == 32)
+		return memset32((uint32_t *)p, (uintptr_t)v, n);
+	else
+		return memset64((uint64_t *)p, (uintptr_t)v, n);
+}
+
 #ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMCPY
 extern void * memcpy(void *,const void *,__kernel_size_t);
 #endif

From: Russell King <[email protected]>

commit 9c698bff66ab4914bb3d71da7dc6112519bde23e upstream.

Ensure that the signal page contains our poison instruction to increase the protection against ROP attacks and also contains well defined contents.

---
 arch/arm/kernel/signal.c |   14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

@@ -625,18 +625,20 @@ struct page *get_signal_page(void)
 
 	addr = page_address(page);
 
+	/* Poison the entire page */
+	memset32(addr, __opcode_to_mem_arm(0xe7fddef1),
+		 PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(u32));
+
 	/* Give the signal return code some randomness */
 	offset = 0x200 + (get_random_int() & 0x7fc);
 	signal_return_offset = offset;
 
-	/*
-	 * Copy signal return handlers into the vector page, and
-	 * set sigreturn to be a pointer to these.
-	 */
+	/* Copy signal return handlers into the page */
 	memcpy(addr + offset, sigreturn_codes, sizeof(sigreturn_codes));
 
-	ptr = (unsigned long)addr + offset;
-	flush_icache_range(ptr, ptr + sizeof(sigreturn_codes));
+	/* Flush out all instructions in this page */
+	ptr = (unsigned long)addr;
+	flush_icache_range(ptr, ptr + PAGE_SIZE);
 
 	return page;
 }

From: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>

commit f267aeb6dea5e468793e5b8eb6a9c72c0020d418 upstream.

If append-dio feature is enabled, direct-io write and fallocate could run in parallel to extend file size, fallocate used "orig_isize" to record i_size before taking "ip_alloc_sem", when ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster() zeroout EOF blocks, i_size maybe already extended by ocfs2_dio_end_io_write(), that will cause valid data zeroed out.

---
 fs/ocfs2/file.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -1939,7 +1939,6 @@ static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(str
 		goto out_inode_unlock;
 	}
 
-	orig_isize = i_size_read(inode);
 	switch (sr->l_whence) {
 	case 0: /*SEEK_SET*/
 		break;

@@ -1947,7 +1946,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(str
 		sr->l_start += f_pos;
 		break;
 	case 2: /*SEEK_END*/
-		sr->l_start += orig_isize;
+		sr->l_start += i_size_read(inode);
 		break;
 	default:
 		ret = -EINVAL;

@@ -2002,6 +2001,7 @@ static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(str
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	orig_isize = i_size_read(inode);
 	/* zeroout eof blocks in the cluster. */
 	if (!ret && change_size && orig_isize < size) {
 		ret = ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster(inode, orig_isize,

From: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>

commit 9449ad33be8480f538b11a593e2dda2fb33ca06d upstream.

For punch holes in EOF blocks, fallocate used buffer write to zero the EOF blocks in last cluster. But since ->writepage will ignore EOF pages, those zeros will not be flushed.

This "looks" ok as commit 6bba4471f0cc ("ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate") will zero the EOF blocks when extend the file size, but it isn't. The problem happened on those EOF pages, before writeback, those pages had DIRTY flag set and all buffer_head in them also had DIRTY flag set, when writeback run by write_cache_pages(), DIRTY flag on the page was cleared, but DIRTY flag on the buffer_head not.

When next write happened to those EOF pages, since buffer_head already had DIRTY flag set, it would not mark page DIRTY again. That made writeback ignore them forever. That will cause data corruption. Even directio write can't work because it will fail when trying to drop pages caches before direct io, as it found the buffer_head for those pages still had DIRTY flag set, then it will fall back to buffer io mode.

To make a summary of the issue, as writeback ingores EOF pages, once any EOF page is generated, any write to it will only go to the page cache, it will never be flushed to disk even file size extends and that page is not EOF page any more. The fix is to avoid zero EOF blocks with buffer write.

The following code snippet from qemu-img could trigger the corruption.

656 open("6b3711ae-3306-4bdd-823c-cf1c0060a095.conv.2", O_RDWR|O_DIRECT|O_CLOEXEC) = 11
...

  660   fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2275868672, 327680 <unfinished ...>
  660   fallocate(11, 0, 2275868672, 327680) = 0
  658   pwrite64(11, "

---
 fs/ocfs2/file.c |   99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)

@@ -1532,6 +1532,45 @@ static void ocfs2_truncate_cluster_pages
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * zero out partial blocks of one cluster.
+ *
+ * start: file offset where zero starts, will be made upper block aligned.
+ * len: it will be trimmed to the end of current cluster if "start + len"
+ *      is bigger than it.
+ */
+static int ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster(struct inode *inode,
+					u64 start, u64 len)
+{
+	int ret;
+	u64 start_block, end_block, nr_blocks;
+	u64 p_block, offset;
+	u32 cluster, p_cluster, nr_clusters;
+	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
+	u64 end = ocfs2_align_bytes_to_clusters(sb, start);
+
+	if (start + len < end)
+		end = start + len;
+
+	start_block = ocfs2_blocks_for_bytes(sb, start);
+	end_block = ocfs2_blocks_for_bytes(sb, end);
+	nr_blocks = end_block - start_block;
+	if (!nr_blocks)
+		return 0;
+
+	cluster = ocfs2_bytes_to_clusters(sb, start);
+	ret = ocfs2_get_clusters(inode, cluster, &p_cluster,
+				&nr_clusters, NULL);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+	if (!p_cluster)
+		return 0;
+
+	offset = start_block - ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(sb, cluster);
+	p_block = ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(sb, p_cluster) + offset;
+	return sb_issue_zeroout(sb, p_block, nr_blocks, GFP_NOFS);
+}
+
 static int ocfs2_zero_partial_clusters(struct inode *inode,
 				       u64 start, u64 len)
 {

@@ -1541,6 +1580,7 @@ static int ocfs2_zero_partial_clusters(s
 	struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
 	unsigned int csize = osb->s_clustersize;
 	handle_t *handle;
+	loff_t isize = i_size_read(inode);
 
 	/*
 	 * The "start" and "end" values are NOT necessarily part of

@@ -1561,6 +1601,26 @@ static int ocfs2_zero_partial_clusters(s
 	if ((start & (csize - 1)) == 0 && (end & (csize - 1)) == 0)
 		goto out;
 
+	/* No page cache for EOF blocks, issue zero out to disk. */
+	if (end > isize) {
+		/*
+		 * zeroout eof blocks in last cluster starting from
+		 * "isize" even "start" > "isize" because it is
+		 * complicated to zeroout just at "start" as "start"
+		 * may be not aligned with block size, buffer write
+		 * would be required to do that, but out of eof buffer
+		 * write is not supported.
+		 */
+		ret = ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster(inode, isize,
+					end - isize);
+		if (ret) {
+			mlog_errno(ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (start >= isize)
+			goto out;
+		end = isize;
+	}
 	handle = ocfs2_start_trans(osb, OCFS2_INODE_UPDATE_CREDITS);
 	if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(handle);

@@ -1860,45 +1920,6 @@ out:
 }
 
 /*
- * zero out partial blocks of one cluster.
- *
- * start: file offset where zero starts, will be made upper block aligned.
- * len: it will be trimmed to the end of current cluster if "start + len"
- *      is bigger than it.
- */
-static int ocfs2_zeroout_partial_cluster(struct inode *inode,
-					u64 start, u64 len)
-{
-	int ret;
-	u64 start_block, end_block, nr_blocks;
-	u64 p_block, offset;
-	u32 cluster, p_cluster, nr_clusters;
-	struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
-	u64 end = ocfs2_align_bytes_to_clusters(sb, start);
-
-	if (start + len < end)
-		end = start + len;
-
-	start_block = ocfs2_blocks_for_bytes(sb, start);
-	end_block = ocfs2_blocks_for_bytes(sb, end);
-	nr_blocks = end_block - start_block;
-	if (!nr_blocks)
-		return 0;
-
-	cluster = ocfs2_bytes_to_clusters(sb, start);
-	ret = ocfs2_get_clusters(inode, cluster, &p_cluster,
-				&nr_clusters, NULL);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-	if (!p_cluster)
-		return 0;
-
-	offset = start_block - ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(sb, cluster);
-	p_block = ocfs2_clusters_to_blocks(sb, p_cluster) + offset;
-	return sb_issue_zeroout(sb, p_block, nr_blocks, GFP_NOFS);
-}
-
-/*
  * Parts of this function taken from xfs_change_file_space()
  */
 static int __ocfs2_change_file_space(struct file *file, struct inode *inode,

From: Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>

commit 0e865f0c31928d6a313269ef624907eec55287c4 upstream.

In usb_8dev_start() MAX_RX_URBS coherent buffers are allocated and there is nothing, that frees them:

1) In callback function the urb is resubmitted and that's all
2) In disconnect function urbs are simply killed, but URB_FREE_BUFFER is not set (see usb_8dev_start) and this flag cannot be used with coherent buffers.

So, all allocated buffers should be freed with usb_free_coherent() explicitly.

Side note: This code looks like a copy-paste of other can drivers. The same patch was applied to mcba_usb driver and it works nice with real hardware. There is no change in functionality, only clean-up code for coherent buffers.

---
 drivers/net/can/usb/usb_8dev.c |   15 +++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ struct usb_8dev_priv {
 	u8 *cmd_msg_buffer;
 
 	struct mutex usb_8dev_cmd_lock;
-
+	void *rxbuf[MAX_RX_URBS];
+	dma_addr_t rxbuf_dma[MAX_RX_URBS];
 };
 
 /* tx frame */

@@ -746,6 +747,7 @@ static int usb_8dev_start(struct usb_8de
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; i++) {
 		struct urb *urb = NULL;
 		u8 *buf;
+		dma_addr_t buf_dma;
 
 		/* create a URB, and a buffer for it */
 		urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);

@@ -756,7 +758,7 @@ static int usb_8dev_start(struct usb_8de
 		}
 
 		buf = usb_alloc_coherent(priv->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL,
-					 &urb->transfer_dma);
+					 &buf_dma);
 		if (!buf) {
 			netdev_err(netdev, "No memory left for USB buffer\n");
 			usb_free_urb(urb);

@@ -764,6 +766,8 @@ static int usb_8dev_start(struct usb_8de
 			break;
 		}
 
+		urb->transfer_dma = buf_dma;
+
 		usb_fill_bulk_urb(urb, priv->udev,
 				  usb_rcvbulkpipe(priv->udev,
 						  USB_8DEV_ENDP_DATA_RX),

@@ -781,6 +785,9 @@ static int usb_8dev_start(struct usb_8de
 			break;
 		}
 
+		priv->rxbuf[i] = buf;
+		priv->rxbuf_dma[i] = buf_dma;
+
 		/* Drop reference, USB core will take care of freeing it */
 		usb_free_urb(urb);
 	}

@@ -850,6 +857,10 @@ static void unlink_all_urbs(struct usb_8
 
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->rx_submitted);
 
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; ++i)
+		usb_free_coherent(priv->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE,
+				  priv->rxbuf[i], priv->rxbuf_dma[i]);
+
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&priv->tx_submitted);
 	atomic_set(&priv->active_tx_urbs, 0);
 

From: Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>

commit 9969e3c5f40c166e3396acc36c34f9de502929f6 upstream.

In ems_usb_start() MAX_RX_URBS coherent buffers are allocated and there is nothing, that frees them:

1) In callback function the urb is resubmitted and that's all
2) In disconnect function urbs are simply killed, but URB_FREE_BUFFER is not set (see ems_usb_start) and this flag cannot be used with coherent buffers.

So, all allocated buffers should be freed with usb_free_coherent() explicitly.

Side note: This code looks like a copy-paste of other can drivers. The same patch was applied to mcba_usb driver and it works nice with real hardware. There is no change in functionality, only clean-up code for coherent buffers.

---
 drivers/net/can/usb/ems_usb.c |   14 +++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ struct ems_usb {
 	unsigned int free_slots; /* remember number of available slots */
 
 	struct ems_cpc_msg active_params; /* active controller parameters */
+	void *rxbuf[MAX_RX_URBS];
+	dma_addr_t rxbuf_dma[MAX_RX_URBS];
 };
 
 static void ems_usb_read_interrupt_callback(struct urb *urb)

@@ -600,6 +602,7 @@ static int ems_usb_start(struct ems_usb
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; i++) {
 		struct urb *urb = NULL;
 		u8 *buf = NULL;
+		dma_addr_t buf_dma;
 
 		/* create a URB, and a buffer for it */
 		urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);

@@ -610,7 +613,7 @@ static int ems_usb_start(struct ems_usb
 		}
 
 		buf = usb_alloc_coherent(dev->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL,
-					 &urb->transfer_dma);
+					 &buf_dma);
 		if (!buf) {
 			netdev_err(netdev, "No memory left for USB buffer\n");
 			usb_free_urb(urb);

@@ -618,6 +621,8 @@ static int ems_usb_start(struct ems_usb
 			break;
 		}
 
+		urb->transfer_dma = buf_dma;
+
 		usb_fill_bulk_urb(urb, dev->udev, usb_rcvbulkpipe(dev->udev, 2),
 				  buf, RX_BUFFER_SIZE,
 				  ems_usb_read_bulk_callback, dev);

@@ -633,6 +638,9 @@ static int ems_usb_start(struct ems_usb
 			break;
 		}
 
+		dev->rxbuf[i] = buf;
+		dev->rxbuf_dma[i] = buf_dma;
+
 		/* Drop reference, USB core will take care of freeing it */
 		usb_free_urb(urb);
 	}

@@ -698,6 +706,10 @@ static void unlink_all_urbs(struct ems_u
 
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted);
 
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; ++i)
+		usb_free_coherent(dev->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE,
+				  dev->rxbuf[i], dev->rxbuf_dma[i]);
+
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->tx_submitted);
 	atomic_set(&dev->active_tx_urbs, 0);
 

From: Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>

commit 928150fad41ba16df7fcc9f7f945747d0f56cbb6 upstream.

In esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs() MAX_RX_URBS coherent buffers are allocated and there is nothing, that frees them:

1) In callback function the urb is resubmitted and that's all
2) In disconnect function urbs are simply killed, but URB_FREE_BUFFER is not set (see esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs) and this flag cannot be used with coherent buffers.

So, all allocated buffers should be freed with usb_free_coherent() explicitly.

Side note: This code looks like a copy-paste of other can drivers. The same patch was applied to mcba_usb driver and it works nice with real hardware. There is no change in functionality, only clean-up code for coherent buffers.

---
 drivers/net/can/usb/esd_usb2.c |   16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ struct esd_usb2 {
 	int net_count;
 	u32 version;
 	int rxinitdone;
+	void *rxbuf[MAX_RX_URBS];
+	dma_addr_t rxbuf_dma[MAX_RX_URBS];
 };
 
 struct esd_usb2_net_priv {

@@ -556,6 +558,7 @@ static int esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs(struct
 	for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; i++) {
 		struct urb *urb = NULL;
 		u8 *buf = NULL;
+		dma_addr_t buf_dma;
 
 		/* create a URB, and a buffer for it */
 		urb = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);

@@ -567,7 +570,7 @@ static int esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs(struct
 		}
 
 		buf = usb_alloc_coherent(dev->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL,
-					 &urb->transfer_dma);
+					 &buf_dma);
 		if (!buf) {
 			dev_warn(dev->udev->dev.parent,
 				 "No memory left for USB buffer\n");

@@ -575,6 +578,8 @@ static int esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs(struct
 			goto freeurb;
 		}
 
+		urb->transfer_dma = buf_dma;
+
 		usb_fill_bulk_urb(urb, dev->udev,
 				  usb_rcvbulkpipe(dev->udev, 1),
 				  buf, RX_BUFFER_SIZE,

@@ -587,8 +592,12 @@ static int esd_usb2_setup_rx_urbs(struct
 			usb_unanchor_urb(urb);
 			usb_free_coherent(dev->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE, buf,
 					  urb->transfer_dma);
+			goto freeurb;
 		}
 
+		dev->rxbuf[i] = buf;
+		dev->rxbuf_dma[i] = buf_dma;
+
 freeurb:
 		/* Drop reference, USB core will take care of freeing it */
 		usb_free_urb(urb);

@@ -676,6 +685,11 @@ static void unlink_all_urbs(struct esd_u
 	int i, j;
 
 	usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&dev->rx_submitted);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_RX_URBS; ++i)
+		usb_free_coherent(dev->udev, RX_BUFFER_SIZE,
+				  dev->rxbuf[i], dev->rxbuf_dma[i]);
+
 	for (i = 0; i < dev->net_count; i++) {
 		priv = dev->nets[i];
 		if (priv) {

From: Paul Jakma <[email protected]>

commit 15bbf8bb4d4ab87108ecf5f4155ec8ffa3c141d6 upstream.

Commit 7930742d6, reverting 26fd962, missed out on reverting an incorrect change to a return value. The niu_pci_vpd_scan_props(..) == 1 case appears to be a normal path - treating it as an error and return -EINVAL was breaking VPD_SCAN and causing the driver to fail to load.

Fix, so my Neptune card works again.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -8213,8 +8213,9 @@ static int niu_pci_vpd_fetch(struct niu
 		err = niu_pci_vpd_scan_props(np, here, end);
 		if (err < 0)
 			return err;
+		/* ret == 1 is not an error */
 		if (err == 1)
-			return -EINVAL;
+			return 0;
 	}
 	return 0;
 }

From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f7b21a0e41171d22296b897dac6e4c41d2a3643c ]

Fix:

  ../arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h:14:30: warning: ‘struct task_struct’ declared \
    inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
  long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2);
                               ^~~~~~~~~~~

.../arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h:40:34: warning: ‘struct task_struct’ declared \
inside parameter list will not be visible outside of this definition or declaration
long do_arch_prctl_common(struct task_struct *task, int option,

                                    ^~~~~~~~~~~

if linux/sched.h hasn't be included previously. This fixes a build error when this header is used outside of the kernel tree.

[ bp: Massage commit message. ]

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/proto.h | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index a4a77286cb1d..ae6f1592530b 100644
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@
 
 #include <asm/ldt.h>
 
+struct task_struct;
+
 /* misc architecture specific prototypes */
 
 void syscall_init(void);

2.30.2

From: Nguyen Dinh Phi <[email protected]>

commit f9a5c358c8d26fed0cc45f2afc64633d4ba21dff upstream.

When we exceed the limit of BSS entries, this function will free the new entry, however, at this time, it is the last door to access the inputed ies, so these ies will be unreferenced objects and cause memory leak.
Therefore we should free its ies before deallocating the new entry, beside of dropping it from hidden_list.

---
 net/wireless/scan.c |    6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -947,16 +947,14 @@ cfg80211_bss_update(struct cfg80211_regi
 			 * be grouped with this beacon for updates ...
 			 */
 			if (!cfg80211_combine_bsses(rdev, new)) {
-				kfree(new);
+				bss_ref_put(rdev, new);
 				goto drop;
 			}
 		}
 
 		if (rdev->bss_entries >= bss_entries_limit &&
 		    !cfg80211_bss_expire_oldest(rdev)) {
-			if (!list_empty(&new->hidden_list))
-				list_del(&new->hidden_list);
-			kfree(new);
+			bss_ref_put(rdev, new);
 			goto drop;
 		}
 

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a33f387ecd5aafae514095c2c4a8c24f7aea7e8b ]

nft_nat reports a bogus EAFNOSUPPORT if no layer 3 information is specified.

---
 net/netfilter/nft_nat.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 868480b83649..182704b980d1 100644
@@ -157,7 +157,9 @@ static int nft_nat_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, const struct nft_expr *expr,
 		alen = FIELD_SIZEOF(struct nf_nat_range, min_addr.ip6);
 		break;
 	default:
-		return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		if (tb[NFTA_NAT_REG_ADDR_MIN])
+			return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		break;
 	}
 	priv->family = family;
 

2.30.2

From: Hoang Le <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d237a7f11719ff9320721be5818352e48071aab6 ]

The release_sock() is blocking function, it would change the state after sleeping. In order to evaluate the stated condition outside the socket lock context, switch to use wait_woken() instead.

---
 net/tipc/socket.c | 9 ++++-----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index 3ad9158ecf30..9d15bb865eea 100644
@@ -1987,7 +1987,7 @@ static int tipc_listen(struct socket *sock, int len)
 static int tipc_wait_for_accept(struct socket *sock, long timeo)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-	DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
+	DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
 	int err;
 
 	/* True wake-one mechanism for incoming connections: only

@@ -1996,12 +1996,12 @@ static int tipc_wait_for_accept(struct socket *sock, long timeo)
 	 * anymore, the common case will execute the loop only once.
 	*/
 	for (;;) {
-		prepare_to_wait_exclusive(sk_sleep(sk), &wait,
-					  TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 		if (timeo && skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
+			add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
 			release_sock(sk);
-			timeo = schedule_timeout(timeo);
+			timeo = wait_woken(&wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, timeo);
 			lock_sock(sk);
+			remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
 		}
 		err = 0;
 		if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))

@@ -2016,7 +2016,6 @@ static int tipc_wait_for_accept(struct socket *sock, long timeo)
 		if (signal_pending(current))
 			break;
 	}
-	finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
 	return err;
 }
 

2.30.2

From: Jiapeng Chong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7e4960b3d66d7248b23de3251118147812b42da2 ]

The error code is missing in this code scenario, add the error code '-EINVAL' to the return value 'err'.

Eliminate the follow smatch warning:

drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c:3538 mlx4_load_one() warn:
missing error code 'err'.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx4/main.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

index b774ba64bd4b..913e0fd10fde 100644
@@ -3222,6 +3222,7 @@ slave_start:
 
 		if (!SRIOV_VALID_STATE(dev->flags)) {
 			mlx4_err(dev, "Invalid SRIOV state\n");
+			err = -EINVAL;
 			goto err_close;
 		}
 	}

2.30.2

From: Pavel Skripkin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c7c9d2102c9c098916ab9e0ab248006107d00d6c ]

Syzbot reported skb_over_panic() in llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). The problem was in wrong LCC header manipulations.

Syzbot's reproducer tries to send XID packet. llc_ui_sendmsg() is doing following steps:

1. skb allocation with size = len + header size len is passed from userpace and header size is 3 since addr->sllc_xid is set.

2. skb_reserve() for header_len = 3
3. filling all other space with memcpy_from_msg()

Ok, at this moment we have fully loaded skb, only headers needs to be filled.

Then code comes to llc_sap_action_send_xid_c(). This function pushes 3 bytes for LLC PDU header and initializes it. Then comes llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(). It initalizes next 3 bytes *AFTER* LLC PDU header and call skb_push(skb, 3). This looks wrong for 2 reasons:

1. Bytes rigth after LLC header are user data, so this function was overwriting payload.

2. skb_push(skb, 3) call can cause skb_over_panic() since all free space was filled in llc_ui_sendmsg(). (This can happen is user passed 686 len: 686 + 14 (eth header) + 3 (LLC header) = 703. SKB_DATA_ALIGN(703) = 704)

So, in this patch I added 2 new private constansts: LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID and LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID. LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID is used to correctly reserve header size to handle LLC + XID case. LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID is used by llc_pdu_header_init() function to push 6 bytes instead of 3. And finally I removed skb_push() call from llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd().

This changes should not affect other parts of LLC, since after all steps we just transmit buffer.

---
 include/net/llc_pdu.h | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 net/llc/af_llc.c      | 10 +++++++++-
 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c    |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

index c0f0a13ed818..49aa79c7b278 100644
@@ -15,9 +15,11 @@
 #include <linux/if_ether.h>
 
 /* Lengths of frame formats */
-#define LLC_PDU_LEN_I	4       /* header and 2 control bytes */
-#define LLC_PDU_LEN_S	4
-#define LLC_PDU_LEN_U	3       /* header and 1 control byte */
+#define LLC_PDU_LEN_I		4       /* header and 2 control bytes */
+#define LLC_PDU_LEN_S		4
+#define LLC_PDU_LEN_U		3       /* header and 1 control byte */
+/* header and 1 control byte and XID info */
+#define LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID	(LLC_PDU_LEN_U + sizeof(struct llc_xid_info))
 /* Known SAP addresses */
 #define LLC_GLOBAL_SAP	0xFF
 #define LLC_NULL_SAP	0x00	/* not network-layer visible */

@@ -50,9 +52,10 @@
 #define LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_MASK    0x03	/* 8-bit control field */
 #define LLC_PDU_TYPE_MASK      0x03
 
-#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_I	0	/* first bit */
-#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_S	1	/* first two bits */
-#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_U	3	/* first two bits */
+#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_I		0	/* first bit */
+#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_S		1	/* first two bits */
+#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_U		3	/* first two bits */
+#define LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID	4	/* private type for detecting XID commands */
 
 #define LLC_PDU_TYPE_IS_I(pdu) \
 	((!(pdu->ctrl_1 & LLC_PDU_TYPE_I_MASK)) ? 1 : 0)

@@ -230,9 +233,18 @@ static inline struct llc_pdu_un *llc_pdu_un_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb)
 static inline void llc_pdu_header_init(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 type,
 				       u8 ssap, u8 dsap, u8 cr)
 {
-	const int hlen = type == LLC_PDU_TYPE_U ? 3 : 4;
+	int hlen = 4; /* default value for I and S types */
 	struct llc_pdu_un *pdu;
 
+	switch (type) {
+	case LLC_PDU_TYPE_U:
+		hlen = 3;
+		break;
+	case LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID:
+		hlen = 6;
+		break;
+	}
+
 	skb_push(skb, hlen);
 	skb_reset_network_header(skb);
 	pdu = llc_pdu_un_hdr(skb);

@@ -374,7 +386,10 @@ static inline void llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	xid_info->fmt_id = LLC_XID_FMT_ID;	/* 0x81 */
 	xid_info->type	 = svcs_supported;
 	xid_info->rw	 = rx_window << 1;	/* size of receive window */
-	skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct llc_xid_info));
+
+	/* no need to push/put since llc_pdu_header_init() has already
+	 * pushed 3 + 3 bytes
+	 */
 }
 
 /**

index f613a1007107..82b07bc43071 100644
@@ -96,8 +96,16 @@ static inline u8 llc_ui_header_len(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_llc *addr)
 {
 	u8 rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_U;
 
-	if (addr->sllc_test || addr->sllc_xid)
+	if (addr->sllc_test)
 		rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_U;
+	else if (addr->sllc_xid)
+		/* We need to expand header to sizeof(struct llc_xid_info)
+		 * since llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd() sets 4,5,6 bytes of LLC header
+		 * as XID PDU. In llc_ui_sendmsg() we reserved header size and then
+		 * filled all other space with user data. If we won't reserve this
+		 * bytes, llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd() will overwrite user data
+		 */
+		rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_U_XID;
 	else if (sk->sk_type == SOCK_STREAM)
 		rc = LLC_PDU_LEN_I;
 	return rc;

index 7ae4cc684d3a..9fa3342c7a82 100644
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int llc_sap_action_send_xid_c(struct llc_sap *sap, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct llc_sap_state_ev *ev = llc_sap_ev(skb);
 	int rc;
 
-	llc_pdu_header_init(skb, LLC_PDU_TYPE_U, ev->saddr.lsap,
+	llc_pdu_header_init(skb, LLC_PDU_TYPE_U_XID, ev->saddr.lsap,
 			    ev->daddr.lsap, LLC_PDU_CMD);
 	llc_pdu_init_as_xid_cmd(skb, LLC_XID_NULL_CLASS_2, 0);
 	rc = llc_mac_hdr_init(skb, ev->saddr.mac, ev->daddr.mac);

2.30.2

From: Wang Hai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 76a16be07b209a3f507c72abe823bd3af1c8661a ]

Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(), pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be called in release automatically.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/dec/tulip/winbond-840.c | 7 ++-----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index 3c0e4d5c5fef..abc66eb13c35 100644
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ static int w840_probe1(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 	int i, option = find_cnt < MAX_UNITS ? options[find_cnt] : 0;
 	void __iomem *ioaddr;
 
-	i = pci_enable_device(pdev);
+	i = pcim_enable_device(pdev);
 	if (i) return i;
 
 	pci_set_master(pdev);

@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static int w840_probe1(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 
 	ioaddr = pci_iomap(pdev, TULIP_BAR, netdev_res_size);
 	if (!ioaddr)
-		goto err_out_free_res;
+		goto err_out_netdev;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
 		((__le16 *)dev->dev_addr)[i] = cpu_to_le16(eeprom_read(ioaddr, i));

@@ -469,8 +469,6 @@ static int w840_probe1(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 
 err_out_cleardev:
 	pci_iounmap(pdev, ioaddr);
-err_out_free_res:
-	pci_release_regions(pdev);
 err_out_netdev:
 	free_netdev (dev);
 	return -ENODEV;

@@ -1537,7 +1535,6 @@ static void w840_remove1(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 	if (dev) {
 		struct netdev_private *np = netdev_priv(dev);
 		unregister_netdev(dev);
-		pci_release_regions(pdev);
 		pci_iounmap(pdev, np->base_addr);
 		free_netdev(dev);
 	}

2.30.2

From: Wang Hai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 89fb62fde3b226f99b7015280cf132e2a7438edf ]

Replace pci_enable_device() with pcim_enable_device(), pci_disable_device() and pci_release_regions() will be called in release automatically.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/sis/sis900.c | 7 ++-----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

index dff5b56738d3..9fe5d13402e0 100644
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static int sis900_probe(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,
 #endif
 
 	/* setup various bits in PCI command register */
-	ret = pci_enable_device(pci_dev);
+	ret = pcim_enable_device(pci_dev);
 	if(ret) return ret;
 
 	i = pci_set_dma_mask(pci_dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32));

@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ static int sis900_probe(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,
 	ioaddr = pci_iomap(pci_dev, 0, 0);
 	if (!ioaddr) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto err_out_cleardev;
+		goto err_out;
 	}
 
 	sis_priv = netdev_priv(net_dev);

@@ -576,8 +576,6 @@ err_unmap_tx:
 		sis_priv->tx_ring_dma);
 err_out_unmap:
 	pci_iounmap(pci_dev, ioaddr);
-err_out_cleardev:
-	pci_release_regions(pci_dev);
  err_out:
 	free_netdev(net_dev);
 	return ret;

@@ -2425,7 +2423,6 @@ static void sis900_remove(struct pci_dev *pci_dev)
 		sis_priv->tx_ring_dma);
 	pci_iounmap(pci_dev, sis_priv->ioaddr);
 	free_netdev(net_dev);
-	pci_release_regions(pci_dev);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PM

2.30.2

Hi!

CIP testing did not find any problems here:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-4.4.y

Best regards,
Pavel

DENX Software Engineering GmbH,      Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v4.4:

    6 builds:	6 pass, 0 fail
    12 boots:	12 pass, 0 fail
    30 tests:	30 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 4.4.278-rc1-g0de2c08236b3
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,

                tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

## Build
* kernel: 4.4.278-rc1
* git: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
* git branch: linux-4.4.y
* git commit: 0de2c08236b37f04155d7a3dd65098f2a31fce22
* git describe: v4.4.277-27-g0de2c08236b3
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.4.y/build/v4.4.277-27-g0de2c08236b3

## No regressions (compared to v4.4.277-20-g46908ed929d6)

## No fixes (compared to v4.4.277-20-g46908ed929d6)

## Test result summary
total: 45986, pass: 36044, fail: 377, skip: 8270, xfail: 1295,

## Build Summary
* arm: 97 total, 97 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 24 total, 24 passed, 0 failed
* i386: 14 total, 14 passed, 0 failed
* juno-r2: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* mips: 37 total, 36 passed, 1 failed
* sparc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* x15: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* x86: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 14 total, 14 passed, 0 failed

## Test suites summary
* fwts
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-bpf
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-lkdtm
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kvm-unit-tests
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* perf
* ssuite
* v4l2-compliance

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Build results:

	total: 160 pass: 160 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 336 pass: 336 fail: 0

Guenter