Detect unusable ciphers on patched OpenSSL of RHEL/Centos
PATCH 1/2 Detect unusable ciphers on patched OpenSSL of RHEL/Centos
OpenSSL on RHEL 8 and CentOS 8 system when these system are put into FIPS mode need extra code to figure out if a specific cipher algorithm is usable on these system. This is particularly problem in data-ciphers as the errors might occur much later when a client connects and as these cipher are not caught during config initialisation.
This also prepares for adding Chacha20-Poly1305 when available to data-ciphers by making the detection logic used to check if cipher_kt_get returns non-NULL work on these systems.
--- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 6 ++++++ src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c | 10 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
src/openvpn/crypto.c +6 -0
@@ -1806,6 +1806,12 @@ print_cipher(const cipher_kt_t *cipher) {printf (", TLS client/server mode only" ); } +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS +if (FIPS_mode () && !(EVP_CIPHER_flags (cipher) &EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS )) + { +printf (", disabled by FIPS mode" ); + } +#endif printf (")\n" ); }
src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c +10 -0
@@ -599,7 +599,17 @@ cipher_kt_get(const char *ciphername)return NULL ; } +#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS +/* Rhel 8/CentOS 8 have a patched OpenSSL version that return a cipher +* here that is actually not usable if in FIPS mode */ +if (FIPS_mode () && !(EVP_CIPHER_flags (cipher) &EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS )) + { +msg (D_LOW ,"Cipher algorithm '%s' is known by OpenSSL library but " +"currently disabled by running in FIPS mode." , ciphername); +return NULL ; + } +#endif if (EVP_CIPHER_key_length (cipher) >MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH ) { msg(D_LOW, "Cipher algorithm '%s' uses a default key size (%d bytes) "
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0
PATCH 2/2 Include Chacha20-Poly1305 into default --data-ciphers when available
Most TLS 1.3 libraries inlcude the Chacha20-Poly1305 based cipher suite beside the AES-GCM based ones int he list of default ciphers suites. Chacha20-Poly1305 is accepted as good alternative AEAD algorithm to the AES-GCM algorithm by crypto community.
Follow this and include Chacha20-Poly1305 by default in data-ciphers when available. This makes picking Chacha20-Poly1305 easier as it only requires to change server (by changing priority) or client side (removing AES-GCM from data-ciphers) to change to Chacha20-Poly1305.
--- Changes.rst | 5 +++++ doc/man-sections/cipher-negotiation.rst | 3 ++- doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst | 3 ++- src/openvpn/options.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Changes.rst +5 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ Deprecated features This option mainly served a role as debug option when NCP was first introduced. It should now no longer be necessary. + +User-visible Changes +-------------------- +- CHACHA20-POLY1305 is included in the default of ``--data-ciphers`` when available. + Overview of changes in 2.5 ==========================
doc/man-sections/cipher-negotiation.rst +2 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ with a AUTH_FAILED message (as seen in client log): OpenVPN 2.5 will only allow the ciphers specified in ``--data-ciphers``. To ensure backwards compatibility also if a cipher is specified using the ``--cipher`` option it is automatically added to this list. If both options are unset the default is -:code:`AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM`. +:code:`AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM`. In 2.6 and later the default is changed to +:code:`AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM:CHACHA20-POLY1305` when Chacha20-Poly1305 is available. OpenVPN 2.4 clients -------------------
doc/man-sections/protocol-options.rst +2 -1
@@ -192,7 +192,8 @@ configured in a compatible way between both the local and remote side. --data-ciphers cipher-list Restrict the allowed ciphers to be negotiated to the ciphers in ``cipher-list``. ``cipher-list`` is a colon-separated list of ciphers, - and defaults to :code:`AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM`. + and defaults to :code:`AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM:CHACHA20-POLY1305` when + Chacha20-Poly1305 is available and otherwise :code:`AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM`. For servers, the first cipher from ``cipher-list`` that is also supported by the client will be pushed to clients that support cipher
src/openvpn/options.c +24 -1
@@ -842,7 +842,6 @@ init_options(struct options *o, const bool init_gc) o->stale_routes_check_interval =0 ; o->ifconfig_pool_persist_refresh_freq =600 ; o->scheduled_exit_interval =5 ; - o->ncp_ciphers ="AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM" ; o->authname ="SHA1" ; o->prng_hash ="SHA1" ; o->prng_nonce_secret_len =16 ;
@@ -3077,6 +3076,29 @@ options_postprocess_verify(const struct options *o) } } +/** +* Checks for availibility of Chacha20-Poly1305 and sets +* the ncp_cipher to either AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM or +* AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM:CHACHA20-POLY1305. +*/ +static void +options_postprocess_setdefault_ncpciphers (struct options *o) +{ +if (o->ncp_ciphers) + { +/* custom --data-ciphers set, keep list */ +return ; + } +else if (cipher_kt_get ("CHACHA20-POLY1305" )) + { + o->ncp_ciphers ="AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM:CHACHA20-POLY1305" ; + } +else + { + o->ncp_ciphers ="AES-256-GCM:AES-128-GCM" ; + } +} +static void options_postprocess_cipher (struct options *o) {
@@ -3137,6 +3159,7 @@ options_postprocess_mutate(struct options *o)helper_keepalive (o);helper_tcp_nodelay (o); +options_postprocess_setdefault_ncpciphers (o);options_postprocess_cipher (o);options_postprocess_mutate_invariant (o);
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 2/2] Include Chacha20-Poly1305 into default --data-ciphers when available
Hi,
Quoted 11 lines · Arne Schwabe
Most TLS 1.3 libraries inlcude the Chacha20-Poly1305 based cipher suite beside the AES-GCM based ones int he list of default ciphers suites. Chacha20-Poly1305 is accepted as good alternative AEAD algorithm to the AES-GCM algorithm by crypto community.
Follow this and include Chacha20-Poly1305 by default in data-ciphers when available. This makes picking Chacha20-Poly1305 easier as it only requires to change server (by changing priority) or client side (removing AES-GCM from data-ciphers) to change to Chacha20-Poly1305.
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Not sure why this is 2/2 as it seems unrelated to 1/2. Indeed I applied and reviewed this patch alone.
It does what it says and imho it is pretty clean.
Tested with a client that connects against a server having default ciphers. The client, if willing, can specify chacha20poly1305 only and connect with it.
This is a sensible change which IMHO will make a lot of people happy.
Signature · 1 line
Antonio Quartulli
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Include Chacha20-Poly1305 into default --data-ciphers when available
In reply to Arne SchwabeI have not tested this "in-depth", but the code looks good, and the result passes my t_client rig with various OpenSSL and mbedTLS versions.
(I have not actually tested "both server and client have CHACHA-POLY active and using that works" but I trust Antonio there :-) )
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
commit a38a377fd524d0e14a23ed17487ea3e3d3ad3fe7
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Wed Aug 18 23:33:54 2021 +0200
Include Chacha20-Poly1305 into default --data-ciphers when available
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg22745.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
Quoted 10 lines · Arne Schwabe
OpenSSL on RHEL 8 and CentOS 8 system when these system are put into FIPS mode need extra code to figure out if a specific cipher algorithm is usable on these system. This is particularly problem in data-ciphers as the errors might occur much later when a client connects and as these cipher are not caught during config initialisation.
This also prepares for adding Chacha20-Poly1305 when available to data-ciphers by making the detection logic used to check if
cipher_kt_getreturns non-NULL work on these systems.
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 6 ++++++ src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c | 10 ++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
I've Looked at the code, built it on a RHEL-8.4 box with FIPS enabled and tested the binary with FIPS both enabled and disabled. It works smoothly there.
The OPENSSL_FIPS macro is defined in /usr/include/openssl/opensslconf-x86_64.h. So is handled outside of OpenVPN, and without that macro we don't need to be concerned about the FIPS_mode() function.
As mentioned in the community developer meeting today, there are some concerns about the recently released OpenSSL 3.0 and FIPS - but lets tackle that further down the road once we have distributions with the latest OpenSSL library more easily available.
The bottom line is ...
Signature · 4 lines
kind regards, David Sommerseth OpenVPN Inc
Thanks for the test on CentOS 8. I have skimmed the code, but since I have no FIPS enabled OpenSSL around, haven't tested anything.
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
commit 8f25cefea15481cc0338bca40a89d96fbe745b9f
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Wed Aug 18 23:33:53 2021 +0200
Detect unusable ciphers on patched OpenSSL of RHEL/Centos
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: David Sommerseth <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg22746.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering