memfd_secret.2: add NOTES section ...
PATCH 1/1 memfd_secret.2: add NOTES section ...
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
... that explains the rationale for the system call
--- man2/memfd_secret.2 | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)
man2/memfd_secret.2 +61 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,67 @@ system call first appeared in Linux 5.14. The .BR memfd_secret () system call is Linux-specific. +.SH NOTES +.PP +The +.BR memfd_secret () +system call is designed to allow a user-space process +to create a range of memory that is inaccessible to anybody else - +kernel included. +There is no 100% guarantee that kernel won't be able to access +memory ranges backed by +.BR memfd_secret () +in any circumstances, but nevertheless, +it is much harder to exfiltrate data from these regions. +.PP +The +.BR memfd_secret () +provides the following protections: +.IP \(bu 3 +Enhanced protection +(in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) +against ROP attacks. +Absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing memory backed by +.BR memfd_secret () +means that one-gadget ROP attack +can't work to perform data exfiltration. +The attacker would need to find enough ROP gadgets +to reconstruct the missing page table entries, +which significantly increases difficulty of the attack, +especially when other protections like the kernel stack size limit +and address space layout randomization are in place. +.IP \(bu +Prevent cross-process userspace memory exposures. +Once a region for a +.BR memfd_secret () +memory mapping is allocated, +the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel +to be transmitted somewhere. +The memory pages in this region cannot be accessed via the direct map +and they are disallowed in get_user_pages. +.IP \(bu +Harden against exploited kernel flaws. +In order to access memory areas backed by +.BR memfd_secret(), +a kernel-side attack would need to +either walk the page tables and create new ones, +or spawn a new privileged userspace process to perform +secrets exfiltration using +.BR ptrace (2). +.PP +The way +.BR memfd_secret () +allocates and locks the memory may impact overall system performance, +therefore the system call is disabled by default and only available +if the system administrator turned it on using +"secretmem.enable=y" kernel parameter. +.PP +To prevent potiential data leaks of memory regions backed by +.BR memfd_secret() +from a hybernation image, +hybernation is prevented when there are active +.BR memfd_secret () +users. .SH SEE ALSO .BR fcntl (2), .BR ftruncate (2),
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Hi Mike,
Quoted 5 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
... that explains the rationale for the system call
Signed-off-by Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
I found a few formatting/wording issues (see below; but I fixed them myself, so you don't need to worry about them).
In general, I understood the rationale for the system call,
so I applied the patch to my tree. However, there are some parts that I didn't understand well, mostly related to kernel internals, but since Michael knows more about those, I expect him to review those again when I send him the patch.
Thanks!
Alex
Quoted 9 lines
--- man2/memfd_secret.2 | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)man2/memfd_secret.2 +0
-0
man2/memfd_secret.2 system call first appeared in Linux 5.14. · line 151
Quoted 5 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +2
-0@@ -147,6 +147,67 @@ system call first appeared in Linux 5.14. The .BR memfd_secret () system call is Linux-specific. +.SH NOTES +.PP
Unnecessary .PP after .SH or .SS
man2/memfd_secret.2 system call first appeared in Linux 5.14. · line 163
Quoted 12 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +12
-0+The +.BR memfd_secret () +system call is designed to allow a user-space process +to create a range of memory that is inaccessible to anybody else - +kernel included. +There is no 100% guarantee that kernel won't be able to access +memory ranges backed by +.BR memfd_secret () +in any circumstances, but nevertheless, +it is much harder to exfiltrate data from these regions. +.PP +The
/The/d
Quoted 7 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +7
-0+.BR memfd_secret () +provides the following protections: +.IP \(bu 3 +Enhanced protection +(in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) +against ROP attacks. +Absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing memory backed by
man2/memfd_secret.2 system call first appeared in Linux 5.14. · line 180
Quoted 10 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +10
-0+.BR memfd_secret () +means that one-gadget ROP attack +can't work to perform data exfiltration. +The attacker would need to find enough ROP gadgets +to reconstruct the missing page table entries, +which significantly increases difficulty of the attack, +especially when other protections like the kernel stack size limit +and address space layout randomization are in place. +.IP \(bu +Prevent cross-process userspace memory exposures.
s/userspace/user-space/
Quoted 4 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +4
-0+Once a region for a +.BR memfd_secret () +memory mapping is allocated, +the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernel
man2/memfd_secret.2 system call first appeared in Linux 5.14. · line 194
Quoted 10 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +10
-0+to be transmitted somewhere. +The memory pages in this region cannot be accessed via the direct map +and they are disallowed in get_user_pages. +.IP \(bu +Harden against exploited kernel flaws. +In order to access memory areas backed by +.BR memfd_secret(), +a kernel-side attack would need to +either walk the page tables and create new ones, +or spawn a new privileged userspace process to perform
s/userspace/user-space/
Quoted 20 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +16
-0+secrets exfiltration using +.BR ptrace (2). +.PP +The way +.BR memfd_secret () +allocates and locks the memory may impact overall system performance, +therefore the system call is disabled by default and only available +if the system administrator turned it on using +"secretmem.enable=y" kernel parameter. +.PP +To prevent potiential data leaks of memory regions backed by +.BR memfd_secret() +from a hybernation image, +hybernation is prevented when there are active +.BR memfd_secret () +users. .SH SEE ALSO .BR fcntl (2), .BR ftruncate (2),
Signature · 3 lines
Alejandro Colomar Linux man-pages comaintainer; https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ http://www.alejandro-colomar.es/
Hi Alex,
Quoted 11 lines · Alejandro Colomar (man-pages)
Hi Mike,
Quoted 5 lines · Mike Rapoport
From: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
... that explains the rationale for the system call
Signed-off-by Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>I found a few formatting/wording issues (see below; but I fixed them myself, so you don't need to worry about them).
Thanks a lot!
Quoted 105 lines
In general, I understood the rationale for the system call, so I applied the patch to my tree. However, there are some parts that I didn't understand well, mostly related to kernel internals, but since Michael knows more about those, I expect him to review those again when I send him the patch.
Thanks!
Alex
Quoted 9 lines
--- man2/memfd_secret.2 | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)man2/memfd_secret.2 +0
-0man2/memfd_secret.2 system call first appeared in Linux 5.14. · line 151
Quoted 5 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +2
-0@@ -147,6 +147,67 @@ system call first appeared in Linux 5.14. The .BR memfd_secret () system call is Linux-specific. +.SH NOTES +.PPUnnecessary .PP after .SH or .SS
man2/memfd_secret.2 system call first appeared in Linux 5.14. · line 163
Quoted 12 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +12
-0+The +.BR memfd_secret () +system call is designed to allow a user-space process +to create a range of memory that is inaccessible to anybody else - +kernel included. +There is no 100% guarantee that kernel won't be able to access +memory ranges backed by +.BR memfd_secret () +in any circumstances, but nevertheless, +it is much harder to exfiltrate data from these regions. +.PP +The/The/d
Quoted 7 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +7
-0+.BR memfd_secret () +provides the following protections: +.IP \(bu 3 +Enhanced protection +(in conjunction with all the other in-kernel attack prevention systems) +against ROP attacks. +Absence of any in-kernel primitive for accessing memory backed byman2/memfd_secret.2 system call first appeared in Linux 5.14. · line 180
Quoted 10 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +10
-0+.BR memfd_secret () +means that one-gadget ROP attack +can't work to perform data exfiltration. +The attacker would need to find enough ROP gadgets +to reconstruct the missing page table entries, +which significantly increases difficulty of the attack, +especially when other protections like the kernel stack size limit +and address space layout randomization are in place. +.IP \(bu +Prevent cross-process userspace memory exposures.s/userspace/user-space/
Quoted 4 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +4
-0+Once a region for a +.BR memfd_secret () +memory mapping is allocated, +the user can't accidentally pass it into the kernelman2/memfd_secret.2 system call first appeared in Linux 5.14. · line 194
Quoted 10 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +10
-0+to be transmitted somewhere. +The memory pages in this region cannot be accessed via the direct map +and they are disallowed in get_user_pages. +.IP \(bu +Harden against exploited kernel flaws. +In order to access memory areas backed by +.BR memfd_secret(), +a kernel-side attack would need to +either walk the page tables and create new ones, +or spawn a new privileged userspace process to performs/userspace/user-space/
Quoted 20 lines
man2/memfd_secret.2 +16
-0+secrets exfiltration using +.BR ptrace (2). +.PP +The way +.BR memfd_secret () +allocates and locks the memory may impact overall system performance, +therefore the system call is disabled by default and only available +if the system administrator turned it on using +"secretmem.enable=y" kernel parameter. +.PP +To prevent potiential data leaks of memory regions backed by +.BR memfd_secret() +from a hybernation image, +hybernation is prevented when there are active +.BR memfd_secret () +users. .SH SEE ALSO .BR fcntl (2), .BR ftruncate (2),Signature · 3 lines
Alejandro Colomar Linux man-pages comaintainer; https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/ http://www.alejandro-colomar.es/
Signature · 2 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike.