KVM: SEV: Acquire vcpu mutex when updating VMSA
Subsystems (4)
PATCH v3 1/1 KVM: SEV: Acquire vcpu mutex when updating VMSA
Adds vcpu mutex guard to the VMSA updating code. Refactors out __sev_launch_update_vmsa() function to deal with per vCPU parts of sev_launch_update_vmsa().
Fixes ad73109ae7ec ("KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest")
Signed-off-by Peter Gonda <[email protected]>
Cc Marc Orr <[email protected]>
Cc Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
Cc Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Cc Brijesh Singh <[email protected]>
---
V3
* Fixes bug with missing 'guest_state_protected = true' after refactor.
V2
* Refactor per vcpu work to separate function.
* Remove check to skip already initialized VMSAs.
* Removed vmsa struct zeroing.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +34 -22
@@ -595,43 +595,55 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)return 0 ; } -static int sev_launch_update_vmsa (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, +int *error) { -struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm (kvm)->sev_info;struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa; +struct vcpu_svm *svm =to_svm (vcpu); +int ret; + +/* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */ + ret =sev_es_sync_vmsa (svm); +if (ret) +return ret; + +/* +* The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place encryption of +* the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region +* with the guest's key), so invalidate it first. +*/ +clflush_cache_range (svm->vmsa,PAGE_SIZE ); + + vmsa.reserved =0 ; + vmsa.handle =to_kvm_svm (kvm)->sev_info.handle; + vmsa.address =__sme_pa (svm->vmsa); + vmsa.len =PAGE_SIZE ; + ret =sev_issue_cmd (kvm,SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA , &vmsa, error); +if (ret) +return ret; + + vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true; +return 0 ; +} + +static int sev_launch_update_vmsa (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp) +{struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;int i, ret;if (!sev_es_guest (kvm))return -ENOTTY ; - vmsa.reserved =0 ; -kvm_for_each_vcpu (i, vcpu, kvm) { -struct vcpu_svm *svm =to_svm (vcpu); - -/* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */ - ret =sev_es_sync_vmsa (svm); + ret =mutex_lock_killable (&vcpu->mutex);if (ret)return ret; -/* -* The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place -* encryption of the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write -* the same memory region with the guest's key), so invalidate -* it first. -*/ -clflush_cache_range (svm->vmsa,PAGE_SIZE ); + ret =__sev_launch_update_vmsa (kvm, vcpu, &argp->error); - vmsa.handle = sev->handle; - vmsa.address =__sme_pa (svm->vmsa); - vmsa.len =PAGE_SIZE ; - ret =sev_issue_cmd (kvm,SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA , &vmsa, - &argp->error); +mutex_unlock (&vcpu->mutex);if (ret)return ret; - - svm->vcpu.arch.guest_state_protected = true; }return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0.882.g93a45727a2-goog