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netfilter: nat: force port remap to prevent shadowing well-known ports

PATCH Superseded Florian Westphal 3 participants 6 messages Nov 29, 2021 – Dec 8, 2021

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v1 of 4 Superseded Latest is v4 →

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Florian Westphal

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 netfilter: nat: force port remap to prevent shadowing well-known ports

If destination port is above 32k and source port below 16k assume this might cause 'port shadowing' where a 'new' inbound connection matches an existing one, e.g.

inbound X:41234 -> Y:53 matches existing conntrack entry

        Z:53 -> X:4123, where Z got natted to X.

In this case, new packet is natted to Z:53 which is likely unwanted.

We could avoid the rewrite for connections that are not being forwarded, but get_unique_tuple() and the callers don't propagate the required hook information for this.

Also adjust test case.

---
 net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c                  | 42 ++++++++++++++++++--
 tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh |  5 ++-
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c +39 -3
index 4d50d51db796..fac9cee3233a 100644
@@ -494,6 +494,38 @@ static void nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
 	goto another_round;
 }
 
+static bool tuple_force_port_remap(const struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple)
+{
+	u16 sp, dp;
+
+	switch (tuple->dst.protonum) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP:
+		sp = ntohs(tuple->src.u.tcp.port);
+		dp = ntohs(tuple->dst.u.tcp.port);
+		break;
+	case IPPROTO_UDP:
+	case IPPROTO_UDPLITE:
+		sp = ntohs(tuple->src.u.udp.port);
+		dp = ntohs(tuple->dst.u.udp.port);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* IANA: System port range: 1-1023,
+	 *         user port range: 1024-49151,
+	 *      private port range: 49152-65535.
+	 *
+	 * Linux default ephemeral port range is 32768-60999.
+	 *
+	 * Enforce port remapping if sport is significantly lower
+	 * than dport to prevent NAT port shadowing, i.e.
+	 * accidental match of 'new' inbound connection vs.
+	 * existing outbound one.
+	 */
+	return sp < 16384 && dp >= 32768;
+}
+
 /* Manipulate the tuple into the range given. For NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
  * we change the source to map into the range. For NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING
  * and NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, we change the destination to map into the
@@ -507,11 +539,16 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
 		 struct nf_conn *ct,
 		 enum nf_nat_manip_type maniptype)
 {
+	bool random_port = range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_ALL;
 	const struct nf_conntrack_zone *zone;
 	struct net *net = nf_ct_net(ct);
 
 	zone = nf_ct_zone(ct);
 
+	if (maniptype == NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC &&
+	    tuple_force_port_remap(orig_tuple))
+		random_port = true;
+
 	/* 1) If this srcip/proto/src-proto-part is currently mapped,
 	 * and that same mapping gives a unique tuple within the given
 	 * range, use that.
@@ -520,8 +557,7 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
 	 * So far, we don't do local source mappings, so multiple
 	 * manips not an issue.
 	 */
-	if (maniptype == NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC &&
-	    !(range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_ALL)) {
+	if (maniptype == NF_NAT_MANIP_SRC && !random_port) {
 		/* try the original tuple first */
 		if (in_range(orig_tuple, range)) {
 			if (!nf_nat_used_tuple(orig_tuple, ct)) {
@@ -545,7 +581,7 @@ get_unique_tuple(struct nf_conntrack_tuple *tuple,
 	 */
 
 	/* Only bother mapping if it's not already in range and unique */
-	if (!(range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_RANDOM_ALL)) {
+	if (!random_port) {
 		if (range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_SPECIFIED) {
 			if (!(range->flags & NF_NAT_RANGE_PROTO_OFFSET) &&
 			    l4proto_in_range(tuple, maniptype,
tools/testing/selftests/netfilter/nft_nat.sh +3 -2
index d88867d2fed7..349a319a9e51 100755
@@ -880,8 +880,9 @@ EOF
 		return $ksft_skip
 	fi
 
-	# test default behaviour. Packet from ns1 to ns0 is redirected to ns2.
-	test_port_shadow "default" "CLIENT"
+	# test default behaviour. Packet from ns1 to ns0 is not redirected
+	# due to automatic port translation.
+	test_port_shadow "default" "ROUTER"
 
 	# test packet filter based mitigation: prevent forwarding of
 	# packets claiming to come from the service port.
Signature · 1 line
2.32.0
#1 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Florian Westphal

If destination port is above 32k and source port below 16k assume this might cause 'port shadowing' where a 'new' inbound connection matches an existing one, e.g.

How did you arrive at 16k?

Quoted 17 lines

inbound X:41234 -> Y:53 matches existing conntrack entry

        Z:53 -> X:4123, where Z got natted to X.

In this case, new packet is natted to Z:53 which is likely unwanted.

We could avoid the rewrite for connections that are not being forwarded, but get_unique_tuple() and the callers don't propagate the required hook information for this.

Also adjust test case.

---

[..]

author maintainer
#2 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Eric Garver
Quoted 3 lines · Florian Westphal

If destination port is above 32k and source port below 16k assume this might cause 'port shadowing' where a 'new' inbound connection matches an existing one, e.g.

How did you arrive at 16k?

I had to pick some number. 1k is too low since some administrative portals (or openvpn for that matter) are on ports above that.

I wanted to pick something that would not kick in for most cases. 16k just seemed like a good compromise, thats all.

#3 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Florian Westphal
Quoted 5 lines · Eric Garver
Quoted 3 lines · Florian Westphal

If destination port is above 32k and source port below 16k assume this might cause 'port shadowing' where a 'new' inbound connection matches an existing one, e.g.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

How did you arrive at 16k?

I had to pick some number. 1k is too low since some administrative portals (or openvpn for that matter) are on ports above that.

I wanted to pick something that would not kick in for most cases. 16k just seemed like a good compromise, thats all.

Understood. I don't have a real reason to choose anything else.

That being said, there are more things registered in the > 16k range than I realized.

#4 lore raw
In reply to Florian Westphal
Quoted 5 lines · Florian Westphal

If destination port is above 32k and source port below 16k assume this might cause 'port shadowing' where a 'new' inbound connection matches an existing one, e.g.

inbound X:41234 -> Y:53 matches existing conntrack entry

Quoted 8 lines
        Z:53 -> X:4123, where Z got natted to X.

In this case, new packet is natted to Z:53 which is likely unwanted.

We could avoid the rewrite for connections that are not being forwarded, but get_unique_tuple() and the callers don't propagate the required hook information for this.

Probably you can scratch a bit to store in the struct nf_conn object if this is locally generated flows?

Thanks

author maintainer
#5 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 3 lines

We could avoid the rewrite for connections that are not being forwarded, but get_unique_tuple() and the callers don't propagate the required hook information for this.

Probably you can scratch a bit to store in the struct nf_conn object if this is locally generated flows?

Yes, that's doable.