x86/Hyper-V: Add Hyper-V Isolation VM support(Second part)
Subsystems (8)
v7 cover x86/Hyper-V: Add Hyper-V Isolation VM support(Second part)
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Hyper-V provides two kinds of Isolation VMs. VBS(Virtualization-based security) and AMD SEV-SNP unenlightened Isolation VMs. This patchset is to add support for these Isolation VM support in Linux.
The memory of these vms are encrypted and host can't access guest memory directly. Hyper-V provides new host visibility hvcall and the guest needs to call new hvcall to mark memory visible to host before sharing memory with host. For security, all network/storage stack memory should not be shared with host and so there is bounce buffer requests.
Vmbus channel ring buffer already plays bounce buffer role because all data from/to host needs to copy from/to between the ring buffer and IO stack memory. So mark vmbus channel ring buffer visible.
For SNP isolation VM, guest needs to access the shared memory via extra address space which is specified by Hyper-V CPUID HYPERV_CPUID_ ISOLATION_CONFIG. The access physical address of the shared memory should be bounce buffer memory GPA plus with shared_gpa_boundary reported by CPUID.
This patchset is to enable swiotlb bounce buffer for netvsc/storvsc drivers in Isolation VM.
Change since v6:
* Fix compile error in hv_init.c and mshyperv.c when swiotlb is not enabled.
* Change the order in the cc_platform_has() and check sev first.
Change sicne v5:
* Modify "Swiotlb" to "swiotlb" in commit log.
* Remove CONFIG_HYPERV check in the hyperv_cc_platform_has()
Change since v4:
* Remove Hyper-V IOMMU IOMMU_INIT_FINISH related functions and set SWIOTLB_FORCE and swiotlb_unencrypted_base in the ms_hyperv_init_platform(). Call swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() in the hyperv_init().
Change since v3:
* Fix boot up failure on the host with mem_encrypt=on. Move calloing of set_memory_decrypted() back from swiotlb_init_io_tlb_mem to swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl() and rmem_swiotlb_device_init().
* Change code style of checking GUEST_MEM attribute in the hyperv_cc_platform_has().
* Add comment in pci-swiotlb-xen.c to explain why add dependency between hyperv_swiotlb_detect() and pci_ xen_swiotlb_detect().
* Return directly when fails to allocate Hyper-V swiotlb buffer in the hyperv_iommu_swiotlb_init().
Change since v2:
* Remove Hyper-V dma ops and dma_alloc/free_noncontiguous. Add hv_map/unmap_memory() to map/umap netvsc rx/tx ring into extra address space.
* Leave mem->vaddr in swiotlb code with phys_to_virt(mem->start) when fail to remap swiotlb memory.
Change since v1:
* Add Hyper-V Isolation support check in the cc_platform_has() and return true for guest memory encrypt attr.
* Remove hv isolation check in the sev_setup_arch()
Tianyu Lan (5):
swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM x86/hyper-v: Add hyperv Isolation VM check in the cc_platform_has()
hyper-v: Enable swiotlb bounce buffer for Isolation VM
scsi: storvsc: Add Isolation VM support for storvsc driver
net: netvsc: Add Isolation VM support for netvsc driver
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 12 +++ arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 28 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c | 8 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 15 +++- drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 11 +++ drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 4 + drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h | 5 ++ drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 1 + drivers/net/hyperv/rndis_filter.c | 2 + drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c | 37 ++++---- include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 2 + include/linux/hyperv.h | 6 ++ include/linux/swiotlb.h | 6 ++ kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 43 +++++++++- 15 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
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2.25.1
PATCH v7 1/5 swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
In Isolation VM with AMD SEV, bounce buffer needs to be accessed via extra address space which is above shared_gpa_boundary (E.G 39 bit address line) reported by Hyper-V CPUID ISOLATION_CONFIG. The access physical address will be original physical address + shared_gpa_boundary. The shared_gpa_boundary in the AMD SEV SNP spec is called virtual top of memory(vTOM). Memory addresses below vTOM are automatically treated as private while memory above vTOM is treated as shared.
Expose swiotlb_unencrypted_base for platforms to set unencrypted memory base offset and platform calls swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() to remap swiotlb mem to unencrypted address space. memremap() can not be called in the early stage and so put remapping code into swiotlb_update_mem_attributes(). Store remap address and use it to copy data from/to swiotlb bounce buffer.
---
Change since v3:
* Fix boot up failure on the host with mem_encrypt=on. Move calloing of set_memory_decrypted() back from swiotlb_init_io_tlb_mem to swiotlb_late_init_with_tbl() and rmem_swiotlb_device_init().
Change since v2:
* Leave mem->vaddr with phys_to_virt(mem->start) when fail to remap swiotlb memory.
Change since v1:
* Rework comment in the swiotlb_init_io_tlb_mem()
* Make swiotlb_init_io_tlb_mem() back to return void.
--- include/linux/swiotlb.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/swiotlb.h +6 -0
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ extern enum swiotlb_force swiotlb_force;* @end: The end address of the swiotlb memory pool. Used to do a quick * range check to see if the memory was in fact allocated by this * API. +* @vaddr: The vaddr of the swiotlb memory pool. The swiotlb memory pool +* may be remapped in the memory encrypted case and store virtual +* address for bounce buffer operation. * @nslabs: The number of IO TLB blocks (in groups of 64) between @start and * @end. For default swiotlb, this is command line adjustable via * setup_io_tlb_npages.
@@ -92,6 +95,7 @@ extern enum swiotlb_force swiotlb_force;struct io_tlb_mem {phys_addr_t start;phys_addr_t end; +void *vaddr;unsigned long nslabs;unsigned long used;unsigned int index;
@@ -186,4 +190,6 @@ static inline bool is_swiotlb_for_alloc(struct device *dev) }#endif /* CONFIG_DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL */ +extern phys_addr_t swiotlb_unencrypted_base; +#endif /* __LINUX_SWIOTLB_H */
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c +41 -2
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2.25.1
PATCH v7 2/5 x86/hyper-v: Add hyperv Isolation VM check in the cc_platform_has()
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Hyper-V provides Isolation VM for confidential computing support and guest memory is encrypted in it. Places checking cc_platform_has() with GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT attr should return "True" in Isolation vm. e.g, swiotlb bounce buffer size needs to adjust according to memory size in the sev_setup_arch(). Add GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT check for Hyper-V Isolation VM.
---
Change since v6:
* Change the order in the cc_platform_has() and check sev first.
Change since v3:
* Change code style of checking GUEST_MEM attribute in the hyperv_cc_platform_has().
--- arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c +8 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> +#include <asm/mshyperv.h> #include <asm/processor.h> static bool __maybe_unused intel_cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr)
@@ -58,12 +59,19 @@ static bool amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)#endif } +static bool hyperv_cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr) +{ +return attr ==CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT ; +}bool cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr) {if (sme_me_mask)return amd_cc_platform_has (attr); +if (hv_is_isolation_supported ()) +return hyperv_cc_platform_has (attr); +return false; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (cc_platform_has);
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2.25.1 _______________________________________________ iommu mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
PATCH v7 3/5 hyper-v: Enable swiotlb bounce buffer for Isolation VM
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
hyperv Isolation VM requires bounce buffer support to copy data from/to encrypted memory and so enable swiotlb force mode to use swiotlb bounce buffer for DMA transaction.
In Isolation VM with AMD SEV, the bounce buffer needs to be accessed via extra address space which is above shared_gpa_boundary (E.G 39 bit address line) reported by Hyper-V CPUID ISOLATION_CONFIG. The access physical address will be original physical address + shared_gpa_boundary. The shared_gpa_boundary in the AMD SEV SNP spec is called virtual top of memory(vTOM). Memory addresses below vTOM are automatically treated as private while memory above vTOM is treated as shared.
Swiotlb bounce buffer code calls set_memory_decrypted() to mark bounce buffer visible to host and map it in extra address space via memremap. Populate the shared_gpa_boundary (vTOM) via swiotlb_unencrypted_base variable.
The map function memremap() can't work in the early place (e.g ms_hyperv_init_platform()) and so call swiotlb_update_mem_ attributes() in the hyperv_init().
---
Change since v6:
* Fix compile error when swiotlb is not enabled.
Change since v4:
* Remove Hyper-V IOMMU IOMMU_INIT_FINISH related functions and set SWIOTLB_FORCE and swiotlb_unencrypted_base in the ms_hyperv_init_platform(). Call swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() in the hyperv_init().
Change since v3:
* Add comment in pci-swiotlb-xen.c to explain why add dependency between hyperv_swiotlb_detect() and pci_ xen_swiotlb_detect().
* Return directly when fails to allocate Hyper-V swiotlb buffer in the hyperv_iommu_swiotlb_init().
--- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c +12 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <linux/syscore_ops.h> #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h> #include <linux/highmem.h> +#include <linux/swiotlb.h> int hyperv_init_cpuhp;u64 hv_current_partition_id = ~0ull ;
@@ -502,6 +503,17 @@ void __init hyperv_init(void)/* Query the VMs extended capability once, so that it can be cached. */ hv_query_ext_cap (0 ); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB +/* +* Swiotlb bounce buffer needs to be mapped in extra address +* space. Map function doesn't work in the early place and so +* call swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() here. +*/ +if (hv_is_isolation_supported ()) +swiotlb_update_mem_attributes (); +#endif +return ; clean_guest_os_id:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +14 -1
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <linux/kexec.h> #include <linux/i8253.h> #include <linux/random.h> +#include <linux/swiotlb.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/hypervisor.h> #include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h>
@@ -319,8 +320,20 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)pr_info ("Hyper-V: Isolation Config: Group A 0x%x, Group B 0x%x\n" , ms_hyperv.isolation_config_a, ms_hyperv.isolation_config_b); -if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP ) +if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP ) {static_branch_enable (&isolation_type_snp); +#ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB + swiotlb_unencrypted_base = ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary; +#endif + } + +#ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB +/* +* Enable swiotlb force mode in Isolation VM to +* use swiotlb bounce buffer for dma transaction. +*/ + swiotlb_force =SWIOTLB_FORCE ; +#endif }if (hv_max_functions_eax >=HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES ) {
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2.25.1
PATCH v7 4/5 scsi: storvsc: Add Isolation VM support for storvsc driver
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
In Isolation VM, all shared memory with host needs to mark visible to host via hvcall. vmbus_establish_gpadl() has already done it for storvsc rx/tx ring buffer. The page buffer used by vmbus_sendpacket_ mpb_desc() still needs to be handled. Use DMA API(scsi_dma_map/unmap) to map these memory during sending/receiving packet and return swiotlb bounce buffer dma address. In Isolation VM, swiotlb bounce buffer is marked to be visible to host and the swiotlb force mode is enabled.
Set device's dma min align mask to HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE - 1 in order to keep the original data offset in the bounce buffer.
--- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 4 ++++ drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------- include/linux/hyperv.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +4 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> +#include <linux/dma-map-ops.h> #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h> #include "hyperv_vmbus.h"
@@ -2078,6 +2079,7 @@ struct hv_device *vmbus_device_create(const guid_t *type,return child_device_obj; } +static u64 vmbus_dma_mask =DMA_BIT_MASK (64 );/* * vmbus_device_register - Register the child device */
@@ -2118,6 +2120,8 @@ int vmbus_device_register(struct hv_device *child_device_obj) }hv_debug_add_dev_dir (child_device_obj); + child_device_obj->device.dma_mask = &vmbus_dma_mask; + child_device_obj->device.dma_parms = &child_device_obj->dma_parms;return 0 ; err_kset_unregister:
drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c +21 -16
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/hyperv.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <scsi/scsi.h> #include <scsi/scsi_cmnd.h> #include <scsi/scsi_host.h>
@@ -1336,6 +1338,7 @@ static void storvsc_on_channel_callback(void *context)continue ; } request = (struct storvsc_cmd_request *)scsi_cmd_priv (scmnd); +scsi_dma_unmap (scmnd); }storvsc_on_receive (stor_device, packet, request);
@@ -1749,7 +1752,6 @@ static int storvsc_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *scmnd)struct hv_host_device *host_dev =shost_priv (host);struct hv_device *dev = host_dev->dev;struct storvsc_cmd_request *cmd_request =scsi_cmd_priv (scmnd); -int i;struct scatterlist *sgl;unsigned int sg_count;struct vmscsi_request *vm_srb;
@@ -1831,10 +1833,11 @@ static int storvsc_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *scmnd) payload_sz =sizeof (cmd_request->mpb);if (sg_count) { -unsigned int hvpgoff, hvpfns_to_add;unsigned long offset_in_hvpg =offset_in_hvpage (sgl->offset);unsigned int hvpg_count =HVPFN_UP (offset_in_hvpg + length); -u64 hvpfn; +struct scatterlist *sg; +unsigned long hvpfn, hvpfns_to_add; +int j, i =0 ;if (hvpg_count >MAX_PAGE_BUFFER_COUNT ) {
@@ -1848,21 +1851,22 @@ static int storvsc_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *scmnd) payload->range.len = length; payload->range.offset = offset_in_hvpg; + sg_count =scsi_dma_map (scmnd); +if (sg_count <0 ) +return SCSI_MLQUEUE_DEVICE_BUSY ; -for (i =0 ; sgl !=NULL ; sgl =sg_next (sgl)) { +for_each_sg (sgl, sg, sg_count, j) {/* -* Init values for the current sgl entry. hvpgoff -* and hvpfns_to_add are in units of Hyper-V size -* pages. Handling the PAGE_SIZE != HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE -* case also handles values of sgl->offset that are -* larger than PAGE_SIZE. Such offsets are handled -* even on other than the first sgl entry, provided -* they are a multiple of PAGE_SIZE. +* Init values for the current sgl entry. hvpfns_to_add +* is in units of Hyper-V size pages. Handling the +* PAGE_SIZE != HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE case also handles +* values of sgl->offset that are larger than PAGE_SIZE. +* Such offsets are handled even on other than the first +* sgl entry, provided they are a multiple of PAGE_SIZE. */ - hvpgoff =HVPFN_DOWN (sgl->offset); - hvpfn =page_to_hvpfn (sg_page (sgl)) + hvpgoff; - hvpfns_to_add =HVPFN_UP (sgl->offset + sgl->length) - - hvpgoff; + hvpfn =HVPFN_DOWN (sg_dma_address (sg)); + hvpfns_to_add =HVPFN_UP (sg_dma_address (sg) + +sg_dma_len (sg)) - hvpfn;/* * Fill the next portion of the PFN array with
@@ -1872,7 +1876,7 @@ static int storvsc_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *scmnd)* the PFN array is filled. */ while (hvpfns_to_add--) - payload->range.pfn_array[i++] = hvpfn++; + payload->range.pfn_array[i++] = hvpfn++; } }
@@ -2016,6 +2020,7 @@ static int storvsc_probe(struct hv_device *device, stor_device->vmscsi_size_delta =sizeof (struct vmscsi_win8_extension );spin_lock_init (&stor_device->lock);hv_set_drvdata (device, stor_device); +dma_set_min_align_mask (&device->device,HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE -1 ); stor_device->port_number = host->host_no; ret =storvsc_connect_to_vsp (device, storvsc_ringbuffer_size, is_fc);
include/linux/hyperv.h +1 -0
@@ -1261,6 +1261,7 @@ struct hv_device {struct vmbus_channel *channel;struct kset *channels_kset; +struct device_dma_parameters dma_parms;/* place holder to keep track of the dir for hv device in debugfs */ struct dentry *debug_dir;
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2.25.1 _______________________________________________ iommu mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
PATCH v7 5/5 net: netvsc: Add Isolation VM support for netvsc driver
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
In Isolation VM, all shared memory with host needs to mark visible to host via hvcall. vmbus_establish_gpadl() has already done it for netvsc rx/tx ring buffer. The page buffer used by vmbus_sendpacket_ pagebuffer() stills need to be handled. Use DMA API to map/umap these memory during sending/receiving packet and Hyper-V swiotlb bounce buffer dma address will be returned. The swiotlb bounce buffer has been masked to be visible to host during boot up.
rx/tx ring buffer is allocated via vzalloc() and they need to be mapped into unencrypted address space(above vTOM) before sharing with host and accessing. Add hv_map/unmap_memory() to map/umap rx /tx ring buffer.
---
Change since v3:
* Replace HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE with PAGE_SIZE and virt_to_hvpfn() with vmalloc_to_pfn() in the hv_map_memory()
Change since v2:
* Add hv_map/unmap_memory() to map/umap rx/tx ring buffer.
--- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 28 ++++++ drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 11 +++ drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h | 5 ++ drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 1 + drivers/net/hyperv/rndis_filter.c | 2 + include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 2 + include/linux/hyperv.h | 5 ++ 8 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +28 -0
@@ -287,3 +287,31 @@ int hv_set_mem_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool visiblkfree (pfn_array);return ret; } + +/* +* hv_map_memory - map memory to extra space in the AMD SEV-SNP Isolation VM. +*/ +void *hv_map_memory (void *addr,unsigned long size) +{ +unsigned long *pfns =kcalloc (size /PAGE_SIZE , +sizeof (unsigned long ),GFP_KERNEL ); +void *vaddr; +int i; + +if (!pfns) +return NULL ; + +for (i =0 ; i < size /PAGE_SIZE ; i++) + pfns[i] =vmalloc_to_pfn (addr + i *PAGE_SIZE ) + + (ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary >>PAGE_SHIFT ); + + vaddr =vmap_pfn (pfns, size /PAGE_SIZE ,PAGE_KERNEL_IO ); +kfree (pfns); + +return vaddr; +} + +void hv_unmap_memory (void *addr) +{ +vunmap (addr); +}
drivers/hv/hv_common.c +11 -0
@@ -295,3 +295,14 @@ u64 __weak hv_ghcb_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output, u32 input_sreturn HV_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_ghcb_hypercall); + +void __weak *hv_map_memory (void *addr,unsigned long size) +{ +return NULL ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_map_memory); + +void __weak hv_unmap_memory (void *addr) +{ +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_unmap_memory);
drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h +5 -0
@@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ struct hv_netvsc_packet {u32 total_bytes;u32 send_buf_index;u32 total_data_buflen; +struct hv_dma_range *dma_range; };#define NETVSC_HASH_KEYLEN 40
@@ -1074,6 +1075,7 @@ struct netvsc_device {/* Receive buffer allocated by us but manages by NetVSP */ void *recv_buf; +void *recv_original_buf;u32 recv_buf_size;/* allocated bytes */ struct vmbus_gpadl recv_buf_gpadl_handle;u32 recv_section_cnt;
@@ -1082,6 +1084,7 @@ struct netvsc_device {/* Send buffer allocated by us */ void *send_buf; +void *send_original_buf;u32 send_buf_size;struct vmbus_gpadl send_buf_gpadl_handle;u32 send_section_cnt;
@@ -1731,4 +1734,6 @@ struct rndis_message {#define RETRY_US_HI 10000#define RETRY_MAX 2000/* >10 sec */ +void netvsc_dma_unmap (struct hv_device *hv_dev, +struct hv_netvsc_packet *packet);#endif /* _HYPERV_NET_H */
drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c +133 -3
198 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c +1 -0
@@ -2512,6 +2512,7 @@ static int netvsc_probe(struct hv_device *dev, net->netdev_ops = &device_ops; net->ethtool_ops = ðtool_ops;SET_NETDEV_DEV (net, &dev->device); +dma_set_min_align_mask (&dev->device,HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE -1 );/* We always need headroom for rndis header */ net->needed_headroom =RNDIS_AND_PPI_SIZE ;
drivers/net/hyperv/rndis_filter.c +2 -0
@@ -361,6 +361,8 @@ static void rndis_filter_receive_response(struct net_device *ndev, } } +netvsc_dma_unmap (((struct net_device_context *) +netdev_priv (ndev))->device_ctx, &request->pkt);complete (&request->wait_event); }else { netdev_err(ndev,
include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h +2 -0
@@ -269,6 +269,8 @@ bool hv_isolation_type_snp(void);u64 hv_ghcb_hypercall (u64 control,void *input,void *output,u32 input_size);void hyperv_cleanup (void );bool hv_query_ext_cap (u64 cap_query); +void *hv_map_memory (void *addr,unsigned long size); +void hv_unmap_memory (void *addr);#else /* CONFIG_HYPERV */ static inline bool hv_is_hyperv_initialized (void ) {return false; }static inline bool hv_is_hibernation_supported (void ) {return false; }
include/linux/hyperv.h +5 -0
@@ -1584,6 +1584,11 @@ struct hyperv_service_callback {void (*callback)(void *context); }; +struct hv_dma_range { +dma_addr_t dma; +u32 mapping_size; +}; +#define MAX_SRV_VER 0x7ffffff extern bool vmbus_prep_negotiate_resp(struct icmsg_hdr *icmsghdrp, u8 *buf, u32 buflen, const int *fw_version, int fw_vercnt,
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2.25.1 _______________________________________________ iommu mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/iommu
Re: [PATCH V7 1/5] swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 7 lines · Tianyu Lan
In Isolation VM with AMD SEV, bounce buffer needs to be accessed via extra address space which is above
shared_gpa_boundary(E.G 39 bit address line) reported by Hyper-V CPUIDISOLATION_CONFIG. The access physical address will be original physical address +shared_gpa_boundary. Theshared_gpa_boundaryin the AMD SEV SNP spec is called virtual top of memory(vTOM). Memory addresses below vTOM are automatically treated as private while memory above vTOM is treated as shared.
This seems to be independently reintroducing some of the SEV infrastructure. Is it really OK that this doesn't interact at all with any existing SEV code?
For instance, do we need a new 'swiotlb_unencrypted_base', or should this just be using sme_me_mask somehow?
RE: [PATCH V7 5/5] net: netvsc: Add Isolation VM support for netvsc driver
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 42 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, December 13, 2021 2:14 AM
To: KY Srinivasan <[email protected]>; Haiyang Zhang <[email protected]>; Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>; [email protected]; Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>; Michael Kelley (LINUX) <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; linux- [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; vkuznets <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: [PATCH V7 5/5] net: netvsc: Add Isolation VM support for netvsc driverFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
In Isolation VM, all shared memory with host needs to mark visible to host via hvcall.
vmbus_establish_gpadl()has already done it for netvsc rx/tx ring buffer. The page buffer used byvmbus_sendpacket_pagebuffer()stills need to be handled. Use DMA API to map/umap these memory during sending/receiving packet and Hyper-V swiotlb bounce buffer dma address will be returned. The swiotlb bounce buffer has been masked to be visible to host during boot up.rx/tx ring buffer is allocated via
vzalloc()and they need to be mapped into unencrypted address space(above vTOM) before sharing with host and accessing. Add hv_map/unmap_memory() to map/umap rx /tx ring buffer.Signed-off-by Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>---
Change since v3:
* ReplaceHV_HYP_PAGE_SIZEwithPAGE_SIZEandvirt_to_hvpfn()withvmalloc_to_pfn()in thehv_map_memory()Change since v2:
* Add hv_map/unmap_memory() to map/umap rx/tx ring buffer.
Quoted 11 lines
--- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 28 ++++++ drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 11 +++ drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h | 5 ++ drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 1 + drivers/net/hyperv/rndis_filter.c | 2 + include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 2 + include/linux/hyperv.h | 5 ++ 8 files changed, 187 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Re: [PATCH V7 1/5] swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM
In reply to Dave HansenQuoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 7 lines · Tianyu Lan
In Isolation VM with AMD SEV, bounce buffer needs to be accessed via extra address space which is above
shared_gpa_boundary(E.G 39 bit address line) reported by Hyper-V CPUIDISOLATION_CONFIG. The access physical address will be original physical address +shared_gpa_boundary. Theshared_gpa_boundaryin the AMD SEV SNP spec is called virtual top of memory(vTOM). Memory addresses below vTOM are automatically treated as private while memory above vTOM is treated as shared.
Quoted 6 lines
This seems to be independently reintroducing some of the SEV infrastructure. Is it really OK that this doesn't interact at all with any existing SEV code?
For instance, do we need a new '
swiotlb_unencrypted_base', or should this just be usingsme_me_masksomehow?
Hi Dave:
Thanks for your review. Hyper-V provides a para-virtualized
confidential computing solution based on the AMD SEV function and not expose sev&sme capabilities to guest. So sme_me_mask is unset in the Hyper-V Isolation VM. swiotlb_unencrypted_base is more general solution to handle such case of different address space for encrypted and decrypted memory and other platform also may reuse it.
Wei Liu
maintainerRe: [PATCH V7 2/5] x86/hyper-v: Add hyperv Isolation VM check in the cc_platform_has()
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 10 lines · Tianyu Lan
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Hyper-V provides Isolation VM for confidential computing support and guest memory is encrypted in it. Places checking
cc_platform_has()withGUEST_MEM_ENCRYPTattr should return "True" in Isolation vm. e.g, swiotlb bounce buffer size needs to adjust according to memory size in thesev_setup_arch(). AddGUEST_MEM_ENCRYPTcheck for Hyper-V Isolation VM.Signed-off-by Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
x86 maintainers, any comment on this patch?
Quoted 46 lines
---
Change since v6:
* Change the order in thecc_platform_has()and check sev first.Change since v3:
* Change code style of checkingGUEST_MEMattribute in thehyperv_cc_platform_has().--- arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c +8
-0@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/cc_platform.h> #include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> +#include <asm/mshyperv.h> #include <asm/processor.h> static bool __maybe_unused intel_cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr)@@ -58,12 +59,19 @@ static bool amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)#endif } +static bool hyperv_cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr) +{ +return attr ==CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT ; +}bool cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr) {if (sme_me_mask)return amd_cc_platform_has (attr); +if (hv_is_isolation_supported ()) +return hyperv_cc_platform_has (attr); +return false; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (cc_platform_has);Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH V7 2/5] x86/hyper-v: Add hyperv Isolation VM check in the cc_platform_has()
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 5 lines · Tianyu Lan
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Hyper-V provides Isolation VM for confidential computing support and guest memory is encrypted in it. Places checking
cc_platform_has()withGUEST_MEM_ENCRYPTattr should return "True" in Isolation vm. e.g,
Stick to a single spelling variant: "VM".
Quoted 2 lines
swiotlb bounce buffer size needs to adjust according to memory size in the
sev_setup_arch().
So basically you wanna simply say here:
"Hyper-V Isolation VMs need to adjust the SWIOTLB size just like SEV guests. Add a hyperv_cc_platform_has() variant which enables that."
?
With that addressed you can have my
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteWei Liu
maintainerRe: [PATCH V7 2/5] x86/hyper-v: Add hyperv Isolation VM check in the cc_platform_has()
Quoted 14 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 5 lines · Tianyu Lan
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Hyper-V provides Isolation VM for confidential computing support and guest memory is encrypted in it. Places checking
cc_platform_has()withGUEST_MEM_ENCRYPTattr should return "True" in Isolation vm. e.g,Stick to a single spelling variant: "VM".
Quoted 2 lines
swiotlb bounce buffer size needs to adjust according to memory size in the
sev_setup_arch().So basically you wanna simply say here:
Quoted 8 lines
"Hyper-V Isolation VMs need to adjust the SWIOTLB size just like SEV guests. Add a
hyperv_cc_platform_has()variant which enables that."?
With that addressed you can have my
Acked-by Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Thanks. I can address your comments when I pick up this series.
Wei.
Quoted 8 lines
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]> Sent: Sunday, December 12, 2021 11:14 PM
Quoted 89 lines
Hyper-V provides two kinds of Isolation VMs. VBS(Virtualization-based security) and AMD SEV-SNP unenlightened Isolation VMs. This patchset is to add support for these Isolation VM support in Linux.
The memory of these vms are encrypted and host can't access guest memory directly. Hyper-V provides new host visibility hvcall and the guest needs to call new hvcall to mark memory visible to host before sharing memory with host. For security, all network/storage stack memory should not be shared with host and so there is bounce buffer requests.
Vmbus channel ring buffer already plays bounce buffer role because all data from/to host needs to copy from/to between the ring buffer and IO stack memory. So mark vmbus channel ring buffer visible.
For SNP isolation VM, guest needs to access the shared memory via extra address space which is specified by Hyper-V CPUID
HYPERV_CPUID_ISOLATION_CONFIG. The access physical address of the shared memory should be bounce buffer memory GPA plus withshared_gpa_boundaryreported by CPUID.This patchset is to enable swiotlb bounce buffer for netvsc/storvsc drivers in Isolation VM.
Change since v6:
* Fix compile error inhv_init.candmshyperv.cwhen swiotlb is not enabled.
* Change the order in thecc_platform_has()and check sev first.Change sicne v5:
* Modify "Swiotlb" to "swiotlb" in commit log.
* RemoveCONFIG_HYPERVcheck in thehyperv_cc_platform_has()Change since v4:
* Remove Hyper-V IOMMUIOMMU_INIT_FINISHrelated functions and setSWIOTLB_FORCEandswiotlb_unencrypted_basein thems_hyperv_init_platform(). Callswiotlb_update_mem_attributes()in thehyperv_init().Change since v3:
* Fix boot up failure on the host with mem_encrypt=on. Move calloing ofset_memory_decrypted()back fromswiotlb_init_io_tlb_memtoswiotlb_late_init_with_tbl()andrmem_swiotlb_device_init().
* Change code style of checkingGUEST_MEMattribute in thehyperv_cc_platform_has().
* Add comment inpci-swiotlb-xen.cto explain why add dependency betweenhyperv_swiotlb_detect()andpci_xen_swiotlb_detect().
* Return directly when fails to allocate Hyper-V swiotlb buffer in thehyperv_iommu_swiotlb_init().Change since v2:
* Remove Hyper-V dma ops and dma_alloc/free_noncontiguous. Add hv_map/unmap_memory() to map/umap netvsc rx/tx ring into extra address space.
* Leavemem->vaddrin swiotlb code withphys_to_virt(mem->start)when fail to remap swiotlb memory.Change since v1:
* Add Hyper-V Isolation support check in thecc_platform_has()and return true for guest memory encrypt attr.
* Remove hv isolation check in thesev_setup_arch()Tianyu Lan (5):
swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM x86/hyper-v: Add hyperv Isolation VM check in thecc_platform_has()
hyper-v: Enable swiotlb bounce buffer for Isolation VM
scsi: storvsc: Add Isolation VM support for storvsc driver
net: netvsc: Add Isolation VM support for netvsc driverarch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 12 +++ arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 28 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cc_platform.c | 8 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 15 +++- drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 11 +++ drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 4 + drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h | 5 ++ drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c | 136 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc_drv.c | 1 + drivers/net/hyperv/rndis_filter.c | 2 + drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c | 37 ++++---- include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 2 + include/linux/hyperv.h | 6 ++ include/linux/swiotlb.h | 6 ++ kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 43 +++++++++- 15 files changed, 294 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
Quoted 2 lines
--
2.25.1
For the entire series,
Re: [PATCH V7 1/5] swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 18 lines · Tianyu Lan
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Tianyu Lan
In Isolation VM with AMD SEV, bounce buffer needs to be accessed via extra address space which is above
shared_gpa_boundary(E.G 39 bit address line) reported by Hyper-V CPUIDISOLATION_CONFIG. The access physical address will be original physical address +shared_gpa_boundary.
Theshared_gpa_boundaryin the AMD SEV SNP spec is called virtual top of memory(vTOM). Memory addresses below vTOM are automatically treated as private while memory above vTOM is treated as shared.Quoted 6 lines
This seems to be independently reintroducing some of the SEV infrastructure. Is it really OK that this doesn't interact at all with any existing SEV code?
For instance, do we need a new '
swiotlb_unencrypted_base', or should this just be usingsme_me_masksomehow?
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks for your review. Hyper-V provides a para-virtualized confidential computing solution based on the AMD SEV function and not expose sev&sme capabilities to guest. So
sme_me_maskis unset in the Hyper-V Isolation VM.swiotlb_unencrypted_baseis more general solution to handle such case of different address space for encrypted and decrypted memory and other platform also may reuse it.
I don't really understand how this can be more general any *not* get utilized by the existing SEV support.
Re: [PATCH V7 1/5] swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM
Quoted 26 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 18 lines · Tianyu Lan
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Tianyu Lan
In Isolation VM with AMD SEV, bounce buffer needs to be accessed via extra address space which is above
shared_gpa_boundary(E.G 39 bit address line) reported by Hyper-V CPUIDISOLATION_CONFIG. The access physical address will be original physical address +shared_gpa_boundary.
Theshared_gpa_boundaryin the AMD SEV SNP spec is called virtual top of memory(vTOM). Memory addresses below vTOM are automatically treated as private while memory above vTOM is treated as shared.Quoted 6 lines
This seems to be independently reintroducing some of the SEV infrastructure. Is it really OK that this doesn't interact at all with any existing SEV code?
For instance, do we need a new '
swiotlb_unencrypted_base', or should this just be usingsme_me_masksomehow?Quoted 6 lines
Thanks for your review. Hyper-V provides a para-virtualized
confidential computing solution based on the AMD SEV function and not expose sev&sme capabilities to guest. Sosme_me_maskis unset in the Hyper-V Isolation VM.swiotlb_unencrypted_baseis more general solution to handle such case of different address space for encrypted and decrypted memory and other platform also may reuse it.
Quoted 2 lines
I don't really understand how this can be more general any *not* get utilized by the existing SEV support.
The Virtual Top-of-Memory (VTOM) support is an SEV-SNP feature that is meant to be used with a (relatively) un-enlightened guest. The idea is that the C-bit in the guest page tables must be 0 for all accesses. It is only the physical address relative to VTOM that determines if the access is encrypted or not. So setting sme_me_mask will actually cause issues when running with this feature. Since all DMA for an SEV-SNP guest must still be to shared (unencrypted) memory, some enlightenment is needed. In this case, memory mapped above VTOM will provide that via the SWIOTLB update. For SEV-SNP guests running with VTOM, they are likely to also be running with the Reflect #VC feature, allowing a "paravisor" to handle any #VCs generated by the guest.
See sections 15.36.8 "Virtual Top-of-Memory" and 15.36.9 "Reflect #VC" in volume 2 of the AMD APM [1].
I'm not sure if that will answer your question or generate more :)
Thanks,
Tom
[1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf
Quoted 1 line
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Re: [PATCH V7 1/5] swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM
Quoted 15 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 2 lines
I don't really understand how this can be more general any *not* get utilized by the existing SEV support.
The Virtual Top-of-Memory (VTOM) support is an SEV-SNP feature that is meant to be used with a (relatively) un-enlightened guest. The idea is that the C-bit in the guest page tables must be 0 for all accesses. It is only the physical address relative to VTOM that determines if the access is encrypted or not. So setting
sme_me_maskwill actually cause issues when running with this feature. Since all DMA for an SEV-SNP guest must still be to shared (unencrypted) memory, some enlightenment is needed. In this case, memory mapped above VTOM will provide that via the SWIOTLB update. For SEV-SNP guests running with VTOM, they are likely to also be running with the Reflect #VC feature, allowing a "paravisor" to handle any #VCs generated by the guest.
Quoted 2 lines
See sections 15.36.8 "Virtual Top-of-Memory" and 15.36.9 "Reflect #VC" in volume 2 of the AMD APM [1].
Thanks, Tom, that's pretty much what I was looking for.
The C-bit normally comes from the page tables. But, the hardware also provides an alternative way to effectively get C-bit behavior without actually setting the bit in the page tables: Virtual Top-of-Memory (VTOM). Right?
It sounds like Hyper-V has chosen to use VTOM instead of requiring the guest to do the C-bit in its page tables.
But, the thing that confuses me is when you said: "it (VTOM) is meant to be used with a (relatively) un-enlightened guest". We don't have an unenlightened guest here. We have Linux, which is quite enlightened.
Is VTOM being used because there's something that completely rules out using the C-bit in the page tables? What's that "something"?
Re: [PATCH V7 1/5] swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM
Quoted 26 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 15 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 2 lines
I don't really understand how this can be more general any *not* get utilized by the existing SEV support.
The Virtual Top-of-Memory (VTOM) support is an SEV-SNP feature that is meant to be used with a (relatively) un-enlightened guest. The idea is that the C-bit in the guest page tables must be 0 for all accesses. It is only the physical address relative to VTOM that determines if the access is encrypted or not. So setting
sme_me_maskwill actually cause issues when running with this feature. Since all DMA for an SEV-SNP guest must still be to shared (unencrypted) memory, some enlightenment is needed. In this case, memory mapped above VTOM will provide that via the SWIOTLB update. For SEV-SNP guests running with VTOM, they are likely to also be running with the Reflect #VC feature, allowing a "paravisor" to handle any #VCs generated by the guest.Quoted 2 lines
See sections 15.36.8 "Virtual Top-of-Memory" and 15.36.9 "Reflect #VC" in volume 2 of the AMD APM [1].
Thanks, Tom, that's pretty much what I was looking for.
The C-bit normally comes from the page tables. But, the hardware also provides an alternative way to effectively get C-bit behavior without actually setting the bit in the page tables: Virtual Top-of-Memory (VTOM). Right?
Quoted 9 lines
It sounds like Hyper-V has chosen to use VTOM instead of requiring the guest to do the C-bit in its page tables.
But, the thing that confuses me is when you said: "it (VTOM) is meant to be used with a (relatively) un-enlightened guest". We don't have an unenlightened guest here. We have Linux, which is quite enlightened.
Quoted 2 lines
Is VTOM being used because there's something that completely rules out using the C-bit in the page tables? What's that "something"?
For "un-enlightened" guest, there is an another system running insider
the VM to emulate some functions(tsc, timer, interrupt and so on) and
this helps not to modify OS(Linux/Windows) a lot. In Hyper-V Isolation
VM, we called the new system as HCL/paravisor. HCL runs in the VMPL0 and Linux runs in VMPL2. This is similar with nested virtualization. HCL plays similar role as L1 hypervisor to emulate some general functions
(e.g, rdmsr/wrmsr accessing and interrupt injection) which needs to be
enlightened in the enlightened guest. Linux kernel needs to handle
#vc/#ve exception directly in the enlightened guest. HCL handles such
exception in un-enlightened guest and emulate interrupt injection which
helps not to modify OS core part code. Using vTOM also is same purpose.
Hyper-V uses vTOM avoid changing page table related code in OS(include
Windows and Linux)and just needs to map memory into decrypted address
space above vTOM in the driver code.
Linux has generic swiotlb bounce buffer implementation and so introduceswiotlb_unencrypted_base here to set shared memory boundary or vTOM.
Hyper-V Isolation VM is un-enlightened guest. Hyper-V doesn't expose sev/sme capability to guest and so SEV code actually doesn't work. So we also can't interact current existing SEV code and these code is
for enlightened guest support without HCL/paravisor. If other platforms
or SEV want to use similar vTOM feature, swiotlb_unencrypted_base can
be reused. So swiotlb_unencrypted_base is a general solution for all
platforms besides SEV and Hyper-V.
RE: [PATCH V7 4/5] scsi: storvsc: Add Isolation VM support for storvsc driver
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 29 lines
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Sent: Sunday, December 12, 2021 11:14 PM
To: KY Srinivasan <[email protected]>; Haiyang Zhang <[email protected]>; Stephen Hemminger <[email protected]>; [email protected]; Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>; Michael Kelley (LINUX) <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; linux- [email protected]; [email protected]; linux- [email protected]; [email protected]; vkuznets <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: [PATCH V7 4/5] scsi: storvsc: Add Isolation VM support for storvsc driverFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
In Isolation VM, all shared memory with host needs to mark visible to host via hvcall.
vmbus_establish_gpadl()has already done it for storvsc rx/tx ring buffer. The page buffer used byvmbus_sendpacket_mpb_desc()still needs to be handled. Use DMAAPI(scsi_dma_map/unmap)to map these memory during sending/receiving packet and return swiotlb bounce buffer dma address. In Isolation VM, swiotlb bounce buffer is marked to be visible to host and the swiotlb force mode is enabled.
Quoted 4 lines
Set device's dma min align mask to
HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE- 1 in order to keep the original data offset in the bounce buffer.Signed-off-by Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Quoted 154 lines
--- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 4 ++++ drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------- include/linux/hyperv.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c index renamed from drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +0
-0
392c1ac4f819..ae6ec503399a100644drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +2
-0@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> +#include <linux/dma-map-ops.h> #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h> #include "hyperv_vmbus.h" @@ -2078,6 +2079,7 @@ struct hv_device *vmbus_device_create(const guid_t *type, return child_device_obj; } +static u64 vmbus_dma_mask =DMA_BIT_MASK (64 );/* * vmbus_device_register - Register the child device */
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +2
-0@@ -2118,6 +2120,8 @@ int vmbus_device_register(struct hv_device *child_device_obj) }hv_debug_add_dev_dir (child_device_obj); + child_device_obj->device.dma_mask = &vmbus_dma_mask; + child_device_obj->device.dma_parms = &child_device_obj->dma_parms;return 0 ;
err_kset_unregister:drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c index renamed from drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c +0
-0
20595c0ba0ae..ae293600d799100644drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c +3
-0@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/hyperv.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <scsi/scsi.h> #include <scsi/scsi_cmnd.h> #include <scsi/scsi_host.h> @@ -1336,6 +1338,7 @@ static void storvsc_on_channel_callback(void *context)continue ; } request = (struct storvsc_cmd_request *)scsi_cmd_priv (scmnd); +scsi_dma_unmap (scmnd); }
storvsc_on_receive(stor_device, packet, request); @@
-1749,7 +1752,6 @@ static intstorvsc_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *scmnd)drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c +7
-7struct hv_host_device *host_dev =shost_priv (host);struct hv_device *dev = host_dev->dev;struct storvsc_cmd_request *cmd_request =scsi_cmd_priv (scmnd); -int i;struct scatterlist *sgl;unsigned int sg_count;struct vmscsi_request *vm_srb;@@ -1831,10 +1833,11 @@ static int storvsc_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *scmnd) payload_sz =sizeof (cmd_request->mpb);if (sg_count) { -unsigned int hvpgoff, hvpfns_to_add;unsigned long offset_in_hvpg =offset_in_hvpage (sgl->offset);unsigned int hvpg_count =HVPFN_UP (offset_in_hvpg + length); -u64 hvpfn; +struct scatterlist *sg; +unsigned long hvpfn, hvpfns_to_add; +int j, i =0 ;if (hvpg_count >MAX_PAGE_BUFFER_COUNT ) {@@ -1848,21 +1851,22 @@ static int storvsc_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *scmnd) payload->range.len = length; payload->range.offset = offset_in_hvpg; + sg_count =scsi_dma_map (scmnd); +if (sg_count <0 ) +return SCSI_MLQUEUE_DEVICE_BUSY ; -for (i =0 ; sgl !=NULL ; sgl =sg_next (sgl)) { +for_each_sg (sgl, sg, sg_count, j) {/* -* Init values for the current sgl entry. hvpgoff -* and hvpfns_to_add are in units of Hyper-V size -* pages. Handling the PAGE_SIZE !=
HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZEdrivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c +6
-7-* case also handles values of sgl->offset that are -* larger than PAGE_SIZE. Such offsets are handled -* even on other than the first sgl entry, provided -* they are a multiple of PAGE_SIZE. +* Init values for the current sgl entry. hvpfns_to_add +* is in units of Hyper-V size pages. Handling the +* PAGE_SIZE != HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE case also handles +* values of sgl->offset that are larger than PAGE_SIZE. +* Such offsets are handled even on other than the first +* sgl entry, provided they are a multiple of PAGE_SIZE. */ - hvpgoff =HVPFN_DOWN (sgl->offset); - hvpfn =page_to_hvpfn (sg_page (sgl)) + hvpgoff; - hvpfns_to_add = HVPFN_UP(sgl->offset + sgl-Quoted 1 line
length) -
drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c +3
-1- hvpgoff; + hvpfn =HVPFN_DOWN (sg_dma_address (sg)); + hvpfns_to_add =HVPFN_UP (sg_dma_address (sg) + +sg_dma_len (sg)) - hvpfn;/* * Fill the next portion of the PFN array with @@ - 1872,7 +1876,7 @@ static int
storvsc_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *scmnd)drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c +2
-1* the PFN array is filled. */ while (hvpfns_to_add--) - payload->range.pfn_array[i++] = hvpfn++; + payload->range.pfn_array[i++] = hvpfn++; } }@@ -2016,6 +2020,7 @@ static int storvsc_probe(struct hv_device *device, stor_device->vmscsi_size_delta =sizeof (struct vmscsi_win8_extension );spin_lock_init (&stor_device->lock);hv_set_drvdata (device, stor_device); +dma_set_min_align_mask (&device->device,HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE -1 ); stor_device->port_number = host->host_no; ret =storvsc_connect_to_vsp (device, storvsc_ringbuffer_size, is_fc);include/linux/hyperv.h index renamed from include/linux/hyperv.h +0
-0
b823311eac79..650a0574b746100644include/linux/hyperv.h +1
-1@@ -1261,6 +1261,7 @@ struct hv_device {struct vmbus_channel *channel;struct kset *channels_kset; +struct device_dma_parameters dma_parms;/* place holder to keep track of the dir for hv device in debugfs */ struct dentry *debug_dir; --2.25.1
Wei Liu
maintainerRe: [PATCH V7 1/5] swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 55 lines · Tianyu Lan
Quoted 26 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 15 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 2 lines
I don't really understand how this can be more general any *not* get utilized by the existing SEV support.
The Virtual Top-of-Memory (VTOM) support is an SEV-SNP feature that is meant to be used with a (relatively) un-enlightened guest. The idea is that the C-bit in the guest page tables must be 0 for all accesses. It is only the physical address relative to VTOM that determines if the access is encrypted or not. So setting
sme_me_maskwill actually cause issues when running with this feature. Since all DMA for an SEV-SNP guest must still be to shared (unencrypted) memory, some enlightenment is needed. In this case, memory mapped above VTOM will provide that via the SWIOTLB update. For SEV-SNP guests running with VTOM, they are likely to also be running with the Reflect #VC feature, allowing a "paravisor" to handle any #VCs generated by the guest.Quoted 2 lines
See sections 15.36.8 "Virtual Top-of-Memory" and 15.36.9 "Reflect #VC" in volume 2 of the AMD APM [1].
Thanks, Tom, that's pretty much what I was looking for.
The C-bit normally comes from the page tables. But, the hardware also provides an alternative way to effectively get C-bit behavior without actually setting the bit in the page tables: Virtual Top-of-Memory (VTOM). Right?
Quoted 9 lines
It sounds like Hyper-V has chosen to use VTOM instead of requiring the guest to do the C-bit in its page tables.
But, the thing that confuses me is when you said: "it (VTOM) is meant to be used with a (relatively) un-enlightened guest". We don't have an unenlightened guest here. We have Linux, which is quite enlightened.
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Is VTOM being used because there's something that completely rules out using the C-bit in the page tables? What's that "something"?
For "un-enlightened" guest, there is an another system running insider the VM to emulate some
functions(tsc, timer, interrupt and so on)and this helps not to modify OS(Linux/Windows) a lot. In Hyper-V Isolation VM, we called the new system as HCL/paravisor. HCL runs in the VMPL0 and Linux runs in VMPL2. This is similar with nested virtualization. HCL plays similar role as L1 hypervisor to emulate some general functions (e.g, rdmsr/wrmsr accessing and interrupt injection) which needs to be enlightened in the enlightened guest. Linux kernel needs to handle #vc/#ve exception directly in the enlightened guest. HCL handles such exception in un-enlightened guest and emulate interrupt injection which helps not to modify OS core part code. Using vTOM also is same purpose. Hyper-V uses vTOM avoid changing page table related code in OS(include Windows and Linux)and just needs to map memory into decrypted address space above vTOM in the driver code.
Quoted 10 lines
Linux has generic swiotlb bounce buffer implementation and so introduce
swiotlb_unencrypted_basehere to set shared memory boundary or vTOM. Hyper-V Isolation VM is un-enlightened guest. Hyper-V doesn't expose sev/sme capability to guest and so SEV code actually doesn't work.
So we also can't interact current existing SEV code and these code is for enlightened guest support without HCL/paravisor. If other platforms or SEV want to use similar vTOM feature,swiotlb_unencrypted_basecan be reused. Soswiotlb_unencrypted_baseis a general solution for all platforms besides SEV and Hyper-V.
Thanks for the detailed explanation.
Dave, are you happy with this?
The code looks pretty solid to my untrained eyes. And the series has collected necessary acks from stakeholders. If I don't hear objection by EOD Friday I will apply this series to hyperv-next.
Wei.
Quoted 1 line · Tianyu Lan
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
[...]
Quoted 8 lines
Tianyu Lan (5):
swiotlb: Add swiotlb bounce buffer remap function for HV IVM x86/hyper-v: Add hyperv Isolation VM check in thecc_platform_has()
hyper-v: Enable swiotlb bounce buffer for Isolation VM
scsi: storvsc: Add Isolation VM support for storvsc driver
net: netvsc: Add Isolation VM support for netvsc driver
Applied to hyperv-next. Thanks.
Wei.
Jakub Kicinski
maintainerRe: [PATCH V7 4/5] scsi: storvsc: Add Isolation VM support for storvsc driver
In reply to Tianyu Landrivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c struct hv_device *vmbus_device_create(const guid_t *type, · line 2082
Quoted 5 lines · On Mon, 13 Dec 2021 02:14:05 -0500 Tianyu Lan wrote:
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +1
-0@@ -2078,6 +2079,7 @@ struct hv_device *vmbus_device_create(const guid_t *type,return child_device_obj; } +static u64 vmbus_dma_mask =DMA_BIT_MASK (64 );
This breaks the x86 clang allmodconfig build as I presume those involved know by now:
../drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c:2082:29: error: shift count >= width of type [-Werror,-Wshift-count-overflow]
static u64 vmbus_dma_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(64);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK'
#define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1))
^ ~~~1 error generated.
Is there any ETA on getting the fix into Linus's tree?
Jakub Kicinski
maintainerRe: [PATCH V7 4/5] scsi: storvsc: Add Isolation VM support for storvsc driver
Quoted 10 lines · On Thu, 3 Feb 2022 15:53:51 -0800 Jakub Kicinski wrote:
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c struct hv_device *vmbus_device_create(const guid_t *type, · line 2082
Quoted 5 lines · On Mon, 13 Dec 2021 02:14:05 -0500 Tianyu Lan wrote:
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +1
-0@@ -2078,6 +2079,7 @@ struct hv_device *vmbus_device_create(const guid_t *type,return child_device_obj; } +static u64 vmbus_dma_mask =DMA_BIT_MASK (64 );This breaks the x86 clang allmodconfig build as I presume those involved know by now:
Quoted 7 lines
../drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c:2082:29: error: shift count >= width of type [-Werror,-Wshift-count-overflow]static u64 vmbus_dma_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(64); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../include/linux/dma-mapping.h:76:54: note: expanded from macro 'DMA_BIT_MASK' #define DMA_BIT_MASK(n) (((n) == 64) ? ~0ULL : ((1ULL<<(n))-1)) ^ ~~~1 error generated.
Looks like a compiler issue actually, found the discussion now: