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crypto: more rsa-pkcs1pad fixes

PATCH Superseded Eric Biggers 2 participants 6 messages Jan 14, 2022 – Jan 15, 2022

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#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/3 crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - correctly get hash from source scatterlist

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms") changed akcipher_alg::verify to take in both the signature and the actual hash and do the signature verification, rather than just return the hash expected by the signature as was the case before. To do this, it implemented a hack where the signature and hash are concatenated with each other in one scatterlist.

Obviously, for this to work correctly, akcipher_alg::verify needs to correctly extract the two items from the scatterlist it is given. Unfortunately, it doesn't correctly extract the hash in the case where the signature is longer than the RSA key size, as it assumes that the signature's length is equal to the RSA key size. This causes a prefix of the hash, or even the entire hash, to be taken from the *signature*.

It is unclear whether the resulting scheme has any useful security properties.

Fix this by correctly extracting the hash from the scatterlist.

Fixes c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms")
Cc <[email protected]> # v5.2+
---
 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +1 -1
index 1b3545781425..7b223adebabf 100644
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 			   sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
 					    req->src_len + req->dst_len),
 			   req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size,
-			   req->dst_len, ctx->key_size);
+			   req->dst_len, req->src_len);
 	/* Do the actual verification step. */
 	if (memcmp(req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos,
 		   req->dst_len) != 0)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#0 lore raw

cover crypto: more rsa-pkcs1pad fixes

This series fixes two more bugs in rsa-pkcs1pad.

Eric Biggers (3):
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - correctly get hash from source scatterlist
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in
pkcs1pad_verify_complete()
crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - use clearer variable names

 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH 2/3 crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in pkcs1pad_verify_complete()

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to check that there are enough bytes remaining.

Fixes a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad")
Cc Tadeusz Struk <[email protected]>
Cc <[email protected]> # v4.6+
---
 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +2 -0
index 7b223adebabf..6cd24b4b9b9e 100644
@@ -476,6 +476,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 	pos++;
 
 	if (digest_info) {
+		if (digest_info->size > dst_len - pos)
+			goto done;
 		if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data,
 				  digest_info->size))
 			goto done;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH 3/3 crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - use clearer variable names

In reply to Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

The new convention for akcipher_alg::verify makes it unclear which values are the lengths of the signature and digest. Add local variables to make it clearer what is going on.

Also rename the digest_size variable in pkcs1pad_sign(), as it is actually the digest *info* size, not the digest size which is different.

---
 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++---------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +16 -15
index 6cd24b4b9b9e..8a3054a43735 100644
@@ -385,15 +385,15 @@ static int pkcs1pad_sign(struct akcipher_request *req)
 	struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
 	const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info;
 	int err;
-	unsigned int ps_end, digest_size = 0;
+	unsigned int ps_end, digest_info_size = 0;
 
 	if (!ctx->key_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (digest_info)
-		digest_size = digest_info->size;
+		digest_info_size = digest_info->size;
 
-	if (req->src_len + digest_size > ctx->key_size - 11)
+	if (req->src_len + digest_info_size > ctx->key_size - 11)
 		return -EOVERFLOW;
 
 	if (req->dst_len < ctx->key_size) {
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_sign(struct akcipher_request *req)
 	if (!req_ctx->in_buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ps_end = ctx->key_size - digest_size - req->src_len - 2;
+	ps_end = ctx->key_size - digest_info_size - req->src_len - 2;
 	req_ctx->in_buf[0] = 0x01;
 	memset(req_ctx->in_buf + 1, 0xff, ps_end - 1);
 	req_ctx->in_buf[ps_end] = 0x00;
@@ -441,6 +441,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 	struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
 	struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
 	const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info;
+	const unsigned int sig_size = req->src_len;
+	const unsigned int digest_size = req->dst_len;
 	unsigned int dst_len;
 	unsigned int pos;
 	u8 *out_buf;
@@ -487,20 +489,19 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 
 	err = 0;
 
-	if (req->dst_len != dst_len - pos) {
+	if (digest_size != dst_len - pos) {
 		err = -EKEYREJECTED;
 		req->dst_len = dst_len - pos;
 		goto done;
 	}
 	/* Extract appended digest. */
 	sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src,
-			   sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
-					    req->src_len + req->dst_len),
+			   sg_nents_for_len(req->src, sig_size + digest_size),
 			   req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size,
-			   req->dst_len, req->src_len);
+			   digest_size, sig_size);
 	/* Do the actual verification step. */
 	if (memcmp(req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos,
-		   req->dst_len) != 0)
+		   digest_size) != 0)
 		err = -EKEYREJECTED;
 done:
 	kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
@@ -536,14 +537,15 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
 	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
 	struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
 	struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
+	const unsigned int sig_size = req->src_len;
+	const unsigned int digest_size = req->dst_len;
 	int err;
 
-	if (WARN_ON(req->dst) ||
-	    WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) ||
-	    !ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size)
+	if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || WARN_ON(!digest_size) ||
+	    !ctx->key_size || sig_size < ctx->key_size)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!req_ctx->out_buf)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -556,8 +558,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
 
 	/* Reuse input buffer, output to a new buffer */
 	akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req->src,
-				   req_ctx->out_sg, req->src_len,
-				   ctx->key_size);
+				   req_ctx->out_sg, sig_size, ctx->key_size);
 
 	err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
 	if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Reviewed-by on v1 1/3
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - correctly get hash from source scatterlist

In reply to Eric Biggers

Eric,

Quoted 33 lines · Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms") changed akcipher_alg::verify to take in both the signature and the actual hash and do the signature verification, rather than just return the hash expected by the signature as was the case before. To do this, it implemented a hack where the signature and hash are concatenated with each other in one scatterlist.

Obviously, for this to work correctly, akcipher_alg::verify needs to correctly extract the two items from the scatterlist it is given. Unfortunately, it doesn't correctly extract the hash in the case where the signature is longer than the RSA key size, as it assumes that the signature's length is equal to the RSA key size. This causes a prefix of the hash, or even the entire hash, to be taken from the *signature*.

It is unclear whether the resulting scheme has any useful security properties.

Fix this by correctly extracting the hash from the scatterlist.

Fixes c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms")
Cc <[email protected]> # v5.2+
---
 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +0 -0
index 1b3545781425..7b223adebabf 100644

crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err) · line 498

Quoted 5 lines
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +1 -1
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 			   sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
 					    req->src_len + req->dst_len),
 			   req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size,
-			   req->dst_len, ctx->key_size);
+			   req->dst_len, req->src_len);

Reviewing this I noticed that while req->src_len is checked in pkcs1pad_verify() to be not shorter than ctx->key_size it's never checked to be not longer. Signatures longer than RSA modulus N (which is ctx->key_size) are still invalid (RFC8017 8.2.2). (So, assumption they are equal was in accord with the standard, but not with the current codebase.)

I suggest to add this check too while we at it.

There was such check before, but it was removed in a49de377e051 ("crypto:
Add hash param to pkcs1pad") for an unknown reason:

  -    if (!ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size)
  +    if (!ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size)
           return -EINVAL;

Thanks,

Quoted 5 lines
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +0 -0
 	/* Do the actual verification step. */
 	if (memcmp(req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos,
 		   req->dst_len) != 0)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/3] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - correctly get hash from source scatterlist

Quoted 53 lines · Vitaly Chikunov

Eric,

Quoted 33 lines · Eric Biggers

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

Commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms") changed akcipher_alg::verify to take in both the signature and the actual hash and do the signature verification, rather than just return the hash expected by the signature as was the case before. To do this, it implemented a hack where the signature and hash are concatenated with each other in one scatterlist.

Obviously, for this to work correctly, akcipher_alg::verify needs to correctly extract the two items from the scatterlist it is given. Unfortunately, it doesn't correctly extract the hash in the case where the signature is longer than the RSA key size, as it assumes that the signature's length is equal to the RSA key size. This causes a prefix of the hash, or even the entire hash, to be taken from the *signature*.

It is unclear whether the resulting scheme has any useful security properties.

Fix this by correctly extracting the hash from the scatterlist.

Fixes c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms")
Cc <[email protected]> # v5.2+
---
 crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +0 -0
index 1b3545781425..7b223adebabf 100644

crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err) · line 498

Quoted 5 lines
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c +1 -1
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 			   sg_nents_for_len(req->src,
 					    req->src_len + req->dst_len),
 			   req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size,
-			   req->dst_len, ctx->key_size);
+			   req->dst_len, req->src_len);

Reviewing this I noticed that while req->src_len is checked in pkcs1pad_verify() to be not shorter than ctx->key_size it's never checked to be not longer. Signatures longer than RSA modulus N (which is ctx->key_size) are still invalid (RFC8017 8.2.2). (So, assumption they are equal was in accord with the standard, but not with the current codebase.)

I suggest to add this check too while we at it.

Quoted 9 lines

There was such check before, but it was removed in a49de377e051 ("crypto:
Add hash param to pkcs1pad") for an unknown reason:

  -    if (!ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size)
  +    if (!ctx->key_size || req->src_len < ctx->key_size)
           return -EINVAL;

Thanks,

Yes, after sending this out I was looking at the PKCS#1 v1.5 encoding specification, and I had noticed that too:

"1. Length checking: If the length of the signature S is not k
octets, output 'invalid signature' and stop."

I agree that we should enforce that too, although it's curious that commit a49de377e051 removed that check. Hopefully that was just a mistake and not something that someone was actually relying on. I'll send a separate patch for that; I think it should be separate from this patch.

- Eric