KVM: x86/cpuid: Stop exposing unknown AMX Tile Palettes and accelerator units
PATCH 1/1 KVM: x86/cpuid: Stop exposing unknown AMX Tile Palettes and accelerator units
From: Like Xu <[email protected]>
Guest enablement of Intel AMX requires a good co-work from both host and KVM, which means that KVM should take a more safer approach to avoid the accidental inclusion of new unknown AMX features, even though it's designed to be an extensible architecture.
Per current spec, Intel CPUID Leaf 1EH sub-leaf 1 and above are reserved, other bits in leaves 0x1d and 0x1e marked as "Reserved=0" shall be strictly limited by definition for reporeted KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +8 -4
@@ -661,7 +661,6 @@ static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *do_host_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array,case 0x17 :case 0x18 :case 0x1d : -case 0x1e :case 0x1f :case 0x8000001d : entry->flags |=KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX ;
@@ -936,21 +935,26 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)break ;/* Intel AMX TILE */ case 0x1d : + entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ;if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE )) { - entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ; + entry->eax =0 ;break ; } + entry->eax =min (entry->eax,1u );for (i =1 , max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {if (!do_host_cpuid (array, function, i)) goto out; }break ; -case 0x1e :/* TMUL information */ +/* TMUL Information */ +case 0x1e : + entry->eax = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ;if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE )) { - entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ; + entry->ebx =0 ;break ; } + entry->ebx &=0xffffffu ;break ;case KVM_CPUID_SIGNATURE : {const u32 *sigptr = (const u32 *)KVM_SIGNATURE ;
Signature · 1 line
2.33.1
Hi,
KVM does not have much filtering in exposing the host cpuid (at least for Intel PT and AMX), and innocent user spaces could be corrupted when unknown new bits are accidentally exposed.
Comments on code changes in this direction are welcome.
+ https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
Quoted 59 lines · Like Xu
From: Like Xu <[email protected]>
Guest enablement of Intel AMX requires a good co-work from both host and KVM, which means that KVM should take a more safer approach to avoid the accidental inclusion of new unknown AMX features, even though it's designed to be an extensible architecture.
Per current spec, Intel CPUID Leaf 1EH sub-leaf 1 and above are reserved, other bits in leaves
0x1dand0x1emarked as "Reserved=0" shall be strictly limited by definition for reporetedKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.Fixes 690a757d610e ("kvm: x86: Add CPUID support for Intel AMX")Signed-off-by Like Xu <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +8
-4@@ -661,7 +661,6 @@ static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *do_host_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array,case 0x17 :case 0x18 :case 0x1d : -case 0x1e :case 0x1f :case 0x8000001d : entry->flags |=KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX ;@@ -936,21 +935,26 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)break ;/* Intel AMX TILE */ case 0x1d : + entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ;if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE )) { - entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ; + entry->eax =0 ;break ; } + entry->eax =min (entry->eax,1u );for (i =1 , max_idx = entry->eax; i <= max_idx; ++i) {if (!do_host_cpuid (array, function, i)) goto out; }break ; -case 0x1e :/* TMUL information */ +/* TMUL Information */ +case 0x1e : + entry->eax = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ;if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE )) { - entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ; + entry->ebx =0 ;break ; } + entry->ebx &=0xffffffu ;break ;case KVM_CPUID_SIGNATURE : {const u32 *sigptr = (const u32 *)KVM_SIGNATURE ;
Let me try pinging again until it times out or fails.
Quoted 70 lines · Like Xu
Hi,
KVM does not have much filtering in exposing the host cpuid (at least for Intel PT and AMX), and innocent user spaces could be corrupted when unknown new bits are accidentally exposed.
Comments on code changes in this direction are welcome.
+ https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
Quoted 60 lines · Like Xu
From: Like Xu <[email protected]>
Guest enablement of Intel AMX requires a good co-work from both host and KVM, which means that KVM should take a more safer approach to avoid the accidental inclusion of new unknown AMX features, even though it's designed to be an extensible architecture.
Per current spec, Intel CPUID Leaf 1EH sub-leaf 1 and above are reserved, other bits in leaves
0x1dand0x1emarked as "Reserved=0" shall be strictly limited by definition for reporetedKVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID.Fixes 690a757d610e ("kvm: x86: Add CPUID support for Intel AMX")Signed-off-by Like Xu <[email protected]>---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c| 12 ++++++++----1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +0
-0@@ -661,7 +661,6 @@ static struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *do_host_cpuid(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array,case
0x17:
case0x18:
case0x1d:
- case0x1e:
case0x1f:
case0x8000001d:
entry->flags|=KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX;arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +0
-0@@ -936,21 +935,26 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function) break; /* Intel AMX TILE */case
0x1d:
+entry->ebx=entry->ecx=entry->edx= 0;
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE)) { -entry->eax=entry->ebx=entry->ecx=entry->edx= 0; +entry->eax= 0;
break;
}
+entry->eax=min(entry->eax, 1u);
for (i = 1,max_idx=entry->eax; i <=max_idx; ++i) { if (!do_host_cpuid(array, function, i)) goto out;
}
break;
- case0x1e: /* TMUL information */
+ /* TMUL Information */
+ case0x1e:
+entry->eax=entry->ecx=entry->edx= 0;
if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE)) { -entry->eax=entry->ebx=entry->ecx=entry->edx= 0; +entry->ebx= 0;
break;
}
+entry->ebx&=0xffffffu;
break;
caseKVM_CPUID_SIGNATURE: {
const u32 *sigptr = (const u32 *)KVM_SIGNATURE;