selinux: split no transition execve check
RFC PATCH 1/1 selinux: split no transition execve check
In case a setuid or setgid binary is mislabeled with a generic context, either via a policy mistake or a move by the distribution package, executing it will be checked by the file permission execute_no_trans on the generic file context (e.g. bin_t). The setuid(2)/setgid(2) syscall within will then be checked against the unchanged caller process context, which might have been granted the capability permission setuid/ setgid to initially drop privileges. To avoid that scenario split the execute_no_trans permission in case of a setuid/setgid binary into a new permission execute_sxid_no_trans.
For backward compatibility this behavior is contained in a new policy capability.
--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 3 ++- security/selinux/include/security.h | 8 ++++++++ 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/selinux/hooks.c +8 -1
@@ -2348,9 +2348,16 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) ad.u.file = bprm->file;if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { +u32 perm; + +if (selinux_policycap_execute_sxid_no_trans () &&is_sxid (inode->i_mode)) + perm =FILE__EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS ; +else + perm =FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS ; + rc =avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, -SECCLASS_FILE ,FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS , &ad); +SECCLASS_FILE , perm, &ad);if (rc)return rc; }else {
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1 -1
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "quotaget", "watch", NULL } }, {"file" , { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, - "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } }, + "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execute_sxid_no_trans", NULL } }, {"dir" , { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name", "reparent", "search", "rmdir", NULL } },
security/selinux/include/policycap.h +1 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS , +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS , __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +2 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {"always_check_network" ,"cgroup_seclabel" ,"nnp_nosuid_transition" , -"genfs_seclabel_symlinks" +"genfs_seclabel_symlinks" , + "execute_sxid_no_trans", };#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */
security/selinux/include/security.h +8 -0
@@ -219,6 +219,14 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)return READ_ONCE (state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_execute_sxid_no_trans (void ) +{ +struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + +return READ_ONCE (state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS ]); +} + +struct selinux_policy_convert_data ;struct selinux_load_state {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 14 lines · Christian Göttsche
In case a setuid or setgid binary is mislabeled with a generic context, either via a policy mistake or a move by the distribution package, executing it will be checked by the file permission
execute_no_transon the generic file context (e.g.bin_t). The setuid(2)/setgid(2) syscall within will then be checked against the unchanged caller process context, which might have been granted the capability permission setuid/ setgid to initially drop privileges. To avoid that scenario split theexecute_no_transpermission in case of a setuid/setgid binary into a new permissionexecute_sxid_no_trans.For backward compatibility this behavior is contained in a new policy capability.
Quoted 8 lines
Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 3 ++- security/selinux/include/security.h | 8 ++++++++ 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Adding the refpolicy list to this thread as their opinion seems particularly relevant to this discussion.
FWIW, this looks reasonable to me but I would like to hear what others have to say.
Quoted 83 lines
security/selinux/hooks.c +8
-1@@ -2348,9 +2348,16 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) ad.u.file = bprm->file;if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { +u32 perm; + +if (selinux_policycap_execute_sxid_no_trans () &&is_sxid (inode->i_mode)) + perm =FILE__EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS ; +else + perm =FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS ; + rc =avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, -SECCLASS_FILE ,FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS , &ad); +SECCLASS_FILE , perm, &ad);if (rc)return rc; }else {security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1
-1@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "quotaget", "watch", NULL } }, {"file" , { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, - "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } }, + "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execute_sxid_no_trans", NULL } }, {"dir" , { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name", "reparent", "search", "rmdir", NULL } },security/selinux/include/policycap.h +1
-0@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS , +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS , __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +2
-1@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {"always_check_network" ,"cgroup_seclabel" ,"nnp_nosuid_transition" , -"genfs_seclabel_symlinks" +"genfs_seclabel_symlinks" , + "execute_sxid_no_trans", };#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */ security/selinux/include/security.h +8
-1@@ -219,6 +219,14 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)return READ_ONCE (state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_execute_sxid_no_trans (void ) +{ +struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + +return READ_ONCE (state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS ]); +} + +struct selinux_policy_convert_data ;struct selinux_load_state { --2.34.1
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Quoted 25 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 14 lines · Christian Göttsche
In case a setuid or setgid binary is mislabeled with a generic context, either via a policy mistake or a move by the distribution package, executing it will be checked by the file permission
execute_no_transon the generic file context (e.g.bin_t). The setuid(2)/setgid(2) syscall within will then be checked against the unchanged caller process context, which might have been granted the capability permission setuid/ setgid to initially drop privileges. To avoid that scenario split theexecute_no_transpermission in case of a setuid/setgid binary into a new permissionexecute_sxid_no_trans.For backward compatibility this behavior is contained in a new policy capability.
Quoted 8 lines
Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 3 ++- security/selinux/include/security.h | 8 ++++++++ 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Quoted 5 lines
Adding the refpolicy list to this thread as their opinion seems particularly relevant to this discussion.
FWIW, this looks reasonable to me but I would like to hear what others have to say.
I think this a band-aid to cover up the real problem, which is the mislabeled files.
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security/selinux/hooks.c +8
-1@@ -2348,9 +2348,16 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) ad.u.file = bprm->file;if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { +u32 perm; + +if (selinux_policycap_execute_sxid_no_trans () &&is_sxid (inode->i_mode)) + perm =FILE__EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS ; +else + perm =FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS ; + rc =avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, -SECCLASS_FILE ,FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS , &ad); +SECCLASS_FILE , perm, &ad);if (rc)return rc; }else {security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1
-1@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "quotaget", "watch", NULL } }, {"file" , { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, - "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } }, + "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execute_sxid_no_trans", NULL } }, {"dir" , { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name", "reparent", "search", "rmdir", NULL } },security/selinux/include/policycap.h +1
-0@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS , +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS , __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +2
-1@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {"always_check_network" ,"cgroup_seclabel" ,"nnp_nosuid_transition" , -"genfs_seclabel_symlinks" +"genfs_seclabel_symlinks" , + "execute_sxid_no_trans", };#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */ security/selinux/include/security.h +8
-1@@ -219,6 +219,14 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)return READ_ONCE (state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_execute_sxid_no_trans (void ) +{ +struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + +return READ_ONCE (state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS ]); +} + +struct selinux_policy_convert_data ;struct selinux_load_state { --2.34.1
Signature · 1 line
Chris PeBenito
Paul Moore
maintainerQuoted 26 lines · Chris PeBenito
Quoted 25 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 22 lines · Christian Göttsche
In case a setuid or setgid binary is mislabeled with a generic context, either via a policy mistake or a move by the distribution package, executing it will be checked by the file permission
execute_no_transon the generic file context (e.g.bin_t). The setuid(2)/setgid(2) syscall within will then be checked against the unchanged caller process context, which might have been granted the capability permission setuid/ setgid to initially drop privileges. To avoid that scenario split theexecute_no_transpermission in case of a setuid/setgid binary into a new permissionexecute_sxid_no_trans.For backward compatibility this behavior is contained in a new policy capability.
Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 3 ++- security/selinux/include/security.h | 8 ++++++++ 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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Adding the refpolicy list to this thread as their opinion seems particularly relevant to this discussion.
FWIW, this looks reasonable to me but I would like to hear what others have to say.
I think this a band-aid to cover up the real problem, which is the mislabeled files.
It's hard to disagree with that, and the kernel is probably the wrong place to apply a band-aid unless it is the only option left.
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security/selinux/hooks.c +8
-1@@ -2348,9 +2348,16 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) ad.u.file = bprm->file;if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { +u32 perm; + +if (selinux_policycap_execute_sxid_no_trans () &&is_sxid (inode->i_mode)) + perm =FILE__EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS ; +else + perm =FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS ; + rc =avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, -SECCLASS_FILE ,FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS , &ad); +SECCLASS_FILE , perm, &ad);if (rc)return rc; }else {security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1
-1@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "quotaget", "watch", NULL } }, {"file" , { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, - "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } }, + "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execute_sxid_no_trans", NULL } }, {"dir" , { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name", "reparent", "search", "rmdir", NULL } },security/selinux/include/policycap.h +1
-0@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS , +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS , __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +2
-1@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {"always_check_network" ,"cgroup_seclabel" ,"nnp_nosuid_transition" , -"genfs_seclabel_symlinks" +"genfs_seclabel_symlinks" , + "execute_sxid_no_trans", };#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */ security/selinux/include/security.h +8
-0@@ -219,6 +219,14 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)return READ_ONCE (state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_execute_sxid_no_trans (void ) +{ +struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + +return READ_ONCE (state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS ]); +} + +struct selinux_policy_convert_data ;Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h +0
-1struct selinux_load_state { --2.34.1
--
Chris PeBenito
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
Quoted 31 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 29 lines · Chris PeBenito
Quoted 28 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 14 lines · Christian Göttsche
In case a setuid or setgid binary is mislabeled with a generic context, either via a policy mistake or a move by the distribution package, executing it will be checked by the file permission
execute_no_transon the generic file context (e.g.bin_t). The setuid(2)/setgid(2) syscall within will then be checked against the unchanged caller process context, which might have been granted the capability permission setuid/ setgid to initially drop privileges. To avoid that scenario split theexecute_no_transpermission in case of a setuid/setgid binary into a new permissionexecute_sxid_no_trans.For backward compatibility this behavior is contained in a new policy capability.
Quoted 8 lines
Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++++++++- security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 3 ++- security/selinux/include/security.h | 8 ++++++++ 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)Adding the refpolicy list to this thread as their opinion seems particularly relevant to this discussion.
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FWIW, this looks reasonable to me but I would like to hear what others have to say.
I think this a band-aid to cover up the real problem, which is the mislabeled files.
It's hard to disagree with that, and the kernel is probably the wrong place to apply a band-aid unless it is the only option left.
Adding a new datapoint to this RFC:
An unprivileged user can via the setuid binary newgrp(1) write arbitrary content to files he can open in write mode but not actually write to, e.g. /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid [1].
This also is reproducible on Fedora where /usr/bin/newgrp has the generic context bin_t, so the write (and capable check) happens in the caller context of unconfined_t.
With the proposed permission split applied and instead of granting unconfined_t the new permission execute_sxid_no_trans but relying on an intermediate template domain $1_newgrp_t the access would have been denied, due to lack of permissions of the templated newgrp domain. With a generic file type of bin_t newgrp would not be executable for callers otherwise. Most setuid binaries are already labeled with a private type, newgrp and pkexec are the only ones left on a head-less Fedora system.
One could still argue this is a policy neglect, but normally policy neglects result in missing permissions and reduced functionality, not in unintended privilege escalation.
[1]: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/758
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security/selinux/hooks.c +8
-1@@ -2348,9 +2348,16 @@ static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) ad.u.file = bprm->file;if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { +u32 perm; + +if (selinux_policycap_execute_sxid_no_trans () &&is_sxid (inode->i_mode)) + perm =FILE__EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS ; +else + perm =FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS ; + rc =avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, -SECCLASS_FILE ,FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS , &ad); +SECCLASS_FILE , perm, &ad);if (rc)return rc; }else {security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1
-1@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "quotaget", "watch", NULL } }, {"file" , { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, - "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } }, + "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", "execute_sxid_no_trans", NULL } }, {"dir" , { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "add_name", "remove_name", "reparent", "search", "rmdir", NULL } },security/selinux/include/policycap.h +1
-0@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ enum {POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION ,POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS , +POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS , __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX };#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +2
-1@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {"always_check_network" ,"cgroup_seclabel" ,"nnp_nosuid_transition" , -"genfs_seclabel_symlinks" +"genfs_seclabel_symlinks" , + "execute_sxid_no_trans", };#endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */ security/selinux/include/security.h +8
-0@@ -219,6 +219,14 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)return READ_ONCE (state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS ]); } +static inline bool selinux_policycap_execute_sxid_no_trans (void ) +{ +struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + +return READ_ONCE (state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXECUTE_SXID_NO_TRANS ]); +} + +struct selinux_policy_convert_data ;Quoted 6 lines
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security/selinux/include/security.h +0
-1struct selinux_load_state { --2.34.1
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Chris PeBenito--
paul-moore.com