random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq
Subsystems (2)
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH 1/1 random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things here.
But maybe there's another reason to change things up: by deferring the crng pre-init loading to the worker, we can use the cryptographic hash function rather than xor, which is perhaps a meaningful difference when considering this data has only been through the relatively weak fast_mix() function.
The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small, especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 62 ++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +17 -45
@@ -443,10 +443,6 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],* boot time when it's better to have something there rather than * nothing. * -* There are two paths, a slow one and a fast one. The slow one -* hashes the input along with the current key. The fast one simply -* xors it in, and should only be used from interrupt context. -* * If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented. * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(), * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be
@@ -455,19 +451,15 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],* Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded * by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true. */ -static size_t crng_pre_init_inject (const void *input,size_t len, -bool fast,bool account) +static size_t crng_pre_init_inject (const void *input,size_t len,bool account) {static int crng_init_cnt =0 ; +struct blake2s_state hash;unsigned long flags; -if (fast) { -if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags)) -return 0 ; - }else { -spin_lock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags); - } +blake2s_init (&hash,sizeof (base_crng.key)); +spin_lock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags);if (crng_init !=0 ) {spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);return 0 ;
@@ -476,21 +468,9 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len,if (account) len =min_t (size_t, len,CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); -if (fast) { -const u8 *src = input; -size_t i; - -for (i =0 ; i < len; ++i) - base_crng.key[(crng_init_cnt + i) % -sizeof (base_crng.key)] ^= src[i]; - }else { -struct blake2s_state hash; - -blake2s_init (&hash,sizeof (base_crng.key)); -blake2s_update (&hash, base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); -blake2s_update (&hash, input, len); -blake2s_final (&hash, base_crng.key); - } +blake2s_update (&hash, base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); +blake2s_update (&hash, input, len); +blake2s_final (&hash, base_crng.key);if (account) { crng_init_cnt += len;
@@ -1040,7 +1020,7 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)unsigned long flags;if (crng_init ==0 && size) -crng_pre_init_inject (buf, size, false, false); +crng_pre_init_inject (buf, size, false);spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags);_mix_pool_bytes (buf, size);
@@ -1157,7 +1137,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) {if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { -size_t ret =crng_pre_init_inject (buffer, count, false, true); +size_t ret =crng_pre_init_inject (buffer, count, true);mix_pool_bytes (buffer, ret); count -= ret; buffer += ret;
@@ -1298,7 +1278,12 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)local_irq_enable ();mix_pool_bytes (pool,sizeof (pool)); -credit_entropy_bits (1 ); + +if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) +crng_pre_init_inject (pool,sizeof (pool), true); +else +credit_entropy_bits (1 ); +memzero_explicit (pool,sizeof (pool)); }
@@ -1331,24 +1316,11 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)fast_mix (fast_pool->pool32); new_count = ++fast_pool->count; -if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { -if (new_count >=64 && -crng_pre_init_inject (fast_pool->pool32,sizeof (fast_pool->pool32), - true, true) >0 ) { - fast_pool->count =0 ; - fast_pool->last = now; -if (spin_trylock (&input_pool.lock)) { -_mix_pool_bytes (&fast_pool->pool32,sizeof (fast_pool->pool32)); -spin_unlock (&input_pool.lock); - } - } -return ; - } -if (new_count &MIX_INFLIGHT )return ; -if (new_count <64 && !time_after (now, fast_pool->last +HZ )) +if (new_count <64 && (!time_after (now, fast_pool->last +HZ ) || +unlikely (crng_init ==0 )))return ;if (unlikely (!fast_pool->mix.func))
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Am Wed, Feb 23, 2022 at 07:55:11PM +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 37 lines
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for
PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things here.But maybe there's another reason to change things up: by deferring the crng pre-init loading to the worker, we can use the cryptographic hash function rather than xor, which is perhaps a meaningful difference when considering this data has only been through the relatively weak
fast_mix()function.The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small, especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred.
Cc Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>Cc Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>Cc Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/random.c | 62 ++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)drivers/char/random.c +0
-0@@ -1298,7 +1278,12 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)local_irq_enable ();
drivers/char/random.c static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) · line 1288
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/char/random.c +6
-1mix_pool_bytes (pool,sizeof (pool)); -credit_entropy_bits (1 ); + +if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) +crng_pre_init_inject (pool,sizeof (pool), true); +else +credit_entropy_bits (1 ); +memzero_explicit (pool,sizeof (pool)); }
Might it make sense to call crng_pre_init_inject() before mix_pool_bytes? Otherwise, all looks fine:
Thanks
Dominik
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerQuoted 39 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Am Wed, Feb 23, 2022 at 07:55:11PM +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 38 lines
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for
PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things here.But maybe there's another reason to change things up: by deferring the crng pre-init loading to the worker, we can use the cryptographic hash function rather than xor, which is perhaps a meaningful difference when considering this data has only been through the relatively weak
fast_mix()function.The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small, especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred.
Cc Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>Cc Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>Cc Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/random.c | 62 ++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)drivers/char/random.c +0
-0@@ -1298,7 +1278,12 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)local_irq_enable ();
Quoted 12 lines
drivers/char/random.c static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) · line 1288
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/char/random.c +6
-1mix_pool_bytes (pool,sizeof (pool)); -credit_entropy_bits (1 ); + +if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) +crng_pre_init_inject (pool,sizeof (pool), true); +else +credit_entropy_bits (1 ); +memzero_explicit (pool,sizeof (pool)); }Might it make sense to call
crng_pre_init_inject()beforemix_pool_bytes?
What exactly is the difference you see mattering in the order? I keep chasing my tail trying to think about it.
Jason
Am Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 10:49:12AM +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 53 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Quoted 39 lines
Am Wed, Feb 23, 2022 at 07:55:11PM +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 38 lines
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for
PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things here.But maybe there's another reason to change things up: by deferring the crng pre-init loading to the worker, we can use the cryptographic hash function rather than xor, which is perhaps a meaningful difference when considering this data has only been through the relatively weak
fast_mix()function.The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small, especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred.
Cc Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>Cc Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>Cc Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/random.c | 62 ++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)drivers/char/random.c +0
-0@@ -1298,7 +1278,12 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)local_irq_enable ();Quoted 12 lines
drivers/char/random.c static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) · line 1288
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/char/random.c +6
-1mix_pool_bytes (pool,sizeof (pool)); -credit_entropy_bits (1 ); + +if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) +crng_pre_init_inject (pool,sizeof (pool), true); +else +credit_entropy_bits (1 ); +memzero_explicit (pool,sizeof (pool)); }Might it make sense to call
crng_pre_init_inject()beforemix_pool_bytes?
Quoted 2 lines
What exactly is the difference you see mattering in the order? I keep chasing my tail trying to think about it.
We had that order beforehand -- and even if it probably doesn't matter, this means crng_pre_init_inject() gets called a tiny bit earlier. That means there's a chance to progres to crng_init=1 a tiny bit earlier as well.
Thanks,
Dominik
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerQuoted 55 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Am Thu, Feb 24, 2022 at 10:49:12AM +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 53 lines · Dominik Brodowski
Quoted 51 lines
Am Wed, Feb 23, 2022 at 07:55:11PM +0100 schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld:
Quoted 38 lines
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for
PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things here.But maybe there's another reason to change things up: by deferring the crng pre-init loading to the worker, we can use the cryptographic hash function rather than xor, which is perhaps a meaningful difference when considering this data has only been through the relatively weak
fast_mix()function.The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small, especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred.
Cc Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>Cc Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>Cc Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/random.c | 62 ++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)drivers/char/random.c +0
-0@@ -1298,7 +1278,12 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)local_irq_enable ();drivers/char/random.c static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct · line 1289
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/char/random.c +6
-1mix_pool_bytes (pool,sizeof (pool)); -credit_entropy_bits (1 ); + +if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) +crng_pre_init_inject (pool,sizeof (pool), true); +else +credit_entropy_bits (1 ); +memzero_explicit (pool,sizeof (pool)); }Might it make sense to call
crng_pre_init_inject()beforemix_pool_bytes?
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
What exactly is the difference you see mattering in the order? I keep chasing my tail trying to think about it.
We had that order beforehand -- and even if it probably doesn't matter, this means
crng_pre_init_inject()gets called a tiny bit earlier. That means there's a chance to progres to crng_init=1 a tiny bit earlier as well.
Alright, I'll send a v2.
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerPATCH v2 1/1 random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things here.
But maybe there's another reason to change things up: by deferring the crng pre-init loading to the worker, we can use the cryptographic hash function rather than xor, which is perhaps a meaningful difference when considering this data has only been through the relatively weak fast_mix() function.
The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small, especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred.
---
Changes v1->v2:
- [Dominik] Call crng_pre_init_inject() before calling mix_pool_bytes().
drivers/char/random.c | 65 +++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +19 -46
@@ -443,10 +443,6 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],* boot time when it's better to have something there rather than * nothing. * -* There are two paths, a slow one and a fast one. The slow one -* hashes the input along with the current key. The fast one simply -* xors it in, and should only be used from interrupt context. -* * If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented. * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(), * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be
@@ -455,19 +451,15 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],* Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded * by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true. */ -static size_t crng_pre_init_inject (const void *input,size_t len, -bool fast,bool account) +static size_t crng_pre_init_inject (const void *input,size_t len,bool account) {static int crng_init_cnt =0 ; +struct blake2s_state hash;unsigned long flags; -if (fast) { -if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags)) -return 0 ; - }else { -spin_lock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags); - } +blake2s_init (&hash,sizeof (base_crng.key)); +spin_lock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags);if (crng_init !=0 ) {spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);return 0 ;
@@ -476,21 +468,9 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len,if (account) len =min_t (size_t, len,CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); -if (fast) { -const u8 *src = input; -size_t i; - -for (i =0 ; i < len; ++i) - base_crng.key[(crng_init_cnt + i) % -sizeof (base_crng.key)] ^= src[i]; - }else { -struct blake2s_state hash; - -blake2s_init (&hash,sizeof (base_crng.key)); -blake2s_update (&hash, base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); -blake2s_update (&hash, input, len); -blake2s_final (&hash, base_crng.key); - } +blake2s_update (&hash, base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); +blake2s_update (&hash, input, len); +blake2s_final (&hash, base_crng.key);if (account) { crng_init_cnt += len;
@@ -1040,7 +1020,7 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)unsigned long flags;if (crng_init ==0 && size) -crng_pre_init_inject (buf, size, false, false); +crng_pre_init_inject (buf, size, false);spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags);_mix_pool_bytes (buf, size);
@@ -1157,7 +1137,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) {if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { -size_t ret =crng_pre_init_inject (buffer, count, false, true); +size_t ret =crng_pre_init_inject (buffer, count, true);mix_pool_bytes (buffer, ret); count -= ret; buffer += ret;
@@ -1297,8 +1277,14 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work) fast_pool->last = jiffies;local_irq_enable (); -mix_pool_bytes (pool,sizeof (pool)); -credit_entropy_bits (1 ); +if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { +crng_pre_init_inject (pool,sizeof (pool), true); +mix_pool_bytes (pool,sizeof (pool)); + }else { +mix_pool_bytes (pool,sizeof (pool)); +credit_entropy_bits (1 ); + } +memzero_explicit (pool,sizeof (pool)); }
@@ -1331,24 +1317,11 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)fast_mix (fast_pool->pool32); new_count = ++fast_pool->count; -if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { -if (new_count >=64 && -crng_pre_init_inject (fast_pool->pool32,sizeof (fast_pool->pool32), - true, true) >0 ) { - fast_pool->count =0 ; - fast_pool->last = now; -if (spin_trylock (&input_pool.lock)) { -_mix_pool_bytes (&fast_pool->pool32,sizeof (fast_pool->pool32)); -spin_unlock (&input_pool.lock); - } - } -return ; - } -if (new_count &MIX_INFLIGHT )return ; -if (new_count <64 && !time_after (now, fast_pool->last +HZ )) +if (new_count <64 && (!time_after (now, fast_pool->last +HZ ) || +unlikely (crng_init ==0 )))return ;if (unlikely (!fast_pool->mix.func))
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Quoted 5 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for
PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things here.
Could you please post a lockdep report so I can take a look?
Quoted 13 lines
But maybe there's another reason to change things up: by deferring the crng pre-init loading to the worker, we can use the cryptographic hash function rather than xor, which is perhaps a meaningful difference when considering this data has only been through the relatively weak
fast_mix()function.The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small, especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred.
Quoted 7 lines
Cc Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Eric Biggers <[email protected]>Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Other than that:
Sebastian
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerHey Sebastian,
Quoted 8 lines · Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Quoted 5 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for
PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things here.Could you please post a lockdep report so I can take a look?
I thought the problem with lockdep was stated by you somewhere in this thread?
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
"But even then we need to find a way to move the crng init part (crng_fast_load()) out of the hard-IRQ."
And Jonathan posted two related (?) splats he ran into.
I may have gotten that all wrong, in which case, I'll just excise that part from the commit message. I'm pretty sure you want this patch either way, right?
Jason
Quoted 1 line · Jason A. Donenfeld
Hey Sebastian,
Hi Jason,
Quoted 16 lines · Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Quoted 8 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Quoted 5 lines
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for
PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things here.Could you please post a lockdep report so I can take a look?
I thought the problem with lockdep was stated by you somewhere in this thread?
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
"But even then we need to find a way to move the crng init part (crng_fast_load()) out of the hard-IRQ."
And Jonathan posted two related (?) splats he ran into.
Quoted 3 lines
I may have gotten that all wrong, in which case, I'll just excise that part from the commit message. I'm pretty sure you want this patch either way, right?
Oh, that report. So yes, I want that patch ;)
In this case the lockdep is right. The thing that it affects only PREEMPT_RT.
That trylock is not the thing that lockdep complains about but the spin_lock_irqsave() within invalidate_batched_entropy().
Taking a spinlock_t from IRQ context is problematic for PREEMPT_RT, correct. A spin_try_lock() is also problematic since another spin_lock() invocation would PI-boost the wrong task (the spin_try_lock() is invoked from an IRQ-context so the task on CPU (random task or idle) is not the actual owner). I'm pointing this out because there was also _another_ problem with try_lock from hard-IRQ context which was fixed in the meantime.
Would it work for you to update the commit message? Basically I'm fine with the firs sentence but the remaining part is misleading.
Quoted 1 line
Jason
Sebastian
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerHi Sebastian,
Quoted 27 lines · Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 1 line
Could you please post a lockdep report so I can take a look?
I thought the problem with lockdep was stated by you somewhere in this thread?
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
"But even then we need to find a way to move the crng init part (crng_fast_load()) out of the hard-IRQ."
And Jonathan posted two related (?) splats he ran into.I may have gotten that all wrong, in which case, I'll just excise that part from the commit message. I'm pretty sure you want this patch either way, right?
Oh, that report. So yes, I want that patch ;)
In this case the lockdep is right. The thing that it affects only
PREEMPT_RT.
That trylock is not the thing that lockdep complains about but thespin_lock_irqsave()withininvalidate_batched_entropy().Taking a
spinlock_tfrom IRQ context is problematic forPREEMPT_RT, correct. Aspin_try_lock()is also problematic since anotherspin_lock()invocation would PI-boost the wrong task (thespin_try_lock()is invoked from an IRQ-context so the task on CPU (random task or idle) is not the actual owner). I'm pointing this out because there was also _another_ problem withtry_lockfrom hard-IRQ context which was fixed in the meantime.
Quoted 2 lines
Would it work for you to update the commit message? Basically I'm fine with the firs sentence but the remaining part is misleading.
Ahh, I understand, okay. Yes, I'll change that first paragraph to incorporate your wording, as:
"""
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is generally problematic for PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. However, a spin_try_lock() is also problematic since another spin_lock() invocation can potentially PI-boost the wrong task, as the spin_try_lock() is invoked from an IRQ-context, so the task on CPU (random task or idle) is not the actual owner.
"""
Jason
Quoted 1 line · Jason A. Donenfeld
Hi Sebastian,
Hi Jason,
Quoted 11 lines
Ahh, I understand, okay. Yes, I'll change that first paragraph to incorporate your wording, as:
"""
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is generally problematic forPREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. However, aspin_try_lock()is also problematic since anotherspin_lock()invocation can potentially PI-boost the wrong task, as thespin_try_lock()is invoked from an IRQ-context, so the task on CPU (random task or idle) is not the actual owner.
"""
I didn't expect it that verbose but yes, full ACK from side. Thank you.
Quoted 1 line
Jason
Sebastian
Jason A. Donenfeld
maintainerCC +Eric
Quoted 155 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Taking spinlocks from IRQ context is problematic for
PREEMPT_RT. That is, in part, why we take trylocks instead. But apparently this still trips up various lock dependency analyzers. That seems like a bug in the analyzers that should be fixed, rather than having to change things here.But maybe there's another reason to change things up: by deferring the crng pre-init loading to the worker, we can use the cryptographic hash function rather than xor, which is perhaps a meaningful difference when considering this data has only been through the relatively weak
fast_mix()function.The biggest downside of this approach is that the pre-init loading is now deferred until later, which means things that need random numbers after interrupts are enabled, but before workqueues are running -- or before this particular worker manages to run -- are going to get into trouble. Hopefully in the real world, this window is rather small, especially since this code won't run until 64 interrupts had occurred.
Cc Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>Cc Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>Cc Sultan Alsawaf <[email protected]>Cc Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>Cc Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/random.c | 62 ++++++++++++------------------------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)drivers/char/random.c +17
-46@@ -443,10 +443,6 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],* boot time when it's better to have something there rather than * nothing. * -* There are two paths, a slow one and a fast one. The slow one -* hashes the input along with the current key. The fast one simply -* xors it in, and should only be used from interrupt context. -* * If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented. * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(), * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be @@ -455,19 +451,15 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],* Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded * by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true. */ -static size_t crng_pre_init_inject (const void *input,size_t len, -bool fast,bool account) +static size_t crng_pre_init_inject (const void *input,size_t len,bool account) {static int crng_init_cnt =0 ; +struct blake2s_state hash;unsigned long flags; -if (fast) { -if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags)) -return 0 ; - }else { -spin_lock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags); - } +blake2s_init (&hash,sizeof (base_crng.key)); +spin_lock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags);if (crng_init !=0 ) {spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);return 0 ;@@ -476,21 +468,9 @@ static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len,if (account) len =min_t (size_t, len,CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); -if (fast) { -const u8 *src = input; -size_t i; - -for (i =0 ; i < len; ++i) - base_crng.key[(crng_init_cnt + i) % -sizeof (base_crng.key)] ^= src[i]; - }else { -struct blake2s_state hash; - -blake2s_init (&hash,sizeof (base_crng.key)); -blake2s_update (&hash, base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); -blake2s_update (&hash, input, len); -blake2s_final (&hash, base_crng.key); - } +blake2s_update (&hash, base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); +blake2s_update (&hash, input, len); +blake2s_final (&hash, base_crng.key);if (account) { crng_init_cnt += len;@@ -1040,7 +1020,7 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)unsigned long flags;if (crng_init ==0 && size) -crng_pre_init_inject (buf, size, false, false); +crng_pre_init_inject (buf, size, false);spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags);_mix_pool_bytes (buf, size);@@ -1157,7 +1137,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy) {if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { -size_t ret =crng_pre_init_inject (buffer, count, false, true); +size_t ret =crng_pre_init_inject (buffer, count, true);mix_pool_bytes (buffer, ret); count -= ret; buffer += ret;@@ -1298,7 +1278,12 @@ static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)local_irq_enable ();mix_pool_bytes (pool,sizeof (pool)); -credit_entropy_bits (1 ); + +if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) +crng_pre_init_inject (pool,sizeof (pool), true); +else +credit_entropy_bits (1 ); +memzero_explicit (pool,sizeof (pool)); }@@ -1331,24 +1316,11 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)fast_mix (fast_pool->pool32); new_count = ++fast_pool->count; -if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { -if (new_count >=64 && -crng_pre_init_inject (fast_pool->pool32,sizeof (fast_pool->pool32), - true, true) >0 ) { - fast_pool->count =0 ; - fast_pool->last = now; -if (spin_trylock (&input_pool.lock)) { -_mix_pool_bytes (&fast_pool->pool32,sizeof (fast_pool->pool32)); -spin_unlock (&input_pool.lock); - } - } -return ; - } -if (new_count &MIX_INFLIGHT )return ; -if (new_count <64 && !time_after (now, fast_pool->last +HZ )) +if (new_count <64 && (!time_after (now, fast_pool->last +HZ ) || +unlikely (crng_init ==0 )))return ;if (unlikely (!fast_pool->mix.func)) --
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2.35.1
FYI, I think you were concerned about those trylocks too. This should make that go away.
Jason