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5.4.186-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 8 participants 57 messages Mar 17, 2022 – Mar 19, 2022

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Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 5.4.186-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.186 release. There are 43 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 19 Mar 2022 12:45:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.186-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 5.4.186-rc1

Chengming Zhou <[email protected]>
kselftest/vm: fix tests build with old libc

Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>
bnx2: Fix an error message

Niels Dossche <[email protected]>

    sfc: extend the locking on mcdi->seqno

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: make tcp_read_sock() more robust

Sreeramya Soratkal <[email protected]>
nl80211: Update bss channel on channel switch for P2P_CLIENT

Manasi Navare <[email protected]>
drm/vrr: Set VRR capable prop only if it is attached to connector

Golan Ben Ami <[email protected]>
iwlwifi: don't advertise TWT support

Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>
atm: firestream: check the return value of ioremap() in fs_init()

Lad Prabhakar <[email protected]>
can: rcar_canfd: rcar_canfd_channel_probe(): register the CAN device when fully ready

Julian Braha <[email protected]>
ARM: 9178/1: fix unmet dependency on BITREVERSE for HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE

Alexander Lobakin <[email protected]>
MIPS: smp: fill in sibling and core maps earlier

Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
mac80211: refuse aggregations sessions before authorized

Corentin Labbe <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: rockchip: fix a typo on rk3288 crypto-controller

Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: rockchip: reorder rk322x hmdi clocks

Dinh Nguyen <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: agilex: use the compatible "intel,socfpga-agilex-hsotg"

Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: rockchip: reorder rk3399 hdmi clocks

Jakob Unterwurzacher <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: rockchip: fix rk3399-puma eMMC HS400 signal integrity

Yan Yan <[email protected]>
xfrm: Fix xfrm migrate issues when address family changes

Yan Yan <[email protected]>
xfrm: Check if_id in xfrm_migrate

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations

James Morse <[email protected]>
KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels

James Morse <[email protected]>
KVM: arm64: Add templates for BHB mitigation sequences

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampoline's kpti sequence optional

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdef'd section

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry: Don't assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry: Free up another register on kpti's tramp_exit path

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional

James Morse <[email protected]>
arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks

Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>
arm64: Add Cortex-X2 CPU part definition

Joey Gouly <[email protected]>
arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register

Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>
arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition

Rob Herring <[email protected]>
arm64: Add part number for Arm Cortex-A77

Xin Long <[email protected]>
sctp: fix the processing for INIT chunk

Kai Lueke <[email protected]>
Revert "xfrm: state and policy should fail if XFRMA_IF_ID 0"

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/rk322x.dtsi                      |   4 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi                      |   2 +-
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h                    |   7 +
 arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h                    |   6 +
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                                 |   9 +
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/intel/socfpga_agilex.dtsi      |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi      |   6 +
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi           |   6 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h                 |  33 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h                       |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h                   |   3 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h                |  40 +++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h                   |  16 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h                    |   6 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h                  |   5 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h                   |   6 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h                       |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h                  |   5 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h                    |  17 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h                   |  73 ++++
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h                  |   5 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                     | 385 ++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c                     |  21 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c                        |   1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S                          | 213 +++++++++---
 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S                    |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S                     |  64 ++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c                        |   8 +-
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c                          |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c                                |  12 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/smp.c                             |   6 +-
 drivers/atm/firestream.c                           |   2 +
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c                    |   3 +
 drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c                  |   6 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2.c               |   2 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/mcdi.c                    |   2 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-nvm-parse.c |   3 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c  |   1 -
 include/linux/arm-smccc.h                          |   5 +
 include/net/xfrm.h                                 |   5 +-
 lib/Kconfig                                        |   1 -
 net/ipv4/tcp.c                                     |  10 +-
 net/key/af_key.c                                   |   2 +-
 net/mac80211/agg-tx.c                              |  10 +-
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c                            |  71 ++--
 net/wireless/nl80211.c                             |   3 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c                             |  14 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c                              |  15 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c                               |  27 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c           |   1 +
 virt/kvm/arm/psci.c                                |  34 +-
 52 files changed, 1037 insertions(+), 160 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/43 Revert "xfrm: state and policy should fail if XFRMA_IF_ID 0"

From: Kai Lueke <[email protected]>

commit a3d9001b4e287fc043e5539d03d71a32ab114bcb upstream.

This reverts commit 68ac0f3810e76a853b5f7b90601a05c3048b8b54 because ID 0 was meant to be used for configuring the policy/state without matching for a specific interface (e.g., Cilium is affected, see
https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/18789 and
https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/19019).

---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c |   21 +++------------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +3 -18
@@ -621,13 +621,8 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_con
 
 	xfrm_smark_init(attrs, &x->props.smark);
 
-	if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]) {
+	if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
 		x->if_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]);
-		if (!x->if_id) {
-			err = -EINVAL;
-			goto error;
-		}
-	}
 
 	err = __xfrm_init_state(x, false, attrs[XFRMA_OFFLOAD_DEV]);
 	if (err)
@@ -1333,13 +1328,8 @@ static int xfrm_alloc_userspi(struct sk_
 
 	mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
 
-	if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]) {
+	if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
 		if_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]);
-		if (!if_id) {
-			err = -EINVAL;
-			goto out_noput;
-		}
-	}
 
 	if (p->info.seq) {
 		x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, mark, p->info.seq);
@@ -1641,13 +1631,8 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_policy_c
 
 	xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &xp->mark);
 
-	if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]) {
+	if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
 		xp->if_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]);
-		if (!xp->if_id) {
-			err = -EINVAL;
-			goto error;
-		}
-	}
 
 	return xp;
  error:
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/43 sctp: fix the processing for INIT chunk

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Xin Long <[email protected]>

commit eae5783908042a762c24e1bd11876edb91d314b1 upstream.

This patch fixes the problems below:

1. In non-shutdown_ack_sent states: in sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit():

chunk length check should be done before any checks that may cause to send abort, as making packet for abort will access the init_tag from init_hdr in sctp_ootb_pkt_new().

2. In shutdown_ack_sent state: in sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack():

The same checks as does in sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit() is needed for sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack().

---
 net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c |   71 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
net/sctp/sm_statefuns.c +46 -25
@@ -149,6 +149,12 @@ static enum sctp_disposition __sctp_sf_d
 					void *arg,
 					struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands);
 
+static enum sctp_disposition
+__sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+			   const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+			   const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg,
+			   struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands);
+
 /* Small helper function that checks if the chunk length
  * is of the appropriate length.  The 'required_length' argument
  * is set to be the size of a specific chunk we are testing.
@@ -330,6 +336,14 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_in
 	if (!chunk->singleton)
 		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
 
+	/* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length.
+	 * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation
+	 * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll
+	 * just discard the packet.
+	 */
+	if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk)))
+		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
 	/* If the packet is an OOTB packet which is temporarily on the
 	 * control endpoint, respond with an ABORT.
 	 */
@@ -344,14 +358,6 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_5_1B_in
 	if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0)
 		return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
 
-	/* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length.
-	 * Normally, this would cause an ABORT with a Protocol Violation
-	 * error, but since we don't have an association, we'll
-	 * just discard the packet.
-	 */
-	if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk)))
-		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
-
 	/* If the INIT is coming toward a closing socket, we'll send back
 	 * and ABORT.  Essentially, this catches the race of INIT being
 	 * backloged to the socket at the same time as the user isses close().
@@ -1484,19 +1490,16 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_
 	if (!chunk->singleton)
 		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
 
+	/* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length. */
+	if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk)))
+		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
 	/* 3.1 A packet containing an INIT chunk MUST have a zero Verification
 	 * Tag.
 	 */
 	if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0)
 		return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
 
-	/* Make sure that the INIT chunk has a valid length.
-	 * In this case, we generate a protocol violation since we have
-	 * an association established.
-	 */
-	if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk)))
-		return sctp_sf_violation_chunklen(net, ep, asoc, type, arg,
-						  commands);
 	/* Grab the INIT header.  */
 	chunk->subh.init_hdr = (struct sctp_inithdr *)chunk->skb->data;
 
@@ -1814,9 +1817,9 @@ static enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_
 	 * its peer.
 	*/
 	if (sctp_state(asoc, SHUTDOWN_ACK_SENT)) {
-		disposition = sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc,
-				SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type),
-				chunk, commands);
+		disposition = __sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc,
+							 SCTP_ST_CHUNK(chunk->chunk_hdr->type),
+							 chunk, commands);
 		if (SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM == disposition)
 			goto nomem;
 
@@ -2915,13 +2918,11 @@ enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_shu
  * that belong to this association, it should discard the INIT chunk and
  * retransmit the SHUTDOWN ACK chunk.
  */
-enum sctp_disposition sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(
-					struct net *net,
-					const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
-					const struct sctp_association *asoc,
-					const union sctp_subtype type,
-					void *arg,
-					struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands)
+static enum sctp_disposition
+__sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+			   const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+			   const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg,
+			   struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands)
 {
 	struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
 	struct sctp_chunk *reply;
@@ -2955,6 +2956,26 @@ nomem:
 	return SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM;
 }
 
+enum sctp_disposition
+sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(struct net *net, const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+			 const struct sctp_association *asoc,
+			 const union sctp_subtype type, void *arg,
+			 struct sctp_cmd_seq *commands)
+{
+	struct sctp_chunk *chunk = arg;
+
+	if (!chunk->singleton)
+		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
+	if (!sctp_chunk_length_valid(chunk, sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk)))
+		return sctp_sf_pdiscard(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
+	if (chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag != 0)
+		return sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+
+	return __sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack(net, ep, asoc, type, arg, commands);
+}
+
 /*
  * sctp_sf_do_ecn_cwr
  *
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/43 arm64: Add part number for Arm Cortex-A77

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Rob Herring <[email protected]>

commit 8a6b88e66233f5f1779b0a1342aa9dc030dddcd5 upstream.

Add the MIDR part number info for the Arm Cortex-A77.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +2 -0
index aca07c2f6e6e..b009d4813537 100644
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55		0xD05
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76		0xD0B
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1	0xD0C
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77		0xD0D
 
 #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA		0x000
 
@@ -102,6 +103,7 @@
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A55 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A55)
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A76	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76)
 #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1)
+#define MIDR_CORTEX_A77	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/43 arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Suzuki K Poulose <[email protected]>

commit 2d0d656700d67239a57afaf617439143d8dac9be upstream.

Add the CPU Partnumbers for the new Arm designs.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +4 -0
index b009d4813537..6a0acbec77ae 100644
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76		0xD0B
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1	0xD0C
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77		0xD0D
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710	0xD47
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2	0xD49
 
 #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA		0x000
 
@@ -104,6 +106,8 @@
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A76	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76)
 #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1)
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A77	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77)
+#define MIDR_CORTEX_A710 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710)
+#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/43 arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Joey Gouly <[email protected]>

commit 9e45365f1469ef2b934f9d035975dbc9ad352116 upstream.

This is a new ID register, introduced in 8.7.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h    |  1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c  |  9 +++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c     |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c       |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpu.h +1 -0
index d72d995b7e25..85cc06380e93 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct cpuinfo_arm64 {
 	u64		reg_id_aa64dfr1;
 	u64		reg_id_aa64isar0;
 	u64		reg_id_aa64isar1;
+	u64		reg_id_aa64isar2;
 	u64		reg_id_aa64mmfr0;
 	u64		reg_id_aa64mmfr1;
 	u64		reg_id_aa64mmfr2;
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +15 -0
index 9b68f1b3915e..50ed2747c572 100644
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@
 
 #define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 0)
 #define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 1)
+#define SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 6, 2)
 
 #define SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 7, 0)
 #define SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1		sys_reg(3, 0, 0, 7, 1)
@@ -575,6 +576,20 @@
 #define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_NI		0x0
 #define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF	0x1
 
+/* id_aa64isar2 */
+#define ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_SHIFT	4
+#define ID_AA64ISAR2_WFXT_SHIFT		0
+
+#define ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_8BIT		0x0
+#define ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_12BIT	0x1
+/*
+ * Value 0x1 has been removed from the architecture, and is
+ * reserved, but has not yet been removed from the ARM ARM
+ * as of ARM DDI 0487G.b.
+ */
+#define ID_AA64ISAR2_WFXT_NI		0x0
+#define ID_AA64ISAR2_WFXT_SUPPORTED	0x2
+
 /* id_aa64pfr0 */
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT		60
 #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT		56
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +9 -0
index acdef8d76c64..6b77e4942495 100644
@@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
+static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar2[] = {
+	ARM64_FTR_END,
+};
+
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64pfr0[] = {
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_NONSTRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT, 4, 0),
@@ -410,6 +414,7 @@ static const struct __ftr_reg_entry {
 	/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 6 */
 	ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar0),
 	ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar1),
+	ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, ftr_id_aa64isar2),
 
 	/* Op1 = 0, CRn = 0, CRm = 7 */
 	ARM64_FTR_REG(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, ftr_id_aa64mmfr0),
@@ -581,6 +586,7 @@ void __init init_cpu_features(struct cpuinfo_arm64 *info)
 	init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64DFR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64dfr1);
 	init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64isar0);
 	init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64isar1);
+	init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64isar2);
 	init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr0);
 	init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr1);
 	init_cpu_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1, info->reg_id_aa64mmfr2);
@@ -704,6 +710,8 @@ void update_cpu_features(int cpu,
 				      info->reg_id_aa64isar0, boot->reg_id_aa64isar0);
 	taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1, cpu,
 				      info->reg_id_aa64isar1, boot->reg_id_aa64isar1);
+	taint |= check_update_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1, cpu,
+				      info->reg_id_aa64isar2, boot->reg_id_aa64isar2);
 
 	/*
 	 * Differing PARange support is fine as long as all peripherals and
@@ -838,6 +846,7 @@ static u64 __read_sysreg_by_encoding(u32 sys_id)
 	read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1);
 	read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1);
 	read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1);
+	read_sysreg_case(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1);
 
 	read_sysreg_case(SYS_CNTFRQ_EL0);
 	read_sysreg_case(SYS_CTR_EL0);
arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c +1 -0
index 05933c065732..90b35011a22f 100644
@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@ static void __cpuinfo_store_cpu(struct cpuinfo_arm64 *info)
 	info->reg_id_aa64dfr1 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64DFR1_EL1);
 	info->reg_id_aa64isar0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1);
 	info->reg_id_aa64isar1 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1);
+	info->reg_id_aa64isar2 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1);
 	info->reg_id_aa64mmfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1);
 	info->reg_id_aa64mmfr1 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR1_EL1);
 	info->reg_id_aa64mmfr2 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR2_EL1);
arch/arm64/kvm/sys_regs.c +1 -1
index da649e90240c..a25f737dfa0b 100644
@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ static const struct sys_reg_desc sys_reg_descs[] = {
 	/* CRm=6 */
 	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1),
 	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1),
-	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,2),
+	ID_SANITISED(ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1),
 	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,3),
 	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,4),
 	ID_UNALLOCATED(6,5),
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/43 arm64: Add Cortex-X2 CPU part definition

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Anshuman Khandual <[email protected]>

commit 72bb9dcb6c33cfac80282713c2b4f2b254cd24d1 upstream.

Add the CPU Partnumbers for the new Arm designs.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +2 -0
index 6a0acbec77ae..e4394be47d35 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1	0xD0C
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77		0xD0D
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710	0xD47
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2		0xD48
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2	0xD49
 
 #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA		0x000
@@ -107,6 +108,7 @@
 #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1)
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A77	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77)
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A710 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710)
+#define MIDR_CORTEX_X2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2)
 #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/43 arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit 4330e2c5c04c27bebf89d34e0bc14e6943413067 upstream.

Subsequent patches add even more code to the ventry slots. Ensure kernels that overflow a ventry slot don't get built.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +3 -0
index db137746c6fa..98991aa9d0b1 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
 
 	.macro kernel_ventry, el, label, regsize = 64
 	.align 7
+.Lventry_start\@:
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 alternative_if ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 	.if	\el == 0
@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	mrs	x0, tpidrro_el0
 #endif
 	b	el\()\el\()_\label
+.org .Lventry_start\@ + 128	// Did we overflow the ventry slot?
 	.endm
 
 	.macro tramp_alias, dst, sym
@@ -1080,6 +1082,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	add	x30, x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors)
 	isb
 	ret
+.org 1b + 128	// Did we overflow the ventry slot?
 	.endm
 
 	.macro tramp_exit, regsize = 64
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/43 arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit d739da1694a0eaef0358a42b76904b611539b77b upstream.

Subsequent patches will add additional sets of vectors that use the same tricks as the kpti vectors to reach the full-fat vectors. The full-fat vectors contain some cleanup for kpti that is patched in by alternatives when kpti is in use. Once there are additional vectors, the cleanup will be needed in more cases.

But on big/little systems, the cleanup would be harmful if no trampoline vector were in use. Instead of forcing CPUs that don't need a trampoline vector to use one, make the trampoline cleanup optional.

Entry at the top of the vectors will skip the cleanup. The trampoline vectors can then skip the first instruction, triggering the cleanup to run.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +7 -3
index 98991aa9d0b1..a6dcd68ce7de 100644
@@ -61,16 +61,20 @@
 	.align 7
 .Lventry_start\@:
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
-alternative_if ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 	.if	\el == 0
+	/*
+	 * This must be the first instruction of the EL0 vector entries. It is
+	 * skipped by the trampoline vectors, to trigger the cleanup.
+	 */
+	b	.Lskip_tramp_vectors_cleanup\@
 	.if	\regsize == 64
 	mrs	x30, tpidrro_el0
 	msr	tpidrro_el0, xzr
 	.else
 	mov	x30, xzr
 	.endif
+.Lskip_tramp_vectors_cleanup\@:
 	.endif
-alternative_else_nop_endif
 #endif
 
 	sub	sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE
@@ -1079,7 +1083,7 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_PRFM
 	prfm	plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors)]
 alternative_else_nop_endif
 	msr	vbar_el1, x30
-	add	x30, x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors)
+	add	x30, x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors + 4)
 	isb
 	ret
 .org 1b + 128	// Did we overflow the ventry slot?
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/43 arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit 03aff3a77a58b5b52a77e00537a42090ad57b80b upstream.

Kpti stashes x30 in far_el1 while it uses x30 for all its work.

Making the vectors a per-cpu data structure will require a second register.

Allow tramp_exit two registers before it unmaps the kernel, by leaving x30 on the stack, and stashing x29 in far_el1.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 18 ++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +12 -6
index a6dcd68ce7de..7e52b6991bf1 100644
@@ -367,14 +367,16 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	ldp	x24, x25, [sp, #16 * 12]
 	ldp	x26, x27, [sp, #16 * 13]
 	ldp	x28, x29, [sp, #16 * 14]
-	ldr	lr, [sp, #S_LR]
-	add	sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE		// restore sp
 
 	.if	\el == 0
-alternative_insn eret, nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
+alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
+	ldr	lr, [sp, #S_LR]
+	add	sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE		// restore sp
+	eret
+alternative_else_nop_endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 	bne	5f
-	msr	far_el1, x30
+	msr	far_el1, x29
 	tramp_alias	x30, tramp_exit_native
 	br	x30
 5:
@@ -382,6 +384,8 @@ alternative_insn eret, nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 	br	x30
 #endif
 	.else
+	ldr	lr, [sp, #S_LR]
+	add	sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE		// restore sp
 	eret
 	.endif
 	sb
@@ -1092,10 +1096,12 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	.macro tramp_exit, regsize = 64
 	adr	x30, tramp_vectors
 	msr	vbar_el1, x30
-	tramp_unmap_kernel	x30
+	ldr	lr, [sp, #S_LR]
+	tramp_unmap_kernel	x29
 	.if	\regsize == 64
-	mrs	x30, far_el1
+	mrs	x29, far_el1
 	.endif
+	add	sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE		// restore sp
 	eret
 	sb
 	.endm
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/43 arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit c091fb6ae059cda563b2a4d93fdbc548ef34e1d6 upstream.

The trampoline code has a data page that holds the address of the vectors, which is unmapped when running in user-space. This ensures that with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE, the randomised address of the kernel can't be discovered until after the kernel has been mapped.

If the trampoline text page is extended to include multiple sets of vectors, it will be larger than a single page, making it tricky to find the data page without knowing the size of the trampoline text pages, which will vary with PAGE_SIZE.

Move the data page to appear before the text page. This allows the data page to be found without knowing the size of the trampoline text pages. 'tramp_vectors' is used to refer to the beginning of the .entry.tramp.text section, do that explicitly.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h | 2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S       | 9 +++++++--
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h +1 -1
index f987b8a8f325..2e0977c7564c 100644
@@ -63,8 +63,8 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
 #endif /* CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_GHES */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
-	FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_DATA,
 	FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT,
+	FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_DATA,
 #define TRAMP_VALIAS		(__fix_to_virt(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT))
 #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
 	__end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses,
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +7 -2
index 7e52b6991bf1..7822ecc0e165 100644
@@ -1061,6 +1061,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	 */
 	.endm
 
+	.macro tramp_data_page	dst
+	adr	\dst, .entry.tramp.text
+	sub	\dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE
+	.endm
+
 	.macro tramp_ventry, regsize = 64
 	.align	7
 1:
@@ -1077,7 +1082,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 2:
 	tramp_map_kernel	x30
 #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
-	adr	x30, tramp_vectors + PAGE_SIZE
+	tramp_data_page		x30
 alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003
 	ldr	x30, [x30]
 #else
@@ -1228,7 +1233,7 @@ ENTRY(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 1:	str	x4, [x1, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT)]
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
-	adr	x4, tramp_vectors + PAGE_SIZE
+	tramp_data_page		x4
 	add	x4, x4, #:lo12:__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
 	ldr	x4, [x4]
 #else
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/43 arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit 6c5bf79b69f911560fbf82214c0971af6e58e682 upstream.

Systems using kpti enter and exit the kernel through a trampoline mapping that is always mapped, even when the kernel is not. tramp_valias is a macro to find the address of a symbol in the trampoline mapping.

Adding extra sets of vectors will expand the size of the entry.tramp.text section to beyond 4K. tramp_valias will be unable to generate addresses for symbols beyond 4K as it uses the 12 bit immediate of the add instruction.

As there are now two registers available when tramp_alias is called, use the extra register to avoid the 4K limit of the 12 bit immediate.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +8 -5
index 7822ecc0e165..3489edd57c51 100644
@@ -124,9 +124,12 @@
 .org .Lventry_start\@ + 128	// Did we overflow the ventry slot?
 	.endm
 
-	.macro tramp_alias, dst, sym
+	.macro tramp_alias, dst, sym, tmp
 	mov_q	\dst, TRAMP_VALIAS
-	add	\dst, \dst, #(\sym - .entry.tramp.text)
+	adr_l	\tmp, \sym
+	add	\dst, \dst, \tmp
+	adr_l	\tmp, .entry.tramp.text
+	sub	\dst, \dst, \tmp
 	.endm
 
 	// This macro corrupts x0-x3. It is the caller's duty
@@ -377,10 +380,10 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 	bne	5f
 	msr	far_el1, x29
-	tramp_alias	x30, tramp_exit_native
+	tramp_alias	x30, tramp_exit_native, x29
 	br	x30
 5:
-	tramp_alias	x30, tramp_exit_compat
+	tramp_alias	x30, tramp_exit_compat, x29
 	br	x30
 #endif
 	.else
@@ -1362,7 +1365,7 @@ alternative_if_not ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 alternative_else_nop_endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
-	tramp_alias	dst=x5, sym=__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline
+	tramp_alias	dst=x5, sym=__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline, tmp=x3
 	br	x5
 #endif
 ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_handler)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/43 arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit ed50da7764535f1e24432ded289974f2bf2b0c5a upstream.

The tramp_ventry macro uses tramp_vectors as the address of the vectors when calculating which ventry in the 'full fat' vectors to branch to.

While there is one set of tramp_vectors, this will be true. Adding multiple sets of vectors will break this assumption.

Move the generation of the vectors to a macro, and pass the start of the vectors as an argument to tramp_ventry.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 28 +++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +15 -13
index 3489edd57c51..09c78d6781a7 100644
@@ -1069,7 +1069,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	sub	\dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE
 	.endm
 
-	.macro tramp_ventry, regsize = 64
+	.macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize
 	.align	7
 1:
 	.if	\regsize == 64
@@ -1092,10 +1092,10 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003
 	ldr	x30, =vectors
 #endif
 alternative_if_not ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_PRFM
-	prfm	plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors)]
+	prfm	plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - \vector_start)]
 alternative_else_nop_endif
 	msr	vbar_el1, x30
-	add	x30, x30, #(1b - tramp_vectors + 4)
+	add	x30, x30, #(1b - \vector_start + 4)
 	isb
 	ret
 .org 1b + 128	// Did we overflow the ventry slot?
@@ -1114,19 +1114,21 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	sb
 	.endm
 
-	.align	11
-ENTRY(tramp_vectors)
+	.macro	generate_tramp_vector
+.Lvector_start\@:
 	.space	0x400
 
-	tramp_ventry
-	tramp_ventry
-	tramp_ventry
-	tramp_ventry
+	.rept	4
+	tramp_ventry	.Lvector_start\@, 64
+	.endr
+	.rept	4
+	tramp_ventry	.Lvector_start\@, 32
+	.endr
+	.endm
 
-	tramp_ventry	32
-	tramp_ventry	32
-	tramp_ventry	32
-	tramp_ventry	32
+	.align	11
+ENTRY(tramp_vectors)
+	generate_tramp_vector
 END(tramp_vectors)
 
 ENTRY(tramp_exit_native)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/43 arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit 13d7a08352a83ef2252aeb464a5e08dfc06b5dfd upstream.

The macros for building the kpti trampoline are all behind CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0, and in a region that outputs to the .entry.tramp.text section.

Move the macros out so they can be used to generate other kinds of trampoline. Only the symbols need to be guarded by CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 and appear in the .entry.tramp.text section.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 11 +++++------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +5 -6
index 09c78d6781a7..a2ec7ef24402 100644
@@ -1025,12 +1025,6 @@ ENDPROC(el0_svc)
 
 	.popsection				// .entry.text
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
-/*
- * Exception vectors trampoline.
- */
-	.pushsection ".entry.tramp.text", "ax"
-
 	// Move from tramp_pg_dir to swapper_pg_dir
 	.macro tramp_map_kernel, tmp
 	mrs	\tmp, ttbr1_el1
@@ -1126,6 +1120,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	.endr
 	.endm
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
+/*
+ * Exception vectors trampoline.
+ */
+	.pushsection ".entry.tramp.text", "ax"
 	.align	11
 ENTRY(tramp_vectors)
 	generate_tramp_vector
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/43 arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit c47e4d04ba0f1ea17353d85d45f611277507e07a upstream.

Spectre-BHB needs to add sequences to the vectors. Having one global set of vectors is a problem for big/little systems where the sequence is costly on cpus that are not vulnerable.

Making the vectors per-cpu in the style of KVM's bh_harden_hyp_vecs requires the vectors to be generated by macros.

Make the kpti re-mapping of the kernel optional, so the macros can be used without kpti.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 18 ++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +12 -6
index a2ec7ef24402..bb456f596c43 100644
@@ -1063,9 +1063,10 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	sub	\dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE
 	.endm
 
-	.macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize
+	.macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti
 	.align	7
 1:
+	.if	\kpti == 1
 	.if	\regsize == 64
 	msr	tpidrro_el0, x30	// Restored in kernel_ventry
 	.endif
@@ -1088,9 +1089,14 @@ alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003
 alternative_if_not ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_PRFM
 	prfm	plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - \vector_start)]
 alternative_else_nop_endif
+
 	msr	vbar_el1, x30
-	add	x30, x30, #(1b - \vector_start + 4)
 	isb
+	.else
+	ldr	x30, =vectors
+	.endif // \kpti == 1
+
+	add	x30, x30, #(1b - \vector_start + 4)
 	ret
 .org 1b + 128	// Did we overflow the ventry slot?
 	.endm
@@ -1108,15 +1114,15 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	sb
 	.endm
 
-	.macro	generate_tramp_vector
+	.macro	generate_tramp_vector,	kpti
 .Lvector_start\@:
 	.space	0x400
 
 	.rept	4
-	tramp_ventry	.Lvector_start\@, 64
+	tramp_ventry	.Lvector_start\@, 64, \kpti
 	.endr
 	.rept	4
-	tramp_ventry	.Lvector_start\@, 32
+	tramp_ventry	.Lvector_start\@, 32, \kpti
 	.endr
 	.endm
 
@@ -1127,7 +1133,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	.pushsection ".entry.tramp.text", "ax"
 	.align	11
 ENTRY(tramp_vectors)
-	generate_tramp_vector
+	generate_tramp_vector	kpti=1
 END(tramp_vectors)
 
 ENTRY(tramp_exit_native)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/43 arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit a9c406e6462ff14956d690de7bbe5131a5677dc9 upstream.

Adding a second set of vectors to .entry.tramp.text will make it larger than a single 4K page.

Allow the trampoline text to occupy up to three pages by adding two more fixmap slots. Previous changes to tramp_valias allowed it to reach beyond a single page.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h   |  6 ++++--
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h |  5 +++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S         |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S   |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c               | 12 +++++++++---
 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/fixmap.h +4 -2
index 2e0977c7564c..928a96b9b161 100644
@@ -63,9 +63,11 @@ enum fixed_addresses {
 #endif /* CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_GHES */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
-	FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT,
+	FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT3,
+	FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT2,
+	FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT1,
 	FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_DATA,
-#define TRAMP_VALIAS		(__fix_to_virt(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT))
+#define TRAMP_VALIAS		(__fix_to_virt(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT1))
 #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
 	__end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses,
 
arch/arm64/include/asm/sections.h +5 -0
index 25a73aab438f..a75f2882cc7c 100644
@@ -20,4 +20,9 @@ extern char __irqentry_text_start[], __irqentry_text_end[];
 extern char __mmuoff_data_start[], __mmuoff_data_end[];
 extern char __entry_tramp_text_start[], __entry_tramp_text_end[];
 
+static inline size_t entry_tramp_text_size(void)
+{
+	return __entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start;
+}
+
 #endif /* __ASM_SECTIONS_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +1 -1
index bb456f596c43..c1cebaf68e0c 100644
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	.endm
 
 	.macro tramp_data_page	dst
-	adr	\dst, .entry.tramp.text
+	adr_l	\dst, .entry.tramp.text
 	sub	\dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE
 	.endm
 
arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +1 -1
index 1f82cf631c3c..fbab044b3a39 100644
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ ASSERT(__hibernate_exit_text_end - (__hibernate_exit_text_start & ~(SZ_4K - 1))
 	<= SZ_4K, "Hibernate exit text too big or misaligned")
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
-ASSERT((__entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start) == PAGE_SIZE,
+ASSERT((__entry_tramp_text_end - __entry_tramp_text_start) <= 3*PAGE_SIZE,
 	"Entry trampoline text too big")
 #endif
 /*
arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c +9 -3
index 99bc0289ab2b..5cf575f23af2 100644
@@ -583,6 +583,8 @@ early_param("rodata", parse_rodata);
 #ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 static int __init map_entry_trampoline(void)
 {
+	int i;
+
 	pgprot_t prot = rodata_enabled ? PAGE_KERNEL_ROX : PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
 	phys_addr_t pa_start = __pa_symbol(__entry_tramp_text_start);
 
@@ -591,11 +593,15 @@ static int __init map_entry_trampoline(void)
 
 	/* Map only the text into the trampoline page table */
 	memset(tramp_pg_dir, 0, PGD_SIZE);
-	__create_pgd_mapping(tramp_pg_dir, pa_start, TRAMP_VALIAS, PAGE_SIZE,
-			     prot, __pgd_pgtable_alloc, 0);
+	__create_pgd_mapping(tramp_pg_dir, pa_start, TRAMP_VALIAS,
+			     entry_tramp_text_size(), prot,
+			     __pgd_pgtable_alloc, NO_BLOCK_MAPPINGS);
 
 	/* Map both the text and data into the kernel page table */
-	__set_fixmap(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT, pa_start, prot);
+	for (i = 0; i < DIV_ROUND_UP(entry_tramp_text_size(), PAGE_SIZE); i++)
+		__set_fixmap(FIX_ENTRY_TRAMP_TEXT1 - i,
+			     pa_start + i * PAGE_SIZE, prot);
+
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE)) {
 		extern char __entry_tramp_data_start[];
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/43 arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit aff65393fa1401e034656e349abd655cfe272de0 upstream.

kpti is an optional feature, for systems not using kpti a set of vectors for the spectre-bhb mitigations is needed.

Add another set of vectors, __bp_harden_el1_vectors, that will be used if a mitigation is needed and kpti is not in use.

The EL1 ventries are repeated verbatim as there is no additional work needed for entry from EL1.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +34 -1
index c1cebaf68e0c..1bc33f506bb1 100644
@@ -1066,10 +1066,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	.macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti
 	.align	7
 1:
-	.if	\kpti == 1
 	.if	\regsize == 64
 	msr	tpidrro_el0, x30	// Restored in kernel_ventry
 	.endif
+
+	.if	\kpti == 1
 	/*
 	 * Defend against branch aliasing attacks by pushing a dummy
 	 * entry onto the return stack and using a RET instruction to
@@ -1156,6 +1157,38 @@ __entry_tramp_data_start:
 #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
 
+/*
+ * Exception vectors for spectre mitigations on entry from EL1 when
+ * kpti is not in use.
+ */
+	.macro generate_el1_vector
+.Lvector_start\@:
+	kernel_ventry	1, sync_invalid			// Synchronous EL1t
+	kernel_ventry	1, irq_invalid			// IRQ EL1t
+	kernel_ventry	1, fiq_invalid			// FIQ EL1t
+	kernel_ventry	1, error_invalid		// Error EL1t
+
+	kernel_ventry	1, sync				// Synchronous EL1h
+	kernel_ventry	1, irq				// IRQ EL1h
+	kernel_ventry	1, fiq_invalid			// FIQ EL1h
+	kernel_ventry	1, error			// Error EL1h
+
+	.rept	4
+	tramp_ventry	.Lvector_start\@, 64, kpti=0
+	.endr
+	.rept 4
+	tramp_ventry	.Lvector_start\@, 32, kpti=0
+	.endr
+	.endm
+
+	.pushsection ".entry.text", "ax"
+	.align	11
+SYM_CODE_START(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
+	generate_el1_vector
+SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
+	.popsection
+
+
 /*
  * Register switch for AArch64. The callee-saved registers need to be saved
  * and restored. On entry:
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/43 arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit ba2689234be92024e5635d30fe744f4853ad97db upstream.

Some CPUs affected by Spectre-BHB need a sequence of branches, or a firmware call to be run before any indirect branch. This needs to go in the vectors. No CPU needs both.

While this can be patched in, it would run on all CPUs as there is a single set of vectors. If only one part of a big/little combination is affected, the unaffected CPUs have to run the mitigation too.

Create extra vectors that include the sequence. Subsequent patches will allow affected CPUs to select this set of vectors. Later patches will modify the loop count to match what the CPU requires.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 24 ++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h   | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S          | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 include/linux/arm-smccc.h          |  5 +++
 4 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h
arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +24 -0
index 4a4258f17c86..1279e4f5bd8f 100644
@@ -757,4 +757,28 @@ USER(\label, ic	ivau, \tmp2)			// invalidate I line PoU
 .Lyield_out_\@ :
 	.endm
 
+	.macro __mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop      tmp
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
+	mov	\tmp, #32
+.Lspectre_bhb_loop\@:
+	b	. + 4
+	subs	\tmp, \tmp, #1
+	b.ne	.Lspectre_bhb_loop\@
+	sb
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
+	.endm
+
+	/* Save/restores x0-x3 to the stack */
+	.macro __mitigate_spectre_bhb_fw
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
+	stp	x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!
+	stp	x2, x3, [sp, #-16]!
+	mov	w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3
+alternative_cb	smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit
+	nop					// Patched to SMC/HVC #0
+alternative_cb_end
+	ldp	x2, x3, [sp], #16
+	ldp	x0, x1, [sp], #16
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
+	.endm
 #endif	/* __ASM_ASSEMBLER_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..16ca74260375
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 ARM Ltd.
+ */
+#ifndef __ASM_VECTORS_H
+#define __ASM_VECTORS_H
+
+/*
+ * Note: the order of this enum corresponds to two arrays in entry.S:
+ * tramp_vecs and __bp_harden_el1_vectors. By default the canonical
+ * 'full fat' vectors are used directly.
+ */
+enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors {
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
+	/*
+	 * Perform the BHB loop mitigation, before branching to the canonical
+	 * vectors.
+	 */
+	EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP,
+
+	/*
+	 * Make the SMC call for firmware mitigation, before branching to the
+	 * canonical vectors.
+	 */
+	EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW,
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
+
+	/*
+	 * Remap the kernel before branching to the canonical vectors.
+	 */
+	EL1_VECTOR_KPTI,
+};
+
+#endif /* __ASM_VECTORS_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +44 -9

119 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/arm-smccc.h +5 -0
index 4e97ba64dbb4..3e6ef64e74d3 100644
@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@
 			   ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32,				\
 			   0, 0x7fff)
 
+#define ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3					\
+	ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL,				\
+			   ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32,				\
+			   0, 0x3fff)
+
 #define SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED	1
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/43 arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit b28a8eebe81c186fdb1a0078263b30576c8e1f42 upstream.

The trampoline code needs to use the address of symbols in the wider kernel, e.g. vectors. PC-relative addressing wouldn't work as the trampoline code doesn't run at the address the linker expected.

tramp_ventry uses a literal pool, unless CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is set, in which case it uses the data page as a literal pool because the data page can be unmapped when running in user-space, which is required for CPUs vulnerable to meltdown.

Pull this logic out as a macro, instead of adding a third copy of it.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 35 ++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +16 -19
index 14351ee5e812..e4b5a15c2e2e 100644
@@ -1063,6 +1063,15 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	sub	\dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE
 	.endm
 
+	.macro tramp_data_read_var	dst, var
+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
+	tramp_data_page		\dst
+	add	\dst, \dst, #:lo12:__entry_tramp_data_\var
+	ldr	\dst, [\dst]
+#else
+	ldr	\dst, =\var
+#endif
+	.endm
 
 #define BHB_MITIGATION_NONE	0
 #define BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP	1
@@ -1093,13 +1102,8 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	b	.
 2:
 	tramp_map_kernel	x30
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
-	tramp_data_page		x30
 alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003
-	ldr	x30, [x30]
-#else
-	ldr	x30, =vectors
-#endif
+	tramp_data_read_var	x30, vectors
 alternative_if_not ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_PRFM
 	prfm	plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - \vector_start)]
 alternative_else_nop_endif
@@ -1183,7 +1187,12 @@ END(tramp_exit_compat)
 	.align PAGE_SHIFT
 	.globl	__entry_tramp_data_start
 __entry_tramp_data_start:
+__entry_tramp_data_vectors:
 	.quad	vectors
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE
+__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler:
+	.quad	__sdei_asm_handler
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */
 	.popsection				// .rodata
 #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
@@ -1310,13 +1319,7 @@ ENTRY(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 	 */
 1:	str	x4, [x1, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT)]
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
-	tramp_data_page		x4
-	add	x4, x4, #:lo12:__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
-	ldr	x4, [x4]
-#else
-	ldr	x4, =__sdei_asm_handler
-#endif
+	tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
 	br	x4
 ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
@@ -1339,12 +1342,6 @@ ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline)
 NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline)
 	.ltorg
 .popsection		// .entry.tramp.text
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
-.pushsection ".rodata", "a"
-__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler:
-	.quad	__sdei_asm_handler
-.popsection		// .rodata
-#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.4 18/43] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline

Quoted 13 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit b28a8eebe81c186fdb1a0078263b30576c8e1f42 upstream.

The trampoline code needs to use the address of symbols in the wider kernel, e.g. vectors. PC-relative addressing wouldn't work as the trampoline code doesn't run at the address the linker expected.

tramp_ventry uses a literal pool, unless CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is set, in which case it uses the data page as a literal pool because the data page can be unmapped when running in user-space, which is required for CPUs vulnerable to meltdown.

Quoted 6 lines

Pull this logic out as a macro, instead of adding a third copy of it.

This commit causes a linking failure with CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE=y enabled in the kernel:

LD .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/host/bin/aarch64-linux-ld:
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.o: in function `__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline':
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/build/linux-custom/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1352:
undefined reference to `__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler'
make[2]: *** [Makefile:1100: vmlinux] Error 1
make[1]: *** [package/pkg-generic.mk:295:
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/build/linux-custom/.stamp_built] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:27: _all] Error 2

Quoted 81 lines
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 35 ++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +16 -19
index 14351ee5e812..e4b5a15c2e2e 100644
@@ -1063,6 +1063,15 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	sub	\dst, \dst, PAGE_SIZE
 	.endm
 
+	.macro tramp_data_read_var	dst, var
+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
+	tramp_data_page		\dst
+	add	\dst, \dst, #:lo12:__entry_tramp_data_\var
+	ldr	\dst, [\dst]
+#else
+	ldr	\dst, =\var
+#endif
+	.endm
 
 #define BHB_MITIGATION_NONE	0
 #define BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP	1
@@ -1093,13 +1102,8 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	b	.
 2:
 	tramp_map_kernel	x30
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
-	tramp_data_page		x30
 alternative_insn isb, nop, ARM64_WORKAROUND_QCOM_FALKOR_E1003
-	ldr	x30, [x30]
-#else
-	ldr	x30, =vectors
-#endif
+	tramp_data_read_var	x30, vectors
 alternative_if_not ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_PRFM
 	prfm	plil1strm, [x30, #(1b - \vector_start)]
 alternative_else_nop_endif
@@ -1183,7 +1187,12 @@ END(tramp_exit_compat)
 	.align PAGE_SHIFT
 	.globl	__entry_tramp_data_start
 __entry_tramp_data_start:
+__entry_tramp_data_vectors:
 	.quad	vectors
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE
+__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler:
+	.quad	__sdei_asm_handler
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */
 	.popsection				// .rodata
 #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
@@ -1310,13 +1319,7 @@ ENTRY(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 	 */
 1:	str	x4, [x1, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT)]
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
-	tramp_data_page		x4
-	add	x4, x4, #:lo12:__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
-	ldr	x4, [x4]
-#else
-	ldr	x4, =__sdei_asm_handler
-#endif
+	tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
 	br	x4
 ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
@@ -1339,12 +1342,6 @@ ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline)
 NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline)
 	.ltorg
 .popsection		// .entry.tramp.text
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
-.pushsection ".rodata", "a"
-__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler:
-	.quad	__sdei_asm_handler
-.popsection		// .rodata
-#endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
Florian
#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.4 18/43] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline

Hi Florian,

Quoted 24 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 13 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit b28a8eebe81c186fdb1a0078263b30576c8e1f42 upstream.

The trampoline code needs to use the address of symbols in the wider kernel, e.g. vectors. PC-relative addressing wouldn't work as the trampoline code doesn't run at the address the linker expected.

tramp_ventry uses a literal pool, unless CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is set, in which case it uses the data page as a literal pool because the data page can be unmapped when running in user-space, which is required for CPUs vulnerable to meltdown.

Quoted 6 lines

Pull this logic out as a macro, instead of adding a third copy of it.

This commit causes a linking failure with CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE=y enabled in the kernel:

Quoted 10 lines

LD .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/host/bin/aarch64-linux-ld:
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.o: in function `__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline':
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/build/linux-custom/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1352:
undefined reference to `__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler'
make[2]: *** [Makefile:1100: vmlinux] Error 1
make[1]: *** [package/pkg-generic.mk:295:
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/build/linux-custom/.stamp_built] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:27: _all] Error 2

... and with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE turned off, which is why allyesconfig didn't catch it. This is because I kept the next_handler bit of the label when it conflicted, which isn't needed because the __entry_tramp bit added by the macro serves the same purpose.

The below diff fixes it:
----------%<----------

arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +2 -2
index e4b5a15c2e2e..cfc0bb6c49f7 100644
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ __entry_tramp_data_start:
 __entry_tramp_data_vectors:
        .quad   vectors
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE
-__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler:
+__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_handler:
        .quad   __sdei_asm_handler
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */
        .popsection                             // .rodata
@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ ENTRY(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
         */
 1:     str     x4, [x1, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT)]
 
-       tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
+       tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_handler
        br      x4
 ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)

----------%<----------

Good news - this didn't happen with v5.10.

I don't see this in v5.4.185 yet.

Greg/Sasha, what is least work for you?:
A new version of this patch,
A fixup on top of the series,
Reposting the series with this fixed.

Thanks for catching this!

James

author maintainer
#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.4 18/43] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline

Quoted 67 lines · James Morse

Hi Florian,

Quoted 24 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 13 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit b28a8eebe81c186fdb1a0078263b30576c8e1f42 upstream.

The trampoline code needs to use the address of symbols in the wider kernel, e.g. vectors. PC-relative addressing wouldn't work as the trampoline code doesn't run at the address the linker expected.

tramp_ventry uses a literal pool, unless CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is set, in which case it uses the data page as a literal pool because the data page can be unmapped when running in user-space, which is required for CPUs vulnerable to meltdown.

Quoted 6 lines

Pull this logic out as a macro, instead of adding a third copy of it.

This commit causes a linking failure with CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE=y enabled in the kernel:

Quoted 10 lines

LD .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/host/bin/aarch64-linux-ld:
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.o: in function `__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline':
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/build/linux-custom/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1352:
undefined reference to `__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler'
make[2]: *** [Makefile:1100: vmlinux] Error 1
make[1]: *** [package/pkg-generic.mk:295:
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/build/linux-custom/.stamp_built] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:27: _all] Error 2

... and with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE turned off, which is why allyesconfig didn't catch it. This is because I kept the next_handler bit of the label when it conflicted, which isn't needed because the __entry_tramp bit added by the macro serves the same purpose.

The below diff fixes it:
----------%<----------

arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +2 -3
index e4b5a15c2e2e..cfc0bb6c49f7 100644
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ __entry_tramp_data_start:
 __entry_tramp_data_vectors:
        .quad   vectors
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE
-__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler:
+__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_handler:
        .quad   __sdei_asm_handler
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */
        .popsection                             // .rodata
@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ ENTRY(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
         */
 1:     str     x4, [x1, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT)]
-       tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
+       tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_handler
        br      x4
 ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
----------%<----------
Quoted 8 lines

Good news - this didn't happen with v5.10.

I don't see this in v5.4.185 yet.

Greg/Sasha, what is least work for you?:
A new version of this patch,
A fixup on top of the series,
Reposting the series with this fixed.

Let me merge this into this commit.

thanks!

greg k-h

author maintainer
#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.4 18/43] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline

Quoted 70 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 69 lines · James Morse

Hi Florian,

Quoted 24 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 13 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit b28a8eebe81c186fdb1a0078263b30576c8e1f42 upstream.

The trampoline code needs to use the address of symbols in the wider kernel, e.g. vectors. PC-relative addressing wouldn't work as the trampoline code doesn't run at the address the linker expected.

tramp_ventry uses a literal pool, unless CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is set, in which case it uses the data page as a literal pool because the data page can be unmapped when running in user-space, which is required for CPUs vulnerable to meltdown.

Quoted 6 lines

Pull this logic out as a macro, instead of adding a third copy of it.

This commit causes a linking failure with CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE=y enabled in the kernel:

Quoted 10 lines

LD .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/host/bin/aarch64-linux-ld:
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.o: in function `__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline':
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/build/linux-custom/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1352:
undefined reference to `__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler'
make[2]: *** [Makefile:1100: vmlinux] Error 1
make[1]: *** [package/pkg-generic.mk:295:
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/build/linux-custom/.stamp_built] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:27: _all] Error 2

... and with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE turned off, which is why allyesconfig didn't catch it. This is because I kept the next_handler bit of the label when it conflicted, which isn't needed because the __entry_tramp bit added by the macro serves the same purpose.

The below diff fixes it:
----------%<----------

arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +2 -3
index e4b5a15c2e2e..cfc0bb6c49f7 100644
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ __entry_tramp_data_start:
 __entry_tramp_data_vectors:
        .quad   vectors
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE
-__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler:
+__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_handler:
        .quad   __sdei_asm_handler
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */
        .popsection                             // .rodata
@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ ENTRY(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
         */
 1:     str     x4, [x1, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT)]
-       tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
+       tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_handler
        br      x4
 ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
----------%<----------

Good news - this didn't happen with v5.10.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

I don't see this in v5.4.185 yet.

Greg/Sasha, what is least work for you?:
A new version of this patch,
A fixup on top of the series,
Reposting the series with this fixed.

Let me merge this into this commit.

Well I would if it would actually apply :(

Can you send a version that isn't whitespace corrupted?

thanks,

greg k-h

#23 lore raw

fixup for [PATCH 5.4 18/43] arm64 entry: Add macro for reading symbol address from the trampoline

__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler shouldn't have its own name as the tramp_data_read_var takes the symbol name, and generates the name for the value in the data page if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is clear.

This means when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is clear, this code won't compile as __sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler doesn't exist.

Use the proper name, and let the macro do its thing.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +2 -2
index e4b5a15c2e2e..cfc0bb6c49f7 100644
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ __entry_tramp_data_start:
 __entry_tramp_data_vectors:
 	.quad	vectors
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE
-__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler:
+__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_handler:
 	.quad	__sdei_asm_handler
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */
 	.popsection				// .rodata
@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ ENTRY(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 	 */
 1:	str	x4, [x1, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT)]
 
-	tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
+	tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_handler
 	br	x4
 ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
author maintainer
#24 lore raw

Re: fixup for [PATCH 5.4 18/43] arm64 entry: Add macro for reading symbol address from the trampoline

Quoted 41 lines · James Morse

__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler shouldn't have its own name as the tramp_data_read_var takes the symbol name, and generates the name for the value in the data page if CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is clear.

This means when CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is clear, this code won't compile as __sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler doesn't exist.

Use the proper name, and let the macro do its thing.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +2 -2
index e4b5a15c2e2e..cfc0bb6c49f7 100644
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ __entry_tramp_data_start:
 __entry_tramp_data_vectors:
 	.quad	vectors
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE
-__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler:
+__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_handler:
 	.quad	__sdei_asm_handler
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */
 	.popsection				// .rodata
@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ ENTRY(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 	 */
 1:	str	x4, [x1, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT)]
 
-	tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
+	tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_handler
 	br	x4
 ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
 NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2

Thanks, now queued up.

greg k-h

#25 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.4 18/43] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline

In reply to James Morse
Quoted 37 lines · James Morse

Hi Florian,

Quoted 34 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 13 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit b28a8eebe81c186fdb1a0078263b30576c8e1f42 upstream.

The trampoline code needs to use the address of symbols in the wider kernel, e.g. vectors. PC-relative addressing wouldn't work as the trampoline code doesn't run at the address the linker expected.

tramp_ventry uses a literal pool, unless CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is set, in which case it uses the data page as a literal pool because the data page can be unmapped when running in user-space, which is required for CPUs vulnerable to meltdown.

Quoted 6 lines

Pull this logic out as a macro, instead of adding a third copy of it.

This commit causes a linking failure with CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE=y enabled in the kernel:

   LD      .tmp_vmlinux.kallsyms1 /local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/host/bin/aarch64-linux-ld:
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.o: in function `__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline':
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/build/linux-custom/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1352:

undefined reference to `__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler' make[2]: *** [Makefile:1100: vmlinux] Error 1
make[1]: *** [package/pkg-generic.mk:295:
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/build/linux-custom/.stamp_built]

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:27: _all] Error 2

... and with CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE turned off, which is why allyesconfig didn't catch it.

Yes that is correct CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is turned off in the configuration file I used.

Quoted 29 lines

This is because I kept the next_handler bit of the label when it conflicted, which isn't needed because the __entry_tramp bit added by the macro serves the same purpose.

The below diff fixes it:
----------%<----------

arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +2 -3
index e4b5a15c2e2e..cfc0bb6c49f7 100644
@@ -1190,7 +1190,7 @@ __entry_tramp_data_start:
  __entry_tramp_data_vectors:
         .quad   vectors
  #ifdef CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE
-__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler:
+__entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_handler:
         .quad   __sdei_asm_handler
  #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */
         .popsection                             // .rodata
@@ -1319,7 +1319,7 @@ ENTRY(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
          */
  1:     str     x4, [x1, #(SDEI_EVENT_INTREGS + S_ORIG_ADDR_LIMIT)]
 
-       tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler
+       tramp_data_read_var     x4, __sdei_asm_handler
         br      x4
  ENDPROC(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
  NOKPROBE(__sdei_asm_entry_trampoline)
----------%<----------
Quoted 8 lines

Good news - this didn't happen with v5.10.

I don't see this in v5.4.185 yet.

Greg/Sasha, what is least work for you?:
A new version of this patch,
A fixup on top of the series,
Reposting the series with this fixed.

FWIW, applying your patch on top of the entire 5.4.186-rc1 series will fail with some rejects so that would require you to fixup the patch instead, and then I suppose the whole -rc1 now becomes an -rc2?

Quoted 3 lines

Thanks for catching this!

Thanks for the quick turnaround:

Signature · 1 line
Florian
author maintainer
#26 lore raw

PATCH 19/43 arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit bd09128d16fac3c34b80bd6a29088ac632e8ce09 upstream.

The Spectre-BHB workaround adds a firmware call to the vectors. This is needed on some CPUs, but not others. To avoid the unaffected CPU in a big/little pair from making the firmware call, create per cpu vectors.

The per-cpu vectors only apply when returning from EL0.

Systems using KPTI can use the canonical 'full-fat' vectors directly at EL1, the trampoline exit code will switch to this_cpu_vector on exit to EL0. Systems not using KPTI should always use this_cpu_vector.

this_cpu_vector will point at a vector in tramp_vecs or __bp_harden_el1_vectors, depending on whether KPTI is in use.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h     |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c   | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S        | 16 ++++++++++------
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c      |  8 ++++++--
 5 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +1 -1
index f217e3292919..353450011e3d 100644
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ typedef struct {
  */
 #define ASID(mm)	((mm)->context.id.counter & 0xffff)
 
-static inline bool arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(void)
+static __always_inline bool arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0(void)
 {
 	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0) &&
 	       cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0);
arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h +27 -0
index 16ca74260375..3f76dfd9e074 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
 #ifndef __ASM_VECTORS_H
 #define __ASM_VECTORS_H
 
+#include <linux/bug.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+
+#include <asm/fixmap.h>
+
+extern char vectors[];
+extern char tramp_vectors[];
+extern char __bp_harden_el1_vectors[];
+
 /*
  * Note: the order of this enum corresponds to two arrays in entry.S:
  * tramp_vecs and __bp_harden_el1_vectors. By default the canonical
@@ -31,4 +40,22 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors {
 	EL1_VECTOR_KPTI,
 };
 
+/* The vectors to use on return from EL0. e.g. to remap the kernel */
+DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, this_cpu_vector);
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
+#define TRAMP_VALIAS	0
+#endif
+
+static inline const char *
+arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors slot)
+{
+	if (arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
+		return (char *)TRAMP_VALIAS + SZ_2K * slot;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(slot == EL1_VECTOR_KPTI);
+
+	return __bp_harden_el1_vectors + SZ_2K * slot;
+}
+
 #endif /* __ASM_VECTORS_H */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +11 -0
index 6b77e4942495..0d89d535720f 100644
@@ -10,11 +10,13 @@
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
 #include <linux/cpumask.h>
 #include <linux/crash_dump.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
 #include <linux/sort.h>
 #include <linux/stop_machine.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/cpu.h>
+
 #include <asm/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/sysreg.h>
 #include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/vectors.h>
 #include <asm/virt.h>
 
 /* Kernel representation of AT_HWCAP and AT_HWCAP2 */
@@ -45,6 +48,8 @@ static struct arm64_cpu_capabilities const __ro_after_init *cpu_hwcaps_ptrs[ARM6
 /* Need also bit for ARM64_CB_PATCH */
 DECLARE_BITMAP(boot_capabilities, ARM64_NPATCHABLE);
 
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, this_cpu_vector) = vectors;
+
 /*
  * Flag to indicate if we have computed the system wide
  * capabilities based on the boot time active CPUs. This
@@ -1047,6 +1052,12 @@ kpti_install_ng_mappings(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 	static bool kpti_applied = false;
 	int cpu = smp_processor_id();
 
+	if (__this_cpu_read(this_cpu_vector) == vectors) {
+		const char *v = arm64_get_bp_hardening_vector(EL1_VECTOR_KPTI);
+
+		__this_cpu_write(this_cpu_vector, v);
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * We don't need to rewrite the page-tables if either we've done
 	 * it already or we have KASLR enabled and therefore have not
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +10 -6
index e4b5a15c2e2e..fcfbb2b009e2 100644
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@
 	.macro kernel_ventry, el, label, regsize = 64
 	.align 7
 .Lventry_start\@:
-#ifdef CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0
 	.if	\el == 0
 	/*
 	 * This must be the first instruction of the EL0 vector entries. It is
@@ -75,7 +74,6 @@
 	.endif
 .Lskip_tramp_vectors_cleanup\@:
 	.endif
-#endif
 
 	sub	sp, sp, #S_FRAME_SIZE
 #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
@@ -1129,10 +1127,14 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	.endm
 
 	.macro tramp_exit, regsize = 64
-	adr	x30, tramp_vectors
-#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
-	add	x30, x30, SZ_4K
-#endif
+	tramp_data_read_var	x30, this_cpu_vector
+alternative_if_not ARM64_HAS_VIRT_HOST_EXTN
+	mrs	x29, tpidr_el1
+alternative_else
+	mrs	x29, tpidr_el2
+alternative_endif
+	ldr	x30, [x30, x29]
+
 	msr	vbar_el1, x30
 	ldr	lr, [sp, #S_LR]
 	tramp_unmap_kernel	x29
@@ -1193,6 +1195,8 @@ __entry_tramp_data_vectors:
 __entry_tramp_data___sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler:
 	.quad	__sdei_asm_handler
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE */
+__entry_tramp_data_this_cpu_vector:
+	.quad	this_cpu_vector
 	.popsection				// .rodata
 #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c +6 -2
index 14607fac7ca3..768983bd2326 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/thread_info.h>
+#include <asm/vectors.h>
 
 extern struct exception_table_entry __start___kvm_ex_table;
 extern struct exception_table_entry __stop___kvm_ex_table;
@@ -152,7 +153,7 @@ static void __hyp_text __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static void deactivate_traps_vhe(void)
 {
-	extern char vectors[];	/* kernel exception vectors */
+	const char *host_vectors = vectors;
 	write_sysreg(HCR_HOST_VHE_FLAGS, hcr_el2);
 
 	/*
@@ -163,7 +164,10 @@ static void deactivate_traps_vhe(void)
 	asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", "isb", ARM64_WORKAROUND_1165522));
 
 	write_sysreg(CPACR_EL1_DEFAULT, cpacr_el1);
-	write_sysreg(vectors, vbar_el1);
+
+	if (!arm64_kernel_unmapped_at_el0())
+		host_vectors = __this_cpu_read(this_cpu_vector);
+	write_sysreg(host_vectors, vbar_el1);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(deactivate_traps_vhe);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#27 lore raw

PATCH 20/43 arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit dee435be76f4117410bbd90573a881fd33488f37 upstream.

Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can make use of branch history to influence future speculation as part of a spectre-v2 attack. This is not mitigated by CSV2, meaning CPUs that previously reported 'Not affected' are now moderately mitigated by CSV2.

Update the value in /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 to also show the state of the BHB mitigation.

[ code move to cpu_errata.c for backport ]
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |  9 +++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +9 -0
index ccae05da98a7..a798443ed76f 100644
@@ -639,6 +639,15 @@ static inline int arm64_get_ssbd_state(void)
 
 void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state);
 
+/* Watch out, ordering is important here. */
+enum mitigation_state {
+	SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED,
+	SPECTRE_MITIGATED,
+	SPECTRE_VULNERABLE,
+};
+
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void);
+
 extern int do_emulate_mrs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 sys_reg, u32 rt);
 
 static inline u32 id_aa64mmfr0_parange_to_phys_shift(int parange)
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +37 -4

55 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#28 lore raw

PATCH 21/43 KVM: arm64: Add templates for BHB mitigation sequences

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

KVM writes the Spectre-v2 mitigation template at the beginning of each vector when a CPU requires a specific sequence to run.

Because the template is copied, it can not be modified by the alternatives at runtime.

Add templates for calling ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 and one for each value of K in the brancy-loop. Instead of adding dummy functions for 'fn', which would disable the Spectre-v2 mitigation, add template_start to indicate that a template (and which one) is in use. Finally add a copy of install_bp_hardening_cb() that is able to install these.

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h |  3 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h |  6 ++-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h     |  6 +++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c   | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S   | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 130 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h +2 -1
index 1dc3c762fdcb..4ffa86149d28 100644
@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@
 #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_TVM	45
 #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_CAVIUM_TX2_219_PRFM	46
 #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1542419		47
+#define ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB			48
 
-#define ARM64_NCAPS				48
+#define ARM64_NCAPS				49
 
 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h +4 -2
index befe37d4bc0e..78d110667c0c 100644
@@ -478,7 +478,8 @@ static inline void *kvm_get_hyp_vector(void)
 	void *vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__kvm_hyp_vector));
 	int slot = -1;
 
-	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) && data->fn) {
+	if ((cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) ||
+	     cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB)) && data->template_start) {
 		vect = kern_hyp_va(kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start));
 		slot = data->hyp_vectors_slot;
 	}
@@ -507,7 +508,8 @@ static inline int kvm_map_vectors(void)
 	 * !HBP +  HEL2 -> allocate one vector slot and use exec mapping
 	 *  HBP +  HEL2 -> use hardened vertors and use exec mapping
 	 */
-	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
+	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) ||
+	    cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB)) {
 		__kvm_bp_vect_base = kvm_ksym_ref(__bp_harden_hyp_vecs_start);
 		__kvm_bp_vect_base = kern_hyp_va(__kvm_bp_vect_base);
 	}
arch/arm64/include/asm/mmu.h +6 -0
index 353450011e3d..1b9e49fb0e1b 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,12 @@ typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void);
 struct bp_hardening_data {
 	int			hyp_vectors_slot;
 	bp_hardening_cb_t	fn;
+
+	/*
+	 * template_start is only used by the BHB mitigation to identify the
+	 * hyp_vectors_slot sequence.
+	 */
+	const char *template_start;
 };
 
 #if (defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) ||	\
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +64 -1

90 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +54 -0

58 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#29 lore raw

PATCH 22/43 arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit 558c303c9734af5a813739cd284879227f7297d2 upstream.

Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can make use of branch history to influence future speculation. When taking an exception from user-space, a sequence of branches or a firmware call overwrites or invalidates the branch history.

The sequence of branches is added to the vectors, and should appear before the first indirect branch. For systems using KPTI the sequence is added to the kpti trampoline where it has a free register as the exit from the trampoline is via a 'ret'. For systems not using KPTI, the same register tricks are used to free up a register in the vectors.

For the firmware call, arch-workaround-3 clobbers 4 registers, so there is no choice but to save them to the EL1 stack. This only happens for entry from EL0, so if we take an exception due to the stack access, it will not become re-entrant.

For KVM, the existing branch-predictor-hardening vectors are used. When a spectre version of these vectors is in use, the firmware call is sufficient to mitigate against Spectre-BHB. For the non-spectre versions, the sequence of branches is added to the indirect vector.

Cc <[email protected]> # <v5.17.x 72bb9dcb6c33c arm64: Add Cortex-X2 CPU part definition
Cc <[email protected]> # <v5.16.x 2d0d656700d67 arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition
Cc <[email protected]> # <v5.10.x 8a6b88e66233f arm64: Add part number for Arm Cortex-A77

[ modified for stable, moved code to cpu_errata.c removed bitmap of
mitigations, use kvm template infrastructure ]

---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                  |   9 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h  |   6 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h |  18 ++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h    |   8 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h     |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h    |   5 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      | 269 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S      |   4 +
 8 files changed, 316 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +9 -0
index 9c8ea5939865..a1a828ca188c 100644
@@ -1139,6 +1139,15 @@ config ARM64_SSBD
 
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
+config MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
+	bool "Mitigate Spectre style attacks against branch history" if EXPERT
+	default y
+	help
+	  Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can
+	  make use of branch history to influence future speculation.
+	  When taking an exception from user-space, a sequence of branches
+	  or a firmware call overwrites the branch history.
+
 config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED
 	bool "Apply r/o permissions of VM areas also to their linear aliases"
 	default y
arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +4 -2
index 1279e4f5bd8f..4b13739ca518 100644
@@ -759,7 +759,9 @@ USER(\label, ic	ivau, \tmp2)			// invalidate I line PoU
 
 	.macro __mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop      tmp
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
-	mov	\tmp, #32
+alternative_cb  spectre_bhb_patch_loop_iter
+	mov	\tmp, #32		// Patched to correct the immediate
+alternative_cb_end
 .Lspectre_bhb_loop\@:
 	b	. + 4
 	subs	\tmp, \tmp, #1
@@ -774,7 +776,7 @@ USER(\label, ic	ivau, \tmp2)			// invalidate I line PoU
 	stp	x0, x1, [sp, #-16]!
 	stp	x2, x3, [sp, #-16]!
 	mov	w0, #ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3
-alternative_cb	smccc_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit
+alternative_cb	arm64_update_smccc_conduit
 	nop					// Patched to SMC/HVC #0
 alternative_cb_end
 	ldp	x2, x3, [sp], #16
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +18 -0
index a798443ed76f..40a5e48881af 100644
@@ -508,6 +508,21 @@ static inline bool cpu_supports_mixed_endian_el0(void)
 	return id_aa64mmfr0_mixed_endian_el0(read_cpuid(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1));
 }
 
+static inline bool supports_csv2p3(int scope)
+{
+	u64 pfr0;
+	u8 csv2_val;
+
+	if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
+		pfr0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
+	else
+		pfr0 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
+
+	csv2_val = cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0,
+							ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT);
+	return csv2_val == 3;
+}
+
 static inline bool system_supports_32bit_el0(void)
 {
 	return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0);
@@ -647,6 +662,9 @@ enum mitigation_state {
 };
 
 enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void);
+bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope);
+u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope);
+void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
 
 extern int do_emulate_mrs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 sys_reg, u32 rt);
 
arch/arm64/include/asm/cputype.h +8 -0
index e4394be47d35..f0165df489a3 100644
@@ -72,9 +72,13 @@
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76		0xD0B
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1	0xD0C
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77		0xD0D
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1	0xD40
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78		0xD41
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1		0xD44
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710	0xD47
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2		0xD48
 #define ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2	0xD49
+#define ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C	0xD4B
 
 #define APM_CPU_PART_POTENZA		0x000
 
@@ -107,9 +111,13 @@
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A76	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A76)
 #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N1 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N1)
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A77	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A77)
+#define MIDR_NEOVERSE_V1	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_V1)
+#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78)
+#define MIDR_CORTEX_X1	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X1)
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_A710 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A710)
 #define MIDR_CORTEX_X2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_X2)
 #define MIDR_NEOVERSE_N2 MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_NEOVERSE_N2)
+#define MIDR_CORTEX_A78C	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_ARM, ARM_CPU_PART_CORTEX_A78C)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX	MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_81XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_81XX)
 #define MIDR_THUNDERX_83XX MIDR_CPU_MODEL(ARM_CPU_IMP_CAVIUM, CAVIUM_CPU_PART_THUNDERX_83XX)
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +1 -0
index 50ed2747c572..b35579352856 100644
@@ -661,6 +661,7 @@
 #endif
 
 /* id_aa64mmfr1 */
+#define ID_AA64MMFR1_ECBHB_SHIFT	60
 #define ID_AA64MMFR1_PAN_SHIFT		20
 #define ID_AA64MMFR1_LOR_SHIFT		16
 #define ID_AA64MMFR1_HPD_SHIFT		12
arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h +5 -0
index 3f76dfd9e074..1f65c37dc653 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors {
 	EL1_VECTOR_KPTI,
 };
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
+#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP		-1
+#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW		-1
+#endif /* !CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
+
 /* The vectors to use on return from EL0. e.g. to remap the kernel */
 DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(const char *, this_cpu_vector);
 
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +267 -2

303 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +4 -0
index 2ad750208e33..b59b66f1f905 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,10 @@ el1_hvc_guest:
 	/* ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 handling */
 	eor	w1, w1, #(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 ^ \
 			  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2)
+	cbz	w1, wa_epilogue
+
+	eor	w1, w1, #(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 ^ \
+			  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3)
 	cbnz	w1, el1_trap
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#30 lore raw

PATCH 23/43 KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit a5905d6af492ee6a4a2205f0d550b3f931b03d03 upstream.

KVM allows the guest to discover whether the ARCH_WORKAROUND SMCCC are implemented, and to preserve that state during migration through its firmware register interface.

Add the necessary boiler plate for SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3.

---
 arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h   |  7 +++++++
 arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h   |  6 ++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  5 +++++
 arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h |  5 +++++
 virt/kvm/arm/psci.c               | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 5 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h +7 -0
index 32564b017ba0..d8ac89879327 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <asm/kvm_asm.h>
 #include <asm/kvm_mmio.h>
 #include <asm/fpstate.h>
+#include <asm/spectre.h>
 #include <kvm/arm_arch_timer.h>
 
 #define __KVM_HAVE_ARCH_INTC_INITIALIZED
@@ -424,4 +425,10 @@ static inline bool kvm_arm_vcpu_is_finalized(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 #define kvm_arm_vcpu_loaded(vcpu)	(false)
 
+static inline int kvm_arm_get_spectre_bhb_state(void)
+{
+	/* 32bit guests don't need firmware for this */
+	return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; /* aka SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED */
+}
+
 #endif /* __ARM_KVM_HOST_H__ */
arch/arm/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +6 -0
index 2769360f195c..89b8e70068a1 100644
@@ -227,6 +227,12 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_events {
 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED	3
 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED	(1U << 4)
 
+#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3	KVM_REG_ARM_FW_REG(3)
+	/* Higher values mean better protection. */
+#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_AVAIL		0
+#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_AVAIL		1
+#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_REQUIRED	2
+
 /* Device Control API: ARM VGIC */
 #define KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_ADDR	0
 #define KVM_DEV_ARM_VGIC_GRP_DIST_REGS	1
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h +5 -0
index 697702a1a1ff..e6efdbe88c0a 100644
@@ -684,4 +684,9 @@ bool kvm_arm_vcpu_is_finalized(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 #define kvm_arm_vcpu_loaded(vcpu)	((vcpu)->arch.sysregs_loaded_on_cpu)
 
+static inline enum mitigation_state kvm_arm_get_spectre_bhb_state(void)
+{
+	return arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state();
+}
+
 #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_HOST_H__ */
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h +5 -0
index 67c21f9bdbad..08440ce57a1c 100644
@@ -240,6 +240,11 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_events {
 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED	3
 #define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_ENABLED     	(1U << 4)
 
+#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3	KVM_REG_ARM_FW_REG(3)
+#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_AVAIL		0
+#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_AVAIL		1
+#define KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_REQUIRED	2
+
 /* SVE registers */
 #define KVM_REG_ARM64_SVE		(0x15 << KVM_REG_ARM_COPROC_SHIFT)
 
virt/kvm/arm/psci.c +31 -3
index 48fde38d64c3..2f5dc7fb437b 100644
@@ -426,6 +426,18 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 				break;
 			}
 			break;
+		case ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3:
+			switch (kvm_arm_get_spectre_bhb_state()) {
+			case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
+				break;
+			case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+				val = SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS;
+				break;
+			case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
+				val = SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_RET_UNAFFECTED;
+				break;
+			}
+			break;
 		}
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -438,7 +450,7 @@ int kvm_hvc_call_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 int kvm_arm_get_fw_num_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
-	return 3;		/* PSCI version and two workaround registers */
+	return 4;		/* PSCI version and three workaround registers */
 }
 
 int kvm_arm_copy_fw_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
@@ -452,6 +464,9 @@ int kvm_arm_copy_fw_reg_indices(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 __user *uindices)
 	if (put_user(KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, uindices++))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	if (put_user(KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3, uindices++))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -486,9 +501,20 @@ static int get_kernel_wa_level(u64 regid)
 			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_NOT_REQUIRED;
 		case KVM_SSBD_UNKNOWN:
 		default:
-			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_UNKNOWN;
+			break;
 		}
-	}
+		return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2_UNKNOWN;
+	case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3:
+		switch (kvm_arm_get_spectre_bhb_state()) {
+		case SPECTRE_VULNERABLE:
+			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_AVAIL;
+		case SPECTRE_MITIGATED:
+			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_AVAIL;
+		case SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED:
+			return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_REQUIRED;
+		}
+		return KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3_NOT_AVAIL;
+        }
 
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
@@ -503,6 +529,7 @@ int kvm_arm_get_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
 		val = kvm_psci_version(vcpu, vcpu->kvm);
 		break;
 	case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
+	case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3:
 		val = get_kernel_wa_level(reg->id) & KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK;
 		break;
 	case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2:
@@ -555,6 +582,7 @@ int kvm_arm_set_fw_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const struct kvm_one_reg *reg)
 	}
 
 	case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1:
+	case KVM_REG_ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3:
 		if (val & ~KVM_REG_FEATURE_LEVEL_MASK)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#31 lore raw

PATCH 24/43 arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: James Morse <[email protected]>

commit 228a26b912287934789023b4132ba76065d9491c upstream.

Future CPUs may implement a clearbhb instruction that is sufficient to mitigate SpectreBHB. CPUs that implement this instruction, but not CSV2.3 must be affected by Spectre-BHB.

Add support to use this instruction as the BHB mitigation on CPUs that support it. The instruction is in the hint space, so it will be treated by a NOP as older CPUs.

[ modified for stable: Use a KVM vector template instead of alternatives,
removed bitmap of mitigations ]

---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h  |  7 +++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h     |  1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h    |  7 +++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c      | 14 ++++++++++++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c      |  1 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S           |  8 ++++++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S      |  6 ++++++
 8 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h +7 -0
index 4b13739ca518..01112f9767bc 100644
@@ -110,6 +110,13 @@
 	hint	#20
 	.endm
 
+/*
+ * Clear Branch History instruction
+ */
+	.macro clearbhb
+	hint	#22
+	.endm
+
 /*
  * Speculation barrier
  */
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h +13 -0
index 40a5e48881af..f63438474dd5 100644
@@ -523,6 +523,19 @@ static inline bool supports_csv2p3(int scope)
 	return csv2_val == 3;
 }
 
+static inline bool supports_clearbhb(int scope)
+{
+	u64 isar2;
+
+	if (scope == SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)
+		isar2 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1);
+	else
+		isar2 = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1);
+
+	return cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(isar2,
+						    ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT);
+}
+
 static inline bool system_supports_32bit_el0(void)
 {
 	return cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HAS_32BIT_EL0);
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h +1 -0
index b35579352856..5b3bdad66b27 100644
@@ -577,6 +577,7 @@
 #define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF	0x1
 
 /* id_aa64isar2 */
+#define ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT	28
 #define ID_AA64ISAR2_RPRES_SHIFT	4
 #define ID_AA64ISAR2_WFXT_SHIFT		0
 
arch/arm64/include/asm/vectors.h +7 -0
index 1f65c37dc653..f64613a96d53 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors {
 	 * canonical vectors.
 	 */
 	EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW,
+
+	/*
+	 * Use the ClearBHB instruction, before branching to the canonical
+	 * vectors.
+	 */
+	EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN,
 #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
 
 	/*
@@ -43,6 +49,7 @@ enum arm64_bp_harden_el1_vectors {
 #ifndef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
 #define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_LOOP		-1
 #define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_FW		-1
+#define EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN	-1
 #endif /* !CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
 
 /* The vectors to use on return from EL0. e.g. to remap the kernel */
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +14 -0
index 0f74dc2b13c0..33b33416fea4 100644
@@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start[];
 extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_end[];
 extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start[];
 extern char __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end[];
+extern char __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start[];
+extern char __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end[];
 
 static void __copy_hyp_vect_bpi(int slot, const char *hyp_vecs_start,
 				const char *hyp_vecs_end)
@@ -1086,6 +1088,7 @@ static void update_mitigation_state(enum mitigation_state *oldp,
  * - Mitigated by a branchy loop a CPU specific number of times, and listed
  *   in our "loop mitigated list".
  * - Mitigated in software by the firmware Spectre v2 call.
+ * - Has the ClearBHB instruction to perform the mitigation.
  * - Has the 'Exception Clears Branch History Buffer' (ECBHB) feature, so no
  *   software mitigation in the vectors is needed.
  * - Has CSV2.3, so is unaffected.
@@ -1226,6 +1229,9 @@ bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 	if (supports_csv2p3(scope))
 		return false;
 
+	if (supports_clearbhb(scope))
+		return true;
+
 	if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(scope))
 		return true;
 
@@ -1266,6 +1272,8 @@ static const char *kvm_bhb_get_vecs_end(const char *start)
 		return __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_end;
 	else if (start == __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start)
 		return __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end;
+	else if (start == __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start)
+		return __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end;
 
 	return NULL;
 }
@@ -1305,6 +1313,7 @@ static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start)
 #define __spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start NULL
 #define __spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start NULL
 #define __spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start NULL
+#define __spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start NULL
 
 static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start) { }
 #endif
@@ -1323,6 +1332,11 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 	} else if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pr_info_once("spectre-bhb mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
 	} else if (supports_ecbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
+		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
+	} else if (supports_clearbhb(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
+		kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start);
+		this_cpu_set_vectors(EL1_VECTOR_BHB_CLEAR_INSN);
+
 		state = SPECTRE_MITIGATED;
 	} else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
 		switch (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) {
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c +1 -0
index 0d89d535720f..d07dadd6b8ff 100644
@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {
 };
 
 static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar2[] = {
+	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_HIGHER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR2_CLEARBHB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
 	ARM64_FTR_END,
 };
 
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +8 -0
index fcfbb2b009e2..296422119488 100644
@@ -1074,6 +1074,7 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 #define BHB_MITIGATION_NONE	0
 #define BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP	1
 #define BHB_MITIGATION_FW	2
+#define BHB_MITIGATION_INSN	3
 
 	.macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti, bhb
 	.align	7
@@ -1090,6 +1091,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	__mitigate_spectre_bhb_loop	x30
 	.endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP
 
+	.if	\bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
+	clearbhb
+	isb
+	.endif // \bhb == BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
+
 	.if	\kpti == 1
 	/*
 	 * Defend against branch aliasing attacks by pushing a dummy
@@ -1170,6 +1176,7 @@ ENTRY(tramp_vectors)
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
 	generate_tramp_vector	kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP
 	generate_tramp_vector	kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW
+	generate_tramp_vector	kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
 #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
 	generate_tramp_vector	kpti=1, bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_NONE
 END(tramp_vectors)
@@ -1232,6 +1239,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
 #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY
 	generate_el1_vector	bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_LOOP
 	generate_el1_vector	bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_FW
+	generate_el1_vector	bhb=BHB_MITIGATION_INSN
 #endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY */
 SYM_CODE_END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
 	.popsection
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +6 -0
index b59b66f1f905..99b8ecaae810 100644
@@ -405,4 +405,10 @@ ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32_start)
 	ldp	x0, x1, [sp, #(8 * 0)]
 	add	sp, sp, #(8 * 2)
 ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_loop_k32_end)
+
+ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_start)
+	esb
+	clearbhb
+	isb
+ENTRY(__spectre_bhb_clearbhb_end)
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#32 lore raw

PATCH 25/43 xfrm: Check if_id in xfrm_migrate

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yan Yan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c1aca3080e382886e2e58e809787441984a2f89b ]

This patch enables distinguishing SAs and SPs based on if_id during the xfrm_migrate flow. This ensures support for xfrm interfaces throughout the SA/SP lifecycle.

When there are multiple existing SPs with the same direction, the same xfrm_selector and different endpoint addresses, xfrm_migrate might fail with ENODATA.

Specifically, the code path for performing xfrm_migrate is:
Stage 1: find policy to migrate with
xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type, net)
Stage 2: find and update state(s) with
xfrm_migrate_state_find(mp, net)
Stage 3: update endpoint address(es) of template(s) with
xfrm_policy_migrate(pol, m, num_migrate)

Currently "Stage 1" always returns the first xfrm_policy that matches, and "Stage 3" looks for the xfrm_tmpl that matches the old endpoint address. Thus if there are multiple xfrm_policy with same selector, direction, type and net, "Stage 1" might rertun a wrong xfrm_policy and "Stage 3" will fail with ENODATA because it cannot find a xfrm_tmpl with the matching endpoint address.

The fix is to allow userspace to pass an if_id and add if_id to the matching rule in Stage 1 and Stage 2 since if_id is a unique ID for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state. For compatibility, if_id will only be checked if the attribute is set.

Tested with additions to Android's kernel unit test suite:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/tests/+/1668886

---
 include/net/xfrm.h     |  5 +++--
 net/key/af_key.c       |  2 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 14 ++++++++------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c  |  7 ++++++-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c   |  6 +++++-
 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +3 -2
index 614f19bbad74..96faf0918694 100644
@@ -1663,14 +1663,15 @@ int km_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
 	       const struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_bundles,
 	       const struct xfrm_kmaddress *k,
 	       const struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap);
-struct xfrm_state *xfrm_migrate_state_find(struct xfrm_migrate *m, struct net *net);
+struct xfrm_state *xfrm_migrate_state_find(struct xfrm_migrate *m, struct net *net,
+						u32 if_id);
 struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_migrate(struct xfrm_state *x,
 				      struct xfrm_migrate *m,
 				      struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap);
 int xfrm_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
 		 struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_bundles,
 		 struct xfrm_kmaddress *k, struct net *net,
-		 struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap);
+		 struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap, u32 if_id);
 #endif
 
 int km_new_mapping(struct xfrm_state *x, xfrm_address_t *ipaddr, __be16 sport);
net/key/af_key.c +1 -1
index 907d04a47459..406e13478b01 100644
@@ -2627,7 +2627,7 @@ static int pfkey_migrate(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	}
 
 	return xfrm_migrate(&sel, dir, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN, m, i,
-			    kma ? &k : NULL, net, NULL);
+			    kma ? &k : NULL, net, NULL, 0);
 
  out:
 	return err;
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +8 -6
index 404823c5eb7d..3ecb77c58c44 100644
@@ -4271,7 +4271,7 @@ static bool xfrm_migrate_selector_match(const struct xfrm_selector *sel_cmp,
 }
 
 static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_migrate_policy_find(const struct xfrm_selector *sel,
-						    u8 dir, u8 type, struct net *net)
+						    u8 dir, u8 type, struct net *net, u32 if_id)
 {
 	struct xfrm_policy *pol, *ret = NULL;
 	struct hlist_head *chain;
@@ -4280,7 +4280,8 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_migrate_policy_find(const struct xfrm_selector *
 	spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
 	chain = policy_hash_direct(net, &sel->daddr, &sel->saddr, sel->family, dir);
 	hlist_for_each_entry(pol, chain, bydst) {
-		if (xfrm_migrate_selector_match(sel, &pol->selector) &&
+		if ((if_id == 0 || pol->if_id == if_id) &&
+		    xfrm_migrate_selector_match(sel, &pol->selector) &&
 		    pol->type == type) {
 			ret = pol;
 			priority = ret->priority;
@@ -4292,7 +4293,8 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_migrate_policy_find(const struct xfrm_selector *
 		if ((pol->priority >= priority) && ret)
 			break;
 
-		if (xfrm_migrate_selector_match(sel, &pol->selector) &&
+		if ((if_id == 0 || pol->if_id == if_id) &&
+		    xfrm_migrate_selector_match(sel, &pol->selector) &&
 		    pol->type == type) {
 			ret = pol;
 			break;
@@ -4408,7 +4410,7 @@ static int xfrm_migrate_check(const struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_migrate)
 int xfrm_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
 		 struct xfrm_migrate *m, int num_migrate,
 		 struct xfrm_kmaddress *k, struct net *net,
-		 struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap)
+		 struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap, u32 if_id)
 {
 	int i, err, nx_cur = 0, nx_new = 0;
 	struct xfrm_policy *pol = NULL;
@@ -4427,14 +4429,14 @@ int xfrm_migrate(const struct xfrm_selector *sel, u8 dir, u8 type,
 	}
 
 	/* Stage 1 - find policy */
-	if ((pol = xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type, net)) == NULL) {
+	if ((pol = xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type, net, if_id)) == NULL) {
 		err = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	/* Stage 2 - find and update state(s) */
 	for (i = 0, mp = m; i < num_migrate; i++, mp++) {
-		if ((x = xfrm_migrate_state_find(mp, net))) {
+		if ((x = xfrm_migrate_state_find(mp, net, if_id))) {
 			x_cur[nx_cur] = x;
 			nx_cur++;
 			xc = xfrm_state_migrate(x, mp, encap);
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +6 -1
index 1423e2b7cb42..83ee3d337a60 100644
@@ -1563,7 +1563,8 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_clone(struct xfrm_state *orig,
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-struct xfrm_state *xfrm_migrate_state_find(struct xfrm_migrate *m, struct net *net)
+struct xfrm_state *xfrm_migrate_state_find(struct xfrm_migrate *m, struct net *net,
+						u32 if_id)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
 	struct xfrm_state *x = NULL;
@@ -1579,6 +1580,8 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_migrate_state_find(struct xfrm_migrate *m, struct net *n
 				continue;
 			if (m->reqid && x->props.reqid != m->reqid)
 				continue;
+			if (if_id != 0 && x->if_id != if_id)
+				continue;
 			if (!xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, &m->old_daddr,
 					     m->old_family) ||
 			    !xfrm_addr_equal(&x->props.saddr, &m->old_saddr,
@@ -1594,6 +1597,8 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_migrate_state_find(struct xfrm_migrate *m, struct net *n
 			if (x->props.mode != m->mode ||
 			    x->id.proto != m->proto)
 				continue;
+			if (if_id != 0 && x->if_id != if_id)
+				continue;
 			if (!xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, &m->old_daddr,
 					     m->old_family) ||
 			    !xfrm_addr_equal(&x->props.saddr, &m->old_saddr,
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +5 -1
index ddcf569d852f..bd44a800e7db 100644
@@ -2374,6 +2374,7 @@ static int xfrm_do_migrate(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 	int n = 0;
 	struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
 	struct xfrm_encap_tmpl  *encap = NULL;
+	u32 if_id = 0;
 
 	if (attrs[XFRMA_MIGRATE] == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -2398,7 +2399,10 @@ static int xfrm_do_migrate(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 			return 0;
 	}
 
-	err = xfrm_migrate(&pi->sel, pi->dir, type, m, n, kmp, net, encap);
+	if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
+		if_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]);
+
+	err = xfrm_migrate(&pi->sel, pi->dir, type, m, n, kmp, net, encap, if_id);
 
 	kfree(encap);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#33 lore raw

PATCH 26/43 xfrm: Fix xfrm migrate issues when address family changes

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Yan Yan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e03c3bba351f99ad932e8f06baa9da1afc418e02 ]

xfrm_migrate cannot handle address family change of an xfrm_state. The symptons are the xfrm_state will be migrated to a wrong address, and sending as well as receiving packets wil be broken.

This commit fixes it by breaking the original xfrm_state_clone method into two steps so as to update the props.family before running xfrm_init_state. As the result, xfrm_state's inner mode, outer mode, type and IP header length in xfrm_state_migrate can be updated with the new address family.

Tested with additions to Android's kernel unit test suite:
https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/tests/+/1885354

---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 8 +++++---
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +5 -3
index 83ee3d337a60..268bba29bb60 100644
@@ -1539,9 +1539,6 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_clone(struct xfrm_state *orig,
 	memcpy(&x->mark, &orig->mark, sizeof(x->mark));
 	memcpy(&x->props.smark, &orig->props.smark, sizeof(x->props.smark));
 
-	if (xfrm_init_state(x) < 0)
-		goto error;
-
 	x->props.flags = orig->props.flags;
 	x->props.extra_flags = orig->props.extra_flags;
 
@@ -1625,6 +1622,11 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_migrate(struct xfrm_state *x,
 	if (!xc)
 		return NULL;
 
+	xc->props.family = m->new_family;
+
+	if (xfrm_init_state(xc) < 0)
+		goto error;
+
 	memcpy(&xc->id.daddr, &m->new_daddr, sizeof(xc->id.daddr));
 	memcpy(&xc->props.saddr, &m->new_saddr, sizeof(xc->props.saddr));
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#34 lore raw

PATCH 27/43 arm64: dts: rockchip: fix rk3399-puma eMMC HS400 signal integrity

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jakob Unterwurzacher <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 62966cbdda8a92f82d966a45aa671e788b2006f7 ]

There are signal integrity issues running the eMMC at 200MHz on Puma RK3399-Q7.

Similar to the work-around found for RK3399 Gru boards, lowering the frequency to 100MHz made the eMMC much more stable, so let's lower the frequency to 100MHz.

It might be possible to run at 150MHz as on RK3399 Gru boards but only 100MHz was extensively tested.

---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma.dtsi +6 -0
index 45b86933c6ea..390b86ec6538 100644
@@ -467,6 +467,12 @@
 };
 
 &sdhci {
+	/*
+	 * Signal integrity isn't great at 200MHz but 100MHz has proven stable
+	 * enough.
+	 */
+	max-frequency = <100000000>;
+
 	bus-width = <8>;
 	mmc-hs400-1_8v;
 	mmc-hs400-enhanced-strobe;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#35 lore raw

PATCH 28/43 arm64: dts: rockchip: reorder rk3399 hdmi clocks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2e8a8b5955a000cc655f7e368670518cbb77fe58 ]

The binding specifies the clock order to "cec", "grf", "vpll". Reorder the clocks accordingly.

---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399.dtsi +3 -3
index 750dad0d1740..95942d917de5 100644
@@ -1746,10 +1746,10 @@
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 23 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH 0>;
 		clocks = <&cru PCLK_HDMI_CTRL>,
 			 <&cru SCLK_HDMI_SFR>,
-			 <&cru PLL_VPLL>,
+			 <&cru SCLK_HDMI_CEC>,
 			 <&cru PCLK_VIO_GRF>,
-			 <&cru SCLK_HDMI_CEC>;
-		clock-names = "iahb", "isfr", "vpll", "grf", "cec";
+			 <&cru PLL_VPLL>;
+		clock-names = "iahb", "isfr", "cec", "grf", "vpll";
 		power-domains = <&power RK3399_PD_HDCP>;
 		reg-io-width = <4>;
 		rockchip,grf = <&grf>;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#36 lore raw

PATCH 29/43 arm64: dts: agilex: use the compatible "intel,socfpga-agilex-hsotg"

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dinh Nguyen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 268a491aebc25e6dc7c618903b09ac3a2e8af530 ]

The DWC2 USB controller on the Agilex platform does not support clock gating, so use the chip specific "intel,socfpga-agilex-hsotg" compatible.

---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/intel/socfpga_agilex.dtsi | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/intel/socfpga_agilex.dtsi +2 -2
index d911d38877e5..19f17bb29e4b 100644
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@
 		};
 
 		usb0: usb@ffb00000 {
-			compatible = "snps,dwc2";
+			compatible = "intel,socfpga-agilex-hsotg", "snps,dwc2";
 			reg = <0xffb00000 0x40000>;
 			interrupts = <0 93 4>;
 			phys = <&usbphy0>;
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@
 		};
 
 		usb1: usb@ffb40000 {
-			compatible = "snps,dwc2";
+			compatible = "intel,socfpga-agilex-hsotg", "snps,dwc2";
 			reg = <0xffb40000 0x40000>;
 			interrupts = <0 94 4>;
 			phys = <&usbphy0>;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#37 lore raw

PATCH 30/43 ARM: dts: rockchip: reorder rk322x hmdi clocks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sascha Hauer <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit be4e65bdffab5f588044325117df77dad7e9c45a ]

The binding specifies the clock order to "iahb", "isfr", "cec". Reorder the clocks accordingly.

---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/rk322x.dtsi | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/arm/boot/dts/rk322x.dtsi +2 -2
index 140e22d74dcf..d393bb481e74 100644
@@ -635,8 +635,8 @@
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 35 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
 		assigned-clocks = <&cru SCLK_HDMI_PHY>;
 		assigned-clock-parents = <&hdmi_phy>;
-		clocks = <&cru SCLK_HDMI_HDCP>, <&cru PCLK_HDMI_CTRL>, <&cru SCLK_HDMI_CEC>;
-		clock-names = "isfr", "iahb", "cec";
+		clocks = <&cru PCLK_HDMI_CTRL>, <&cru SCLK_HDMI_HDCP>, <&cru SCLK_HDMI_CEC>;
+		clock-names = "iahb", "isfr", "cec";
 		pinctrl-names = "default";
 		pinctrl-0 = <&hdmii2c_xfer &hdmi_hpd &hdmi_cec>;
 		resets = <&cru SRST_HDMI_P>;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#38 lore raw

PATCH 31/43 ARM: dts: rockchip: fix a typo on rk3288 crypto-controller

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Corentin Labbe <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3916c3619599a3970d3e6f98fb430b7c46266ada ]

crypto-controller had a typo, fix it.
In the same time, rename it to just crypto

---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/boot/dts/rk3288.dtsi +1 -1
index 658ceb96d8bd..7dcafd0833ba 100644
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@
 		status = "disabled";
 	};
 
-	crypto: cypto-controller@ff8a0000 {
+	crypto: crypto@ff8a0000 {
 		compatible = "rockchip,rk3288-crypto";
 		reg = <0x0 0xff8a0000 0x0 0x4000>;
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 48 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#39 lore raw

PATCH 32/43 mac80211: refuse aggregations sessions before authorized

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a6bce78262f5dd4b50510f0aa47f3995f7b185f3 ]

If an MFP station isn't authorized, the receiver will (or at least should) drop the action frame since it's a robust management frame, but if we're not authorized we haven't installed keys yet. Refuse attempts to start a session as they'd just time out.

---
 net/mac80211/agg-tx.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/mac80211/agg-tx.c +9 -1
index f140c2b94b2c..f30cdd7f3a73 100644
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
  * Copyright 2007, Michael Wu <[email protected]>
  * Copyright 2007-2010, Intel Corporation
  * Copyright(c) 2015-2017 Intel Deutschland GmbH
- * Copyright (C) 2018 - 2021 Intel Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 - 2022 Intel Corporation
  */
 
 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
@@ -615,6 +615,14 @@ int ieee80211_start_tx_ba_session(struct ieee80211_sta *pubsta, u16 tid,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_MFP) &&
+	    !test_sta_flag(sta, WLAN_STA_AUTHORIZED)) {
+		ht_dbg(sdata,
+		       "MFP STA not authorized - deny BA session request %pM tid %d\n",
+		       sta->sta.addr, tid);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * 802.11n-2009 11.5.1.1: If the initiating STA is an HT STA, is a
 	 * member of an IBSS, and has no other existing Block Ack agreement
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#40 lore raw

PATCH 33/43 MIPS: smp: fill in sibling and core maps earlier

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Alexander Lobakin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f2703def339c793674010cc9f01bfe4980231808 ]

After enabling CONFIG_SCHED_CORE (landed during 5.14 cycle), 2-core 2-thread-per-core interAptiv (CPS-driven) started emitting the following:

[    0.025698] CPU1 revision is: 0001a120 (MIPS interAptiv (multi))
[    0.048183] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    0.048187] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at kernel/sched/core.c:6025 sched_core_cpu_starting+0x198/0x240
[    0.048220] Modules linked in:
[    0.048233] CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc3+ #35 b7b319f24073fd9a3c2aa7ad15fb7993eec0b26f
[    0.048247] Stack : 817f0000 00000004 327804c8 810eb050 00000000 00000004 00000000 c314fdd1
[    0.048278]         830cbd64 819c0000 81800000 817f0000 83070bf4 00000001 830cbd08 00000000
[    0.048307]         00000000 00000000 815fcbc4 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
[    0.048334]         00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 817f0000 00000000 00000000 817f6f34
[    0.048361]         817f0000 818a3c00 817f0000 00000004 00000000 00000000 4dc33260 0018c933
[    0.048389]         ...
[    0.048396] Call Trace:
[    0.048399] [<8105a7bc>] show_stack+0x3c/0x140
[    0.048424] [<8131c2a0>] dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80
[    0.048440] [<8108b5c0>] __warn+0xc0/0xf4
[    0.048454] [<8108b658>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x64/0x10c
[    0.048467] [<810bd418>] sched_core_cpu_starting+0x198/0x240
[    0.048483] [<810c6514>] sched_cpu_starting+0x14/0x80
[    0.048497] [<8108c0f8>] cpuhp_invoke_callback_range+0x78/0x140
[    0.048510] [<8108d914>] notify_cpu_starting+0x94/0x140
[    0.048523] [<8106593c>] start_secondary+0xbc/0x280
[    0.048539]
[    0.048543] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[    0.048636] Synchronize counters for CPU 1: done.

...for each but CPU 0/boot.
Basic debug printks right before the mentioned line say:

[    0.048170] CPU: 1, smt_mask:

So smt_mask, which is sibling mask obviously, is empty when entering the function.
This is critical, as sched_core_cpu_starting() calculates core-scheduling parameters only once per CPU start, and it's crucial to have all the parameters filled in at that moment (at least it uses cpu_smt_mask() which in fact is &cpu_sibling_map[cpu] on MIPS).

A bit of debugging led me to that set_cpu_sibling_map() performing the actual map calculation, was being invocated after notify_cpu_start(), and exactly the latter function starts CPU HP callback round (sched_core_cpu_starting() is basically a CPU HP callback).
While the flow is same on ARM64 (maps after the notifier, although before calling set_cpu_online()), x86 started calculating sibling maps earlier than starting the CPU HP callbacks in Linux 4.14 (see
[0] for the reference). Neither me nor my brief tests couldn't find any potential caveats in calculating the maps right after performing delay calibration, but the WARN splat is now gone.
The very same debug prints now yield exactly what I expected from them:

[    0.048433] CPU: 1, smt_mask: 0-1

[0] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mips/linux.git/commit/?id=76ce7cfe35ef

---
 arch/mips/kernel/smp.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/mips/kernel/smp.c +3 -3
index f510c00bda88..c563b03bdccc 100644
@@ -361,6 +361,9 @@ asmlinkage void start_secondary(void)
 	cpu = smp_processor_id();
 	cpu_data[cpu].udelay_val = loops_per_jiffy;
 
+	set_cpu_sibling_map(cpu);
+	set_cpu_core_map(cpu);
+
 	cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &cpu_coherent_mask);
 	notify_cpu_starting(cpu);
 
@@ -372,9 +375,6 @@ asmlinkage void start_secondary(void)
 	/* The CPU is running and counters synchronised, now mark it online */
 	set_cpu_online(cpu, true);
 
-	set_cpu_sibling_map(cpu);
-	set_cpu_core_map(cpu);
-
 	calculate_cpu_foreign_map();
 
 	/*
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#41 lore raw

PATCH 34/43 ARM: 9178/1: fix unmet dependency on BITREVERSE for HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Julian Braha <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 11c57c3ba94da74c3446924260e34e0b1950b5d7 ]

Resending this to properly add it to the patch tracker - thanks for letting me know, Arnd :)

When ARM is enabled, and BITREVERSE is disabled,
Kbuild gives the following warning:

WARNING: unmet direct dependencies detected for HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE
Depends on [n]: BITREVERSE [=n]
Selected by [y]:
- ARM [=y] && (CPU_32v7M [=n] || CPU_32v7 [=y]) && !CPU_32v6 [=n]

This is because ARM selects HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE
without selecting BITREVERSE, despite
HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE depending on BITREVERSE.

This unmet dependency bug was found by Kismet,
a static analysis tool for Kconfig. Please advise if this is not the appropriate solution.

---
 lib/Kconfig | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
lib/Kconfig +0 -1
index 3321d04dfa5a..fa129b5c4320 100644
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ config BITREVERSE
 config HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE
 	bool
 	default n
-	depends on BITREVERSE
 	help
 	  This option enables the use of hardware bit-reversal instructions on
 	  architectures which support such operations.
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#42 lore raw

PATCH 35/43 can: rcar_canfd: rcar_canfd_channel_probe(): register the CAN device when fully ready

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Lad Prabhakar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c5048a7b2c23ab589f3476a783bd586b663eda5b ]

Register the CAN device only when all the necessary initialization is completed. This patch makes sure all the data structures and locks are initialized before registering the CAN device.

---
 drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c +3 -3
index edaa1ca972c1..d4e9815ca26f 100644
@@ -1598,15 +1598,15 @@ static int rcar_canfd_channel_probe(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv, u32 ch,
 
 	netif_napi_add(ndev, &priv->napi, rcar_canfd_rx_poll,
 		       RCANFD_NAPI_WEIGHT);
+	spin_lock_init(&priv->tx_lock);
+	devm_can_led_init(ndev);
+	gpriv->ch[priv->channel] = priv;
 	err = register_candev(ndev);
 	if (err) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev,
 			"register_candev() failed, error %d\n", err);
 		goto fail_candev;
 	}
-	spin_lock_init(&priv->tx_lock);
-	devm_can_led_init(ndev);
-	gpriv->ch[priv->channel] = priv;
 	dev_info(&pdev->dev, "device registered (channel %u)\n", priv->channel);
 	return 0;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#43 lore raw

PATCH 36/43 atm: firestream: check the return value of ioremap() in fs_init()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Jia-Ju Bai <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d4e26aaea7f82ba884dcb4acfe689406bc092dc3 ]

The function ioremap() in fs_init() can fail, so its return value should be checked.

---
 drivers/atm/firestream.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/atm/firestream.c +2 -0
index 5acb45985675..8995c39330fa 100644
@@ -1677,6 +1677,8 @@ static int fs_init(struct fs_dev *dev)
 	dev->hw_base = pci_resource_start(pci_dev, 0);
 
 	dev->base = ioremap(dev->hw_base, 0x1000);
+	if (!dev->base)
+		return 1;
 
 	reset_chip (dev);
   
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#44 lore raw

PATCH 37/43 iwlwifi: dont advertise TWT support

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Golan Ben Ami <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1db5fcbba2631277b78d7f8aff99c9607d29f6d8 ]

Some APs misbehave when TWT is used and cause our firmware to crash. We don't know a reasonable way to detect and work around this problem in the FW yet. To prevent these crashes, disable TWT in the driver by stopping to advertise TWT support.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-nvm-parse.c | 3 +--
 drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c  | 1 -
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/iwl-nvm-parse.c +1 -2
index 022f2faccab4..4a433e34ee7a 100644
@@ -519,8 +519,7 @@ static struct ieee80211_sband_iftype_data iwl_he_capa[] = {
 			.has_he = true,
 			.he_cap_elem = {
 				.mac_cap_info[0] =
-					IEEE80211_HE_MAC_CAP0_HTC_HE |
-					IEEE80211_HE_MAC_CAP0_TWT_REQ,
+					IEEE80211_HE_MAC_CAP0_HTC_HE,
 				.mac_cap_info[1] =
 					IEEE80211_HE_MAC_CAP1_TF_MAC_PAD_DUR_16US |
 					IEEE80211_HE_MAC_CAP1_MULTI_TID_AGG_RX_QOS_8,
drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/mac80211.c +0 -1
index 29ad7804d77a..3c523774ef0e 100644
@@ -343,7 +343,6 @@ const static u8 he_if_types_ext_capa_sta[] = {
 	 [0] = WLAN_EXT_CAPA1_EXT_CHANNEL_SWITCHING,
 	 [2] = WLAN_EXT_CAPA3_MULTI_BSSID_SUPPORT,
 	 [7] = WLAN_EXT_CAPA8_OPMODE_NOTIF,
-	 [9] = WLAN_EXT_CAPA10_TWT_REQUESTER_SUPPORT,
 };
 
 const static struct wiphy_iftype_ext_capab he_iftypes_ext_capa[] = {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#45 lore raw

PATCH 38/43 drm/vrr: Set VRR capable prop only if it is attached to connector

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Manasi Navare <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 62929726ef0ec72cbbe9440c5d125d4278b99894 ]

VRR capable property is not attached by default to the connector It is attached only if VRR is supported.
So if the driver tries to call drm core set prop function without it being attached that causes NULL dereference.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_connector.c +3 -0
index 2337b3827e6a..11a81e8ba963 100644
@@ -1984,6 +1984,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(drm_connector_attach_max_bpc_property);
 void drm_connector_set_vrr_capable_property(
 		struct drm_connector *connector, bool capable)
 {
+	if (!connector->vrr_capable_property)
+		return;
+
 	drm_object_property_set_value(&connector->base,
 				      connector->vrr_capable_property,
 				      capable);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#46 lore raw

PATCH 39/43 nl80211: Update bss channel on channel switch for P2P_CLIENT

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Sreeramya Soratkal <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e50b88c4f076242358b66ddb67482b96947438f2 ]

The wdev channel information is updated post channel switch only for the station mode and not for the other modes. Due to this, the P2P client still points to the old value though it moved to the new channel when the channel change is induced from the P2P GO.

Update the bss channel after CSA channel switch completion for P2P client interface as well.

---
 net/wireless/nl80211.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/wireless/nl80211.c +2 -1
index f2bc465de284..d3e2b97d5d05 100644
@@ -16314,7 +16314,8 @@ void cfg80211_ch_switch_notify(struct net_device *dev,
 	wdev->chandef = *chandef;
 	wdev->preset_chandef = *chandef;
 
-	if (wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION &&
+	if ((wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION ||
+	     wdev->iftype == NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_CLIENT) &&
 	    !WARN_ON(!wdev->current_bss))
 		cfg80211_update_assoc_bss_entry(wdev, chandef->chan);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#47 lore raw

PATCH 40/43 tcp: make tcp_read_sock() more robust

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e3d5ea2c011ecb16fb94c56a659364e6b30fac94 ]

If recv_actor() returns an incorrect value, tcp_read_sock() might loop forever.

Instead, issue a one time warning and make sure to make progress.

---
 net/ipv4/tcp.c | 10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp.c +6 -4
index 9f53d25e047e..4815cf72569e 100644
@@ -1652,11 +1652,13 @@ int tcp_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 				if (!copied)
 					copied = used;
 				break;
-			} else if (used <= len) {
-				seq += used;
-				copied += used;
-				offset += used;
 			}
+			if (WARN_ON_ONCE(used > len))
+				used = len;
+			seq += used;
+			copied += used;
+			offset += used;
+
 			/* If recv_actor drops the lock (e.g. TCP splice
 			 * receive) the skb pointer might be invalid when
 			 * getting here: tcp_collapse might have deleted it
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#48 lore raw

PATCH 41/43 sfc: extend the locking on mcdi->seqno

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Niels Dossche <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f1fb205efb0ccca55626fd4ef38570dd16b44719 ]

seqno could be read as a stale value outside of the lock. The lock is already acquired to protect the modification of seqno against a possible race condition. Place the reading of this value also inside this locking to protect it against a possible race condition.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/mcdi.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/mcdi.c +1 -1
index 2713300343c7..ec551def5835 100644
@@ -163,9 +163,9 @@ static void efx_mcdi_send_request(struct efx_nic *efx, unsigned cmd,
 	/* Serialise with efx_mcdi_ev_cpl() and efx_mcdi_ev_death() */
 	spin_lock_bh(&mcdi->iface_lock);
 	++mcdi->seqno;
+	seqno = mcdi->seqno & SEQ_MASK;
 	spin_unlock_bh(&mcdi->iface_lock);
 
-	seqno = mcdi->seqno & SEQ_MASK;
 	xflags = 0;
 	if (mcdi->mode == MCDI_MODE_EVENTS)
 		xflags |= MCDI_HEADER_XFLAGS_EVREQ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
author maintainer
#49 lore raw

PATCH 42/43 bnx2: Fix an error message

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ccffe9ac3239e549beaa0a9d5e1a1eac94e866c ]

Fix an error message and report the correct failing function.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2.c +1 -1
index c3f67d8e1093..f53292eab9da 100644
@@ -8231,7 +8231,7 @@ bnx2_init_board(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct net_device *dev)
 		rc = pci_set_consistent_dma_mask(pdev, persist_dma_mask);
 		if (rc) {
 			dev_err(&pdev->dev,
-				"pci_set_consistent_dma_mask failed, aborting\n");
+				"dma_set_coherent_mask failed, aborting\n");
 			goto err_out_unmap;
 		}
 	} else if ((rc = pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32))) != 0) {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#50 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.4 42/43] bnx2: Fix an error message

Hi,

this one should be removed,
The message is correct in 5.4.

Le 17/03/2022 à 13:45, Greg Kroah-Hartman a écrit :

Quoted 26 lines

From: Christophe JAILLET <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8ccffe9ac3239e549beaa0a9d5e1a1eac94e866c ]

Fix an error message and report the correct failing function.

---
  drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2.c +1 -1
index c3f67d8e1093..f53292eab9da 100644
@@ -8231,7 +8231,7 @@ bnx2_init_board(struct pci_dev *pdev, struct net_device *dev)
  		rc = pci_set_consistent_dma_mask(pdev, persist_dma_mask);
  		if (rc) {
  			dev_err(&pdev->dev,
-				"pci_set_consistent_dma_mask failed, aborting\n");
+				"dma_set_coherent_mask failed, aborting\n");
  			goto err_out_unmap;
  		}
  	} else if ((rc = pci_set_dma_mask(pdev, DMA_BIT_MASK(32))) != 0) {
author maintainer
#51 lore raw

PATCH 43/43 kselftest/vm: fix tests build with old libc

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Chengming Zhou <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b773827e361952b3f53ac6fa4c4e39ccd632102e ]

The error message when I build vm tests on debian10 (GLIBC 2.28):

userfaultfd.c: In function `userfaultfd_pagemap_test':
userfaultfd.c:1393:37: error: MADV_PAGEOUT' undeclared (first use in this function); did you mean MADV_RANDOM'?
if (madvise(area_dst, test_pgsize, MADV_PAGEOUT))
^~~~~~~~~~~~ MADV_RANDOM

This patch includes these newer definitions from UAPI linux/mman.h, is useful to fix tests build on systems without these definitions in glibc sys/mman.h.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/testing/selftests/vm/userfaultfd.c +1 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 #include <signal.h>
 #include <poll.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/syscall.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
#52 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.186 release. There are 43 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 19 Mar 2022 12:45:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.186-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

There is a build failure with SDEI enable that was reported to the patch author in response to patch #18 in this series:

/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/host/bin/aarch64-linux-ld:
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.o: in function `__sdei_asm_exit_trampoline':
/local/users/fainelli/buildroot/output/arm64/build/linux-custom/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:1352:
undefined reference to `__sdei_asm_trampoline_next_handler'
make[2]: *** [Makefile:1100: vmlinux] Error 1

Signature · 1 line
Florian
Tested-by on the v1 series
#53 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.186 release. There are 43 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 19 Mar 2022 12:45:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 159 pass: 159 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 449 pass: 449 fail: 0

Guenter

Tested-by Linux Kernel Functional Testing on the v1 series
#54 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.186 release. There are 43 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 19 Mar 2022 12:45:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.186-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

## Build
* kernel: 5.4.186-rc1
* git: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
* git branch: linux-5.4.y
* git commit: 4eb765392859512cee9488eb5831d73f5b47b4ac
* git describe: v5.4.185-44-g4eb765392859
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.4.y/build/v5.4.185-44-g4eb765392859

## Test Regressions (compared to v5.4.185)
No test regressions found.

## Metric Regressions (compared to v5.4.185)
No metric regressions found.

## Test Fixes (compared to v5.4.185)
No test fixes found.

## Metric Fixes (compared to v5.4.185)
No metric fixes found.

## Test result summary
total: 92947, pass: 76842, fail: 1135, skip: 13484, xfail: 1486

## Build Summary
* arc: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 290 total, 290 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 40 total, 34 passed, 6 failed
* dragonboard-410c: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* hi6220-hikey: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* i386: 20 total, 20 passed, 0 failed
* juno-r2: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* mips: 37 total, 37 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* powerpc: 60 total, 49 passed, 11 failed
* riscv: 27 total, 27 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 24 total, 24 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 12 total, 12 passed, 0 failed
* x15: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* x86: 1 total, 1 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 40 total, 40 passed, 0 failed

## Test suites summary
* fwts
* igt-gpu-tools
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-bpf
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kvm-unit-tests
* libgpiod
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* network-basic-tests
* packetdrill
* perf
* perf/Zstd-perf.data-compression
* rcutorture
* ssuite
* v4l2-compliance
* vdso

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#55 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.186 release. There are 43 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 19 Mar 2022 12:45:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.186-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v5.4:

    10 builds:	10 pass, 0 fail
    26 boots:	26 pass, 0 fail
    59 tests:	59 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 5.4.186-rc1-g4eb765392859
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra210-p3450-0000,
                tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon

Tested-by on the v1 series
#56 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Hi Greg,

Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.186 release. There are 43 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 19 Mar 2022 12:45:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build test:
mips (gcc version 11.2.1 20220301): 65 configs -> no new failure arm (gcc version 11.2.1 20220301): 107 configs -> no new failure arm64 (gcc version 11.2.1 20220301): 2 configs -> no failure x86_64 (gcc version 11.2.1 20220301): 4 configs -> no failure

Boot test:
x86_64: Booted on my test laptop. No regression.
x86_64: Booted on qemu. No regression. [1]

[1]. https://openqa.qa.codethink.co.uk/tests/902

--
Regards
Sudip