x86/sgx: Allow RW for TCS pages
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerPATCH 1/1 x86/sgx: Allow RW for TCS pages
Not allowing to set RW for added TCS pages leads only to a special case to be handled in the user space run-time. Thus, allow permissions to be set RW. Originally, it would have probably made more sense to check up that the permissions are RW.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1 -1
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo)* CPU will silently overwrite the permissions as zero, which means * that we need to validate it ourselves. */ -if (pt ==SGX_SECINFO_TCS && perm) +if (pt ==SGX_SECINFO_TCS && (perm !=0 || perm != (PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE )))return -EINVAL ;if (secinfo->flags &SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK )
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 15 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Not allowing to set RW for added TCS pages leads only to a special case to be handled in the user space run-time. Thus, allow permissions to be set RW. Originally, it would have probably made more sense to check up that the permissions are RW.
Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) · line 221
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-1@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo)* CPU will silently overwrite the permissions as zero, which means * that we need to validate it ourselves. */ -if (pt ==SGX_SECINFO_TCS && perm) +if (pt ==SGX_SECINFO_TCS && (perm !=0 || perm != (PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE )))return -EINVAL ;if (secinfo->flags &SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK )
The comments above sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() seem to indicate that zero permissions are required:
"A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in the measurement."
Reinette
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 25 lines · Reinette Chatre
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 22 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Not allowing to set RW for added TCS pages leads only to a special case to be handled in the user space run-time. Thus, allow permissions to be set RW. Originally, it would have probably made more sense to check up that the permissions are RW.
Signed-off-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1
-1@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo)* CPU will silently overwrite the permissions as zero, which means * that we need to validate it ourselves. */ -if (pt ==SGX_SECINFO_TCS && perm) +if (pt ==SGX_SECINFO_TCS && (perm !=0 || perm != (PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE )))return -EINVAL ;
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo) · line 221
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +0
-0if (secinfo->flags &SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK )The comments above
sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages()seem to indicate that zero permissions are required:"A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in the measurement."
I think this can be left out for now but fixing the relative addressing is an obvious fix.
BR, Jarkko