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kasan-page_alloc-init-memory-of-skipped-pages-on-free.patch removed from -mm tree

merged Andrew Morton 1 participant 1 message Mar 25, 2022

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The patch titled
Subject: kasan, page_alloc: init memory of skipped pages on free
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
kasan-page_alloc-init-memory-of-skipped-pages-on-free.patch

This patch was dropped because it was merged into mainline or a subsystem tree

------------------------------------------------------
From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Subject: kasan, page_alloc: init memory of skipped pages on free

Since commit 7a3b83537188 ("kasan: use separate (un)poison implementation for integrated init"), when all init, kasan_has_integrated_init(), and skip_kasan_poison are true, free_pages_prepare() doesn't initialize the page. This is wrong.

Fix it by remembering whether kasan_poison_pages() performed initialization, and call kernel_init_free_pages() if it didn't.

Reordering kasan_poison_pages() and kernel_init_free_pages() is OK, since kernel_init_free_pages() can handle poisoned memory.

---

 mm/page_alloc.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/page_alloc.c renamed from mm/page_alloc.c~kasan-page_alloc-init-memory-of-skipped-pages-on-free +8 -3
@@ -1371,11 +1371,16 @@ static __always_inline bool free_pages_p
 	 * With hardware tag-based KASAN, memory tags must be set before the
 	 * page becomes unavailable via debug_pagealloc or arch_free_page.
 	 */
-	if (init && !kasan_has_integrated_init())
-		kernel_init_free_pages(page, 1 << order);
-	if (!skip_kasan_poison)
+	if (!skip_kasan_poison) {
 		kasan_poison_pages(page, order, init);
 
+		/* Memory is already initialized if KASAN did it internally. */
+		if (kasan_has_integrated_init())
+			init = false;
+	}
+	if (init)
+		kernel_init_free_pages(page, 1 << order);
+
 	/*
 	 * arch_free_page() can make the page's contents inaccessible.  s390
 	 * does this.  So nothing which can access the page's contents should

_

Patches currently in -mm which might be from [email protected] are

stacktrace-add-interface-based-on-shadow-call-stack.patch arm64-scs-save-scs_sp-values-per-cpu-when-switching-stacks.patch arm64-implement-stack_trace_save_shadow.patch kasan-use-stack_trace_save_shadow.patch