Follow ups for kptr series
Subsystems (5)
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainercover Follow ups for kptr series
Fix a build time warning, and address comments from Alexei on the merged version [0].
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi (4):
bpf: Fix sparse warning for bpf_kptr_xchg_proto
bpf: Prepare prog_test_struct kfuncs for runtime tests selftests/bpf: Add negative C tests for kptrs selftests/bpf: Add tests for kptr_ref refcounting
include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + net/bpf/test_run.c | 32 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/map_kptr.c | 109 ++++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr.c | 109 ++++- .../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 419 ++++++++++++++++++ .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_kptr.c | 4 +- 6 files changed, 660 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH 1/4 bpf: Fix sparse warning for bpf_kptr_xchg_proto
Kernel Test Robot complained about missing static storage class annotation for bpf_kptr_xchg_proto variable.
sparse: symbol 'bpf_kptr_xchg_proto' was not declared. Should it be static?
This caused by missing extern definition in the header. Add it to suppress the sparse warning.
--- include/linux/bpf.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
include/linux/bpf.h +1 -0
@@ -2224,6 +2224,7 @@ extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_find_vma_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_loop_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_strncmp_proto;extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_copy_from_user_task_proto; +extern const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_kptr_xchg_proto;const struct bpf_func_proto *tracing_prog_func_proto (enum bpf_func_id func_id,const struct bpf_prog *prog);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH 2/4 bpf: Prepare prog_test_struct kfuncs for runtime tests
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediIn an effort to actually test the refcounting logic at runtime, add a refcount_t member to prog_test_ref_kfunc and use it in selftests to verify and test the whole logic more exhaustively.
To ensure reading the count to verify it remains stable, make prog_test_ref_kfunc a per-CPU variable, so that inside a BPF program the count can be read reliably based on number of acquisitions made. Then, pairing them with releases and reading from the global per-CPU variable will allow verifying whether release operations put the refcount.
We don't actually rely on preemption being disabled, but migration must be disabled, as BPF program is the only context where these acquire and release functions are called. As such, when an object is acquired on one CPU, only that CPU should manipulate its refcount. Likewise, for bpf_this_cpu_ptr, the returned pointer and acquired pointer must match, so that refcount can actually be read and verified.
The kfunc calls for prog_test_member do not require runtime refcounting, as they are only used for verifier selftests, not during runtime execution. Hence, their implementation now has a WARN_ON_ONCE as it is not meant to be reachable code at runtime. It is strictly used in tests triggering failure cases in the verifier. bpf_kfunc_call_memb_release is called from map free path, since prog_test_member is embedded in map value for some verifier tests, so we skip WARN_ON_ONCE for it.
--- net/bpf/test_run.c | 32 +++++++++++++------ .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_kptr.c | 4 +-- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/bpf/test_run.c +23 -9
@@ -564,31 +564,39 @@ struct prog_test_ref_kfunc {int b;struct prog_test_member memb;struct prog_test_ref_kfunc *next; +refcount_t cnt; }; -static struct prog_test_ref_kfunc prog_test_struct = { +DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct prog_test_ref_kfunc, prog_test_struct) = { .a =42 , .b =108 , - .next = &prog_test_struct, + .cnt =REFCOUNT_INIT (1 ), }; noinline struct prog_test_ref_kfunc *bpf_kfunc_call_test_acquire (unsigned long *scalar_ptr) { -/* randomly return NULL */ -if (get_jiffies_64 () %2 ) -return NULL ; -return &prog_test_struct; +struct prog_test_ref_kfunc *p; + + p =this_cpu_ptr (&prog_test_struct); + p->next = p; +refcount_inc (&p->cnt); +return p; } noinline struct prog_test_member *bpf_kfunc_call_memb_acquire (void ) { -return &prog_test_struct.memb; +WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); +return NULL ; } noinline void bpf_kfunc_call_test_release(struct prog_test_ref_kfunc *p) { +if (!p) +return ; + +refcount_dec (&p->cnt); } noinline void bpf_kfunc_call_memb_release(struct prog_test_member *p)
@@ -597,12 +605,18 @@ noinline void bpf_kfunc_call_memb_release(struct prog_test_member *p) noinline void bpf_kfunc_call_memb1_release(struct prog_test_member1 *p) { +WARN_ON_ONCE (1 ); } noinline struct prog_test_ref_kfunc * -bpf_kfunc_call_test_kptr_get (struct prog_test_ref_kfunc **p,int a,int b) +bpf_kfunc_call_test_kptr_get (struct prog_test_ref_kfunc **pp,int a,int b) { -return &prog_test_struct; +struct prog_test_ref_kfunc *p =READ_ONCE (*pp); + +if (!p) +return NULL ; +refcount_inc (&p->cnt); +return p; }struct prog_test_pass1 {
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_kptr.c +2 -2
@@ -212,13 +212,13 @@BPF_LDX_MEM (BPF_DW ,BPF_REG_0 ,BPF_REG_0 ,0 ),BPF_JMP_IMM (BPF_JNE ,BPF_REG_0 ,0 ,1 ),BPF_EXIT_INSN (), -BPF_LDX_MEM (BPF_DW ,BPF_REG_0 ,BPF_REG_0 ,24 ), +BPF_LDX_MEM (BPF_DW ,BPF_REG_0 ,BPF_REG_0 ,32 ), BPF_EXIT_INSN(), }, .prog_type =BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS , .fixup_map_kptr = { 1 }, .result = REJECT, - .errstr = "access beyond struct prog_test_ref_kfunc at off 24 size 8", + .errstr = "access beyond struct prog_test_ref_kfunc at off 32 size 8", }, { "map_kptr: unref: inherit PTR_UNTRUSTED on struct walk",
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v1 2/4] bpf: Prepare prog_test_struct kfuncs for runtime tests
Quoted 10 lines · Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
In an effort to actually test the refcounting logic at runtime, add a
refcount_tmember toprog_test_ref_kfuncand use it in selftests to verify and test the whole logic more exhaustively.To ensure reading the count to verify it remains stable, make
prog_test_ref_kfunca per-CPU variable, so that inside a BPF program the count can be read reliably based on number of acquisitions made. Then, pairing them with releases and reading from the global per-CPU variable will allow verifying whether release operations put the refcount.
The patches look good, but the per-cpu part is a puzzle. The test is not parallel. Everything looks sequential and there are no races.
It seems to me if it was
static struct prog_test_ref_kfunc prog_test_struct = {..}; and none of [bpf_]this_cpu_ptr()
the test would work the same way.
What am I missing?
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v1 2/4] bpf: Prepare prog_test_struct kfuncs for runtime tests
Quoted 13 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 10 lines · Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
In an effort to actually test the refcounting logic at runtime, add a
refcount_tmember toprog_test_ref_kfuncand use it in selftests to verify and test the whole logic more exhaustively.To ensure reading the count to verify it remains stable, make
prog_test_ref_kfunca per-CPU variable, so that inside a BPF program the count can be read reliably based on number of acquisitions made. Then, pairing them with releases and reading from the global per-CPU variable will allow verifying whether release operations put the refcount.
Quoted 8 lines
The patches look good, but the per-cpu part is a puzzle. The test is not parallel. Everything looks sequential and there are no races.
It seems to me if it was
static structprog_test_ref_kfuncprog_test_struct= {..}; and none of [bpf_]this_cpu_ptr()
the test would work the same way.
What am I missing?
You are not missing anything. It would work the same. I just made it per-CPU for the off chance that someone runs ./test_progs -t map_kptr in parallel on the same machine. Then one or both might fail, since count won't just be inc/dec by us, and reading it would produce something other than what we expect.
One other benefit is getting non-ref PTR_TO_BTF_ID to prog_test_struct to inspect cnt after releasing acquired pointer (using bpf_this_cpu_ptr), but that can also be done by non-ref kfunc returning a pointer to it.
If you feel it's not worth it, I will drop it in the next version.
--
Kartikeya
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v1 2/4] bpf: Prepare prog_test_struct kfuncs for runtime tests
Quoted 24 lines · Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
Quoted 13 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 10 lines · Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
In an effort to actually test the refcounting logic at runtime, add a
refcount_tmember toprog_test_ref_kfuncand use it in selftests to verify and test the whole logic more exhaustively.To ensure reading the count to verify it remains stable, make
prog_test_ref_kfunca per-CPU variable, so that inside a BPF program the count can be read reliably based on number of acquisitions made. Then, pairing them with releases and reading from the global per-CPU variable will allow verifying whether release operations put the refcount.Quoted 8 lines
The patches look good, but the per-cpu part is a puzzle. The test is not parallel. Everything looks sequential and there are no races.
It seems to me if it was
static structprog_test_ref_kfuncprog_test_struct= {..}; and none of [bpf_]this_cpu_ptr()
the test would work the same way.
What am I missing?
Quoted 4 lines
You are not missing anything. It would work the same. I just made it per-CPU for the off chance that someone runs ./test_progs -t
map_kptrin parallel on the same machine. Then one or both might fail, since count won't just be inc/dec by us, and reading it would produce something other than what we expect.
I see. You should have mentioned that in the commit log. But how per-cpu helps in this case?prog_run is executed with cpu=0, so both test_progs -t map_kptr will collide on the same cpu.
At the end it's the same. one or both might fail?
In general all serial_ tests in test_progs will fail in parallel run.
Even non-serial tests might fail.
The non-serial tests are ok for test_progs -j.
They're parallel between themselves, but there are no guarantees that every individual test can be run parallel with itself. Majority will probably be fine, but not all.
Quoted 3 lines
One other benefit is getting non-ref
PTR_TO_BTF_IDtoprog_test_structto inspect cnt after releasing acquired pointer (usingbpf_this_cpu_ptr), but that can also be done by non-ref kfunc returning a pointer to it.
Not following. non-ref == ptr_untrusted. That doesn't preclude bpf prog from reading refcnt directly, but disallows passing into helpers.
So with non-percpu the following hack
bpf_kfunc_call_test_release(p);
if (p_cpu->cnt.refs.counter ...)
wouldn't be necessary.
The prog could release(p) and read p->cnt.refs.counter right after. While with per-cpu approach you had to dop_cpu = bpf_this_cpu_ptr(&prog_test_struct);
hack and rely on intimate knowledge of the kernel side.
Quoted 1 line
If you feel it's not worth it, I will drop it in the next version.
So far I see the downsides.
Also check the CI. test_progs-no_alu32 fails:
test_map_kptr_fail_prog:PASS:map_kptr__load must fail 0 nsec test_map_kptr_fail_prog:FAIL:expected error message unexpected error: -22
Expected: Unreleased reference id=5 alloc_insn=18
Verifier: 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v1 2/4] bpf: Prepare prog_test_struct kfuncs for runtime tests
Quoted 31 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 24 lines · Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
Quoted 13 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 10 lines · Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
In an effort to actually test the refcounting logic at runtime, add a
refcount_tmember toprog_test_ref_kfuncand use it in selftests to verify and test the whole logic more exhaustively.To ensure reading the count to verify it remains stable, make
prog_test_ref_kfunca per-CPU variable, so that inside a BPF program the count can be read reliably based on number of acquisitions made. Then, pairing them with releases and reading from the global per-CPU variable will allow verifying whether release operations put the refcount.Quoted 8 lines
The patches look good, but the per-cpu part is a puzzle. The test is not parallel. Everything looks sequential and there are no races.
It seems to me if it was
static structprog_test_ref_kfuncprog_test_struct= {..}; and none of [bpf_]this_cpu_ptr()
the test would work the same way.
What am I missing?Quoted 4 lines
You are not missing anything. It would work the same. I just made it per-CPU for the off chance that someone runs ./test_progs -t
map_kptrin parallel on the same machine. Then one or both might fail, since count won't just be inc/dec by us, and reading it would produce something other than what we expect.
Quoted 4 lines
I see. You should have mentioned that in the commit log. But how per-cpu helps in this case?
prog_runis executed with cpu=0, so bothtest_progs-tmap_kptrwill collide on the same cpu.
Right, I was thinking bpf_prog_run disabled preemption, so that would prevent collisions, but it seems my knowledge is now outdated (only migration is disabled). Also, just realising, we rely on observing a specific count across test_run invocations, which won't be protected against for parallel runs anyway.
Quoted 10 lines
At the end it's the same. one or both might fail?
In general all
serial_tests intest_progswill fail in parallel run.
Even non-serial tests might fail.
The non-serial tests are ok fortest_progs-j.
They're parallel between themselves, but there are no guarantees that every individual test can be run parallel with itself. Majority will probably be fine, but not all.
I'll drop it and go with a global struct.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
One other benefit is getting non-ref
PTR_TO_BTF_IDtoprog_test_structto inspect cnt after releasing acquired pointer (usingbpf_this_cpu_ptr), but that can also be done by non-ref kfunc returning a pointer to it.Not following. non-ref ==
ptr_untrusted. That doesn't preclude
By non-ref PTR_TO_BTF_ID I meant normal (not untrusted) PTR_TO_BTF_ID with ref_obj_id = 0.
bpf_this_cpu_ptr returns a normal PTR_TO_BTF_ID, not an untrusted one.
Quoted 7 lines
bpf prog from reading refcnt directly, but disallows passing into helpers.
So with non-percpu the following hack
bpf_kfunc_call_test_release(p);
if (p_cpu->cnt.refs.counter...)
wouldn't be necessary.
The prog could release(p) and readp->cnt.refs.counterright after.
release(p) will kill p, so that won't work. I have a better idea, since p->next points to itself, just loading that will give me a pointer I can read after release(p).
As an aside, do you think we should change the behaviour of killing released registers and skip it for refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID (perhaps mark it as untrusted pointer instead, with ref_obj_id reset to zero)? So loads are allowed into it, but passing into the kernel isn't, wdyt?
p = acq(); // p.type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID, ref_obj_id=X
foo(p); // worksbar(p->a + p->b); // works
rel(p); // p.type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED, ref_obj_id=0
// Instead of mark_reg_unknown(p)
There is still the case where you can do:
p2 = p->next;
rel(p);
p3 = p->next;
Now p2 is trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID, while p3 is untrusted, but this is a separate problem which requires a more general fix, and needs more discussion.
A bit of a digression, but I would like to know what you and other BPF developers think.
So far my thinking (culminating towards an RFC) is this:
For a refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID, it is marked as trusted.
When loading from it, by default all loads yield untrusted pointers, except those which are specifically marked with some annotation ("bpf_ptr_trust") which indicates that parent holds reference to member pointer. This is a loose description to mean that for the lifetime of trusted parent pointer, member pointer may also be trusted. If lifetime can end (due to release), trusted member pointers will become untrusted. If it cannot (e.g. function arguments), it remains valid.
This will use BTF tags.
Known cases in the kernel which are useful and safe can be whitelisted.
Such loads yield trusted pointers linked to refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Linked means the source refcounted PTR_TO_BTF_ID owns it.
When releasing PTR_TO_BTF_ID, all registers with same ref_obj_id, and all linked PTR_TO_BTF_ID are marked as untrusted.
As an example:
struct foo {
struct bar __ref *br;
struct baz *bz;
};struct foo *f = acq(); // f.type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID, ref_obj_id=X
br = f->br; // br.type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID, linked_to=X
bz = f->bz; // bz.type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED
rel(f); // f.type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED
// and since br.linked_to == f.ref_obj_id, // br.type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTED
For trusted loads from br, linked_to will be same as X, so they will also be marked as untrusted, and so on.
For tp_btf/LSM programs, pointer arguments will be non-refcounted trusted PTR_TO_BTF_ID. All rules as above apply, but since it cannot be released, trusted pointers obtained from them remain valid till BPF_EXIT.
I have no idea how much backwards compat this will break, or how much of it can be tolerated.
Quoted 4 lines
While with per-cpu approach you had to do
p_cpu=bpf_this_cpu_ptr(&prog_test_struct); hack and rely on intimate knowledge of the kernel side.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
If you feel it's not worth it, I will drop it in the next version.
So far I see the downsides.
Also check the CI. test_progs-no_alu32 fails:
test_map_kptr_fail_prog:PASS:map_kptr__load must fail 0 nsec test_map_kptr_fail_prog:FAIL:expected error message unexpected error: -22
Expected: Unreleased reference id=5 alloc_insn=18
Verifier: 0: R1=ctx(off=0,imm=0) R10=fp0
Yes, noticed that. It is because alloc_insn= is different for no_alu32. I'll drop the matching on specific insn idx number.
Thanks for your feedback.
--
Kartikeya
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v1 2/4] bpf: Prepare prog_test_struct kfuncs for runtime tests
Quoted 88 lines · Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
Quoted 31 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 24 lines · Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
Quoted 13 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 10 lines · Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
In an effort to actually test the refcounting logic at runtime, add a
refcount_tmember toprog_test_ref_kfuncand use it in selftests to verify and test the whole logic more exhaustively.To ensure reading the count to verify it remains stable, make
prog_test_ref_kfunca per-CPU variable, so that inside a BPF program the count can be read reliably based on number of acquisitions made. Then, pairing them with releases and reading from the global per-CPU variable will allow verifying whether release operations put the refcount.Quoted 8 lines
The patches look good, but the per-cpu part is a puzzle. The test is not parallel. Everything looks sequential and there are no races.
It seems to me if it was
static structprog_test_ref_kfuncprog_test_struct= {..}; and none of [bpf_]this_cpu_ptr()
the test would work the same way.
What am I missing?Quoted 4 lines
You are not missing anything. It would work the same. I just made it per-CPU for the off chance that someone runs ./test_progs -t
map_kptrin parallel on the same machine. Then one or both might fail, since count won't just be inc/dec by us, and reading it would produce something other than what we expect.Quoted 4 lines
I see. You should have mentioned that in the commit log. But how per-cpu helps in this case?
prog_runis executed with cpu=0, so bothtest_progs-tmap_kptrwill collide on the same cpu.Right, I was thinking
bpf_prog_rundisabled preemption, so that would prevent collisions, but it seems my knowledge is now outdated (only migration is disabled). Also, just realising, we rely on observing a specific count acrosstest_runinvocations, which won't be protected against for parallel runs anyway.Quoted 10 lines
At the end it's the same. one or both might fail?
In general all
serial_tests intest_progswill fail in parallel run.
Even non-serial tests might fail.
The non-serial tests are ok fortest_progs-j.
They're parallel between themselves, but there are no guarantees that every individual test can be run parallel with itself. Majority will probably be fine, but not all.I'll drop it and go with a global struct.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
One other benefit is getting non-ref
PTR_TO_BTF_IDtoprog_test_structto inspect cnt after releasing acquired pointer (usingbpf_this_cpu_ptr), but that can also be done by non-ref kfunc returning a pointer to it.Not following. non-ref ==
ptr_untrusted. That doesn't precludeBy non-ref
PTR_TO_BTF_IDI meant normal (not untrusted)PTR_TO_BTF_IDwithref_obj_id= 0.
bpf_this_cpu_ptrreturns a normalPTR_TO_BTF_ID, not an untrusted one.Quoted 7 lines
bpf prog from reading refcnt directly, but disallows passing into helpers.
So with non-percpu the following hack
bpf_kfunc_call_test_release(p);
if (p_cpu->cnt.refs.counter...)
wouldn't be necessary.
The prog could release(p) and readp->cnt.refs.counterright after.release(p) will kill p, so that won't work. I have a better idea, since
p->nextpoints to itself, just loading that will give me a pointer I can read after release(p).As an aside, do you think we should change the behaviour of killing released registers and skip it for refcounted
PTR_TO_BTF_ID(perhaps mark it as untrusted pointer instead, withref_obj_idreset to zero)? So loads are allowed into it, but passing into the kernel isn't, wdyt?p =
acq(); // p.type =PTR_TO_BTF_ID, ref_obj_id=X
foo(p); // worksbar(p->a + p->b); // works
rel(p); // p.type =PTR_TO_BTF_ID|PTR_UNTRUSTED, ref_obj_id=0
Quoted 6 lines
// Instead of mark_reg_unknown(p)There is still the case where you can do:
p2 =p->next;
rel(p);
p3 =p->next;
It's probably better to keep existing behavior since acquire/release is mainly used in the networking context today.
Probe reading a socket after release is technically safe, but right now such usage will be rejected by the verifier and the user will have to fix such bug. If we relax it such bugs might be much harder to spot.
Quoted 2 lines
Now p2 is trusted
PTR_TO_BTF_ID, while p3 is untrusted, but this is a separate problem which requires a more general fix, and needs more discussion.
It might not be a bug. p3 might still be trusted and valid pointer. rel(p) releases p only.
The verifier doesn't know semantics.
It's a general link list walking issue.
It needs separate discussion.
Quoted 41 lines
A bit of a digression, but I would like to know what you and other BPF developers think.
So far my thinking (culminating towards an RFC) is this:
For a refcounted
PTR_TO_BTF_ID, it is marked as trusted.When loading from it, by default all loads yield untrusted pointers, except those which are specifically marked with some annotation ("
bpf_ptr_trust") which indicates that parent holds reference to member pointer. This is a loose description to mean that for the lifetime of trusted parent pointer, member pointer may also be trusted. If lifetime can end (due to release), trusted member pointers will become untrusted. If it cannot (e.g. function arguments), it remains valid.This will use BTF tags.
Known cases in the kernel which are useful and safe can be whitelisted.Such loads yield trusted pointers linked to refcounted
PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Linked means the source refcountedPTR_TO_BTF_IDowns it.When releasing
PTR_TO_BTF_ID, all registers with sameref_obj_id, and all linkedPTR_TO_BTF_IDare marked as untrusted.As an example:
struct foo { struct bar __ref *br; struct baz *bz; };struct foo *f =
acq(); // f.type =PTR_TO_BTF_ID, ref_obj_id=X
br =f->br; // br.type =PTR_TO_BTF_ID, linked_to=X
bz =f->bz; // bz.type =PTR_TO_BTF_ID|PTR_UNTRUSTED
rel(f); // f.type =PTR_TO_BTF_ID|PTR_UNTRUSTED// and since br.linked_to == f.ref_obj_id, // br.type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID | PTR_UNTRUSTEDFor trusted loads from br,
linked_towill be same as X, so they will also be marked as untrusted, and so on.
Quoted 6 lines
For tp_btf/LSM programs, pointer arguments will be non-refcounted trusted
PTR_TO_BTF_ID. All rules as above apply, but since it cannot be released, trusted pointers obtained from them remain valid tillBPF_EXIT.I have no idea how much backwards compat this will break, or how much of it can be tolerated.
Exactly. It's not practical to mark all such fields in the kernel with __ref tags. bpf_lsm is already in the wild and is using multi level pointer walks and then passes them into helpers. We cannot break them.
In other words if you try really hard you can crash the kernel.
bpf tracing is only 99.99% safe.
I'll start a separate thread about link lists in bpf.
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH 3/4 selftests/bpf: Add negative C tests for kptrs
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediThis uses the newly added SEC("?foo") naming to disable autoload of programs, and then loads them one by one for the object and verifies that loading fails and matches the returned error string from verifier. This is similar to already existing verifier tests but provides coverage for BPF C.
--- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/map_kptr.c | 87 +++- .../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 419 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 505 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/map_kptr.c +86 -1
@@ -2,8 +2,86 @@#include <test_progs.h> #include "map_kptr.skel.h" +#include "map_kptr_fail.skel.h" -void test_map_kptr (void ) +static char log_buf[1024 *1024 ]; + +struct { +const char *prog_name; +const char *err_msg; +} map_kptr_fail_tests[] = { + {"size_not_bpf_dw" ,"kptr access size must be BPF_DW" }, + {"non_const_var_off" ,"kptr access cannot have variable offset" }, + {"non_const_var_off_kptr_xchg" ,"R1 doesn't have constant offset. kptr has to be" }, + {"misaligned_access_write" ,"kptr access misaligned expected=8 off=7" }, + {"misaligned_access_read" ,"kptr access misaligned expected=8 off=1" }, + {"reject_var_off_store" ,"variable untrusted_ptr_ access var_off=(0x0; 0x1e0)" }, + {"reject_bad_type_match" ,"invalid kptr access, R1 type=untrusted_ptr_prog_test_ref_kfunc" }, + {"marked_as_untrusted_or_null" ,"R1 type=untrusted_ptr_or_null_ expected=percpu_ptr_" }, + {"correct_btf_id_check_size" ,"access beyond struct prog_test_ref_kfunc at off 32 size 4" }, + {"inherit_untrusted_on_walk" ,"R1 type=untrusted_ptr_ expected=percpu_ptr_" }, + {"reject_kptr_xchg_on_unref" ,"off=8 kptr isn't referenced kptr" }, + {"reject_kptr_get_no_map_val" ,"arg#0 expected pointer to map value" }, + {"reject_kptr_get_no_null_map_val" ,"arg#0 expected pointer to map value" }, + {"reject_kptr_get_no_kptr" ,"arg#0 no referenced kptr at map value offset=0" }, + {"reject_kptr_get_on_unref" ,"arg#0 no referenced kptr at map value offset=8" }, + {"reject_kptr_get_bad_type_match" ,"kernel function bpf_kfunc_call_test_kptr_get args#0" }, + {"mark_ref_as_untrusted_or_null" ,"R1 type=untrusted_ptr_or_null_ expected=percpu_ptr_" }, + {"reject_untrusted_store_to_ref" ,"store to referenced kptr disallowed" }, + {"reject_bad_type_xchg" ,"invalid kptr access, R2 type=ptr_prog_test_ref_kfunc expected=ptr_prog_test_member" }, + {"reject_untrusted_xchg" ,"R2 type=untrusted_ptr_ expected=ptr_" }, + {"reject_member_of_ref_xchg" ,"invalid kptr access, R2 type=ptr_prog_test_ref_kfunc" }, + {"reject_indirect_helper_access" ,"kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper" }, + {"reject_indirect_global_func_access" ,"kptr cannot be accessed indirectly by helper" }, + {"kptr_xchg_ref_state" ,"Unreleased reference id=5 alloc_insn=18" }, + {"kptr_get_ref_state" ,"Unreleased reference id=3 alloc_insn=12" }, +}; + +static void test_map_kptr_fail_prog (const char *prog_name,const char *err_msg) +{ + LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_object_open_opts, opts, .kernel_log_buf = log_buf, + .kernel_log_size = sizeof(log_buf), + .kernel_log_level = 1); +struct map_kptr_fail *skel; +struct bpf_program *prog; +int ret; + + skel =map_kptr_fail__open_opts (&opts); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"map_kptr_fail__open_opts" )) +return ; + + prog =bpf_object__find_program_by_name (skel->obj, prog_name); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (prog,"bpf_object__find_program_by_name" )) + goto end; + +bpf_program__set_autoload (prog, true); + + ret =map_kptr_fail__load (skel); +if (!ASSERT_ERR (ret,"map_kptr__load must fail" )) + goto end; + +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (strstr (log_buf, err_msg),"expected error message" )) { +fprintf (stderr,"Expected: %s\n" , err_msg); +fprintf (stderr,"Verifier: %s\n" , log_buf); + } + +end: +map_kptr_fail__destroy (skel); +} + +static void test_map_kptr_fail (void ) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (map_kptr_fail_tests); i++) { +if (!test__start_subtest (map_kptr_fail_tests[i].prog_name)) +continue ; +test_map_kptr_fail_prog (map_kptr_fail_tests[i].prog_name, + map_kptr_fail_tests[i].err_msg); + } +} + +static void test_map_kptr_success (void ) {struct map_kptr *skel;int key =0 , ret;
@@ -35,3 +113,10 @@ void test_map_kptr(void)map_kptr__destroy (skel); } + +void test_map_kptr (void ) +{ +if (test__start_subtest ("success" )) +test_map_kptr_success (); +test_map_kptr_fail (); +}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c new file +419 -0
419 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi
maintainerPATCH 4/4 selftests/bpf: Add tests for kptr_ref refcounting
In reply to Kumar Kartikeya DwivediCheck at runtime how various operations for kptr_ref affect its refcount and verify against the actual count. We use the per-CPU prog_test_struct to get an isolated object to inspect the refcount of.
--- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/map_kptr.c | 28 ++++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/map_kptr.c +25 -3
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <test_progs.h> +#include <network_helpers.h> #include "map_kptr.skel.h" #include "map_kptr_fail.skel.h"
@@ -81,8 +82,14 @@ static void test_map_kptr_fail(void) } } -static void test_map_kptr_success (void ) +static void test_map_kptr_success (bool test_run) { +LIBBPF_OPTS (bpf_test_run_opts, opts, + .data_in = &pkt_v4, + .data_size_in = sizeof(pkt_v4), + .repeat = 1, + .cpu = 0, + );struct map_kptr *skel;int key =0 , ret;char buf[24 ];
@@ -91,6 +98,16 @@ static void test_map_kptr_success(void)if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"map_kptr__open_and_load" ))return ; + ret =bpf_prog_test_run_opts (bpf_program__fd (skel->progs.test_map_kptr_ref), &opts); +ASSERT_OK (ret,"test_map_kptr_ref refcount" ); +ASSERT_OK (opts.retval,"test_map_kptr_ref retval" ); + ret =bpf_prog_test_run_opts (bpf_program__fd (skel->progs.test_map_kptr_ref2), &opts); +ASSERT_OK (ret,"test_map_kptr_ref2 refcount" ); +ASSERT_OK (opts.retval,"test_map_kptr_ref2 retval" ); + +if (test_run) +return ; + ret =bpf_map_update_elem (bpf_map__fd (skel->maps.array_map), &key, buf,0 );ASSERT_OK (ret,"array_map update" ); ret =bpf_map_update_elem (bpf_map__fd (skel->maps.array_map), &key, buf,0 );
@@ -116,7 +133,12 @@ static void test_map_kptr_success(void)void test_map_kptr (void ) { -if (test__start_subtest ("success" )) -test_map_kptr_success (); +if (test__start_subtest ("success" )) { +test_map_kptr_success (false); +/* Do test_run twice, so that we see refcount going back to 1 +* after we leave it in map from first iteration. +*/ +test_map_kptr_success (true); + }test_map_kptr_fail (); }
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr.c +107 -2
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Signature · 1 line
2.35.1