4.9.320-rc1 review
Subsystems (5)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/264 9p: missing chunk of "fs/9p: Dont update file type when updating file attributes"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Al Viro <[email protected]>
commit b577d0cd2104fdfcf0ded3707540a12be8ddd8b0 upstream.
In commit 45089142b149 Aneesh had missed one (admittedly, very unlikely to hit) case in v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(). However, the same considerations apply there as well - we have no business whatsoever to change ->i_rdev or the file type.
--- fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c | 10 +++------- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c +3 -7
@@ -656,14 +656,10 @@ v9fs_stat2inode_dotl(struct p9_stat_dotlif (stat->st_result_mask &P9_STATS_NLINK )set_nlink (inode, stat->st_nlink);if (stat->st_result_mask &P9_STATS_MODE ) { - inode->i_mode = stat->st_mode; -if ((S_ISBLK (inode->i_mode)) || - (S_ISCHR (inode->i_mode))) -init_special_inode (inode, inode->i_mode, - inode->i_rdev); + mode = stat->st_mode &S_IALLUGO ; + mode |= inode->i_mode & ~S_IALLUGO ; + inode->i_mode = mode; } -if (stat->st_result_mask &P9_STATS_RDEV ) - inode->i_rdev =new_decode_dev (stat->st_rdev);if (!(flags &V9FS_STAT2INODE_KEEP_ISIZE ) && stat->st_result_mask &P9_STATS_SIZE )v9fs_i_size_write (inode, stat->st_size);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/264 random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit e297a783e41560b44e3c14f38e420cba518113b8 upstream.
This enables users of get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long} to wait until the pool is ready before using this function, in case they actually want to have reliable randomness.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- include/linux/random.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +31 -10
@@ -927,11 +927,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat } } -static inline void crng_wait_ready (void ) -{ -wait_event_interruptible (crng_init_wait,crng_ready ()); -} -static void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng,__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) {
@@ -1541,7 +1536,10 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(stru* number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG -* (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). +* (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure +* that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function +* wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once +* at any point prior. */ void get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes) {
@@ -1571,6 +1569,24 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbyEXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes);/* +* Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply +* cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom +* device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long} +* family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling +* this function forfeits the guarantee of security. +* +* Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded. +* -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal. +*/ +int wait_for_random_bytes (void ) +{ +if (likely (crng_ready ())) +return 0 ; +return wait_event_interruptible (crng_init_wait,crng_ready ()); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (wait_for_random_bytes); + +/* * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking * pool is initialised. *
@@ -1927,6 +1943,8 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fop SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, flags) { +int ret; +if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK |GRND_RANDOM ))return -EINVAL ;
@@ -1939,9 +1957,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *if (!crng_ready ()) {if (flags &GRND_NONBLOCK )return -EAGAIN ; -crng_wait_ready (); -if (signal_pending (current)) -return -ERESTARTSYS ; + ret =wait_for_random_bytes (); +if (unlikely (ret)) +return ret; }return urandom_read (NULL , buf, count,NULL ); }
@@ -2102,7 +2120,10 @@ static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lo/* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random * number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the -* goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. +* goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure +* that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function +* wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once +* at any point prior. */ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64);u64 get_random_u64 (void )
include/linux/random.h +1 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigne extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;extern void get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes); +extern int wait_for_random_bytes (void );extern int add_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy);extern void del_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy);extern void get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/264 random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit da9ba564bd683374b8d319756f312821b8265b06 upstream.
These functions are simple convenience wrappers that call wait_for_random_bytes before calling the respective get_random_* function.
--- include/linux/net.h | 2 ++ include/linux/once.h | 2 ++ include/linux/random.h | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
include/linux/net.h +2 -0
@@ -274,6 +274,8 @@ do { \#define net_get_random_once (buf, nbytes) \ get_random_once((buf), (nbytes)) +#define net_get_random_once_wait (buf, nbytes) \ + get_random_once_wait((buf), (nbytes))int kernel_sendmsg (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,struct kvec *vec,size_t num,size_t len);
include/linux/once.h +2 -0
@@ -53,5 +53,7 @@ void __do_once_done(bool *done, struct s#define get_random_once (buf, nbytes) \ DO_ONCE(get_random_bytes, (buf), (nbytes)) +#define get_random_once_wait (buf, nbytes) \ + DO_ONCE(get_random_bytes_wait, (buf), (nbytes)) \#endif /* _LINUX_ONCE_H */
include/linux/random.h +25 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,31 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_l#endif } +/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes). +* Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */ +static inline int get_random_bytes_wait (void *buf,int nbytes) +{ +int ret =wait_for_random_bytes (); +if (unlikely (ret)) +return ret; +get_random_bytes (buf, nbytes); +return 0 ; +} + +#define declare_get_random_var_wait (var) \ + static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \ + int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \ + if (unlikely(ret)) \ + return ret; \ + *out = get_random_ ## var(); \ + return 0; \ + } +declare_get_random_var_wait(u32) +declare_get_random_var_wait(u64) +declare_get_random_var_wait(int) +declare_get_random_var_wait(long) +#undef declare_get_random_var + unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/264 random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit d06bfd1989fe97623b32d6df4ffa6e4338c99dc8 upstream.
This enables an important dmesg notification about when drivers have used the crng without it being seeded first. Prior, these errors would occur silently, and so there hasn't been a great way of diagnosing these types of bugs for obscure setups. By adding this as a config option, we can leave it on by default, so that we learn where these issues happen, in the field, will still allowing some people to turn it off, if they really know what they're doing and do not want the log entries.
However, we don't leave it _completely_ by default. An earlier version of this patch simply had default y. I'd really love that, but it turns out, this problem with unseeded randomness being used is really quite present and is going to take a long time to fix. Thus, as a compromise between log-messages-for-all and nobody-knows, this is default y, except it is also depends on DEBUG_KERNEL. This will ensure that the curious see the messages while others don't have to.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- lib/Kconfig.debug | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +13 -2
@@ -289,7 +289,6 @@#define SEC_XFER_SIZE 512#define EXTRACT_SIZE 10 -#define DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT 0#define LONGS (x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
@@ -1545,7 +1544,7 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nby {__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; -#if DEBUG_RANDOM_BOOT >0 +#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM if (!crng_ready ())printk (KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_bytes called " "with crng_init = %d\n" , (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init);
@@ -2142,6 +2141,12 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)return ret;#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM +if (!crng_ready ()) +printk (KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_u64 called " +"with crng_init = %d\n" , (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init); +#endif + batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u64);if (use_lock)read_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
@@ -2168,6 +2173,12 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)if (arch_get_random_int (&ret))return ret; +#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM +if (!crng_ready ()) +printk (KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_u32 called " +"with crng_init = %d\n" , (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init); +#endif + batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u32);if (use_lock)read_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
lib/Kconfig.debug +16 -0
@@ -1177,6 +1177,22 @@ config STACKTRACE It is also used by various kernel debugging features that require stack trace generation. +config WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM + bool "Warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness" + default y + depends on DEBUG_KERNEL + help + Some parts of the kernel contain bugs relating to their use of + cryptographically secure random numbers before it's actually possible + to generate those numbers securely. This setting ensures that these + flaws don't go unnoticed, by enabling a message, should this ever + occur. This will allow people with obscure setups to know when things + are going wrong, so that they might contact developers about fixing + it. + + Say Y here, unless you simply do not care about using unseeded + randomness and do not want a potential warning message in your logs. + config DEBUG_KOBJECT bool "kobject debugging" depends on DEBUG_KERNEL
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/264 random: do not ignore early device randomness
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
commit ee7998c50c2697737c6530431709f77c852bf0d6 upstream.
The add_device_randomness() function would ignore incoming bytes if the crng wasn't ready. This additionally makes sure to make an early enough call to add_latent_entropy() to influence the initial stack canary, which is especially important on non-x86 systems where it stays the same through the life of the boot.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++++ init/main.c | 1 + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
drivers/char/random.c +5 -0
@@ -1045,6 +1045,11 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *bunsigned long time =random_get_entropy () ^ jiffies;unsigned long flags; +if (!crng_ready ()) { +crng_fast_load (buf, size); +return ; + } +trace_add_device_randomness (size, _RET_IP_);spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags);_mix_pool_bytes (&input_pool, buf, size);
init/main.c +1 -0
@@ -490,6 +490,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_k/* * Set up the the initial canary ASAP: */ +add_latent_entropy ();boot_init_stack_canary ();cgroup_init_early ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/264 random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit eecabf567422eda02bd179f2707d8fe24f52d888 upstream.
Unfortunately, on some models of some architectures getting a fully seeded CRNG is extremely difficult, and so this can result in dmesg getting spammed for a surprisingly long time. This is really bad from a security perspective, and so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted. However, users can't do anything actionble to address this, and spamming the kernel messages log will only just annoy people.
For developers who want to work on improving this situation, CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM has been renamed to CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM. By default the kernel will always print the first use of unseeded randomness. This way, hopefully the security obsessed will be happy that there is _some_ indication when the kernel boots there may be a potential issue with that architecture or subarchitecture. To see all uses of unseeded randomness, developers can enable CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- lib/Kconfig.debug | 24 ++++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +39 -17
@@ -438,6 +438,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_ststatic void _crng_backtrack_protect (struct crng_state *crng,__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used);static void process_random_ready_list (void ); +static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes);static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT ("warn_unseeded_randomness" ,HZ ,3 );
@@ -788,7 +789,7 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng__extract_entropy (&input_pool, &crng->state[4 ],sizeof (__u32) *12 ,0 ); else - get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12); + _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);for (i =4 ; i <16 ; i++) {if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) && !arch_get_random_long (&rv))
@@ -1535,6 +1536,30 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(strureturn ret; } +#define warn_unseeded_randomness (previous) \ + _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous)) + +static void _warn_unseeded_randomness (const char *func_name,void *caller, +void **previous) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM +const bool print_once = false; +#else +static bool print_once__read_mostly ; +#endif + +if (print_once || +crng_ready () || + (previous && (caller ==READ_ONCE (*previous)))) +return ; +WRITE_ONCE (*previous, caller); +#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM + print_once = true; +#endif +pr_notice ("random: %s called from %pF with crng_init=%d\n" , + func_name, caller, crng_init); +} +/* * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
@@ -1545,15 +1570,10 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(stru* wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once * at any point prior. */ -void get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes) +static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes) {__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; -#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM -if (!crng_ready ()) -printk (KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_bytes called " -"with crng_init = %d\n" , (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init); -#endif trace_get_random_bytes (nbytes, _RET_IP_);while (nbytes >=CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ) {
@@ -1570,6 +1590,14 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbycrng_backtrack_protect (tmp,CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE );memzero_explicit (tmp,sizeof (tmp)); } + +void get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes) +{ +static void *previous; + +warn_unseeded_randomness (&previous); +_get_random_bytes (buf, nbytes); +}EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes);/*
@@ -2136,6 +2164,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)bool use_lock =READ_ONCE (crng_init) <2 ;unsigned long flags =0 ;struct batched_entropy *batch; +static void *previous;#if BITS_PER_LONG ==64 if (arch_get_random_long ((unsigned long *)&ret))
@@ -2146,11 +2175,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)return ret;#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM -if (!crng_ready ()) -printk (KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_u64 called " -"with crng_init = %d\n" , (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init); -#endif +warn_unseeded_randomness (&previous); batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u64);if (use_lock)
@@ -2174,15 +2199,12 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)bool use_lock =READ_ONCE (crng_init) <2 ;unsigned long flags =0 ;struct batched_entropy *batch; +static void *previous;if (arch_get_random_int (&ret))return ret; -#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM -if (!crng_ready ()) -printk (KERN_NOTICE "random: %pF get_random_u32 called " -"with crng_init = %d\n" , (void *) _RET_IP_, crng_init); -#endif +warn_unseeded_randomness (&previous); batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u32);if (use_lock)
lib/Kconfig.debug +18 -6
@@ -1177,10 +1177,9 @@ config STACKTRACE It is also used by various kernel debugging features that require stack trace generation. -config WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM - bool "Warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness" - default y - depends on DEBUG_KERNEL +config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM + bool "Warn for all uses of unseeded randomness" + default n help Some parts of the kernel contain bugs relating to their use of cryptographically secure random numbers before it's actually possible
@@ -1190,8 +1189,21 @@ config WARN_UNSEEDED_RANDOM are going wrong, so that they might contact developers about fixing it. - Say Y here, unless you simply do not care about using unseeded - randomness and do not want a potential warning message in your logs. + Unfortunately, on some models of some architectures getting + a fully seeded CRNG is extremely difficult, and so this can + result in dmesg getting spammed for a surprisingly long + time. This is really bad from a security perspective, and + so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can + to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted. + However, since users can not do anything actionble to + address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single + warning for the first use of unseeded randomness. + + Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of + unseeded randomness. This will be of use primarily for + those developers interersted in improving the security of + Linux kernels running on their architecture (or + subarchitecture). config DEBUG_KOBJECT bool "kobject debugging"
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/264 random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
commit 72e5c740f6335e27253b8ff64d23d00337091535 upstream.
Avoid the READ_ONCE in commit 4a072c71f49b ("random: silence compiler warnings and fix race") if we can leave the function after arch_get_random_XXX().
--- drivers/char/random.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +4 -2
@@ -2161,7 +2161,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entu64 get_random_u64 (void ) {u64 ret; -bool use_lock =READ_ONCE (crng_init) <2 ; +bool use_lock;unsigned long flags =0 ;struct batched_entropy *batch;static void *previous;
@@ -2177,6 +2177,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)warn_unseeded_randomness (&previous); + use_lock =READ_ONCE (crng_init) <2 ; batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u64);if (use_lock)read_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
@@ -2196,7 +2197,7 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entu32 get_random_u32 (void ) {u32 ret; -bool use_lock =READ_ONCE (crng_init) <2 ; +bool use_lock;unsigned long flags =0 ;struct batched_entropy *batch;static void *previous;
@@ -2206,6 +2207,7 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)warn_unseeded_randomness (&previous); + use_lock =READ_ONCE (crng_init) <2 ; batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u32);if (use_lock)read_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/264 random: fix warning message on ia64 and parisc
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Helge Deller <[email protected]>
commit 51d96dc2e2dc2cf9b81cf976cc93c51ba3ac2f92 upstream.
Fix the warning message on the parisc and IA64 architectures to show the correct function name of the caller by using %pS instead of %pF. The message is printed with the value of _RET_IP_ which calls __builtin_return_address(0) and as such returns the IP address caller instead of pointer to a function descriptor of the caller.
The effect of this patch is visible on the parisc and ia64 architectures only since those are the ones which use function descriptors while on all others %pS and %pF will behave the same.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -1
@@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM print_once = true;#endif -pr_notice ("random: %s called from %pF with crng_init=%d\n" , +pr_notice ("random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n" , func_name, caller, crng_init); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/264 random: use a different mixing algorithm for add_device_randomness()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit dc12baacb95f205948f64dc936a47d89ee110117 upstream.
add_device_randomness() use of crng_fast_load() was highly problematic. Some callers of add_device_randomness() can pass in a large amount of static information. This would immediately promote the crng_init state from 0 to 1, without really doing much to initialize the primary_crng's internal state with something even vaguely unpredictable.
Since we don't have the speed constraints of add_interrupt_randomness(), we can do a better job mixing in the what unpredictability a device driver or architecture maintainer might see fit to give us, and do it in a way which does not bump the crng_init_cnt variable.
Also, since add_device_randomness() doesn't bump any entropy accounting in crng_init state 0, mix the device randomness into the input_pool entropy pool as well. This is related to CVE-2018-1108.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +51 -4
@@ -799,6 +799,10 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_ crng->init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; } +/* +* crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service +* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. +*/ static int crng_fast_load (const char *cp,size_t len) {unsigned long flags;
@@ -876,6 +880,51 @@ static struct crng_state *select_crng(vo }#endif +/* +* crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two +* attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is +* guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at +* all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of +* crng_fast_load(). +* +* So we do something more comprehensive which is guaranteed to touch +* all of the primary_crng's state, and which uses a LFSR with a +* period of 255 as part of the mixing algorithm. Finally, we do +* *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be something +* like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be +* unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. +*/ +static int crng_slow_load (const char *cp,size_t len) +{ +unsigned long flags; +static unsigned char lfsr =1 ; +unsigned char tmp; +unsigned i, max =CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ; +const char * src_buf = cp; +char * dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4 ]; + +if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags)) +return 0 ; +if (crng_init !=0 ) { +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +return 0 ; + } +if (len > max) + max = len; + +for (i =0 ; i < max ; i++) { + tmp = lfsr; + lfsr >>=1 ; +if (tmp &1 ) + lfsr ^=0xE1 ; + tmp = dest_buf[i %CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ]; + dest_buf[i %CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr; + lfsr += (tmp <<3 ) | (tmp >>5 ); + } +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +return 1 ; +} +static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng,struct entropy_store *r) {unsigned long flags;
@@ -1046,10 +1095,8 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *bunsigned long time =random_get_entropy () ^ jiffies;unsigned long flags; -if (!crng_ready ()) { -crng_fast_load (buf, size); -return ; - } +if (!crng_ready () && size) +crng_slow_load (buf, size);trace_add_device_randomness (size, _RET_IP_);spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/264 random: remove stale maybe_reseed_primary_crng
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
commit 3d071d8da1f586c24863a57349586a1611b9aa67 upstream.
The function maybe_reseed_primary_crng is not used anywhere and thus can be removed.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +0 -7
@@ -931,13 +931,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statspin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); } -static inline void maybe_reseed_primary_crng (void ) -{ -if (crng_init >2 && -time_after (jiffies, primary_crng.init_time +CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL )) -crng_reseed (&primary_crng, &input_pool); -} -static inline void crng_wait_ready (void ) {wait_event_interruptible (crng_init_wait,crng_ready ());
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/264 random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 8ef35c866f8862df074a49a93b0309725812dea8 upstream.
Until the primary_crng is fully initialized, don't initialize the NUMA crng nodes. Otherwise users of /dev/urandom on NUMA systems before the CRNG is fully initialized can get very bad quality randomness. Of course everyone should move to getrandom(2) where this won't be an issue, but there's a lot of legacy code out there. This related to CVE-2018-1108.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
drivers/char/random.c +27 -0
@@ -799,6 +799,32 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_ crng->init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA +static void numa_crng_init (void ) +{ +int i; +struct crng_state *crng; +struct crng_state **pool; + + pool =kcalloc (nr_node_ids,sizeof (*pool),GFP_KERNEL |__GFP_NOFAIL); +for_each_online_node (i) { + crng =kmalloc_node (sizeof (struct crng_state ), +GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i); +spin_lock_init (&crng->lock); +crng_initialize (crng); + pool[i] = crng; + } +mb (); +if (cmpxchg (&crng_node_pool,NULL , pool)) { +for_each_node (i) +kfree (pool[i]); +kfree (pool); + } +} +#else +static void numa_crng_init (void ) {} +#endif +/* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally.
@@ -957,6 +983,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statif (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init <2 ) {numa_crng_init ();invalidate_batched_entropy (); +numa_crng_init (); crng_init =2 ;process_random_ready_list ();wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/264 random: fix possible sleeping allocation from irq context
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 6c1e851c4edc13a43adb3ea4044e3fc8f43ccf7d upstream.
We can do a sleeping allocation from an irq context when CONFIG_NUMA is enabled. Fix this by initializing the NUMA crng instances in a workqueue.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +8 -1
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_ }#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA -static void numa_crng_init (void ) +static void do_numa_crng_init (struct work_struct *work) {int i;struct crng_state *crng;
@@ -821,6 +821,13 @@ static void numa_crng_init(void) kfree(pool); } } + +static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init); + +static void numa_crng_init (void ) +{ +schedule_work (&numa_crng_init_work); +}#else static void numa_crng_init (void ) {}#endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/264 random: rate limit unseeded randomness warnings
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 4e00b339e264802851aff8e73cde7d24b57b18ce upstream.
On systems without sufficient boot randomness, no point spamming dmesg.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +3 -2
@@ -1637,8 +1637,9 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM print_once = true;#endif -pr_notice ("random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n" , - func_name, caller, crng_init); +if (__ratelimit (&unseeded_warning)) +pr_notice ("random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n" , + func_name, caller, crng_init); }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/264 random: add a spinlock_t to struct batched_entropy
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b7d5dc21072cda7124d13eae2aefb7343ef94197 ]
The per-CPU variable batched_entropy_uXX is protected by get_cpu_var(). This is just a preempt_disable() which ensures that the variable is only from the local CPU. It does not protect against users on the same CPU from another context. It is possible that a preemptible context reads slot 0 and then an interrupt occurs and the same value is read again.
The above scenario is confirmed by lockdep if we add a spinlock:
| ================================
| WARNING: inconsistent lock state
| 5.1.0-rc3+ #42 Not tainted
| --------------------------------
| inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
| ksoftirqd/9/56 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE0:SE0] takes:
| (____ptrval____) (batched_entropy_u32.lock){+.?.}, at: get_random_u32+0x3e/0xe0
| {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
| _raw_spin_lock+0x2a/0x40
| get_random_u32+0x3e/0xe0
| new_slab+0x15c/0x7b0
| ___slab_alloc+0x492/0x620
| __slab_alloc.isra.73+0x53/0xa0
| kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xaf/0x2a0
| copy_process.part.41+0x1e1/0x2370
| _do_fork+0xdb/0x6d0
| kernel_thread+0x20/0x30
| kthreadd+0x1ba/0x220
| ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
…
| other info that might help us debug this:
| Possible unsafe locking scenario:
|
| CPU0
| ----
| lock(batched_entropy_u32.lock);
| <Interrupt>
| lock(batched_entropy_u32.lock);
|
| *** DEADLOCK ***
|
| stack backtrace:
| Call Trace:
…
| kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x20e/0x270
| ipmi_alloc_recv_msg+0x16/0x40
…
| __do_softirq+0xec/0x48d
| run_ksoftirqd+0x37/0x60
| smpboot_thread_fn+0x191/0x290
| kthread+0xfe/0x130
| ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50Add a spinlock_t to the batched_entropy data structure and acquire the lock while accessing it. Acquire the lock with disabled interrupts because this function may be used from interrupt context.
Remove the batched_entropy_reset_lock lock. Now that we have a lock for the data scructure, we can access it from a remote CPU.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +27 -25
@@ -2228,8 +2228,8 @@ struct batched_entropy {u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u32)]; };unsigned int position; +spinlock_t batch_lock; }; -static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lock =__RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED (batched_entropy_reset_lock);/* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
@@ -2239,12 +2239,14 @@ static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lo* wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once * at any point prior. */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { + .batch_lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (batched_entropy_u64.lock), +}; +u64 get_random_u64 (void ) {u64 ret; -bool use_lock; -unsigned long flags =0 ; +unsigned long flags;struct batched_entropy *batch;static void *previous;
@@ -2259,28 +2261,25 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)warn_unseeded_randomness (&previous); - use_lock =READ_ONCE (crng_init) <2 ; - batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u64); -if (use_lock) -read_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); + batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u64); +spin_lock_irqsave (&batch->batch_lock, flags);if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u64) ==0 ) {extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position =0 ; } ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; -if (use_lock) -read_unlock_irqrestore (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); -put_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u64); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&batch->batch_lock, flags);return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_u64); -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = { + .batch_lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (batched_entropy_u32.lock), +};u32 get_random_u32 (void ) {u32 ret; -bool use_lock; -unsigned long flags =0 ; +unsigned long flags;struct batched_entropy *batch;static void *previous;
@@ -2289,18 +2288,14 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)warn_unseeded_randomness (&previous); - use_lock =READ_ONCE (crng_init) <2 ; - batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u32); -if (use_lock) -read_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); + batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u32); +spin_lock_irqsave (&batch->batch_lock, flags);if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u32) ==0 ) {extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position =0 ; } ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; -if (use_lock) -read_unlock_irqrestore (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); -put_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u32); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&batch->batch_lock, flags);return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_u32);
@@ -2314,12 +2309,19 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(vint cpu;unsigned long flags; -write_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { -per_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position =0 ; -per_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position =0 ; +struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy; + + batched_entropy =per_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u32, cpu); +spin_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags); + batched_entropy->position =0 ; +spin_unlock (&batched_entropy->batch_lock); + + batched_entropy =per_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u64, cpu); +spin_lock (&batched_entropy->batch_lock); + batched_entropy->position =0 ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags); } -write_unlock_irqrestore (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); }/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/264 Revert "char/random: silence a lockdep splat with printk()"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
This reverts commit 28820c5802f9f83c655ab09ccae8289103ce1490 which is commit 1b710b1b10eff9d46666064ea25f079f70bc67a8 upstream.
It causes problems here just like it did in 4.19.y and odds are it will be reverted upstream as well.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +2 -3
@@ -1638,9 +1638,8 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co print_once = true;#endif if (__ratelimit (&unseeded_warning)) -printk_deferred (KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS " -"with crng_init=%d\n" , func_name, caller, - crng_init); +pr_notice ("random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n" , + func_name, caller, crng_init); }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/264 char/random: silence a lockdep splat with printk()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1b710b1b10eff9d46666064ea25f079f70bc67a8 ]
Sergey didn't like the locking order,
uart_port->lock -> tty_port->lock
uart_write (uart_port->lock)
__uart_start
pl011_start_tx
pl011_tx_chars
uart_write_wakeup
tty_port_tty_wakeup
tty_port_default
tty_port_tty_get (tty_port->lock)but those code is so old, and I have no clue how to de-couple it after checking other locks in the splat. There is an onging effort to make all printk() as deferred, so until that happens, workaround it for now as a short-term fix.
LTP: starting iogen01 (export LTPROOT; rwtest -N iogen01 -i 120s -s read,write -Da -Dv -n 2 500b:$TMPDIR/doio.f1.$$ 1000b:$TMPDIR/doio.f2.$$)
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
------------------------------------------------------
doio/49441 is trying to acquire lock:ffff008b7cff7290 (&(&zone->lock)->rlock){..-.}, at: rmqueue+0x138/0x2050
but task is already holding lock:60ff000822352818 (&pool->lock/1){-.-.}, at: start_flush_work+0xd8/0x3f0
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #4 (&pool->lock/1){-.-.}:
lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
_raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80
__queue_work+0x4b4/0xa10
queue_work_on+0xac/0x11c
tty_schedule_flip+0x84/0xbc
tty_flip_buffer_push+0x1c/0x28
pty_write+0x98/0xd0
n_tty_write+0x450/0x60c
tty_write+0x338/0x474
__vfs_write+0x88/0x214
vfs_write+0x12c/0x1a4
redirected_tty_write+0x90/0xdc
do_loop_readv_writev+0x140/0x180
do_iter_write+0xe0/0x10c
vfs_writev+0x134/0x1cc
do_writev+0xbc/0x130
__arm64_sys_writev+0x58/0x8c
el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240
el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250
el0_sync+0x164/0x180-> #3 (&(&port->lock)->rlock){-.-.}:
lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7c/0x9c
tty_port_tty_get+0x24/0x60
tty_port_default_wakeup+0x1c/0x3c
tty_port_tty_wakeup+0x34/0x40
uart_write_wakeup+0x28/0x44
pl011_tx_chars+0x1b8/0x270
pl011_start_tx+0x24/0x70
__uart_start+0x5c/0x68
uart_write+0x164/0x1c8
do_output_char+0x33c/0x348
n_tty_write+0x4bc/0x60c
tty_write+0x338/0x474
redirected_tty_write+0xc0/0xdc
do_loop_readv_writev+0x140/0x180
do_iter_write+0xe0/0x10c
vfs_writev+0x134/0x1cc
do_writev+0xbc/0x130
__arm64_sys_writev+0x58/0x8c
el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240
el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250
el0_sync+0x164/0x180-> #2 (&port_lock_key){-.-.}:
lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
_raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80
pl011_console_write+0xec/0x2cc
console_unlock+0x794/0x96c
vprintk_emit+0x260/0x31c
vprintk_default+0x54/0x7c
vprintk_func+0x218/0x254
printk+0x7c/0xa4
register_console+0x734/0x7b0
uart_add_one_port+0x734/0x834
pl011_register_port+0x6c/0xac
sbsa_uart_probe+0x234/0x2ec
platform_drv_probe+0xd4/0x124
really_probe+0x250/0x71c
driver_probe_device+0xb4/0x200
__device_attach_driver+0xd8/0x188
bus_for_each_drv+0xbc/0x110
__device_attach+0x120/0x220
device_initial_probe+0x20/0x2c
bus_probe_device+0x54/0x100
device_add+0xae8/0xc2c
platform_device_add+0x278/0x3b8
platform_device_register_full+0x238/0x2ac
acpi_create_platform_device+0x2dc/0x3a8
acpi_bus_attach+0x390/0x3cc
acpi_bus_attach+0x108/0x3cc
acpi_bus_attach+0x108/0x3cc
acpi_bus_attach+0x108/0x3cc
acpi_bus_scan+0x7c/0xb0
acpi_scan_init+0xe4/0x304
acpi_init+0x100/0x114
do_one_initcall+0x348/0x6a0
do_initcall_level+0x190/0x1fc
do_basic_setup+0x34/0x4c
kernel_init_freeable+0x19c/0x260
kernel_init+0x18/0x338
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18-> #1 (console_owner){-...}:
lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
console_lock_spinning_enable+0x6c/0x7c
console_unlock+0x4f8/0x96c
vprintk_emit+0x260/0x31c
vprintk_default+0x54/0x7c
vprintk_func+0x218/0x254
printk+0x7c/0xa4
get_random_u64+0x1c4/0x1dc
shuffle_pick_tail+0x40/0xac
__free_one_page+0x424/0x710
free_one_page+0x70/0x120
__free_pages_ok+0x61c/0xa94
__free_pages_core+0x1bc/0x294
memblock_free_pages+0x38/0x48
__free_pages_memory+0xcc/0xfc
__free_memory_core+0x70/0x78
free_low_memory_core_early+0x148/0x18c
memblock_free_all+0x18/0x54
mem_init+0xb4/0x17c
mm_init+0x14/0x38
start_kernel+0x19c/0x530-> #0 (&(&zone->lock)->rlock){..-.}:
validate_chain+0xf6c/0x2e2c
__lock_acquire+0x868/0xc2c
lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
_raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80
rmqueue+0x138/0x2050
get_page_from_freelist+0x474/0x688
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3b4/0x18dc
alloc_pages_current+0xd0/0xe0
alloc_slab_page+0x2b4/0x5e0
new_slab+0xc8/0x6bc
___slab_alloc+0x3b8/0x640
kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b4/0x588
__debug_object_init+0x778/0x8b4
debug_object_init_on_stack+0x40/0x50
start_flush_work+0x16c/0x3f0
__flush_work+0xb8/0x124
flush_work+0x20/0x30
xlog_cil_force_lsn+0x88/0x204 [xfs]
xfs_log_force_lsn+0x128/0x1b8 [xfs]
xfs_file_fsync+0x3c4/0x488 [xfs]
vfs_fsync_range+0xb0/0xd0
generic_write_sync+0x80/0xa0 [xfs]
xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0x66c/0x6e4 [xfs]
xfs_file_write_iter+0x1a0/0x218 [xfs]
__vfs_write+0x1cc/0x214
vfs_write+0x12c/0x1a4
ksys_write+0xb0/0x120
__arm64_sys_write+0x54/0x88
el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240
el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250
el0_sync+0x164/0x180other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of: &(&zone->lock)->rlock --> &(&port->lock)->rlock --> &pool->lock/1 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(&pool->lock/1);
lock(&(&port->lock)->rlock);
lock(&pool->lock/1);lock(&(&zone->lock)->rlock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
4 locks held by doio/49441:
#0: a0ff00886fc27408 (sb_writers#8){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x118/0x1a4 #1: 8fff00080810dfe0 (&xfs_nondir_ilock_class){++++}, at:
xfs_ilock+0x2a8/0x300 [xfs]
#2: ffff9000129f2390 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at:
rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38
#3: 60ff000822352818 (&pool->lock/1){-.-.}, at:
start_flush_work+0xd8/0x3f0
stack backtrace:
CPU: 48 PID: 49441 Comm: doio Tainted: G W
Hardware name: HPE Apollo 70 /C01_APACHE_MB , BIOS
L50_5.13_1.11 06/18/2019
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x248
show_stack+0x20/0x2c
dump_stack+0xe8/0x150
print_circular_bug+0x368/0x380
check_noncircular+0x28c/0x294
validate_chain+0xf6c/0x2e2c
__lock_acquire+0x868/0xc2c
lock_acquire+0x320/0x360
_raw_spin_lock+0x64/0x80
rmqueue+0x138/0x2050
get_page_from_freelist+0x474/0x688
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x3b4/0x18dc
alloc_pages_current+0xd0/0xe0
alloc_slab_page+0x2b4/0x5e0
new_slab+0xc8/0x6bc
___slab_alloc+0x3b8/0x640
kmem_cache_alloc+0x4b4/0x588
__debug_object_init+0x778/0x8b4
debug_object_init_on_stack+0x40/0x50
start_flush_work+0x16c/0x3f0
__flush_work+0xb8/0x124
flush_work+0x20/0x30
xlog_cil_force_lsn+0x88/0x204 [xfs]
xfs_log_force_lsn+0x128/0x1b8 [xfs]
xfs_file_fsync+0x3c4/0x488 [xfs]
vfs_fsync_range+0xb0/0xd0
generic_write_sync+0x80/0xa0 [xfs]
xfs_file_buffered_aio_write+0x66c/0x6e4 [xfs]
xfs_file_write_iter+0x1a0/0x218 [xfs]
__vfs_write+0x1cc/0x214
vfs_write+0x12c/0x1a4
ksys_write+0xb0/0x120
__arm64_sys_write+0x54/0x88
el0_svc_handler+0x170/0x240
el0_sync_handler+0x150/0x250
el0_sync+0x164/0x180--- drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +3 -2
@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co print_once = true;#endif if (__ratelimit (&unseeded_warning)) -pr_notice ("random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n" , - func_name, caller, crng_init); +printk_deferred (KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS " +"with crng_init=%d\n" , func_name, caller, + crng_init); }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/264 random: always use batched entropy for get_random_u{32,64}
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 69efea712f5b0489e67d07565aad5c94e09a3e52 upstream.
It turns out that RDRAND is pretty slow. Comparing these two constructions:
for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(ret))
arch_get_random_long(&ret);and
long buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(long)]; extract_crng((u8 *)buf);
it amortizes out to 352 cycles per long for the top one and 107 cycles per long for the bottom one, on Coffee Lake Refresh, Intel Core i9-9880H.
And importantly, the top one has the drawback of not benefiting from the real rng, whereas the bottom one has all the nice benefits of using our own chacha rng. As get_random_u{32,64} gets used in more places (perhaps beyond what it was originally intended for when it was introduced as get_random_{int,long} back in the md5 monstrosity era), it seems like it might be a good thing to strengthen its posture a tiny bit. Doing this should only be stronger and not any weaker because that pool is already initialized with a bunch of rdrand data (when available). This way, we get the benefits of the hardware rng as well as our own rng.
Another benefit of this is that we no longer hit pitfalls of the recent stream of AMD bugs in RDRAND. One often used code pattern for various things is:
do {
val = get_random_u32();
} while (hash_table_contains_key(val));That recent AMD bug rendered that pattern useless, whereas we're really very certain that chacha20 output will give pretty distributed numbers, no matter what.
So, this simplification seems better both from a security perspective and from a performance perspective.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 20 ++++---------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +4 -16
@@ -2233,11 +2233,11 @@ struct batched_entropy {/* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random -* number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the -* goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure +* number is good as /dev/urandom, but there is no backtrack protection, with +* the goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function -* wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once -* at any point prior. +* wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any +* point prior. */ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { .batch_lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (batched_entropy_u64.lock),
@@ -2250,15 +2250,6 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)struct batched_entropy *batch;static void *previous; -#if BITS_PER_LONG ==64 -if (arch_get_random_long ((unsigned long *)&ret)) -return ret; -#else -if (arch_get_random_long ((unsigned long *)&ret) && -arch_get_random_long ((unsigned long *)&ret +1 )) -return ret; -#endif -warn_unseeded_randomness (&previous); batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u64);
@@ -2283,9 +2274,6 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void)struct batched_entropy *batch;static void *previous; -if (arch_get_random_int (&ret)) -return ret; -warn_unseeded_randomness (&previous); batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u32);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/264 random: fix data race on crng_node_pool
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 5d73d1e320c3fd94ea15ba5f79301da9a8bcc7de upstream.
extract_crng() and crng_backtrack_protect() load crng_node_pool with a plain load, which causes undefined behavior if do_numa_crng_init() modifies it concurrently.
Fix this by using READ_ONCE(). Note: as per the previous discussion
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#u,READ_ONCE() is believed to be sufficient here, and it was requested that it be used here instead of smp_load_acquire().
Also change do_numa_crng_init() to set crng_node_pool using cmpxchg_release() instead of mb() + cmpxchg(), as the former is sufficient here but is more lightweight.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +20 -2
@@ -814,8 +814,8 @@ static void do_numa_crng_init(struct worcrng_initialize (crng); pool[i] = crng; } -mb (); -if (cmpxchg (&crng_node_pool,NULL , pool)) { +/* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */ +if (cmpxchg_release (&crng_node_pool,NULL , pool) !=NULL ) {for_each_node (i)kfree (pool[i]);kfree (pool);
@@ -828,8 +828,26 @@ static void numa_crng_init(void) {schedule_work (&numa_crng_init_work); } + +static struct crng_state *select_crng (void ) +{ +struct crng_state **pool; +int nid =numa_node_id (); + +/* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */ + pool =READ_ONCE (crng_node_pool); +if (pool && pool[nid]) +return pool[nid]; + +return &primary_crng; +}#else static void numa_crng_init (void ) {} + +static struct crng_state *select_crng (void ) +{ +return &primary_crng; +}#endif /*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/264 crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for chacha20_block()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 9f480faec58cd6197a007ea1dcac6b7c3daf1139 upstream.
When chacha20_block() outputs the keystream block, it uses 'u32' stores directly. However, the callers (crypto/chacha20_generic.c and drivers/char/random.c) declare the keystream buffer as a 'u8' array, which is not guaranteed to have the needed alignment.
Fix it by having both callers declare the keystream as a 'u32' array. For now this is preferable to switching over to the unaligned access macros because chacha20_block() is only being used in cases where we can easily control the alignment (stack buffers).
--- crypto/chacha20_generic.c | 6 +++--- drivers/char/random.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ include/crypto/chacha20.h | 3 ++- lib/chacha20.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
crypto/chacha20_generic.c +3 -3
@@ -23,20 +23,20 @@ static inline u32 le32_to_cpuvp(const vostatic void chacha20_docrypt (u32 *state,u8 *dst,const u8 *src,unsigned int bytes) { -u8 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; +u32 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ];if (dst != src)memcpy (dst, src, bytes);while (bytes >=CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ) {chacha20_block (state, stream); -crypto_xor (dst, stream,CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ); +crypto_xor (dst, (const u8 *)stream,CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ); bytes -=CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ; dst +=CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ; }if (bytes) {chacha20_block (state, stream); -crypto_xor (dst, stream, bytes); +crypto_xor (dst, (const u8 *)stream, bytes); } }
drivers/char/random.c +12 -12
@@ -434,9 +434,9 @@ static int crng_init_cnt = 0;static unsigned long crng_global_init_time =0 ;#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)static void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng, -__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]); +__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ]);static void _crng_backtrack_protect (struct crng_state *crng, -__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used); +__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ],int used);static void process_random_ready_list (void );static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes);
@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statunsigned long flags;int i, num;union { -__u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; +__u32 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ];__u32 key[8 ]; } buf;
@@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat }static void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng, -__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) +__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ]) {unsigned long v, flags, init_time;
@@ -1049,7 +1049,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_stspin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); } -static void extract_crng (__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) +static void extract_crng (__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ]) {_extract_crng (select_crng (), out); }
@@ -1059,7 +1059,7 @@ static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA* enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. */ static void _crng_backtrack_protect (struct crng_state *crng, -__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) +__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ],int used) {unsigned long flags;__u32 *s, *d;
@@ -1071,14 +1071,14 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(stru used =0 ; }spin_lock_irqsave (&crng->lock, flags); - s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used]; + s = &tmp[used /sizeof (__u32)]; d = &crng->state[4 ];for (i=0 ; i <8 ; i++) *d++ ^= *s++;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); } -static void crng_backtrack_protect (__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) +static void crng_backtrack_protect (__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ],int used) {_crng_backtrack_protect (select_crng (), tmp, used); }
@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8static ssize_t extract_crng_user (void __user *buf,size_t nbytes) {ssize_t ret =0 , i =CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ; -__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; +__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ];int large_request = (nbytes >256 );while (nbytes) {
@@ -1672,7 +1672,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co*/ static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes) { -__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; +__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ];trace_get_random_bytes (nbytes, _RET_IP_);
@@ -2273,7 +2273,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u64);spin_lock_irqsave (&batch->batch_lock, flags);if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u64) ==0 ) { -extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); +extract_crng ((__u32 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position =0 ; } ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
@@ -2297,7 +2297,7 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u32);spin_lock_irqsave (&batch->batch_lock, flags);if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u32) ==0 ) { -extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); +extract_crng (batch->entropy_u32); batch->position =0 ; } ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
include/crypto/chacha20.h +2 -1
@@ -11,12 +11,13 @@#define CHACHA20_IV_SIZE 16#define CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE 32#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE 64 +#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS (CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32))struct chacha20_ctx {u32 key[8 ]; }; -void chacha20_block (u32 *state,void *stream); +void chacha20_block (u32 *state,u32 *stream);void crypto_chacha20_init (u32 *state,struct chacha20_ctx *ctx,u8 *iv);int crypto_chacha20_setkey (struct crypto_tfm *tfm,const u8 *key,unsigned int keysize);
lib/chacha20.c +1 -1
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static inline u32 rotl32(u32 v, u8 n)return (v << n) | (v >> (sizeof (v) *8 - n)); } -extern void chacha20_block (u32 *state,void *stream) +void chacha20_block (u32 *state,u32 *stream) {u32 x[16 ], *out = stream;int i;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/264 random: remove stale urandom_init_wait
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Stephan M�ller" <[email protected]>
commit 2e03c36f25ebb52d3358b8baebcdf96895c33a87 upstream.
The urandom_init_wait wait queue is a left over from the pre-ChaCha20 times and can therefore be savely removed.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +0 -1
@@ -410,7 +410,6 @@ static struct poolinfo {*/ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (random_read_wait);static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (random_write_wait); -static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (urandom_init_wait);static struct fasync_struct *fasync;static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (random_ready_list_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/264 random: always fill buffer in get_random_bytes_wait
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 25e3fca492035a2e1d4ac6e3b1edd9c1acd48897 upstream.
In the unfortunate event that a developer fails to check the return value of get_random_bytes_wait, or simply wants to make a "best effort" attempt, for whatever that's worth, it's much better to still fill the buffer with _something_ rather than catastrophically failing in the case of an interruption. This is both a defense in depth measure against inevitable programming bugs, as well as a means of making the API a bit more useful.
--- include/linux/random.h | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/random.h +1 -3
@@ -63,10 +63,8 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_lstatic inline int get_random_bytes_wait (void *buf,int nbytes) {int ret =wait_for_random_bytes (); -if (unlikely (ret)) -return ret;get_random_bytes (buf, nbytes); -return 0 ; +return ret; }#define declare_get_random_var_wait (var) \
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/264 random: optimize add_interrupt_randomness
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
commit e8e8a2e47db6bb85bb0cb21e77b5c6aaedf864b4 upstream.
add_interrupt_randomess always wakes up
code blocking on /dev/random. This wake up is done unconditionally. Unfortunately this means all interrupts take the wait queue spinlock, which can be rather expensive on large systems processing lots of interrupts.
We saw 1% cpu time spinning on this on a large macro workload running on a large system.
I believe it's a recent regression (?)
Always check if there is a waiter on the wait queue before waking up. This check can be done without taking a spinlock.
1.06% 10460 [kernel.vmlinux] [k] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath
|
---native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath
|
--0.57%--_raw_spin_lock_irqsave
|
--0.56%--__wake_up_common_lock
credit_entropy_bits
add_interrupt_randomness
handle_irq_event_percpu
handle_irq_event
handle_edge_irq
handle_irq
do_IRQ
common_interrupt--- drivers/char/random.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +2 -1
@@ -722,7 +722,8 @@ retry: }/* should we wake readers? */ -if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits) { +if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits && +wq_has_sleeper (&random_read_wait)) {wake_up_interruptible (&random_read_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN ); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/264 drivers/char/random.c: remove unused dont_count_entropy
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
commit 5e747dd9be54be190dd6ebeebf4a4a01ba765625 upstream.
Ever since "random: kill dead extract_state struct" [1], the dont_count_entropy member of struct timer_rand_state has been effectively unused. Since it hasn't found a new use in 12 years, it's probably safe to finally kill it.
[1] Pre-git, https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tglx/history.git/commit/?id=c1c48e61c251f57e7a3f1bf11b3c462b2de9dcb5
--- drivers/char/random.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +26 -29
@@ -1130,7 +1130,6 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __struct timer_rand_state {cycles_t last_time;long last_delta, last_delta2; -unsigned dont_count_entropy:1 ; };#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, };
@@ -1194,35 +1193,33 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct* We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas * in order to make our estimate. */ + delta = sample.jiffies - state->last_time; + state->last_time = sample.jiffies; + + delta2 = delta - state->last_delta; + state->last_delta = delta; + + delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2; + state->last_delta2 = delta2; + +if (delta <0 ) + delta = -delta; +if (delta2 <0 ) + delta2 = -delta2; +if (delta3 <0 ) + delta3 = -delta3; +if (delta > delta2) + delta = delta2; +if (delta > delta3) + delta = delta3; + +/* +* delta is now minimum absolute delta. +* Round down by 1 bit on general principles, +* and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits. +*/ +credit_entropy_bits (r,min_t (int,fls (delta>>1 ),11 )); -if (!state->dont_count_entropy) { - delta = sample.jiffies - state->last_time; - state->last_time = sample.jiffies; - - delta2 = delta - state->last_delta; - state->last_delta = delta; - - delta3 = delta2 - state->last_delta2; - state->last_delta2 = delta2; - -if (delta <0 ) - delta = -delta; -if (delta2 <0 ) - delta2 = -delta2; -if (delta3 <0 ) - delta3 = -delta3; -if (delta > delta2) - delta = delta2; -if (delta > delta3) - delta = delta3; - -/* -* delta is now minimum absolute delta. -* Round down by 1 bit on general principles, -* and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits. -*/ -credit_entropy_bits (r,min_t (int,fls (delta>>1 ),11 )); - }preempt_enable (); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/264 random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Tobin C. Harding" <[email protected]>
commit 8ddd6efa56c3fe23df9fe4cf5e2b49cc55416ef4 upstream.
There are a couple of whitespace issues around the function get_random_bytes_arch(). In preparation for patching this function let's clean them up.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -2
@@ -1795,7 +1795,7 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, inif (!arch_get_random_long (&v))break ; - +memcpy (p, &v, chunk); p += chunk; nbytes -= chunk;
@@ -1806,7 +1806,6 @@ void get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, in }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes_arch); -/* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data *
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/264 random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Tobin C. Harding" <[email protected]>
commit 753d433b586d1d43c487e3d660f5778c7c8d58ea upstream.
Currently the function get_random_bytes_arch() has return value 'void'. If the hw RNG fails we currently fall back to using get_random_bytes(). This defeats the purpose of requesting random material from the hw RNG in the first place.
There are currently no intree users of get_random_bytes_arch().
Only get random bytes from the hw RNG, make function return the number of bytes retrieved from the hw RNG.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 16 +++++++++------- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +9 -7
@@ -1783,26 +1783,28 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback)* key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to * have put in a back door. +* +* Return number of bytes filled in. */ -void get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes) +int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes) { +int left = nbytes;char *p = buf; -trace_get_random_bytes_arch (nbytes, _RET_IP_); -while (nbytes) { +trace_get_random_bytes_arch (left, _RET_IP_); +while (left) {unsigned long v; -int chunk =min (nbytes, (int )sizeof (unsigned long )); +int chunk =min_t (int, left,sizeof (unsigned long ));if (!arch_get_random_long (&v))break ;memcpy (p, &v, chunk); p += chunk; - nbytes -= chunk; + left -= chunk; } -if (nbytes) -get_random_bytes (p, nbytes); +return nbytes - left; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes_arch);
include/linux/random.h +1 -1
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf,extern int wait_for_random_bytes (void );extern int add_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy);extern void del_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy); -extern void get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes); +extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes);#ifndef MODULE extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/264 random: add a config option to trust the CPUs hwrng
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 39a8883a2b989d1d21bd8dd99f5557f0c5e89694 upstream.
This gives the user building their own kernel (or a Linux distribution) the option of deciding whether or not to trust the CPU's hardware random number generator (e.g., RDRAND for x86 CPU's) as being correctly implemented and not having a back door introduced (perhaps courtesy of a Nation State's law enforcement or intelligence agencies).
This will prevent getrandom(2) from blocking, if there is a willingness to trust the CPU manufacturer.
--- drivers/char/Kconfig | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/char/random.c | 11 ++++++++++- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/Kconfig +14 -0
@@ -595,3 +595,17 @@ source "drivers/char/xillybus/Kconfig" endmenu +config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU + bool "Trust the CPU manufacturer to initialize Linux's CRNG" + depends on X86 || S390 || PPC + default n + help + Assume that CPU manufacturer (e.g., Intel or AMD for RDSEED or + RDRAND, IBM for the S390 and Power PC architectures) is trustworthy + for the purposes of initializing Linux's CRNG. Since this is not + something that can be independently audited, this amounts to trusting + that CPU manufacturer (perhaps with the insistence or mandate + of a Nation State's intelligence or law enforcement agencies) + has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's + random number generation facilities. +
drivers/char/random.c +10 -1
@@ -783,6 +783,7 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(vstatic void crng_initialize (struct crng_state *crng) {int i; +int arch_init =1 ;unsigned long rv;memcpy (&crng->state[0 ],"expand 32-byte k" ,16 );
@@ -793,10 +794,18 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng__get_random_bytes (&crng->state[4 ],sizeof (__u32) *12 );for (i =4 ; i <16 ; i++) {if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long (&rv)) + !arch_get_random_long (&rv)) { rv =random_get_entropy (); + arch_init =0 ; + } crng->state[i] ^= rv; } +#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU +if (arch_init) { + crng_init =2 ; +pr_notice ("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n" ); + } +#endif crng->init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/264 random: remove preempt disabled region
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
commit b34fbaa9289328c7aec67d2b8b8b7d02bc61c67d upstream.
No need to keep preemption disabled across the whole function.
mix_pool_bytes() uses a spin_lock() to protect the pool and there are other places like write_pool() whhich invoke mix_pool_bytes() without disabling preemption.credit_entropy_bits() is invoked from other places like add_hwgenerator_randomness() without disabling preemption.
Before commit 95b709b6be49 ("random: drop trickle mode") the function used __this_cpu_inc_return() which would require disabled preemption. The preempt_disable() section was added in commit 43d5d3018c37 ("[PATCH] random driver preempt robustness", history tree). It was claimed that the code relied on "vt_ioctl() being called under BKL".
--- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +0 -4
@@ -1189,8 +1189,6 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct } sample;long delta, delta2, delta3; -preempt_disable (); - sample.jiffies = jiffies; sample.cycles =random_get_entropy (); sample.num = num;
@@ -1228,8 +1226,6 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct* and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits. */ credit_entropy_bits (r,min_t (int,fls (delta>>1 ),11 )); - -preempt_enable (); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/264 random: Make crng state queryable
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 9a47249d444d344051c7c0e909fad0e88515a5c2 upstream.
It is very useful to be able to know whether or not get_random_bytes_wait / wait_for_random_bytes is going to block or not, or whether plain get_random_bytes is going to return good randomness or bad randomness.
The particular use case is for mitigating certain attacks in WireGuard. A handshake packet arrives and is queued up. Elsewhere a worker thread takes items from the queue and processes them. In replying to these items, it needs to use some random data, and it has to be good random data. If we simply block until we can have good randomness, then it's possible for an attacker to fill the queue up with packets waiting to be processed. Upon realizing the queue is full, WireGuard will detect that it's under a denial of service attack, and behave accordingly. A better approach is just to drop incoming handshake packets if the crng is not yet initialized.
This patch, therefore, makes that information directly accessible.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ include/linux/random.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
drivers/char/random.c +15 -0
@@ -1722,6 +1722,21 @@ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)EXPORT_SYMBOL (wait_for_random_bytes);/* +* Returns whether or not the urandom pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed +* to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the +* /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32, +* ,u64,int,long} family of functions. +* +* Returns: true if the urandom pool has been seeded. +* false if the urandom pool has not been seeded. +*/ +bool rng_is_initialized (void ) +{ +return crng_ready (); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (rng_is_initialized); + +/* * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking * pool is initialised. *
include/linux/random.h +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(intextern void get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes);extern int wait_for_random_bytes (void ); +extern bool rng_is_initialized (void );extern int add_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy);extern void del_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy);extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/264 random: make CPU trust a boot parameter
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
commit 9b25436662d5fb4c66eb527ead53cab15f596ee0 upstream.
Instead of forcing a distro or other system builder to choose at build time whether the CPU is trusted for CRNG seeding via CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU, provide a boot-time parameter for end users to control the choice. The CONFIG will set the default state instead.
--- Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++++++ drivers/char/Kconfig | 4 ++-- drivers/char/random.c | 11 ++++++++--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt +6 -0
@@ -3577,6 +3577,12 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes ramdisk_size= [RAM] Sizes of RAM disks in kilobytes See Documentation/blockdev/ramdisk.txt. + random.trust_cpu={on,off} + [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of the + CPU's random number generator (if available) to + fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled + by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU. + rcu_nocbs= [KNL] The argument is a cpu list, as described above.
drivers/char/Kconfig +2 -2
@@ -607,5 +607,5 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU that CPU manufacturer (perhaps with the insistence or mandate of a Nation State's intelligence or law enforcement agencies) has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's - random number generation facilities. - + random number generation facilities. This can also be configured + at boot with "random.trust_cpu=on/off".
drivers/char/random.c +8 -3
@@ -780,6 +780,13 @@ static struct crng_state **crng_node_poostatic void invalidate_batched_entropy (void ); +static bool trust_cpu__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU ); +static int __init parse_trust_cpu (char *arg) +{ +return kstrtobool (arg, &trust_cpu); +} +early_param ("random.trust_cpu" , parse_trust_cpu); +static void crng_initialize (struct crng_state *crng) {int i;
@@ -800,12 +807,10 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_ } crng->state[i] ^= rv; } -#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU -if (arch_init) { +if (trust_cpu && arch_init) { crng_init =2 ;pr_notice ("random: crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n" ); } -#endif crng->init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/264 drivers/char/random.c: constify poolinfo_table
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
commit 26e0854ab3310bbeef1ed404a2c87132fc91f8e1 upstream.
Never modified, might as well be put in .rodata.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -1
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28* polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be * irreducible, which we have made here. */ -static struct poolinfo { +static const struct poolinfo { int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits; #define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 37/264 drivers/char/random.c: remove unused stuct poolinfo::poolbits
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
commit 3bd0b5bf7dc3ea02070fcbcd682ecf628269e8ef upstream.
This field is never used, might as well remove it.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +3 -3
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. * -* 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + log2(poolbits)) must <= 31, or the multiply in +* 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. */ #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
@@ -361,8 +361,8 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28* irreducible, which we have made here. */ static const struct poolinfo { -int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolbits, poolfracbits; -#define S (x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x)*32, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) +int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolfracbits; +#define S (x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; } poolinfo_table[] = {/* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/264 random: remove variable limit
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Stephan M�ller" <[email protected]>
commit 43d8a72cd985ca5279a9eb84d61fcbb3ee3d3774 upstream.
The variable limit was used to identify the nonblocking pool's unlimited random number generation. As the nonblocking pool is a thing of the past, remove the limit variable and any conditions around it (i.e. preserve the branches for limit == 1).
--- drivers/char/random.c | 32 ++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +8 -24
@@ -478,7 +478,6 @@ struct entropy_store {int entropy_count;int entropy_total; unsigned int initialized:1; - unsigned int limit:1; unsigned int last_data_init:1;__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE ]; };
@@ -496,7 +495,6 @@ static __u32 blocking_pool_data[OUTPUT_Pstatic struct entropy_store input_pool = { .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0 ], .name ="input" , - .limit =1 , .lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (input_pool.lock), .pool = input_pool_data };
@@ -504,7 +502,6 @@ static struct entropy_store input_pool =static struct entropy_store blocking_pool = { .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[1 ], .name ="blocking" , - .limit =1 , .pull = &input_pool, .lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (blocking_pool.lock), .pool = blocking_pool_data,
@@ -1280,15 +1277,6 @@ static void xfer_secondary_pool(struct e r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits) return; -if (r->limit ==0 && random_min_urandom_seed) { -unsigned long now = jiffies; - -if (time_before (now, - r->last_pulled + random_min_urandom_seed *HZ )) -return ; - r->last_pulled = now; - } -_xfer_secondary_pool (r, nbytes); }
@@ -1296,8 +1284,6 @@ static void _xfer_secondary_pool(struct {__u32 tmp[OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS ]; -/* For /dev/random's pool, always leave two wakeups' worth */ -int rsvd_bytes = r->limit ?0 : random_read_wakeup_bits /4 ;int bytes = nbytes;/* pull at least as much as a wakeup */
@@ -1308,7 +1294,7 @@ static void _xfer_secondary_pool(structtrace_xfer_secondary_pool (r->name, bytes *8 , nbytes *8 ,ENTROPY_BITS (r),ENTROPY_BITS (r->pull)); bytes =extract_entropy (r->pull, tmp, bytes, - random_read_wakeup_bits /8 , rsvd_bytes); + random_read_wakeup_bits /8 ,0 );mix_pool_bytes (r, tmp, bytes);credit_entropy_bits (r, bytes*8 ); }
@@ -1336,7 +1322,7 @@ static void push_to_pool(struct work_strstatic size_t account (struct entropy_store *r,size_t nbytes,int min,int reserved) { -int entropy_count, orig; +int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;size_t ibytes, nfrac;BUG_ON (r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
@@ -1345,14 +1331,12 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_sto retry: entropy_count = orig =ACCESS_ONCE (r->entropy_count); ibytes = nbytes; -/* If limited, never pull more than available */ -if (r->limit) { -int have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 ); - -if ((have_bytes -= reserved) <0 ) - have_bytes =0 ; - ibytes =min_t (size_t, ibytes, have_bytes); - } +/* never pull more than available */ + have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 ); + +if ((have_bytes -= reserved) <0 ) + have_bytes =0 ; + ibytes =min_t (size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);if (ibytes < min) ibytes =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/264 random: fix comment for unused random_min_urandom_seed
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Stephan M�ller" <[email protected]>
commit 5d0e5ea343a0f70351428476bcf8715e0731f26a upstream.
The variable random_min_urandom_seed is not needed any more as it defined the reseeding behavior of the nonblocking pool. Though it is not needed any more, it is left in the code for user space interface compatibility.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -3
@@ -314,9 +314,7 @@ static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64;static int random_write_wakeup_bits =28 *OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS ;/* -* The minimum number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding. We -* do this to limit the amount of entropy that can be drained from the -* input pool even if there are heavy demands on /dev/urandom. +* Variable is currently unused by left for user space compatibility. */ static int random_min_urandom_seed =60 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/264 random: convert get_random_int/long into get_random_u32/u64
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit c440408cf6901eeb2c09563397e24a9097907078 upstream.
Many times, when a user wants a random number, he wants a random number of a guaranteed size. So, thinking of get_random_int and get_random_long in terms of get_random_u32 and get_random_u64 makes it much easier to achieve this. It also makes the code simpler.
On 32-bit platforms, get_random_int and get_random_long are both aliased to get_random_u32. On 64-bit platforms, int->u32 and long->u64.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- include/linux/random.h | 17 +++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +34 -29
@@ -2089,57 +2089,62 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {struct batched_entropy {union { -unsigned long entropy_long[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (unsigned long )]; -unsigned int entropy_int[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (unsigned int )]; +u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u64)]; +u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u32)]; };unsigned int position; };/* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random -* number is good as /dev/urandom, but there is no backtrack protection, with -* the goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. +* number is either as good as RDRAND or as good as /dev/urandom, with the +* goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_long); -unsigned long get_random_long (void ) +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64); +u64 get_random_u64 (void ) { -unsigned long ret; +u64 ret;struct batched_entropy *batch; - batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_long); -if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_long) ==0 ) { -extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_long); +#if BITS_PER_LONG ==64 +if (arch_get_random_long ((unsigned long *)&ret)) +return ret; +#else +if (arch_get_random_long ((unsigned long *)&ret) && +arch_get_random_long ((unsigned long *)&ret +1 )) +return ret; +#endif + + batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u64); +if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u64) ==0 ) { +extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position =0 ; } - ret = batch->entropy_long[batch->position++]; -put_cpu_var (batched_entropy_long); + ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; +put_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u64);return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_long); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_u64); -#if BITS_PER_LONG ==32 -unsigned int get_random_int (void ) -{ -return get_random_long (); -} -#else -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_int); -unsigned int get_random_int (void ) +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32); +u32 get_random_u32 (void ) { -unsigned int ret; +u32 ret;struct batched_entropy *batch; - batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_int); -if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_int) ==0 ) { -extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_int); +if (arch_get_random_int (&ret)) +return ret; + + batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u32); +if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u32) ==0 ) { +extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position =0 ; } - ret = batch->entropy_int[batch->position++]; -put_cpu_var (batched_entropy_int); + ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; +put_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u32);return ret; } -#endif -EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_int); +EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_u32);/** * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
include/linux/random.h +15 -2
@@ -42,8 +42,21 @@ extern void get_random_bytes_arch(void *extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;#endif -unsigned int get_random_int (void ); -unsigned long get_random_long (void ); +u32 get_random_u32 (void ); +u64 get_random_u64 (void ); +static inline unsigned int get_random_int (void ) +{ +return get_random_u32 (); +} +static inline unsigned long get_random_long (void ) +{ +#if BITS_PER_LONG ==64 +return get_random_u64 (); +#else +return get_random_u32 (); +#endif +} +unsigned long randomize_page (unsigned long start,unsigned long range);/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/264 random: move random_min_urandom_seed into CONFIG_SYSCTL ifdef block
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]>
commit db61ffe3a71c697aaa91c42c862a5f7557a0e562 upstream.
Building arm allnodefconfig causes the following build warning:
drivers/char/random.c:318:12: warning: 'random_min_urandom_seed' defined but not used [-Wunused-variable]
Fix the warning by moving 'random_min_urandom_seed' declaration inside the CONFIG_SYSCTL ifdef block, where it is actually used.
While at it, remove the comment prior to the variable declaration.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 6 +----- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -5
@@ -314,11 +314,6 @@ static int random_read_wakeup_bits = 64;static int random_write_wakeup_bits =28 *OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS ;/* -* Variable is currently unused by left for user space compatibility. -*/ -static int random_min_urandom_seed =60 ; - -/* * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords * over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are defined below. They * were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1
@@ -1957,6 +1952,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *static int min_read_thresh =8 , min_write_thresh;static int max_read_thresh =OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS *32 ;static int max_write_thresh =INPUT_POOL_WORDS *32 ; +static int random_min_urandom_seed =60 ;static char sysctl_bootid[16 ];/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/264 random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit b169c13de473a85b3c859bb36216a4cb5f00a54a upstream.
It's possible that get_random_{u32,u64} is used before the crng has initialized, in which case, its output might not be cryptographically secure. For this problem, directly, this patch set is introducing the *_wait variety of functions, but even with that, there's a subtle issue:
what happens to our batched entropy that was generated before initialization. Prior to this commit, it'd stick around, supplying bad numbers. After this commit, we force the entropy to be re-extracted after each phase of the crng has initialized.
In order to avoid a race condition with the position counter, we introduce a simple rwlock for this invalidation. Since it's only during this awkward transition period, after things are all set up, we stop using it, so that it doesn't have an impact on performance.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+)
drivers/char/random.c +37 -0
@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@/* * random.c -- A strong random number generator * +* Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All +* Rights Reserved. +* * Copyright Matt Mackall <[email protected]>, 2003, 2004, 2005 * * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All
@@ -774,6 +777,8 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_initstatic struct crng_state **crng_node_pool__read_mostly ;#endif +static void invalidate_batched_entropy (void ); +static void crng_initialize (struct crng_state *crng) {int i;
@@ -811,6 +816,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; }if (crng_init_cnt >=CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) { +invalidate_batched_entropy (); crng_init =1 ;wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);pr_notice ("random: fast init done\n" );
@@ -900,6 +906,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statWRITE_ONCE (crng->init_time, jiffies);if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init <2 ) {numa_crng_init (); +invalidate_batched_entropy (); crng_init =2 ;process_random_ready_list ();wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);
@@ -2090,6 +2097,7 @@ struct batched_entropy { };unsigned int position; }; +static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lock =__RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED (batched_entropy_reset_lock);/* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
@@ -2100,6 +2108,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entu64 get_random_u64 (void ) {u64 ret; +bool use_lock = crng_init <2 ; +unsigned long flags;struct batched_entropy *batch;#if BITS_PER_LONG ==64
@@ -2112,11 +2122,15 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)#endif batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u64); +if (use_lock) +read_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u64) ==0 ) {extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position =0 ; } ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; +if (use_lock) +read_unlock_irqrestore (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);put_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u64);return ret; }
@@ -2126,22 +2140,45 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entu32 get_random_u32 (void ) {u32 ret; +bool use_lock = crng_init <2 ; +unsigned long flags;struct batched_entropy *batch;if (arch_get_random_int (&ret))return ret; batch = &get_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u32); +if (use_lock) +read_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u32) ==0 ) {extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position =0 ; } ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; +if (use_lock) +read_unlock_irqrestore (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags);put_cpu_var (batched_entropy_u32);return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_u32); +/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might +* be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by +* simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the +* next usage. */ +static void invalidate_batched_entropy (void ) +{ +int cpu; +unsigned long flags; + +write_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); +for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { +per_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position =0 ; +per_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position =0 ; + } +write_unlock_irqrestore (&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); +} +/** * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 4.9.320-rc1 review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.320 release. There are 264 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 25 Jun 2022 16:43:11 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.320-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 4.9.320-rc1
Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
tcp: drop the hash_32() part from the index calculation
Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
tcp: increase source port perturb table to 2^16
Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
tcp: dynamically allocate the perturb table used by source ports
Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
tcp: add small random increments to the source port
Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
tcp: use different parts of the port_offset for index and offset
Willy Tarreau <[email protected]>
secure_seq: use the 64 bits of the siphash for port offset calculation
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: add some entropy in __inet_hash_connect()
Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
tcp: change source port randomizarion at connect() time
Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>
fuse: fix pipe buffer lifetime for direct_io
Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
Reinstate some of "swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE""
Halil Pasic <[email protected]>
swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE
Colin Ian King <[email protected]>
xprtrdma: fix incorrect header size calculations
Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
s390/mm: use non-quiescing sske for KVM switch to keyed guest
James Chapman <[email protected]>
l2tp: fix race in pppol2tp_release with session object destroy
James Chapman <[email protected]>
l2tp: don't use inet_shutdown on ppp session destroy
Zhang Yi <[email protected]>
ext4: add reserved GDT blocks check
Ding Xiang <[email protected]>
ext4: make variable "count" signed
Baokun Li <[email protected]>
ext4: fix bug_on ext4_mb_use_inode_pa
Ilpo Järvinen <[email protected]>
serial: 8250: Store to lsr_save_flags after lsr read
Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>
usb: gadget: lpc32xx_udc: Fix refcount leak in lpc32xx_udc_probe
Robert Eckelmann <[email protected]>
USB: serial: io_ti: add Agilent E5805A support
Slark Xiao <[email protected]>
USB: serial: option: add support for Cinterion MV31 with new baseline
Ian Abbott <[email protected]>
comedi: vmk80xx: fix expression for tx buffer size
zijun_hu <[email protected]>
irqchip/gic-v3: Iterate over possible CPUs by for_each_possible_cpu()
Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>
irqchip/gic/realview: Fix refcount leak in realview_gic_of_init
Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>
misc: atmel-ssc: Fix IRQ check in ssc_probe
Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
pNFS: Don't keep retrying if the server replied NFS4ERR_LAYOUTUNAVAILABLE
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: credit cpu and bootloader seeds by default
Chen Lin <[email protected]>
net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix misuse of mem alloc interface netdev[napi]_alloc_frag
Wang Yufen <[email protected]>
ipv6: Fix signed integer overflow in l2tp_ip6_sendmsg
Xiaohui Zhang <[email protected]>
nfc: nfcmrvl: Fix memory leak in nfcmrvl_play_deferred
chengkaitao <[email protected]>
virtio-mmio: fix missing put_device() when vm_cmdline_parent registration failed
James Smart <[email protected]>
scsi: lpfc: Fix port stuck in bypassed state after LIP in PT2PT topology
Wentao Wang <[email protected]>
scsi: vmw_pvscsi: Expand vcpuHint to 16 bits
Adam Ford <[email protected]>
ASoC: wm8962: Fix suspend while playing music
Sergey Shtylyov <[email protected]>
ata: libata-core: fix NULL pointer deref in ata_host_alloc_pinfo()
Charles Keepax <[email protected]>
ASoC: cs42l56: Correct typo in minimum level for SX volume controls
Charles Keepax <[email protected]>
ASoC: cs42l52: Correct TLV for Bypass Volume
Charles Keepax <[email protected]>
ASoC: cs53l30: Correct number of volume levels on SX controls
Charles Keepax <[email protected]>
ASoC: cs42l52: Fix TLV scales for mixer controls
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: account for arch randomness in bits
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: mark bootloader randomness code as __init
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: avoid checking crng_ready() twice in random_init()
Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>
crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronous
Stephan Müller <[email protected]>
crypto: drbg - always try to free Jitter RNG instance
Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>
crypto: drbg - move dynamic ->reseed_threshold adjustments to __drbg_seed()
Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>
crypto: drbg - track whether DRBG was seeded with !rng_is_initialized()
Nicolai Stange <[email protected]>
crypto: drbg - prepare for more fine-grained tracking of seeding state
Stephan Müller <[email protected]>
crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B compliant noise source
Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
crypto: drbg - add FIPS 140-2 CTRNG for noise source
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Revert "random: use static branch for crng_ready()"
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: check for signals after page of pool writes
Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
random: wire up fops->splice_{read,write}_iter()Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
random: convert to using fops->write_iter()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: move randomize_page() into mm where it belongs
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: move initialization functions out of hot pages
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: use proper return types on get_random_{int,long}_wait()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: remove extern from functions in header
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: use static branch for crng_ready()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: credit architectural init the exact amount
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: handle latent entropy and command line from random_init()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: use proper jiffies comparison macro
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: remove ratelimiting for in-kernel unseeded randomness
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: avoid initializing twice in credit race
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: use symbolic constants for crng_init states
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
siphash: use one source of truth for siphash permutations
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: help compiler out with fast_mix() by using simpler arguments
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: do not use input pool from hard IRQs
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: order timer entropy functions below interrupt functions
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: do not pretend to handle premature next security model
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: do not use batches when !crng_ready()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: insist on random_get_entropy() existing in order to simplify
Yury Norov <[email protected]>
uapi: rename ext2_swab() to swab() and share globally in swab.h
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
xtensa: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
sparc: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
um: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
x86/tsc: Use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
nios2: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
arm: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
mips: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of just c0 random
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
m68k: use fallback for random_get_entropy() instead of zero
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
timekeeping: Add raw clock fallback for random_get_entropy()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
powerpc: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
alpha: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
parisc: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
s390: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
ia64: define get_cycles macro for arch-override
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
init: call time_init() before rand_initialize()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: fix sysctl documentation nits
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: document crng_fast_key_erasure() destination possibility
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: make random_get_entropy() return an unsigned long
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: check for signals every PAGE_SIZE chunk of /dev/[u]random
Jann Horn <[email protected]>
random: check for signal_pending() outside of need_resched() check
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: do not allow user to keep crng key around on stack
Jan Varho <[email protected]>
random: do not split fast init input in add_hwgenerator_randomness()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: mix build-time latent entropy into pool at init
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: re-add removed comment about get_random_{u32,u64} reseeding
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: treat bootloader trust toggle the same way as cpu trust toggle
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: skip fast_init if hwrng provides large chunk of entropy
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: check for signal and try earlier when generating entropy
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: reseed more often immediately after booting
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: make consistent usage of crng_ready()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: use SipHash as interrupt entropy accumulator
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: replace custom notifier chain with standard one
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: don't let 644 read-only sysctls be written to
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: give sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed a more sensible value
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: do crng pre-init loading in worker rather than irq
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: unify cycles_t and jiffies usage and types
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: cleanup UUID handling
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: only wake up writers after zap if threshold was passed
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: round-robin registers as ulong, not u32
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: clear fast pool, crng, and batches in cpuhp bring up
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: pull add_hwgenerator_randomness() declaration into random.h
Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
hwrng: remember rng chosen by user
Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
hwrng: use rng source with best quality
Corentin LABBE <[email protected]>
hwrng: core - remove unused PFX macro
Corentin LABBE <[email protected]>
hwrng: core - Move hwrng miscdev minor number to include/linux/miscdevice.h
Corentin LABBE <[email protected]>
hwrng: core - Rewrite the header
Corentin LABBE <[email protected]>
hwrng: core - rewrite better comparison to NULL
Corentin LABBE <[email protected]>
hwrng: core - do not use multiple blank lines
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: unify early init crng load accounting
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: do not take pool spinlock at boot
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: defer fast pool mixing to worker
Tejun Heo <[email protected]>
workqueue: make workqueue available early during boot
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: rewrite header introductory comment
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: group sysctl functions
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: group userspace read/write functions
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: group entropy collection functions
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: group entropy extraction functions
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: group initialization wait functions
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: remove whitespace and reorder includes
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: remove useless header comment
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: introduce drain_entropy() helper to declutter crng_reseed()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: deobfuscate irq u32/u64 contributions
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: add proper SPDX header
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: remove unused tracepoints
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: remove ifdef'd out interrupt bench
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: tie batched entropy generation to base_crng generation
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: use hash function for crng_slow_load()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: inline leaves of rand_initialize()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction
Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
random: fix locking in crng_fast_load()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: remove batched entropy locking
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: make credit_entropy_bits() always safe
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: simplify entropy debiting
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: use computational hash for entropy extraction
Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng
Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer
Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
random: continually use hwgenerator randomness
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: access input_pool_data directly rather than through pointer
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global
Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
random: try to actively add entropy rather than passively wait for it
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: remove incomplete last_data logic
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: cleanup integer types
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: chacha20 - Fix chacha20_block() keystream alignment (again)
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction
Schspa Shi <[email protected]>
random: fix typo in comments
Jann Horn <[email protected]>
random: don't reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read()
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction
Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
random: early initialization of ChaCha constants
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
random: initialize ChaCha20 constants with correct endianness
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs
Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
random: harmonize "crng init done" messages
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: mix bootloader randomness into pool
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness()
Mark Brown <[email protected]>
random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h>
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool
Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness
Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
random: add arch_get_random_*long_early()
Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
powerpc: Use bool in archrandom.h
Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
linux/random.h: Mark CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM functions __must_check
Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
linux/random.h: Use false with bool
Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
linux/random.h: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed
Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
powerpc: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed
Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
x86: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed
Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
random: avoid warnings for !CONFIG_NUMA builds
Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
random: split primary/secondary crng init paths
Yangtao Li <[email protected]>
random: remove some dead code of poolinfo
Yangtao Li <[email protected]>
random: fix typo in add_timer_randomness()
Yangtao Li <[email protected]>
random: Add and use pr_fmt()
Yangtao Li <[email protected]>
random: convert to ENTROPY_BITS for better code readability
Yangtao Li <[email protected]>
random: remove unnecessary unlikely()
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
random: remove kernel.random.read_wakeup_threshold
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
random: delete code to pull data into pools
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
random: remove the blocking pool
Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
random: fix crash on multiple early calls to add_bootloader_randomness()
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
random: make /dev/random be almost like /dev/urandom
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
random: ignore GRND_RANDOM in getentropy(2)
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
random: add GRND_INSECURE to return best-effort non-cryptographic bytes
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
random: Add a urandom_read_nowait() for random APIs that don't warn
Andy Lutomirski <[email protected]>
random: Don't wake crng_init_wait when crng_init == 1
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
lib/crypto: sha1: re-roll loops to reduce code size
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
lib/crypto: blake2s: move hmac construction into wireguard
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
crypto: blake2s - generic C library implementation and selftest
Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
crypto: Deduplicate le32_to_cpu_array() and cpu_to_le32_array()
Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Revert "hwrng: core - Freeze khwrng thread during suspend"
Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
char/random: Add a newline at the end of the file
Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
random: Use wait_event_freezable() in add_hwgenerator_randomness()
Hsin-Yi Wang <[email protected]>
fdt: add support for rng-seed
Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
random: Support freezable kthreads in add_hwgenerator_randomness()
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: fix soft lockup when trying to read from an uninitialized blocking pool
Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
latent_entropy: avoid build error when plugin cflags are not set
George Spelvin <[email protected]>
random: document get_random_int() family
Kees Cook <[email protected]>
random: move rand_initialize() earlier
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: only read from /dev/random after its pool has received 128 bits
Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
drivers/char/random.c: make primary_crng static
Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
drivers/char/random.c: remove unused stuct poolinfo::poolbits
Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
drivers/char/random.c: constify poolinfo_table
Kees Cook <[email protected]>
random: make CPU trust a boot parameter
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: Make crng state queryable
Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
random: remove preempt disabled region
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: add a config option to trust the CPU's hwrng
Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>
random: Return nbytes filled from hw RNG
Tobin C. Harding <[email protected]>
random: Fix whitespace pre random-bytes work
Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
drivers/char/random.c: remove unused dont_count_entropy
Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
random: optimize add_interrupt_randomness
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: always fill buffer in get_random_bytes_wait
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for chacha20_block()
Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
random: fix data race on crng_node_pool
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: always use batched entropy for get_random_u{32,64}Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Revert "char/random: silence a lockdep splat with printk()"
Sergey Senozhatsky <[email protected]>
char/random: silence a lockdep splat with printk()
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
random: add a spinlock_t to struct batched_entropy
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: rate limit unseeded randomness warnings
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: fix possible sleeping allocation from irq context
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: use a different mixing algorithm for add_device_randomness()
Helge Deller <[email protected]>
random: fix warning message on ia64 and parisc
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX
Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness
Kees Cook <[email protected]>
random: do not ignore early device randomness
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: silence compiler warnings and fix race
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init
Fabio Estevam <[email protected]>
random: move random_min_urandom_seed into CONFIG_SYSCTL ifdef block
Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
random: convert get_random_int/long into get_random_u32/u64
Stephan Müller <[email protected]>
random: fix comment for unused random_min_urandom_seed
Stephan Müller <[email protected]>
random: remove variable limit
Stephan Müller <[email protected]>
random: remove stale urandom_init_wait
Stephan Mueller <[email protected]>
random: remove stale maybe_reseed_primary_crng
Al Viro <[email protected]>
9p: missing chunk of "fs/9p: Don't update file type when updating file attributes"
-------------
Diffstat:
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 + Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 35 +- MAINTAINERS | 1 + Makefile | 4 +- arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h | 2 +- arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h | 17 +- arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h | 3 + arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h | 3 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 27 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h | 1 + arch/s390/mm/pgtable.c | 2 +- arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h | 4 +- arch/um/include/asm/timex.h | 9 +- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 12 +- arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h | 9 + arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h | 7 +- arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h | 6 +- crypto/chacha20_generic.c | 3 +- crypto/drbg.c | 220 +- crypto/md4.c | 17 - crypto/md5.c | 17 - drivers/ata/libata-core.c | 4 +- drivers/char/Kconfig | 38 +- drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 93 +- drivers/char/random.c | 2891 ++++++++++----------------- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 2 +- drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-realview.c | 1 + drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3.c | 8 +- drivers/misc/atmel-ssc.c | 4 +- drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c | 21 +- drivers/nfc/nfcmrvl/usb.c | 16 +- drivers/of/fdt.c | 14 +- drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_nportdisc.c | 3 +- drivers/scsi/vmw_pvscsi.h | 4 +- drivers/staging/comedi/drivers/vmk80xx.c | 2 +- drivers/tty/serial/8250/8250_port.c | 2 + drivers/usb/gadget/udc/lpc32xx_udc.c | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/io_ti.c | 2 + drivers/usb/serial/io_usbvend.h | 1 + drivers/usb/serial/option.c | 6 + drivers/virtio/virtio_mmio.c | 1 + fs/9p/vfs_inode_dotl.c | 10 +- fs/ext4/mballoc.c | 9 + fs/ext4/namei.c | 3 +- fs/ext4/resize.c | 10 + fs/fuse/dev.c | 12 +- fs/fuse/file.c | 1 + fs/fuse/fuse_i.h | 2 + fs/nfs/pnfs.c | 6 + include/crypto/blake2s.h | 102 + include/crypto/chacha20.h | 17 +- include/crypto/drbg.h | 18 +- include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h | 19 + include/linux/byteorder/generic.h | 17 + include/linux/cpuhotplug.h | 2 + include/linux/hw_random.h | 2 - include/linux/miscdevice.h | 1 + include/linux/mm.h | 2 + include/linux/net.h | 2 + include/linux/once.h | 2 + include/linux/prandom.h | 23 +- include/linux/random.h | 133 +- include/linux/siphash.h | 28 + include/linux/swab.h | 1 + include/linux/timex.h | 10 +- include/linux/uuid.h | 1 + include/linux/workqueue.h | 7 +- include/net/inet_hashtables.h | 2 +- include/net/secure_seq.h | 4 +- include/trace/events/random.h | 315 --- include/uapi/linux/random.h | 4 +- include/uapi/linux/swab.h | 10 + init/main.c | 22 + kernel/cpu.c | 11 + kernel/irq/handle.c | 2 +- kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 16 + kernel/workqueue.c | 76 +- lib/Kconfig.debug | 27 + lib/Makefile | 2 + lib/chacha20.c | 6 +- lib/crypto/Makefile | 7 + lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c | 111 + lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c | 591 ++++++ lib/crypto/blake2s.c | 78 + lib/find_bit.c | 16 +- lib/random32.c | 15 +- lib/sha1.c | 95 +- lib/siphash.c | 32 +- lib/swiotlb.c | 11 +- mm/util.c | 33 + net/core/secure_seq.c | 4 +- net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c | 46 +- net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c | 4 +- net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c | 5 +- net/l2tp/l2tp_ppp.c | 60 +- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/rpc_rdma.c | 4 +- sound/soc/codecs/cs42l52.c | 8 +- sound/soc/codecs/cs42l56.c | 4 +- sound/soc/codecs/cs53l30.c | 16 +- sound/soc/codecs/wm8962.c | 1 + 104 files changed, 2966 insertions(+), 2641 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 39/264 random: only read from /dev/random after its pool has received 128 bits
From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit eb9d1bf079bb438d1a066d72337092935fc770f6 upstream.
Immediately after boot, we allow reads from /dev/random before its entropy pool has been fully initialized. Fix this so that we don't allow this until the blocking pool has received 128 bits.
We do this by repurposing the initialized flag in the entropy pool struct, and use the initialized flag in the blocking pool to indicate whether it is safe to pull from the blocking pool.
To do this, we needed to rework when we decide to push entropy from the input pool to the blocking pool, since the initialized flag for the input pool was used for this purpose. To simplify things, we no longer use the initialized flag for that purpose, nor do we use the entropy_total field any more.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- include/trace/events/random.h | 13 ++++-------- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +22 -22
@@ -472,7 +472,6 @@ struct entropy_store {unsigned short add_ptr;unsigned short input_rotate;int entropy_count; -int entropy_total; unsigned int initialized:1; unsigned int last_data_init:1;__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE ];
@@ -645,7 +644,7 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vo*/ static void credit_entropy_bits (struct entropy_store *r,int nbits) { -int entropy_count, orig; +int entropy_count, orig, has_initialized =0 ;const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;int nfrac = nbits <<ENTROPY_SHIFT ;
@@ -700,23 +699,25 @@ retry: entropy_count =0 ; }else if (entropy_count > pool_size) entropy_count = pool_size; +if ((r == &blocking_pool) && !r->initialized && + (entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT ) >128 ) + has_initialized =1 ;if (cmpxchg (&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; - r->entropy_total += nbits; -if (!r->initialized && r->entropy_total >128 ) { +if (has_initialized) r->initialized =1 ; - r->entropy_total =0 ; - }trace_credit_entropy_bits (r->name, nbits, - entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT , - r->entropy_total, _RET_IP_); + entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT , _RET_IP_);if (r == &input_pool) {int entropy_bits = entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT ; +struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool; -if (crng_init <2 && entropy_bits >=128 ) { +if (crng_init <2 ) { +if (entropy_bits <128 ) +return ;crng_reseed (&primary_crng, r); entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT ; }
@@ -727,20 +728,14 @@ retry:wake_up_interruptible (&random_read_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN ); } -/* If the input pool is getting full, send some -* entropy to the blocking pool until it is 75% full. +/* If the input pool is getting full, and the blocking +* pool has room, send some entropy to the blocking +* pool. */ -if (entropy_bits > random_write_wakeup_bits && - r->initialized && - r->entropy_total >=2 *random_read_wakeup_bits) { -struct entropy_store *other = &blocking_pool; - -if (other->entropy_count <= -3 * other->poolinfo->poolfracbits /4 ) { -schedule_work (&other->push_work); - r->entropy_total =0 ; - } - } +if (!work_pending (&other->push_work) && + (ENTROPY_BITS (r) >6 * r->poolinfo->poolbytes) && + (ENTROPY_BITS (other) <=6 * other->poolinfo->poolbytes)) +schedule_work (&other->push_work); } }
@@ -1612,6 +1607,11 @@ static ssize_t extract_entropy_user(struint large_request = (nbytes >256 );trace_extract_entropy_user (r->name, nbytes,ENTROPY_BITS (r), _RET_IP_); +if (!r->initialized && r->pull) { +xfer_secondary_pool (r,ENTROPY_BITS (r->pull)/8 ); +if (!r->initialized) +return 0 ; + }xfer_secondary_pool (r, nbytes); nbytes =account (r, nbytes,0 ,0 );
include/trace/events/random.h +5 -8
@@ -61,15 +61,14 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits, TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count, - int entropy_total, unsigned long IP), + unsigned long IP), - TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, entropy_total, IP), + TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, IP), TP_STRUCT__entry( __field( const char *, pool_name ) __field( int, bits ) __field( int, entropy_count ) - __field( int, entropy_total ) __field(unsigned long, IP ) ),
@@ -77,14 +76,12 @@ TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits, __entry->pool_name = pool_name; __entry->bits = bits; __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count; - __entry->entropy_total = entropy_total; __entry->IP =IP ; ), -TP_printk ("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d entropy_total %d " -"caller %pS" , __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits, - __entry->entropy_count, __entry->entropy_total, - (void *)__entry->IP) +TP_printk ("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS" , + __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits, + __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) ); TRACE_EVENT(push_to_pool,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/264 random: silence compiler warnings and fix race
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 4a072c71f49b0a0e495ea13423bdb850da73c58c upstream.
Odd versions of gcc for the sh4 architecture will actually warn about flags being used while uninitialized, so we set them to zero. Non crazy gccs will optimize that out again, so it doesn't make a difference.
Next, over aggressive gccs could inline the expression that defines use_lock, which could then introduce a race resulting in a lock imbalance. By using READ_ONCE, we prevent that fate. Finally, we make that assignment const, so that gcc can still optimize a nice amount.
Finally, we fix a potential deadlock between primary_crng.lock and batched_entropy_reset_lock, where they could be called in opposite order. Moving the call to invalidate_batched_entropy to outside the lock rectifies this issue.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +6 -6
@@ -815,13 +815,13 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp p[crng_init_cnt %CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ] ^= *cp; cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; } +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags);if (crng_init_cnt >=CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) {invalidate_batched_entropy (); crng_init =1 ;wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);pr_notice ("random: fast init done\n" ); } -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags);return 1 ; }
@@ -904,6 +904,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat }memzero_explicit (&buf,sizeof (buf));WRITE_ONCE (crng->init_time, jiffies); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags);if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init <2 ) {numa_crng_init ();invalidate_batched_entropy ();
@@ -924,7 +925,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat urandom_warning.missed =0 ; } } -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); }static inline void crng_wait_ready (void )
@@ -2108,8 +2108,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entu64 get_random_u64 (void ) {u64 ret; -bool use_lock = crng_init <2 ; -unsigned long flags; +bool use_lock =READ_ONCE (crng_init) <2 ; +unsigned long flags =0 ;struct batched_entropy *batch;#if BITS_PER_LONG ==64
@@ -2140,8 +2140,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entu32 get_random_u32 (void ) {u32 ret; -bool use_lock = crng_init <2 ; -unsigned long flags; +bool use_lock =READ_ONCE (crng_init) <2 ; +unsigned long flags =0 ;struct batched_entropy *batch;if (arch_get_random_int (&ret))
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 48/264 Revert "hwrng: core - Freeze khwrng thread during suspend"
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
commit 08e97aec700aeff54c4847f170e566cbd7e14e81 upstream.
This reverts commit 03a3bb7ae631 ("hwrng: core - Freeze khwrng thread during suspend"), ff296293b353 ("random: Support freezable kthreads in add_hwgenerator_randomness()") and 59b569480dc8 ("random:
Use wait_event_freezable() in add_hwgenerator_randomness()").
These patches introduced regressions and we need more time to get them ready for mainline.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -3
@@ -327,7 +327,6 @@#include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/cryptohash.h> #include <linux/fips.h> -#include <linux/freezer.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/kmemcheck.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h>
@@ -2484,8 +2483,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch* We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. */ -wait_event_freezable (random_write_wait, -kthread_should_stop () || +wait_event_interruptible (random_write_wait,kthread_should_stop () ||ENTROPY_BITS (&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits);mix_pool_bytes (poolp, buffer, count);credit_entropy_bits (poolp, entropy);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 82/264 random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[email protected]>
commit 703f7066f40599c290babdb79dd61319264987e9 upstream.
Since commit
ee3e00e9e7101 ("random: use registers from interrupted code for CPU's w/o a cycle counter")
the irq_flags argument is no longer used.
Remove unused irq_flags.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ++-- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 2 +- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- kernel/irq/handle.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +2 -2
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@* void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, * unsigned int value); -* void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags); +* void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, * size_t entropy);
@@ -1323,7 +1323,7 @@ static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *freturn *ptr; } -void add_interrupt_randomness (int irq,int irq_flags) +void add_interrupt_randomness (int irq) {struct entropy_store *r;struct fast_pool *fast_pool =this_cpu_ptr (&irq_randomness);
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +1 -1
@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void)tasklet_schedule (hv_context.msg_dpc[cpu]); } -add_interrupt_randomness (HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR ,0 ); +add_interrupt_randomness (HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR ); }
include/linux/random.h +1 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline void add_latent_entropy(vo extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; -extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy; +extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;extern void get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes);extern int wait_for_random_bytes (void );
kernel/irq/handle.c +1 -1
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_irq_event_percpu(stru retval =__handle_irq_event_percpu (desc, &flags); -add_interrupt_randomness (desc->irq_data.irq, flags); +add_interrupt_randomness (desc->irq_data.irq);if (!noirqdebug)note_interrupt (desc, retval);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 88/264 random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 7b87324112df2e1f9b395217361626362dcfb9fb upstream.
Rather than an awkward combination of ifdefs and __maybe_unused, we can ensure more source gets parsed, regardless of the configuration, by using IS_ENABLED for the CONFIG_NUMA conditional code. This makes things cleaner and easier to follow.
I've confirmed that on !CONFIG_NUMA, we don't wind up with excess code by accident; the generated object file is the same.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 32 ++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +12 -20
@@ -762,7 +762,6 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(strustatic DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (crng_init_wait); -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA /* * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost
@@ -770,7 +769,6 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init* their brain damage. */ static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool__read_mostly ; -#endif static void invalidate_batched_entropy (void );
@@ -817,7 +815,7 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_eareturn arch_init; } -static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary (struct crng_state *crng) +static void crng_initialize_secondary (struct crng_state *crng) {memcpy (&crng->state[0 ],"expand 32-byte k" ,16 );_get_random_bytes (&crng->state[4 ],sizeof (__u32) *12 );
@@ -868,7 +866,6 @@ static void crng_finalize_init(struct cr } } -#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA static void do_numa_crng_init (struct work_struct *work) {int i;
@@ -895,29 +892,24 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work,static void numa_crng_init (void ) { -schedule_work (&numa_crng_init_work); +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NUMA )) +schedule_work (&numa_crng_init_work); }static struct crng_state *select_crng (void ) { -struct crng_state **pool; -int nid =numa_node_id (); - -/* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */ - pool =READ_ONCE (crng_node_pool); -if (pool && pool[nid]) -return pool[nid]; - -return &primary_crng; -} -#else -static void numa_crng_init (void ) {} +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NUMA )) { +struct crng_state **pool; +int nid =numa_node_id (); + +/* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */ + pool =READ_ONCE (crng_node_pool); +if (pool && pool[nid]) +return pool[nid]; + } -static struct crng_state *select_crng (void ) -{return &primary_crng; } -#endif /* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 90/264 random: early initialization of ChaCha constants
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
commit 96562f286884e2db89c74215b199a1084b5fb7f7 upstream.
Previously, the ChaCha constants for the primary pool were only initialized in crng_initialize_primary(), called by rand_initialize(). However, some randomness is actually extracted from the primary pool beforehand, e.g. by kmem_cache_create(). Therefore, statically initialize the ChaCha constants for the primary pool.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 5 ++++- include/crypto/chacha20.h | 15 +++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +4 -1
@@ -459,6 +459,10 @@ struct crng_state {static struct crng_state primary_crng = { .lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (primary_crng.lock), + .state[0 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA , + .state[1 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 , + .state[2 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY , + .state[3 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K , };/*
@@ -825,7 +829,6 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(ststatic void __init crng_initialize_primary (struct crng_state *crng) { -chacha_init_consts (crng->state);_extract_entropy (&input_pool, &crng->state[4 ],sizeof (__u32) *12 ,0 );if (crng_init_try_arch_early (crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) {invalidate_batched_entropy ();
include/crypto/chacha20.h +11 -4
@@ -24,12 +24,19 @@ int crypto_chacha20_setkey(struct cryptoint crypto_chacha20_crypt (struct blkcipher_desc *desc,struct scatterlist *dst,struct scatterlist *src,unsigned int nbytes); +enum chacha_constants {/* expand 32-byte k */ +CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA =0x61707865U , +CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 =0x3320646eU , +CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY =0x79622d32U , +CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K =0x6b206574U +}; +static inline void chacha_init_consts (u32 *state) { - state[0 ] =0x61707865 ;/* "expa" */ - state[1 ] =0x3320646e ;/* "nd 3" */ - state[2 ] =0x79622d32 ;/* "2-by" */ - state[3 ] =0x6b206574 ;/* "te k" */ + state[0 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA ; + state[1 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 ; + state[2 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY ; + state[3 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K ; }#endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 118/264 random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 28f425e573e906a4c15f8392cc2b1561ef448595 upstream.
When /dev/random was directly connected with entropy extraction, without any expansion stage, extract_buf() was called for every 10 bytes of data read from /dev/random. For that reason, RDRAND was used rather than RDSEED. At the same time, crng_reseed() was still only called every 5 minutes, so there RDSEED made sense.
Those olden days were also a time when the entropy collector did not use a cryptographic hash function, which meant most bets were off in terms of real preimage resistance. For that reason too it didn't matter _that_ much whether RDSEED was mixed in before or after entropy extraction; both choices were sort of bad.
But now we have a cryptographic hash function at work, and with that we get real preimage resistance. We also now only call extract_entropy() every 5 minutes, rather than every 10 bytes. This allows us to do two important things.
First, we can switch to using RDSEED in extract_entropy(), as Dominik suggested. Second, we can ensure that RDSEED input always goes into the cryptographic hash function with other things before being used directly. This eliminates a category of attacks in which the CPU knows the current state of the crng and knows that we're going to xor RDSEED into it, and so it computes a malicious RDSEED. By going through our hash function, it would require the CPU to compute a preimage on the fly, which isn't going to happen.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 246 ++++++++++++-------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 62 insertions(+), 184 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +62 -184
@@ -324,14 +324,11 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng =* its value (from 0->1->2). */ static int crng_init =0 ; -static bool crng_need_final_init = false;#define crng_ready () (likely(crng_init > 1))static int crng_init_cnt =0 ; -static unsigned long crng_global_init_time =0 ;#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) -static void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng,u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]); -static void _crng_backtrack_protect (struct crng_state *crng, -u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used); +static void extract_crng (u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]); +static void crng_backtrack_protect (u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used);static void process_random_ready_list (void );static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes);
@@ -366,7 +363,7 @@ static struct {static void extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes); -static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng); +static void crng_reseed (void );/* * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
@@ -465,7 +462,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbittrace_credit_entropy_bits (nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_);if (crng_init <2 && entropy_count >=POOL_MIN_BITS ) -crng_reseed (&primary_crng); +crng_reseed (); }/*********************************************************************
@@ -478,14 +475,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbitstatic DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (crng_init_wait); -/* -* Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying -* to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost -* certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around -* their brain damage. -*/ -static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool__read_mostly ; -static void invalidate_batched_entropy (void );static bool trust_cpu__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU );
@@ -495,24 +484,6 @@ static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char * }early_param ("random.trust_cpu" , parse_trust_cpu); -static bool crng_init_try_arch (struct crng_state *crng) -{ -int i; -bool arch_init = true; -unsigned long rv; - -for (i =4 ; i <16 ; i++) { -if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long (&rv)) { - rv =random_get_entropy (); - arch_init = false; - } - crng->state[i] ^= rv; - } - -return arch_init; -} -static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early (void ) {int i;
@@ -531,100 +502,17 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_eareturn arch_init; } -static void crng_initialize_secondary (struct crng_state *crng) -{ -chacha_init_consts (crng->state); -_get_random_bytes (&crng->state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 ); -crng_init_try_arch (crng); - crng->init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; -} - -static void __init crng_initialize_primary (void ) +static void __init crng_initialize (void ) {extract_entropy (&primary_crng.state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 );if (crng_init_try_arch_early () && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) {invalidate_batched_entropy (); -numa_crng_init (); crng_init =2 ;pr_notice ("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n" ); } primary_crng.init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; } -static void crng_finalize_init (void ) -{ -if (!system_wq) { -/* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues, -* so mark this for processing later. */ - crng_need_final_init = true; -return ; - } - -invalidate_batched_entropy (); -numa_crng_init (); - crng_init =2 ; - crng_need_final_init = false; -process_random_ready_list (); -wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait); -kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN ); -pr_notice ("crng init done\n" ); -if (unseeded_warning.missed) { -pr_notice ("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n" , - unseeded_warning.missed); - unseeded_warning.missed =0 ; - } -if (urandom_warning.missed) { -pr_notice ("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n" , - urandom_warning.missed); - urandom_warning.missed =0 ; - } -} - -static void do_numa_crng_init (struct work_struct *work) -{ -int i; -struct crng_state *crng; -struct crng_state **pool; - - pool =kcalloc (nr_node_ids,sizeof (*pool),GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL); -for_each_online_node (i) { - crng =kmalloc_node (sizeof (struct crng_state ), -GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i); -spin_lock_init (&crng->lock); -crng_initialize_secondary (crng); - pool[i] = crng; - } -/* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */ -if (cmpxchg_release (&crng_node_pool,NULL , pool) !=NULL ) { -for_each_node (i) -kfree (pool[i]); -kfree (pool); - } -} - -static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init); - -static void numa_crng_init (void ) -{ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NUMA )) -schedule_work (&numa_crng_init_work); -} - -static struct crng_state *select_crng (void ) -{ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NUMA )) { -struct crng_state **pool; -int nid =numa_node_id (); - -/* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */ - pool =READ_ONCE (crng_node_pool); -if (pool && pool[nid]) -return pool[nid]; - } - -return &primary_crng; -} -/* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
@@ -753,73 +641,71 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp,return 1 ; } -static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng) +static void crng_reseed (void ) {unsigned long flags; -int i; +int i, entropy_count;union {u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ];u32 key[8 ]; } buf; -if (crng == &primary_crng) { -int entropy_count; -do { - entropy_count =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count); -if (entropy_count <POOL_MIN_BITS ) -return ; - }while (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count,0 ) != entropy_count); -extract_entropy (buf.key,sizeof (buf.key)); -wake_up_interruptible (&random_write_wait); -kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_OUT ); - }else { -_extract_crng (&primary_crng, buf.block); -_crng_backtrack_protect (&primary_crng, buf.block, -CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ); - } -spin_lock_irqsave (&crng->lock, flags); -for (i =0 ; i <8 ; i++) { -unsigned long rv; -if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long (&rv)) - rv =random_get_entropy (); - crng->state[i +4 ] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv; - } +do { + entropy_count =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count); +if (entropy_count <POOL_MIN_BITS ) +return ; + }while (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count,0 ) != entropy_count); +extract_entropy (buf.key,sizeof (buf.key)); +wake_up_interruptible (&random_write_wait); +kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_OUT ); + +spin_lock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +for (i =0 ; i <8 ; i++) + primary_crng.state[i +4 ] ^= buf.key[i];memzero_explicit (&buf,sizeof (buf)); -WRITE_ONCE (crng->init_time, jiffies); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); -if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init <2 ) -crng_finalize_init (); +WRITE_ONCE (primary_crng.init_time, jiffies); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +if (crng_init <2 ) { +invalidate_batched_entropy (); + crng_init =2 ; +process_random_ready_list (); +wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait); +kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN ); +pr_notice ("crng init done\n" ); +if (unseeded_warning.missed) { +pr_notice ("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n" , + unseeded_warning.missed); + unseeded_warning.missed =0 ; + } +if (urandom_warning.missed) { +pr_notice ("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n" , + urandom_warning.missed); + urandom_warning.missed =0 ; + } + } } -static void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng,u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) +static void extract_crng (u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) {unsigned long flags, init_time;if (crng_ready ()) { - init_time =READ_ONCE (crng->init_time); -if (time_after (READ_ONCE (crng_global_init_time), init_time) || -time_after (jiffies, init_time +CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL )) -crng_reseed (crng); - } -spin_lock_irqsave (&crng->lock, flags); -chacha20_block (&crng->state[0 ], out); -if (crng->state[12 ] ==0 ) - crng->state[13 ]++; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); -} - -static void extract_crng (u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) -{ -_extract_crng (select_crng (), out); + init_time =READ_ONCE (primary_crng.init_time); +if (time_after (jiffies, init_time +CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL )) +crng_reseed (); + } +spin_lock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +chacha20_block (&primary_crng.state[0 ], out); +if (primary_crng.state[12 ] ==0 ) + primary_crng.state[13 ]++; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); }/* * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. */ -static void _crng_backtrack_protect (struct crng_state *crng, -u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) +static void crng_backtrack_protect (u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) {unsigned long flags;u32 *s, *d;
@@ -830,17 +716,12 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struextract_crng (tmp); used =0 ; } -spin_lock_irqsave (&crng->lock, flags); +spin_lock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags); s = (u32 *)&tmp[used]; - d = &crng->state[4 ]; + d = &primary_crng.state[4 ];for (i =0 ; i <8 ; i++) *d++ ^= *s++; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); -} - -static void crng_backtrack_protect (u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) -{ -_crng_backtrack_protect (select_crng (), tmp, used); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); }static ssize_t extract_crng_user (void __user *buf,size_t nbytes)
@@ -1105,16 +986,17 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, sunsigned long flags;u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ];struct { -unsigned long rdrand[32 /sizeof (long )]; +unsigned long rdseed[32 /sizeof (long )];size_t counter; } block;size_t i;trace_extract_entropy (nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count); -for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (block.rdrand); ++i) { -if (!arch_get_random_long (&block.rdrand[i])) - block.rdrand[i] =random_get_entropy (); +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (block.rdseed); ++i) { +if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&block.rdseed[i]) && + !arch_get_random_long (&block.rdseed[i])) + block.rdseed[i] =random_get_entropy (); }spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags);
@@ -1122,7 +1004,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s/* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */ blake2s_final (&input_pool.hash, seed); -/* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || 0) */ +/* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */ block.counter =0 ;blake2s (next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed,sizeof (next_key),sizeof (block),sizeof (seed));blake2s_init_key (&input_pool.hash,BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE , next_key,sizeof (next_key));
@@ -1132,7 +1014,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, swhile (nbytes) { i =min_t (size_t, nbytes,BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ); -/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDRAND || ++counter) */ +/* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */ ++block.counter;blake2s (buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i,sizeof (block),sizeof (seed)); nbytes -= i;
@@ -1426,10 +1308,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(void)int __init rand_initialize (void ) {init_std_data (); -if (crng_need_final_init) -crng_finalize_init (); -crng_initialize_primary (); - crng_global_init_time = jiffies; +crng_initialize ();if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval =0 ; unseeded_warning.interval =0 ;
@@ -1599,8 +1478,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,return -EPERM ;if (crng_init <2 )return -ENODATA ; -crng_reseed (&primary_crng); -WRITE_ONCE (crng_global_init_time, jiffies -1 ); +crng_reseed ();return 0 ;default :return -EINVAL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 103/264 random: prepend remaining pool constants with POOL_
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit b3d51c1f542113342ddfbf6007e38a684b9dbec9 upstream.
The other pool constants are prepended with POOL_, but not these last ones. Rename them. This will then let us move them into the enum in the following commit.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +20 -20
@@ -363,11 +363,11 @@* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. * -* 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in +* 2*(POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. */ -#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 -#define ENTROPY_BITS () (input_pool.entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) +#define POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 +#define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS () (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT)/* * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ enum poolinfo {POOL_BYTES =POOL_WORDS *sizeof (u32),POOL_BITS =POOL_BYTES *8 ,POOL_BITSHIFT =ilog2 (POOL_WORDS ) +5 , -POOL_FRACBITS =POOL_WORDS << (ENTROPY_SHIFT +5 ), +POOL_FRACBITS =POOL_WORDS << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +5 ),/* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ POOL_TAP1 = 104,
@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vostatic void credit_entropy_bits (int nbits) {int entropy_count, entropy_bits, orig; -int nfrac = nbits <<ENTROPY_SHIFT ; +int nfrac = nbits <<POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT ;if (!nbits)return ;
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ retry:* turns no matter how large nbits is. */ int pnfrac = nfrac; -const int s =POOL_BITSHIFT +ENTROPY_SHIFT +2 ; +const int s =POOL_BITSHIFT +POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +2 ;/* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ do {
@@ -705,9 +705,9 @@ retry:if (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; -trace_credit_entropy_bits (nbits, entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT , _RET_IP_); +trace_credit_entropy_bits (nbits, entropy_count >>POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT , _RET_IP_); - entropy_bits = entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT ; + entropy_bits = entropy_count >>POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT ;if (crng_init <2 && entropy_bits >=128 )crng_reseed (&primary_crng, true); }
@@ -1238,7 +1238,7 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int t last_value = value;add_timer_randomness (&input_timer_state, (type <<4 ) ^ code ^ (code >>4 ) ^ value); -trace_add_input_randomness (ENTROPY_BITS ()); +trace_add_input_randomness (POOL_ENTROPY_BITS ()); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_input_randomness);
@@ -1337,7 +1337,7 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendiskreturn ;/* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ add_timer_randomness (disk->random,0x100 +disk_devt (disk)); - trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS()); + trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), POOL_ENTROPY_BITS()); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_disk_randomness);#endif
@@ -1364,7 +1364,7 @@ retry: entropy_count = orig =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count); ibytes = nbytes;/* never pull more than available */ - have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 ); + have_bytes = entropy_count >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 );if (have_bytes <0 ) have_bytes =0 ;
@@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@ retry:pr_warn ("negative entropy count: count %d\n" , entropy_count); entropy_count =0 ; } - nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 ); + nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 );if ((size_t ) entropy_count > nfrac) entropy_count -= nfrac;else
@@ -1386,7 +1386,7 @@ retry: goto retry;trace_debit_entropy (8 * ibytes); -if (ibytes &&ENTROPY_BITS () < random_write_wakeup_bits) { +if (ibytes &&POOL_ENTROPY_BITS () < random_write_wakeup_bits) {wake_up_interruptible (&random_write_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_OUT ); }
@@ -1474,7 +1474,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(void *bu*/ static ssize_t extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes,int min) { -trace_extract_entropy (nbytes,ENTROPY_BITS (), _RET_IP_); +trace_extract_entropy (nbytes,POOL_ENTROPY_BITS (), _RET_IP_); nbytes =account (nbytes, min);return _extract_entropy (buf, nbytes); }
@@ -1799,9 +1799,9 @@ urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, c {int ret; - nbytes =min_t (size_t, nbytes,INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 )); + nbytes =min_t (size_t, nbytes,INT_MAX >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 )); ret =extract_crng_user (buf, nbytes); -trace_urandom_read (8 * nbytes,0 ,ENTROPY_BITS ()); +trace_urandom_read (8 * nbytes,0 ,POOL_ENTROPY_BITS ());return ret; }
@@ -1841,7 +1841,7 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_tabl mask =0 ;if (crng_ready ()) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ; -if (ENTROPY_BITS () < random_write_wakeup_bits) +if (POOL_ENTROPY_BITS () < random_write_wakeup_bits) mask |=POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ;return mask; }
@@ -1897,7 +1897,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,switch (cmd) {case RNDGETENTCNT :/* inherently racy, no point locking */ - ent_count =ENTROPY_BITS (); + ent_count =POOL_ENTROPY_BITS ();if (put_user (ent_count, p))return -EFAULT ;return 0 ;
@@ -2053,7 +2053,7 @@ static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_tastruct ctl_table fake_table;int entropy_count; - entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >>ENTROPY_SHIFT ; + entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >>POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT ; fake_table.data = &entropy_count; fake_table.maxlen =sizeof (entropy_count);
@@ -2272,7 +2272,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch*/ wait_event_interruptible (random_write_wait, !system_wq ||kthread_should_stop () || -ENTROPY_BITS () <= random_write_wakeup_bits); +POOL_ENTROPY_BITS () <= random_write_wakeup_bits);mix_pool_bytes (buffer, count);credit_entropy_bits (entropy); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 111/264 random: simplify entropy debiting
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 9c07f57869e90140080cfc282cc628d123e27704 upstream.
Our pool is 256 bits, and we only ever use all of it or don't use it at all, which is decided by whether or not it has at least 128 bits in it. So we can drastically simplify the accounting and cmpxchg loop to do exactly this. While we're at it, we move the minimum bit size into a constant so it can be shared between the two places where it matters.
The reason we want any of this is for the case in which an attacker has compromised the current state, and then bruteforces small amounts of entropy added to it. By demanding a particular minimum amount of entropy be present before reseeding, we make that bruteforcing difficult.
Note that this rationale no longer includes anything about /dev/random blocking at the right moment, since /dev/random no longer blocks (except for at ~boot), but rather uses the crng. In a former life, /dev/random was different and therefore required a more nuanced account(), but this is no longer.
Behaviorally, nothing changes here. This is just a simplification of the code.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 91 +++++++++--------------------------------- include/trace/events/random.h | 30 ++----------- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +21 -70
@@ -290,12 +290,14 @@enum poolinfo {POOL_BITS =BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE *8 ,POOL_BITSHIFT =ilog2 (POOL_BITS ), +POOL_MIN_BITS =POOL_BITS /2 ,/* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. */ POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT =3 ,#define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT) - POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, +POOL_MIN_FRACBITS =POOL_MIN_BITS <<POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT };/*
@@ -376,8 +378,7 @@ static struct { .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock), }; -static bool extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes,int min); -static void _extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes); +static void extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes);static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng,bool use_input_pool);
@@ -468,7 +469,7 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vo*/ static void credit_entropy_bits (int nbits) { -int entropy_count, entropy_bits, orig; +int entropy_count, orig;int nfrac = nbits <<POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT ;/* Ensure that the multiplication can avoid being 64 bits wide. */
@@ -528,8 +529,7 @@ retry:trace_credit_entropy_bits (nbits, entropy_count >>POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT , _RET_IP_); - entropy_bits = entropy_count >>POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT ; -if (crng_init <2 && entropy_bits >=128 ) +if (crng_init <2 && entropy_count >=POOL_MIN_FRACBITS )crng_reseed (&primary_crng, true); }
@@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(ststatic void __init crng_initialize_primary (void ) { -_extract_entropy (&primary_crng.state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 ); +extract_entropy (&primary_crng.state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 );if (crng_init_try_arch_early () && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) {invalidate_batched_entropy ();numa_crng_init ();
@@ -839,8 +839,17 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat } buf;if (use_input_pool) { -if (!extract_entropy (&buf,32 ,16 )) -return ; +int entropy_count; +do { + entropy_count =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count); +if (entropy_count <POOL_MIN_FRACBITS ) +return ; + }while (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count,0 ) != entropy_count); +extract_entropy (buf.key,sizeof (buf.key)); +if (random_write_wakeup_bits) { +wake_up_interruptible (&random_write_wait); +kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_OUT ); + } }else {_extract_crng (&primary_crng, buf.block); _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
@@ -1166,51 +1175,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);*********************************************************************/ /* -* This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the -* given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly. -*/ -static size_t account (size_t nbytes,int min) -{ -int entropy_count, orig; -size_t ibytes, nfrac; - -BUG_ON (input_pool.entropy_count >POOL_FRACBITS ); - -/* Can we pull enough? */ -retry: - entropy_count = orig =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count); -if (WARN_ON (entropy_count <0 )) { -pr_warn ("negative entropy count: count %d\n" , entropy_count); - entropy_count =0 ; - } - -/* never pull more than available */ - ibytes =min_t (size_t, nbytes, entropy_count >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 )); -if (ibytes < min) - ibytes =0 ; - nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 ); -if ((size_t )entropy_count > nfrac) - entropy_count -= nfrac; -else - entropy_count =0 ; - -if (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) - goto retry; - -trace_debit_entropy (8 * ibytes); -if (ibytes &&POOL_ENTROPY_BITS () < random_write_wakeup_bits) { -wake_up_interruptible (&random_write_wait); -kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_OUT ); - } - -return ibytes; -} - -/* * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block. */ -static void _extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes) +static void extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes) {unsigned long flags;u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ];
@@ -1220,6 +1188,8 @@ static void _extract_entropy(void *buf, } block;size_t i; +trace_extract_entropy (nbytes,POOL_ENTROPY_BITS ()); +for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (block.rdrand); ++i) {if (!arch_get_random_long (&block.rdrand[i])) block.rdrand[i] =random_get_entropy ();
@@ -1251,25 +1221,6 @@ static void _extract_entropy(void *buf,memzero_explicit (&block,sizeof (block)); } -/* -* This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and -* returns it in a buffer. -* -* The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before -* failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding. If we -* have less than min entropy available, we return false and buf is -* not filled. -*/ -static bool extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes,int min) -{ -trace_extract_entropy (nbytes,POOL_ENTROPY_BITS (), _RET_IP_); -if (account (nbytes, min)) { -_extract_entropy (buf, nbytes); -return true; - } -return false; -} -#define warn_unseeded_randomness (previous) \ _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous))
include/trace/events/random.h +6 -24
@@ -78,22 +78,6 @@ TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits, __entry->bits, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) ); -TRACE_EVENT (debit_entropy, - TP_PROTO(int debit_bits), - -TP_ARGS ( debit_bits), - -TP_STRUCT__entry ( -__field ( int, debit_bits ) - ), - -TP_fast_assign ( - __entry->debit_bits = debit_bits; - ), - -TP_printk ("input pool: debit_bits %d" , __entry->debit_bits) -); - TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness, TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
@@ -160,31 +144,29 @@ DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, g );DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS (random__extract_entropy, - TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count), -TP_ARGS (nbytes, entropy_count,IP ), +TP_ARGS (nbytes, entropy_count),TP_STRUCT__entry ( __field( int, nbytes )__field ( int, entropy_count ) - __field(unsigned long, IP ) ),TP_fast_assign ( __entry->nbytes = nbytes; __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count; - __entry->IP = IP; ), -TP_printk ("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS" , - __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP) +TP_printk ("input pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d" , + __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count) );DEFINE_EVENT (random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy, - TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count, unsigned long IP), + TP_PROTO(int nbytes, int entropy_count), -TP_ARGS (nbytes, entropy_count,IP ) +TP_ARGS (nbytes, entropy_count) ); TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 97/264 random: remove incomplete last_data logic
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit a4bfa9b31802c14ff5847123c12b98d5e36b3985 upstream.
There were a few things added under the "if (fips_enabled)" banner, which never really got completed, and the FIPS people anyway are choosing a different direction. Rather than keep around this halfbaked code, get rid of it so that we can focus on a single design of the RNG rather than two designs.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 40 ++++------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +4 -36
@@ -337,8 +337,6 @@#include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/percpu.h> -#include <linux/cryptohash.h> -#include <linux/fips.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/kmemcheck.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h>
@@ -519,14 +517,12 @@ struct entropy_store {u16 add_ptr;u16 input_rotate;int entropy_count; - unsigned int last_data_init:1; -u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE ]; };static ssize_t extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf,size_t nbytes,int min,int rsvd);static ssize_t _extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf, -size_t nbytes,int fips); +size_t nbytes);static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng,struct entropy_store *r); static u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
@@ -822,7 +818,7 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(ststatic void __init crng_initialize_primary (struct crng_state *crng) { -_extract_entropy (&input_pool, &crng->state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 ,0 ); +_extract_entropy (&input_pool, &crng->state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 );if (crng_init_try_arch_early (crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) {invalidate_batched_entropy ();numa_crng_init ();
@@ -1478,22 +1474,13 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_s }static ssize_t _extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf, -size_t nbytes,int fips) +size_t nbytes) {ssize_t ret =0 , i;u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE ]; -unsigned long flags;while (nbytes) {extract_buf (r, tmp); - -if (fips) { -spin_lock_irqsave (&r->lock, flags); -if (!memcmp (tmp, r->last_data,EXTRACT_SIZE )) -panic ("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n" ); -memcpy (r->last_data, tmp,EXTRACT_SIZE ); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&r->lock, flags); - } i =min_t (int, nbytes,EXTRACT_SIZE );memcpy (buf, tmp, i); nbytes -= i;
@@ -1519,28 +1506,9 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct estatic ssize_t extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf,size_t nbytes,int min,int reserved) { -u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE ]; -unsigned long flags; - -/* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */ -if (fips_enabled) { -spin_lock_irqsave (&r->lock, flags); -if (!r->last_data_init) { - r->last_data_init =1 ; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&r->lock, flags); -trace_extract_entropy (r->name,EXTRACT_SIZE , -ENTROPY_BITS (r), _RET_IP_); -extract_buf (r, tmp); -spin_lock_irqsave (&r->lock, flags); -memcpy (r->last_data, tmp,EXTRACT_SIZE ); - } -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&r->lock, flags); - } -trace_extract_entropy (r->name, nbytes,ENTROPY_BITS (r), _RET_IP_); nbytes =account (r, nbytes, min, reserved); - -return _extract_entropy (r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled); +return _extract_entropy (r, buf, nbytes); }#define warn_unseeded_randomness (previous) \
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 102/264 random: de-duplicate INPUT_POOL constants
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 5b87adf30f1464477169a1d653e9baf8c012bbfe upstream.
We already had the POOL_* constants, so deduplicate the older INPUT_POOL ones. As well, fold EXTRACT_SIZE into the poolinfo enum, since it's related.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 17 ++++++----------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +6 -11
@@ -360,13 +360,6 @@/* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ /* -* Configuration information -*/ -#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12 -#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) -#define EXTRACT_SIZE (BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2) - -/* * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is * denominated in units of 1/8th bits. *
@@ -441,7 +434,9 @@ enum poolinfo {POOL_TAP2 =76 ,POOL_TAP3 =51 ,POOL_TAP4 =25 , - POOL_TAP5 = 1 +POOL_TAP5 =1 , + + EXTRACT_SIZE = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2 };/*
@@ -504,7 +499,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis* **********************************************************************/ -static u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; +static u32 input_pool_data[POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; static struct { /* read-only data: */
@@ -2009,7 +2004,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *#include <linux/sysctl.h> static int min_write_thresh; -static int max_write_thresh =INPUT_POOL_WORDS *32 ; +static int max_write_thresh =POOL_BITS ;static int random_min_urandom_seed =60 ;static char sysctl_bootid[16 ];
@@ -2066,7 +2061,7 @@ static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_tareturn proc_dointvec (&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); } -static int sysctl_poolsize =INPUT_POOL_WORDS *32 ; +static int sysctl_poolsize =POOL_BITS ;extern struct ctl_table random_table[];struct ctl_table random_table[] = { {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 109/264 random: only call crng_finalize_init() for primary_crng
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
commit 9d5505f1eebeca778074a0260ed077fd85f8792c upstream.
crng_finalize_init() returns instantly if it is called for another pool than primary_crng. The test whether crng_finalize_init() is still required can be moved to the relevant caller in crng_reseed(), and crng_need_final_init can be reset to false if crng_finalize_init() is called with workqueues ready. Then, no previous callsite will call crng_finalize_init() unless it is needed, and we can get rid of the superfluous function parameter.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +5 -5
@@ -800,10 +800,8 @@ static void __init crng_initialize_prima primary_crng.init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; } -static void crng_finalize_init (struct crng_state *crng) +static void crng_finalize_init (void ) { -if (crng != &primary_crng || crng_init >=2 ) -return ;if (!system_wq) {/* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues, * so mark this for processing later. */
@@ -814,6 +812,7 @@ static void crng_finalize_init(struct crinvalidate_batched_entropy ();numa_crng_init (); crng_init =2 ; + crng_need_final_init = false;process_random_ready_list ();wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN );
@@ -1031,7 +1030,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statmemzero_explicit (&buf,sizeof (buf));WRITE_ONCE (crng->init_time, jiffies);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); -crng_finalize_init (crng); +if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init <2 ) +crng_finalize_init (); }static void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng,u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ])
@@ -1748,7 +1748,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) {init_std_data ();if (crng_need_final_init) -crng_finalize_init (&primary_crng); +crng_finalize_init ();crng_initialize_primary (); crng_global_init_time = jiffies;if (ratelimit_disable) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 136/264 random: group entropy collection functions
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 92c653cf14400946f376a29b828d6af7e01f38dd upstream.
This pulls all of the entropy collection-focused functions into the fourth labeled section.
No functional changes.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 370 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 206 insertions(+), 164 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +206 -164
@@ -1035,60 +1035,112 @@ static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, sizreturn true; } -struct fast_pool { -union { -u32 pool32[4 ]; -u64 pool64[2 ]; - }; -unsigned long last; -u16 reg_idx; -u8 count; -}; + +/********************************************************************** +* +* Entropy collection routines. +* +* The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into +* the above entropy accumulation routines: +* +* void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); +* void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, +* unsigned int value); +* void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); +* void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, +* size_t entropy); +* void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); +* void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); +* +* add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that +* is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot). +* This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the +* read-out of the RTC. This does *not* credit any actual entropy to +* the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices +* that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy +* available to them (particularly common in the embedded world). +* +* add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well +* as the event type information from the hardware. +* +* add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block +* layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the +* entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low +* seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek +* times are usually fairly consistent. +* +* The above two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy +* to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second +* order deltas of the event timings. +* +* add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit +* entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will +* block until more entropy is needed. +* +* add_bootloader_randomness() is the same as add_hwgenerator_randomness() or +* add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration +* option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. +* +* add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random +* inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source +* as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64 +* interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first. +* +**********************************************************************/ + +static bool trust_cpu__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU ); +static int __init parse_trust_cpu (char *arg) +{ +return kstrtobool (arg, &trust_cpu); +} +early_param ("random.trust_cpu" , parse_trust_cpu);/* -* This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness -* collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any -* locks that might be needed are taken by the caller. +* The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts +* are still turned off. Here we push in RDSEED, a timestamp, and utsname(). +* Depending on the above configuration knob, RDSEED may be considered +* sufficient for initialization. Note that much earlier setup may already +* have pushed entropy into the input pool by the time we get here. */ -static void fast_mix (u32 pool[4 ]) +int __init rand_initialize (void ) { -u32 a = pool[0 ], b = pool[1 ]; -u32 c = pool[2 ], d = pool[3 ]; - - a += b; c += d; - b =rol32 (b,6 ); d =rol32 (d,27 ); - d ^= a; b ^= c; +size_t i; +ktime_t now =ktime_get_real (); +bool arch_init = true; +unsigned long rv; - a += b; c += d; - b =rol32 (b,16 ); d =rol32 (d,14 ); - d ^= a; b ^= c; +for (i =0 ; i <BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE ; i +=sizeof (rv)) { +if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early (&rv) && + !arch_get_random_long_early (&rv)) { + rv =random_get_entropy (); + arch_init = false; + } +mix_pool_bytes (&rv,sizeof (rv)); + } +mix_pool_bytes (&now,sizeof (now)); +mix_pool_bytes (utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ()))); - a += b; c += d; - b =rol32 (b,6 ); d =rol32 (d,27 ); - d ^= a; b ^= c; +extract_entropy (base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); + ++base_crng.generation; - a += b; c += d; - b =rol32 (b,16 ); d =rol32 (d,14 ); - d ^= a; b ^= c; +if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) { + crng_init =2 ; +pr_notice ("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n" ); + } - pool[0 ] = a; pool[1 ] = b; - pool[2 ] = c; pool[3 ] = d; +if (ratelimit_disable) { + urandom_warning.interval =0 ; + unseeded_warning.interval =0 ; + } +return 0 ; } -/********************************************************************* -* -* Entropy input management -* -*********************************************************************/ -/* There is one of these per entropy source */ struct timer_rand_state {cycles_t last_time;long last_delta, last_delta2; }; -#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, }; -/* * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help * initialize it.
@@ -1112,8 +1164,6 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *b }EXPORT_SYMBOL (add_device_randomness); -static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state =INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE ; -/* * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
@@ -1175,8 +1225,9 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int t unsigned int value) {static unsigned char last_value; +static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = {INITIAL_JIFFIES }; -/* ignore autorepeat and the like */ +/* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */ if (value == last_value)return ;
@@ -1186,6 +1237,119 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int t }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_input_randomness); +#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK +void add_disk_randomness (struct gendisk *disk) +{ +if (!disk || !disk->random) +return ; +/* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */ +add_timer_randomness (disk->random,0x100 +disk_devt (disk)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_disk_randomness); + +void rand_initialize_disk (struct gendisk *disk) +{ +struct timer_rand_state *state; + +/* +* If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy +* source. +*/ + state =kzalloc (sizeof (struct timer_rand_state ),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (state) { + state->last_time =INITIAL_JIFFIES ; + disk->random = state; + } +} +#endif + +/* +* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. +* Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled +* when our pool is full. +*/ +void add_hwgenerator_randomness (const void *buffer,size_t count, +size_t entropy) +{ +if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { +size_t ret =crng_fast_load (buffer, count); +mix_pool_bytes (buffer, ret); + count -= ret; + buffer += ret; +if (!count || crng_init ==0 ) +return ; + } + +/* +* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold. +* We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when +* the calling thread is about to terminate, or once +* CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed. +*/ +wait_event_interruptible_timeout (random_write_wait, + !system_wq ||kthread_should_stop () || + input_pool.entropy_count <POOL_MIN_BITS , +CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ); +mix_pool_bytes (buffer, count); +credit_entropy_bits (entropy); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_hwgenerator_randomness); + +/* +* Handle random seed passed by bootloader. +* If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise +* it would be regarded as device data. +* The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER. +*/ +void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *buf,size_t size) +{ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER )) +add_hwgenerator_randomness (buf, size, size *8 ); +else +add_device_randomness (buf, size); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_bootloader_randomness); + +struct fast_pool { +union { +u32 pool32[4 ]; +u64 pool64[2 ]; + }; +unsigned long last; +u16 reg_idx; +u8 count; +}; + +/* +* This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness +* collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any +* locks that might be needed are taken by the caller. +*/ +static void fast_mix (u32 pool[4 ]) +{ +u32 a = pool[0 ], b = pool[1 ]; +u32 c = pool[2 ], d = pool[3 ]; + + a += b; c += d; + b =rol32 (b,6 ); d =rol32 (d,27 ); + d ^= a; b ^= c; + + a += b; c += d; + b =rol32 (b,16 ); d =rol32 (d,14 ); + d ^= a; b ^= c; + + a += b; c += d; + b =rol32 (b,6 ); d =rol32 (d,27 ); + d ^= a; b ^= c; + + a += b; c += d; + b =rol32 (b,16 ); d =rol32 (d,14 ); + d ^= a; b ^= c; + + pool[0 ] = a; pool[1 ] = b; + pool[2 ] = c; pool[3 ] = d; +} + static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness);static u32 get_reg (struct fast_pool *f,struct pt_regs *regs)
@@ -1255,22 +1419,11 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) fast_pool->count =0 ; -/* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */ +/* Award one bit for the contents of the fast pool. */ credit_entropy_bits (1 ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_interrupt_randomness); -#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK -void add_disk_randomness (struct gendisk *disk) -{ -if (!disk || !disk->random) -return ; -/* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ -add_timer_randomness (disk->random,0x100 +disk_devt (disk)); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_disk_randomness); -#endif -/* * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
@@ -1320,73 +1473,6 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(voidmix_pool_bytes (&stack.now,sizeof (stack.now)); } -static bool trust_cpu__ro_after_init =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU ); -static int __init parse_trust_cpu (char *arg) -{ -return kstrtobool (arg, &trust_cpu); -} -early_param ("random.trust_cpu" , parse_trust_cpu); - -/* -* Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness() -* long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools -* with some platform dependent data very early in the boot -* process. But it limits our options here. We must use -* statically allocated structures that already have all -* initializations complete at compile time. We should also -* take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data -* we were given. -*/ -int __init rand_initialize (void ) -{ -size_t i; -ktime_t now =ktime_get_real (); -bool arch_init = true; -unsigned long rv; - -for (i =0 ; i <BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE ; i +=sizeof (rv)) { -if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early (&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long_early (&rv)) { - rv =random_get_entropy (); - arch_init = false; - } -mix_pool_bytes (&rv,sizeof (rv)); - } -mix_pool_bytes (&now,sizeof (now)); -mix_pool_bytes (utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ()))); - -extract_entropy (base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); - ++base_crng.generation; - -if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) { - crng_init =2 ; -pr_notice ("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n" ); - } - -if (ratelimit_disable) { - urandom_warning.interval =0 ; - unseeded_warning.interval =0 ; - } -return 0 ; -} - -#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK -void rand_initialize_disk (struct gendisk *disk) -{ -struct timer_rand_state *state; - -/* -* If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy -* source. -*/ - state =kzalloc (sizeof (struct timer_rand_state ),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (state) { - state->last_time =INITIAL_JIFFIES ; - disk->random = state; - } -} -#endif -static ssize_t urandom_read (struct file *file,char __user *buf,size_t nbytes,loff_t *ppos) {
@@ -1669,47 +1755,3 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { { } };#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ - -/* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs. -* Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled -* when our pool is full. -*/ -void add_hwgenerator_randomness (const void *buffer,size_t count, -size_t entropy) -{ -if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { -size_t ret =crng_fast_load (buffer, count); -mix_pool_bytes (buffer, ret); - count -= ret; - buffer += ret; -if (!count || crng_init ==0 ) -return ; - } - -/* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold. -* We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when -* the calling thread is about to terminate, or once -* CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed. -*/ -wait_event_interruptible_timeout (random_write_wait, - !system_wq ||kthread_should_stop () || - input_pool.entropy_count <POOL_MIN_BITS , -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ); -mix_pool_bytes (buffer, count); -credit_entropy_bits (entropy); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_hwgenerator_randomness); - -/* Handle random seed passed by bootloader. -* If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise -* it would be regarded as device data. -* The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER. -*/ -void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *buf,size_t size) -{ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER )) -add_hwgenerator_randomness (buf, size, size *8 ); -else -add_device_randomness (buf, size); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_bootloader_randomness);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 96/264 random: cleanup integer types
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit d38bb0853589c939573ea50e9cb64f733e0e273d upstream.
Rather than using the userspace type, __uXX, switch to using uXX. And rather than using variously chosen char * or unsigned char *, use u8 * uniformly for things that aren't strings, in the case where we are doing byte-by-byte traversal.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +57 -57
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_liststatic LIST_HEAD (random_ready_list);struct crng_state { -__u32 state[16 ]; +u32 state[16 ];unsigned long init_time;spinlock_t lock; };
@@ -485,10 +485,9 @@ static bool crng_need_final_init = falsestatic int crng_init_cnt =0 ;static unsigned long crng_global_init_time =0 ;#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) -static void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng, -__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]); +static void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng,u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]);static void _crng_backtrack_protect (struct crng_state *crng, -__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used); +u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used);static void process_random_ready_list (void );static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes);
@@ -512,16 +511,16 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disstruct entropy_store ;struct entropy_store {/* read-only data: */ -__u32 *pool; +u32 *pool;const char *name;/* read-write data: */ spinlock_t lock; -unsigned short add_ptr; -unsigned short input_rotate; +u16 add_ptr; +u16 input_rotate;int entropy_count;unsigned int last_data_init:1 ; -__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE ]; +u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE ]; }; static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
@@ -530,7 +529,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct e size_t nbytes, int fips);static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng,struct entropy_store *r); -static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; +static u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;static struct entropy_store input_pool = { .name ="input" ,
@@ -538,7 +537,7 @@ static struct entropy_store input_pool = .pool = input_pool_data }; -static __u32 const twist_table[8 ] = { +static u32 const twist_table[8 ] = {0x00000000 ,0x3b6e20c8 ,0x76dc4190 ,0x4db26158 ,0xedb88320 ,0xd6d6a3e8 ,0x9b64c2b0 ,0xa00ae278 };
@@ -557,8 +556,8 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entro {unsigned long i;int input_rotate; -const unsigned char *bytes = in; -__u32 w; +const u8 *bytes = in; +u32 w; input_rotate = r->input_rotate; i = r->add_ptr;
@@ -611,10 +610,10 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entrop }struct fast_pool { -__u32 pool[4 ]; +u32 pool[4 ];unsigned long last; -unsigned short reg_idx; -unsigned char count; +u16 reg_idx; +u8 count; };/*
@@ -624,8 +623,8 @@ struct fast_pool {*/ static void fast_mix (struct fast_pool *f) { -__u32 a = f->pool[0 ], b = f->pool[1 ]; -__u32 c = f->pool[2 ], d = f->pool[3 ]; +u32 a = f->pool[0 ], b = f->pool[1 ]; +u32 c = f->pool[2 ], d = f->pool[3 ]; a += b; c += d; b =rol32 (b,6 ); d =rol32 (d,27 );
@@ -816,14 +815,14 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_eastatic void crng_initialize_secondary (struct crng_state *crng) {chacha_init_consts (crng->state); -_get_random_bytes (&crng->state[4 ],sizeof (__u32) *12 ); +_get_random_bytes (&crng->state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 );crng_init_try_arch (crng); crng->init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; }static void __init crng_initialize_primary (struct crng_state *crng) { -_extract_entropy (&input_pool, &crng->state[4 ],sizeof (__u32) *12 ,0 ); +_extract_entropy (&input_pool, &crng->state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 ,0 );if (crng_init_try_arch_early (crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) {invalidate_batched_entropy ();numa_crng_init ();
@@ -910,12 +909,14 @@ static struct crng_state *select_crng(vo/* * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service -* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. +* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of +* bytes processed from cp. */ -static int crng_fast_load (const char *cp,size_t len) +static size_t crng_fast_load (const u8 *cp,size_t len) {unsigned long flags; -char *p; +u8 *p; +size_t ret =0 ;if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags))return 0 ;
@@ -923,10 +924,10 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cpspin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags);return 0 ; } - p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4 ]; + p = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4 ];while (len >0 && crng_init_cnt <CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) { p[crng_init_cnt %CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ] ^= *cp; - cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; + cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; }spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags);if (crng_init_cnt >=CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) {
@@ -934,7 +935,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp crng_init =1 ;pr_notice ("fast init done\n" ); } -return 1 ; +return ret; }#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
@@ -1002,14 +1003,14 @@ static struct crng_state *select_crng(vo* like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be * unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. */ -static int crng_slow_load (const char *cp,size_t len) +static int crng_slow_load (const u8 *cp,size_t len) {unsigned long flags; -static unsigned char lfsr =1 ; -unsigned char tmp; -unsigned i, max =CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ; -const char * src_buf = cp; -char * dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4 ]; +static u8 lfsr =1 ; +u8 tmp; +unsigned int i, max =CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ; +const u8 * src_buf = cp; +u8 * dest_buf = (u8 *) &primary_crng.state[4 ];if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags))return 0 ;
@@ -1038,8 +1039,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statunsigned long flags;int i, num;union { -__u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; -__u32 key[8 ]; +u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; +u32 key[8 ]; } buf;if (r) {
@@ -1066,7 +1067,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat }static void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng, -__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) +u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) {unsigned long flags, init_time;
@@ -1084,7 +1085,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_stspin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); } -static void extract_crng (__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) +static void extract_crng (u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) {_extract_crng (select_crng (), out); }
@@ -1094,26 +1095,26 @@ static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA* enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. */ static void _crng_backtrack_protect (struct crng_state *crng, -__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) +u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) {unsigned long flags; -__u32 *s, *d; +u32 *s, *d;int i; - used =round_up (used,sizeof (__u32)); + used =round_up (used,sizeof (u32));if (used +CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE >CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ) {extract_crng (tmp); used =0 ; }spin_lock_irqsave (&crng->lock, flags); - s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used]; + s = (u32 *) &tmp[used]; d = &crng->state[4 ];for (i=0 ; i <8 ; i++) *d++ ^= *s++;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); } -static void crng_backtrack_protect (__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) +static void crng_backtrack_protect (u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) {_crng_backtrack_protect (select_crng (), tmp, used); }
@@ -1121,7 +1122,7 @@ static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8static ssize_t extract_crng_user (void __user *buf,size_t nbytes) {ssize_t ret =0 , i =CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ; -__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]__aligned(4) ; +u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]__aligned(4) ;int large_request = (nbytes >256 );while (nbytes) {
@@ -1209,8 +1210,8 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(structstruct entropy_store *r;struct {long jiffies; -unsigned cycles; -unsigned num; +unsigned int cycles; +unsigned int num; } sample;long delta, delta2, delta3;
@@ -1292,15 +1293,15 @@ static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t#define add_interrupt_bench (x)#endif -static __u32 get_reg (struct fast_pool *f,struct pt_regs *regs) +static u32 get_reg (struct fast_pool *f,struct pt_regs *regs) { -__u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs; +u32 *ptr = (u32 *) regs;unsigned int idx;if (regs ==NULL )return 0 ; idx =READ_ONCE (f->reg_idx); -if (idx >=sizeof (struct pt_regs ) /sizeof (__u32)) +if (idx >=sizeof (struct pt_regs ) /sizeof (u32)) idx =0 ; ptr += idx++;WRITE_ONCE (f->reg_idx, idx);
@@ -1314,8 +1315,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)struct pt_regs *regs =get_irq_regs ();unsigned long now = jiffies;cycles_t cycles =random_get_entropy (); -__u32 c_high, j_high; -__u64 ip; +u32 c_high, j_high; +u64 ip;if (cycles ==0 ) cycles =get_reg (fast_pool, regs);
@@ -1333,8 +1334,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) {if ((fast_pool->count >=64 ) && -crng_fast_load ((char *) fast_pool->pool, -sizeof (fast_pool->pool))) { +crng_fast_load ((u8 *)fast_pool->pool,sizeof (fast_pool->pool)) >0 ) { fast_pool->count =0 ; fast_pool->last = now; }
@@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ retry:* * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words. */ -static void extract_buf (struct entropy_store *r,__u8 *out) +static void extract_buf (struct entropy_store *r,u8 *out) {struct blake2s_state state__aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long)) ;u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ];
@@ -1481,7 +1481,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct e size_t nbytes, int fips) {ssize_t ret =0 , i; -__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE ]; +u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE ];unsigned long flags;while (nbytes) {
@@ -1519,7 +1519,7 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct estatic ssize_t extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf,size_t nbytes,int min,int reserved) { -__u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE ]; +u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE ];unsigned long flags;/* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */
@@ -1580,7 +1580,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co*/ static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes) { -__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]__aligned(4) ; +u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]__aligned(4) ;trace_get_random_bytes (nbytes, _RET_IP_);
@@ -1714,7 +1714,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback)int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes) {int left = nbytes; -char *p = buf; +u8 *p = buf;trace_get_random_bytes_arch (left, _RET_IP_);while (left) {
@@ -1856,7 +1856,7 @@ static int write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count) { size_t bytes; -__u32 t, buf[16 ]; +u32 t, buf[16 ];const char __user *p = buffer;while (count >0 ) {
@@ -1866,7 +1866,7 @@ write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, consif (copy_from_user (&buf, p, bytes))return -EFAULT ; -for (b = bytes ; b >0 ; b -=sizeof (__u32), i++) { +for (b = bytes; b >0 ; b -=sizeof (u32), i++) {if (!arch_get_random_int (&t))break ; buf[i] ^= t;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 106/264 random: simplify arithmetic function flow in account()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit a254a0e4093fce8c832414a83940736067eed515 upstream.
Now that have_bytes is never modified, we can simplify this function. First, we move the check for negative entropy_count to be first. That ensures that subsequent reads of this will be non-negative. Then, have_bytes and ibytes can be folded into their one use site in the min_t() function.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 17 ++++++----------- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +6 -11
@@ -1344,7 +1344,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);*/ static size_t account (size_t nbytes,int min) { -int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes; +int entropy_count, orig;size_t ibytes, nfrac;BUG_ON (input_pool.entropy_count >POOL_FRACBITS );
@@ -1352,20 +1352,15 @@ static size_t account(size_t nbytes, int/* Can we pull enough? */ retry: entropy_count = orig =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count); - ibytes = nbytes; -/* never pull more than available */ - have_bytes = entropy_count >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 ); - -if (have_bytes <0 ) - have_bytes =0 ; - ibytes =min_t (size_t, ibytes, have_bytes); -if (ibytes < min) - ibytes =0 ; -if (WARN_ON (entropy_count <0 )) {pr_warn ("negative entropy count: count %d\n" , entropy_count); entropy_count =0 ; } + +/* never pull more than available */ + ibytes =min_t (size_t, nbytes, entropy_count >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 )); +if (ibytes < min) + ibytes =0 ; nfrac = ibytes << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 );if ((size_t )entropy_count > nfrac) entropy_count -= nfrac;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 122/264 random: absorb fast pool into input pool after fast load
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit c30c575db4858f0bbe5e315ff2e529c782f33a1f upstream.
During crng_init == 0, we never credit entropy in add_interrupt_ randomness(), but instead dump it directly into the primary_crng. That's fine, except for the fact that we then wind up throwing away that entropy later when we switch to extracting from the input pool and xoring into (and later in this series overwriting) the primary_crng key. The two other early init sites -- add_hwgenerator_randomness()'s use crng_fast_load() and add_device_ randomness()'s use of crng_slow_load() -- always additionally give their inputs to the input pool. But not add_interrupt_randomness().
This commit fixes that shortcoming by calling mix_pool_bytes() after crng_fast_load() in add_interrupt_randomness(). That's partially verboten on PREEMPT_RT, where it implies taking spinlock_t from an IRQ handler. But this also only happens during early boot and then never again after that. Plus it's a trylock so it has the same considerations as calling crng_fast_load(), which we're already using.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 407 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 237 insertions(+), 170 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +237 -170
@@ -67,63 +67,19 @@* Exported interfaces ---- kernel output * -------------------------------------- * -* The primary kernel interface is +* The primary kernel interfaces are: * * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); -* -* This interface will return the requested number of random bytes, -* and place it in the requested buffer. This is equivalent to a -* read from /dev/urandom. -* -* For less critical applications, there are the functions: -* * u32 get_random_u32() * u64 get_random_u64() * unsigned int get_random_int() * unsigned long get_random_long() * -* These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes, -* and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much. These are recommended -* for most in-kernel operations *if the result is going to be stored in -* the kernel*. -* -* Specifically, the get_random_int() family do not attempt to do -* "anti-backtracking". If you capture the state of the kernel (e.g. -* by snapshotting the VM), you can figure out previous get_random_int() -* return values. But if the value is stored in the kernel anyway, -* this is not a problem. -* -* It *is* safe to expose get_random_int() output to attackers (e.g. as -* network cookies); given outputs 1..n, it's not feasible to predict -* outputs 0 or n+1. The only concern is an attacker who breaks into -* the kernel later; the get_random_int() engine is not reseeded as -* often as the get_random_bytes() one. -* -* get_random_bytes() is needed for keys that need to stay secret after -* they are erased from the kernel. For example, any key that will -* be wrapped and stored encrypted. And session encryption keys: we'd -* like to know that after the session is closed and the keys erased, -* the plaintext is unrecoverable to someone who recorded the ciphertext. -* -* But for network ports/cookies, stack canaries, PRNG seeds, address -* space layout randomization, session *authentication* keys, or other -* applications where the sensitive data is stored in the kernel in -* plaintext for as long as it's sensitive, the get_random_int() family -* is just fine. -* -* Consider ASLR. We want to keep the address space secret from an -* outside attacker while the process is running, but once the address -* space is torn down, it's of no use to an attacker any more. And it's -* stored in kernel data structures as long as it's alive, so worrying -* about an attacker's ability to extrapolate it from the get_random_int() -* CRNG is silly. -* -* Even some cryptographic keys are safe to generate with get_random_int(). -* In particular, keys for SipHash are generally fine. Here, knowledge -* of the key authorizes you to do something to a kernel object (inject -* packets to a network connection, or flood a hash table), and the -* key is stored with the object being protected. Once it goes away, -* we no longer care if anyone knows the key. +* These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes +* into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to a +* read from /dev/urandom. The get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}() family +* of functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers, +* because they do a bit of buffering. * * prandom_u32() * -------------
@@ -301,20 +257,6 @@ static struct fasync_struct *fasync;static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (random_ready_list_lock);static LIST_HEAD (random_ready_list); -struct crng_state { -u32 state[16 ]; -unsigned long init_time; -spinlock_t lock; -}; - -static struct crng_state primary_crng = { - .lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (primary_crng.lock), - .state[0 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA , - .state[1 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 , - .state[2 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY , - .state[3 ] =CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K , -}; -/* * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized * 1 --> Initialized
@@ -326,9 +268,6 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng =static int crng_init =0 ;#define crng_ready () (likely(crng_init > 1))static int crng_init_cnt =0 ; -#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2 * CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE) -static void extract_crng (u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]); -static void crng_backtrack_protect (u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used);static void process_random_ready_list (void );static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes);
@@ -471,7 +410,28 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbit* *********************************************************************/ -#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300 * HZ) +enum { +CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL =300 *HZ , +CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH =2 *CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE +}; + +static struct { +u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ]__aligned(__alignof__(long)) ; +unsigned long birth; +unsigned long generation; +spinlock_t lock; +} base_crng = { + .lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (base_crng.lock) +}; + +struct crng { +u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ]; +unsigned long generation; +}; + +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = { + .generation =ULONG_MAX +};static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (crng_init_wait);
@@ -488,22 +448,22 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cu8 *p;size_t ret =0 ; -if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags)) +if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags))return 0 ;if (crng_init !=0 ) { -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);return 0 ; } - p = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4 ]; + p = base_crng.key;while (len >0 && crng_init_cnt <CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) { - p[crng_init_cnt %CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ] ^= *cp; + p[crng_init_cnt %sizeof (base_crng.key)] ^= *cp; cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; }if (crng_init_cnt >=CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) {invalidate_batched_entropy (); crng_init =1 ; } -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);if (crng_init ==1 )pr_notice ("fast init done\n" );return ret;
@@ -579,14 +539,14 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp,unsigned long flags;static u8 lfsr =1 ;u8 tmp; -unsigned int i, max =CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ; +unsigned int i, max =sizeof (base_crng.key);const u8 *src_buf = cp; -u8 *dest_buf = (u8 *)&primary_crng.state[4 ]; +u8 *dest_buf = base_crng.key; -if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags)) +if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags))return 0 ;if (crng_init !=0 ) { -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);return 0 ; }if (len > max)
@@ -597,38 +557,50 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp, lfsr >>=1 ;if (tmp &1 ) lfsr ^=0xE1 ; - tmp = dest_buf[i %CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ]; - dest_buf[i %CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr; + tmp = dest_buf[i %sizeof (base_crng.key)]; + dest_buf[i %sizeof (base_crng.key)] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr; lfsr += (tmp <<3 ) | (tmp >>5 ); } -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);return 1 ; }static void crng_reseed (void ) {unsigned long flags; -int i, entropy_count; -union { -u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; -u32 key[8 ]; - } buf; +int entropy_count; +unsigned long next_gen; +u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ]; +/* +* First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool, +* and then we drain all of it. Only then can we extract a new key. +*/ do { entropy_count =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count);if (entropy_count <POOL_MIN_BITS )return ; }while (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count,0 ) != entropy_count); -extract_entropy (buf.key,sizeof (buf.key)); +extract_entropy (key,sizeof (key));wake_up_interruptible (&random_write_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_OUT ); -spin_lock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags); -for (i =0 ; i <8 ; i++) - primary_crng.state[i +4 ] ^= buf.key[i]; -memzero_explicit (&buf,sizeof (buf)); -WRITE_ONCE (primary_crng.init_time, jiffies); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +/* +* We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one, +* and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX, +* because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this +* forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize. +*/ +spin_lock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags); +memcpy (base_crng.key, key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); + next_gen = base_crng.generation +1 ; +if (next_gen ==ULONG_MAX ) + ++next_gen; +WRITE_ONCE (base_crng.generation, next_gen); +WRITE_ONCE (base_crng.birth, jiffies); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags); +memzero_explicit (key,sizeof (key)); +if (crng_init <2 ) {invalidate_batched_entropy (); crng_init =2 ;
@@ -649,77 +621,143 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) } } -static void extract_crng (u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) +/* +* The general form here is based on a "fast key erasure RNG" from +* <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>. It generates a ChaCha +* block using the provided key, and then immediately overwites that +* key with half the block. It returns the resultant ChaCha state to the +* user, along with the second half of the block containing 32 bytes of +* random data that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than +* 32. +*/ +static void crng_fast_key_erasure (u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ], +u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u32)], +u8 *random_data,size_t random_data_len) { -unsigned long flags, init_time; +u8 first_block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; -if (crng_ready ()) { - init_time =READ_ONCE (primary_crng.init_time); -if (time_after (jiffies, init_time +CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL )) -crng_reseed (); - } -spin_lock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags); -chacha20_block (&primary_crng.state[0 ], out); -if (primary_crng.state[12 ] ==0 ) - primary_crng.state[13 ]++; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +BUG_ON (random_data_len >32 ); + +chacha_init_consts (chacha_state); +memcpy (&chacha_state[4 ], key,CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ); +memset (&chacha_state[12 ],0 ,sizeof (u32) *4 ); +chacha20_block (chacha_state, first_block); + +memcpy (key, first_block,CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ); +memcpy (random_data, first_block +CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE , random_data_len); +memzero_explicit (first_block,sizeof (first_block)); }/* -* Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is -* enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. +* This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating +* random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data +* that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32. */ -static void crng_backtrack_protect (u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) +static void crng_make_state (u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u32)], +u8 *random_data,size_t random_data_len) {unsigned long flags; -u32 *s, *d; -int i; +struct crng *crng; + +BUG_ON (random_data_len >32 ); + +/* +* For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and +* then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not +* ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because +* this is what crng_{fast,slow}_load mutate during early init. +*/ +if (unlikely (!crng_ready ())) { +bool ready; + +spin_lock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags); + ready =crng_ready (); +if (!ready) +crng_fast_key_erasure (base_crng.key, chacha_state, + random_data, random_data_len); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags); +if (!ready) +return ; + } + +/* +* If the base_crng is more than 5 minutes old, we reseed, which +* in turn bumps the generation counter that we check below. +*/ +if (unlikely (time_after (jiffies,READ_ONCE (base_crng.birth) +CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ))) +crng_reseed (); + +local_irq_save (flags); + crng =raw_cpu_ptr (&crngs); + +/* +* If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means +* somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key +* erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key +* for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng. +*/ +if (unlikely (crng->generation !=READ_ONCE (base_crng.generation))) { +spin_lock (&base_crng.lock); +crng_fast_key_erasure (base_crng.key, chacha_state, + crng->key,sizeof (crng->key)); + crng->generation = base_crng.generation; +spin_unlock (&base_crng.lock); + } + +/* +* Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up +* to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce +* some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other +* branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we +* should wind up here immediately. +*/ +crng_fast_key_erasure (crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len); +local_irq_restore (flags); +} + +static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user (void __user *buf,size_t nbytes) +{ +bool large_request = nbytes >256 ; +ssize_t ret =0 , len; +u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u32)]; +u8 output[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; + +if (!nbytes) +return 0 ; - used =round_up (used,sizeof (u32)); -if (used +CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE >CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ) { -extract_crng (tmp); - used =0 ; - } -spin_lock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags); - s = (u32 *)&tmp[used]; - d = &primary_crng.state[4 ]; -for (i =0 ; i <8 ; i++) - *d++ ^= *s++; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); -} - -static ssize_t extract_crng_user (void __user *buf,size_t nbytes) -{ -ssize_t ret =0 , i =CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ; -u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]__aligned(4) ; -int large_request = (nbytes >256 ); + len =min_t (ssize_t,32 , nbytes); +crng_make_state (chacha_state, output, len); + +if (copy_to_user (buf, output, len)) +return -EFAULT ; + nbytes -= len; + buf += len; + ret += len;while (nbytes) {if (large_request &&need_resched ()) { -if (signal_pending (current)) { -if (ret ==0 ) - ret = -ERESTARTSYS ; +if (signal_pending (current))break ; - }schedule (); } -extract_crng (tmp); - i =min_t (int, nbytes,CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ); -if (copy_to_user (buf, tmp, i)) { +chacha20_block (chacha_state, output); +if (unlikely (chacha_state[12 ] ==0 )) + ++chacha_state[13 ]; + + len =min_t (ssize_t, nbytes,CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ); +if (copy_to_user (buf, output, len)) { ret = -EFAULT ;break ; } - nbytes -= i; - buf += i; - ret += i; + nbytes -= len; + buf += len; + ret += len; } -crng_backtrack_protect (tmp, i); - -/* Wipe data just written to memory */ -memzero_explicit (tmp,sizeof (tmp)); +memzero_explicit (chacha_state,sizeof (chacha_state)); +memzero_explicit (output,sizeof (output));return ret; }
@@ -902,6 +940,10 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) crng_fast_load((u8 *)fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) { fast_pool->count =0 ; fast_pool->last = now; +if (spin_trylock (&input_pool.lock)) { +_mix_pool_bytes (&fast_pool->pool,sizeof (fast_pool->pool)); +spin_unlock (&input_pool.lock); + } }return ; }
@@ -1024,23 +1066,36 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co*/ static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes) { -u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]__aligned(4) ; +u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u32)]; +u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; +ssize_t len;trace_get_random_bytes (nbytes, _RET_IP_); -while (nbytes >=CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ) { -extract_crng (buf); - buf +=CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ; +if (!nbytes) +return ; + + len =min_t (ssize_t,32 , nbytes); +crng_make_state (chacha_state, buf, len); + nbytes -= len; + buf += len; + +while (nbytes) { +if (nbytes <CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ) { +chacha20_block (chacha_state, tmp); +memcpy (buf, tmp, nbytes); +memzero_explicit (tmp,sizeof (tmp)); +break ; + } + +chacha20_block (chacha_state, buf); +if (unlikely (chacha_state[12 ] ==0 )) + ++chacha_state[13 ]; nbytes -=CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ; + buf +=CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ; } -if (nbytes >0 ) { -extract_crng (tmp); -memcpy (buf, tmp, nbytes); -crng_backtrack_protect (tmp, nbytes); - }else -crng_backtrack_protect (tmp,CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ); -memzero_explicit (tmp,sizeof (tmp)); +memzero_explicit (chacha_state,sizeof (chacha_state)); }void get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes)
@@ -1271,13 +1326,12 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)mix_pool_bytes (&now,sizeof (now));mix_pool_bytes (utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ()))); -extract_entropy (&primary_crng.state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 ); +extract_entropy (base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key));if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) {invalidate_batched_entropy (); crng_init =2 ;pr_notice ("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n" ); } - primary_crng.init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ;if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval =0 ;
@@ -1309,7 +1363,7 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(strucint ret; nbytes =min_t (size_t, nbytes,INT_MAX >>6 ); - ret =extract_crng_user (buf, nbytes); + ret =get_random_bytes_user (buf, nbytes);trace_urandom_read (8 * nbytes,0 , input_pool.entropy_count);return ret; }
@@ -1613,8 +1667,15 @@ static atomic_t batch_generation = ATOMIstruct batched_entropy {union { -u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u64)]; -u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u32)]; +/* +* We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the +* remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full +* block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase +* the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the +* formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE. +*/ +u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE *3 / (2 *sizeof (u64))]; +u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE *3 / (2 *sizeof (u32))]; };unsigned int position;int generation;
@@ -1622,13 +1683,13 @@ struct batched_entropy {/* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random -* number is good as /dev/urandom, but there is no backtrack protection, with -* the goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure -* that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function -* wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any -* point prior. +* number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness +* provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes() +* should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior. */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { + .position =UINT_MAX +};u64 get_random_u64 (void ) {
@@ -1644,20 +1705,24 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u64); next_gen =atomic_read (&batch_generation); -if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u64) ==0 || +if (batch->position >=ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u64) || next_gen != batch->generation) { -extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); +_get_random_bytes (batch->entropy_u64,sizeof (batch->entropy_u64)); batch->position =0 ; batch->generation = next_gen; } - ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; + ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position]; + batch->entropy_u64[batch->position] =0 ; + ++batch->position;local_irq_restore (flags);return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_u64); -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32); +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = { + .position =UINT_MAX +};u32 get_random_u32 (void ) {
@@ -1673,14 +1738,16 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u32); next_gen =atomic_read (&batch_generation); -if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u32) ==0 || +if (batch->position >=ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u32) || next_gen != batch->generation) { -extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); +_get_random_bytes (batch->entropy_u32,sizeof (batch->entropy_u32)); batch->position =0 ; batch->generation = next_gen; } - ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; + ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position]; + batch->entropy_u32[batch->position] =0 ; + ++batch->position;local_irq_restore (flags);return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 84/264 random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 0d9488ffbf2faddebc6bac055bfa6c93b94056a3 upstream.
By using char instead of unsigned char, certain platforms will sign extend the byte when w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate) is called, meaning that bit 7 is overrepresented when mixing. This isn't a real problem (unless the mixer itself is already broken) since it's still invertible, but it's not quite correct either. Fix this by using an explicit unsigned type.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -1
@@ -550,7 +550,7 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entrounsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;int input_rotate;int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords -1 ; -const char *bytes = in; +const unsigned char *bytes = in;__u32 w; tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 123/264 random: use hash function for crng_slow_load()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 66e4c2b9541503d721e936cc3898c9f25f4591ff upstream.
Since we have a hash function that's really fast, and the goal of crng_slow_load() is reportedly to "touch all of the crng's state", we can just hash the old state together with the new state and call it a day. This way we dont need to reason about another LFSR or worry about various attacks there. This code is only ever used at early boot and then never again.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 163 +++++++++++++++++------------------------- include/linux/hw_random.h | 2 include/linux/random.h | 10 +- include/trace/events/random.h | 79 +++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 141 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +69 -94
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@* * The primary kernel interfaces are: * -* void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); +* void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes); * u32 get_random_u32() * u64 get_random_u64() * unsigned int get_random_int()
@@ -97,14 +97,14 @@* The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise * from the devices are: * -* void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); +* void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, * unsigned int value); * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq); * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); -* void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, +* void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count, * size_t entropy); -* void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); +* void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size); * * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ static int crng_init = 0;#define crng_ready () (likely(crng_init > 1))static int crng_init_cnt =0 ;static void process_random_ready_list (void ); -static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes); +static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,size_t nbytes);static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT ("warn_unseeded_randomness" ,HZ ,3 );
@@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disstatic struct {struct blake2s_state hash;spinlock_t lock; -int entropy_count; +unsigned int entropy_count; } input_pool = { .hash.h = {BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 |BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ),BLAKE2S_IV1 ,BLAKE2S_IV2 ,BLAKE2S_IV3 ,BLAKE2S_IV4 ,
@@ -309,18 +309,12 @@ static void crng_reseed(void);* update the entropy estimate. The caller should call * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate. */ -static void _mix_pool_bytes (const void *in,int nbytes) +static void _mix_pool_bytes (const void *in,size_t nbytes) {blake2s_update (&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes); } -static void __mix_pool_bytes (const void *in,int nbytes) -{ -trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock (nbytes, _RET_IP_); -_mix_pool_bytes (in, nbytes); -} - -static void mix_pool_bytes (const void *in,int nbytes) +static void mix_pool_bytes (const void *in,size_t nbytes) {unsigned long flags;
@@ -384,18 +378,18 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vospin_unlock_irqrestore (&random_ready_list_lock, flags); } -static void credit_entropy_bits (int nbits) +static void credit_entropy_bits (size_t nbits) { -int entropy_count, orig; +unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add; -if (nbits <=0 ) +if (!nbits)return ; - nbits =min (nbits,POOL_BITS ); + add =min_t (size_t, nbits,POOL_BITS );do { orig =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count); - entropy_count =min (POOL_BITS , orig + nbits); + entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); }while (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);trace_credit_entropy_bits (nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_);
@@ -442,10 +436,10 @@ static void invalidate_batched_entropy(v* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of * bytes processed from cp. */ -static size_t crng_fast_load (const u8 *cp,size_t len) +static size_t crng_fast_load (const void *cp,size_t len) {unsigned long flags; -u8 *p; +const u8 *src = (const u8 *)cp;size_t ret =0 ;if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags))
@@ -454,10 +448,9 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *cspin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);return 0 ; } - p = base_crng.key;while (len >0 && crng_init_cnt <CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) { - p[crng_init_cnt %sizeof (base_crng.key)] ^= *cp; - cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; + base_crng.key[crng_init_cnt %sizeof (base_crng.key)] ^= *src; + src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; }if (crng_init_cnt >=CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) {invalidate_batched_entropy ();
@@ -527,42 +520,30 @@ static struct crng_state *select_crng(vo* all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of * crng_fast_load(). * -* So we do something more comprehensive which is guaranteed to touch -* all of the primary_crng's state, and which uses a LFSR with a -* period of 255 as part of the mixing algorithm. Finally, we do -* *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be something -* like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be -* unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. +* So, we simply hash the contents in with the current key. Finally, +* we do *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be +* something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very +* well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. */ -static int crng_slow_load (const u8 *cp,size_t len) +static void crng_slow_load (const void *cp,size_t len) {unsigned long flags; -static u8 lfsr =1 ; -u8 tmp; -unsigned int i, max =sizeof (base_crng.key); -const u8 *src_buf = cp; -u8 *dest_buf = base_crng.key; +struct blake2s_state hash; + +blake2s_init (&hash,sizeof (base_crng.key));if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags)) -return 0 ; +return ;if (crng_init !=0 ) {spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags); -return 0 ; +return ; } -if (len > max) - max = len; -for (i =0 ; i < max; i++) { - tmp = lfsr; - lfsr >>=1 ; -if (tmp &1 ) - lfsr ^=0xE1 ; - tmp = dest_buf[i %sizeof (base_crng.key)]; - dest_buf[i %sizeof (base_crng.key)] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr; - lfsr += (tmp <<3 ) | (tmp >>5 ); - } +blake2s_update (&hash, base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); +blake2s_update (&hash, cp, len); +blake2s_final (&hash, base_crng.key); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags); -return 1 ; }static void crng_reseed (void )
@@ -718,14 +699,15 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_sstatic ssize_t get_random_bytes_user (void __user *buf,size_t nbytes) {bool large_request = nbytes >256 ; -ssize_t ret =0 , len; +ssize_t ret =0 ; +size_t len;u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u32)];u8 output[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ];if (!nbytes)return 0 ; - len =min_t (ssize_t,32 , nbytes); + len =min_t (size_t,32 , nbytes);crng_make_state (chacha_state, output, len);if (copy_to_user (buf, output, len))
@@ -745,7 +727,7 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(voiif (unlikely (chacha_state[12 ] ==0 )) ++chacha_state[13 ]; - len =min_t (ssize_t, nbytes,CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ); + len =min_t (size_t, nbytes,CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE );if (copy_to_user (buf, output, len)) { ret = -EFAULT ;break ;
@@ -783,7 +765,7 @@ struct timer_rand_state {* the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely * identical devices. */ -void add_device_randomness (const void *buf,unsigned int size) +void add_device_randomness (const void *buf,size_t size) {unsigned long time =random_get_entropy () ^ jiffies;unsigned long flags;
@@ -811,7 +793,7 @@ static struct timer_rand_state input_tim* keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts. * */ -static void add_timer_randomness (struct timer_rand_state *state,unsigned num) +static void add_timer_randomness (struct timer_rand_state *state,unsigned int num) {struct {long jiffies;
@@ -855,7 +837,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct* Round down by 1 bit on general principles, * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. */ -credit_entropy_bits (min_t (int,fls (delta >>1 ),11 )); + credit_entropy_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11)); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
@@ -936,8 +918,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)add_interrupt_bench (cycles);if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { -if ((fast_pool->count >=64 ) && -crng_fast_load ((u8 *)fast_pool->pool,sizeof (fast_pool->pool)) >0 ) { +if (fast_pool->count >=64 && +crng_fast_load (fast_pool->pool,sizeof (fast_pool->pool)) >0 ) { fast_pool->count =0 ; fast_pool->last = now;if (spin_trylock (&input_pool.lock)) {
@@ -955,7 +937,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)return ; fast_pool->last = now; -__mix_pool_bytes (&fast_pool->pool,sizeof (fast_pool->pool)); +_mix_pool_bytes (&fast_pool->pool,sizeof (fast_pool->pool));spin_unlock (&input_pool.lock); fast_pool->count =0 ;
@@ -1064,18 +1046,18 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co* wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once * at any point prior. */ -static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes) +static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,size_t nbytes) {u32 chacha_state[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u32)];u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]; -ssize_t len; +size_t len;trace_get_random_bytes (nbytes, _RET_IP_);if (!nbytes)return ; - len =min_t (ssize_t,32 , nbytes); + len =min_t (size_t,32 , nbytes);crng_make_state (chacha_state, buf, len); nbytes -= len; buf += len;
@@ -1098,7 +1080,7 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,memzero_explicit (chacha_state,sizeof (chacha_state)); } -void get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes) +void get_random_bytes (void *buf,size_t nbytes) {static void *previous;
@@ -1259,25 +1241,19 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback)/* * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random -* number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will -* almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it -* is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as -* opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a -* key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but -* only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to -* have put in a back door. -* -* Return number of bytes filled in. +* number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for +* use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of +* bytes filled in. */ -int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes) +size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,size_t nbytes) { -int left = nbytes; +size_t left = nbytes;u8 *p = buf;trace_get_random_bytes_arch (left, _RET_IP_);while (left) {unsigned long v; -int chunk =min_t (int, left,sizeof (unsigned long )); +size_t chunk =min_t (size_t, left,sizeof (unsigned long ));if (!arch_get_random_long (&v))break ;
@@ -1310,12 +1286,12 @@ early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_tr*/ int __init rand_initialize (void ) { -int i; +size_t i;ktime_t now =ktime_get_real ();bool arch_init = true;unsigned long rv; -for (i =BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE ; i >0 ; i -=sizeof (rv)) { +for (i =0 ; i <BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE ; i +=sizeof (rv)) {if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early (&rv) && !arch_get_random_long_early (&rv)) { rv =random_get_entropy ();
@@ -1364,7 +1340,7 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struc nbytes =min_t (size_t, nbytes,INT_MAX >>6 ); ret =get_random_bytes_user (buf, nbytes); -trace_urandom_read (8 * nbytes,0 , input_pool.entropy_count); +trace_urandom_read (nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count);return ret; }
@@ -1408,19 +1384,18 @@ static unsigned int random_poll(struct freturn mask; } -static int write_pool (const char __user *buffer,size_t count) +static int write_pool (const char __user *ubuf,size_t count) { -size_t bytes; -u8 buf[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE ]; -const char __user *p = buffer; - -while (count >0 ) { - bytes =min (count,sizeof (buf)); -if (copy_from_user (buf, p, bytes)) +size_t len; +u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE ]; + +while (count) { + len =min (count,sizeof (block)); +if (copy_from_user (block, ubuf, len))return -EFAULT ; - count -= bytes; - p += bytes; -mix_pool_bytes (buf, bytes); + count -= len; + ubuf += len; +mix_pool_bytes (block, len);cond_resched (); }
@@ -1430,7 +1405,7 @@ static int write_pool(const char __userstatic ssize_t random_write (struct file *file,const char __user *buffer,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) { -size_t ret; +int ret; ret =write_pool (buffer, count);if (ret)
@@ -1524,8 +1499,6 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fop SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int, flags) { -int ret; -if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK |GRND_RANDOM |GRND_INSECURE ))return -EINVAL ;
@@ -1540,6 +1513,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user * count =INT_MAX ;if (!(flags &GRND_INSECURE ) && !crng_ready ()) { +int ret; +if (flags &GRND_NONBLOCK )return -EAGAIN ; ret =wait_for_random_bytes ();
@@ -1798,7 +1773,7 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned lo* Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled * when our pool is full. */ -void add_hwgenerator_randomness (const char *buffer,size_t count, +void add_hwgenerator_randomness (const void *buffer,size_t count,size_t entropy) {if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) {
@@ -1829,7 +1804,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_random* it would be regarded as device data. * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER. */ -void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *buf,unsigned int size) +void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *buf,size_t size) {if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER ))add_hwgenerator_randomness (buf, size, size *8 );
include/linux/hw_random.h +1 -1
@@ -61,6 +61,6 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct deextern void hwrng_unregister (struct hwrng *rng);extern void devm_hwrng_unregister (struct device *dve,struct hwrng *rng);/** Feed random bits into the pool. */ -extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness (const char *buffer,size_t count,size_t entropy); +extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness (const void *buffer,size_t count,size_t entropy);#endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */
include/linux/random.h +5 -5
@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ struct random_ready_callback {struct module *owner; }; -extern void add_device_randomness (const void *,unsigned int ); -extern void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *,unsigned int ); +extern void add_device_randomness (const void *,size_t ); +extern void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *,size_t );#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN ) && !defined(__CHECKER__)static inline void add_latent_entropy (void )
@@ -36,13 +36,13 @@ extern void add_input_randomness(unsigne unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; -extern void get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes); +extern void get_random_bytes (void *buf,size_t nbytes);extern int wait_for_random_bytes (void );extern int __init rand_initialize (void );extern bool rng_is_initialized (void );extern int add_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy);extern void del_random_ready_callback (struct random_ready_callback *rdy); -extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,int nbytes); +extern size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch (void *buf,size_t nbytes);#ifndef MODULE extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_l/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes). * Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */ -static inline int get_random_bytes_wait (void *buf,int nbytes) +static inline int get_random_bytes_wait (void *buf,size_t nbytes) {int ret =wait_for_random_bytes ();get_random_bytes (buf, nbytes);
include/trace/events/random.h +38 -41
211 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 142/264 random: do not take pool spinlock at boot
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit afba0b80b977b2a8f16234f2acd982f82710ba33 upstream.
Since rand_initialize() is run while interrupts are still off and nothing else is running, we don't need to repeatedly take and release the pool spinlock, especially in the RDSEED loop.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +3 -3
@@ -974,10 +974,10 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void) rv =random_get_entropy (); arch_init = false; } -mix_pool_bytes (&rv,sizeof (rv)); +_mix_pool_bytes (&rv,sizeof (rv)); } -mix_pool_bytes (&now,sizeof (now)); -mix_pool_bytes (utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ()))); +_mix_pool_bytes (&now,sizeof (now)); +_mix_pool_bytes (utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ())));extract_entropy (base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); ++base_crng.generation;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 108/264 random: access primary_pool directly rather than through pointer
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
commit ebf7606388732ecf2821ca21087e9446cb4a5b57 upstream.
Both crng_initialize_primary() and crng_init_try_arch_early() are only called for the primary_pool. Accessing it directly instead of through a function parameter simplifies the code.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +7 -7
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crreturn arch_init; } -static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early (struct crng_state *crng) +static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early (void ) {int i;bool arch_init = true;
@@ -774,7 +774,7 @@ static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_ea rv =random_get_entropy (); arch_init = false; } - crng->state[i] ^= rv; + primary_crng.state[i] ^= rv; }return arch_init;
@@ -788,16 +788,16 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(st crng->init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; } -static void __init crng_initialize_primary (struct crng_state *crng) +static void __init crng_initialize_primary (void ) { -_extract_entropy (&crng->state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 ); -if (crng_init_try_arch_early (crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) { +_extract_entropy (&primary_crng.state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 ); +if (crng_init_try_arch_early () && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) {invalidate_batched_entropy ();numa_crng_init (); crng_init =2 ;pr_notice ("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n" ); } - crng->init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; + primary_crng.init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; }static void crng_finalize_init (struct crng_state *crng)
@@ -1749,7 +1749,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)init_std_data ();if (crng_need_final_init)crng_finalize_init (&primary_crng); -crng_initialize_primary (&primary_crng); +crng_initialize_primary (); crng_global_init_time = jiffies;if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 98/264 random: remove unused extract_entropy() reserved argument
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 8b2d953b91e7f60200c24067ab17b77cc7bfd0d4 upstream.
This argument is always set to zero, as a result of us not caring about keeping a certain amount reserved in the pool these days. So just remove it and cleanup the function signatures.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 17 +++++++---------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +7 -10
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ struct entropy_store { };static ssize_t extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf, -size_t nbytes,int min,int rsvd); +size_t nbytes,int min);static ssize_t _extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf,size_t nbytes);
@@ -1040,7 +1040,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat } buf;if (r) { - num =extract_entropy (r, &buf,32 ,16 ,0 ); + num =extract_entropy (r, &buf,32 ,16 );if (num ==0 )return ; }else {
@@ -1378,8 +1378,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);* This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly. */ -static size_t account (struct entropy_store *r,size_t nbytes,int min, -int reserved) +static size_t account (struct entropy_store *r,size_t nbytes,int min) {int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;size_t ibytes, nfrac;
@@ -1393,7 +1392,7 @@ retry:/* never pull more than available */ have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 ); -if ((have_bytes -= reserved) <0 ) +if (have_bytes <0 ) have_bytes =0 ; ibytes =min_t (size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);if (ibytes < min)
@@ -1499,15 +1498,13 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct e* returns it in a buffer. * * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before -* failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the -* reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the -* pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers. +* failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding. */ static ssize_t extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf, -size_t nbytes,int min,int reserved) +size_t nbytes,int min) {trace_extract_entropy (r->name, nbytes,ENTROPY_BITS (r), _RET_IP_); - nbytes =account (r, nbytes, min, reserved); + nbytes =account (r, nbytes, min);return _extract_entropy (r, buf, nbytes); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 104/264 random: cleanup fractional entropy shift constants
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 18263c4e8e62f7329f38f5eadc568751242ca89c upstream.
The entropy estimator is calculated in terms of 1/8 bits, which means there are various constants where things are shifted by 3. Move these into our pool info enum with the other relevant constants. While we're at it, move an English assertion about sizes into a proper BUILD_BUG_ON so that the compiler can ensure this invariant.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 28 +++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +13 -15
@@ -360,16 +360,6 @@/* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ /* -* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is -* denominated in units of 1/8th bits. -* -* 2*(POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in -* credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. -*/ -#define POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 -#define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS () (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT) - -/* * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write * access to /dev/random.
@@ -426,8 +416,13 @@ enum poolinfo {POOL_WORDMASK =POOL_WORDS -1 ,POOL_BYTES =POOL_WORDS *sizeof (u32),POOL_BITS =POOL_BYTES *8 , -POOL_BITSHIFT =ilog2 (POOL_WORDS ) +5 , -POOL_FRACBITS =POOL_WORDS << (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +5 ), +POOL_BITSHIFT =ilog2 (POOL_BITS ), + +/* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is +* denominated in units of 1/8th bits. */ +POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT =3 , +#define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT) +POOL_FRACBITS =POOL_BITS <<POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT ,/* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ POOL_TAP1 = 104,
@@ -653,6 +648,9 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbitint entropy_count, entropy_bits, orig;int nfrac = nbits <<POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT ; +/* Ensure that the multiplication can avoid being 64 bits wide. */ +BUILD_BUG_ON (2 * (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +POOL_BITSHIFT ) >31 ); +if (!nbits)return ;
@@ -688,13 +686,13 @@ retry:/* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ do { -unsigned int anfrac =min (pnfrac,POOL_FRACBITS /2 ); +unsigned int anfrac =min (pnfrac,POOL_FRACBITS /2 );unsigned int add = - ((POOL_FRACBITS - entropy_count)*anfrac*3 ) >> s; + ((POOL_FRACBITS - entropy_count) * anfrac *3 ) >> s; entropy_count += add; pnfrac -= anfrac; - }while (unlikely (entropy_count <POOL_FRACBITS -2 && pnfrac)); + }while (unlikely (entropy_count <POOL_FRACBITS -2 && pnfrac)); }if (WARN_ON (entropy_count <0 )) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 115/264 random: remove use_input_pool parameter from crng_reseed()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 5d58ea3a31cc98b9fa563f6921d3d043bf0103d1 upstream.
The primary_crng is always reseeded from the input_pool, while the NUMA crngs are always reseeded from the primary_crng. Remove the redundant 'use_input_pool' parameter from crng_reseed() and just directly check whether the crng is the primary_crng.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +6 -6
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static struct {static void extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes); -static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng,bool use_input_pool); +static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng);/* * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(int nbittrace_credit_entropy_bits (nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_);if (crng_init <2 && entropy_count >=POOL_MIN_BITS ) -crng_reseed (&primary_crng, true); +crng_reseed (&primary_crng); }/*********************************************************************
@@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp,return 1 ; } -static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng,bool use_input_pool) +static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng) {unsigned long flags;int i;
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statu32 key[8 ]; } buf; -if (use_input_pool) { +if (crng == &primary_crng) {int entropy_count; do { entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
@@ -799,7 +799,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_st init_time =READ_ONCE (crng->init_time);if (time_after (READ_ONCE (crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||time_after (jiffies, init_time +CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL )) -crng_reseed (crng, crng == &primary_crng); +crng_reseed (crng); }spin_lock_irqsave (&crng->lock, flags);chacha20_block (&crng->state[0 ], out);
@@ -1598,7 +1598,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,return -EPERM ;if (crng_init <2 )return -ENODATA ; -crng_reseed (&primary_crng, true); +crng_reseed (&primary_crng);WRITE_ONCE (crng_global_init_time, jiffies -1 );return 0 ;default :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 86/264 random: mix bootloader randomness into pool
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 57826feeedb63b091f807ba8325d736775d39afd upstream.
If we're trusting bootloader randomness, crng_fast_load() is called by add_hwgenerator_randomness(), which sets us to crng_init==1. However, usually it is only called once for an initial 64-byte push, so bootloader entropy will not mix any bytes into the input pool. So it's conceivable that crng_init==1 when crng_initialize_primary() is called later, but then the input pool is empty. When that happens, the crng state key will be overwritten with extracted output from the empty input pool. That's bad.
In contrast, if we're not trusting bootloader randomness, we call crng_slow_load() *and* we call mix_pool_bytes(), so that later crng_initialize_primary() isn't drawing on nothing.
In order to prevent crng_initialize_primary() from extracting an empty pool, have the trusted bootloader case mirror that of the untrusted bootloader case, mixing the input into the pool.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +6 -2
@@ -2285,8 +2285,12 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const chstruct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { -crng_fast_load (buffer, count); -return ; +size_t ret =crng_fast_load (buffer, count); +mix_pool_bytes (poolp, buffer, ret); + count -= ret; + buffer += ret; +if (!count || crng_init ==0 ) +return ; }/* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 94/264 random: cleanup poolinfo abstraction
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 91ec0fe138f107232cb36bc6112211db37cb5306 upstream.
Now that we're only using one polynomial, we can cleanup its representation into constants, instead of passing around pointers dynamically to select different polynomials. This improves the codegen and makes the code a bit more straightforward.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +30 -37
@@ -432,14 +432,20 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28* polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be * irreducible, which we have made here. */ -static const struct poolinfo { -int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolfracbits; -#define S (x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5) -int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; -} poolinfo_table[] = { -/* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ +enum poolinfo { +POOL_WORDS =128 , +POOL_WORDMASK =POOL_WORDS -1 , +POOL_BYTES =POOL_WORDS *sizeof (u32), +POOL_BITS =POOL_BYTES *8 , +POOL_BITSHIFT =ilog2 (POOL_WORDS ) +5 , +POOL_FRACBITS =POOL_WORDS << (ENTROPY_SHIFT +5 ), +/* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ - {S (128 ),104 ,76 ,51 ,25 ,1 }, +POOL_TAP1 =104 , +POOL_TAP2 =76 , +POOL_TAP3 =51 , +POOL_TAP4 =25 , +POOL_TAP5 =1 };/*
@@ -506,7 +512,6 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disstruct entropy_store ;struct entropy_store {/* read-only data: */ -const struct poolinfo *poolinfo;__u32 *pool;const char *name;
@@ -528,7 +533,6 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;static struct entropy_store input_pool = { - .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0 ], .name ="input" , .lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (input_pool.lock), .pool = input_pool_data
@@ -551,33 +555,26 @@ static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {static void _mix_pool_bytes (struct entropy_store *r,const void *in,int nbytes) { -unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5; +unsigned long i;int input_rotate; -int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords -1 ;const unsigned char *bytes = in;__u32 w; - tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1; - tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2; - tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3; - tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4; - tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5; - input_rotate = r->input_rotate; i = r->add_ptr;/* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */ while (nbytes--) { w =rol32 (*bytes++, input_rotate); - i = (i -1 ) & wordmask; + i = (i -1 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ;/* XOR in the various taps */ w ^= r->pool[i]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask]; - w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask]; + w ^= r->pool[(i +POOL_TAP1 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; + w ^= r->pool[(i +POOL_TAP2 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; + w ^= r->pool[(i +POOL_TAP3 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; + w ^= r->pool[(i +POOL_TAP4 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; + w ^= r->pool[(i +POOL_TAP5 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ];/* Mix the result back in with a twist */ r->pool[i] = (w >>3 ) ^ twist_table[w &7 ];
@@ -675,7 +672,6 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vostatic void credit_entropy_bits (struct entropy_store *r,int nbits) {int entropy_count, orig; -const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;int nfrac = nbits <<ENTROPY_SHIFT ;if (!nbits)
@@ -709,25 +705,25 @@ retry:* turns no matter how large nbits is. */ int pnfrac = nfrac; -const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift +ENTROPY_SHIFT +2 ; +const int s =POOL_BITSHIFT +ENTROPY_SHIFT +2 ;/* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ do { -unsigned int anfrac =min (pnfrac, pool_size/2 ); +unsigned int anfrac =min (pnfrac,POOL_FRACBITS /2 );unsigned int add = - ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3 ) >> s; + ((POOL_FRACBITS - entropy_count)*anfrac*3 ) >> s; entropy_count += add; pnfrac -= anfrac; - }while (unlikely (entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac)); + }while (unlikely (entropy_count <POOL_FRACBITS -2 && pnfrac)); }if (WARN_ON (entropy_count <0 )) {pr_warn ("negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n" , r->name, entropy_count); entropy_count =0 ; - }else if (entropy_count > pool_size) - entropy_count = pool_size; + }else if (entropy_count >POOL_FRACBITS ) + entropy_count =POOL_FRACBITS ;if (cmpxchg (&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry;
@@ -744,13 +740,11 @@ retry:static int credit_entropy_bits_safe (struct entropy_store *r,int nbits) { -const int nbits_max = r->poolinfo->poolwords *32 ; -if (nbits <0 )return -EINVAL ;/* Cap the value to avoid overflows */ - nbits =min (nbits, nbits_max); + nbits =min (nbits,POOL_BITS );credit_entropy_bits (r, nbits);return 0 ;
@@ -1394,7 +1388,7 @@ static size_t account(struct entropy_stoint entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;size_t ibytes, nfrac; -BUG_ON (r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits); +BUG_ON (r->entropy_count >POOL_FRACBITS );/* Can we pull enough? */ retry:
@@ -1460,8 +1454,7 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_s/* Generate a hash across the pool */ spin_lock_irqsave (&r->lock, flags); -blake2s_update (&state, (const u8 *)r->pool, - r->poolinfo->poolwords *sizeof (*r->pool)); +blake2s_update (&state, (const u8 *)r->pool,POOL_BYTES );blake2s_final (&state, hash);/* final zeros out state */ /*
@@ -1756,7 +1749,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(structunsigned long rv;mix_pool_bytes (r, &now,sizeof (now)); -for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i >0 ; i -=sizeof (rv)) { +for (i =POOL_BYTES ; i >0 ; i -=sizeof (rv)) {if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) && !arch_get_random_long (&rv)) rv =random_get_entropy ();
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 117/264 random: fix locking in crng_fast_load()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
commit 7c2fe2b32bf76441ff5b7a425b384e5f75aa530a upstream.
crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, so keep holding that lock when incrementing crng_init from 0 to 1 in crng_fast_load(). The call to pr_notice() can wait until the lock is released; this code path cannot be reached twice, as crng_fast_load() aborts early if crng_init > 0.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +3 -2
@@ -647,12 +647,13 @@ static size_t crng_fast_load(const u8 *c p[crng_init_cnt %CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ] ^= *cp; cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; } -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags);if (crng_init_cnt >=CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) {invalidate_batched_entropy (); crng_init =1 ; -pr_notice ("fast init done\n" ); } +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); +if (crng_init ==1 ) +pr_notice ("fast init done\n" );return ret; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 101/264 random: remove unused OUTPUT_POOL constants
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 0f63702718c91d89c922081ac1e6baeddc2d8b1a upstream.
We no longer have an output pool. Rather, we have just a wakeup bits threshold for /dev/random reads, presumably so that processes don't hang. This value, random_write_wakeup_bits, is configurable anyway. So all the no longer usefully named OUTPUT_POOL constants were doing was setting a reasonable default for random_write_wakeup_bits. This commit gets rid of the constants and just puts it all in the default value of random_write_wakeup_bits.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -3
@@ -364,8 +364,6 @@*/ #define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) -#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10 -#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))#define EXTRACT_SIZE (BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2)/*
@@ -383,7 +381,7 @@* should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write * access to /dev/random. */ -static int random_write_wakeup_bits =28 *OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS ; +static int random_write_wakeup_bits =28 * (1 <<5 );/* * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 99/264 random: try to actively add entropy rather than passively wait for it
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit 50ee7529ec4500c88f8664560770a7a1b65db72b upstream.
For 5.3 we had to revert a nice ext4 IO pattern improvement, because it caused a bootup regression due to lack of entropy at bootup together with arguably broken user space that was asking for secure random numbers when it really didn't need to.
See commit 72dbcf721566 (Revert "ext4: make __ext4_get_inode_loc plug").
This aims to solve the issue by actively generating entropy noise using the CPU cycle counter when waiting for the random number generator to initialize. This only works when you have a high-frequency time stamp counter available, but that's the case on all modern x86 CPU's, and on most other modern CPU's too.
What we do is to generate jitter entropy from the CPU cycle counter under a somewhat complex load: calling the scheduler while also guaranteeing a certain amount of timing noise by also triggering a timer.
I'm sure we can tweak this, and that people will want to look at other alternatives, but there's been a number of papers written on jitter entropy, and this should really be fairly conservative by crediting one bit of entropy for every timer-induced jump in the cycle counter. Not because the timer itself would be all that unpredictable, but because the interaction between the timer and the loop is going to be.
Even if (and perhaps particularly if) the timer actually happens on another CPU, the cacheline interaction between the loop that reads the cycle counter and the timer itself firing is going to add perturbations to the cycle counter values that get mixed into the entropy pool.
As Thomas pointed out, with a modern out-of-order CPU, even quite simple loops show a fair amount of hard-to-predict timing variability even in the absense of external interrupts. But this tries to take that further by actually having a fairly complex interaction.
This is not going to solve the entropy issue for architectures that have no CPU cycle counter, but it's not clear how (and if) that is solvable, and the hardware in question is largely starting to be irrelevant. And by doing this we can at least avoid some of the even more contentious approaches (like making the entropy waiting time out in order to avoid the possibly unbounded waiting).
--- drivers/char/random.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +61 -1
@@ -1573,6 +1573,56 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nby }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_bytes); + +/* +* Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable +* jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another +* CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is +* generating entropy.. +* +* Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are +* happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more +* complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the +* entropy loop is running. +* +* So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself. +*/ +static void entropy_timer (unsigned long data) +{ +credit_entropy_bits (&input_pool,1 ); +} + +/* +* If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can +* generate enough entropy with timing noise +*/ +static void try_to_generate_entropy (void ) +{ +struct { +unsigned long now; +struct timer_list timer; + } stack; + + stack.now =random_get_entropy (); + +/* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */ +if (stack.now ==random_get_entropy ()) +return ; + +__setup_timer_on_stack (&stack.timer, entropy_timer,0 ,0 ); +while (!crng_ready ()) { +if (!timer_pending (&stack.timer)) +mod_timer (&stack.timer, jiffies+1 ); +mix_pool_bytes (&input_pool, &stack.now,sizeof (stack.now)); +schedule (); + stack.now =random_get_entropy (); + } + +del_timer_sync (&stack.timer); +destroy_timer_on_stack (&stack.timer); +mix_pool_bytes (&input_pool, &stack.now,sizeof (stack.now)); +} +/* * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
@@ -1587,7 +1637,17 @@ int wait_for_random_bytes(void) {if (likely (crng_ready ()))return 0 ; -return wait_event_interruptible (crng_init_wait,crng_ready ()); + +do { +int ret; + ret =wait_event_interruptible_timeout (crng_init_wait,crng_ready (),HZ ); +if (ret) +return ret >0 ?0 : ret; + +try_to_generate_entropy (); + }while (!crng_ready ()); + +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (wait_for_random_bytes);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 112/264 random: use linear min-entropy accumulation crediting
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit c570449094844527577c5c914140222cb1893e3f upstream.
30e37ec516ae ("random: account for entropy loss due to overwrites") assumed that adding new entropy to the LFSR pool probabilistically cancelled out old entropy there, so entropy was credited asymptotically, approximating Shannon entropy of independent sources (rather than a stronger min-entropy notion) using 1/8th fractional bits and replacing a constant 2-2/√𝑒 term (~0.786938) with 3/4 (0.75) to slightly underestimate it. This wasn't superb, but it was perhaps better than nothing, so that's what was done. Which entropy specifically was being cancelled out and how much precisely each time is hard to tell, though as I showed with the attack code in my previous commit, a motivated adversary with sufficient information can actually cancel out everything.
Since we're no longer using an LFSR for entropy accumulation, this probabilistic cancellation is no longer relevant. Rather, we're now using a computational hash function as the accumulator and we've switched to working in the random oracle model, from which we can now revisit the question of min-entropy accumulation, which is done in detail in <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/198>.
Consider a long input bit string that is built by concatenating various smaller independent input bit strings. Each one of these inputs has a designated min-entropy, which is what we're passing to credit_entropy_bits(h). When we pass the concatenation of these to a random oracle, it means that an adversary trying to receive back the same reply as us would need to become certain about each part of the concatenated bit string we passed in, which means becoming certain about all of those h values. That means we can estimate the accumulation by simply adding up the h values in calls to credit_entropy_bits(h); there's no probabilistic cancellation at play like there was said to be for the LFSR. Incidentally, this is also what other entropy accumulators based on computational hash functions do as well.
So this commit replaces credit_entropy_bits(h) with essentially total = min(POOL_BITS, total + h), done with a cmpxchg loop as before.
What if we're wrong and the above is nonsense? It's not, but let's assume we don't want the actual _behavior_ of the code to change much. Currently that behavior is not extracting from the input pool until it has 128 bits of entropy in it. With the old algorithm, we'd hit that magic 128 number after roughly 256 calls to credit_entropy_bits(1). So, we can retain more or less the old behavior by waiting to extract from the input pool until it hits 256 bits of entropy using the new code. For people concerned about this change, it means that there's not that much practical behavioral change. And for folks actually trying to model the behavior rigorously, it means that we have an even higher margin against attacks.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 114 ++++++++------------------------------------------ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +20 -94
@@ -287,17 +287,9 @@/* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ -enum poolinfo { +enum {POOL_BITS =BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE *8 , -POOL_BITSHIFT =ilog2 (POOL_BITS ), -POOL_MIN_BITS =POOL_BITS /2 , - -/* To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is -* denominated in units of 1/8th bits. */ -POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT =3 , -#define POOL_ENTROPY_BITS() (input_pool.entropy_count >> POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT) - POOL_FRACBITS = POOL_BITS << POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT, -POOL_MIN_FRACBITS =POOL_MIN_BITS <<POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +POOL_MIN_BITS =POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */ };/*
@@ -310,7 +302,7 @@ static struct fasync_struct *fasync;* should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write * access to /dev/random. */ -static int random_write_wakeup_bits =POOL_BITS *3 /4 ; +static int random_write_wakeup_bits =POOL_MIN_BITS ;static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (random_ready_list_lock);static LIST_HEAD (random_ready_list);
@@ -470,66 +462,18 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vostatic void credit_entropy_bits (int nbits) {int entropy_count, orig; -int nfrac = nbits <<POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT ; - -/* Ensure that the multiplication can avoid being 64 bits wide. */ -BUILD_BUG_ON (2 * (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +POOL_BITSHIFT ) >31 );if (!nbits)return ; -retry: - entropy_count = orig =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count); -if (nfrac <0 ) { -/* Debit */ - entropy_count += nfrac; - }else { -/* -* Credit: we have to account for the possibility of -* overwriting already present entropy. Even in the -* ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions -* approach the full value asymptotically: -* -* entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) * -* (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) -* -* For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then -* (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >= -* (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869... -* so we can approximate the exponential with -* 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the -* safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time. -* -* The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to -* prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop -* arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2 -* turns no matter how large nbits is. -*/ -int pnfrac = nfrac; -const int s =POOL_BITSHIFT +POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +2 ; -/* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */ - -do { -unsigned int anfrac =min (pnfrac,POOL_FRACBITS /2 ); -unsigned int add = - ((POOL_FRACBITS - entropy_count) * anfrac *3 ) >> s; - - entropy_count += add; - pnfrac -= anfrac; - }while (unlikely (entropy_count <POOL_FRACBITS -2 && pnfrac)); - } - -if (WARN_ON (entropy_count <0 )) { -pr_warn ("negative entropy/overflow: count %d\n" , entropy_count); - entropy_count =0 ; - }else if (entropy_count >POOL_FRACBITS ) - entropy_count =POOL_FRACBITS ; -if (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) - goto retry; +do { + orig =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count); + entropy_count =min (POOL_BITS , orig + nbits); + }while (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); -trace_credit_entropy_bits (nbits, entropy_count >>POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT , _RET_IP_); +trace_credit_entropy_bits (nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_); -if (crng_init <2 && entropy_count >=POOL_MIN_FRACBITS ) +if (crng_init <2 && entropy_count >=POOL_MIN_BITS )crng_reseed (&primary_crng, true); }
@@ -842,7 +786,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statint entropy_count;do { entropy_count =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count); -if (entropy_count <POOL_MIN_FRACBITS ) +if (entropy_count <POOL_MIN_BITS )return ; }while (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count,0 ) != entropy_count);extract_entropy (buf.key,sizeof (buf.key));
@@ -1065,7 +1009,7 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int t last_value = value;add_timer_randomness (&input_timer_state, (type <<4 ) ^ code ^ (code >>4 ) ^ value); -trace_add_input_randomness (POOL_ENTROPY_BITS ()); +trace_add_input_randomness (input_pool.entropy_count); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_input_randomness);
@@ -1163,7 +1107,7 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendiskreturn ;/* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ add_timer_randomness (disk->random,0x100 +disk_devt (disk)); - trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), POOL_ENTROPY_BITS()); + trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), input_pool.entropy_count); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_disk_randomness);#endif
@@ -1188,7 +1132,7 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s } block;size_t i; -trace_extract_entropy (nbytes,POOL_ENTROPY_BITS ()); +trace_extract_entropy (nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count);for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (block.rdrand); ++i) {if (!arch_get_random_long (&block.rdrand[i]))
@@ -1537,9 +1481,9 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn(struc {int ret; - nbytes =min_t (size_t, nbytes,INT_MAX >> (POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 )); + nbytes =min_t (size_t, nbytes,INT_MAX >>6 ); ret =extract_crng_user (buf, nbytes); -trace_urandom_read (8 * nbytes,0 ,POOL_ENTROPY_BITS ()); +trace_urandom_read (8 * nbytes,0 , input_pool.entropy_count);return ret; }
@@ -1578,7 +1522,7 @@ static unsigned int random_poll(struct f mask =0 ;if (crng_ready ()) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ; -if (POOL_ENTROPY_BITS () < random_write_wakeup_bits) +if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_bits) mask |=POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ;return mask; }
@@ -1633,8 +1577,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,switch (cmd) {case RNDGETENTCNT :/* inherently racy, no point locking */ - ent_count =POOL_ENTROPY_BITS (); -if (put_user (ent_count, p)) +if (put_user (input_pool.entropy_count, p))return -EFAULT ;return 0 ;case RNDADDTOENTCNT :
@@ -1780,23 +1723,6 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_tablereturn proc_dostring (&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); } -/* -* Return entropy available scaled to integral bits -*/ -static int proc_do_entropy (struct ctl_table *table,int write, -void __user *buffer,size_t *lenp,loff_t *ppos) -{ -struct ctl_table fake_table; -int entropy_count; - - entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >>POOL_ENTROPY_SHIFT ; - - fake_table.data = &entropy_count; - fake_table.maxlen =sizeof (entropy_count); - -return proc_dointvec (&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); -} -static int sysctl_poolsize =POOL_BITS ;extern struct ctl_table random_table[];struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
@@ -1809,10 +1735,10 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { }, { .procname = "entropy_avail", + .data = &input_pool.entropy_count, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0444, - .proc_handler = proc_do_entropy, - .data = &input_pool.entropy_count, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, { .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold",
@@ -2008,7 +1934,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch*/ wait_event_interruptible_timeout (random_write_wait, !system_wq ||kthread_should_stop () || -POOL_ENTROPY_BITS () <= random_write_wakeup_bits, + input_pool.entropy_count <= random_write_wakeup_bits,CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL );mix_pool_bytes (buffer, count);credit_entropy_bits (entropy);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 125/264 random: zero buffer after reading entropy from userspace
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 7b5164fb1279bf0251371848e40bae646b59b3a8 upstream.
This buffer may contain entropic data that shouldn't stick around longer than needed, so zero out the temporary buffer at the end of write_pool().
--- drivers/char/random.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +14 -6
@@ -552,6 +552,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)int entropy_count;unsigned long next_gen;u8 key[CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE ]; +bool finalize_init = false;/* * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool,
@@ -579,12 +580,14 @@ static void crng_reseed(void) ++next_gen;WRITE_ONCE (base_crng.generation, next_gen);WRITE_ONCE (base_crng.birth, jiffies); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags); -memzero_explicit (key,sizeof (key)); -if (crng_init <2 ) {invalidate_batched_entropy (); crng_init =2 ; + finalize_init = true; + } +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags); +memzero_explicit (key,sizeof (key)); +if (finalize_init) {process_random_ready_list ();wake_up_interruptible (&crng_init_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN );
@@ -1386,19 +1389,24 @@ static unsigned int random_poll(struct fstatic int write_pool (const char __user *ubuf,size_t count) {size_t len; +int ret =0 ;u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE ];while (count) { len =min (count,sizeof (block)); -if (copy_from_user (block, ubuf, len)) -return -EFAULT ; +if (copy_from_user (block, ubuf, len)) { + ret = -EFAULT ; + goto out; + } count -= len; ubuf += len;mix_pool_bytes (block, len);cond_resched (); } -return 0 ; +out: +memzero_explicit (block,sizeof (block)); +return ret; } static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 113/264 random: always wake up entropy writers after extraction
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 489c7fc44b5740d377e8cfdbf0851036e493af00 upstream.
Now that POOL_BITS == POOL_MIN_BITS, we must unconditionally wake up entropy writers after every extraction. Therefore there's no point of write_wakeup_threshold, so we can move it to the dustbin of unused compatibility sysctls. While we're at it, we can fix a small comparison where we were waking up after <= min rather than < min.
--- Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/char/random.c | 36 ++++++++++++-------------------- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +42 -2
@@ -777,9 +777,49 @@ The kernel command line parameter printk a one-time setting until next reboot: once set, it cannot be changed by this sysctl interface anymore. -============================================================== +pty +=== -randomize_va_space: +See Documentation/filesystems/devpts.rst. + + +random +====== + +This is a directory, with the following entries: + +* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and + unvarying after that; + +* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits; + +* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits; + +* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum + number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is + writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect + on any RNG behavior. + +* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can + thus be used to generate UUIDs at will); + +* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this + (as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random`` + are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but + writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior. + +If ``drivers/char/random.c`` is built with ``ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH`` +defined, these additional entries are present: + +* ``add_interrupt_avg_cycles``: the average number of cycles between + interrupts used to feed the pool; + +* ``add_interrupt_avg_deviation``: the standard deviation seen on the + number of cycles between interrupts used to feed the pool. + + +randomize_va_space +================== This option can be used to select the type of process address space randomization that is used in the system, for architectures
drivers/char/random.c +14 -22
@@ -297,12 +297,6 @@ enum {*/ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD (random_write_wait);static struct fasync_struct *fasync; -/* -* If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we -* should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write -* access to /dev/random. -*/ -static int random_write_wakeup_bits =POOL_MIN_BITS ;static DEFINE_SPINLOCK (random_ready_list_lock);static LIST_HEAD (random_ready_list);
@@ -790,10 +784,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statreturn ; }while (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count,0 ) != entropy_count);extract_entropy (buf.key,sizeof (buf.key)); -if (random_write_wakeup_bits) { -wake_up_interruptible (&random_write_wait); -kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_OUT ); - } +wake_up_interruptible (&random_write_wait); +kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_OUT ); }else {_extract_crng (&primary_crng, buf.block); _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
@@ -1522,7 +1514,7 @@ static unsigned int random_poll(struct f mask =0 ;if (crng_ready ()) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ; -if (input_pool.entropy_count < random_write_wakeup_bits) +if (input_pool.entropy_count <POOL_MIN_BITS ) mask |=POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ;return mask; }
@@ -1607,7 +1599,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,*/ if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ; - input_pool.entropy_count =0 ; +if (xchg (&input_pool.entropy_count,0 )) { +wake_up_interruptible (&random_write_wait); +kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_OUT ); + }return 0 ;case RNDRESEEDCRNG :if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))
@@ -1682,9 +1677,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *#include <linux/sysctl.h> -static int min_write_thresh; -static int max_write_thresh =POOL_BITS ;static int random_min_urandom_seed =60 ; +static int random_write_wakeup_bits =POOL_MIN_BITS ; +static int sysctl_poolsize =POOL_BITS ;static char sysctl_bootid[16 ];/*
@@ -1723,7 +1718,6 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_tablereturn proc_dostring (&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); } -static int sysctl_poolsize =POOL_BITS ;extern struct ctl_table random_table[];struct ctl_table random_table[] = { {
@@ -1745,9 +1739,7 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, - .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, - .extra1 = &min_write_thresh, - .extra2 = &max_write_thresh, + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec, }, { .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
@@ -1928,13 +1920,13 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch }/* Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold. -* We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, -* when the calling thread is about to terminate, or once -* CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has lapsed. +* We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when +* the calling thread is about to terminate, or once +* CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed. */ wait_event_interruptible_timeout (random_write_wait, !system_wq ||kthread_should_stop () || - input_pool.entropy_count <= random_write_wakeup_bits, + input_pool.entropy_count <POOL_MIN_BITS ,CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL );mix_pool_bytes (buffer, count);credit_entropy_bits (entropy);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 91/264 random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 2ee25b6968b1b3c66ffa408de23d023c1bce81cf upstream.
RDRAND is not fast. RDRAND is actually quite slow. We've known this for a while, which is why functions like get_random_u{32,64} were converted to use batching of our ChaCha-based CRNG instead.
Yet CRNG extraction still includes a call to RDRAND, in the hot path of every call to get_random_bytes(), /dev/urandom, and getrandom(2).
This call to RDRAND here seems quite superfluous. CRNG is already extracting things based on a 256-bit key, based on good entropy, which is then reseeded periodically, updated, backtrack-mutated, and so forth. The CRNG extraction construction is something that we're already relying on to be secure and solid. If it's not, that's a serious problem, and it's unlikely that mixing in a measly 32 bits from RDRAND is going to alleviate things.
And in the case where the CRNG doesn't have enough entropy yet, we're already initializing the ChaCha key row with RDRAND in crng_init_try_arch_early().
Removing the call to RDRAND improves performance on an i7-11850H by 370%. In other words, the vast majority of the work done by extract_crng() prior to this commit was devoted to fetching 32 bits of RDRAND.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -3
@@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statstatic void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng,__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ]) { -unsigned long v, flags, init_time; +unsigned long flags, init_time;if (crng_ready ()) { init_time =READ_ONCE (crng->init_time);
@@ -1084,8 +1084,6 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_st &input_pool : NULL); }spin_lock_irqsave (&crng->lock, flags); -if (arch_get_random_long (&v)) - crng->state[14 ] ^= v;chacha20_block (&crng->state[0 ], out);if (crng->state[12 ] ==0 ) crng->state[13 ]++;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 95/264 crypto: chacha20 - Fix chacha20_block() keystream alignment (again)
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a5e9f557098e54af44ade5d501379be18435bfbf ]
In commit 9f480faec58c ("crypto: chacha20 - Fix keystream alignment for chacha20_block()"), I had missed that chacha20_block() can be called directly on the buffer passed to get_random_bytes(), which can have any alignment. So, while my commit didn't break anything, it didn't fully solve the alignment problems.
Revert my solution and just update chacha20_block() to use put_unaligned_le32(), so the output buffer need not be aligned. This is simpler, and on many CPUs it's the same speed.
But, I kept the 'tmp' buffers in extract_crng_user() and _get_random_bytes() 4-byte aligned, since that alignment is actually needed for _crng_backtrack_protect() too.
--- crypto/chacha20_generic.c | 7 ++++--- drivers/char/random.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ include/crypto/chacha20.h | 3 +-- lib/chacha20.c | 6 +++--- 4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
crypto/chacha20_generic.c +4 -3
@@ -23,20 +23,21 @@ static inline u32 le32_to_cpuvp(const vostatic void chacha20_docrypt (u32 *state,u8 *dst,const u8 *src,unsigned int bytes) { -u32 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ]; +/* aligned to potentially speed up crypto_xor() */ +u8 stream[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]__aligned(sizeof(long)) ;if (dst != src)memcpy (dst, src, bytes);while (bytes >=CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ) {chacha20_block (state, stream); -crypto_xor (dst, (const u8 *)stream,CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ); +crypto_xor (dst, stream,CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ); bytes -=CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ; dst +=CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ; }if (bytes) {chacha20_block (state, stream); -crypto_xor (dst, (const u8 *)stream, bytes); +crypto_xor (dst, stream, bytes); } }
drivers/char/random.c +12 -12
@@ -486,9 +486,9 @@ static int crng_init_cnt = 0;static unsigned long crng_global_init_time =0 ;#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)static void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng, -__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ]); +__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]);static void _crng_backtrack_protect (struct crng_state *crng, -__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ],int used); +__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used);static void process_random_ready_list (void );static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes);
@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statunsigned long flags;int i, num;union { -__u32 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ]; +__u8 block[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ];__u32 key[8 ]; } buf;
@@ -1066,7 +1066,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat }static void _extract_crng (struct crng_state *crng, -__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ]) +__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) {unsigned long flags, init_time;
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_stspin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); } -static void extract_crng (__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ]) +static void extract_crng (__u8 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]) {_extract_crng (select_crng (), out); }
@@ -1094,7 +1094,7 @@ static void extract_crng(__u32 out[CHACH* enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection. */ static void _crng_backtrack_protect (struct crng_state *crng, -__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ],int used) +__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) {unsigned long flags;__u32 *s, *d;
@@ -1106,14 +1106,14 @@ static void _crng_backtrack_protect(stru used =0 ; }spin_lock_irqsave (&crng->lock, flags); - s = &tmp[used /sizeof (__u32)]; + s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used]; d = &crng->state[4 ];for (i=0 ; i <8 ; i++) *d++ ^= *s++;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&crng->lock, flags); } -static void crng_backtrack_protect (__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ],int used) +static void crng_backtrack_protect (__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ],int used) {_crng_backtrack_protect (select_crng (), tmp, used); }
@@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u32static ssize_t extract_crng_user (void __user *buf,size_t nbytes) {ssize_t ret =0 , i =CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ; -__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ]; +__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]__aligned(4) ;int large_request = (nbytes >256 );while (nbytes) {
@@ -1580,7 +1580,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co*/ static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,int nbytes) { -__u32 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS ]; +__u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ]__aligned(4) ;trace_get_random_bytes (nbytes, _RET_IP_);
@@ -2167,7 +2167,7 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u64);spin_lock_irqsave (&batch->batch_lock, flags);if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u64) ==0 ) { -extract_crng ((__u32 *)batch->entropy_u64); +extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position =0 ; } ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
@@ -2191,7 +2191,7 @@ u32 get_random_u32(void) batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u32);spin_lock_irqsave (&batch->batch_lock, flags);if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u32) ==0 ) { -extract_crng (batch->entropy_u32); +extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position =0 ; } ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
include/crypto/chacha20.h +1 -2
@@ -11,13 +11,12 @@#define CHACHA20_IV_SIZE 16#define CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE 32#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE 64 -#define CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS (CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32))struct chacha20_ctx {u32 key[8 ]; }; -void chacha20_block (u32 *state,u32 *stream); +void chacha20_block (u32 *state,u8 *stream);void crypto_chacha20_init (u32 *state,struct chacha20_ctx *ctx,u8 *iv);int crypto_chacha20_setkey (struct crypto_tfm *tfm,const u8 *key,unsigned int keysize);
lib/chacha20.c +3 -3
@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ static inline u32 rotl32(u32 v, u8 n)return (v << n) | (v >> (sizeof (v) *8 - n)); } -void chacha20_block (u32 *state,u32 *stream) +void chacha20_block (u32 *state,u8 *stream) { -u32 x[16 ], *out = stream; +u32 x[16 ];int i;for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (x); i++)
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ void chacha20_block(u32 *state, u32 *str }for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (x); i++) - out[i] =cpu_to_le32 (x[i] + state[i]); +put_unaligned_le32 (x[i] + state[i], &stream[i *sizeof (u32)]); state[12 ]++; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 100/264 random: rather than entropy_store abstraction, use global
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 90ed1e67e896cc8040a523f8428fc02f9b164394 upstream.
Originally, the RNG used several pools, so having things abstracted out over a generic entropy_store object made sense. These days, there's only one input pool, and then an uneven mix of usage via the abstraction and usage via &input_pool. Rather than this uneasy mixture, just get rid of the abstraction entirely and have things always use the global. This simplifies the code and makes reading it a bit easier.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 219 ++++++++++++++++++------------------------ include/trace/events/random.h | 56 ++++------ 2 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 158 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +96 -123
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@* credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide. */ #define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3 -#define ENTROPY_BITS (r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT) +#define ENTROPY_BITS () (input_pool.entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)/* * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
@@ -506,33 +506,27 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis* **********************************************************************/ -struct entropy_store ; -struct entropy_store { +static u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; + +static struct {/* read-only data: */ u32 *pool; -const char *name;/* read-write data: */ spinlock_t lock;u16 add_ptr;u16 input_rotate;int entropy_count; -}; - -static ssize_t extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf, -size_t nbytes,int min); -static ssize_t _extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf, -size_t nbytes); - -static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng,struct entropy_store *r); -static u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy; - -static struct entropy_store input_pool = { - .name ="input" , +} input_pool = { .lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (input_pool.lock), .pool = input_pool_data }; +static ssize_t extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes,int min); +static ssize_t _extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes); + +static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng,bool use_input_pool); +static u32 const twist_table[8 ] = {0x00000000 ,0x3b6e20c8 ,0x76dc4190 ,0x4db26158 ,0xedb88320 ,0xd6d6a3e8 ,0x9b64c2b0 ,0xa00ae278 };
@@ -547,16 +541,15 @@ static u32 const twist_table[8] = {* it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits. */ -static void _mix_pool_bytes (struct entropy_store *r,const void *in, -int nbytes) +static void _mix_pool_bytes (const void *in,int nbytes) {unsigned long i;int input_rotate;const u8 *bytes = in;u32 w; - input_rotate = r->input_rotate; - i = r->add_ptr; + input_rotate = input_pool.input_rotate; + i = input_pool.add_ptr;/* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */ while (nbytes--) {
@@ -564,15 +557,15 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entro i = (i -1 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ;/* XOR in the various taps */ - w ^= r->pool[i]; - w ^= r->pool[(i +POOL_TAP1 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; - w ^= r->pool[(i +POOL_TAP2 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; - w ^= r->pool[(i +POOL_TAP3 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; - w ^= r->pool[(i +POOL_TAP4 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; - w ^= r->pool[(i +POOL_TAP5 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[i]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[(i +POOL_TAP1 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[(i +POOL_TAP2 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[(i +POOL_TAP3 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[(i +POOL_TAP4 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ]; + w ^= input_pool.pool[(i +POOL_TAP5 ) &POOL_WORDMASK ];/* Mix the result back in with a twist */ - r->pool[i] = (w >>3 ) ^ twist_table[w &7 ]; + input_pool.pool[i] = (w >>3 ) ^ twist_table[w &7 ];/* * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
@@ -583,26 +576,24 @@ static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entro input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ?7 :14 )) &31 ; } - r->input_rotate = input_rotate; - r->add_ptr = i; + input_pool.input_rotate = input_rotate; + input_pool.add_ptr = i; } -static void __mix_pool_bytes (struct entropy_store *r,const void *in, -int nbytes) +static void __mix_pool_bytes (const void *in,int nbytes) { -trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock (r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_); -_mix_pool_bytes (r, in, nbytes); +trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock (nbytes, _RET_IP_); +_mix_pool_bytes (in, nbytes); } -static void mix_pool_bytes (struct entropy_store *r,const void *in, -int nbytes) +static void mix_pool_bytes (const void *in,int nbytes) {unsigned long flags; -trace_mix_pool_bytes (r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_); -spin_lock_irqsave (&r->lock, flags); -_mix_pool_bytes (r, in, nbytes); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&r->lock, flags); +trace_mix_pool_bytes (nbytes, _RET_IP_); +spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags); +_mix_pool_bytes (in, nbytes); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&input_pool.lock, flags); }struct fast_pool {
@@ -664,16 +655,16 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vo* Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values. */ -static void credit_entropy_bits (struct entropy_store *r,int nbits) +static void credit_entropy_bits (int nbits) { -int entropy_count, orig; +int entropy_count, entropy_bits, orig;int nfrac = nbits <<ENTROPY_SHIFT ;if (!nbits)return ; retry: - entropy_count = orig =ACCESS_ONCE (r->entropy_count); + entropy_count = orig =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count);if (nfrac <0 ) {/* Debit */ entropy_count += nfrac;
@@ -714,26 +705,21 @@ retry: }if (WARN_ON (entropy_count <0 )) { -pr_warn ("negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n" , - r->name, entropy_count); +pr_warn ("negative entropy/overflow: count %d\n" , entropy_count); entropy_count =0 ; }else if (entropy_count >POOL_FRACBITS ) entropy_count =POOL_FRACBITS ; -if (cmpxchg (&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) +if (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; -trace_credit_entropy_bits (r->name, nbits, - entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT , _RET_IP_); +trace_credit_entropy_bits (nbits, entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT , _RET_IP_); -if (r == &input_pool) { -int entropy_bits = entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT ; - -if (crng_init <2 && entropy_bits >=128 ) -crng_reseed (&primary_crng, r); - } + entropy_bits = entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT ; +if (crng_init <2 && entropy_bits >=128 ) +crng_reseed (&primary_crng, true); } -static int credit_entropy_bits_safe (struct entropy_store *r,int nbits) +static int credit_entropy_bits_safe (int nbits) {if (nbits <0 )return -EINVAL ;
@@ -741,7 +727,7 @@ static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(stru/* Cap the value to avoid overflows */ nbits =min (nbits,POOL_BITS ); -credit_entropy_bits (r, nbits); +credit_entropy_bits (nbits);return 0 ; }
@@ -818,7 +804,7 @@ static void crng_initialize_secondary(ststatic void __init crng_initialize_primary (struct crng_state *crng) { -_extract_entropy (&input_pool, &crng->state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 ); +_extract_entropy (&crng->state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 );if (crng_init_try_arch_early (crng) && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) {invalidate_batched_entropy ();numa_crng_init ();
@@ -1030,7 +1016,7 @@ static int crng_slow_load(const u8 *cp,return 1 ; } -static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng,struct entropy_store *r) +static void crng_reseed (struct crng_state *crng,bool use_input_pool) {unsigned long flags;int i, num;
@@ -1039,8 +1025,8 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_statu32 key[8 ]; } buf; -if (r) { - num =extract_entropy (r, &buf,32 ,16 ); +if (use_input_pool) { + num =extract_entropy (&buf,32 ,16 );if (num ==0 )return ; }else {
@@ -1071,8 +1057,7 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_st init_time =READ_ONCE (crng->init_time);if (time_after (READ_ONCE (crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||time_after (jiffies, init_time +CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL )) -crng_reseed (crng, crng == &primary_crng ? - &input_pool :NULL ); +crng_reseed (crng, crng == &primary_crng); }spin_lock_irqsave (&crng->lock, flags);chacha20_block (&crng->state[0 ], out);
@@ -1183,8 +1168,8 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *btrace_add_device_randomness (size, _RET_IP_);spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags); -_mix_pool_bytes (&input_pool, buf, size); -_mix_pool_bytes (&input_pool, &time,sizeof (time)); +_mix_pool_bytes (buf, size); +_mix_pool_bytes (&time,sizeof (time));spin_unlock_irqrestore (&input_pool.lock, flags); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (add_device_randomness);
@@ -1203,7 +1188,6 @@ static struct timer_rand_state input_tim*/ static void add_timer_randomness (struct timer_rand_state *state,unsigned num) { -struct entropy_store *r;struct {long jiffies;unsigned int cycles;
@@ -1214,8 +1198,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct sample.jiffies = jiffies; sample.cycles =random_get_entropy (); sample.num = num; - r = &input_pool; -mix_pool_bytes (r, &sample,sizeof (sample)); +mix_pool_bytes (&sample,sizeof (sample));/* * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
@@ -1247,7 +1230,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct* Round down by 1 bit on general principles, * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. */ -credit_entropy_bits (r,min_t (int,fls (delta>>1 ),11 )); +credit_entropy_bits (min_t (int,fls (delta>>1 ),11 )); } void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
@@ -1262,7 +1245,7 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int t last_value = value;add_timer_randomness (&input_timer_state, (type <<4 ) ^ code ^ (code >>4 ) ^ value); -trace_add_input_randomness (ENTROPY_BITS (&input_pool)); +trace_add_input_randomness (ENTROPY_BITS ()); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_input_randomness);
@@ -1306,7 +1289,6 @@ static u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f,void add_interrupt_randomness (int irq) { -struct entropy_store *r;struct fast_pool *fast_pool =this_cpu_ptr (&irq_randomness);struct pt_regs *regs =get_irq_regs ();unsigned long now = jiffies;
@@ -1341,18 +1323,17 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))return ; - r = &input_pool; -if (!spin_trylock (&r->lock)) +if (!spin_trylock (&input_pool.lock))return ; fast_pool->last = now; -__mix_pool_bytes (r, &fast_pool->pool,sizeof (fast_pool->pool)); -spin_unlock (&r->lock); +__mix_pool_bytes (&fast_pool->pool,sizeof (fast_pool->pool)); +spin_unlock (&input_pool.lock); fast_pool->count =0 ;/* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */ -credit_entropy_bits (r,1 ); +credit_entropy_bits (1 ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_interrupt_randomness);
@@ -1363,7 +1344,7 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendiskreturn ;/* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ add_timer_randomness (disk->random,0x100 +disk_devt (disk)); - trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool)); + trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS()); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_disk_randomness);#endif
@@ -1378,16 +1359,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);* This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly. */ -static size_t account (struct entropy_store *r,size_t nbytes,int min) +static size_t account (size_t nbytes,int min) {int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;size_t ibytes, nfrac; -BUG_ON (r->entropy_count >POOL_FRACBITS ); +BUG_ON (input_pool.entropy_count >POOL_FRACBITS );/* Can we pull enough? */ retry: - entropy_count = orig =ACCESS_ONCE (r->entropy_count); + entropy_count = orig =READ_ONCE (input_pool.entropy_count); ibytes = nbytes;/* never pull more than available */ have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 );
@@ -1399,8 +1380,7 @@ retry: ibytes =0 ;if (WARN_ON (entropy_count <0 )) { -pr_warn ("negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n" , - r->name, entropy_count); +pr_warn ("negative entropy count: count %d\n" , entropy_count); entropy_count =0 ; } nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 );
@@ -1409,11 +1389,11 @@ retry:else entropy_count =0 ; -if (cmpxchg (&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) +if (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; -trace_debit_entropy (r->name,8 * ibytes); -if (ibytes &&ENTROPY_BITS (r) < random_write_wakeup_bits) { +trace_debit_entropy (8 * ibytes); +if (ibytes &&ENTROPY_BITS () < random_write_wakeup_bits) {wake_up_interruptible (&random_write_wait);kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_OUT ); }
@@ -1426,7 +1406,7 @@ retry:* * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words. */ -static void extract_buf (struct entropy_store *r,u8 *out) +static void extract_buf (u8 *out) {struct blake2s_state state__aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long)) ;u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ];
@@ -1448,8 +1428,8 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_s }/* Generate a hash across the pool */ -spin_lock_irqsave (&r->lock, flags); -blake2s_update (&state, (const u8 *)r->pool,POOL_BYTES ); +spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags); +blake2s_update (&state, (const u8 *)input_pool.pool,POOL_BYTES );blake2s_final (&state, hash);/* final zeros out state */ /*
@@ -1461,8 +1441,8 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_s* brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the * hash. */ -__mix_pool_bytes (r, hash,sizeof (hash)); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&r->lock, flags); +__mix_pool_bytes (hash,sizeof (hash)); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&input_pool.lock, flags);/* Note that EXTRACT_SIZE is half of hash size here, because above * we've dumped the full length back into mixer. By reducing the
@@ -1472,14 +1452,13 @@ static void extract_buf(struct entropy_smemzero_explicit (hash,sizeof (hash)); } -static ssize_t _extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf, -size_t nbytes) +static ssize_t _extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes) {ssize_t ret =0 , i;u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE ];while (nbytes) { -extract_buf (r, tmp); +extract_buf (tmp); i =min_t (int, nbytes,EXTRACT_SIZE );memcpy (buf, tmp, i); nbytes -= i;
@@ -1500,12 +1479,11 @@ static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct e* The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding. */ -static ssize_t extract_entropy (struct entropy_store *r,void *buf, -size_t nbytes,int min) +static ssize_t extract_entropy (void *buf,size_t nbytes,int min) { -trace_extract_entropy (r->name, nbytes,ENTROPY_BITS (r), _RET_IP_); - nbytes =account (r, nbytes, min); -return _extract_entropy (r, buf, nbytes); +trace_extract_entropy (nbytes,ENTROPY_BITS (), _RET_IP_); + nbytes =account (nbytes, min); +return _extract_entropy (buf, nbytes); }#define warn_unseeded_randomness (previous) \
@@ -1589,7 +1567,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);*/ static void entropy_timer (unsigned long data) { -credit_entropy_bits (&input_pool,1 ); +credit_entropy_bits (1 ); }/*
@@ -1613,14 +1591,14 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(voidwhile (!crng_ready ()) {if (!timer_pending (&stack.timer))mod_timer (&stack.timer, jiffies+1 ); -mix_pool_bytes (&input_pool, &stack.now,sizeof (stack.now)); +mix_pool_bytes (&stack.now,sizeof (stack.now));schedule (); stack.now =random_get_entropy (); }del_timer_sync (&stack.timer);destroy_timer_on_stack (&stack.timer); -mix_pool_bytes (&input_pool, &stack.now,sizeof (stack.now)); +mix_pool_bytes (&stack.now,sizeof (stack.now)); }/*
@@ -1761,26 +1739,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);/* * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data * -* @r: pool to initialize -* * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool. */ -static void __init init_std_data (struct entropy_store *r) +static void __init init_std_data (void ) {int i;ktime_t now =ktime_get_real ();unsigned long rv; -mix_pool_bytes (r, &now,sizeof (now)); +mix_pool_bytes (&now,sizeof (now));for (i =POOL_BYTES ; i >0 ; i -=sizeof (rv)) {if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) && !arch_get_random_long (&rv)) rv =random_get_entropy (); -mix_pool_bytes (r, &rv,sizeof (rv)); +mix_pool_bytes (&rv,sizeof (rv)); } -mix_pool_bytes (r,utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ()))); +mix_pool_bytes (utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ()))); }/*
@@ -1795,7 +1771,7 @@ static void __init init_std_data(struct*/ int __init rand_initialize (void ) { -init_std_data (&input_pool); +init_std_data ();if (crng_need_final_init)crng_finalize_init (&primary_crng);crng_initialize_primary (&primary_crng);
@@ -1832,7 +1808,7 @@ urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, c nbytes =min_t (size_t, nbytes,INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT +3 )); ret =extract_crng_user (buf, nbytes); -trace_urandom_read (8 * nbytes,0 ,ENTROPY_BITS (&input_pool)); +trace_urandom_read (8 * nbytes,0 ,ENTROPY_BITS ());return ret; }
@@ -1872,13 +1848,13 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_tabl mask =0 ;if (crng_ready ()) mask |=POLLIN |POLLRDNORM ; -if (ENTROPY_BITS (&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits) +if (ENTROPY_BITS () < random_write_wakeup_bits) mask |=POLLOUT |POLLWRNORM ;return mask; }static int -write_pool (struct entropy_store *r,const char __user *buffer,size_t count) +write_pool (const char __user *buffer,size_t count) {size_t bytes;u32 t, buf[16 ];
@@ -1900,7 +1876,7 @@ write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, cons count -= bytes; p += bytes; -mix_pool_bytes (r, buf, bytes); +mix_pool_bytes (buf, bytes);cond_resched (); }
@@ -1912,7 +1888,7 @@ static ssize_t random_write(struct file {size_t ret; - ret =write_pool (&input_pool, buffer, count); + ret =write_pool (buffer, count);if (ret)return ret;
@@ -1928,7 +1904,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,switch (cmd) {case RNDGETENTCNT :/* inherently racy, no point locking */ - ent_count =ENTROPY_BITS (&input_pool); + ent_count =ENTROPY_BITS ();if (put_user (ent_count, p))return -EFAULT ;return 0 ;
@@ -1937,7 +1913,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,return -EPERM ;if (get_user (ent_count, p))return -EFAULT ; -return credit_entropy_bits_safe (&input_pool, ent_count); +return credit_entropy_bits_safe (ent_count);case RNDADDENTROPY :if (!capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN ))return -EPERM ;
@@ -1947,11 +1923,10 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,return -EINVAL ;if (get_user (size, p++))return -EFAULT ; - retval =write_pool (&input_pool, (const char __user *)p, - size); + retval =write_pool ((const char __user *)p, size);if (retval <0 )return retval; -return credit_entropy_bits_safe (&input_pool, ent_count); +return credit_entropy_bits_safe (ent_count);case RNDZAPENTCNT :case RNDCLEARPOOL :/*
@@ -1967,7 +1942,7 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,return -EPERM ;if (crng_init <2 )return -ENODATA ; -crng_reseed (&primary_crng, &input_pool); +crng_reseed (&primary_crng, true);WRITE_ONCE (crng_global_init_time, jiffies -1 );return 0 ;default :
@@ -2289,11 +2264,9 @@ randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsivoid add_hwgenerator_randomness (const char *buffer,size_t count,size_t entropy) { -struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; -if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) {size_t ret =crng_fast_load (buffer, count); -mix_pool_bytes (poolp, buffer, ret); +mix_pool_bytes (buffer, ret); count -= ret; buffer += ret;if (!count || crng_init ==0 )
@@ -2306,9 +2279,9 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch*/ wait_event_interruptible (random_write_wait, !system_wq ||kthread_should_stop () || -ENTROPY_BITS (&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits); -mix_pool_bytes (poolp, buffer, count); -credit_entropy_bits (poolp, entropy); +ENTROPY_BITS () <= random_write_wakeup_bits); +mix_pool_bytes (buffer, count); +credit_entropy_bits (entropy); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_hwgenerator_randomness);
include/trace/events/random.h +21 -35
137 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 92/264 random: dont reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Jann Horn <[email protected]>
commit 6c8e11e08a5b74bb8a5cdd5cbc1e5143df0fba72 upstream.
At the moment, urandom_read() (used for /dev/urandom) resets crng_init_cnt to zero when it is called at crng_init<2. This is inconsistent: We do it for /dev/urandom reads, but not for the equivalent getrandom(GRND_INSECURE).
(And worse, as Jason pointed out, we're only doing this as long as maxwarn>0.)
crng_init_cnt is only read in crng_fast_load(); it is relevant at crng_init==0 for determining when to switch to crng_init==1 (and where in the RNG state array to write).
As far as I understand:
- crng_init==0 means "we have nothing, we might just be returning the same exact numbers on every boot on every machine, we don't even have non-cryptographic randomness; we should shove every bit of entropy we can get into the RNG immediately"
- crng_init==1 means "well we have something, it might not be cryptographic, but at least we're not gonna return the same data every time or whatever, it's probably good enough for TCP and ASLR and stuff; we now have time to build up actual cryptographic entropy in the input pool"
- crng_init==2 means "this is supposed to be cryptographically secure now, but we'll keep adding more entropy just to be sure".
The current code means that if someone is pulling data from /dev/urandom fast enough at crng_init==0, we'll keep resetting crng_init_cnt, and we'll never make forward progress to crng_init==1. It seems to be intended to prevent an attacker from bruteforcing the contents of small individual RNG inputs on the way from crng_init==0 to crng_init==1, but that's misguided; crng_init==1 isn't supposed to provide proper cryptographic security anyway, RNG users who care about getting secure RNG output have to wait until crng_init==2.
This code was inconsistent, and it probably made things worse - just get rid of it.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +0 -4
@@ -1821,7 +1821,6 @@ urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, cstatic ssize_t urandom_read (struct file *file,char __user *buf,size_t nbytes,loff_t *ppos) { -unsigned long flags;static int maxwarn =10 ;if (!crng_ready () && maxwarn >0 ) {
@@ -1829,9 +1828,6 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __uif (__ratelimit (&urandom_warning))pr_notice ("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n" , current->comm, nbytes); -spin_lock_irqsave (&primary_crng.lock, flags); - crng_init_cnt =0 ; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&primary_crng.lock, flags); }return urandom_read_nowarn (file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 120/264 random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit a02cf3d0dd77244fd5333ac48d78871de459ae6d upstream.
Continuing the reasoning of "random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction" from this series, at init time we also don't want to be xoring RDSEED directly into the crng. Instead it's safer to put it into our entropy collector and then re-extract it, so that it goes through a hash function with preimage resistance. As a matter of hygiene, we also order these now so that the RDSEED byte are hashed in first, followed by the bytes that are likely more predictable (e.g. utsname()).
--- drivers/char/random.c | 16 +++++----------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +5 -11
@@ -1260,24 +1260,18 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)bool arch_init = true;unsigned long rv; -mix_pool_bytes (&now,sizeof (now));for (i =BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE ; i >0 ; i -=sizeof (rv)) { -if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) && - !arch_get_random_long (&rv)) - rv =random_get_entropy (); -mix_pool_bytes (&rv,sizeof (rv)); - } -mix_pool_bytes (utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ()))); - -extract_entropy (&primary_crng.state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 ); -for (i =4 ; i <16 ; i++) {if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early (&rv) && !arch_get_random_long_early (&rv)) { rv =random_get_entropy (); arch_init = false; } - primary_crng.state[i] ^= rv; +mix_pool_bytes (&rv,sizeof (rv)); } +mix_pool_bytes (&now,sizeof (now)); +mix_pool_bytes (utsname (),sizeof (*(utsname ()))); + +extract_entropy (&primary_crng.state[4 ],sizeof (u32) *12 );if (arch_init && trust_cpu && crng_init <2 ) {invalidate_batched_entropy (); crng_init =2 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 93/264 random: fix typo in comments
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Schspa Shi <[email protected]>
commit c0a8a61e7abbf66729687ee63659ee25983fbb1e upstream.
s/or/for
--- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -1
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@* =============================== * * There are four exported interfaces; two for use within the kernel, -* and two or use from userspace. +* and two for use from userspace. * * Exported interfaces ---- userspace output * -----------------------------------------
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 87/264 random: harmonize "crng init done" messages
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>
commit 161212c7fd1d9069b232785c75492e50941e2ea8 upstream.
We print out "crng init done" for !TRUST_CPU, so we should also print out the same for TRUST_CPU.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -1
@@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ static void __init crng_initialize_primainvalidate_batched_entropy ();numa_crng_init (); crng_init =2 ; -pr_notice ("crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n" ); +pr_notice ("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n" ); } crng->init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 127/264 random: remove ifdefd out interrupt bench
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 95e6060c20a7f5db60163274c5222a725ac118f9 upstream.
With tools like kbench9000 giving more finegrained responses, and this basically never having been used ever since it was initially added, let's just get rid of this. There *is* still work to be done on the interrupt handler, but this really isn't the way it's being developed.
--- Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 9 --------- drivers/char/random.c | 40 ---------------------------------------- 2 files changed, 49 deletions(-)
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt +0 -9
@@ -808,15 +808,6 @@ This is a directory, with the following are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior. -If ``drivers/char/random.c`` is built with ``ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH`` -defined, these additional entries are present: - -* ``add_interrupt_avg_cycles``: the average number of cycles between - interrupts used to feed the pool; - -* ``add_interrupt_avg_deviation``: the standard deviation seen on the - number of cycles between interrupts used to feed the pool. - randomize_va_space ==================
drivers/char/random.c +0 -40
@@ -241,8 +241,6 @@#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include <trace/events/random.h> -/* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */ -enum {POOL_BITS =BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE *8 ,POOL_MIN_BITS =POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
@@ -858,27 +856,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness); -#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH -static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation; - -#define AVG_SHIFT 8/* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */ -#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT - 1)) - -static void add_interrupt_bench (cycles_t start) -{ -long delta =random_get_entropy () - start; - -/* Use a weighted moving average */ - delta = delta - ((avg_cycles +FIXED_1_2 ) >>AVG_SHIFT ); - avg_cycles += delta; -/* And average deviation */ - delta =abs (delta) - ((avg_deviation +FIXED_1_2 ) >>AVG_SHIFT ); - avg_deviation += delta; -} -#else -#define add_interrupt_bench (x) -#endif -static u32 get_reg (struct fast_pool *f,struct pt_regs *regs) {u32 *ptr = (u32 *)regs;
@@ -915,7 +892,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) (sizeof (ip) >4 ) ? ip >>32 :get_reg (fast_pool, regs);fast_mix (fast_pool); -add_interrupt_bench (cycles);if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { if (fast_pool->count >= 64 &&
@@ -1623,22 +1599,6 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { .mode = 0444, .proc_handler = proc_do_uuid, }, -#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH - { - .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_cycles", - .data = &avg_cycles, - .maxlen = sizeof(avg_cycles), - .mode = 0444, - .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, - }, - { - .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_deviation", - .data = &avg_deviation, - .maxlen = sizeof(avg_deviation), - .mode = 0444, - .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax, - }, -#endif { } };#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 116/264 random: remove batched entropy locking
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 77760fd7f7ae3dfd03668204e708d1568d75447d upstream.
Rather than use spinlocks to protect batched entropy, we can instead disable interrupts locally, since we're dealing with per-cpu data, and manage resets with a basic generation counter. At the same time, we can't quite do this on PREEMPT_RT, where we still want spinlocks-as- mutexes semantics. So we use a local_lock_t, which provides the right behavior for each. Because this is a per-cpu lock, that generation counter is still doing the necessary CPU-to-CPU communication.
This should improve performance a bit. It will also fix the linked splat that Jonathan received with a PROVE_RAW_LOCK_NESTING=y.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +27 -31
@@ -1770,13 +1770,15 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = { };#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ +static atomic_t batch_generation =ATOMIC_INIT (0 ); +struct batched_entropy {union {u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u64)];u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE /sizeof (u32)]; };unsigned int position; -spinlock_t batch_lock; +int generation; };/*
@@ -1787,9 +1789,7 @@ struct batched_entropy {* wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any * point prior. */ -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = { - .batch_lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (batched_entropy_u64.lock), -}; +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64);u64 get_random_u64 (void ) {
@@ -1797,67 +1797,63 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void)unsigned long flags;struct batched_entropy *batch;static void *previous; +int next_gen;warn_unseeded_randomness (&previous); +local_irq_save (flags); batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u64); -spin_lock_irqsave (&batch->batch_lock, flags); -if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u64) ==0 ) { + + next_gen =atomic_read (&batch_generation); +if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u64) ==0 || + next_gen != batch->generation) {extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position =0 ; + batch->generation = next_gen; } + ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&batch->batch_lock, flags); +local_irq_restore (flags);return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_u64); -static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = { - .batch_lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (batched_entropy_u32.lock), -}; +static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32); +u32 get_random_u32 (void ) {u32 ret;unsigned long flags;struct batched_entropy *batch;static void *previous; +int next_gen;warn_unseeded_randomness (&previous); +local_irq_save (flags); batch =raw_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u32); -spin_lock_irqsave (&batch->batch_lock, flags); -if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u32) ==0 ) { + + next_gen =atomic_read (&batch_generation); +if (batch->position %ARRAY_SIZE (batch->entropy_u32) ==0 || + next_gen != batch->generation) {extract_crng ((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position =0 ; + batch->generation = next_gen; } + ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&batch->batch_lock, flags); +local_irq_restore (flags);return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (get_random_u32);/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by -* simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the -* next usage. */ +* bumping the generation counter. +*/ static void invalidate_batched_entropy (void ) { -int cpu; -unsigned long flags; - -for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { -struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy; - - batched_entropy =per_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u32, cpu); -spin_lock_irqsave (&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags); - batched_entropy->position =0 ; -spin_unlock (&batched_entropy->batch_lock); - - batched_entropy =per_cpu_ptr (&batched_entropy_u64, cpu); -spin_lock (&batched_entropy->batch_lock); - batched_entropy->position =0 ; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags); - } +atomic_inc (&batch_generation); }/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 144/264 random: check for crng_init == 0 in add_device_randomness()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 1daf2f387652bf3a7044aea042f5023b3f6b189b upstream.
This has no real functional change, as crng_pre_init_inject() (and before that, crng_slow_init()) always checks for == 0, not >= 2. So correct the outer unlocked change to reflect that. Before this used crng_ready(), which was not correct.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -1
@@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *bunsigned long time =random_get_entropy () ^ jiffies;unsigned long flags; -if (!crng_ready () && size) +if (crng_init ==0 && size)crng_pre_init_inject (buf, size, false, false);spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 143/264 random: unify early init crng load accounting
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit da792c6d5f59a76c10a310c5d4c93428fd18f996 upstream.
crng_fast_load() and crng_slow_load() have different semantics:
- crng_fast_load() xors and accounts with crng_init_cnt.
- crng_slow_load() hashes and doesn't account.
However add_hwgenerator_randomness() can afford to hash (it's called from a kthread), and it should account. Additionally, ones that can afford to hash don't need to take a trylock but can take a normal lock. So, we combine these into one function, crng_pre_init_inject(), which allows us to control these in a uniform way. This will make it simpler later to simplify this all down when the time comes for that.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +59 -55
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_s* For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because -* this is what crng_{fast,slow}_load mutate during early init. +* this is what crng_pre_init_inject() mutates during early init. */ if (unlikely (!crng_ready ())) {bool ready;
@@ -436,72 +436,75 @@ static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_s }/* -* This function is for crng_init == 0 only. +* This function is for crng_init == 0 only. It loads entropy directly +* into the crng's key, without going through the input pool. It is, +* generally speaking, not very safe, but we use this only at early +* boot time when it's better to have something there rather than +* nothing. +* +* There are two paths, a slow one and a fast one. The slow one +* hashes the input along with the current key. The fast one simply +* xors it in, and should only be used from interrupt context. +* +* If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented. +* This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(), +* where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be +* unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all). * -* crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service -* path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of -* bytes processed from cp. +* Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded +* by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true. */ -static size_t crng_fast_load (const void *cp,size_t len) +static size_t crng_pre_init_inject (const void *input,size_t len, +bool fast,bool account) {static int crng_init_cnt =0 ;unsigned long flags; -const u8 *src = (const u8 *)cp; -size_t ret =0 ; -if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags)) -return 0 ; +if (fast) { +if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags)) +return 0 ; + }else { +spin_lock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags); + } +if (crng_init !=0 ) {spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags);return 0 ; } -while (len >0 && crng_init_cnt <CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) { - base_crng.key[crng_init_cnt %sizeof (base_crng.key)] ^= *src; - src++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++; - } -if (crng_init_cnt >=CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) { - ++base_crng.generation; - crng_init =1 ; - } -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags); -if (crng_init ==1 ) -pr_notice ("fast init done\n" ); -return ret; -} -/* -* This function is for crng_init == 0 only. -* -* crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two -* attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is -* guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at -* all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of -* crng_fast_load(). -* -* So, we simply hash the contents in with the current key. Finally, -* we do *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be -* something like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very -* well be unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying. -*/ -static void crng_slow_load (const void *cp,size_t len) -{ -unsigned long flags; -struct blake2s_state hash; +if (account) + len =min_t (size_t, len,CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt); -blake2s_init (&hash,sizeof (base_crng.key)); - -if (!spin_trylock_irqsave (&base_crng.lock, flags)) -return ; -if (crng_init !=0 ) { -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags); -return ; +if (fast) { +const u8 *src = input; +size_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < len; ++i) + base_crng.key[(crng_init_cnt + i) % +sizeof (base_crng.key)] ^= src[i]; + }else { +struct blake2s_state hash; + +blake2s_init (&hash,sizeof (base_crng.key)); +blake2s_update (&hash, base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); +blake2s_update (&hash, input, len); +blake2s_final (&hash, base_crng.key); + } + +if (account) { + crng_init_cnt += len; +if (crng_init_cnt >=CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH ) { + ++base_crng.generation; + crng_init =1 ; + } } -blake2s_update (&hash, base_crng.key,sizeof (base_crng.key)); -blake2s_update (&hash, cp, len); -blake2s_final (&hash, base_crng.key); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&base_crng.lock, flags); + +if (crng_init ==1 ) +pr_notice ("fast init done\n" ); + +return len; }static void _get_random_bytes (void *buf,size_t nbytes)
@@ -1014,7 +1017,7 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *bunsigned long flags;if (!crng_ready () && size) -crng_slow_load (buf, size); +crng_pre_init_inject (buf, size, false, false);spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags);_mix_pool_bytes (buf, size);
@@ -1131,7 +1134,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const vo size_t entropy) {if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) { -size_t ret =crng_fast_load (buffer, count); +size_t ret =crng_pre_init_inject (buffer, count, false, true);mix_pool_bytes (buffer, ret); count -= ret; buffer += ret;
@@ -1294,7 +1297,8 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) {if (new_count >=64 && -crng_fast_load (fast_pool->pool32,sizeof (fast_pool->pool32)) >0 ) { +crng_pre_init_inject (fast_pool->pool32,sizeof (fast_pool->pool32), + true, true) >0 ) {atomic_set (&fast_pool->count,0 ); fast_pool->last = now;if (spin_trylock (&input_pool.lock)) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 83/264 random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 9f9eff85a008b095eafc5f4ecbaf5aca689271c1 upstream.
This commit addresses one of the lower hanging fruits of the RNG: its usage of SHA1.
BLAKE2s is generally faster, and certainly more secure, than SHA1, which has [1] been [2] really [3] very [4] broken [5]. Additionally, the current construction in the RNG doesn't use the full SHA1 function, as specified, and allows overwriting the IV with RDRAND output in an undocumented way, even in the case when RDRAND isn't set to "trusted", which means potential malicious IV choices. And its short length means that keeping only half of it secret when feeding back into the mixer gives us only 2^80 bits of forward secrecy. In other words, not only is the choice of hash function dated, but the use of it isn't really great either.
This commit aims to fix both of these issues while also keeping the general structure and semantics as close to the original as possible. Specifically:
a) Rather than overwriting the hash IV with RDRAND, we put it into BLAKE2's documented "salt" and "personal" fields, which were specifically created for this type of usage.
b) Since this function feeds the full hash result back into the entropy collector, we only return from it half the length of the hash, just as it was done before. This increases the construction's forward secrecy from 2^80 to a much more comfortable 2^128.
c) Rather than using the raw "sha1_transform" function alone, we instead use the full proper BLAKE2s function, with finalization.
This also has the advantage of supplying 16 bytes at a time rather than SHA1's 10 bytes, which, in addition to having a faster compression function to begin with, means faster extraction in general. On an Intel i7-11850H, this commit makes initial seeding around 131% faster.
BLAKE2s itself has the nice property of internally being based on the ChaCha permutation, which the RNG is already using for expansion, so there shouldn't be any issue with newness, funkiness, or surprising CPU behavior, since it's based on something already in use.
[1] https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/010.pdf
[2] https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2005/36210017/36210017.pdf
[3] https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/967.pdf
[4] https://shattered.io/static/shattered.pdf
[5] https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-leurent.pdf
--- drivers/char/random.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +30 -40
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@/* * random.c -- A strong random number generator * -* Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All -* Rights Reserved. +* Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved. * * Copyright Matt Mackall <[email protected]>, 2003, 2004, 2005 *
@@ -78,12 +77,12 @@* an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into * the random number generator's internal state. * -* When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA -* hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids +* When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the BLAKE2s +* hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The BLAKE2s hash avoids * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information -* about the input of SHA from its output. Even if it is possible to -* analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data +* about the input of BLAKE2s from its output. Even if it is possible to +* analyze BLAKE2s in some clever way, as long as the amount of data * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
@@ -93,7 +92,7 @@* If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior -* outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is +* outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of BLAKE2s, which is * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility. * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority * of purposes.
@@ -349,6 +348,7 @@#include <linux/completion.h> #include <linux/uuid.h> #include <crypto/chacha20.h> +#include <crypto/blake2s.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h>
@@ -368,10 +368,7 @@#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5)) -#define EXTRACT_SIZE 10 - - -#define LONGS (x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long)) +#define EXTRACT_SIZE (BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE / 2)/* * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
@@ -407,7 +404,7 @@ static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28* Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this. * * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash, -* where we use SHA-1. All that we want of mixing operation is that +* where we use BLAKE2s. All that we want of mixing operation is that * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see. As long as * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the
@@ -1449,56 +1446,49 @@ retry:*/ static void extract_buf (struct entropy_store *r,__u8 *out) { -int i; -union { -__u32 w[5 ]; -unsigned long l[LONGS (20 )]; - } hash; -__u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS ]; +struct blake2s_state state__aligned(__alignof__(unsigned long)) ; +u8 hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ]; +unsigned long *salt;unsigned long flags; +blake2s_init (&state,sizeof (hash)); +/* * If we have an architectural hardware random number -* generator, use it for SHA's initial vector +* generator, use it for BLAKE2's salt & personal fields. */ -sha_init (hash.w); -for (i =0 ; i <LONGS (20 ); i++) { +for (salt = (unsigned long *)&state.h[4 ]; + salt < (unsigned long *)&state.h[8 ]; ++salt) {unsigned long v;if (!arch_get_random_long (&v))break ; - hash.l[i] = v; + *salt ^= v; } -/* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */ +/* Generate a hash across the pool */ spin_lock_irqsave (&r->lock, flags); -for (i =0 ; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i +=16 ) -sha_transform (hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace); +blake2s_update (&state, (const u8 *)r->pool, + r->poolinfo->poolwords *sizeof (*r->pool)); +blake2s_final (&state, hash);/* final zeros out state */ /* * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous -* ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By -* mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make +* outputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By +* mixing at least a hash worth of hash data back, we make * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the * hash. */ -__mix_pool_bytes (r, hash.w,sizeof (hash.w)); +__mix_pool_bytes (r, hash,sizeof (hash));spin_unlock_irqrestore (&r->lock, flags); -memzero_explicit (workspace,sizeof (workspace)); - -/* -* In case the hash function has some recognizable output -* pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back -* twice as much data as we output. +/* Note that EXTRACT_SIZE is half of hash size here, because above +* we've dumped the full length back into mixer. By reducing the +* amount that we emit, we retain a level of forward secrecy. */ - hash.w[0 ] ^= hash.w[3 ]; - hash.w[1 ] ^= hash.w[4 ]; - hash.w[2 ] ^=rol32 (hash.w[2 ],16 ); - -memcpy (out, &hash,EXTRACT_SIZE ); -memzero_explicit (&hash,sizeof (hash)); +memcpy (out, hash,EXTRACT_SIZE ); +memzero_explicit (hash,sizeof (hash)); } static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 145/264 hwrng: core - do not use multiple blank lines
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Corentin LABBE <[email protected]>
commit 6bc17d90e62d16828d1a2113b54cfa4e04582fb6 upstream.
This patch fix the checkpatch warning "Please don't use multiple blank lines"
--- drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +0 -5
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@*/ -#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/hw_random.h> #include <linux/module.h>
@@ -45,12 +44,10 @@#include <linux/err.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> -#define RNG_MODULE_NAME "hw_random"#define PFX RNG_MODULE_NAME ": "#define RNG_MISCDEV_MINOR 183/* official */ -static struct hwrng *current_rng;static struct task_struct *hwrng_fill;static LIST_HEAD (rng_list);
@@ -296,7 +293,6 @@ out_put: goto out; } -static const struct file_operations rng_chrdev_ops = { .owner =THIS_MODULE , .open = rng_dev_open,
@@ -314,7 +310,6 @@ static struct miscdevice rng_miscdev = { .groups = rng_dev_groups, }; -static ssize_t hwrng_attr_current_store (struct device *dev,struct device_attribute *attr,const char *buf,size_t len)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 128/264 random: remove unused tracepoints
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 14c174633f349cb41ea90c2c0aaddac157012f74 upstream.
These explicit tracepoints aren't really used and show sign of aging. It's work to keep these up to date, and before I attempted to keep them up to date, they weren't up to date, which indicates that they're not really used. These days there are better ways of introspecting anyway.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 30 ------ include/trace/events/random.h | 194 ------------------------------------------ lib/random32.c | 2 3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 221 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 include/trace/events/random.h
drivers/char/random.c +3 -27
@@ -238,9 +238,6 @@#include <asm/irq_regs.h> #include <asm/io.h> -#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS -#include <trace/events/random.h> -enum {POOL_BITS =BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE *8 ,POOL_MIN_BITS =POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
@@ -316,7 +313,6 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *i {unsigned long flags; -trace_mix_pool_bytes (nbytes, _RET_IP_);spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags);_mix_pool_bytes (in, nbytes);spin_unlock_irqrestore (&input_pool.lock, flags);
@@ -390,8 +386,6 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t n entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add); }while (cmpxchg (&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig); -trace_credit_entropy_bits (nbits, entropy_count, _RET_IP_); -if (crng_init <2 && entropy_count >=POOL_MIN_BITS )crng_reseed (); }
@@ -771,7 +765,6 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *bif (!crng_ready () && size)crng_slow_load (buf, size); -trace_add_device_randomness (size, _RET_IP_);spin_lock_irqsave (&input_pool.lock, flags);_mix_pool_bytes (buf, size);_mix_pool_bytes (&time,sizeof (time));
@@ -850,7 +843,6 @@ void add_input_randomness(unsigned int t last_value = value;add_timer_randomness (&input_timer_state, (type <<4 ) ^ code ^ (code >>4 ) ^ value); -trace_add_input_randomness (input_pool.entropy_count); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_input_randomness);
@@ -930,7 +922,6 @@ void add_disk_randomness(struct gendiskreturn ;/* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */ add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk)); - trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), input_pool.entropy_count); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_disk_randomness);#endif
@@ -955,8 +946,6 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s } block;size_t i; -trace_extract_entropy (nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count); -for (i =0 ; i <ARRAY_SIZE (block.rdseed); ++i) {if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&block.rdseed[i]) && !arch_get_random_long (&block.rdseed[i]))
@@ -1028,8 +1017,6 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,u8 tmp[CHACHA20_BLOCK_SIZE ];size_t len; -trace_get_random_bytes (nbytes, _RET_IP_); -if (!nbytes)return ;
@@ -1226,7 +1213,6 @@ size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arcsize_t left = nbytes;u8 *p = buf; -trace_get_random_bytes_arch (left, _RET_IP_);while (left) {unsigned long v;size_t chunk =min_t (size_t, left,sizeof (unsigned long ));
@@ -1310,16 +1296,6 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk }#endif -static ssize_t urandom_read_nowarn (struct file *file,char __user *buf, -size_t nbytes,loff_t *ppos) -{ -ssize_t ret; - - ret =get_random_bytes_user (buf, nbytes); -trace_urandom_read (nbytes, input_pool.entropy_count); -return ret; -} -static ssize_t urandom_read (struct file *file,char __user *buf,size_t nbytes,loff_t *ppos) {
@@ -1332,7 +1308,7 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file current->comm, nbytes); } -return urandom_read_nowarn (file, buf, nbytes, ppos); +return get_random_bytes_user (buf, nbytes); } static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
@@ -1343,7 +1319,7 @@ static ssize_t random_read(struct file * ret =wait_for_random_bytes ();if (ret !=0 )return ret; -return urandom_read_nowarn (file, buf, nbytes, ppos); +return get_random_bytes_user (buf, nbytes); }static unsigned int random_poll (struct file *file,poll_table *wait)
@@ -1502,7 +1478,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *if (unlikely (ret))return ret; } -return urandom_read_nowarn (NULL , buf, count,NULL ); +return get_random_bytes_user (buf, count); }/********************************************************************
include/trace/events/random.h deleted +0 -194
194 lines not on this page · raw message
lib/random32.c +2 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@#include <linux/jiffies.h> #include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/sched.h> +#include <linux/bitops.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h> /**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 146/264 hwrng: core - rewrite better comparison to NULL
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Corentin LABBE <[email protected]>
commit 2a971e3b248775f808950bdc0ac75f12a2853eff upstream.
This patch fix the checkpatch warning "Comparison to NULL could be written "!ptr"
--- drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +1 -2
@@ -439,8 +439,7 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)int err = -EINVAL ;struct hwrng *old_rng, *tmp; -if (rng->name ==NULL || - (rng->data_read ==NULL && rng->read ==NULL )) +if (!rng->name || (!rng->data_read && !rng->read)) goto out;mutex_lock (&rng_mutex);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/264 drivers/char/random.c: make primary_crng static
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Rasmus Villemoes <[email protected]>
commit 764ed189c82090c1d85f0e30636156736d8f09a8 upstream.
Since the definition of struct crng_state is private to random.c, and primary_crng is neither declared or used elsewhere, there's no reason for that symbol to have external linkage.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -1
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ struct crng_state {spinlock_t lock; }; -struct crng_state primary_crng = { +static struct crng_state primary_crng = { .lock =__SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED (primary_crng.lock), };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/264 char/random: Add a newline at the end of the file
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
commit 3fd57e7a9e66b9a8bcbf0560ff09e84d0b8de1bd upstream.
Quoted 8 lines · Linus Torvalds
The previous state of the file didn't have that
0xaat the end, so you get that-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness); \ No newline at end of file +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);which is "the '-' line doesn't have a newline, the '+' line does" marker.
Aaha, that makes total sense, thanks for explaining. Oh well, let's fix it then so that people don't scratch heads like me.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -1
@@ -2504,4 +2504,4 @@ void add_bootloader_randomness(const voielse add_device_randomness (buf, size); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_bootloader_randomness); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_bootloader_randomness);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/264 random: Support freezable kthreads in add_hwgenerator_randomness()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
commit ff296293b3538d19278a7f7cd1f3aa600ad9164c upstream.
The kthread calling this function is freezable after commit 03a3bb7ae631 ("hwrng: core - Freeze khwrng thread during suspend") is applied. Unfortunately, this function uses wait_event_interruptible() but doesn't check for the kthread being woken up by the fake freezer signal. When a user suspends the system, this kthread will wake up and if it fails the entropy size check it will immediately go back to sleep and not go into the freezer. Eventually, suspend will fail because the task never froze and a warning message like this may appear:
PM: suspend entry (deep)
Filesystems sync: 0.000 seconds
Freezing user space processes ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done.
OOM killer disabled.
Freezing remaining freezable tasks ...
Freezing of tasks failed after 20.003 seconds (1 tasks refusing to freeze, wq_busy=0):
hwrng R running task 0 289 2 0x00000020
[<c08c64c4>] (__schedule) from [<c08c6a10>] (schedule+0x3c/0xc0)
[<c08c6a10>] (schedule) from [<c05dbd8c>] (add_hwgenerator_randomness+0xb0/0x100) [<c05dbd8c>] (add_hwgenerator_randomness) from [<bf1803c8>] (hwrng_fillfn+0xc0/0x14c [rng_core]) [<bf1803c8>] (hwrng_fillfn [rng_core]) from [<c015abec>] (kthread+0x134/0x148) [<c015abec>] (kthread) from [<c01010e8>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c)
Check for a freezer signal here and skip adding any randomness if the task wakes up because it was frozen. This should make the kthread freeze properly and suspend work again.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +7 -3
@@ -2473,6 +2473,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch size_t entropy) {struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; +bool frozen = false;if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) {crng_fast_load (buffer, count);
@@ -2483,9 +2484,12 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch* We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. */ -wait_event_interruptible (random_write_wait,kthread_should_stop () || +wait_event_interruptible (random_write_wait, +kthread_freezable_should_stop (&frozen) ||ENTROPY_BITS (&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits); -mix_pool_bytes (poolp, buffer, count); -credit_entropy_bits (poolp, entropy); +if (!frozen) { +mix_pool_bytes (poolp, buffer, count); +credit_entropy_bits (poolp, entropy); + } }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_hwgenerator_randomness);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/264 fdt: add support for rng-seed
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Hsin-Yi Wang <[email protected]>
commit 428826f5358c922dc378830a1717b682c0823160 upstream.
Introducing a chosen node, rng-seed, which is an entropy that can be passed to kernel called very early to increase initial device randomness. Bootloader should provide this entropy and the value is read from /chosen/rng-seed in DT.
Obtain of_fdt_crc32 for CRC check after early_init_dt_scan_nodes(), since early_init_dt_scan_chosen() would modify fdt to erase rng-seed.
Add a new interface add_bootloader_randomness() for rng-seed use case. Depends on whether the seed is trustworthy, rng seed would be passed to add_hwgenerator_randomness(). Otherwise it would be passed to add_device_randomness(). Decision is controlled by kernel config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
--- drivers/char/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++ drivers/char/random.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ drivers/of/fdt.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- include/linux/random.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/Kconfig +9 -0
@@ -609,3 +609,12 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_CPU has not installed a hidden back door to compromise the CPU's random number generation facilities. This can also be configured at boot with "random.trust_cpu=on/off". + +config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER + bool "Trust the bootloader to initialize Linux's CRNG" + help + Some bootloaders can provide entropy to increase the kernel's initial + device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the + booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy + pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that + only mixes the entropy pool.
drivers/char/random.c +14 -0
@@ -2493,3 +2493,17 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch } }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_hwgenerator_randomness); + +/* Handle random seed passed by bootloader. +* If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise +* it would be regarded as device data. +* The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER. +*/ +void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *buf,unsigned int size) +{ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER )) +add_hwgenerator_randomness (buf, size, size *8 ); +else +add_device_randomness (buf, size); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_bootloader_randomness);
drivers/of/fdt.c +12 -2
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#include <linux/debugfs.h> #include <linux/serial_core.h> #include <linux/sysfs.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <asm/setup.h> /* for COMMAND_LINE_SIZE */ #include <asm/page.h>
@@ -1068,6 +1069,7 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(uns {int l;const char *p; +const void *rng_seed;pr_debug ("search \"chosen\", depth: %d, uname: %s\n" , depth, uname);
@@ -1102,6 +1104,14 @@ int __init early_init_dt_scan_chosen(unspr_debug ("Command line is: %s\n" , (char *)data); + rng_seed =of_get_flat_dt_prop (node,"rng-seed" , &l); +if (rng_seed && l >0 ) { +add_bootloader_randomness (rng_seed, l); + +/* try to clear seed so it won't be found. */ +fdt_nop_property (initial_boot_params, node,"rng-seed" ); + } +/* break now */ return 1 ; }
@@ -1203,8 +1213,6 @@ bool __init early_init_dt_verify(void *p/* Setup flat device-tree pointer */ initial_boot_params = params; - of_fdt_crc32 =crc32_be (~0 , initial_boot_params, -fdt_totalsize (initial_boot_params));return true; }
@@ -1230,6 +1238,8 @@ bool __init early_init_dt_scan(void *parreturn false;early_init_dt_scan_nodes (); + of_fdt_crc32 =crc32_be (~0 , initial_boot_params, +fdt_totalsize (initial_boot_params));return true; }
include/linux/random.h +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ struct random_ready_callback { };extern void add_device_randomness (const void *,unsigned int ); +extern void add_bootloader_randomness (const void *,unsigned int );#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN ) && !defined(__CHECKER__)static inline void add_latent_entropy (void )
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 46/264 random: Use wait_event_freezable() in add_hwgenerator_randomness()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
commit 59b569480dc8bb9dce57cdff133853a842dfd805 upstream.
Sebastian reports that after commit ff296293b353 ("random: Support freezable kthreads in add_hwgenerator_randomness()") we can call might_sleep() when the task state is TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE (state=1). This leads to the following warning.
do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<00000000349d1489>] prepare_to_wait_event+0x5a/0x180
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 828 at kernel/sched/core.c:6741 __might_sleep+0x6f/0x80 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 828 Comm: hwrng Not tainted 5.3.0-rc7-next-20190903+ #46 RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x6f/0x80 Call Trace: kthread_freezable_should_stop+0x1b/0x60 add_hwgenerator_randomness+0xdd/0x130 hwrng_fillfn+0xbf/0x120 kthread+0x10c/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
We shouldn't call kthread_freezable_should_stop() from deep within the wait_event code because the task state is still set as TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE instead of TASK_RUNNING and kthread_freezable_should_stop() will try to call into the freezer with the task in the wrong state. Use wait_event_freezable() instead so that it calls schedule() in the right place and tries to enter the freezer when the task state is TASK_RUNNING instead.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 12 +++++------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +5 -7
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@#include <linux/percpu.h> #include <linux/cryptohash.h> #include <linux/fips.h> +#include <linux/freezer.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> #include <linux/kmemcheck.h> #include <linux/workqueue.h>
@@ -2473,7 +2474,6 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch size_t entropy) {struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool; -bool frozen = false;if (unlikely (crng_init ==0 )) {crng_fast_load (buffer, count);
@@ -2484,13 +2484,11 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const ch* We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh, * or when the calling thread is about to terminate. */ -wait_event_interruptible (random_write_wait, -kthread_freezable_should_stop (&frozen) || +wait_event_freezable (random_write_wait, +kthread_should_stop () ||ENTROPY_BITS (&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits); -if (!frozen) { -mix_pool_bytes (poolp, buffer, count); -credit_entropy_bits (poolp, entropy); - } +mix_pool_bytes (poolp, buffer, count); +credit_entropy_bits (poolp, entropy); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_hwgenerator_randomness);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 147/264 hwrng: core - Rewrite the header
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Corentin LABBE <[email protected]>
commit dd8014830d2b1fdf5328978ada706df3ec180c21 upstream.
checkpatch have lot of complaint about header. Furthermore, the header have some offtopic/useless information.
This patch rewrite a proper header.
--- drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 38 +++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +9 -29
@@ -1,33 +1,13 @@/* -Added support for the AMD Geode LX RNG -(c) Copyright 2004-2005 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. - -derived from - -Hardware driver for the Intel/AMD/VIA Random Number Generators (RNG) -(c) Copyright 2003 Red Hat Inc <[email protected]> - -derived from - -Hardware driver for the AMD 768 Random Number Generator (RNG) -(c) Copyright 2001 Red Hat Inc <[email protected]> - -derived from - -Hardware driver for Intel i810 Random Number Generator (RNG) -Copyright 2000,2001 Jeff Garzik <[email protected]> -Copyright 2000,2001 Philipp Rumpf <[email protected]> - -Added generic RNG API -Copyright 2006 Michael Buesch <[email protected]> -Copyright 2005 (c) MontaVista Software, Inc. - -Please read Documentation/hw_random.txt for details on use. - ----------------------------------------------------------- -This software may be used and distributed according to the terms -of the GNU General Public License, incorporated herein by reference. - +* hw_random/core.c: HWRNG core API +* +* Copyright 2006 Michael Buesch <[email protected]> +* Copyright 2005 (c) MontaVista Software, Inc. +* +* Please read Documentation/hw_random.txt for details on use. +* +* This software may be used and distributed according to the terms +* of the GNU General Public License, incorporated herein by reference. */ #include <linux/device.h>
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 149/264 hwrng: core - remove unused PFX macro
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Corentin LABBE <[email protected]>
commit 079840bd13f793b915f6c8e44452eeb4a0aba8ba upstream.
This patch remove the unused PFX macro.
--- drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +0 -1
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@#include <asm/uaccess.h> #define RNG_MODULE_NAME "hw_random" -#define PFX RNG_MODULE_NAME ": "static struct hwrng *current_rng;static struct task_struct *hwrng_fill;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 150/264 hwrng: use rng source with best quality
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
commit 2bbb6983887fefc8026beab01198d30f47b7bd22 upstream.
This patch rewoks the hwrng to always use the
rng source with best entropy quality.
On registation and unregistration the hwrng now tries to choose the best (= highest quality value) rng source. The handling of the internal list of registered rng sources is now always sorted by quality and the top most rng chosen.
--- drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +19 -6
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@static struct hwrng *current_rng;static struct task_struct *hwrng_fill; +/* list of registered rngs, sorted decending by quality */ static LIST_HEAD (rng_list);/* Protects rng_list and current_rng */ static DEFINE_MUTEX (rng_mutex);
@@ -416,6 +417,7 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng) {int err = -EINVAL ;struct hwrng *old_rng, *tmp; +struct list_head *rng_list_ptr;if (!rng->name || (!rng->data_read && !rng->read)) goto out;
@@ -431,14 +433,25 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng)init_completion (&rng->cleanup_done);complete (&rng->cleanup_done); +/* rng_list is sorted by decreasing quality */ +list_for_each (rng_list_ptr, &rng_list) { + tmp = list_entry(rng_list_ptr, struct hwrng, list); +if (tmp->quality < rng->quality) +break ; + } +list_add_tail (&rng->list, rng_list_ptr); + old_rng = current_rng; err =0 ; -if (!old_rng) { +if (!old_rng || (rng->quality > old_rng->quality)) { +/* +* Set new rng as current as the new rng source +* provides better entropy quality. +*/ err =set_current_rng (rng);if (err) goto out_unlock; } -list_add_tail (&rng->list, &rng_list);if (old_rng && !rng->init) {/*
@@ -465,12 +478,12 @@ void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng)list_del (&rng->list);if (current_rng == rng) {drop_current_rng (); +/* rng_list is sorted by quality, use the best (=first) one */ if (!list_empty (&rng_list)) { -struct hwrng *tail; - - tail = list_entry(rng_list.prev, struct hwrng, list); +struct hwrng *new_rng; -set_current_rng (tail); + new_rng = list_entry(rng_list.next, struct hwrng, list); +set_current_rng (new_rng); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/264 random: fix soft lockup when trying to read from an uninitialized blocking pool
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
commit 58be0106c5306b939b07b4b8bf00669a20593f4b upstream.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +13 -3
@@ -774,8 +774,11 @@ retry:if (cmpxchg (&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; -if (has_initialized) +if (has_initialized) { r->initialized =1 ; +wake_up_interruptible (&random_read_wait); +kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN ); + }trace_credit_entropy_bits (r->name, nbits, entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT , _RET_IP_);
@@ -791,6 +794,13 @@ retry: entropy_bits = r->entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT ; } +/* initialize the blocking pool if necessary */ +if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits && + !other->initialized) { +schedule_work (&other->push_work); +return ; + } +/* should we wake readers? */ if (entropy_bits >= random_read_wakeup_bits &&wq_has_sleeper (&random_read_wait)) {
@@ -1992,8 +2002,8 @@ _random_read(int nonblock, char __user *return -EAGAIN ;wait_event_interruptible (random_read_wait, -ENTROPY_BITS (&input_pool) >= - random_read_wakeup_bits); + blocking_pool.initialized && + (ENTROPY_BITS (&input_pool) >= random_read_wakeup_bits));if (signal_pending (current))return -ERESTARTSYS ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 148/264 hwrng: core - Move hwrng miscdev minor number to include/linux/miscdevice.h
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Corentin LABBE <[email protected]>
commit fd50d71f94fb1c8614098949db068cd4c8dbb91d upstream.
This patch move the define for hwrng's miscdev minor number to include/linux/miscdevice.h.
It's better that all minor number are in the same place. Rename it to HWRNG_MINOR (from RNG_MISCDEV_MINOR) in he process since no other miscdev define have MISCDEV in their name.
--- drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 3 +-- include/linux/miscdevice.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +1 -2
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@#define RNG_MODULE_NAME "hw_random"#define PFX RNG_MODULE_NAME ": " -#define RNG_MISCDEV_MINOR 183/* official */ static struct hwrng *current_rng;static struct task_struct *hwrng_fill;
@@ -283,7 +282,7 @@ static const struct file_operations rng_static const struct attribute_group *rng_dev_groups[];static struct miscdevice rng_miscdev = { - .minor =RNG_MISCDEV_MINOR , + .minor =HWRNG_MINOR , .name =RNG_MODULE_NAME , .nodename ="hwrng" , .fops = &rng_chrdev_ops,
include/linux/miscdevice.h +1 -0
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@#define SGI_MMTIMER 153#define STORE_QUEUE_MINOR 155/* unused */ #define I2O_MINOR 166 +#define HWRNG_MINOR 183#define MICROCODE_MINOR 184#define VFIO_MINOR 196#define TUN_MINOR 200
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 81/264 random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mark Brown <[email protected]>
commit 2b6c6e3d9ce3aa0e547ac25d60e06fe035cd9f79 upstream.
The section at the top of random.c which documents the input functions available does not document add_hwgenerator_randomness() which might lead a reader to overlook it. Add a brief note about it.
[Jason: reorganize position of function in doc comment and also document
add_bootloader_randomness() while we're at it.]
--- drivers/char/random.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
drivers/char/random.c +11 -0
@@ -202,6 +202,9 @@* unsigned int value); * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags); * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk); +* void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, +* size_t entropy); +* void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size); * * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
@@ -228,6 +231,14 @@* particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the * first and second order deltas of the event timings. * +* add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit +* entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will +* block until more entropy is needed. +* +* add_bootloader_randomness() is the same as add_hwgenerator_randomness() or +* add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration +* option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set. +* * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup * ============================================ *
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 80/264 crypto: blake2s - adjust include guard naming
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 8786841bc2020f7f2513a6c74e64912f07b9c0dc upstream.
Use the full path in the include guards for the BLAKE2s headers to avoid ambiguity and to match the convention for most files in include/crypto/.
--- include/crypto/blake2s.h | 6 +++--- include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/crypto/blake2s.h +3 -3
@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>. All Rights Reserved. */ -#ifndef BLAKE2S_H -#define BLAKE2S_H +#ifndef _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H +#define _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H#include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/types.h>
@@ -99,4 +99,4 @@ static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, cons blake2s_final(&state, out); } -#endif /* BLAKE2S_H */ +#endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */
include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h +3 -3
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */ -#ifndef BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H -#define BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H +#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H +#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
@@ -16,4 +16,4 @@ static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock state->f[0] = -1; } -#endif /* BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H */ +#endif /* _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 79/264 crypto: blake2s - include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h>
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit bbda6e0f1303953c855ee3669655a81b69fbe899 upstream.
Address the following checkpatch warning:
WARNING: Use #include <linux/bug.h> instead of <asm/bug.h>
--- include/crypto/blake2s.h | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/crypto/blake2s.h +1 -2
@@ -6,12 +6,11 @@#ifndef BLAKE2S_H #define BLAKE2S_H +#include <linux/bug.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/string.h> -#include <asm/bug.h> -enum blake2s_lengths {BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE =64 , BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE = 32,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 78/264 MAINTAINERS: co-maintain random.c
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <[email protected]>
commit 58e1100fdc5990b0cc0d4beaf2562a92e621ac7d upstream.
random.c is a bit understaffed, and folks want more prompt reviews. I've got the crypto background and the interest to do these reviews, and have authored parts of the file already.
--- MAINTAINERS | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
@@ -10068,6 +10068,7 @@ F: drivers/block/brd.c RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER M: "Theodore Ts'o" <[email protected]> +M: Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]> S: Maintained F: drivers/char/random.c
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/264 latent_entropy: avoid build error when plugin cflags are not set
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Vasily Gorbik <[email protected]>
commit 7e756f423af808b6571fed3144747db2ef7fa1c5 upstream.
Some architectures set up CFLAGS for linux decompressor phase from scratch and do not include GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS. Since "latent_entropy" variable declaration is generated by the plugin code itself including linux/random.h in decompressor code then would cause a build error. E.g. on s390:
In file included from ./include/linux/net.h:22,
from ./include/linux/skbuff.h:29,
from ./include/linux/if_ether.h:23,
from ./arch/s390/include/asm/diag.h:12,
from arch/s390/boot/startup.c:8:
./include/linux/random.h: In function 'add_latent_entropy':
./include/linux/random.h:26:39: error: 'latent_entropy' undeclared
(first use in this function); did you mean 'add_latent_entropy'?
26 | add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| add_latent_entropy./include/linux/random.h:26:39: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
The build error is triggered by commit a80313ff91ab ("s390/kernel:
introduce .dma sections") which made it into 5.2 merge window.
To address that avoid using CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY in favour of LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN definition which is defined as a part of gcc plugins cflags and hence reflect more accurately when gcc plugin is active. Besides that it is also used for similar purpose in linux/compiler-gcc.h for latent_entropy attribute definition.
--- include/linux/random.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/random.h +1 -1
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ struct random_ready_callback {extern void add_device_randomness (const void *,unsigned int ); -#if defined(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY ) && !defined(__CHECKER__) +#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN ) && !defined(__CHECKER__)static inline void add_latent_entropy (void ) { add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 77/264 random: remove dead code left over from blocking pool
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
commit 118a4417e14348b2e46f5e467da8444ec4757a45 upstream.
Remove some dead code that was left over following commit 90ea1c6436d2 ("random: remove the blocking pool").
--- drivers/char/random.c | 17 +------- include/trace/events/random.h | 83 ------------------------------------------ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 97 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +3 -14
@@ -503,7 +503,6 @@ struct entropy_store {unsigned short add_ptr;unsigned short input_rotate;int entropy_count; - unsigned int initialized:1; unsigned int last_data_init:1;__u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE ]; };
@@ -663,7 +662,7 @@ static void process_random_ready_list(vo*/ static void credit_entropy_bits (struct entropy_store *r,int nbits) { -int entropy_count, orig, has_initialized =0 ; +int entropy_count, orig;const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;int nfrac = nbits <<ENTROPY_SHIFT ;
@@ -720,23 +719,14 @@ retry:if (cmpxchg (&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig) goto retry; -if (has_initialized) { - r->initialized =1 ; -kill_fasync (&fasync,SIGIO ,POLL_IN ); - } -trace_credit_entropy_bits (r->name, nbits, entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT , _RET_IP_);if (r == &input_pool) {int entropy_bits = entropy_count >>ENTROPY_SHIFT ; -if (crng_init <2 ) { -if (entropy_bits <128 ) -return ; +if (crng_init <2 && entropy_bits >=128 )crng_reseed (&primary_crng, r); - entropy_bits =ENTROPY_BITS (r); - } } }
@@ -1442,8 +1432,7 @@ retry: }/* -* This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and -* extract_entropy_user. +* This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy. * * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words. */
include/trace/events/random.h +0 -83
101 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 76/264 random: avoid arch_get_random_seed_long() when collecting IRQ randomness
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
commit 390596c9959c2a4f5b456df339f0604df3d55fe0 upstream.
When reseeding the CRNG periodically, arch_get_random_seed_long() is called to obtain entropy from an architecture specific source if one is implemented. In most cases, these are special instructions, but in some cases, such as on ARM, we may want to back this using firmware calls, which are considerably more expensive.
Another call to arch_get_random_seed_long() exists in the CRNG driver, in add_interrupt_randomness(), which collects entropy by capturing inter-interrupt timing and relying on interrupt jitter to provide random bits. This is done by keeping a per-CPU state, and mixing in the IRQ number, the cycle counter and the return address every time an interrupt is taken, and mixing this per-CPU state into the entropy pool every 64 invocations, or at least once per second. The entropy that is gathered this way is credited as 1 bit of entropy. Every time this happens, arch_get_random_seed_long() is invoked, and the result is mixed in as well, and also credited with 1 bit of entropy.
This means that arch_get_random_seed_long() is called at least once per second on every CPU, which seems excessive, and doesn't really scale, especially in a virtualization scenario where CPUs may be
oversubscribed: in cases where arch_get_random_seed_long() is backed by an instruction that actually goes back to a shared hardware entropy source (such as RNDRRS on ARM), we will end up hitting it hundreds of times per second.
So let's drop the call to arch_get_random_seed_long() from add_interrupt_randomness(), and instead, rely on crng_reseed() to call the arch hook to get random seed material from the platform.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 15 +-------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -14
@@ -1331,8 +1331,6 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, icycles_t cycles =random_get_entropy ();__u32 c_high, j_high;__u64 ip; -unsigned long seed; -int credit =0 ;if (cycles ==0 ) cycles =get_reg (fast_pool, regs);
@@ -1368,23 +1366,12 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, i fast_pool->last = now;__mix_pool_bytes (r, &fast_pool->pool,sizeof (fast_pool->pool)); - -/* -* If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and -* add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia don't let the -* architectural seed generator dominate the input from the -* interrupt noise. -*/ -if (arch_get_random_seed_long (&seed)) { -__mix_pool_bytes (r, &seed,sizeof (seed)); - credit =1 ; - }spin_unlock (&r->lock); fast_pool->count =0 ;/* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */ -credit_entropy_bits (r, credit +1 ); +credit_entropy_bits (r,1 ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (add_interrupt_randomness);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 74/264 powerpc: Use bool in archrandom.h
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
commit 98dcfce69729f9ce0fb14f96a39bbdba21429597 upstream.
The generic interface uses bool not int; match that.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 17 +++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h +9 -8
@@ -5,27 +5,28 @@#include <asm/machdep.h> -static inline int arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) +static inline bool arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) { -return 0 ; +return false; } -static inline int arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) +static inline bool arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) { -return 0 ; +return false; } -static inline int arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) +static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {if (ppc_md.get_random_seed)return ppc_md.get_random_seed (v); -return 0 ; +return false; } -static inline int arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) + +static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) {unsigned long val; -int rc; +bool rc; rc =arch_get_random_seed_long (&val);if (rc)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 75/264 random: add arch_get_random_*long_early()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
commit 253d3194c2b58152fe830fd27c2fd83ebc6fe5ee upstream.
Some architectures (e.g. arm64) can have heterogeneous CPUs, and the boot CPU may be able to provide entropy while secondary CPUs cannot. On such systems, arch_get_random_long() and arch_get_random_seed_long() will fail unless support for RNG instructions has been detected on all CPUs. This prevents the boot CPU from being able to provide (potentially) trusted entropy when seeding the primary CRNG.
To make it possible to seed the primary CRNG from the boot CPU without adversely affecting the runtime versions of arch_get_random_long() and arch_get_random_seed_long(), this patch adds new early versions of the functions used when initializing the primary CRNG.
Default implementations are provided atop of the existing arch_get_random_long() and arch_get_random_seed_long() so that only architectures with such constraints need to provide the new helpers.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- include/linux/random.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +19 -1
@@ -801,6 +801,24 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crreturn arch_init; } +static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early (struct crng_state *crng) +{ +int i; +bool arch_init = true; +unsigned long rv; + +for (i =4 ; i <16 ; i++) { +if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early (&rv) && + !arch_get_random_long_early (&rv)) { + rv =random_get_entropy (); + arch_init = false; + } + crng->state[i] ^= rv; + } + +return arch_init; +} +static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary (struct crng_state *crng) {memcpy (&crng->state[0 ],"expand 32-byte k" ,16 );
@@ -813,7 +831,7 @@ static void __init crng_initialize_prima {memcpy (&crng->state[0 ],"expand 32-byte k" ,16 );_extract_entropy (&input_pool, &crng->state[4 ],sizeof (__u32) *12 ,0 ); -if (crng_init_try_arch (crng) && trust_cpu) { +if (crng_init_try_arch_early (crng) && trust_cpu) {invalidate_batched_entropy ();numa_crng_init (); crng_init =2 ;
include/linux/random.h +22 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@#ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H#define _LINUX_RANDOM_H +#include <linux/bug.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/once.h>
@@ -114,4 +116,24 @@ static inline bool __must_check arch_get }#endif +/* +* Called from the boot CPU during startup; not valid to call once +* secondary CPUs are up and preemption is possible. +*/ +#ifndef arch_get_random_seed_long_early +static inline bool __init arch_get_random_seed_long_early (unsigned long *v) +{ +WARN_ON (system_state !=SYSTEM_BOOTING ); +return arch_get_random_seed_long (v); +} +#endif + +#ifndef arch_get_random_long_early +static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early (unsigned long *v) +{ +WARN_ON (system_state !=SYSTEM_BOOTING ); +return arch_get_random_long (v); +} +#endif +#endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 73/264 linux/random.h: Mark CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM functions __must_check
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
commit 904caa6413c87aacbf7d0682da617c39ca18cf1a upstream.
We must not use the pointer output without validating the success of the random read.
--- include/linux/random.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/random.h +4 -4
@@ -96,19 +96,19 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned lo#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM # include <asm/archrandom.h> #else -static inline bool arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } -static inline bool arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; } -static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {return false; } -static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) +static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) {return false; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 72/264 linux/random.h: Use false with bool
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
commit 66f5ae899ada79c0e9a3d8d954f93a72344cd350 upstream.
Keep the generic fallback versions in sync with the other architecture specific implementations and use the proper name for false.
--- include/linux/random.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/linux/random.h +4 -4
@@ -98,19 +98,19 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned lo#else static inline bool arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) { -return 0 ; +return false; }static inline bool arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) { -return 0 ; +return false; }static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) { -return 0 ; +return false; }static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) { -return 0 ; +return false; }#endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 71/264 linux/random.h: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
commit 647f50d5d9d933b644b29c54f13ac52af1b1774d upstream.
The arm64 version of archrandom.h will need to be able to test for support and read the random number without preemption, so a separate query predicate is not practical.
Since this part of the generic interface is unused, remove it.
--- include/linux/random.h | 8 -------- 1 file changed, 8 deletions(-)
include/linux/random.h +0 -8
@@ -104,10 +104,6 @@ static inline bool arch_get_random_int(u {return 0 ; } -static inline bool arch_has_random (void ) -{ -return 0 ; -}static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) {return 0 ;
@@ -116,10 +112,6 @@ static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_ {return 0 ; } -static inline bool arch_has_random_seed (void ) -{ -return 0 ; -}#endif #endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 70/264 powerpc: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
commit cbac004995a0ce8453bdc555fab579e2bdb842a6 upstream.
These symbols are currently part of the generic archrandom.h interface, but are currently unused and can be removed.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h | 10 ---------- 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/archrandom.h +0 -10
@@ -33,16 +33,6 @@ static inline int arch_get_random_seed_i return rc; } - -static inline int arch_has_random (void ) -{ -return 0 ; -} - -static inline int arch_has_random_seed (void ) -{ -return !!ppc_md.get_random_seed; -}#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM */ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 69/264 x86: Remove arch_has_random, arch_has_random_seed
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Richard Henderson <[email protected]>
commit 5f2ed7f5b99b54389b74e53309677831ac9cb9d7 upstream.
Use the expansion of these macros directly in arch_get_random_*.
These symbols are currently part of the generic archrandom.h interface, but are currently unused and can be removed.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/archrandom.h +4 -8
@@ -86,10 +86,6 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned ireturn ok; } -/* Conditional execution based on CPU type */ -#define arch_has_random () static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) -#define arch_has_random_seed () static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDSEED) -/* * These are the generic interfaces; they must not be declared if the * stubs in <linux/random.h> are to be invoked,
@@ -99,22 +95,22 @@ static inline bool rdseed_int(unsigned istatic inline bool arch_get_random_long (unsigned long *v) { -return arch_has_random () ?rdrand_long (v) : false; +return static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RDRAND ) ?rdrand_long (v) : false; }static inline bool arch_get_random_int (unsigned int *v) { -return arch_has_random () ?rdrand_int (v) : false; +return static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RDRAND ) ?rdrand_int (v) : false; }static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_long (unsigned long *v) { -return arch_has_random_seed () ?rdseed_long (v) : false; +return static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RDSEED ) ?rdseed_long (v) : false; }static inline bool arch_get_random_seed_int (unsigned int *v) { -return arch_has_random_seed () ?rdseed_int (v) : false; +return static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_RDSEED ) ?rdseed_int (v) : false; }extern void x86_init_rdrand (struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/264 random: document get_random_int() family
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: George Spelvin <[email protected]>
commit 92e507d216139b356a375afbda2824e85235e748 upstream.
Explain what these functions are for and when they offer an advantage over get_random_bytes().
(We still need documentation on rng_is_initialized(), the random_ready_callback system, and early boot in general.)
--- drivers/char/random.c | 83 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 76 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +76 -7
@@ -101,15 +101,13 @@* Exported interfaces ---- output * =============================== * -* There are three exported interfaces; the first is one designed to -* be used from within the kernel: +* There are four exported interfaces; two for use within the kernel, +* and two or use from userspace. * -* void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); -* -* This interface will return the requested number of random bytes, -* and place it in the requested buffer. +* Exported interfaces ---- userspace output +* ----------------------------------------- * -* The two other interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and +* The userspace interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
@@ -122,6 +120,77 @@* this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable. * +* Exported interfaces ---- kernel output +* -------------------------------------- +* +* The primary kernel interface is +* +* void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); +* +* This interface will return the requested number of random bytes, +* and place it in the requested buffer. This is equivalent to a +* read from /dev/urandom. +* +* For less critical applications, there are the functions: +* +* u32 get_random_u32() +* u64 get_random_u64() +* unsigned int get_random_int() +* unsigned long get_random_long() +* +* These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes, +* and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much. These are recommended +* for most in-kernel operations *if the result is going to be stored in +* the kernel*. +* +* Specifically, the get_random_int() family do not attempt to do +* "anti-backtracking". If you capture the state of the kernel (e.g. +* by snapshotting the VM), you can figure out previous get_random_int() +* return values. But if the value is stored in the kernel anyway, +* this is not a problem. +* +* It *is* safe to expose get_random_int() output to attackers (e.g. as +* network cookies); given outputs 1..n, it's not feasible to predict +* outputs 0 or n+1. The only concern is an attacker who breaks into +* the kernel later; the get_random_int() engine is not reseeded as +* often as the get_random_bytes() one. +* +* get_random_bytes() is needed for keys that need to stay secret after +* they are erased from the kernel. For example, any key that will +* be wrapped and stored encrypted. And session encryption keys: we'd +* like to know that after the session is closed and the keys erased, +* the plaintext is unrecoverable to someone who recorded the ciphertext. +* +* But for network ports/cookies, stack canaries, PRNG seeds, address +* space layout randomization, session *authentication* keys, or other +* applications where the sensitive data is stored in the kernel in +* plaintext for as long as it's sensitive, the get_random_int() family +* is just fine. +* +* Consider ASLR. We want to keep the address space secret from an +* outside attacker while the process is running, but once the address +* space is torn down, it's of no use to an attacker any more. And it's +* stored in kernel data structures as long as it's alive, so worrying +* about an attacker's ability to extrapolate it from the get_random_int() +* CRNG is silly. +* +* Even some cryptographic keys are safe to generate with get_random_int(). +* In particular, keys for SipHash are generally fine. Here, knowledge +* of the key authorizes you to do something to a kernel object (inject +* packets to a network connection, or flood a hash table), and the +* key is stored with the object being protected. Once it goes away, +* we no longer care if anyone knows the key. +* +* prandom_u32() +* ------------- +* +* For even weaker applications, see the pseudorandom generator +* prandom_u32(), prandom_max(), and prandom_bytes(). If the random +* numbers aren't security-critical at all, these are *far* cheaper. +* Useful for self-tests, random error simulation, randomized backoffs, +* and any other application where you trust that nobody is trying to +* maliciously mess with you by guessing the "random" numbers. +* * Exported interfaces ---- input * ============================== *
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 68/264 random: avoid warnings for !CONFIG_NUMA builds
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
commit ab9a7e27044b87ff2be47b8f8e095400e7fccc44 upstream.
As crng_initialize_secondary() is only called by do_numa_crng_init(), and the latter is under ifdeffery for CONFIG_NUMA, when CONFIG_NUMA is not selected the compiler will warn that the former is unused:
| drivers/char/random.c:820:13: warning: 'crng_initialize_secondary' defined but not used [-Wunused-function] | 820 | static void crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng) | | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Stephen reports that this happens for x86_64 noallconfig builds.
We could move crng_initialize_secondary() and crng_init_try_arch() under the CONFIG_NUMA ifdeffery, but this has the unfortunate property of separating them from crng_initialize_primary() and crng_init_try_arch_early() respectively. Instead, let's mark crng_initialize_secondary() as __maybe_unused.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -1
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crreturn arch_init; } -static void crng_initialize_secondary (struct crng_state *crng) +static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary (struct crng_state *crng) {memcpy (&crng->state[0 ],"expand 32-byte k" ,16 );_get_random_bytes (&crng->state[4 ],sizeof (__u32) *12 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 67/264 random: split primary/secondary crng init paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
commit 5cbe0f13b51ac2fb2fd55902cff8d0077fc084c0 upstream.
Currently crng_initialize() is used for both the primary CRNG and secondary CRNGs. While we wish to share common logic, we need to do a number of additional things for the primary CRNG, and this would be easier to deal with were these handled in separate functions.
This patch splits crng_initialize() into crng_initialize_primary() and crng_initialize_secondary(), with common logic factored out into a crng_init_try_arch() helper.
There should be no functional change as a result of this patch.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +24 -12
@@ -783,27 +783,39 @@ static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char * }early_param ("random.trust_cpu" , parse_trust_cpu); -static void crng_initialize (struct crng_state *crng) +static bool crng_init_try_arch (struct crng_state *crng) {int i; -int arch_init =1 ; +bool arch_init = true;unsigned long rv; -memcpy (&crng->state[0 ],"expand 32-byte k" ,16 ); -if (crng == &primary_crng) -_extract_entropy (&input_pool, &crng->state[4 ], -sizeof (__u32) *12 ,0 ); -else -_get_random_bytes (&crng->state[4 ],sizeof (__u32) *12 );for (i =4 ; i <16 ; i++) {if (!arch_get_random_seed_long (&rv) && !arch_get_random_long (&rv)) { rv =random_get_entropy (); - arch_init =0 ; + arch_init = false; } crng->state[i] ^= rv; } -if (trust_cpu && arch_init) { + +return arch_init; +} + +static void crng_initialize_secondary (struct crng_state *crng) +{ +memcpy (&crng->state[0 ],"expand 32-byte k" ,16 ); +_get_random_bytes (&crng->state[4 ],sizeof (__u32) *12 ); +crng_init_try_arch (crng); + crng->init_time = jiffies -CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL -1 ; +} + +static void __init crng_initialize_primary (struct crng_state *crng) +{ +memcpy (&crng->state[0 ],"expand 32-byte k" ,16 ); +_extract_entropy (&input_pool, &crng->state[4 ],sizeof (__u32) *12 ,0 ); +if (crng_init_try_arch (crng) && trust_cpu) { +invalidate_batched_entropy (); +numa_crng_init (); crng_init =2 ;pr_notice ("crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n" ); }
@@ -852,7 +864,7 @@ static void do_numa_crng_init(struct wor crng =kmalloc_node (sizeof (struct crng_state ),GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);spin_lock_init (&crng->lock); -crng_initialize (crng); +crng_initialize_secondary (crng); pool[i] = crng; }/* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */
@@ -1780,7 +1792,7 @@ int __init rand_initialize(void)init_std_data (&input_pool);if (crng_need_final_init)crng_finalize_init (&primary_crng); -crng_initialize (&primary_crng); +crng_initialize_primary (&primary_crng); crng_global_init_time = jiffies;if (ratelimit_disable) { urandom_warning.interval =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 66/264 random: remove some dead code of poolinfo
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yangtao Li <[email protected]>
commit 09a6d00a42ce0e63e2a15be3d070974bcc656ec7 upstream.
Since it is not being used, so delete it.
--- drivers/char/random.c | 30 ------------------------------ 1 file changed, 30 deletions(-)
drivers/char/random.c +0 -30
@@ -432,36 +432,6 @@ static const struct poolinfo {/* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */ { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 }, -/* was: x^32 + x^26 + x^20 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ -/* x^32 + x^26 + x^19 + x^14 + x^7 + x + 1 */ - { S(32), 26, 19, 14, 7, 1 }, -#if 0 - /* x^2048 + x^1638 + x^1231 + x^819 + x^411 + x + 1 -- 115 */ - { S(2048), 1638, 1231, 819, 411, 1 }, - -/* x^1024 + x^817 + x^615 + x^412 + x^204 + x + 1 -- 290 */ - { S(1024), 817, 615, 412, 204, 1 }, - -/* x^1024 + x^819 + x^616 + x^410 + x^207 + x^2 + 1 -- 115 */ - { S(1024), 819, 616, 410, 207, 2 }, - -/* x^512 + x^411 + x^308 + x^208 + x^104 + x + 1 -- 225 */ - { S(512), 411, 308, 208, 104, 1 }, - -/* x^512 + x^409 + x^307 + x^206 + x^102 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */ - { S(512), 409, 307, 206, 102, 2 }, -/* x^512 + x^409 + x^309 + x^205 + x^103 + x^2 + 1 -- 95 */ - { S(512), 409, 309, 205, 103, 2 }, - -/* x^256 + x^205 + x^155 + x^101 + x^52 + x + 1 -- 125 */ - { S(256), 205, 155, 101, 52, 1 }, - -/* x^128 + x^103 + x^78 + x^51 + x^27 + x^2 + 1 -- 70 */ - { S(128), 103, 78, 51, 27, 2 }, - -/* x^64 + x^52 + x^39 + x^26 + x^14 + x + 1 -- 15 */ - { S(64), 52, 39, 26, 14, 1 }, -#endif };/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 65/264 random: fix typo in add_timer_randomness()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Yangtao Li <[email protected]>
commit 727d499a6f4f29b6abdb635032f5e53e5905aedb upstream.
s/entimate/estimate
--- drivers/char/random.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/char/random.c +1 -1
@@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ static void add_timer_randomness(struct/* * delta is now minimum absolute delta. * Round down by 1 bit on general principles, -* and limit entropy entimate to 12 bits. +* and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits. */ credit_entropy_bits (r,min_t (int,fls (delta>>1 ),11 )); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 151/264 hwrng: remember rng chosen by user
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanFrom: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
commit 10a515ddb5f19a1ff0b9882c430b4427843169f3 upstream.
When a user chooses a rng source via sysfs attribute this rng should be sticky, even when other sources with better quality to register. This patch introduces a simple way to remember the user's choice. This is reflected by a new sysfs attribute file 'rng_selected' which shows if the current rng has been chosen by userspace. The new attribute file shows '1' for user selected rng and '0' otherwise.
--- drivers/char/hw_random/core.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c +19 -2
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@#define RNG_MODULE_NAME "hw_random"static struct hwrng *current_rng; +/* the current rng has been explicitly chosen by user via sysfs */ +static int cur_rng_set_by_user;static struct task_struct *hwrng_fill;/* list of registered rngs, sorted decending by quality */ static LIST_HEAD (rng_list);
@@ -303,6 +305,7 @@ static ssize_t hwrng_attr_current_store(list_for_each_entry (rng, &rng_list, list) {if (sysfs_streq (rng->name, buf)) { err =0 ; + cur_rng_set_by_user =1 ;if (rng != current_rng) err =set_current_rng (rng);break ;
@@ -351,16 +354,27 @@ static ssize_t hwrng_attr_available_showreturn strlen (buf); } +static ssize_t hwrng_attr_selected_show (struct device *dev, +struct device_attribute *attr, +char *buf) +{ +return snprintf (buf,PAGE_SIZE ,"%d\n" , cur_rng_set_by_user); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(rng_current, S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR, hwrng_attr_current_show, hwrng_attr_current_store); static DEVICE_ATTR(rng_available, S_IRUGO, hwrng_attr_available_show, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(rng_selected, S_IRUGO, + hwrng_attr_selected_show, + NULL);static struct attribute *rng_dev_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_rng_current.attr, &dev_attr_rng_available.attr, + &dev_attr_rng_selected.attr,NULL };
@@ -443,10 +457,12 @@ int hwrng_register(struct hwrng *rng) old_rng = current_rng; err =0 ; -if (!old_rng || (rng->quality > old_rng->quality)) { +if (!old_rng || + (!cur_rng_set_by_user && rng->quality > old_rng->quality)) {/* * Set new rng as current as the new rng source -* provides better entropy quality. +* provides better entropy quality and was not +* chosen by userspace. */ err =set_current_rng (rng);if (err)
@@ -478,6 +494,7 @@ void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng)list_del (&rng->list);if (current_rng == rng) {drop_current_rng (); + cur_rng_set_by_user =0 ;/* rng_list is sorted by quality, use the best (=first) one */ if (!list_empty (&rng_list)) {struct hwrng *new_rng;