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u-boot: fix CVE-2022-34835

PATCH Superseded Minjae Kim 4 participants 7 messages Jul 31, 2022 – Aug 30, 2022 1 message not in the archive

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PATCH 1/1 u-boot: fix CVE-2022-34835

i2c: fix stack buffer overflow vulnerability in i2c md command

CVE: CVE-2022-34835

---
 .../u-boot/files/CVE-2022-34835.patch         | 124 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2020.01.bb     |   4 +
 2 files changed, 128 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-34835.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-34835.patch new file +124 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f1c1a91dcf
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+From 19cc75158388ec7e09e0d2bd7a2866d08974d059 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicolas Iooss <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 14:50:25 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] i2c: fix stack buffer overflow vulnerability in i2c md
+ command
+
+When running "i2c md 0 0 80000100", the function do_i2c_md parses the
+length into an unsigned int variable named length. The value is then
+moved to a signed variable:
+
+    int nbytes = length;
+    #define DISP_LINE_LEN 16
+    int linebytes = (nbytes > DISP_LINE_LEN) ? DISP_LINE_LEN : nbytes;
+    ret = dm_i2c_read(dev, addr, linebuf, linebytes);
+
+On systems where integers are 32 bits wide, 0x80000100 is a negative
+value to "nbytes > DISP_LINE_LEN" is false and linebytes gets assigned
+0x80000100 instead of 16.
+
+The consequence is that the function which reads from the i2c device
+(dm_i2c_read or i2c_read) is called with a 16-byte stack buffer to fill
+but with a size parameter which is too large. In some cases, this could
+trigger a crash. But with some i2c drivers, such as drivers/i2c/nx_i2c.c
+(used with "nexell,s5pxx18-i2c" bus), the size is actually truncated to
+a 16-bit integer. This is because function i2c_transfer expects an
+unsigned short length. In such a case, an attacker who can control the
+response of an i2c device can overwrite the return address of a function
+and execute arbitrary code through Return-Oriented Programming.
+
+Fix this issue by using unsigned integers types in do_i2c_md. While at
+it, make also alen unsigned, as signed sizes can cause vulnerabilities
+when people forgot to check that they can be negative.
+
+Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Heiko Schocher <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/commit/8f8c04bf1ebbd2f72f1643e7ad9617dafa6e5409]
+Signed-off-by:Minjae Kim <[email protected]>
+---
+ cmd/i2c.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cmd/i2c.c b/cmd/i2c.c
+index 43a76299b3..f239d3f336 100644
+--- a/cmd/i2c.c
++++ b/cmd/i2c.c
+@@ -246,10 +246,10 @@ int i2c_set_bus_speed(unsigned int speed)
+  *
+  * Returns the address length.
+  */
+-static uint get_alen(char *arg, int default_len)
++static uint get_alen(char *arg, uint default_len)
+ {
+-      int     j;
+-      int     alen;
++      uint    j;
++      uint    alen;
+
+       alen = default_len;
+       for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
+@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static int do_i2c_read ( cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       uint    devaddr, length;
+-      int alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       u_char  *memaddr;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static int do_i2c_write(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       uint    devaddr, length;
+-      int alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       u_char  *memaddr;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+@@ -511,8 +511,8 @@ static int do_i2c_md ( cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       uint    addr, length;
+-      int alen;
+-      int     j, nbytes, linebytes;
++      uint    alen;
++      uint    j, nbytes, linebytes;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+       struct udevice *dev;
+@@ -630,9 +630,9 @@ static int do_i2c_mw ( cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       ulong   addr;
+-      int     alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       uchar   byte;
+-      int     count;
++      uint    count;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+       struct udevice *dev;
+@@ -716,8 +716,8 @@ static int do_i2c_crc (cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       ulong   addr;
+-      int     alen;
+-      int     count;
++      uint    alen;
++      uint    count;
+       uchar   byte;
+       ulong   crc;
+       ulong   err;
+@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ static int do_i2c_probe (cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv
+ static int do_i2c_loop(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+-      int alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       uint    addr;
+       uint    length;
+       u_char  bytes[16];
+--
+2.25.1
+
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2020.01.bb +4 -0
index 02d67c0db2..16e2340bb6 100644
@@ -2,3 +2,7 @@ require u-boot-common.inc
 require u-boot.inc
 
 DEPENDS += "bc-native dtc-native"
+
+SRC_URI_append = " \
+    file://CVE-2022-34835.patch \
+"
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Minjae Kim

i2c: fix stack buffer overflow vulnerability in i2c md command

CVE: CVE-2022-34835

I'm seeing do_patch errors with this:

stdio: ERROR: u-boot-1_2020.01-r0 do_patch: Applying patch
'CVE-2022-34835.patch' on target directory '/home/pokybuild/yocto-worker/beaglebone/build/build/tmp/work/beaglebone_yocto-poky-linux-gnueabi/u-boot/1_2020.01-r0/git'
stdio: ERROR: Logfile of failure stored in:
/home/pokybuild/yocto-worker/beaglebone/build/build/tmp/work/beaglebone_yocto-poky-linux-gnueabi/u-boot/1_2020.01-r0/temp/log.do_patch.32232
stdio: ERROR: Task
(/home/pokybuild/yocto-worker/beaglebone/build/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2020.01.bb:do_patch)
failed with exit code '1'
stdio: ERROR: Command . ./oe-init-build-env; bitbake core-image-sato
core-image-sato-dev core-image-sato-sdk core-image-minimal
core-image-minimal-dev core-image-sato-ptest
core-image-sato:do_populate_sdk -k failed with exit code 1, see errors
above. (1659369029.4: 2180.9)

Steve

Quoted 162 lines
---
 .../u-boot/files/CVE-2022-34835.patch         | 124 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2020.01.bb     |   4 +
 2 files changed, 128 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-34835.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-34835.patch new file +124 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f1c1a91dcf
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+From 19cc75158388ec7e09e0d2bd7a2866d08974d059 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicolas Iooss <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 14:50:25 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] i2c: fix stack buffer overflow vulnerability in i2c md
+ command
+
+When running "i2c md 0 0 80000100", the function do_i2c_md parses the
+length into an unsigned int variable named length. The value is then
+moved to a signed variable:
+
+    int nbytes = length;
+    #define DISP_LINE_LEN 16
+    int linebytes = (nbytes > DISP_LINE_LEN) ? DISP_LINE_LEN : nbytes;
+    ret = dm_i2c_read(dev, addr, linebuf, linebytes);
+
+On systems where integers are 32 bits wide, 0x80000100 is a negative
+value to "nbytes > DISP_LINE_LEN" is false and linebytes gets assigned
+0x80000100 instead of 16.
+
+The consequence is that the function which reads from the i2c device
+(dm_i2c_read or i2c_read) is called with a 16-byte stack buffer to fill
+but with a size parameter which is too large. In some cases, this could
+trigger a crash. But with some i2c drivers, such as drivers/i2c/nx_i2c.c
+(used with "nexell,s5pxx18-i2c" bus), the size is actually truncated to
+a 16-bit integer. This is because function i2c_transfer expects an
+unsigned short length. In such a case, an attacker who can control the
+response of an i2c device can overwrite the return address of a function
+and execute arbitrary code through Return-Oriented Programming.
+
+Fix this issue by using unsigned integers types in do_i2c_md. While at
+it, make also alen unsigned, as signed sizes can cause vulnerabilities
+when people forgot to check that they can be negative.
+
+Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Heiko Schocher <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/commit/8f8c04bf1ebbd2f72f1643e7ad9617dafa6e5409]
+Signed-off-by:Minjae Kim <[email protected]>
+---
+ cmd/i2c.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cmd/i2c.c b/cmd/i2c.c
+index 43a76299b3..f239d3f336 100644
+--- a/cmd/i2c.c
++++ b/cmd/i2c.c
+@@ -246,10 +246,10 @@ int i2c_set_bus_speed(unsigned int speed)
+  *
+  * Returns the address length.
+  */
+-static uint get_alen(char *arg, int default_len)
++static uint get_alen(char *arg, uint default_len)
+ {
+-      int     j;
+-      int     alen;
++      uint    j;
++      uint    alen;
+
+       alen = default_len;
+       for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
+@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static int do_i2c_read ( cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       uint    devaddr, length;
+-      int alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       u_char  *memaddr;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static int do_i2c_write(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       uint    devaddr, length;
+-      int alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       u_char  *memaddr;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+@@ -511,8 +511,8 @@ static int do_i2c_md ( cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       uint    addr, length;
+-      int alen;
+-      int     j, nbytes, linebytes;
++      uint    alen;
++      uint    j, nbytes, linebytes;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+       struct udevice *dev;
+@@ -630,9 +630,9 @@ static int do_i2c_mw ( cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       ulong   addr;
+-      int     alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       uchar   byte;
+-      int     count;
++      uint    count;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+       struct udevice *dev;
+@@ -716,8 +716,8 @@ static int do_i2c_crc (cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       ulong   addr;
+-      int     alen;
+-      int     count;
++      uint    alen;
++      uint    count;
+       uchar   byte;
+       ulong   crc;
+       ulong   err;
+@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ static int do_i2c_probe (cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv
+ static int do_i2c_loop(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+-      int alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       uint    addr;
+       uint    length;
+       u_char  bytes[16];
+--
+2.25.1
+
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2020.01.bb +4 -1
index 02d67c0db2..16e2340bb6 100644
@@ -2,3 +2,7 @@ require u-boot-common.inc
 require u-boot.inc
 
 DEPENDS += "bc-native dtc-native"
+
+SRC_URI_append = " \
+    file://CVE-2022-34835.patch \
+"
--

2.25.1

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#3 lore raw
In reply to a message not in the archive
Quoted 9 lines · Steve Sakoman via lists.openembedded.org
Quoted 4 lines · Minjae Kim

i2c: fix stack buffer overflow vulnerability in i2c md command

CVE: CVE-2022-34835

I'm seeing do_patch errors with this:

Quoted 13 lines

stdio: ERROR: u-boot-1_2020.01-r0 do_patch: Applying patch
'CVE-2022-34835.patch' on target directory '/home/pokybuild/yocto-worker/beaglebone/build/build/tmp/work/beaglebone_yocto-poky-linux-gnueabi/u-boot/1_2020.01-r0/git'
stdio: ERROR: Logfile of failure stored in:
/home/pokybuild/yocto-worker/beaglebone/build/build/tmp/work/beaglebone_yocto-poky-linux-gnueabi/u-boot/1_2020.01-r0/temp/log.do_patch.32232
stdio: ERROR: Task
(/home/pokybuild/yocto-worker/beaglebone/build/meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2020.01.bb:do_patch)
failed with exit code '1'
stdio: ERROR: Command . ./oe-init-build-env; bitbake core-image-sato
core-image-sato-dev core-image-sato-sdk core-image-minimal
core-image-minimal-dev core-image-sato-ptest
core-image-sato:do_populate_sdk -k failed with exit code 1, see errors
above. (1659369029.4: 2180.9)

More details in the log here:

https://errors.yoctoproject.org/Errors/Details/663916/

Steve

Quoted 164 lines
Quoted 150 lines
---
 .../u-boot/files/CVE-2022-34835.patch         | 124 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2020.01.bb     |   4 +
 2 files changed, 128 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-34835.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/files/CVE-2022-34835.patch new file +124 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f1c1a91dcf
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+From 19cc75158388ec7e09e0d2bd7a2866d08974d059 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Nicolas Iooss <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2022 14:50:25 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] i2c: fix stack buffer overflow vulnerability in i2c md
+ command
+
+When running "i2c md 0 0 80000100", the function do_i2c_md parses the
+length into an unsigned int variable named length. The value is then
+moved to a signed variable:
+
+    int nbytes = length;
+    #define DISP_LINE_LEN 16
+    int linebytes = (nbytes > DISP_LINE_LEN) ? DISP_LINE_LEN : nbytes;
+    ret = dm_i2c_read(dev, addr, linebuf, linebytes);
+
+On systems where integers are 32 bits wide, 0x80000100 is a negative
+value to "nbytes > DISP_LINE_LEN" is false and linebytes gets assigned
+0x80000100 instead of 16.
+
+The consequence is that the function which reads from the i2c device
+(dm_i2c_read or i2c_read) is called with a 16-byte stack buffer to fill
+but with a size parameter which is too large. In some cases, this could
+trigger a crash. But with some i2c drivers, such as drivers/i2c/nx_i2c.c
+(used with "nexell,s5pxx18-i2c" bus), the size is actually truncated to
+a 16-bit integer. This is because function i2c_transfer expects an
+unsigned short length. In such a case, an attacker who can control the
+response of an i2c device can overwrite the return address of a function
+and execute arbitrary code through Return-Oriented Programming.
+
+Fix this issue by using unsigned integers types in do_i2c_md. While at
+it, make also alen unsigned, as signed sizes can cause vulnerabilities
+when people forgot to check that they can be negative.
+
+Signed-off-by: Nicolas Iooss <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Heiko Schocher <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/commit/8f8c04bf1ebbd2f72f1643e7ad9617dafa6e5409]
+Signed-off-by:Minjae Kim <[email protected]>
+---
+ cmd/i2c.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/cmd/i2c.c b/cmd/i2c.c
+index 43a76299b3..f239d3f336 100644
+--- a/cmd/i2c.c
++++ b/cmd/i2c.c
+@@ -246,10 +246,10 @@ int i2c_set_bus_speed(unsigned int speed)
+  *
+  * Returns the address length.
+  */
+-static uint get_alen(char *arg, int default_len)
++static uint get_alen(char *arg, uint default_len)
+ {
+-      int     j;
+-      int     alen;
++      uint    j;
++      uint    alen;
+
+       alen = default_len;
+       for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
+@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ static int do_i2c_read ( cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       uint    devaddr, length;
+-      int alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       u_char  *memaddr;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ static int do_i2c_write(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       uint    devaddr, length;
+-      int alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       u_char  *memaddr;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+@@ -511,8 +511,8 @@ static int do_i2c_md ( cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       uint    addr, length;
+-      int alen;
+-      int     j, nbytes, linebytes;
++      uint    alen;
++      uint    j, nbytes, linebytes;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+       struct udevice *dev;
+@@ -630,9 +630,9 @@ static int do_i2c_mw ( cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       ulong   addr;
+-      int     alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       uchar   byte;
+-      int     count;
++      uint    count;
+       int ret;
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DM_I2C
+       struct udevice *dev;
+@@ -716,8 +716,8 @@ static int do_i2c_crc (cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[]
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+       ulong   addr;
+-      int     alen;
+-      int     count;
++      uint    alen;
++      uint    count;
+       uchar   byte;
+       ulong   crc;
+       ulong   err;
+@@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ static int do_i2c_probe (cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv
+ static int do_i2c_loop(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, int flag, int argc, char * const argv[])
+ {
+       uint    chip;
+-      int alen;
++      uint    alen;
+       uint    addr;
+       uint    length;
+       u_char  bytes[16];
+--
+2.25.1
+
meta/recipes-bsp/u-boot/u-boot_2020.01.bb +4 -1
index 02d67c0db2..16e2340bb6 100644
@@ -2,3 +2,7 @@ require u-boot-common.inc
 require u-boot.inc
 
 DEPENDS += "bc-native dtc-native"
+
+SRC_URI_append = " \
+    file://CVE-2022-34835.patch \
+"
--
Quoted 5 lines

2.25.1

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#6 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Steve Sakoman
Quoted 9 lines · Tom Rini
Quoted 5 lines · Minjae Kim

i2c: fix stack buffer overflow vulnerability in i2c md command

CVE: CVE-2022-34835

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line

Hi Tom,

Thanks for reviewing.

Did you build test this? I'm getting do_patch errors on both local and autobuilder builds.

Ah, no, just that it's indeed the whole of the fix for that CVE, backported. There are a handful of them fixed in v2022.07, fwiw.

Signature · 1 line
Tom
author
#7 lore raw

@Tom and Steve!
I just checked this issue because I was on a long vacation for personal reasons. Sorry for the late response.
I'll update this patch with the latest dunfell branch.