Update openssl_compat.h for newer LibreSSL
PATCH 1/2 Update openssl_compat.h for newer LibreSSL
LibreSSL has added some of the functions that are defined here. However, we still need RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT.
--- src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h | 8 +++++--- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/openssl_compat.h +5 -3
@@ -51,8 +51,8 @@#define SSL_CTX_set1_groups SSL_CTX_set1_curves#endif -/* Functionality missing in LibreSSL and OpenSSL 1.0.2 */ -#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER )) && !defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_WOLFSSL ) +/* Functionality missing in LibreSSL before 3.5 and OpenSSL 1.0.2 */ +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <0x10100000L || (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER ) &&LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER <0x3050000fL )) && !defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_WOLFSSL )/** * Destroy a X509 object *
@@ -68,11 +68,13 @@ X509_OBJECT_free(X509_OBJECT *obj) } } -#define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT#define EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG#define EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG#endif +#if !defined(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT ) +#define RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT +#endif /* Functionality missing in 1.0.2 */ #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <0x10100000L && !defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_WOLFSSL )
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
PATCH 2/2 Handle EVP_MD_CTX as an opaque struct
Building OpenVPN on the latest OpenBSD snapshot failed because EVP_MD_CTX is an opaque struct in LibreSSL now. Therefore, call md_ctx_new() instead of declaring them on the stack. When they're not on the stack anymore, we don't have to call EVP_MD_CTX_init() anymore, but we need to call EVP_MD_CTX_free() instead of cleanup.
--- src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c +19 -19
@@ -1492,7 +1492,7 @@ tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, {int chunk;size_t j; -EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init; +EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, *ctx_tmp, *ctx_init;EVP_PKEY *mac_key;unsigned char A1 [EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE ];size_t A1_len =EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE ;
@@ -1501,28 +1501,28 @@ tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, chunk =EVP_MD_size (md);OPENSSL_assert (chunk >=0 ); -EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx); -EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx_tmp); -EVP_MD_CTX_init (&ctx_init); -EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags (&ctx_init,EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW ); + ctx =md_ctx_new (); + ctx_tmp =md_ctx_new (); + ctx_init =md_ctx_new (); +EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags (ctx_init,EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW ); mac_key =EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key (EVP_PKEY_HMAC ,NULL , sec, sec_len);if (!mac_key) { goto err; } -if (!EVP_DigestSignInit (&ctx_init,NULL , md,NULL , mac_key)) +if (!EVP_DigestSignInit (ctx_init,NULL , md,NULL , mac_key)) { goto err; } -if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (&ctx, &ctx_init)) +if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (ctx, ctx_init)) { goto err; } -if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate (&ctx, seed, seed_len)) +if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate (ctx, seed, seed_len)) { goto err; } -if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal (&ctx,A1 , &A1_len)) +if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal (ctx,A1 , &A1_len)) { goto err; }
@@ -1530,19 +1530,19 @@ tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,for (;; ) {/* Reinit mac contexts */ -if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (&ctx, &ctx_init)) +if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (ctx, ctx_init)) { goto err; } -if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate (&ctx,A1 , A1_len)) +if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate (ctx,A1 , A1_len)) { goto err; } -if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (&ctx_tmp, &ctx)) +if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex (ctx_tmp, ctx)) { goto err; } -if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate (&ctx, seed, seed_len)) +if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate (ctx, seed, seed_len)) { goto err; }
@@ -1550,14 +1550,14 @@ tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,if (olen > chunk) { j = olen; -if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal (&ctx, out, &j)) +if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal (ctx, out, &j)) { goto err; } out += j; olen -= j;/* calc the next A1 value */ -if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal (&ctx_tmp,A1 , &A1_len)) +if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal (ctx_tmp,A1 , &A1_len)) { goto err; }
@@ -1566,7 +1566,7 @@ tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, { A1_len =EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE ;/* last one */ -if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal (&ctx,A1 , &A1_len)) +if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal (ctx,A1 , &A1_len)) { goto err; }
@@ -1577,9 +1577,9 @@ tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, ret = true; err:EVP_PKEY_free (mac_key); -EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx); -EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx_tmp); -EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup (&ctx_init); +EVP_MD_CTX_free (ctx); +EVP_MD_CTX_free (ctx_tmp); +EVP_MD_CTX_free (ctx_init);OPENSSL_cleanse (A1 ,sizeof (A1 ));return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 2/2] Handle EVP_MD_CTX as an opaque struct
Am 11.08.22 um 14:07 schrieb Max Fillinger:
Quoted 5 lines
Building OpenVPN on the latest OpenBSD snapshot failed because
EVP_MD_CTXis an opaque struct in LibreSSL now. Therefore, callmd_ctx_new()instead of declaring them on the stack. When they're not on the stack anymore, we don't have to callEVP_MD_CTX_init()anymore, but we need to callEVP_MD_CTX_free()instead of cleanup.
Urgh. The whole reason I left this code with the EVP_MD_CTX is that it is OpenSSL 1.0.2 only and I expected to be able to remove it sooner or later. So LibreSSL doeds not support the alternative API for that?
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
is what we use for OpenSSL 1.1.0+
I am not happy to soon have LibreSSL specific code in our code but it seems like if want to continue that library, we have to.
The change looks good itself.
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 2/2] Handle EVP_MD_CTX as an opaque struct
Quoted 24 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Arne Schwabe [mailto:[email protected]...]
Sent: donderdag 11 augustus 2022 14:21
To: Maximilian Fillinger <[email protected]...>; openvpn- [email protected]
Subject: Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 2/2] HandleEVP_MD_CTXas an opaque structAm 11.08.22 um 14:07 schrieb Max Fillinger:
Quoted 1 line
Building OpenVPN on the latest OpenBSD snapshot failed because
EVP_MD_CTXQuoted 1 line
is an opaque struct in LibreSSL now. Therefore, call
md_ctx_new()instead
Quoted 1 line
of declaring them on the stack. When they're not on the stack anymore,
we
Quoted 2 lines
don't have to call
EVP_MD_CTX_init()anymore, but we need to callEVP_MD_CTX_free()instead of cleanup.Urgh. The whole reason I left this code with the
EVP_MD_CTXis that it is OpenSSL 1.0.2 only and I expected to be able to remove it sooner or later. So LibreSSL doeds not support the alternative API for that?EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF, NULL);
Quoted 8 lines
is what we use for OpenSSL 1.1.0+
I am not happy to soon have LibreSSL specific code in our code but it seems like if want to continue that library, we have to.
The change looks good itself.
Acked-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
LibreSSL now has EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(), but it does not define EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF.
[Openvpn-devel] [PATCH applied] Re: Handle EVP_MD_CTX as an opaque struct
In reply to Max FillingerSame as for the previous patch, I have not tested this on a recent-enough OpenBSD or OpenSSL 1.0.x (no time to build or find such a system) but I have tested on FreeBSD with 1.1.1l and 3.0.3 - both OpenSSL builds still work fine and pass client side tests.
Arne says this does not apply cleanly to 2.5, so if we want it there, please send a (tested :-) ) backport.
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
commit 5a9d5dbf5c2d0fc979a05c84afd05689f2ad99b0
Author: Max Fillinger Date: Thu Aug 11 14:07:22 2022 +0200
Handle EVP_MD_CTX as an opaque struct
Signed-off-by: Max Fillinger <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg24873.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering