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KVM: SVM: don't apply host security mitigations to the guest

PATCH In review Fares Mehanna 3 participants 3 messages Sep 12, 2022 – Sep 29, 2022

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 KVM: SVM: don't apply host security mitigations to the guest

Support of virtual SPEC_CTRL caused a new behavior in KVM which made host security mitigations applying by default to the guests.

We noticed a regression after applying the patch, primarily because of the enablement of SSBD on AMD Milan.

This patch keeps the new behavior of applying host security mitigations to the guests, but adds an option to disable it so the guests are free to pick their own security mitigations.

Fixes d00b99c514b3 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for Virtual SPEC_CTRL")
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 12 +++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +11 -1
index f3813dbacb9f..c6ea24685301 100644
@@ -225,6 +225,10 @@ module_param(avic, bool, 0444);
 bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
 module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);
 
+/* enable/disable applying host security mitigations on the guest */
+static bool host_mitigations_on_guest = true;
+module_param(host_mitigations_on_guest, bool, 0444);
+
 
 bool intercept_smi = true;
 module_param(intercept_smi, bool, 0444);
@@ -4000,6 +4004,12 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 */
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
 		x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
+	else if (!host_mitigations_on_guest)
+		/*
+		 * Clear the host MSR before vm-enter to avoid applying host
+		 * security mitigations to the guest.
+		 */
+		x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(0, 0);
 
 	svm_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu);
 
@@ -4025,7 +4035,7 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
 		reload_tss(vcpu);
 
-	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL) || !host_mitigations_on_guest)
 		x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
 
 	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
Signature · 12 lines
2.37.1




Amazon Development Center Germany GmbH
Krausenstr. 38
10117 Berlin
Geschaeftsfuehrung: Christian Schlaeger, Jonathan Weiss
Eingetragen am Amtsgericht Charlottenburg unter HRB 149173 B
Sitz: Berlin
Ust-ID: DE 289 237 879
#1 lore raw
Quoted 2 lines · Fares Mehanna

Support of virtual SPEC_CTRL caused a new behavior in KVM which made host security mitigations applying by default to the guests.

Maybe expand on this to say that the effective mitigation is the host SPEC_CTRL value or'd with guest SPEC_CTRL value.

Quoted 32 lines

We noticed a regression after applying the patch, primarily because of the enablement of SSBD on AMD Milan.

This patch keeps the new behavior of applying host security mitigations to the guests, but adds an option to disable it so the guests are free to pick their own security mitigations.

Fixes d00b99c514b3 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for Virtual SPEC_CTRL")
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 12 +++++++++++-
  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +4 -0
index f3813dbacb9f..c6ea24685301 100644
@@ -225,6 +225,10 @@ module_param(avic, bool, 0444);
  bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
  module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);
 
+/* enable/disable applying host security mitigations on the guest */
+static bool host_mitigations_on_guest = true;
+module_param(host_mitigations_on_guest, bool, 0444);
+
 
  bool intercept_smi = true;
  module_param(intercept_smi, bool, 0444);

arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 4012

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +6 -0
@@ -4000,6 +4004,12 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
  	 */
  	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
  		x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
+	else if (!host_mitigations_on_guest)
+		/*
+		 * Clear the host MSR before vm-enter to avoid applying host
+		 * security mitigations to the guest.
+		 */
+		x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(0, 0);

If X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL is active, won't svm->spec_ctrl and svm->virt_spec_ctrl always be zero, in which case you can do the if statement similar to the below one? Maybe just add a comment that those values will be zero in the case of X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL, thus eliminating the host security mitigation effect.

Thanks,
Tom

Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
  	svm_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu);
 
@@ -4025,7 +4035,7 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
  	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
  		reload_tss(vcpu);
 
-	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL) || !host_mitigations_on_guest)
  		x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
 
  	if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
#2 lore raw
Quoted 62 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 2 lines · Fares Mehanna

Support of virtual SPEC_CTRL caused a new behavior in KVM which made host security mitigations applying by default to the guests.

Maybe expand on this to say that the effective mitigation is the host SPEC_CTRL value or'd with guest SPEC_CTRL value.

Quoted 32 lines

We noticed a regression after applying the patch, primarily because of the enablement of SSBD on AMD Milan.

This patch keeps the new behavior of applying host security mitigations to the guests, but adds an option to disable it so the guests are free to pick their own security mitigations.

Fixes d00b99c514b3 ("KVM: SVM: Add support for Virtual SPEC_CTRL")
---
  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 12 +++++++++++-
  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +4 -0
index f3813dbacb9f..c6ea24685301 100644
@@ -225,6 +225,10 @@ module_param(avic, bool, 0444);
  bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcb;
  module_param(dump_invalid_vmcb, bool, 0644);
 
+/* enable/disable applying host security mitigations on the guest */
+static bool host_mitigations_on_guest = true;
+module_param(host_mitigations_on_guest, bool, 0444);
+
 
  bool intercept_smi = true;
  module_param(intercept_smi, bool, 0444);

arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 4012

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +6 -0
@@ -4000,6 +4004,12 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
       */
      if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
              x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);
+     else if (!host_mitigations_on_guest)
+             /*
+              * Clear the host MSR before vm-enter to avoid applying host
+              * security mitigations to the guest.
+              */
+             x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(0, 0);

If X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL is active, won't svm->spec_ctrl and svm->virt_spec_ctrl always be zero, in which case you can do the if statement similar to the below one? Maybe just add a comment that those values will be zero in the case of X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL, thus eliminating the host security mitigation effect.

Thanks,
Tom

Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0 -0
      svm_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu);
 
Quoted 7 lines

arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 4039

Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
@@ -4025,7 +4035,7 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
      if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
              reload_tss(vcpu);
 
-     if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL))
+     if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_SPEC_CTRL) || !host_mitigations_on_guest)
              x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl, svm->virt_spec_ctrl);

This is much too late to restore the host's value of IA32_SPEC_CTRL on hosts that are using RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET. The host's IA32_SPEC_CTRL value should be restored prior to the UNTRAIN_RET in vmenter.S.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0 -0
      if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {