Skip to contentSkip to conversation

x86/uaccess: instrument copy_from_user_nmi()

PATCH In review Alexander Potapenko 3 participants 8 messages Oct 25, 2022 – Oct 27, 2022

Subsystems (2)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 x86/uaccess: instrument copy_from_user_nmi()

Make sure usercopy hooks from linux/instrumented.h are invoked for copy_from_user_nmi().
This fixes KMSAN false positives reported when dumping opcodes for a stack trace.

---
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c +3 -0
index f1bb186171562..24b48af274173 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/instrumented.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 
@@ -44,7 +45,9 @@ copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	 * called from other contexts.
 	 */
 	pagefault_disable();
+	instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
 	ret = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+	instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, ret);
 	pagefault_enable();
 
 	return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0.135.g90850a2211-goog
#1 lore raw
Quoted 27 lines · Alexander Potapenko

Make sure usercopy hooks from linux/instrumented.h are invoked for copy_from_user_nmi().
This fixes KMSAN false positives reported when dumping opcodes for a stack trace.

---
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c +1 -0
index f1bb186171562..24b48af274173 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/instrumented.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 

arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) · line 53

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c +2 -0
@@ -44,7 +45,9 @@ copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
 	 * called from other contexts.
 	 */
 	pagefault_disable();
+	instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
 	ret = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+	instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, ret);
 	pagefault_enable();
 
 	return ret;

Is all that instrumentation NMI safe? ISTR having seen locks in some of that *SAN stuff.

Also did this want:

Fixes 59298997df89 ("x86/uaccess: avoid check_object_size() in copy_from_user_nmi()")

?

#2 lore raw
Quoted 37 lines · Peter Zijlstra

arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from,

Quoted 27 lines · Alexander Potapenko

Make sure usercopy hooks from linux/instrumented.h are invoked for copy_from_user_nmi().
This fixes KMSAN false positives reported when dumping opcodes for a stack trace.

---
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c +1 -0
index f1bb186171562..24b48af274173 100644
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/instrumented.h>
 
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 
@@ -44,7 +45,9 @@ copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from,

unsigned long n)

Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c +2 -0
       * called from other contexts.
       */
      pagefault_disable();
+     instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
      ret = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
+     instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, ret);
      pagefault_enable();
 
Quoted 6 lines

arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c copy_from_user_nmi(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) · line 53

Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/lib/usercopy.c +0 -0
      return ret;

Is all that instrumentation NMI safe? ISTR having seen locks in some of that *SAN stuff.

Good question.

I think the implicit assumption is that every function in include/linux/instrumented.h must be NMI-safe (and IRQ safe as well).

For KASAN I believe it to be the case: kasan_check_read() and kasan_check_write() are pretty simple, and in the worst case we'll get a spinlock in kasan_report(), which is quite unlikely to be nested (that's a KASAN bug report interrupted by an NMI, which in turn contains a KASAN bug). KCSAN also appears to be lockless and may only suffer from the nested bug report case (still super-rare). Marco, am I correct?

For KMSAN the particular kmsan_unpoison_memory() is just a loop doing a memset() of several memory regions belonging to different pages, it doesn't even perform reporting.
A bigger issue from the NMI perspective is probably
having __msan_poison_alloca() inserted in every non-noinstr kernel function, because that hook may acquire the stackdepot lock.

Overall, I think we are safe for now, but I'm a bit afraid this may easily get out of hand if someone adds more tool hooks to instrumented.h

Quoted 7 lines

Also did this want:

Fixes 59298997df89 ("x86/uaccess: avoid check_object_size() in

copy_from_user_nmi()")

?

Ah, this explains why it started popping up.
Yes, the Fixes: tag is relevant here.

Signature · 10 lines
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München

Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Liana Sebastian
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg
#3 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Potapenko

A bigger issue from the NMI perspective is probably having __msan_poison_alloca() inserted in every non-noinstr kernel function, because that hook may acquire the stackdepot lock.

*urgghhh* that's broken, that must not be. There is a *TON* of NMI functions that are non-noinstr.

What's worse, it seems to do a memory allocation as well, and that's out the window with PREEMPT_RT where you can't do even GFP_ATOMIC from regular IRQ context.

That function is wholly unacceptable to be added to every kernel function.

#4 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Potapenko

A bigger issue from the NMI perspective is probably having __msan_poison_alloca() inserted in every non-noinstr kernel function, because that hook may acquire the stackdepot lock.

*urgghhh* that's broken, that must not be. There is a *TON* of NMI functions that are non-noinstr.

__msan_poison_alloca() is guarded by kmsan_in_runtime(), which is currently implemented as:

  static __always_inline bool kmsan_in_runtime(void)
  {
          if ((hardirq_count() >> HARDIRQ_SHIFT) > 1)
                  return true;
          return kmsan_get_context()->kmsan_in_runtime;
  }

I think the easiest way to fix the NMI situation would be adding "if in_nmi() return true"?

Currently that will render kmsan_unpoison_memory() useless in NMI context, but I think we don't need a check for kmsan_in_runtime() there, because unpoisoning is self-contained and normally does not recurse (guess we can tolerate a pr_err() on the rare assertion violation path?)

Quoted 3 lines

What's worse, it seems to do a memory allocation as well, and that's out the window with PREEMPT_RT where you can't do even GFP_ATOMIC from regular IRQ context.

Yes, there's a lazy call to alloc_pages() in lib/stackdepot.c that is done when we run out of storage space.
It would be a pity to ignore everything that is happening inside regular IRQs (by making kmsan_in_runtime() bail out on in_irq()) - I think we occasionally see errors from there, e.g.
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=233563e79a8e00f86412eb3d2fb4eb1f425e70c3
We could make stackdepot avoid allocating memory in IRQs/NMIs and hope that calls to __msan_poison_alloca() from regular contexts keep up with draining the storage from interrupts.
Another option would be to preallocate a very big chunk of memory for stackdepot and never do allocations again.

These tricks won't however save us from acquiring depot_lock from lib/stackdepot.c every time we want to create a new origin. But that should not be a problem by itself, because we always do kmsan_enter_runtime() before accessing the stack depot - i.e. it won't be taken recursively.

Given that PREEMPT_RT is not the default at the moment, shall we make KMSAN incompatible with it for the time being?

Quoted 3 lines

That function is wholly unacceptable to be added to every kernel function.

Signature · 10 lines
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München

Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Liana Sebastian
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg
#5 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · Alexander Potapenko
Quoted 8 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Potapenko

A bigger issue from the NMI perspective is probably having __msan_poison_alloca() inserted in every non-noinstr kernel function, because that hook may acquire the stackdepot lock.

*urgghhh* that's broken, that must not be. There is a *TON* of NMI functions that are non-noinstr.

__msan_poison_alloca() is guarded by kmsan_in_runtime(), which is currently implemented as:

  static __always_inline bool kmsan_in_runtime(void)
  {
          if ((hardirq_count() >> HARDIRQ_SHIFT) > 1)
                  return true;
          return kmsan_get_context()->kmsan_in_runtime;
  }
Quoted 2 lines

I think the easiest way to fix the NMI situation would be adding "if in_nmi() return true"?

It might help to look through these threads:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

I wandered around attempting to deal with in_nmi(), etc. And in the end just drop the attempt to cover it. It's worth noting that copy_from_user_nmi() exists on 1 architecture and has exactly 1 call-site...

Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
#6 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Kees Cook

I wandered around attempting to deal with in_nmi(), etc. And in the end just drop the attempt to cover it. It's worth noting that copy_from_user_nmi() exists on 1 architecture and has exactly 1 call-site...

Yeah, back when I wrote it, it was a lot more complicated because we could not reliably take #PF from NMI context; it did manual page-walks, kmap_atomic()s and mempcy(). That's all fixed now and it's really mostly a rudiment -- except for these instrumentation issues it seems.

#7 lore raw
In reply to Kees Cook
Quoted 22 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 20 lines · Alexander Potapenko
Quoted 8 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Potapenko

A bigger issue from the NMI perspective is probably having __msan_poison_alloca() inserted in every non-noinstr kernel function, because that hook may acquire the stackdepot lock.

*urgghhh* that's broken, that must not be. There is a *TON* of NMI functions that are non-noinstr.

__msan_poison_alloca() is guarded by kmsan_in_runtime(), which is currently implemented as:

  static __always_inline bool kmsan_in_runtime(void)
  {
          if ((hardirq_count() >> HARDIRQ_SHIFT) > 1)
                  return true;
          return kmsan_get_context()->kmsan_in_runtime;
  }
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

I think the easiest way to fix the NMI situation would be adding "if in_nmi() return true"?

It might help to look through these threads:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Sorry, I missed that letter, should have responded earlier.

Quoted 4 lines

I wandered around attempting to deal with in_nmi(), etc. And in the end just drop the attempt to cover it. It's worth noting that copy_from_user_nmi() exists on 1 architecture and has exactly 1 call-site...

It doesn't really matter for KASAN, because a missing addressability check is a matter of missing some (possibly rare) bugs.
For KMSAN a missing initialization will result in false positives, and we already started seeing them: show_opcodes() copies data to a local and prints it, but without a call to kmsan_unpoison_memory() it will result in error reports about opcodes[] being uninitialized.

So for this particular case I want to ensure kmsan_unpoison_memory() can be called from NMI context (by removing the kmsan_in_runtime() check from it), but to be on the safe side we'll also have to do nothing in __msan_poison_alloca() under in_nmi().

Quoted 2 lines

--
Kees Cook

--
Alexander Potapenko
Software Engineer

Google Germany GmbH
Erika-Mann-Straße, 33
80636 München

Geschäftsführer: Paul Manicle, Liana Sebastian
Registergericht und -nummer: Hamburg, HRB 86891
Sitz der Gesellschaft: Hamburg