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crypto/caam: Avoid GCC constprop bug warning

PATCH Superseded Kees Cook 4 participants 10 messages Oct 28, 2022 – Dec 2, 2022

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Kees Cook

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 crypto/caam: Avoid GCC constprop bug warning

GCC 12 appears to perform constant propagation incompletely(?) and can no longer notice that "len" is always 0 when "data" is NULL. Expand the check to avoid warnings about memcpy() having a NULL argument:

...
from drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c:8:
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h: In function 'append_data.constprop':
include/linux/fortify-string.h:48:33: warning: argument 2 null where non-null expected [-Wnonnull]

      48 | #define __underlying_memcpy     __builtin_memcpy
         |                                 ^
   include/linux/fortify-string.h:438:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy'
     438 |         __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);                        \
         |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~

The NULL was being propagated from:

append_fifo_load_as_imm(desc, NULL, 0, LDST_CLASS_2_CCB |
FIFOLD_TYPE_MSG | FIFOLD_TYPE_LAST2);
...
static inline void append_##cmd##_as_imm(u32 * const desc, const void *data, \

                                         unsigned int len, u32 options) \
{ \
        PRINT_POS; \
        append_cmd_data(desc, data, len, CMD_##op | options); \
}

...
APPEND_CMD_PTR_TO_IMM(fifo_load, FIFO_LOAD);
...
static inline void append_cmd_data(u32 * const desc, const void *data, int len,
u32 command)

{
        append_cmd(desc, command | IMMEDIATE | len);
        append_data(desc, data, len);
}
---
 drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h +1 -1
index 62ce6421bb3f..ddbba8b00ab7 100644
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static inline void append_data(u32 * const desc, const void *data, int len)
 {
 	u32 *offset = desc_end(desc);
 
-	if (len) /* avoid sparse warning: memcpy with byte count of 0 */
+	if (data && len) /* avoid sparse warning: memcpy with byte count of 0 */
 		memcpy(offset, data, len);
 
 	(*desc) = cpu_to_caam32(caam32_to_cpu(*desc) +
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

From: Kees Cook

Quoted 5 lines

Sent: 28 October 2022 22:06

GCC 12 appears to perform constant propagation incompletely(?) and can no longer notice that "len" is always 0 when "data" is NULL. Expand the check to avoid warnings about memcpy() having a NULL argument:

...

drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h static inline void append_data(u32 * const desc, const void *data, int len) · line 167

Quoted 12 lines
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h +1 -1
index 62ce6421bb3f..ddbba8b00ab7 100644
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static inline void append_data(u32 * const desc, const void *data, int len)
 {
 	u32 *offset = desc_end(desc);
 
-	if (len) /* avoid sparse warning: memcpy with byte count of 0 */
+	if (data && len) /* avoid sparse warning: memcpy with byte count of 0 */
 		memcpy(offset, data, len);

I'd guess non-constant zero lengths are unlikely?
So how about:

	/* Avoid calling memcpy() when there is never a buffer */
	if (!__builtin_constant(len) || len)
		memcpy(offset, data, len);

Then the test should never actually end up in the object code.

David

-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)

maintainer
#2 lore raw
In reply to Kees Cook

drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h static inline void append_data(u32 * const desc, const void *data, int len) · line 167

Quoted 8 lines · Kees Cook
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h +1 -1
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static inline void append_data(u32 * const desc, const void *data, int len)
 {
 	u32 *offset = desc_end(desc);
 
-	if (len) /* avoid sparse warning: memcpy with byte count of 0 */
+	if (data && len) /* avoid sparse warning: memcpy with byte count of 0 */
 		memcpy(offset, data, len);

How about just killing the if clause altogether? I don't see any sparse warnings without it. What am I missing?

Cheers,

Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
#3 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Herbert Xu
Quoted 5 lines · Kees Cook
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h +0 -0
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static inline void append_data(u32 * const desc, const void *data, int len)
 {
 	u32 *offset = desc_end(desc);
 
Quoted 6 lines

drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h static inline void append_data(u32 * const desc, const void *data, int len) · line 167

Quoted 3 lines
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h +1 -1
-	if (len) /* avoid sparse warning: memcpy with byte count of 0 */
+	if (data && len) /* avoid sparse warning: memcpy with byte count of 0 */
 		memcpy(offset, data, len);

How about just killing the if clause altogether? I don't see any sparse warnings without it. What am I missing?

I think that was fixed in sparse release v0.5.1 [1]. The workaround 'if (len)' was introduced back in 2011, and the sparse release v0.5.1 was done in 2017. So it should probably be safe to remove the 'if (len)' or what do you think?

Cheers,
Anders
[1] https://sparse.docs.kernel.org/en/latest/release-notes/v0.5.1.html

maintainer
#4 lore raw

On Thu, Dec 01, 2022 at 12:52:44PM +0100, Anders Roxell wrote:
.

Quoted 4 lines

I think that was fixed in sparse release v0.5.1 [1]. The workaround 'if (len)' was introduced back in 2011, and the sparse release v0.5.1 was done in 2017. So it should probably be safe to remove the 'if (len)' or what do you think?

Could you please send a patch? :)

Thanks,

Signature · 3 lines
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
#5 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines · Herbert Xu

On Thu, Dec 01, 2022 at 12:52:44PM +0100, Anders Roxell wrote:
.

Quoted 4 lines

I think that was fixed in sparse release v0.5.1 [1]. The workaround 'if (len)' was introduced back in 2011, and the sparse release v0.5.1 was done in 2017. So it should probably be safe to remove the 'if (len)' or what do you think?

Could you please send a patch? :)

Please ignore my previous email... since its not the 'if (len)' statement that GCC comlains about.

Cheers,
Anders

Quoted 6 lines

Thanks,
--
Email: Herbert Xu <[email protected]> Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt

Tested-by on v1 1/1
#6 lore raw
In reply to Kees Cook
Quoted 35 lines · Kees Cook

GCC 12 appears to perform constant propagation incompletely(?) and can no longer notice that "len" is always 0 when "data" is NULL. Expand the check to avoid warnings about memcpy() having a NULL argument:

...
from drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c:8:
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h: In function 'append_data.constprop':
include/linux/fortify-string.h:48:33: warning: argument 2 null where non-null expected [-Wnonnull]

      48 | #define __underlying_memcpy     __builtin_memcpy
         |                                 ^
   include/linux/fortify-string.h:438:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy'
     438 |         __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);                        \
         |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~

The NULL was being propagated from:

append_fifo_load_as_imm(desc, NULL, 0, LDST_CLASS_2_CCB |
FIFOLD_TYPE_MSG | FIFOLD_TYPE_LAST2);
...
static inline void append_##cmd##_as_imm(u32 * const desc, const void *data, \

                                         unsigned int len, u32 options) \
{ \
        PRINT_POS; \
        append_cmd_data(desc, data, len, CMD_##op | options); \
}

...
APPEND_CMD_PTR_TO_IMM(fifo_load, FIFO_LOAD);
...
static inline void append_cmd_data(u32 * const desc, const void *data, int len,
u32 command)

{
        append_cmd(desc, command | IMMEDIATE | len);
        append_data(desc, data, len);
}
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
---
 drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h +0 -0
index 62ce6421bb3f..ddbba8b00ab7 100644

drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h static inline void append_data(u32 * const desc, const void *data, int len) · line 166

Quoted 5 lines
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h +1 -1
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static inline void append_data(u32 * const desc, const void *data, int len)
 {
 	u32 *offset = desc_end(desc);
 
-	if (len) /* avoid sparse warning: memcpy with byte count of 0 */
+	if (data && len) /* avoid sparse warning: memcpy with byte count of 0 */

Maybe we should update the comment, since newer releases of sparse doesn't warn about this.

Cheers,
Anders

#7 lore raw

From: Anders Roxell

Quoted 7 lines

Sent: 02 December 2022 00:58

Quoted 4 lines · Kees Cook

GCC 12 appears to perform constant propagation incompletely(?) and can no longer notice that "len" is always 0 when "data" is NULL. Expand the check to avoid warnings about memcpy() having a NULL argument:

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

...
from drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c:8:
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h: In function 'append_data.constprop':
include/linux/fortify-string.h:48:33: warning: argument 2 null where non-null expected [-

Wnonnull]

Quoted 5 lines
      48 | #define __underlying_memcpy     __builtin_memcpy
         |                                 ^
   include/linux/fortify-string.h:438:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy'
     438 |         __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);                        \
         |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~

...

Is this really a bug in the fortify-string wrappers?
IIRC the call is memcpy(NULL, ptr, 0) (or maybe memcpy(ptr, NULL, 0). In either case call can be removed at compile time.

I'd bet that the constant propagation of 'len' fails because of all the intermediate variables that get used in order to avoid multiple evaluation.

The some 'tricks' that are used in min() (see minmax.h) to generate a constant output for constant input could be use to detect a compile-time zero length.

Something like:

#define memcpy(dst, src, len) \
	(__is_constzero(len) ? (dst) : memcpy_check(dst, src, len))

With:
#define __is_constzero(x) sizeof(*(1 ? (void *)(x) : (int *)0) != 1) Which could go into const.h and used in the definition of __is_constexpr().

David

-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)

author
#8 lore raw
Quoted 32 lines · David Laight

From: Anders Roxell

Quoted 7 lines

Sent: 02 December 2022 00:58

Quoted 4 lines · Kees Cook

GCC 12 appears to perform constant propagation incompletely(?) and can no longer notice that "len" is always 0 when "data" is NULL. Expand the check to avoid warnings about memcpy() having a NULL argument:

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

...
from drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c:8:
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h: In function 'append_data.constprop':
include/linux/fortify-string.h:48:33: warning: argument 2 null where non-null expected [-

Wnonnull]

Quoted 5 lines
      48 | #define __underlying_memcpy     __builtin_memcpy
         |                                 ^
   include/linux/fortify-string.h:438:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy'
     438 |         __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);                        \
         |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~

...

Is this really a bug in the fortify-string wrappers?
IIRC the call is memcpy(NULL, ptr, 0) (or maybe memcpy(ptr, NULL, 0). In either case call can be removed at compile time.

I'd bet that the constant propagation of 'len' fails because of all the intermediate variables that get used in order to avoid multiple evaluation.

The some 'tricks' that are used in min() (see minmax.h) to generate a constant output for constant input could be use to detect a compile-time zero length.

Quoted 7 lines

Something like:

#define memcpy(dst, src, len) \
	(__is_constzero(len) ? (dst) : memcpy_check(dst, src, len))

With:
#define __is_constzero(x) sizeof(*(1 ? (void *)(x) : (int *)0) != 1) Which could go into const.h and used in the definition of __is_constexpr().

While it could be possible to strip the nonnull attribute, I think it's not an unreasonable check to have. This is literally the only case in the entire kernel that is tripped, for example.

Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
#9 lore raw

From: Kees Cook

Quoted 39 lines

Sent: 02 December 2022 18:58

Quoted 36 lines · David Laight

From: Anders Roxell

Quoted 7 lines

Sent: 02 December 2022 00:58

Quoted 4 lines · Kees Cook

GCC 12 appears to perform constant propagation incompletely(?) and can no longer notice that "len" is always 0 when "data" is NULL. Expand the check to avoid warnings about memcpy() having a NULL argument:

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

...
from drivers/crypto/caam/key_gen.c:8:
drivers/crypto/caam/desc_constr.h: In function 'append_data.constprop':
include/linux/fortify-string.h:48:33: warning: argument 2 null where non-null expected [-

Wnonnull]

Quoted 5 lines
      48 | #define __underlying_memcpy     __builtin_memcpy
         |                                 ^
   include/linux/fortify-string.h:438:9: note: in expansion of macro '__underlying_memcpy'
     438 |         __underlying_##op(p, q, __fortify_size);                        \
         |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~

...

Is this really a bug in the fortify-string wrappers?
IIRC the call is memcpy(NULL, ptr, 0) (or maybe memcpy(ptr, NULL, 0). In either case call can be removed at compile time.

I'd bet that the constant propagation of 'len' fails because of all the intermediate variables that get used in order to avoid multiple evaluation.

The some 'tricks' that are used in min() (see minmax.h) to generate a constant output for constant input could be use to detect a compile-time zero length.

Something like:

#define memcpy(dst, src, len) \
	(__is_constzero(len) ? (dst) : memcpy_check(dst, src, len))
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

With:
#define __is_constzero(x) sizeof(*(1 ? (void *)(x) : (int *)0) != 1) Which could go into const.h and used in the definition of __is_constexpr().

While it could be possible to strip the nonnull attribute, I think it's not an unreasonable check to have. This is literally the only case in the entire kernel that is tripped, for example.

It is probably the only place that calls memcpy() with compile-time NULL and zero length.
IIRC the memcpy() call comes from a #define expansion where some expansions don't need anything copied.
A simple 'builtin_constant' check and then one for zero in the #define itself would probably suffice - and avoid the call being compiled in at all.

David

-
Registered Address Lakeside, Bramley Road, Mount Farm, Milton Keynes, MK1 1PT, UK Registration No: 1397386 (Wales)