KVM: VMX: Do not trap VMFUNC instructions for L1 guests.
PATCH 1/1 KVM: VMX: Do not trap VMFUNC instructions for L1 guests.
VMFUNC is not supported for L1 guests, and executing VMFUNC in L1 shall generate a #UD directly. Just disable it in secondary proc-based execution control for L1, instead of intercepting it and inject the #UD again.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 17 +++++------------ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +5 -12
@@ -5793,11 +5793,11 @@ static int handle_vmfunc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)u32 function =kvm_rax_read (vcpu);/* -* VMFUNC is only supported for nested guests, but we always enable the -* secondary control for simplicity; for non-nested mode, fake that we -* didn't by injecting #UD. +* VMFUNC is only supported for nested guests, instead of triggering +* a VM Exit, non-nested guests shall receive #UD directly. */ if (!is_guest_mode (vcpu)) { +vcpu_unimpl (vcpu,"vmx: unexpected vm exit EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC.\n" );kvm_queue_exception (vcpu,UD_VECTOR );return 1 ; }
@@ -6808,6 +6808,7 @@ void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, u32 ept_caps)SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING |SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID | +SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING |SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES |SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING ;
@@ -6839,16 +6840,8 @@ void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, u32 ept_caps)SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML ; msrs->ept_caps |=VMX_EPT_AD_BIT ; } - } -if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc ()) { - msrs->secondary_ctls_high |= -SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC ; -/* -* Advertise EPTP switching unconditionally -* since we emulate it -*/ -if (enable_ept) +if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc ()) msrs->vmfunc_controls =VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING ; }
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +3 -1
@@ -4483,6 +4483,9 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY); exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE ; +/* VMFUNC is not supported for L1 guest, just disable it. */ + exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC ; +/* SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC is enabled/disabled on writes to CR4.UMIP, * in vmx_set_cr4. */ exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC ;
@@ -6000,7 +6003,6 @@ static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = { [EXIT_REASON_RDSEED] = kvm_handle_invalid_op, [EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL] = handle_pml_full, [EXIT_REASON_INVPCID] = handle_invpcid, - [EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC] = handle_vmx_instruction, [EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER] = handle_preemption_timer, [EXIT_REASON_ENCLS] = handle_encls, [EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK] = handle_bus_lock_vmexit,
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 6 lines · Yu Zhang
VMFUNC is not supported for L1 guests, and executing VMFUNC in L1 shall generate a #UD directly. Just disable it in secondary proc-based execution control for L1, instead of intercepting it and inject the #UD again.
Signed-off-by Yu Zhang<[email protected]>
Is this for TDX or similar? The reason for a patch should be mentioned in the commit message.
Paolo
Sean Christopherson
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 6 lines · Yu Zhang
VMFUNC is not supported for L1 guests, and executing VMFUNC in L1 shall generate a #UD directly. Just disable it in secondary proc-based execution control for L1, instead of intercepting it and inject the #UD again.
Signed-off-by Yu Zhang<[email protected]>Is this for TDX or similar? The reason for a patch should be mentioned in the commit message.
It's just a cleanup, but (a) it should be split over two patches as disabling VMFUNC for L1 is technically a functional change, where as the changes to nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs() are pure cleanups, and (b) the !guest_mode path in handle_vmfunc() should either be removed or turned into a KVM_BUG_ON().
E.g.
--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 11 ++--------- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +2 -9
@@ -5792,15 +5792,8 @@ static int handle_vmfunc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;u32 function =kvm_rax_read (vcpu); -/* -* VMFUNC is only supported for nested guests, but we always enable the -* secondary control for simplicity; for non-nested mode, fake that we -* didn't by injecting #UD. -*/ -if (!is_guest_mode (vcpu)) { -kvm_queue_exception (vcpu,UD_VECTOR ); -return 1 ; - } +if (KVM_BUG_ON (!is_guest_mode (vcpu), vcpu->kvm)) +return -EIO ; vmcs12 =get_vmcs12 (vcpu);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +6 -1
@@ -4487,6 +4487,12 @@ static u32 vmx_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY); exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE ; +/* +* KVM doesn't support VMFUNC for L1, but the control is set in KVM's +* base configuration as KVM emulates VMFUNC[EPTP_SWITCHING] for L2. +*/ + exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC ; +/* SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC is enabled/disabled on writes to CR4.UMIP, * in vmx_set_cr4. */ exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC ;
@@ -6004,7 +6010,6 @@ static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = { [EXIT_REASON_RDSEED] = kvm_handle_invalid_op, [EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL] = handle_pml_full, [EXIT_REASON_INVPCID] = handle_invpcid, - [EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC] = handle_vmx_instruction, [EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER] = handle_preemption_timer, [EXIT_REASON_ENCLS] = handle_encls, [EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK] = handle_bus_lock_vmexit,
base-commit: 07341b10fcbd5a7ef18225e0e9a8a40d91e3a2cc
Signature · 7 lines
and then the pure cleanup that is made possible because KVM now does: msrs->secondary_ctls_high = vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl; --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 14 +++++--------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +5 -9
@@ -6801,6 +6801,7 @@ void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, u32 ept_caps)SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING |SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID | +SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING |SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES |SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING ;
@@ -6832,18 +6833,13 @@ void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf, u32 ept_caps)SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML ; msrs->ept_caps |=VMX_EPT_AD_BIT ; } - } -if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc ()) { - msrs->secondary_ctls_high |= -SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC ;/* -* Advertise EPTP switching unconditionally -* since we emulate it +* Advertise EPTP switching irrespective of hardware support, +* KVM emulates it in software so long as VMFUNC is supported. */ -if (enable_ept) - msrs->vmfunc_controls = -VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING ; +if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc ()) + msrs->vmfunc_controls =VMX_VMFUNC_EPTP_SWITCHING ; }/*
base-commit: 777dde94dd5e4328b419dcc5cb7118b39588eab1
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 8 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 6 lines · Yu Zhang
VMFUNC is not supported for L1 guests, and executing VMFUNC in L1 shall generate a #UD directly. Just disable it in secondary proc-based execution control for L1, instead of intercepting it and inject the #UD again.
Signed-off-by Yu Zhang<[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Is this for TDX or similar? The reason for a patch should be mentioned in the commit message.
It's just a cleanup, but (a) it should be split over two patches as disabling VMFUNC for L1 is technically a functional change, where as the changes to
nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs()are pure cleanups, and (b) the !guest_mode path inhandle_vmfunc()should either be removed or turned into aKVM_BUG_ON().
Got it. Will do in V2. And thanks!
B.R.
Yu
Quoted 10 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 6 lines · Yu Zhang
VMFUNC is not supported for L1 guests, and executing VMFUNC in L1 shall generate a #UD directly. Just disable it in secondary proc-based execution control for L1, instead of intercepting it and inject the #UD again.
Signed-off-by Yu Zhang<[email protected]>Is this for TDX or similar? The reason for a patch should be mentioned in the commit message.
Thanks for your quick reply, Paolo.
It is not a new feature. Just a clean up for VMFUNC, which is not supported by KVM for L1 guest.
According to Intel SDM 25.5.6.2 - "General Operation of the VMFUNC Instruction", The VMFUNC instruction causes an invalid-opcode exception (#UD) if the “enable VM functions” VM-execution controls is 0 or the value of EAX is greater than 63 (only VM functions 0–63 can be enable). Otherwise, the instruction causes a VM exit if the bit at position EAX is 0 in the VM-function controls (the selected VM function is not enabled)
And since KVM only provides emulation of VMFUNC for nested guests, it is uncessary for KVM to intercept it and reinject a #UD. So just disable VMFUNC in VM-execution control for L1 guests.
But please feel free to educate me if I missed some backgrounds about why this is enabled in the first place. Thanks!
B.R.
Yu