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bpf: Add bpf_vma_build_id_parse kfunc

PATCH Superseded Jiri Olsa 4 participants 8 messages Nov 18, 2022 – Nov 20, 2022

Subsystems (7)
Kselftest BPF Tracing BPF selftests +3 more subsystems

v3 of 4 Superseded Latest is v4 →

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Jiri Olsa

author reviewer
#0 lore raw

v3 cover bpf: Add bpf_vma_build_id_parse kfunc

hi,
first version of this patchset added helper for this functionality, but based Alexei's feedback [1], changing it to kfunc.

With the current build_id_parse function as kfunc we can't effectively check buffer size provided by user. Therefore adding new function as bpf kfunc:

int bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned char *build_id, size_t build_id__sz);

that triggers kfunc's verifier check for build_id/build_id__sz buffer size and calls build_id_parse.

v3 changes:
- restrict bpf_vma_build_id_parse to bpf_find_vma callback
- move bpf_vma_build_id_parse to kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c and add new tracing_kfunc_set

thanks,
jirka

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQKyT4Mm4EdTCYK8c070E-BwPZS_FOkWKLJC80riSGmLTg@mail.gmail.com/
---
Jiri Olsa (2):
bpf: Add bpf_vma_build_id_parse function and kfunc
selftests/bpf: Add bpf_vma_build_id_parse kfunc test

 include/linux/bpf.h                                             |  4 ++++
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                                           | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c                                        | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_vma_build_id_parse.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_vma_build_id_parse.c      | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 189 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_vma_build_id_parse.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_vma_build_id_parse.c
author reviewer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/2 bpf: Add bpf_vma_build_id_parse function and kfunc

Adding bpf_vma_build_id_parse function to retrieve build id from passed vma object and making it available as bpf kfunc.

We can't use build_id_parse directly as kfunc, because we would not have control over the build id buffer size provided by user.

Instead we are adding new bpf_vma_build_id_parse function with 'build_id__sz' argument that instructs verifier to check for the available space in build_id buffer.

This way we check that there's always available memory space behind build_id pointer. We also check that the build_id__sz is at least BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX so we can place any buildid in.

---
 include/linux/bpf.h      |  4 ++++
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
include/linux/bpf.h +4 -0
index 8b32376ce746..7648188faa2c 100644
@@ -2805,4 +2805,8 @@ static inline bool type_is_alloc(u32 type)
 	return type & MEM_ALLOC;
 }
 
+int bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+			   unsigned char *build_id,
+			   size_t build_id__sz);
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_H */
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +26 -0
index 195d24316750..e20bad754a3a 100644
@@ -8746,6 +8746,29 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
 	return 0;
 }
 
+BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id, func, bpf_vma_build_id_parse)
+
+static int check_kfunc_caller(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id)
+{
+	struct bpf_func_state *cur;
+	struct bpf_insn *insn;
+
+	/* Allow bpf_vma_build_id_parse only from bpf_find_vma callback */
+	if (func_id == bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id[0]) {
+		cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
+		if (cur->callsite != BPF_MAIN_FUNC) {
+			insn = &env->prog->insnsi[cur->callsite];
+			if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_find_vma)
+				return 0;
+		}
+		verbose(env, "calling bpf_vma_build_id_parse outside bpf_find_vma "
+			"callback is not allowed\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
 			    int *insn_idx_p)
 {
@@ -8797,6 +8820,9 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
 		return -EACCES;
 	}
 
+	if (check_kfunc_caller(env, func_id))
+		return -EACCES;
+
 	/* Check the arguments */
 	err = check_kfunc_args(env, &meta);
 	if (err < 0)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +31 -0
index f2d8d070d024..7f08e6c3a080 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/sort.h>
 #include <linux/key.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
+#include <linux/buildid.h>
 
 #include <net/bpf_sk_storage.h>
 
@@ -1383,6 +1384,36 @@ static int __init bpf_key_sig_kfuncs_init(void)
 late_initcall(bpf_key_sig_kfuncs_init);
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
+int bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+			   unsigned char *build_id,
+			   size_t build_id__sz)
+{
+	__u32 size;
+	int err;
+
+	if (build_id__sz < BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = build_id_parse(vma, build_id, &size);
+	return err ?: (int) size;
+}
+
+BTF_SET8_START(tracing_btf_ids)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_vma_build_id_parse)
+BTF_SET8_END(tracing_btf_ids)
+
+static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set tracing_kfunc_set = {
+	.owner = THIS_MODULE,
+	.set   = &tracing_btf_ids,
+};
+
+static int __init kfunc_tracing_init(void)
+{
+	return register_btf_kfunc_id_set(BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING, &tracing_kfunc_set);
+}
+
+late_initcall(kfunc_tracing_init);
+
 static const struct bpf_func_proto *
 bpf_tracing_func_proto(enum bpf_func_id func_id, const struct bpf_prog *prog)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv3 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Add bpf_vma_build_id_parse function and kfunc

Quoted 55 lines · Jiri Olsa

Adding bpf_vma_build_id_parse function to retrieve build id from passed vma object and making it available as bpf kfunc.

We can't use build_id_parse directly as kfunc, because we would not have control over the build id buffer size provided by user.

Instead we are adding new bpf_vma_build_id_parse function with 'build_id__sz' argument that instructs verifier to check for the available space in build_id buffer.

This way we check that there's always available memory space behind build_id pointer. We also check that the build_id__sz is at least BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX so we can place any buildid in.

---
 include/linux/bpf.h      |  4 ++++
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
include/linux/bpf.h +4 -0
index 8b32376ce746..7648188faa2c 100644
@@ -2805,4 +2805,8 @@ static inline bool type_is_alloc(u32 type)
        return type & MEM_ALLOC;
 }
 
+int bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+                          unsigned char *build_id,
+                          size_t build_id__sz);
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_H */
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +12 -0
index 195d24316750..e20bad754a3a 100644
@@ -8746,6 +8746,29 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
        return 0;
 }
 
+BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id, func, bpf_vma_build_id_parse)
+
+static int check_kfunc_caller(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id)
+{
+       struct bpf_func_state *cur;
+       struct bpf_insn *insn;
+
+       /* Allow bpf_vma_build_id_parse only from bpf_find_vma callback */
+       if (func_id == bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id[0]) {
+               cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
+               if (cur->callsite != BPF_MAIN_FUNC) {
+                       insn = &env->prog->insnsi[cur->callsite];

kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ · line 8770

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10 -0
+                       if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_find_vma)
+                               return 0;
+               }
+               verbose(env, "calling bpf_vma_build_id_parse outside bpf_find_vma "
+                       "callback is not allowed\n");
+               return -1;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+}

I understand that calling bpf_vma_build_id_parse from find_vma is your only use case, but put yourself in the maintainer's shoes. We just did an arbitrary restriction and helped a single user. How are we going to explain this to other users?
Let's figure out a more generic way where this call is safe. Have you looked at PTR_TRUSTED approach that David is doing for task_struct ? Can something like this be used here?

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv3 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Add bpf_vma_build_id_parse function and kfunc

Quoted 71 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 55 lines · Jiri Olsa

Adding bpf_vma_build_id_parse function to retrieve build id from passed vma object and making it available as bpf kfunc.

We can't use build_id_parse directly as kfunc, because we would not have control over the build id buffer size provided by user.

Instead we are adding new bpf_vma_build_id_parse function with 'build_id__sz' argument that instructs verifier to check for the available space in build_id buffer.

This way we check that there's always available memory space behind build_id pointer. We also check that the build_id__sz is at least BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX so we can place any buildid in.

---

include/linux/bpf.h      |  4 ++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
include/linux/bpf.h +4 -0
index 8b32376ce746..7648188faa2c 100644
@@ -2805,4 +2805,8 @@ static inline bool type_is_alloc(u32 type)
       return type & MEM_ALLOC;
 }
 
+int bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+                          unsigned char *build_id,
+                          size_t build_id__sz);
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_H */
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +12 -0
index 195d24316750..e20bad754a3a 100644
@@ -8746,6 +8746,29 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
       return 0;
 }
 
+BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id, func, bpf_vma_build_id_parse)
+
+static int check_kfunc_caller(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id)
+{
+       struct bpf_func_state *cur;
+       struct bpf_insn *insn;
+
+       /* Allow bpf_vma_build_id_parse only from bpf_find_vma callback */
+       if (func_id == bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id[0]) {
+               cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
+               if (cur->callsite != BPF_MAIN_FUNC) {
+                       insn = &env->prog->insnsi[cur->callsite];

kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ · line 8770

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10 -0
+                       if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_find_vma)
+                               return 0;
+               }
+               verbose(env, "calling bpf_vma_build_id_parse outside bpf_find_vma "
+                       "callback is not allowed\n");
+               return -1;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+}
Quoted 7 lines

I understand that calling bpf_vma_build_id_parse from find_vma is your only use case, but put yourself in the maintainer's shoes. We just did an arbitrary restriction and helped a single user. How are we going to explain this to other users?
Let's figure out a more generic way where this call is safe. Have you looked at PTR_TRUSTED approach that David is doing for task_struct ? Can something like this be used here?

I guess that won't work, as the vma is not refcounted. :( This is why we have to hold mmap_lock when calling task_vma programs.

OTOH, I would image bpf_vma_build_id_parse being quite useful for task_vma programs.

Thanks,
Song

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv3 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Add bpf_vma_build_id_parse function and kfunc

Quoted 80 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 72 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 55 lines · Jiri Olsa

Adding bpf_vma_build_id_parse function to retrieve build id from passed vma object and making it available as bpf kfunc.

We can't use build_id_parse directly as kfunc, because we would not have control over the build id buffer size provided by user.

Instead we are adding new bpf_vma_build_id_parse function with 'build_id__sz' argument that instructs verifier to check for the available space in build_id buffer.

This way we check that there's always available memory space behind build_id pointer. We also check that the build_id__sz is at least BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX so we can place any buildid in.

---

include/linux/bpf.h      |  4 ++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
include/linux/bpf.h +4 -0
index 8b32376ce746..7648188faa2c 100644
@@ -2805,4 +2805,8 @@ static inline bool type_is_alloc(u32 type)
       return type & MEM_ALLOC;
 }
 
+int bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+                          unsigned char *build_id,
+                          size_t build_id__sz);
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_H */
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +12 -0
index 195d24316750..e20bad754a3a 100644
@@ -8746,6 +8746,29 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
       return 0;
 }
 
+BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id, func, bpf_vma_build_id_parse)
+
+static int check_kfunc_caller(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id)
+{
+       struct bpf_func_state *cur;
+       struct bpf_insn *insn;
+
+       /* Allow bpf_vma_build_id_parse only from bpf_find_vma callback */
+       if (func_id == bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id[0]) {
+               cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
+               if (cur->callsite != BPF_MAIN_FUNC) {
+                       insn = &env->prog->insnsi[cur->callsite];

kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ · line 8770

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10 -0
+                       if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_find_vma)
+                               return 0;
+               }
+               verbose(env, "calling bpf_vma_build_id_parse outside bpf_find_vma "
+                       "callback is not allowed\n");
+               return -1;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+}
Quoted 7 lines

I understand that calling bpf_vma_build_id_parse from find_vma is your only use case, but put yourself in the maintainer's shoes. We just did an arbitrary restriction and helped a single user. How are we going to explain this to other users?
Let's figure out a more generic way where this call is safe. Have you looked at PTR_TRUSTED approach that David is doing for task_struct ? Can something like this be used here?

Quoted 5 lines

I guess that won't work, as the vma is not refcounted. :( This is why we have to hold mmap_lock when calling task_vma programs.

OTOH, I would image bpf_vma_build_id_parse being quite useful for task_vma programs.

Of course we cannot increment non-existing refcnt in vma :) I meant that PTR_TRUSTED part of the concept. The kfunc bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma, ...) should have KF_TRUSTED_ARGS flag
and it will be the job of the verifier to pass a trusted vma pointer. Meaning that the verifier needs to guarantee that
the pointer is safe to operate on.
That's what I was explaining to Kumar and David earlier about KF_TRUSTED_ARGS semantics.

PTR_TRUSTED doesn't mean that the pointer is refcnted. It means that it won't disappear and we can safely pass it to kfunc or helpers.
For bpf_find_vma we can mark vma pointer PTR_TRUSTED on entry into callback bpf prog and the prog will be able to pass it to bpf_vma_build_id_parse() kfunc as long as the prog doesn't add any offset to it.
The implementation of bpf_find_vma() guarantees that vma ptr passed into callback_fn is valid.
So it's exactly PTR_TRUSTED.

Similarly task_vma programs will be receiving PTR_TRUSTED pointers too and will be able to call bpf_vma_build_id_parse() kfunc as well. Any place where we can guarantee the safety of the pointer we should be marking it as PTR_TRUSTED.

David's series start with marking all tp_btf arguments as PTR_TRUSTED. Doing this for iterators, bpf_find_vma callback
will be a continuation of PTR_TRUSTED logic.

#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv3 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Add bpf_vma_build_id_parse function and kfunc

Quoted 112 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 80 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 72 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 55 lines · Jiri Olsa

Adding bpf_vma_build_id_parse function to retrieve build id from passed vma object and making it available as bpf kfunc.

We can't use build_id_parse directly as kfunc, because we would not have control over the build id buffer size provided by user.

Instead we are adding new bpf_vma_build_id_parse function with 'build_id__sz' argument that instructs verifier to check for the available space in build_id buffer.

This way we check that there's always available memory space behind build_id pointer. We also check that the build_id__sz is at least BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX so we can place any buildid in.

---

include/linux/bpf.h      |  4 ++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
include/linux/bpf.h +4 -0
index 8b32376ce746..7648188faa2c 100644
@@ -2805,4 +2805,8 @@ static inline bool type_is_alloc(u32 type)
      return type & MEM_ALLOC;
 }
 
+int bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+                          unsigned char *build_id,
+                          size_t build_id__sz);
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_H */
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +12 -0
index 195d24316750..e20bad754a3a 100644
@@ -8746,6 +8746,29 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
      return 0;
 }
 
+BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id, func, bpf_vma_build_id_parse)
+
+static int check_kfunc_caller(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id)
+{
+       struct bpf_func_state *cur;
+       struct bpf_insn *insn;
+
+       /* Allow bpf_vma_build_id_parse only from bpf_find_vma callback */
+       if (func_id == bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id[0]) {
+               cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
+               if (cur->callsite != BPF_MAIN_FUNC) {
+                       insn = &env->prog->insnsi[cur->callsite];

kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ · line 8770

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10 -0
+                       if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_find_vma)
+                               return 0;
+               }
+               verbose(env, "calling bpf_vma_build_id_parse outside bpf_find_vma "
+                       "callback is not allowed\n");
+               return -1;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+}
Quoted 7 lines

I understand that calling bpf_vma_build_id_parse from find_vma is your only use case, but put yourself in the maintainer's shoes. We just did an arbitrary restriction and helped a single user. How are we going to explain this to other users?
Let's figure out a more generic way where this call is safe. Have you looked at PTR_TRUSTED approach that David is doing for task_struct ? Can something like this be used here?

Quoted 5 lines

I guess that won't work, as the vma is not refcounted. :( This is why we have to hold mmap_lock when calling task_vma programs.

OTOH, I would image bpf_vma_build_id_parse being quite useful for task_vma programs.

Of course we cannot increment non-existing refcnt in vma :) I meant that PTR_TRUSTED part of the concept. The kfunc bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma, ...) should have KF_TRUSTED_ARGS flag
and it will be the job of the verifier to pass a trusted vma pointer. Meaning that the verifier needs to guarantee that
the pointer is safe to operate on.
That's what I was explaining to Kumar and David earlier about KF_TRUSTED_ARGS semantics.

PTR_TRUSTED doesn't mean that the pointer is refcnted. It means that it won't disappear and we can safely pass it to kfunc or helpers.
For bpf_find_vma we can mark vma pointer PTR_TRUSTED on entry into callback bpf prog and the prog will be able to pass it to bpf_vma_build_id_parse() kfunc as long as the prog doesn't add any offset to it.
The implementation of bpf_find_vma() guarantees that vma ptr passed into callback_fn is valid.
So it's exactly PTR_TRUSTED.

Quoted 8 lines

Similarly task_vma programs will be receiving PTR_TRUSTED pointers too and will be able to call bpf_vma_build_id_parse() kfunc as well. Any place where we can guarantee the safety of the pointer we should be marking it as PTR_TRUSTED.

David's series start with marking all tp_btf arguments as PTR_TRUSTED. Doing this for iterators, bpf_find_vma callback
will be a continuation of PTR_TRUSTED logic.

I see. So PTR_TRUSTED task_struct is an refcounted task_struct; while PTR_TRUSTED vm_area_struct is a vma with its mm_struct locked. That makes perfect sense.

Thanks for the explanation!

Song

#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv3 bpf-next 1/2] bpf: Add bpf_vma_build_id_parse function and kfunc

In reply to Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 108 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 80 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 72 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 55 lines · Jiri Olsa

Adding bpf_vma_build_id_parse function to retrieve build id from passed vma object and making it available as bpf kfunc.

We can't use build_id_parse directly as kfunc, because we would not have control over the build id buffer size provided by user.

Instead we are adding new bpf_vma_build_id_parse function with 'build_id__sz' argument that instructs verifier to check for the available space in build_id buffer.

This way we check that there's always available memory space behind build_id pointer. We also check that the build_id__sz is at least BUILD_ID_SIZE_MAX so we can place any buildid in.

---

include/linux/bpf.h      |  4 ++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c    | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 61 insertions(+)
include/linux/bpf.h +4 -0
index 8b32376ce746..7648188faa2c 100644
@@ -2805,4 +2805,8 @@ static inline bool type_is_alloc(u32 type)
       return type & MEM_ALLOC;
 }
 
+int bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+                          unsigned char *build_id,
+                          size_t build_id__sz);
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_H */
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +12 -0
index 195d24316750..e20bad754a3a 100644
@@ -8746,6 +8746,29 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
       return 0;
 }
 
+BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id, func, bpf_vma_build_id_parse)
+
+static int check_kfunc_caller(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id)
+{
+       struct bpf_func_state *cur;
+       struct bpf_insn *insn;
+
+       /* Allow bpf_vma_build_id_parse only from bpf_find_vma callback */
+       if (func_id == bpf_vma_build_id_parse_id[0]) {
+               cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe];
+               if (cur->callsite != BPF_MAIN_FUNC) {
+                       insn = &env->prog->insnsi[cur->callsite];

kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ · line 8770

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10 -0
+                       if (insn->imm == BPF_FUNC_find_vma)
+                               return 0;
+               }
+               verbose(env, "calling bpf_vma_build_id_parse outside bpf_find_vma "
+                       "callback is not allowed\n");
+               return -1;
+       }
+
+       return 0;
+}
Quoted 7 lines

I understand that calling bpf_vma_build_id_parse from find_vma is your only use case, but put yourself in the maintainer's shoes. We just did an arbitrary restriction and helped a single user. How are we going to explain this to other users?
Let's figure out a more generic way where this call is safe. Have you looked at PTR_TRUSTED approach that David is doing for task_struct ? Can something like this be used here?

Quoted 5 lines

I guess that won't work, as the vma is not refcounted. :( This is why we have to hold mmap_lock when calling task_vma programs.

OTOH, I would image bpf_vma_build_id_parse being quite useful for task_vma programs.

Of course we cannot increment non-existing refcnt in vma :) I meant that PTR_TRUSTED part of the concept. The kfunc bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma, ...) should have KF_TRUSTED_ARGS flag
and it will be the job of the verifier to pass a trusted vma pointer. Meaning that the verifier needs to guarantee that
the pointer is safe to operate on.
That's what I was explaining to Kumar and David earlier about KF_TRUSTED_ARGS semantics.

PTR_TRUSTED doesn't mean that the pointer is refcnted. It means that it won't disappear and we can safely pass it to kfunc or helpers.
For bpf_find_vma we can mark vma pointer PTR_TRUSTED on entry into callback bpf prog and the prog will be able to pass it to bpf_vma_build_id_parse() kfunc as long as the prog doesn't add any offset to it.
The implementation of bpf_find_vma() guarantees that vma ptr passed into callback_fn is valid.
So it's exactly PTR_TRUSTED.

Quoted 8 lines

Similarly task_vma programs will be receiving PTR_TRUSTED pointers too and will be able to call bpf_vma_build_id_parse() kfunc as well. Any place where we can guarantee the safety of the pointer we should be marking it as PTR_TRUSTED.

David's series start with marking all tp_btf arguments as PTR_TRUSTED. Doing this for iterators, bpf_find_vma callback
will be a continuation of PTR_TRUSTED logic.

ok, sounds much better.. generic solution for both bpf_find_vma and task_vma iterator

thanks,
jirka

author reviewer
#7 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/2 selftests/bpf: Add bpf_vma_build_id_parse kfunc test

In reply to Jiri Olsa

Adding test for bpf_vma_build_id_parse kfunc.

On bpf side the test finds the vma of the test_progs text through the test function pointer and reads its build id with the new kfunc.

On user side the test uses readelf to get test_progs build id and compares it with the one from bpf side.

---
 .../bpf/prog_tests/bpf_vma_build_id_parse.c   | 88 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../bpf/progs/bpf_vma_build_id_parse.c        | 40 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 128 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_vma_build_id_parse.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_vma_build_id_parse.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_vma_build_id_parse.c new file +88 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..83030a3b2c42
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "bpf_vma_build_id_parse.skel.h"
+
+#define BUILDID_STR_SIZE (BPF_BUILD_ID_SIZE*2 + 1)
+
+static int read_buildid(char **build_id)
+{
+	char tmp[] = "/tmp/dataXXXXXX";
+	char buf[200];
+	int err, fd;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	fd = mkstemp(tmp);
+	if (fd == -1)
+		return -1;
+	close(fd);
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+		"readelf -n ./test_progs 2>/dev/null | grep 'Build ID' | awk '{print $3}' > %s",
+		tmp);
+
+	err = system(buf);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	f = fopen(tmp, "r");
+	if (f) {
+		if (fscanf(f, "%ms$*\n", build_id) != 1) {
+			*build_id = NULL;
+			err = -1;
+		}
+		fclose(f);
+	}
+
+out:
+	unlink(tmp);
+	return err;
+}
+
+void test_bpf_vma_build_id_parse(void)
+{
+	char bpf_build_id[BUILDID_STR_SIZE] = {}, *build_id;
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts);
+	struct bpf_vma_build_id_parse *skel;
+	int i, err, prog_fd;
+
+	skel = bpf_vma_build_id_parse__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "bpf_vma_build_id_parse__open_and_load"))
+		return;
+
+	skel->bss->target_pid = getpid();
+	skel->bss->addr = (__u64)(uintptr_t)test_bpf_vma_build_id_parse;
+
+	err = bpf_vma_build_id_parse__attach(skel);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "bpf_vma_build_id_parse__attach"))
+		goto out;
+
+	prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.test1);
+	err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &topts);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "test_run_err");
+	ASSERT_EQ(topts.retval, 0, "test_run_retval");
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->ret, 0, "ret");
+
+	ASSERT_GT(skel->data->size_pass, 0, "size_pass");
+	ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->size_fail, -EINVAL, "size_fail");
+
+	/* Read build id via readelf to compare with build_id. */
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(read_buildid(&build_id), "read_buildid"))
+		goto out;
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(skel->data->size_pass, strlen(build_id)/2, "build_id_size");
+
+	/* Convert bpf build id to string, so we can compare it later. */
+	for (i = 0; i < skel->data->size_pass; i++) {
+		sprintf(bpf_build_id + i*2, "%02x",
+			(unsigned char) skel->bss->build_id[i]);
+	}
+	ASSERT_STREQ(bpf_build_id, build_id, "build_id_match");
+
+	free(build_id);
+out:
+	bpf_vma_build_id_parse__destroy(skel);
+}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_vma_build_id_parse.c new file +40 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8937212207db
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include "vmlinux.h"
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+#define BPF_BUILD_ID_SIZE 20
+
+extern int bpf_vma_build_id_parse(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned char *build_id,
+				  size_t build_id__sz) __ksym;
+
+pid_t target_pid = 0;
+__u64 addr = 0;
+
+int ret = -1;
+int size_pass = -1;
+int size_fail = -1;
+
+unsigned char build_id[BPF_BUILD_ID_SIZE];
+
+static long check_vma(struct task_struct *task, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+		      void *data)
+{
+	size_fail = bpf_vma_build_id_parse(vma, build_id, sizeof(build_id)/2);
+	size_pass = bpf_vma_build_id_parse(vma, build_id, sizeof(build_id));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("fentry/bpf_fentry_test1")
+int BPF_PROG(test1, int a)
+{
+	struct task_struct *task = bpf_get_current_task_btf();
+
+	if (task->pid != target_pid)
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = bpf_find_vma(task, addr, check_vma, NULL, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1