4.19.272-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.19.272 release. There are 80 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 05 Feb 2023 10:09:58 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.19.272-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 4.19.272-rc1

Peter Chen <[email protected]>
usb: host: xhci-plat: add wakeup entry at sysfs

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipv6: ensure sane device mtu in tunnels

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
exit: Use READ_ONCE() for all oops/warn limit reads

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
docs: Fix path paste-o for /sys/kernel/warn_count

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
panic: Introduce warn_limit

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
exit: Allow oops_limit to be disabled

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
exit: Expose "oops_count" to sysfs

Jann Horn <[email protected]>
exit: Put an upper limit on how often we can oops

Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
ia64: make IA64_MCA_RECOVERY bool instead of tristate

Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
h8300: Fix build errors from do_exit() to make_task_dead() transition

Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
hexagon: Fix function name in die()

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
objtool: Add a missing comma to avoid string concatenation

Eric W. Biederman <[email protected]>
exit: Add and use make_task_dead.

Tiezhu Yang <[email protected]>
panic: unset panic_on_warn inside panic()

Xiaoming Ni <[email protected]>
sysctl: add a new register_sysctl_init() interface

Hui Wang <[email protected]>
dmaengine: imx-sdma: Fix a possible memory leak in sdma_transfer_init

Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
ARM: dts: imx: Fix pca9547 i2c-mux node name

Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
x86/entry/64: Add instruction suffix to SYSRET

Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
x86/asm: Fix an assembler warning with current binutils

Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
drm/i915/display: fix compiler warning about array overrun

Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
x86/i8259: Mark legacy PIC interrupts with IRQ_LEVEL

Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Revert "Input: synaptics - switch touchpad on HP Laptop 15-da3001TU to RMI mode"

David Christensen <[email protected]>
net/tg3: resolve deadlock in tg3_reset_task() during EEH

Yoshihiro Shimoda <[email protected]>
net: ravb: Fix possible hang if RIS2_QFF1 happen

Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>
sctp: fail if no bound addresses can be used for a given scope

Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
netrom: Fix use-after-free of a listening socket.

Sriram Yagnaraman <[email protected]>
netfilter: conntrack: fix vtag checks for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
ipv4: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget in ip_metrics_convert()

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
netlink: annotate data races around sk_state

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
netlink: annotate data races around dst_portid and dst_group

Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

    netlink: annotate data races around nlk->portid

Li RongQing <[email protected]>
netlink: remove hash::nelems check in netlink_insert

Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>
netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: skip elements in transaction from garbage collection

Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
net: fix UaF in netns ops registration error path

Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>
EDAC/device: Respect any driver-supplied workqueue polling value

Giulio Benetti <[email protected]>
ARM: 9280/1: mm: fix warning on phys_addr_t to void pointer assignment

David Howells <[email protected]>

    cifs: Fix oops due to uncleared server->smbd_conn in reconnect

Long Li <[email protected]>
smbd: Make upper layer decide when to destroy the transport

Natalia Petrova <[email protected]>
trace_events_hist: add check for return value of 'create_hist_field'

Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
tracing: Make sure trace_printk() can output as soon as it can be used

Petr Pavlu <[email protected]>
module: Don't wait for GOING modules

Alexey V. Vissarionov <[email protected]>
scsi: hpsa: Fix allocation size for scsi_host_alloc()

Archie Pusaka <[email protected]>
Bluetooth: hci_sync: cancel cmd_timer if hci_open failed

Dongliang Mu <[email protected]>
fs: reiserfs: remove useless new_opts in reiserfs_remount

Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf env: Do not return pointers to local variables

Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
block: fix and cleanup bio_check_ro

Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
netfilter: conntrack: do not renew entry stuck in tcp SYN_SENT state

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
w1: fix WARNING after calling w1_process()

Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>
w1: fix deadloop in __w1_remove_master_device()

Jason Xing <[email protected]>
tcp: avoid the lookup process failing to get sk in ehash table

Liu Shixin <[email protected]>
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()

Swati Agarwal <[email protected]>
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: Fix devm_platform_ioremap_resource error handling

Radhey Shyam Pandey <[email protected]>
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: program hardware supported buffer length

Andrea Merello <[email protected]>
dmaengine: xilinx_dma: commonize DMA copy size calculation

Pietro Borrello <[email protected]>
HID: betop: check shape of output reports

Robert Hancock <[email protected]>
net: macb: fix PTP TX timestamp failure due to packet padding

Koba Ko <[email protected]>
dmaengine: Fix double increment of client_count in dma_chan_get()

Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
net: mlx5: eliminate anonymous module_init & module_exit

Udipto Goswami <[email protected]>
usb: gadget: f_fs: Ensure ep0req is dequeued before free_request

Udipto Goswami <[email protected]>
usb: gadget: f_fs: Prevent race during ffs_ep0_queue_wait

Pietro Borrello <[email protected]>
HID: check empty report_list in hid_validate_values()

Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>
net: mdio: validate parameter addr in mdiobus_get_phy()

Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>
net: usb: sr9700: Handle negative len

Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>
wifi: rndis_wlan: Prevent buffer overflow in rndis_query_oid

Jisoo Jang <[email protected]>
net: nfc: Fix use-after-free in local_cleanup()

Shang XiaoJing <[email protected]>
phy: rockchip-inno-usb2: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare() in rockchip_usb2phy_power_on()

Luis Gerhorst <[email protected]>
bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation

Raju Rangoju <[email protected]>
amd-xgbe: Delay AN timeout during KR training

Raju Rangoju <[email protected]>
amd-xgbe: TX Flow Ctrl Registers are h/w ver dependent

Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>
affs: initialize fsdata in affs_truncate()

Dean Luick <[email protected]>
IB/hfi1: Fix expected receive setup error exit issues

Dean Luick <[email protected]>
IB/hfi1: Reserve user expected TIDs

Dean Luick <[email protected]>
IB/hfi1: Reject a zero-length user expected buffer

Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>
tomoyo: fix broken dependency on *.conf.default

Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>
EDAC/highbank: Fix memory leak in highbank_mc_probe()

Jiasheng Jiang <[email protected]>
HID: intel_ish-hid: Add check for ishtp_dma_tx_map

Fabio Estevam <[email protected]>

    ARM: dts: imx6qdl-gw560x: Remove incorrect 'uart-has-rtscts'

Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>
memory: mvebu-devbus: Fix missing clk_disable_unprepare in mvebu_devbus_probe()

-------------

Diffstat:

 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-oops_count |   6 ++
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count |   6 ++
 Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt                   |  20 ++++
 Makefile                                          |   4 +-
 arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c                         |   6 +-
 arch/alpha/mm/fault.c                             |   2 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/imx53-ppd.dts                   |   2 +-
 arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-gw560x.dtsi             |   1 -
 arch/arm/kernel/traps.c                           |   2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/fault.c                               |   2 +-
 arch/arm/mm/nommu.c                               |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c                         |   2 +-
 arch/arm64/mm/fault.c                             |   2 +-
 arch/h8300/kernel/traps.c                         |   3 +-
 arch/h8300/mm/fault.c                             |   2 +-
 arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c                       |   2 +-
 arch/ia64/Kconfig                                 |   2 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/mca_drv.c                        |   2 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c                          |   2 +-
 arch/ia64/mm/fault.c                              |   2 +-
 arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c                          |   2 +-
 arch/m68k/mm/fault.c                              |   2 +-
 arch/microblaze/kernel/exceptions.c               |   4 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/traps.c                          |   2 +-
 arch/nds32/kernel/traps.c                         |   8 +-
 arch/nios2/kernel/traps.c                         |   4 +-
 arch/openrisc/kernel/traps.c                      |   2 +-
 arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c                        |   2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c                       |   2 +-
 arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c                         |   2 +-
 arch/riscv/mm/fault.c                             |   2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/dumpstack.c                      |   2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/nmi.c                            |   2 +-
 arch/sh/kernel/traps.c                            |   2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c                      |   4 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c                      |   4 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S                         |   6 +-
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                         |   8 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c                       |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c                           |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c                         |   4 +-
 arch/x86/lib/iomap_copy_64.S                      |   2 +-
 arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c                        |   2 +-
 block/blk-core.c                                  |   5 +-
 drivers/dma/dmaengine.c                           |   7 +-
 drivers/dma/imx-sdma.c                            |   4 +-
 drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c                   |  78 +++++++++++----
 drivers/edac/edac_device.c                        |  15 ++-
 drivers/edac/highbank_mc_edac.c                   |   7 +-
 drivers/gpu/drm/i915/intel_dp.c                   |  13 ++-
 drivers/hid/hid-betopff.c                         |  17 ++--
 drivers/hid/hid-core.c                            |   4 +-
 drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ishtp/dma-if.c          |  10 ++
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c         | 101 +++++++++++--------
 drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c                   |   1 -
 drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c                     |   3 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-dev.c          |  23 +++--
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-mdio.c         |  24 +++++
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h              |   2 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c               |   8 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c          |   9 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c    |   8 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c          |   4 +-
 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c                        |   7 +-
 drivers/net/usb/sr9700.c                          |   2 +-
 drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c                 |  19 ++--
 drivers/phy/rockchip/phy-rockchip-inno-usb2.c     |   4 +-
 drivers/scsi/hpsa.c                               |   2 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c                |   7 ++
 drivers/usb/host/xhci-plat.c                      |   2 +-
 drivers/w1/w1.c                                   |   6 +-
 drivers/w1/w1_int.c                               |   5 +-
 fs/affs/file.c                                    |   2 +-
 fs/cifs/connect.c                                 |   9 +-
 fs/cifs/smbdirect.c                               | 115 ++++++++++++++++++----
 fs/cifs/smbdirect.h                               |   5 +-
 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c                             |  33 +++++++
 fs/reiserfs/super.c                               |   6 --
 include/linux/kernel.h                            |   1 +
 include/linux/sched/task.h                        |   1 +
 include/linux/sysctl.h                            |   3 +
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                             |   4 +-
 kernel/exit.c                                     |  72 ++++++++++++++
 kernel/module.c                                   |  26 ++++-
 kernel/panic.c                                    |  75 ++++++++++++--
 kernel/sched/core.c                               |   3 +-
 kernel/trace/trace.c                              |   2 +
 kernel/trace/trace.h                              |   1 +
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c                  |   2 +
 kernel/trace/trace_output.c                       |   3 +-
 mm/kasan/report.c                                 |   3 +-
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c                          |   1 +
 net/core/net_namespace.c                          |   2 +-
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c                        |  17 +++-
 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c                     |   8 +-
 net/ipv4/metrics.c                                |   2 +
 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c                                |  12 ++-
 net/ipv6/ip6_tunnel.c                             |  10 +-
 net/ipv6/sit.c                                    |   8 +-
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c           |  25 +++--
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c            |  10 ++
 net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c                    |  16 ++-
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c                          |  41 ++++----
 net/netrom/nr_timer.c                             |   1 +
 net/nfc/llcp_core.c                               |   1 +
 net/sctp/bind_addr.c                              |   6 ++
 security/tomoyo/Makefile                          |   2 +-
 tools/objtool/check.c                             |   3 +-
 tools/perf/util/env.c                             |   4 +-
 109 files changed, 773 insertions(+), 304 deletions(-)

From: Gaosheng Cui <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cb8fd6f75775165390ededea8799b60d93d9fe3e ]

The clk_disable_unprepare() should be called in the error handling of devbus_get_timing_params() and of_platform_populate(), fix it by replacing devm_clk_get and clk_prepare_enable by devm_clk_get_enabled.

---
 drivers/memory/mvebu-devbus.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 981860879d02..ddd2e50814b7 100644
@@ -294,10 +294,9 @@ static int mvebu_devbus_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (IS_ERR(devbus->base))
 		return PTR_ERR(devbus->base);
 
-	clk = devm_clk_get(&pdev->dev, NULL);
+	clk = devm_clk_get_enabled(&pdev->dev, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(clk))
 		return PTR_ERR(clk);
-	clk_prepare_enable(clk);
 
 	/*
 	 * Obtain clock period in picoseconds,

2.39.0

From: Fabio Estevam <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9dfbc72256b5de608ad10989bcbafdbbd1ac8d4e ]

The following build warning is seen when running:

make dtbs_check DT_SCHEMA_FILES=fsl-imx-uart.yaml

arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6dl-gw560x.dtb: serial@2020000: rts-gpios: False schema does not allow [[20, 1, 0]]
From schema: Documentation/devicetree/bindings/serial/fsl-imx-uart.yaml

The imx6qdl-gw560x board does not expose the UART RTS and CTS as native UART pins, so 'uart-has-rtscts' should not be used.

Using 'uart-has-rtscts' with 'rts-gpios' is an invalid combination detected by serial.yaml.

Fix the problem by removing the incorrect 'uart-has-rtscts' property.

---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/imx6qdl-gw560x.dtsi | 1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

index b5986efe1090..143d249b821e 100644
@@ -463,7 +463,6 @@ &ssi1 {
 &uart1 {
 	pinctrl-names = "default";
 	pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_uart1>;
-	uart-has-rtscts;
 	rts-gpios = <&gpio7 1 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>;
 	status = "okay";
 };

2.39.0

From: Jiasheng Jiang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b3d40c3ec3dc4ad78017de6c3a38979f57aaaab8 ]

As the kcalloc may return NULL pointer,
it should be better to check the ishtp_dma_tx_map before use in order to avoid NULL pointer dereference.

---
 drivers/hid/intel-ish-hid/ishtp/dma-if.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

index 2783f3666114..ff4419c8ed4f 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,11 @@ void *ishtp_cl_get_dma_send_buf(struct ishtp_device *dev,
 	int required_slots = (size / DMA_SLOT_SIZE)
 		+ 1 * (size % DMA_SLOT_SIZE != 0);
 
+	if (!dev->ishtp_dma_tx_map) {
+		dev_err(dev->devc, "Fail to allocate Tx map\n");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->ishtp_dma_tx_lock, flags);
 	for (i = 0; i <= (dev->ishtp_dma_num_slots - required_slots); i++) {
 		free = 1;

@@ -159,6 +164,11 @@ void ishtp_cl_release_dma_acked_mem(struct ishtp_device *dev,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (!dev->ishtp_dma_tx_map) {
+		dev_err(dev->devc, "Fail to allocate Tx map\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
 	i = (msg_addr - dev->ishtp_host_dma_tx_buf) / DMA_SLOT_SIZE;
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&dev->ishtp_dma_tx_lock, flags);
 	for (j = 0; j < acked_slots; j++) {

2.39.0

From: Miaoqian Lin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e7a293658c20a7945014570e1921bf7d25d68a36 ]

When devres_open_group() fails, it returns -ENOMEM without freeing memory allocated by edac_mc_alloc().

Call edac_mc_free() on the error handling path to avoid a memory leak.

[ bp: Massage commit message. ]

---
 drivers/edac/highbank_mc_edac.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 6092e61be605..bcf41601a977 100644
@@ -185,8 +185,10 @@ static int highbank_mc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	drvdata = mci->pvt_info;
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, mci);
 
-	if (!devres_open_group(&pdev->dev, NULL, GFP_KERNEL))
-		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (!devres_open_group(&pdev->dev, NULL, GFP_KERNEL)) {
+		res = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free;
+	}
 
 	r = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
 	if (!r) {

@@ -254,6 +256,7 @@ static int highbank_mc_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	edac_mc_del_mc(&pdev->dev);
 err:
 	devres_release_group(&pdev->dev, NULL);
+free:
 	edac_mc_free(mci);
 	return res;
 }

2.39.0

From: Masahiro Yamada <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eaf2213ba563b2d74a1f2c13a6b258273f689802 ]

If *.conf.default is updated, builtin-policy.h should be rebuilt, but this does not work when compiled with O= option.

[Without this commit]

  $ touch security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
  $ make O=/tmp security/tomoyo/
  make[1]: Entering directory '/tmp'
    GEN     Makefile
    CALL    /home/masahiro/ref/linux/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
    DESCEND objtool
  make[1]: Leaving directory '/tmp'

[With this commit]

  $ touch security/tomoyo/policy/exception_policy.conf.default
  $ make O=/tmp security/tomoyo/
  make[1]: Entering directory '/tmp'
    GEN     Makefile
    CALL    /home/masahiro/ref/linux/scripts/checksyscalls.sh
    DESCEND objtool
    POLICY  security/tomoyo/builtin-policy.h
    CC      security/tomoyo/common.o
    AR      security/tomoyo/built-in.a
  make[1]: Leaving directory '/tmp'

$(srctree)/ is essential because $(wildcard ) does not follow VPATH.

---
 security/tomoyo/Makefile | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index cca5a3012fee..221eaadffb09 100644
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ endef
 quiet_cmd_policy  = POLICY  $@
       cmd_policy  = ($(call do_policy,profile); $(call do_policy,exception_policy); $(call do_policy,domain_policy); $(call do_policy,manager); $(call do_policy,stat)) >$@
 
-$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/*.conf $(src)/policy/*.conf.default) FORCE
+$(obj)/builtin-policy.h: $(wildcard $(obj)/policy/*.conf $(srctree)/$(src)/policy/*.conf.default) FORCE
 	$(call if_changed,policy)
 
 $(obj)/common.o: $(obj)/builtin-policy.h

2.39.0

From: Dean Luick <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0a0a6e80472c98947d73c3d13bcd7d101895f55d ]

A zero length user buffer makes no sense and the code does not handle it correctly. Instead, reject a zero length as invalid.

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index 4e417ed08b09..4e0f7cd14c57 100644
@@ -325,6 +325,8 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 
 	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(tinfo->vaddr))
 		return -EINVAL;
+	if (tinfo->length == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
 
 	tidbuf = kzalloc(sizeof(*tidbuf), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tidbuf)

2.39.0

From: Dean Luick <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ecf91551cdd2925ed6d9a9d99074fa5f67b90596 ]

To avoid a race, reserve the number of user expected TIDs before setup.

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c | 14 ++++++--------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

index 4e0f7cd14c57..0a118f2963fb 100644
@@ -351,16 +351,13 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 	/* Find sets of physically contiguous pages */
 	tidbuf->n_psets = find_phys_blocks(tidbuf, pinned);
 
-	/*
-	 * We don't need to access this under a lock since tid_used is per
-	 * process and the same process cannot be in hfi1_user_exp_rcv_clear()
-	 * and hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup() at the same time.
-	 */
+	/* Reserve the number of expected tids to be used. */
 	spin_lock(&fd->tid_lock);
 	if (fd->tid_used + tidbuf->n_psets > fd->tid_limit)
 		pageset_count = fd->tid_limit - fd->tid_used;
 	else
 		pageset_count = tidbuf->n_psets;
+	fd->tid_used += pageset_count;
 	spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
 
 	if (!pageset_count)

@@ -469,10 +466,11 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 nomem:
 	hfi1_cdbg(TID, "total mapped: tidpairs:%u pages:%u (%d)", tididx,
 		  mapped_pages, ret);
+	/* adjust reserved tid_used to actual count */
+	spin_lock(&fd->tid_lock);
+	fd->tid_used -= pageset_count - tididx;
+	spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
 	if (tididx) {
-		spin_lock(&fd->tid_lock);
-		fd->tid_used += tididx;
-		spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
 		tinfo->tidcnt = tididx;
 		tinfo->length = mapped_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
 

2.39.0

From: Dean Luick <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e0c4a422f5246abefbf7c178ef99a1f2dc3c5f62 ]

Fix three error exit issues in expected receive setup. Re-arrange error exits to increase readability.

Issues and fixes:
1. Possible missed page unpin if tidlist copyout fails and not all pinned pages where made part of a TID.
Fix: Unpin the unused pages.

2. Return success with unset return values tidcnt and length when no pages were pinned.
Fix: Return -ENOSPC if no pages were pinned.

3. Return success with unset return values tidcnt and length when no rcvarray entries available.
Fix: Return -ENOSPC if no rcvarray entries are available.

---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/hfi1/user_exp_rcv.c | 83 ++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

index 0a118f2963fb..dab823aac95e 100644
@@ -337,15 +337,14 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 	tidbuf->psets = kcalloc(uctxt->expected_count, sizeof(*tidbuf->psets),
 				GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tidbuf->psets) {
-		kfree(tidbuf);
-		return -ENOMEM;
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail_release_mem;
 	}
 
 	pinned = pin_rcv_pages(fd, tidbuf);
 	if (pinned <= 0) {
-		kfree(tidbuf->psets);
-		kfree(tidbuf);
-		return pinned;
+		ret = (pinned < 0) ? pinned : -ENOSPC;
+		goto fail_unpin;
 	}
 
 	/* Find sets of physically contiguous pages */

@@ -360,14 +359,16 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 	fd->tid_used += pageset_count;
 	spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
 
-	if (!pageset_count)
-		goto bail;
+	if (!pageset_count) {
+		ret = -ENOSPC;
+		goto fail_unreserve;
+	}
 
 	ngroups = pageset_count / dd->rcv_entries.group_size;
 	tidlist = kcalloc(pageset_count, sizeof(*tidlist), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!tidlist) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto nomem;
+		goto fail_unreserve;
 	}
 
 	tididx = 0;

@@ -463,44 +464,60 @@ int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_setup(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,
 	}
 unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&uctxt->exp_mutex);
-nomem:
 	hfi1_cdbg(TID, "total mapped: tidpairs:%u pages:%u (%d)", tididx,
 		  mapped_pages, ret);
+
+	/* fail if nothing was programmed, set error if none provided */
+	if (tididx == 0) {
+		if (ret >= 0)
+			ret = -ENOSPC;
+		goto fail_unreserve;
+	}
+
 	/* adjust reserved tid_used to actual count */
 	spin_lock(&fd->tid_lock);
 	fd->tid_used -= pageset_count - tididx;
 	spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
-	if (tididx) {
-		tinfo->tidcnt = tididx;
-		tinfo->length = mapped_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
 
-		if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(tinfo->tidlist),
-				 tidlist, sizeof(tidlist[0]) * tididx)) {
-			/*
-			 * On failure to copy to the user level, we need to undo
-			 * everything done so far so we don't leak resources.
-			 */
-			tinfo->tidlist = (unsigned long)&tidlist;
-			hfi1_user_exp_rcv_clear(fd, tinfo);
-			tinfo->tidlist = 0;
-			ret = -EFAULT;
-			goto bail;
-		}
+	/* unpin all pages not covered by a TID */
+	unpin_rcv_pages(fd, tidbuf, NULL, mapped_pages, pinned - mapped_pages,
+			false);
+
+	tinfo->tidcnt = tididx;
+	tinfo->length = mapped_pages * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(tinfo->tidlist),
+			 tidlist, sizeof(tidlist[0]) * tididx)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto fail_unprogram;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * If not everything was mapped (due to insufficient RcvArray entries,
-	 * for example), unpin all unmapped pages so we can pin them nex time.
-	 */
-	if (mapped_pages != pinned)
-		unpin_rcv_pages(fd, tidbuf, NULL, mapped_pages,
-				(pinned - mapped_pages), false);
-bail:
+	kfree(tidbuf->pages);
 	kfree(tidbuf->psets);
+	kfree(tidbuf);
 	kfree(tidlist);
+	return 0;
+
+fail_unprogram:
+	/* unprogram, unmap, and unpin all allocated TIDs */
+	tinfo->tidlist = (unsigned long)tidlist;
+	hfi1_user_exp_rcv_clear(fd, tinfo);
+	tinfo->tidlist = 0;
+	pinned = 0;		/* nothing left to unpin */
+	pageset_count = 0;	/* nothing left reserved */
+fail_unreserve:
+	spin_lock(&fd->tid_lock);
+	fd->tid_used -= pageset_count;
+	spin_unlock(&fd->tid_lock);
+fail_unpin:
+	if (pinned > 0)
+		unpin_rcv_pages(fd, tidbuf, NULL, 0, pinned, false);
+fail_release_mem:
 	kfree(tidbuf->pages);
+	kfree(tidbuf->psets);
 	kfree(tidbuf);
-	return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+	kfree(tidlist);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 int hfi1_user_exp_rcv_clear(struct hfi1_filedata *fd,

2.39.0

From: Alexander Potapenko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit eef034ac6690118c88f357b00e2b3239c9d8575d ]

When aops->write_begin() does not initialize fsdata, KMSAN may report an error passing the latter to aops->write_end().

Fix this by unconditionally initializing fsdata.

---
 fs/affs/file.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index ba084b0b214b..82bb38370aa9 100644
@@ -878,7 +878,7 @@ affs_truncate(struct inode *inode)
 	if (inode->i_size > AFFS_I(inode)->mmu_private) {
 		struct address_space *mapping = inode->i_mapping;
 		struct page *page;
-		void *fsdata;
+		void *fsdata = NULL;
 		loff_t isize = inode->i_size;
 		int res;
 

2.39.0

From: Raju Rangoju <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 579923d84b04abb6cd4cd1fd9974096a2dd1832b ]

There is difference in the TX Flow Control registers (TFCR) between the revisions of the hardware. The older revisions of hardware used to have single register per queue. Whereas, the newer revision of hardware (from ver 30H onwards) have one register per priority.

Update the driver to use the TFCR based on the reported version of the hardware.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-dev.c | 23 +++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

index 4666084eda16..9d6fe5a892d9 100644
@@ -524,19 +524,28 @@ static void xgbe_disable_vxlan(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 	netif_dbg(pdata, drv, pdata->netdev, "VXLAN acceleration disabled\n");
 }
 
+static unsigned int xgbe_get_fc_queue_count(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
+{
+	unsigned int max_q_count = XGMAC_MAX_FLOW_CONTROL_QUEUES;
+
+	/* From MAC ver 30H the TFCR is per priority, instead of per queue */
+	if (XGMAC_GET_BITS(pdata->hw_feat.version, MAC_VR, SNPSVER) >= 0x30)
+		return max_q_count;
+	else
+		return min_t(unsigned int, pdata->tx_q_count, max_q_count);
+}
+
 static int xgbe_disable_tx_flow_control(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 {
-	unsigned int max_q_count, q_count;
 	unsigned int reg, reg_val;
-	unsigned int i;
+	unsigned int i, q_count;
 
 	/* Clear MTL flow control */
 	for (i = 0; i < pdata->rx_q_count; i++)
 		XGMAC_MTL_IOWRITE_BITS(pdata, i, MTL_Q_RQOMR, EHFC, 0);
 
 	/* Clear MAC flow control */
-	max_q_count = XGMAC_MAX_FLOW_CONTROL_QUEUES;
-	q_count = min_t(unsigned int, pdata->tx_q_count, max_q_count);
+	q_count = xgbe_get_fc_queue_count(pdata);
 	reg = MAC_Q0TFCR;
 	for (i = 0; i < q_count; i++) {
 		reg_val = XGMAC_IOREAD(pdata, reg);

@@ -553,9 +562,8 @@ static int xgbe_enable_tx_flow_control(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 {
 	struct ieee_pfc *pfc = pdata->pfc;
 	struct ieee_ets *ets = pdata->ets;
-	unsigned int max_q_count, q_count;
 	unsigned int reg, reg_val;
-	unsigned int i;
+	unsigned int i, q_count;
 
 	/* Set MTL flow control */
 	for (i = 0; i < pdata->rx_q_count; i++) {

@@ -579,8 +587,7 @@ static int xgbe_enable_tx_flow_control(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 	}
 
 	/* Set MAC flow control */
-	max_q_count = XGMAC_MAX_FLOW_CONTROL_QUEUES;
-	q_count = min_t(unsigned int, pdata->tx_q_count, max_q_count);
+	q_count = xgbe_get_fc_queue_count(pdata);
 	reg = MAC_Q0TFCR;
 	for (i = 0; i < q_count; i++) {
 		reg_val = XGMAC_IOREAD(pdata, reg);

2.39.0

From: Raju Rangoju <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 926446ae24c03311a480fb96eb78f0ce7ea6d091 ]

AN restart triggered during KR training not only aborts the KR training process but also move the HW to unstable state. Driver has to wait upto 500ms or until the KR training is completed before restarting AN cycle.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-mdio.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h      |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

index 97167fc9bebe..7840eb4cdb8d 100644
@@ -496,6 +496,7 @@ static enum xgbe_an xgbe_an73_tx_training(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata,
 	reg |= XGBE_KR_TRAINING_ENABLE;
 	reg |= XGBE_KR_TRAINING_START;
 	XMDIO_WRITE(pdata, MDIO_MMD_PMAPMD, MDIO_PMA_10GBR_PMD_CTRL, reg);
+	pdata->kr_start_time = jiffies;
 
 	netif_dbg(pdata, link, pdata->netdev,
 		  "KR training initiated\n");

@@ -632,6 +633,8 @@ static enum xgbe_an xgbe_an73_incompat_link(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 
 	xgbe_switch_mode(pdata);
 
+	pdata->an_result = XGBE_AN_READY;
+
 	xgbe_an_restart(pdata);
 
 	return XGBE_AN_INCOMPAT_LINK;

@@ -1275,9 +1278,30 @@ static bool xgbe_phy_aneg_done(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 static void xgbe_check_link_timeout(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)
 {
 	unsigned long link_timeout;
+	unsigned long kr_time;
+	int wait;
 
 	link_timeout = pdata->link_check + (XGBE_LINK_TIMEOUT * HZ);
 	if (time_after(jiffies, link_timeout)) {
+		if ((xgbe_cur_mode(pdata) == XGBE_MODE_KR) &&
+		    pdata->phy.autoneg == AUTONEG_ENABLE) {
+			/* AN restart should not happen while KR training is in progress.
+			 * The while loop ensures no AN restart during KR training,
+			 * waits up to 500ms and AN restart is triggered only if KR
+			 * training is failed.
+			 */
+			wait = XGBE_KR_TRAINING_WAIT_ITER;
+			while (wait--) {
+				kr_time = pdata->kr_start_time +
+					  msecs_to_jiffies(XGBE_AN_MS_TIMEOUT);
+				if (time_after(jiffies, kr_time))
+					break;
+				/* AN restart is not required, if AN result is COMPLETE */
+				if (pdata->an_result == XGBE_AN_COMPLETE)
+					return;
+				usleep_range(10000, 11000);
+			}
+		}
 		netif_dbg(pdata, link, pdata->netdev, "AN link timeout\n");
 		xgbe_phy_config_aneg(pdata);
 	}

index 0c93a552b921..729307a96c50 100644
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@
 /* Auto-negotiation */
 #define XGBE_AN_MS_TIMEOUT		500
 #define XGBE_LINK_TIMEOUT		5
+#define XGBE_KR_TRAINING_WAIT_ITER	50
 
 #define XGBE_SGMII_AN_LINK_STATUS	BIT(1)
 #define XGBE_SGMII_AN_LINK_SPEED	(BIT(2) | BIT(3))

@@ -1266,6 +1267,7 @@ struct xgbe_prv_data {
 	unsigned int parallel_detect;
 	unsigned int fec_ability;
 	unsigned long an_start;
+	unsigned long kr_start_time;
 	enum xgbe_an_mode an_mode;
 
 	/* I2C support */

2.39.0

From: Luis Gerhorst <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e4f4db47794c9f474b184ee1418f42e6a07412b6 ]

To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a pointer to the stack.

However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using, for example, a branch-based cache side channel.

To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.

The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit and the mitigation:

[...]
// r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
// r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
// r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
//
r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
*(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
// lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
//
// Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor // for no r9-r10 dependency.
//
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr
// 2039f26f3aca: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID, // store may be subject to SSB
//
// fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr
//
r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8)
// r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr
//
// leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel:
r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak
if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredict
// architecturally dead code if input r6 is 0,
// only executes speculatively iff ptr bit is 1
r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) # encode bit in cache (0: slow, 1: fast)
SLOW:
[...]

After running this, the program can time the access to *(r7 + 0) to determine whether the chosen pointer bit was 0 or 1. Repeat this 64 times to recover the whole address on amd64.

In summary, sanitization can only be skipped if one scalar is overwritten with another scalar. Scalar-confusion due to speculative store bypass can not lead to invalid accesses because the pointer bounds deducted during verification are enforced using branchless logic. See 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic") for details.

Do not make the mitigation depend on !env->allow_{uninit_stack,ptr_leaks} because speculative leaks are likely unexpected if these were enabled. For example, leaking the address to a protected log file may be acceptable while disabling the mitigation might unintentionally leak the address into the cached-state of a map that is accessible to unprivileged processes.

---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 694ee0b1fefe..61f3a31abc1a 100644
@@ -1012,7 +1012,9 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 		bool sanitize = reg && is_spillable_regtype(reg->type);
 
 		for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-			if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[i] == STACK_INVALID) {
+			u8 type = state->stack[spi].slot_type[i];
+
+			if (type != STACK_MISC && type != STACK_ZERO) {
 				sanitize = true;
 				break;
 			}

2.39.0

From: Shang XiaoJing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5daba914da0e48950e9407ea4d75fa57029c9adc ]

The clk_disable_unprepare() should be called in the error handling of rockchip_usb2phy_power_on().

---
 drivers/phy/rockchip/phy-rockchip-inno-usb2.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 5049dac79bd0..77c1c3ffaed7 100644
@@ -477,8 +477,10 @@ static int rockchip_usb2phy_power_on(struct phy *phy)
 		return ret;
 
 	ret = property_enable(base, &rport->port_cfg->phy_sus, false);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		clk_disable_unprepare(rphy->clk480m);
 		return ret;
+	}
 
 	/* waiting for the utmi_clk to become stable */
 	usleep_range(1500, 2000);

2.39.0

From: Jisoo Jang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4bb4db7f3187c6e3de6b229ffc87cdb30a2d22b6 ]

Fix a use-after-free that occurs in kfree_skb() called from local_cleanup(). This could happen when killing nfc daemon (e.g. neard) after detaching an nfc device.
When detaching an nfc device, local_cleanup() called from nfc_llcp_unregister_device() frees local->rx_pending and decreases local->ref by kref_put() in nfc_llcp_local_put().
In the terminating process, nfc daemon releases all sockets and it leads to decreasing local->ref. After the last release of local->ref, local_cleanup() called from local_release() frees local->rx_pending again, which leads to the bug.

Setting local->rx_pending to NULL in local_cleanup() could prevent use-after-free when local_cleanup() is called twice.

Found by a modified version of syzkaller.

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in kfree_skb()

Call Trace:

dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:106) print_address_description.constprop.0.cold (mm/kasan/report.c:306) kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:189)
kfree_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:955)
local_cleanup (net/nfc/llcp_core.c:159) nfc_llcp_local_put.part.0 (net/nfc/llcp_core.c:172) nfc_llcp_local_put (net/nfc/llcp_core.c:181) llcp_sock_destruct (net/nfc/llcp_sock.c:959) __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2133)
sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2181)
__sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2192)
sk_free (net/core/sock.c:2203)
llcp_sock_release (net/nfc/llcp_sock.c:646) __sock_release (net/socket.c:650)
sock_close (net/socket.c:1365)
__fput (fs/file_table.c:306)
task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:179)
ptrace_notify (kernel/signal.c:2354) syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare (kernel/entry/common.c:278) syscall_exit_to_user_mode (kernel/entry/common.c:296) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:86) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:106)

Allocated by task 4719:

kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:45) __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:325) slab_post_alloc_hook (mm/slab.h:766) kmem_cache_alloc_node (mm/slub.c:3497) __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:552) pn533_recv_response (drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c:65) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1671) usb_giveback_urb_bh (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1704) tasklet_action_common.isra.0 (kernel/softirq.c:797) __do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:571)

Freed by task 1901:

kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:45) kasan_set_track (mm/kasan/common.c:52) kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/genericdd.c:518) __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:236) kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:3809)
kfree_skbmem (net/core/skbuff.c:874)
kfree_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:931) local_cleanup (net/nfc/llcp_core.c:159) nfc_llcp_unregister_device (net/nfc/llcp_core.c:1617) nfc_unregister_device (net/nfc/core.c:1179) pn53x_unregister_nfc (drivers/nfc/pn533/pn533.c:2846) pn533_usb_disconnect (drivers/nfc/pn533/usb.c:579) usb_unbind_interface (drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458) device_release_driver_internal (drivers/base/dd.c:1279) bus_remove_device (drivers/base/bus.c:529) device_del (drivers/base/core.c:3665) usb_disable_device (drivers/usb/core/message.c:1420) usb_disconnect (drivers/usb/core.c:2261) hub_event (drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5833)

process_one_work (arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 include/linux/jump_label.h:212 include/trace/events/workqueue.h:108 kernel/workqueue.c:2281)
worker_thread (include/linux/list.h:282 kernel/workqueue.c:2423)

kthread (kernel/kthread.c:319)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:301)

---
 net/nfc/llcp_core.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

index 4fa015208aab..3290f2275b85 100644
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static void local_cleanup(struct nfc_llcp_local *local)
 	cancel_work_sync(&local->rx_work);
 	cancel_work_sync(&local->timeout_work);
 	kfree_skb(local->rx_pending);
+	local->rx_pending = NULL;
 	del_timer_sync(&local->sdreq_timer);
 	cancel_work_sync(&local->sdreq_timeout_work);
 	nfc_llcp_free_sdp_tlv_list(&local->pending_sdreqs);

2.39.0

From: Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b870e73a56c4cccbec33224233eaf295839f228c ]

Since resplen and respoffs are signed integers sufficiently large values of unsigned int len and offset members of RNDIS response will result in negative values of prior variables. This may be utilized to bypass implemented security checks to either extract memory contents by manipulating offset or overflow the data buffer via memcpy by manipulating both offset and len.

Additionally assure that sum of resplen and respoffs does not overflow so buffer boundaries are kept.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/rndis_wlan.c | 19 ++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

index 51e4e92d95a0..0bbeb61ec3a3 100644
@@ -712,8 +712,8 @@ static int rndis_query_oid(struct usbnet *dev, u32 oid, void *data, int *len)
 		struct rndis_query	*get;
 		struct rndis_query_c	*get_c;
 	} u;
-	int ret, buflen;
-	int resplen, respoffs, copylen;
+	int ret;
+	size_t buflen, resplen, respoffs, copylen;
 
 	buflen = *len + sizeof(*u.get);
 	if (buflen < CONTROL_BUFFER_SIZE)

@@ -748,22 +748,15 @@ static int rndis_query_oid(struct usbnet *dev, u32 oid, void *data, int *len)
 
 		if (respoffs > buflen) {
 			/* Device returned data offset outside buffer, error. */
-			netdev_dbg(dev->net, "%s(%s): received invalid "
-				"data offset: %d > %d\n", __func__,
-				oid_to_string(oid), respoffs, buflen);
+			netdev_dbg(dev->net,
+				   "%s(%s): received invalid data offset: %zu > %zu\n",
+				   __func__, oid_to_string(oid), respoffs, buflen);
 
 			ret = -EINVAL;
 			goto exit_unlock;
 		}
 
-		if ((resplen + respoffs) > buflen) {
-			/* Device would have returned more data if buffer would
-			 * have been big enough. Copy just the bits that we got.
-			 */
-			copylen = buflen - respoffs;
-		} else {
-			copylen = resplen;
-		}
+		copylen = min(resplen, buflen - respoffs);
 
 		if (copylen > *len)
 			copylen = *len;

2.39.0

From: Szymon Heidrich <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ecf7cf8efb59789e2b21d2f9ab926142579092b2 ]

Packet len computed as difference of length word extracted from skb data and four may result in a negative value. In such case processing of the buffer should be interrupted rather than setting sr_skb->len to an unexpectedly large value (due to cast from signed to unsigned integer) and passing sr_skb to usbnet_skb_return.

---
 drivers/net/usb/sr9700.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 83640628c47d..8bee8286e41a 100644
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static int sr9700_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		/* ignore the CRC length */
 		len = (skb->data[1] | (skb->data[2] << 8)) - 4;
 
-		if (len > ETH_FRAME_LEN || len > skb->len)
+		if (len > ETH_FRAME_LEN || len > skb->len || len < 0)
 			return 0;
 
 		/* the last packet of current skb */

2.39.0

From: Heiner Kallweit <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 867dbe784c5010a466f00a7d1467c1c5ea569c75 ]

The caller may pass any value as addr, what may result in an out-of-bounds access to array mdio_map. One existing case is stmmac_init_phy() that may pass -1 as addr. Therefore validate addr before using it.

---
 drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c | 7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 1d1fbd7bd6fc..550806351049 100644
@@ -103,7 +103,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(mdiobus_unregister_device);
 
 struct phy_device *mdiobus_get_phy(struct mii_bus *bus, int addr)
 {
-	struct mdio_device *mdiodev = bus->mdio_map[addr];
+	struct mdio_device *mdiodev;
+
+	if (addr < 0 || addr >= ARRAY_SIZE(bus->mdio_map))
+		return NULL;
+
+	mdiodev = bus->mdio_map[addr];
 
 	if (!mdiodev)
 		return NULL;

2.39.0

From: Pietro Borrello <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b12fece4c64857e5fab4290bf01b2e0317a88456 ]

Add a check for empty report_list in hid_validate_values(). The missing check causes a type confusion when issuing a list_entry() on an empty report_list.
The problem is caused by the assumption that the device must have valid report_list. While this will be true for all normal HID devices, a suitably malicious device can violate the assumption.

---
 drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 62656636d30c..8cc79d0d11fb 100644
@@ -980,8 +980,8 @@ struct hid_report *hid_validate_values(struct hid_device *hid,
 		 * Validating on id 0 means we should examine the first
 		 * report in the list.
 		 */
-		report = list_entry(
-				hid->report_enum[type].report_list.next,
+		report = list_first_entry_or_null(
+				&hid->report_enum[type].report_list,
 				struct hid_report, list);
 	} else {
 		report = hid->report_enum[type].report_id_hash[id];

2.39.0

From: Udipto Goswami <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6a19da111057f69214b97c62fb0ac59023970850 ]

While performing fast composition switch, there is a possibility that the process of ffs_ep0_write/ffs_ep0_read get into a race condition due to ep0req being freed up from functionfs_unbind.

Consider the scenario that the ffs_ep0_write calls the ffs_ep0_queue_wait by taking a lock &ffs->ev.waitq.lock. However, the functionfs_unbind isn't bounded so it can go ahead and mark the ep0req to NULL, and since there is no NULL check in ffs_ep0_queue_wait we will end up in use-after-free.

Fix this by making a serialized execution between the two functions using a mutex_lock(ffs->mutex).

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

index 49eb4e3c760f..b3489a3449f6 100644
@@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ static int __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(struct ffs_data *ffs, char *data, size_t len)
 	struct usb_request *req = ffs->ep0req;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!req)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	req->zero     = len < le16_to_cpu(ffs->ev.setup.wLength);
 
 	spin_unlock_irq(&ffs->ev.waitq.lock);

@@ -1807,10 +1810,12 @@ static void functionfs_unbind(struct ffs_data *ffs)
 	ENTER();
 
 	if (!WARN_ON(!ffs->gadget)) {
+		mutex_lock(&ffs->mutex);
 		usb_ep_free_request(ffs->gadget->ep0, ffs->ep0req);
 		ffs->ep0req = NULL;
 		ffs->gadget = NULL;
 		clear_bit(FFS_FL_BOUND, &ffs->flags);
+		mutex_unlock(&ffs->mutex);
 		ffs_data_put(ffs);
 	}
 }

2.39.0

From: Udipto Goswami <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce405d561b020e5a46340eb5146805a625dcacee ]

As per the documentation, function usb_ep_free_request guarantees the request will not be queued or no longer be re-queued (or otherwise used). However, with the current implementation it doesn't make sure that the request in ep0 isn't reused.

Fix this by dequeuing the ep0req on functionfs_unbind before freeing the request to align with the definition.

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index b3489a3449f6..48bdb2a3972b 100644
@@ -1810,6 +1810,8 @@ static void functionfs_unbind(struct ffs_data *ffs)
 	ENTER();
 
 	if (!WARN_ON(!ffs->gadget)) {
+		/* dequeue before freeing ep0req */
+		usb_ep_dequeue(ffs->gadget->ep0, ffs->ep0req);
 		mutex_lock(&ffs->mutex);
 		usb_ep_free_request(ffs->gadget->ep0, ffs->ep0req);
 		ffs->ep0req = NULL;

2.39.0

From: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2c1e1b949024989e20907b84e11a731a50778416 ]

Eliminate anonymous module_init() and module_exit(), which can lead to confusion or ambiguity when reading System.map, crashes/oops/bugs, or an initcall_debug log.

Give each of these init and exit functions unique driver-specific names to eliminate the anonymous names.

Example 1: (System.map)
ffffffff832fc78c t init
ffffffff832fc79e t init
ffffffff832fc8f8 t init

Example 2: (initcall_debug log)
calling init+0x0/0x12 @ 1
initcall init+0x0/0x12 returned 0 after 15 usecs
calling init+0x0/0x60 @ 1
initcall init+0x0/0x60 returned 0 after 2 usecs
calling init+0x0/0x9a @ 1
initcall init+0x0/0x9a returned 0 after 74 usecs

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index a2b25afa2472..e09bd059984e 100644
@@ -1683,7 +1683,7 @@ static void mlx5_core_verify_params(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static int __init init(void)
+static int __init mlx5_init(void)
 {
 	int err;
 

@@ -1708,7 +1708,7 @@ static int __init init(void)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static void __exit cleanup(void)
+static void __exit mlx5_cleanup(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_MLX5_CORE_EN
 	mlx5e_cleanup();

@@ -1717,5 +1717,5 @@ static void __exit cleanup(void)
 	mlx5_unregister_debugfs();
 }
 
-module_init(init);
-module_exit(cleanup);
+module_init(mlx5_init);
+module_exit(mlx5_cleanup);

2.39.0

From: Koba Ko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f3dc1b3b4750851a94212dba249703dd0e50bb20 ]

The first time dma_chan_get() is called for a channel the channel client_count is incorrectly incremented twice for public channels, first in balance_ref_count(), and again prior to returning. This results in an incorrect client count which will lead to the channel resources not being freed when they should be. A simple
test of repeated module load and unload of async_tx on a Dell Power Edge R7425 also shows this resulting in a kref underflow warning.

[  124.329662] async_tx: api initialized (async)
[  129.000627] async_tx: api initialized (async)
[  130.047839] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  130.052472] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
[  130.057279] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 19364 at lib/refcount.c:28
refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[  130.065811] Modules linked in: async_tx(-) rfkill intel_rapl_msr

intel_rapl_common amd64_edac edac_mce_amd ipmi_ssif kvm_amd dcdbas kvm mgag200 drm_shmem_helper acpi_ipmi irqbypass drm_kms_helper ipmi_si syscopyarea sysfillrect rapl pcspkr ipmi_devintf sysimgblt fb_sys_fops k10temp i2c_piix4 ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_cpufreq vfat fat drm fuse xfs libcrc32c sd_mod t10_pi sg ahci crct10dif_pclmul libahci crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel igb megaraid_sas i40e libata i2c_algo_bit ccp sp5100_tco dca dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: async_tx]

[  130.117361] CPU: 3 PID: 19364 Comm: modprobe Kdump: loaded Not
tainted 5.14.0-185.el9.x86_64 #1
[  130.126091] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R7425/02MJ3T, BIOS
1.18.0 01/17/2022
[  130.133806] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xba/0x110
[  130.139041] Code: 01 01 e8 6d bd 55 00 0f 0b e9 72 9d 8a 00 80 3d
26 18 9c 01 00 75 85 48 c7 c7 f8 a3 03 9d c6 05 16 18 9c 01 01 e8 4a
bd 55 00 <0f> 0b e9 4f 9d 8a 00 80 3d 01 18 9c 01 00 0f 85 5e ff ff ff
48 c7
[  130.157807] RSP: 0018:ffffbf98898afe68 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  130.163036] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9da06028e598 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  130.170172] RDX: ffff9daf9de26480 RSI: ffff9daf9de198a0 RDI: ffff9daf9de198a0
[  130.177316] RBP: ffff9da7cddf3970 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff
[  130.184459] R10: ffffbf98898afd00 R11: ffffffff9d9e8c28 R12: ffff9da7cddf1970
[  130.191596] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  130.198739] FS:  00007f646435c740(0000) GS:ffff9daf9de00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[  130.206832] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  130.212586] CR2: 00007f6463b214f0 CR3: 00000008ab98c000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
[  130.219729] Call Trace:
[  130.222192]  <TASK>
[  130.224305]  dma_chan_put+0x10d/0x110
[  130.227988]  dmaengine_put+0x7a/0xa0
[  130.231575]  __do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x178/0x280
[  130.237157]  ? syscall_trace_enter.constprop.0+0x145/0x1d0
[  130.242652]  do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
[  130.246240]  ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150
[  130.250178]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[  130.255243] RIP: 0033:0x7f6463a3f5ab
[  130.258830] Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 75 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 b0 00 00
00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 45 a8 1b 00 f7 d8 64 89
01 48
[  130.277591] RSP: 002b:00007fff22f972c8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX:
00000000000000b0
[  130.285164] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b6786edd40 RCX: 00007f6463a3f5ab
[  130.292303] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 000055b6786edda8
[  130.299443] RBP: 000055b6786edd40 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[  130.306584] R10: 00007f6463b9eac0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 000055b6786edda8
[  130.313731] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000055b6786edda8 R15: 00007fff22f995f8
[  130.320875]  </TASK>
[  130.323081] ---[ end trace eff7156d56b5cf25 ]---

cat /sys/class/dma/dma0chan*/in_use would get the wrong result. 2
2
2

---
 drivers/dma/dmaengine.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

index 8a52a5efee4f..e1cf7c250c33 100644
@@ -223,7 +223,8 @@ static int dma_chan_get(struct dma_chan *chan)
 	/* The channel is already in use, update client count */
 	if (chan->client_count) {
 		__module_get(owner);
-		goto out;
+		chan->client_count++;
+		return 0;
 	}
 
 	if (!try_module_get(owner))

@@ -236,11 +237,11 @@ static int dma_chan_get(struct dma_chan *chan)
 			goto err_out;
 	}
 
+	chan->client_count++;
+
 	if (!dma_has_cap(DMA_PRIVATE, chan->device->cap_mask))
 		balance_ref_count(chan);
 
-out:
-	chan->client_count++;
 	return 0;
 
 err_out:

2.39.0

From: Robert Hancock <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7b90f5a665acd46efbbfa677a3a3a18d01ad6487 ]

PTP TX timestamp handling was observed to be broken with this driver when using the raw Layer 2 PTP encapsulation. ptp4l was not receiving the expected TX timestamp after transmitting a packet, causing it to enter a failure state.

The problem appears to be due to the way that the driver pads packets which are smaller than the Ethernet minimum of 60 bytes. If headroom space was available in the SKB, this caused the driver to move the data back to utilize it. However, this appears to cause other data references in the SKB to become inconsistent. In particular, this caused the ptp_one_step_sync function to later (in the TX completion path) falsely detect the packet as a one-step SYNC packet, even when it was not, which caused the TX timestamp to not be processed when it should be.

Using the headroom for this purpose seems like an unnecessary complexity as this is not a hot path in the driver, and in most cases it appears that there is sufficient tailroom to not require using the headroom anyway. Remove this usage of headroom to prevent this inconsistency from occurring and causing other problems.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c | 9 +--------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 8 deletions(-)

index 50331b202f73..324d81516832 100644
@@ -1738,7 +1738,6 @@ static int macb_pad_and_fcs(struct sk_buff **skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 	bool cloned = skb_cloned(*skb) || skb_header_cloned(*skb) ||
 		      skb_is_nonlinear(*skb);
 	int padlen = ETH_ZLEN - (*skb)->len;
-	int headroom = skb_headroom(*skb);
 	int tailroom = skb_tailroom(*skb);
 	struct sk_buff *nskb;
 	u32 fcs;

@@ -1752,9 +1751,6 @@ static int macb_pad_and_fcs(struct sk_buff **skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 		/* FCS could be appeded to tailroom. */
 		if (tailroom >= ETH_FCS_LEN)
 			goto add_fcs;
-		/* FCS could be appeded by moving data to headroom. */
-		else if (!cloned && headroom + tailroom >= ETH_FCS_LEN)
-			padlen = 0;
 		/* No room for FCS, need to reallocate skb. */
 		else
 			padlen = ETH_FCS_LEN;

@@ -1763,10 +1759,7 @@ static int macb_pad_and_fcs(struct sk_buff **skb, struct net_device *ndev)
 		padlen += ETH_FCS_LEN;
 	}
 
-	if (!cloned && headroom + tailroom >= padlen) {
-		(*skb)->data = memmove((*skb)->head, (*skb)->data, (*skb)->len);
-		skb_set_tail_pointer(*skb, (*skb)->len);
-	} else {
+	if (cloned || tailroom < padlen) {
 		nskb = skb_copy_expand(*skb, 0, padlen, GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!nskb)
 			return -ENOMEM;

2.39.0

From: Pietro Borrello <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3782c0d6edf658b71354a64d60aa7a296188fc90 ]

betopff_init() only checks the total sum of the report counts for each report field to be at least 4, but hid_betopff_play() expects 4 report fields.
A device advertising an output report with one field and 4 report counts would pass the check but crash the kernel with a NULL pointer dereference in hid_betopff_play().

---
 drivers/hid/hid-betopff.c | 17 +++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

index 9b60efe6ec44..ba386e5aa055 100644
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ static int betopff_init(struct hid_device *hid)
 	struct list_head *report_list =
 			&hid->report_enum[HID_OUTPUT_REPORT].report_list;
 	struct input_dev *dev;
-	int field_count = 0;
 	int error;
 	int i, j;
 

@@ -89,19 +88,21 @@ static int betopff_init(struct hid_device *hid)
 	 * -----------------------------------------
 	 * Do init them with default value.
 	 */
+	if (report->maxfield < 4) {
+		hid_err(hid, "not enough fields in the report: %d\n",
+				report->maxfield);
+		return -ENODEV;
+	}
 	for (i = 0; i < report->maxfield; i++) {
+		if (report->field[i]->report_count < 1) {
+			hid_err(hid, "no values in the field\n");
+			return -ENODEV;
+		}
 		for (j = 0; j < report->field[i]->report_count; j++) {
 			report->field[i]->value[j] = 0x00;
-			field_count++;
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (field_count < 4) {
-		hid_err(hid, "not enough fields in the report: %d\n",
-				field_count);
-		return -ENODEV;
-	}
-
 	betopff = kzalloc(sizeof(*betopff), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!betopff)
 		return -ENOMEM;

2.39.0

From: Andrea Merello <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 616f0f81d857e248a72b5af45ab185196556ae2e ]

This patch removes a bit of duplicated code by introducing a new function that implements calculations for DMA copy size, and prepares for changes to the copy size calculation that will happen in following patches.

Stable-dep-of: 596b53ccc36a ("dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()")

---
 drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

index 0ba70be4ea85..e4ea94b93400 100644
@@ -428,6 +428,7 @@ struct xilinx_dma_config {
  * @rxs_clk: DMA s2mm stream clock
  * @nr_channels: Number of channels DMA device supports
  * @chan_id: DMA channel identifier
+ * @max_buffer_len: Max buffer length
  */
 struct xilinx_dma_device {
 	void __iomem *regs;

@@ -447,6 +448,7 @@ struct xilinx_dma_device {
 	struct clk *rxs_clk;
 	u32 nr_channels;
 	u32 chan_id;
+	u32 max_buffer_len;
 };
 
 /* Macros */

@@ -969,6 +971,25 @@ static int xilinx_dma_alloc_chan_resources(struct dma_chan *dchan)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/**
+ * xilinx_dma_calc_copysize - Calculate the amount of data to copy
+ * @chan: Driver specific DMA channel
+ * @size: Total data that needs to be copied
+ * @done: Amount of data that has been already copied
+ *
+ * Return: Amount of data that has to be copied
+ */
+static int xilinx_dma_calc_copysize(struct xilinx_dma_chan *chan,
+				    int size, int done)
+{
+	size_t copy;
+
+	copy = min_t(size_t, size - done,
+		     chan->xdev->max_buffer_len);
+
+	return copy;
+}
+
 /**
  * xilinx_dma_tx_status - Get DMA transaction status
  * @dchan: DMA channel

@@ -1002,7 +1023,7 @@ static enum dma_status xilinx_dma_tx_status(struct dma_chan *dchan,
 			list_for_each_entry(segment, &desc->segments, node) {
 				hw = &segment->hw;
 				residue += (hw->control - hw->status) &
-					   XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN;
+					   chan->xdev->max_buffer_len;
 			}
 		}
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&chan->lock, flags);

@@ -1262,7 +1283,7 @@ static void xilinx_cdma_start_transfer(struct xilinx_dma_chan *chan)
 
 		/* Start the transfer */
 		dma_ctrl_write(chan, XILINX_DMA_REG_BTT,
-				hw->control & XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN);
+				hw->control & chan->xdev->max_buffer_len);
 	}
 
 	list_splice_tail_init(&chan->pending_list, &chan->active_list);

@@ -1365,7 +1386,7 @@ static void xilinx_dma_start_transfer(struct xilinx_dma_chan *chan)
 
 		/* Start the transfer */
 		dma_ctrl_write(chan, XILINX_DMA_REG_BTT,
-			       hw->control & XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN);
+			       hw->control & chan->xdev->max_buffer_len);
 	}
 
 	list_splice_tail_init(&chan->pending_list, &chan->active_list);

@@ -1729,7 +1750,7 @@ xilinx_cdma_prep_memcpy(struct dma_chan *dchan, dma_addr_t dma_dst,
 	struct xilinx_cdma_tx_segment *segment;
 	struct xilinx_cdma_desc_hw *hw;
 
-	if (!len || len > XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN)
+	if (!len || len > chan->xdev->max_buffer_len)
 		return NULL;
 
 	desc = xilinx_dma_alloc_tx_descriptor(chan);

@@ -1819,8 +1840,8 @@ static struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *xilinx_dma_prep_slave_sg(
 			 * Calculate the maximum number of bytes to transfer,
 			 * making sure it is less than the hw limit
 			 */
-			copy = min_t(size_t, sg_dma_len(sg) - sg_used,
-				     XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN);
+			copy = xilinx_dma_calc_copysize(chan, sg_dma_len(sg),
+							sg_used);
 			hw = &segment->hw;
 
 			/* Fill in the descriptor */

@@ -1924,8 +1945,8 @@ static struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *xilinx_dma_prep_dma_cyclic(
 			 * Calculate the maximum number of bytes to transfer,
 			 * making sure it is less than the hw limit
 			 */
-			copy = min_t(size_t, period_len - sg_used,
-				     XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN);
+			copy = xilinx_dma_calc_copysize(chan, period_len,
+							sg_used);
 			hw = &segment->hw;
 			xilinx_axidma_buf(chan, hw, buf_addr, sg_used,
 					  period_len * i);

@@ -2645,6 +2666,8 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	/* Retrieve the DMA engine properties from the device tree */
 	xdev->has_sg = of_property_read_bool(node, "xlnx,include-sg");
+	xdev->max_buffer_len = XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN;
+
 	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_AXIDMA)
 		xdev->mcdma = of_property_read_bool(node, "xlnx,mcdma");
 

2.39.0

From: Radhey Shyam Pandey <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ae809690b46a71dc56cda5b3b8884c8c41a0df15 ]

AXI-DMA IP supports configurable (c_sg_length_width) buffer length register width, hence read buffer length (xlnx,sg-length-width) DT property and ensure that driver doesn't program buffer length exceeding the supported limit. For VDMA and CDMA there is no change.

Stable-dep-of: 596b53ccc36a ("dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()")

---
 drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index e4ea94b93400..6687cee26843 100644
@@ -164,7 +164,9 @@
 #define XILINX_DMA_REG_BTT		0x28
 
 /* AXI DMA Specific Masks/Bit fields */
-#define XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN	GENMASK(22, 0)
+#define XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MIN	8
+#define XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX	23
+#define XILINX_DMA_V2_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX	26
 #define XILINX_DMA_CR_COALESCE_MAX	GENMASK(23, 16)
 #define XILINX_DMA_CR_CYCLIC_BD_EN_MASK	BIT(4)
 #define XILINX_DMA_CR_COALESCE_SHIFT	16

@@ -2634,7 +2636,7 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	struct xilinx_dma_device *xdev;
 	struct device_node *child, *np = pdev->dev.of_node;
 	struct resource *io;
-	u32 num_frames, addr_width;
+	u32 num_frames, addr_width, len_width;
 	int i, err;
 
 	/* Allocate and initialize the DMA engine structure */

@@ -2666,10 +2668,24 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	/* Retrieve the DMA engine properties from the device tree */
 	xdev->has_sg = of_property_read_bool(node, "xlnx,include-sg");
-	xdev->max_buffer_len = XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN;
+	xdev->max_buffer_len = GENMASK(XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX - 1, 0);
 
-	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_AXIDMA)
+	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_AXIDMA) {
 		xdev->mcdma = of_property_read_bool(node, "xlnx,mcdma");
+		if (!of_property_read_u32(node, "xlnx,sg-length-width",
+					  &len_width)) {
+			if (len_width < XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MIN ||
+			    len_width > XILINX_DMA_V2_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX) {
+				dev_warn(xdev->dev,
+					 "invalid xlnx,sg-length-width property value. Using default width\n");
+			} else {
+				if (len_width > XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX)
+					dev_warn(xdev->dev, "Please ensure that IP supports buffer length > 23 bits\n");
+				xdev->max_buffer_len =
+					GENMASK(len_width - 1, 0);
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
 	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_VDMA) {
 		err = of_property_read_u32(node, "xlnx,num-fstores",

2.39.0

From: Swati Agarwal <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 91df7751eb890e970afc08f50b8f0fa5ea39e03d ]

Add missing cleanup in devm_platform_ioremap_resource(). When probe fails remove dma channel resources and disable clocks in accordance with the order of resources allocated .

Stable-dep-of: 596b53ccc36a ("dmaengine: xilinx_dma: call of_node_put() when breaking out of for_each_child_of_node()")

---
 drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c | 13 +++++++------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

index 6687cee26843..c56ce7cd1f6f 100644
@@ -2663,9 +2663,10 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	/* Request and map I/O memory */
 	io = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0);
 	xdev->regs = devm_ioremap_resource(&pdev->dev, io);
-	if (IS_ERR(xdev->regs))
-		return PTR_ERR(xdev->regs);
-
+	if (IS_ERR(xdev->regs)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(xdev->regs);
+		goto disable_clks;
+	}
 	/* Retrieve the DMA engine properties from the device tree */
 	xdev->has_sg = of_property_read_bool(node, "xlnx,include-sg");
 	xdev->max_buffer_len = GENMASK(XILINX_DMA_MAX_TRANS_LEN_MAX - 1, 0);

@@ -2759,7 +2760,7 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	for_each_child_of_node(node, child) {
 		err = xilinx_dma_child_probe(xdev, child);
 		if (err < 0)
-			goto disable_clks;
+			goto error;
 	}
 
 	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_VDMA) {

@@ -2792,12 +2793,12 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	return 0;
 
-disable_clks:
-	xdma_disable_allclks(xdev);
 error:
 	for (i = 0; i < xdev->nr_channels; i++)
 		if (xdev->chan[i])
 			xilinx_dma_chan_remove(xdev->chan[i]);
+disable_clks:
+	xdma_disable_allclks(xdev);
 
 	return err;
 }

2.39.0

From: Liu Shixin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 596b53ccc36a546ab28e8897315c5b4d1d5a0200 ]

Since for_each_child_of_node() will increase the refcount of node, we need to call of_node_put() manually when breaking out of the iteration.

---
 drivers/dma/xilinx/xilinx_dma.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index c56ce7cd1f6f..5f9945651e95 100644
@@ -2759,8 +2759,10 @@ static int xilinx_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	/* Initialize the channels */
 	for_each_child_of_node(node, child) {
 		err = xilinx_dma_child_probe(xdev, child);
-		if (err < 0)
+		if (err < 0) {
+			of_node_put(child);
 			goto error;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (xdev->dma_config->dmatype == XDMA_TYPE_VDMA) {

2.39.0

From: Jason Xing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3f4ca5fafc08881d7a57daa20449d171f2887043 ]

While one cpu is working on looking up the right socket from ehash table, another cpu is done deleting the request socket and is about to add (or is adding) the big socket from the table. It means that we could miss both of them, even though it has little chance.

Let me draw a call trace map of the server side.
CPU 0 CPU 1
----- -----
tcp_v4_rcv() syn_recv_sock()

                            inet_ehash_insert()
                            -> sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(osk)
__inet_lookup_established()
                            -> __sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(sk, list)

Notice that the CPU 0 is receiving the data after the final ack during 3-way shakehands and CPU 1 is still handling the final ack.

Why could this be a real problem?
This case is happening only when the final ack and the first data receiving by different CPUs. Then the server receiving data with ACK flag tries to search one proper established socket from ehash table, but apparently it fails as my map shows above. After that, the server fetches a listener socket and then sends a RST because it finds a ACK flag in the skb (data), which obeys RST definition in RFC 793.

Besides, Eric pointed out there's one more race condition where it handles tw socket hashdance. Only by adding to the tail of the list before deleting the old one can we avoid the race if the reader has already begun the bucket traversal and it would possibly miss the head.

Many thanks to Eric for great help from beginning to end.

---
 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c    | 17 +++++++++++++++--
 net/ipv4/inet_timewait_sock.c |  8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

index 3c58019f0718..d64522af9c3a 100644
@@ -579,8 +579,20 @@ bool inet_ehash_insert(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk, bool *found_dup_sk)
 	spin_lock(lock);
 	if (osk) {
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(sk->sk_hash != osk->sk_hash);
-		ret = sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(osk);
-	} else if (found_dup_sk) {
+		ret = sk_hashed(osk);
+		if (ret) {
+			/* Before deleting the node, we insert a new one to make
+			 * sure that the look-up-sk process would not miss either
+			 * of them and that at least one node would exist in ehash
+			 * table all the time. Otherwise there's a tiny chance
+			 * that lookup process could find nothing in ehash table.
+			 */
+			__sk_nulls_add_node_tail_rcu(sk, list);
+			sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(osk);
+		}
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+	if (found_dup_sk) {
 		*found_dup_sk = inet_ehash_lookup_by_sk(sk, list);
 		if (*found_dup_sk)
 			ret = false;

@@ -589,6 +601,7 @@ bool inet_ehash_insert(struct sock *sk, struct sock *osk, bool *found_dup_sk)
 	if (ret)
 		__sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(sk, list);
 
+unlock:
 	spin_unlock(lock);
 
 	return ret;

index 88c5069b5d20..fedd19c22b39 100644
@@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ void inet_twsk_put(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_twsk_put);
 
-static void inet_twsk_add_node_rcu(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,
-				   struct hlist_nulls_head *list)
+static void inet_twsk_add_node_tail_rcu(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,
+					struct hlist_nulls_head *list)
 {
-	hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(&tw->tw_node, list);
+	hlist_nulls_add_tail_rcu(&tw->tw_node, list);
 }
 
 static void inet_twsk_add_bind_node(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,

@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ void inet_twsk_hashdance(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw, struct sock *sk,
 
 	spin_lock(lock);
 
-	inet_twsk_add_node_rcu(tw, &ehead->chain);
+	inet_twsk_add_node_tail_rcu(tw, &ehead->chain);
 
 	/* Step 3: Remove SK from hash chain */
 	if (__sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu(sk))

2.39.0

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 25d5648802f12ae486076ceca5d7ddf1fef792b2 ]

I got a deadloop report while doing device(ds2482) add/remove test:

  [  162.241881] w1_master_driver w1_bus_master1: Waiting for w1_bus_master1 to become free: refcnt=1.
  [  163.272251] w1_master_driver w1_bus_master1: Waiting for w1_bus_master1 to become free: refcnt=1.
  [  164.296157] w1_master_driver w1_bus_master1: Waiting for w1_bus_master1 to become free: refcnt=1.
  ...

__w1_remove_master_device() can't return, because the dev->refcnt is not zero.

w1_add_master_device() |
w1_alloc_dev() |

    atomic_set(&dev->refcnt, 2)		|
  kthread_run()				|
					|__w1_remove_master_device()
					|  kthread_stop()
  // KTHREAD_SHOULD_STOP is set,	|
  // threadfn(w1_process) won't be	|
  // called.				|
  kthread()				|
					|  // refcnt will never be 0, it's deadloop.
					|  while (atomic_read(&dev->refcnt)) {...}

After calling w1_add_master_device(), w1_process() is not really invoked, before w1_process() starting, if kthread_stop() is called in __w1_remove_master_device(), w1_process() will never be called, the refcnt can not be decreased, then it causes deadloop in remove function because of non-zero refcnt.

We need to make sure w1_process() is really started, so move the set refcnt into w1_process() to fix this problem.

---
 drivers/w1/w1.c     | 2 ++
 drivers/w1/w1_int.c | 5 ++---
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

index 890c038c25f8..c1d0e723fabc 100644
@@ -1140,6 +1140,8 @@ int w1_process(void *data)
 	/* remainder if it woke up early */
 	unsigned long jremain = 0;
 
+	atomic_inc(&dev->refcnt);
+
 	for (;;) {
 
 		if (!jremain && dev->search_count) {

index 1c776178f598..eb851eb44300 100644
@@ -60,10 +60,9 @@ static struct w1_master *w1_alloc_dev(u32 id, int slave_count, int slave_ttl,
 	dev->search_count	= w1_search_count;
 	dev->enable_pullup	= w1_enable_pullup;
 
-	/* 1 for w1_process to decrement
-	 * 1 for __w1_remove_master_device to decrement
+	/* For __w1_remove_master_device to decrement
 	 */
-	atomic_set(&dev->refcnt, 2);
+	atomic_set(&dev->refcnt, 1);
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->slist);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->async_list);

2.39.0

From: Yang Yingliang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 36225a7c72e9e3e1ce4001b6ce72849f5c9a2d3b ]

I got the following WARNING message while removing driver(ds2482):

------------[ cut here ]------------
do not call blocking ops when !TASK_RUNNING; state=1 set at [<000000002d50bfb6>] w1_process+0x9e/0x1d0 [wire]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 262 at kernel/sched/core.c:9817 __might_sleep+0x98/0xa0
CPU: 0 PID: 262 Comm: w1_bus_master1 Tainted: G                 N 6.1.0-rc3+ #307
RIP: 0010:__might_sleep+0x98/0xa0
Call Trace:
 exit_signals+0x6c/0x550
 do_exit+0x2b4/0x17e0
 kthread_exit+0x52/0x60
 kthread+0x16d/0x1e0
 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

The state of task is set to TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE in loop in w1_process(), set it to TASK_RUNNING when it breaks out of the loop to avoid the warning.

---
 drivers/w1/w1.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index c1d0e723fabc..cb3650efc29c 100644
@@ -1169,8 +1169,10 @@ int w1_process(void *data)
 		 */
 		mutex_unlock(&dev->list_mutex);
 
-		if (kthread_should_stop())
+		if (kthread_should_stop()) {
+			__set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING);
 			break;
+		}
 
 		/* Only sleep when the search is active. */
 		if (dev->search_count) {

2.39.0

From: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e15d4cdf27cb0c1e977270270b2cea12e0955edd ]

Consider:
client -----> conntrack ---> Host

client sends a SYN, but $Host is unreachable/silent. Client eventually gives up and the conntrack entry will time out.

However, if the client is restarted with same addr/port pair, it may prevent the conntrack entry from timing out.

This is noticeable when the existing conntrack entry has no NAT transformation or an outdated one and port reuse happens either on client or due to a NAT middlebox.

This change prevents refresh of the timeout for SYN retransmits, so entry is going away after nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_syn_sent seconds (default: 60).

Entry will be re-created on next connection attempt, but then nat rules will be evaluated again.

---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

index 66cda5e2d6b9..955b73a9a05e 100644
@@ -1094,6 +1094,16 @@ static int tcp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 			nf_ct_kill_acct(ct, ctinfo, skb);
 			return NF_ACCEPT;
 		}
+
+		if (index == TCP_SYN_SET && old_state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT) {
+			/* do not renew timeout on SYN retransmit.
+			 *
+			 * Else port reuse by client or NAT middlebox can keep
+			 * entry alive indefinitely (including nat info).
+			 */
+			return NF_ACCEPT;
+		}
+
 		/* ESTABLISHED without SEEN_REPLY, i.e. mid-connection
 		 * pickup with loose=1. Avoid large ESTABLISHED timeout.
 		 */

2.39.0

From: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>

commit 57e95e4670d1126c103305bcf34a9442f49f6d6a upstream.

Don't use a WARN_ON when printing a potentially user triggered condition. Also don't print the partno when the block device name already includes it, and use the %pg specifier to simplify printing the block device name.

---
 block/blk-core.c |    5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)

@@ -2179,10 +2179,7 @@ static inline bool bio_check_ro(struct b
 
 		if (op_is_flush(bio->bi_opf) && !bio_sectors(bio))
 			return false;
-
-		WARN_ONCE(1,
-		       "generic_make_request: Trying to write "
-			"to read-only block-device %s (partno %d)\n",
+		pr_warn("Trying to write to read-only block-device %s (partno %d)\n",
 			bio_devname(bio, b), part->partno);
 		/* Older lvm-tools actually trigger this */
 		return false;

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

commit ebcb9464a2ae3a547e97de476575c82ece0e93e2 upstream.

It is possible to return a pointer to a local variable when looking up the architecture name for the running system and no normalization is done on that value, i.e. we may end up returning the uts.machine local variable.

While this doesn't happen on most arches, as normalization takes place, lets fix this by making that a static variable and optimize it a bit by not always running uname(), only the first time.

Noticed in fedora rawhide running with:

  [perfbuilder@a5ff49d6e6e4 ~]$ gcc --version
  gcc (GCC) 10.0.1 20200216 (Red Hat 10.0.1-0.8)

---
 tools/perf/util/env.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -163,11 +163,11 @@ static const char *normalize_arch(char *
 
 const char *perf_env__arch(struct perf_env *env)
 {
-	struct utsname uts;
 	char *arch_name;
 
 	if (!env || !env->arch) { /* Assume local operation */
-		if (uname(&uts) < 0)
+		static struct utsname uts = { .machine[0] = '\0', };
+		if (uts.machine[0] == '\0' && uname(&uts) < 0)
 			return NULL;
 		arch_name = uts.machine;
 	} else

From: Dongliang Mu <[email protected]>

commit 81dedaf10c20959bdf5624f9783f408df26ba7a4 upstream.

Since the commit c3d98ea08291 ("VFS: Don't use save/replace_mount_options if not using generic_show_options") eliminates replace_mount_options in reiserfs_remount, but does not handle the allocated new_opts, it will cause memory leak in the reiserfs_remount.

Because new_opts is useless in reiserfs_mount, so we fix this bug by removing the useless new_opts in reiserfs_remount.

---
 fs/reiserfs/super.c |    6 ------
 1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)

@@ -1443,7 +1443,6 @@ static int reiserfs_remount(struct super
 	unsigned long safe_mask = 0;
 	unsigned int commit_max_age = (unsigned int)-1;
 	struct reiserfs_journal *journal = SB_JOURNAL(s);
-	char *new_opts;
 	int err;
 	char *qf_names[REISERFS_MAXQUOTAS];
 	unsigned int qfmt = 0;

@@ -1451,10 +1450,6 @@ static int reiserfs_remount(struct super
 	int i;
 #endif
 
-	new_opts = kstrdup(arg, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (arg && !new_opts)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
 	sync_filesystem(s);
 	reiserfs_write_lock(s);
 

@@ -1605,7 +1600,6 @@ out_ok_unlocked:
 out_err_unlock:
 	reiserfs_write_unlock(s);
 out_err:
-	kfree(new_opts);
 	return err;
 }
 

From: Archie Pusaka <[email protected]>

commit 97dfaf073f5881c624856ef293be307b6166115c upstream.

If a command is already sent, we take care of freeing it, but we also need to cancel the timeout as well.

---
 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

index e87777255c47..497c8ac140d1 100644
@@ -1519,6 +1519,7 @@ static int hci_dev_do_open(struct hci_dev *hdev)
 			hdev->flush(hdev);
 
 		if (hdev->sent_cmd) {
+			cancel_delayed_work_sync(&hdev->cmd_timer);
 			kfree_skb(hdev->sent_cmd);
 			hdev->sent_cmd = NULL;
 		}

2.39.0

From: Alexey V. Vissarionov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit bbbd25499100c810ceaf5193c3cfcab9f7402a33 ]

The 'h' is a pointer to struct ctlr_info, so it's just 4 or 8 bytes, while the structure itself is much bigger.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

---
 drivers/scsi/hpsa.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 13931c5c0eff..25d9bdd4bc69 100644
@@ -5771,7 +5771,7 @@ static int hpsa_scsi_host_alloc(struct ctlr_info *h)
 {
 	struct Scsi_Host *sh;
 
-	sh = scsi_host_alloc(&hpsa_driver_template, sizeof(h));
+	sh = scsi_host_alloc(&hpsa_driver_template, sizeof(struct ctlr_info));
 	if (sh == NULL) {
 		dev_err(&h->pdev->dev, "scsi_host_alloc failed\n");
 		return -ENOMEM;

2.39.0

From: Petr Pavlu <[email protected]>

commit 0254127ab977e70798707a7a2b757c9f3c971210 upstream.

During a system boot, it can happen that the kernel receives a burst of requests to insert the same module but loading it eventually fails during its init call. For instance, udev can make a request to insert a frequency module for each individual CPU when another frequency module is already loaded which causes the init function of the new module to return an error.

Since commit 6e6de3dee51a ("kernel/module.c: Only return -EEXIST for modules that have finished loading"), the kernel waits for modules in MODULE_STATE_GOING state to finish unloading before making another attempt to load the same module.

This creates unnecessary work in the described scenario and delays the boot. In the worst case, it can prevent udev from loading drivers for other devices and might cause timeouts of services waiting on them and subsequently a failed boot.

This patch attempts a different solution for the problem 6e6de3dee51a was trying to solve. Rather than waiting for the unloading to complete, it returns a different error code (-EBUSY) for modules in the GOING state. This should avoid the error situation that was described in 6e6de3dee51a (user space attempting to load a dependent module because the -EEXIST error code would suggest to user space that the first module had been loaded successfully), while avoiding the delay situation too.

This has been tested on linux-next since December 2022 and passes all kmod selftests except test 0009 with module compression enabled but it has been confirmed that this issue has existed and has gone unnoticed since prior to this commit and can also be reproduced without module compression with a simple usleep(5000000) on tools/modprobe.c [0]. These failures are caused by hitting the kernel mod_concurrent_max and can happen either due to a self inflicted kernel module auto-loead DoS somehow or on a system with large CPU count and each CPU count incorrectly triggering many module auto-loads. Both of those issues need to be fixed in-kernel.

[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y9A4fiobL6IHp%2F%[email protected]/

---
 kernel/module.c |   26 +++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

@@ -3478,7 +3478,8 @@ static bool finished_loading(const char
 	sched_annotate_sleep();
 	mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
 	mod = find_module_all(name, strlen(name), true);
-	ret = !mod || mod->state == MODULE_STATE_LIVE;
+	ret = !mod || mod->state == MODULE_STATE_LIVE
+		|| mod->state == MODULE_STATE_GOING;
 	mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
 
 	return ret;

@@ -3632,20 +3633,35 @@ static int add_unformed_module(struct mo
 
 	mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED;
 
-again:
 	mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
 	old = find_module_all(mod->name, strlen(mod->name), true);
 	if (old != NULL) {
-		if (old->state != MODULE_STATE_LIVE) {
+		if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING
+		    || old->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) {
 			/* Wait in case it fails to load. */
 			mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
 			err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq,
 					       finished_loading(mod->name));
 			if (err)
 				goto out_unlocked;
-			goto again;
+
+			/* The module might have gone in the meantime. */
+			mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
+			old = find_module_all(mod->name, strlen(mod->name),
+					      true);
 		}
-		err = -EEXIST;
+
+		/*
+		 * We are here only when the same module was being loaded. Do
+		 * not try to load it again right now. It prevents long delays
+		 * caused by serialized module load failures. It might happen
+		 * when more devices of the same type trigger load of
+		 * a particular module.
+		 */
+		if (old && old->state == MODULE_STATE_LIVE)
+			err = -EEXIST;
+		else
+			err = -EBUSY;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	mod_update_bounds(mod);

From: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>

commit 3bb06eb6e9acf7c4a3e1b5bc87aed398ff8e2253 upstream.

Currently trace_printk() can be used as soon as early_trace_init() is called from start_kernel(). But if a crash happens, and "ftrace_dump_on_oops" is set on the kernel command line, all you get will be:

  [    0.456075]   <idle>-0         0dN.2. 347519us : Unknown type 6
  [    0.456075]   <idle>-0         0dN.2. 353141us : Unknown type 6
  [    0.456075]   <idle>-0         0dN.2. 358684us : Unknown type 6

This is because the trace_printk() event (type 6) hasn't been registered yet. That gets done via an early_initcall(), which may be early, but not early enough.

Instead of registering the trace_printk() event (and other ftrace events, which are not trace events) via an early_initcall(), have them registered at the same time that trace_printk() can be used. This way, if there is a crash before early_initcall(), then the trace_printk()s will actually be useful.

---
 kernel/trace/trace.c        |    2 ++
 kernel/trace/trace.h        |    1 +
 kernel/trace/trace_output.c |    3 +--
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

@@ -8674,6 +8674,8 @@ void __init early_trace_init(void)
 			static_key_enable(&tracepoint_printk_key.key);
 	}
 	tracer_alloc_buffers();
+
+	init_events();
 }
 
 void __init trace_init(void)

@@ -1530,6 +1530,7 @@ extern void trace_event_enable_cmd_recor
 extern void trace_event_enable_tgid_record(bool enable);
 
 extern int event_trace_init(void);
+extern int init_events(void);
 extern int event_trace_add_tracer(struct dentry *parent, struct trace_array *tr);
 extern int event_trace_del_tracer(struct trace_array *tr);
 

@@ -1395,7 +1395,7 @@ static struct trace_event *events[] __in
 	NULL
 };
 
-__init static int init_events(void)
+__init int init_events(void)
 {
 	struct trace_event *event;
 	int i, ret;

@@ -1413,4 +1413,3 @@ __init static int init_events(void)
 
 	return 0;
 }
-early_initcall(init_events);

From: Natalia Petrova <[email protected]>

commit 8b152e9150d07a885f95e1fd401fc81af202d9a4 upstream.

Function 'create_hist_field' is called recursively at trace_events_hist.c:1954 and can return NULL-value that's why we have to check it to avoid null pointer dereference.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

---
 kernel/trace/trace_events_hist.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

@@ -2314,6 +2314,8 @@ static struct hist_field *create_hist_fi
 		unsigned long fl = flags & ~HIST_FIELD_FL_LOG2;
 		hist_field->fn = hist_field_log2;
 		hist_field->operands[0] = create_hist_field(hist_data, field, fl, NULL);
+		if (!hist_field->operands[0])
+			goto free;
 		hist_field->size = hist_field->operands[0]->size;
 		hist_field->type = kstrdup(hist_field->operands[0]->type, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!hist_field->type)

From: Long Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 050b8c374019c10e4bcc3fbc9023884f76a85d9c ]

On transport recoonect, upper layer CIFS code destroys the current transport and then recoonect. This code path is not used by SMBD, in that SMBD destroys its transport on RDMA disconnect notification independent of CIFS upper layer behavior.

This approach adds some costs to SMBD layer to handle transport shutdown and restart, and to deal with several racing conditions on reconnecting transport.

Re-work this code path by introducing a new smbd_destroy. This function is called form upper layer to ask SMBD to destroy the transport. SMBD will no longer need to destroy the transport by itself while worrying about data transfer is in progress. The upper layer guarantees the transport is locked.

change log:
v2: fix build errors when CONFIG_CIFS_SMB_DIRECT is not configured

Stable-dep-of: b7ab9161cf5d ("cifs: Fix oops due to uncleared server->smbd_conn in reconnect")

---
 fs/cifs/connect.c   |   9 ++--
 fs/cifs/smbdirect.c | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 fs/cifs/smbdirect.h |   5 +-
 3 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)

index a7ef847f285d..37e91f27f49b 100644
@@ -429,7 +429,8 @@ cifs_reconnect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 			 server->ssocket->state, server->ssocket->flags);
 		sock_release(server->ssocket);
 		server->ssocket = NULL;
-	}
+	} else if (cifs_rdma_enabled(server))
+		smbd_destroy(server);
 	server->sequence_number = 0;
 	server->session_estab = false;
 	kfree(server->session_key.response);

@@ -799,10 +800,8 @@ static void clean_demultiplex_info(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 	wake_up_all(&server->request_q);
 	/* give those requests time to exit */
 	msleep(125);
-	if (cifs_rdma_enabled(server) && server->smbd_conn) {
-		smbd_destroy(server->smbd_conn);
-		server->smbd_conn = NULL;
-	}
+	if (cifs_rdma_enabled(server))
+		smbd_destroy(server);
 	if (server->ssocket) {
 		sock_release(server->ssocket);
 		server->ssocket = NULL;

index b5c240ff2191..b0ca7df41454 100644
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ struct smbd_connection {
 	struct completion ri_done;
 	wait_queue_head_t conn_wait;
 	wait_queue_head_t wait_destroy;
+	wait_queue_head_t disconn_wait;
 
 	struct completion negotiate_completion;
 	bool negotiate_done;

@@ -288,7 +289,7 @@ struct smbd_connection *smbd_get_connection(
 /* Reconnect SMBDirect session */
 int smbd_reconnect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server);
 /* Destroy SMBDirect session */
-void smbd_destroy(struct smbd_connection *info);
+void smbd_destroy(struct TCP_Server_Info *server);
 
 /* Interface for carrying upper layer I/O through send/recv */
 int smbd_recv(struct smbd_connection *info, struct msghdr *msg);

@@ -331,7 +332,7 @@ struct smbd_connection {};
 static inline void *smbd_get_connection(
 	struct TCP_Server_Info *server, struct sockaddr *dstaddr) {return NULL;}
 static inline int smbd_reconnect(struct TCP_Server_Info *server) {return -1; }
-static inline void smbd_destroy(struct smbd_connection *info) {}
+static inline void smbd_destroy(struct TCP_Server_Info *server) {}
 static inline int smbd_recv(struct smbd_connection *info, struct msghdr *msg) {return -1; }
 static inline int smbd_send(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, int num_rqst, struct smb_rqst *rqst) {return -1; }
 #endif

2.39.0

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b7ab9161cf5ddc42a288edf9d1a61f3bdffe17c7 ]

In smbd_destroy(), clear the server->smbd_conn pointer after freeing the smbd_connection struct that it points to so that reconnection doesn't get confused.

---
 fs/cifs/smbdirect.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

index c839ff9d4965..591cd5c70432 100644
@@ -1576,6 +1576,7 @@ void smbd_destroy(struct TCP_Server_Info *server)
 	destroy_workqueue(info->workqueue);
 	log_rdma_event(INFO,  "rdma session destroyed\n");
 	kfree(info);
+	server->smbd_conn = NULL;
 }
 
 /*

2.39.0

From: Giulio Benetti <[email protected]>

commit a4e03921c1bb118e6718e0a3b0322a2c13ed172b upstream.

zero_page is a void* pointer but memblock_alloc() returns phys_addr_t type so this generates a warning while using clang and with -Wint-error enabled that becomes and error. So let's cast the return of memblock_alloc() to (void *).

---
 arch/arm/mm/nommu.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void __init paging_init(const struct mac
 	mpu_setup();
 
 	/* allocate the zero page. */
-	zero_page = memblock_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+	zero_page = (void *)memblock_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
 	if (!zero_page)
 		panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n",
 		      __func__, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);

From: Manivannan Sadhasivam <[email protected]>

commit cec669ff716cc83505c77b242aecf6f7baad869d upstream.

The EDAC drivers may optionally pass the poll_msec value. Use that value if available, else fall back to 1000ms.

[ bp: Touchups. ]

---
 drivers/edac/edac_device.c |   15 +++++++--------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(device_ctls_mutex);
 static LIST_HEAD(edac_device_list);
 
+/* Default workqueue processing interval on this instance, in msecs */
+#define DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL 1000
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_EDAC_DEBUG
 static void edac_device_dump_device(struct edac_device_ctl_info *edac_dev)
 {

@@ -366,7 +369,7 @@ static void edac_device_workq_function(s
 	 * whole one second to save timers firing all over the period
 	 * between integral seconds
 	 */
-	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == 1000)
+	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL)
 		edac_queue_work(&edac_dev->work, round_jiffies_relative(edac_dev->delay));
 	else
 		edac_queue_work(&edac_dev->work, edac_dev->delay);

@@ -396,7 +399,7 @@ static void edac_device_workq_setup(stru
 	 * timers firing on sub-second basis, while they are happy
 	 * to fire together on the 1 second exactly
 	 */
-	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == 1000)
+	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL)
 		edac_queue_work(&edac_dev->work, round_jiffies_relative(edac_dev->delay));
 	else
 		edac_queue_work(&edac_dev->work, edac_dev->delay);

@@ -430,7 +433,7 @@ void edac_device_reset_delay_period(stru
 	edac_dev->delay	    = msecs_to_jiffies(msec);
 
 	/* See comment in edac_device_workq_setup() above */
-	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == 1000)
+	if (edac_dev->poll_msec == DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL)
 		edac_mod_work(&edac_dev->work, round_jiffies_relative(edac_dev->delay));
 	else
 		edac_mod_work(&edac_dev->work, edac_dev->delay);

@@ -472,11 +475,7 @@ int edac_device_add_device(struct edac_d
 		/* This instance is NOW RUNNING */
 		edac_dev->op_state = OP_RUNNING_POLL;
 
-		/*
-		 * enable workq processing on this instance,
-		 * default = 1000 msec
-		 */
-		edac_device_workq_setup(edac_dev, 1000);
+		edac_device_workq_setup(edac_dev, edac_dev->poll_msec ?: DEFAULT_POLL_INTERVAL);
 	} else {
 		edac_dev->op_state = OP_RUNNING_INTERRUPT;
 	}

From: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 71ab9c3e2253619136c31c89dbb2c69305cc89b1 ]

If net_assign_generic() fails, the current error path in ops_init() tries to clear the gen pointer slot. Anyway, in such error path, the gen pointer itself has not been modified yet, and the existing and accessed one is smaller than the accessed index, causing an out-of-bounds error:

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ops_init+0x2de/0x320
 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888109124978 by task modprobe/1018

 CPU: 2 PID: 1018 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.2.0-rc2.mptcp_ae5ac65fbed5+ #1641
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x9f
  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x86/0x2b5
  print_report+0x11b/0x1fb
  kasan_report+0x87/0xc0
  ops_init+0x2de/0x320
  register_pernet_operations+0x2e4/0x750
  register_pernet_subsys+0x24/0x40
  tcf_register_action+0x9f/0x560
  do_one_initcall+0xf9/0x570
  do_init_module+0x190/0x650
  load_module+0x1fa5/0x23c0
  __do_sys_finit_module+0x10d/0x1b0
  do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
 RIP: 0033:0x7f42518f778d
 Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48
       89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff
       ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d cb 56 2c 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
 RSP: 002b:00007fff96869688 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005568ef7f7c90 RCX: 00007f42518f778d
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005568ef41d796 RDI: 0000000000000003
 RBP: 00005568ef41d796 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00005568ef7f7d30 R14: 0000000000040000 R15: 0000000000000000
  </TASK>

This change addresses the issue by skipping the gen pointer de-reference in the mentioned error-path.

Found by code inspection and verified with explicit error injection on a kasan-enabled kernel.

---
 net/core/net_namespace.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 56c240c98a56..a87774424829 100644
@@ -132,12 +132,12 @@ static int ops_init(const struct pernet_operations *ops, struct net *net)
 		return 0;
 
 	if (ops->id && ops->size) {
-cleanup:
 		ng = rcu_dereference_protected(net->gen,
 					       lockdep_is_held(&pernet_ops_rwsem));
 		ng->ptr[*ops->id] = NULL;
 	}
 
+cleanup:
 	kfree(data);
 
 out:

2.39.0

From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5d235d6ce75c12a7fdee375eb211e4116f7ab01b ]

Skip interference with an ongoing transaction, do not perform garbage collection on inactive elements. Reset annotated previous end interval if the expired element is marked as busy (control plane removed the element right before expiration).

---
 net/netfilter/nft_set_rbtree.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

index 84d317418d18..78a0f4283787 100644
@@ -375,23 +375,37 @@ static void nft_rbtree_gc(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct nft_rbtree *priv;
 	struct rb_node *node;
 	struct nft_set *set;
+	struct net *net;
+	u8 genmask;
 
 	priv = container_of(work, struct nft_rbtree, gc_work.work);
 	set  = nft_set_container_of(priv);
+	net  = read_pnet(&set->net);
+	genmask = nft_genmask_cur(net);
 
 	write_lock_bh(&priv->lock);
 	write_seqcount_begin(&priv->count);
 	for (node = rb_first(&priv->root); node != NULL; node = rb_next(node)) {
 		rbe = rb_entry(node, struct nft_rbtree_elem, node);
 
+		if (!nft_set_elem_active(&rbe->ext, genmask))
+			continue;
+
+		/* elements are reversed in the rbtree for historical reasons,
+		 * from highest to lowest value, that is why end element is
+		 * always visited before the start element.
+		 */
 		if (nft_rbtree_interval_end(rbe)) {
 			rbe_end = rbe;
 			continue;
 		}
 		if (!nft_set_elem_expired(&rbe->ext))
 			continue;
-		if (nft_set_elem_mark_busy(&rbe->ext))
+
+		if (nft_set_elem_mark_busy(&rbe->ext)) {
+			rbe_end = NULL;
 			continue;
+		}
 
 		if (rbe_prev) {
 			rb_erase(&rbe_prev->node, &priv->root);

2.39.0

From: Li RongQing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0041195d55bc38df6b574cc8c36dcf2266fbee39 ]

The type of hash::nelems has been changed from size_t to atom_t which in fact is int, so not need to check if BITS_PER_LONG, that is bit number of size_t, is bigger than 32

and rht_grow_above_max() will be called to check if hashtable is too big, ensure it can not bigger than 1<<31

Stable-dep-of: c1bb9484e3b0 ("netlink: annotate data races around nlk->portid")

---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 5 -----
 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)

index 6ffa83319d08..966c709c3831 100644
@@ -578,11 +578,6 @@ static int netlink_insert(struct sock *sk, u32 portid)
 	if (nlk_sk(sk)->bound)
 		goto err;
 
-	err = -ENOMEM;
-	if (BITS_PER_LONG > 32 &&
-	    unlikely(atomic_read(&table->hash.nelems) >= UINT_MAX))
-		goto err;
-
 	nlk_sk(sk)->portid = portid;
 	sock_hold(sk);
 

2.39.0

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c1bb9484e3b05166880da8574504156ccbd0549e ]

syzbot reminds us netlink_getname() runs locklessly [1]

This first patch annotates the race against nlk->portid.

Following patches take care of the remaining races.

[1]

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in netlink_getname / netlink_insert

write to 0xffff88814176d310 of 4 bytes by task 2315 on cpu 1:

netlink_insert+0xf1/0x9a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:583
netlink_autobind+0xae/0x180 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:856
netlink_sendmsg+0x444/0x760 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1895
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x38f/0x500 net/socket.c:2476
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2530 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x19a/0x230 net/socket.c:2559
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2568 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2566 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2566
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

read to 0xffff88814176d310 of 4 bytes by task 2316 on cpu 0:

netlink_getname+0xcd/0x1a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1144
__sys_getsockname+0x11d/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2026
__do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2041 [inline]
__se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:2038 [inline]
__x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:2038
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0xc9a49780

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:

CPU: 0 PID: 2316 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00030-ge8f60cd7db24-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022

---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index 966c709c3831..52bf99ed7093 100644
@@ -578,7 +578,9 @@ static int netlink_insert(struct sock *sk, u32 portid)
 	if (nlk_sk(sk)->bound)
 		goto err;
 
-	nlk_sk(sk)->portid = portid;
+	/* portid can be read locklessly from netlink_getname(). */
+	WRITE_ONCE(nlk_sk(sk)->portid, portid);
+
 	sock_hold(sk);
 
 	err = __netlink_insert(table, sk);

@@ -1133,7 +1135,8 @@ static int netlink_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 		nladdr->nl_pid = nlk->dst_portid;
 		nladdr->nl_groups = netlink_group_mask(nlk->dst_group);
 	} else {
-		nladdr->nl_pid = nlk->portid;
+		/* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert() */
+		nladdr->nl_pid = READ_ONCE(nlk->portid);
 		netlink_lock_table();
 		nladdr->nl_groups = nlk->groups ? nlk->groups[0] : 0;
 		netlink_unlock_table();

2.39.0

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 004db64d185a5f23dfb891d7701e23713b2420ee ]

netlink_getname(), netlink_sendmsg() and netlink_getsockbyportid() can read nlk->dst_portid and nlk->dst_group while another thread is changing them.

---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 23 ++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

index 52bf99ed7093..5c630506b7cd 100644
@@ -1091,8 +1091,9 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 
 	if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
 		sk->sk_state	= NETLINK_UNCONNECTED;
-		nlk->dst_portid	= 0;
-		nlk->dst_group  = 0;
+		/* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
+		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, 0);
+		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, 0);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	if (addr->sa_family != AF_NETLINK)

@@ -1114,8 +1115,9 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 
 	if (err == 0) {
 		sk->sk_state	= NETLINK_CONNECTED;
-		nlk->dst_portid = nladdr->nl_pid;
-		nlk->dst_group  = ffs(nladdr->nl_groups);
+		/* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
+		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, nladdr->nl_pid);
+		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, ffs(nladdr->nl_groups));
 	}
 
 	return err;

@@ -1132,8 +1134,9 @@ static int netlink_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 	nladdr->nl_pad = 0;
 
 	if (peer) {
-		nladdr->nl_pid = nlk->dst_portid;
-		nladdr->nl_groups = netlink_group_mask(nlk->dst_group);
+		/* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_connect() */
+		nladdr->nl_pid = READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid);
+		nladdr->nl_groups = netlink_group_mask(READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_group));
 	} else {
 		/* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert() */
 		nladdr->nl_pid = READ_ONCE(nlk->portid);

@@ -1163,8 +1166,9 @@ static struct sock *netlink_getsockbyportid(struct sock *ssk, u32 portid)
 
 	/* Don't bother queuing skb if kernel socket has no input function */
 	nlk = nlk_sk(sock);
+	/* dst_portid can be changed in netlink_connect() */
 	if (sock->sk_state == NETLINK_CONNECTED &&
-	    nlk->dst_portid != nlk_sk(ssk)->portid) {
+	    READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid) != nlk_sk(ssk)->portid) {
 		sock_put(sock);
 		return ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 	}

@@ -1876,8 +1880,9 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 			goto out;
 		netlink_skb_flags |= NETLINK_SKB_DST;
 	} else {
-		dst_portid = nlk->dst_portid;
-		dst_group = nlk->dst_group;
+		/* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_connect() */
+		dst_portid = READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid);
+		dst_group = READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_group);
 	}
 
 	/* Paired with WRITE_ONCE() in netlink_insert() */

2.39.0

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9b663b5cbb15b494ef132a3c937641c90646eb73 ]

netlink_getsockbyportid() reads sk_state while a concurrent netlink_connect() can change its value.

---
 net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index 5c630506b7cd..6a49c0aa55bd 100644
@@ -1090,7 +1090,8 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (addr->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
-		sk->sk_state	= NETLINK_UNCONNECTED;
+		/* paired with READ_ONCE() in netlink_getsockbyportid() */
+		WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, NETLINK_UNCONNECTED);
 		/* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
 		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, 0);
 		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, 0);

@@ -1114,7 +1115,8 @@ static int netlink_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
 		err = netlink_autobind(sock);
 
 	if (err == 0) {
-		sk->sk_state	= NETLINK_CONNECTED;
+		/* paired with READ_ONCE() in netlink_getsockbyportid() */
+		WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_state, NETLINK_CONNECTED);
 		/* dst_portid and dst_group can be read locklessly */
 		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid, nladdr->nl_pid);
 		WRITE_ONCE(nlk->dst_group, ffs(nladdr->nl_groups));

@@ -1166,8 +1168,8 @@ static struct sock *netlink_getsockbyportid(struct sock *ssk, u32 portid)
 
 	/* Don't bother queuing skb if kernel socket has no input function */
 	nlk = nlk_sk(sock);
-	/* dst_portid can be changed in netlink_connect() */
-	if (sock->sk_state == NETLINK_CONNECTED &&
+	/* dst_portid and sk_state can be changed in netlink_connect() */
+	if (READ_ONCE(sock->sk_state) == NETLINK_CONNECTED &&
 	    READ_ONCE(nlk->dst_portid) != nlk_sk(ssk)->portid) {
 		sock_put(sock);
 		return ERR_PTR(-ECONNREFUSED);

2.39.0

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1d1d63b612801b3f0a39b7d4467cad0abd60e5c8 ]

if (!type)

		continue;
	if (type > RTAX_MAX)
		return -EINVAL;
	...
	metrics[type - 1] = val;

@type being used as an array index, we need to prevent cpu speculation or risk leaking kernel memory content.

---
 net/ipv4/metrics.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

index 04311f7067e2..9a6b01d85cd0 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <net/ip.h>

@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ int ip_metrics_convert(struct net *net, struct nlattr *fc_mx, int fc_mx_len,
 		if (type > RTAX_MAX)
 			return -EINVAL;
 
+		type = array_index_nospec(type, RTAX_MAX + 1);
 		if (type == RTAX_CC_ALGO) {
 			char tmp[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
 

2.39.0

From: Sriram Yagnaraman <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a9993591fa94246b16b444eea55d84c54608282a ]

RFC 9260, Sec 8.5.1 states that for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE, the chunk MUST be accepted if the vtag of the packet matches its own tag and the T bit is not set OR if it is set to its peer's vtag and the T bit is set in chunk flags. Otherwise the packet MUST be silently dropped.

Update vtag verification for ABORT/SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE based on the above description.

---
 net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_sctp.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

index 8cb62805fd68..cadeb22a48f2 100644
@@ -317,22 +317,29 @@ static int sctp_packet(struct nf_conn *ct,
 	for_each_sctp_chunk (skb, sch, _sch, offset, dataoff, count) {
 		/* Special cases of Verification tag check (Sec 8.5.1) */
 		if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_INIT) {
-			/* Sec 8.5.1 (A) */
+			/* (A) vtag MUST be zero */
 			if (sh->vtag != 0)
 				goto out_unlock;
 		} else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_ABORT) {
-			/* Sec 8.5.1 (B) */
-			if (sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir] &&
-			    sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir])
+			/* (B) vtag MUST match own vtag if T flag is unset OR
+			 * MUST match peer's vtag if T flag is set
+			 */
+			if ((!(sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
+			     sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir]) ||
+			    ((sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
+			     sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir]))
 				goto out_unlock;
 		} else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE) {
-			/* Sec 8.5.1 (C) */
-			if (sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir] &&
-			    sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir] &&
-			    sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T)
+			/* (C) vtag MUST match own vtag if T flag is unset OR
+			 * MUST match peer's vtag if T flag is set
+			 */
+			if ((!(sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
+			     sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir]) ||
+			    ((sch->flags & SCTP_CHUNK_FLAG_T) &&
+			     sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[!dir]))
 				goto out_unlock;
 		} else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_COOKIE_ECHO) {
-			/* Sec 8.5.1 (D) */
+			/* (D) vtag must be same as init_vtag as found in INIT_ACK */
 			if (sh->vtag != ct->proto.sctp.vtag[dir])
 				goto out_unlock;
 		} else if (sch->type == SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT) {

2.39.0

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 409db27e3a2eb5e8ef7226ca33be33361b3ed1c9 ]

syzbot reported a use-after-free in do_accept(), precisely nr_accept() as sk_prot_alloc() allocated the memory and sock_put() frees it. [0]

The issue could happen if the heartbeat timer is fired and nr_heartbeat_expiry() calls nr_destroy_socket(), where a socket has SOCK_DESTROY or a listening socket has SOCK_DEAD.

In this case, the first condition cannot be true. SOCK_DESTROY is flagged in nr_release() only when the file descriptor is close()d, but accept() is being called for the listening socket, so the second condition must be true.

Usually, the AF_NETROM listener neither starts timers nor sets SOCK_DEAD. However, the condition is met if connect() fails before listen(). connect() starts the t1 timer and heartbeat timer, and t1timer calls nr_disconnect() when timeout happens. Then, SOCK_DEAD is set, and if we call listen(), the heartbeat timer calls nr_destroy_socket().

nr_connect

    nr_establish_data_link(sk)
      nr_start_t1timer(sk)
    nr_start_heartbeat(sk)
                                    nr_t1timer_expiry
                                      nr_disconnect(sk, ETIMEDOUT)
                                        nr_sk(sk)->state = NR_STATE_0
                                        sk->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE
                                        sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD)
nr_listen
  if (sk->sk_state != TCP_LISTEN)
    sk->sk_state = TCP_LISTEN
                                    nr_heartbeat_expiry
                                      switch (nr->state)
                                      case NR_STATE_0
                                        if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN &&
                                            sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
                                          nr_destroy_socket(sk)

This path seems expected, and nr_destroy_socket() is called to clean up resources. Initially, there was sock_hold() before nr_destroy_socket() so that the socket would not be freed, but the commit 517a16b1a88b ("netrom: Decrease sock refcount when sock timers expire") accidentally removed it.

To fix use-after-free, let's add sock_hold().

[0]:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in do_accept+0x483/0x510 net/socket.c:1848
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807978d398 by task syz-executor.3/5315

CPU: 0 PID: 5315 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc3-syzkaller-00165-gd9fc1511728c #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0xd1/0x138 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:306 [inline]
 print_report+0x15e/0x461 mm/kasan/report.c:417
 kasan_report+0xbf/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:517
 do_accept+0x483/0x510 net/socket.c:1848
 __sys_accept4_file net/socket.c:1897 [inline]
 __sys_accept4+0x9a/0x120 net/socket.c:1927
 __do_sys_accept net/socket.c:1944 [inline]
 __se_sys_accept net/socket.c:1941 [inline]
 __x64_sys_accept+0x75/0xb0 net/socket.c:1941
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7fa436a8c0c9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fa437784168 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fa436bac050 RCX: 00007fa436a8c0c9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 00007fa436ae7ae9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007ffebc6700df R14: 00007fa437784300 R15: 0000000000022000
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 5294:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:371 [inline]
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:330 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa3/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:380
 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:968 [inline]
 __kmalloc+0x5a/0xd0 mm/slab_common.c:981
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:584 [inline]
 sk_prot_alloc+0x140/0x290 net/core/sock.c:2038
 sk_alloc+0x3a/0x7a0 net/core/sock.c:2091
 nr_create+0xb6/0x5f0 net/netrom/af_netrom.c:433
 __sock_create+0x359/0x790 net/socket.c:1515
 sock_create net/socket.c:1566 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1603 [inline]
 __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1588 [inline]
 __sys_socket+0x133/0x250 net/socket.c:1636
 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1649 [inline]
 __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1647 [inline]
 __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1647
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Freed by task 14:
 kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:45
 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:518
 ____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:236 [inline]
 ____kasan_slab_free+0x13b/0x1a0 mm/kasan/common.c:200
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3394 [inline]
 __do_kmem_cache_free mm/slab.c:3580 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_free+0xcd/0x3b0 mm/slab.c:3587
 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2074 [inline]
 __sk_destruct+0x5df/0x750 net/core/sock.c:2166
 sk_destruct net/core/sock.c:2181 [inline]
 __sk_free+0x175/0x460 net/core/sock.c:2192
 sk_free+0x7c/0xa0 net/core/sock.c:2203
 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1991 [inline]
 nr_heartbeat_expiry+0x1d7/0x460 net/netrom/nr_timer.c:148
 call_timer_fn+0x1da/0x7c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1700
 expire_timers+0x2c6/0x5c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1751
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:2022 [inline]
 __run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1995 [inline]
 run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910 kernel/time/timer.c:2035
 __do_softirq+0x1fb/0xadc kernel/softirq.c:571

---
 net/netrom/nr_timer.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

index 426d49609524..2bf99bd5be58 100644
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ static void nr_heartbeat_expiry(struct timer_list *t)
 		   is accepted() it isn't 'dead' so doesn't get removed. */
 		if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DESTROY) ||
 		    (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN && sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))) {
+			sock_hold(sk);
 			bh_unlock_sock(sk);
 			nr_destroy_socket(sk);
 			goto out;

2.39.0

From: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 458e279f861d3f61796894cd158b780765a1569f ]

Currently, if you bind the socket to something like:

        servaddr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
        servaddr.sin6_port = htons(0);
        servaddr.sin6_scope_id = 0;
        inet_pton(AF_INET6, "::1", &servaddr.sin6_addr);

And then request a connect to:

        connaddr.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
        connaddr.sin6_port = htons(20000);
        connaddr.sin6_scope_id = if_nametoindex("lo");
        inet_pton(AF_INET6, "fe88::1", &connaddr.sin6_addr);

What the stack does is:
- bind the socket
- create a new asoc
- to handle the connect
- copy the addresses that can be used for the given scope
- try to connect

But the copy returns 0 addresses, and the effect is that it ends up trying to connect as if the socket wasn't bound, which is not the desired behavior. This unexpected behavior also allows KASLR leaks through SCTP diag interface.

The fix here then is, if when trying to copy the addresses that can be used for the scope used in connect() it returns 0 addresses, bail out. This is what TCP does with a similar reproducer.

---
 net/sctp/bind_addr.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)

index f8a283245672..d723942e5e65 100644
@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@ int sctp_bind_addr_copy(struct net *net, struct sctp_bind_addr *dest,
 		}
 	}
 
+	/* If somehow no addresses were found that can be used with this
+	 * scope, it's an error.
+	 */
+	if (list_empty(&dest->address_list))
+		error = -ENETUNREACH;
+
 out:
 	if (error)
 		sctp_bind_addr_clean(dest);

2.39.0

From: Yoshihiro Shimoda <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f3c07758c9007a6bfff5290d9e19d3c41930c897 ]

Since this driver enables the interrupt by RIC2_QFE1, this driver should clear the interrupt flag if it happens. Otherwise, the interrupt causes to hang the system.

Note that this also fix a minor coding style (a comment indentation) around the fixed code.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

index ff374d0d80a7..a1906804c139 100644
@@ -738,14 +738,14 @@ static void ravb_error_interrupt(struct net_device *ndev)
 	ravb_write(ndev, ~(EIS_QFS | EIS_RESERVED), EIS);
 	if (eis & EIS_QFS) {
 		ris2 = ravb_read(ndev, RIS2);
-		ravb_write(ndev, ~(RIS2_QFF0 | RIS2_RFFF | RIS2_RESERVED),
+		ravb_write(ndev, ~(RIS2_QFF0 | RIS2_QFF1 | RIS2_RFFF | RIS2_RESERVED),
 			   RIS2);
 
 		/* Receive Descriptor Empty int */
 		if (ris2 & RIS2_QFF0)
 			priv->stats[RAVB_BE].rx_over_errors++;
 
-		    /* Receive Descriptor Empty int */
+		/* Receive Descriptor Empty int */
 		if (ris2 & RIS2_QFF1)
 			priv->stats[RAVB_NC].rx_over_errors++;
 

2.39.0

From: David Christensen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6c4ca03bd890566d873e3593b32d034bf2f5a087 ]

During EEH error injection testing, a deadlock was encountered in the tg3 driver when tg3_io_error_detected() was attempting to cancel outstanding reset tasks:

crash> foreach UN bt
...
PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067c6000 CPU: 8 COMMAND: "eehd"
...
#5 [c00000000681f990] __cancel_work_timer at c00000000019fd18 #6 [c00000000681fa30] tg3_io_error_detected at c00800000295f098 [tg3] #7 [c00000000681faf0] eeh_report_error at c00000000004e25c
...

PID: 290 TASK: c000000036e5f800 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1"
...
#4 [c00000003721fbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c00000003721fbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c00000003721fc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

PID: 296 TASK: c000000037a65800 CPU: 21 COMMAND: "kworker/21:1"
...
#4 [c000000037247bc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c000000037247be0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c000000037247c60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

PID: 655 TASK: c000000036f49000 CPU: 16 COMMAND: "kworker/16:2"
...:1

#4 [c0000000373ebbc0] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8 #5 [c0000000373ebbe0] tg3_reset_task at c008000002969358 [tg3] #6 [c0000000373ebc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

Code inspection shows that both tg3_io_error_detected() and tg3_reset_task() attempt to acquire the RTNL lock at the beginning of their code blocks. If tg3_reset_task() should happen to execute between the times when tg3_io_error_deteced() acquires the RTNL lock and tg3_reset_task_cancel() is called, a deadlock will occur.

Moving tg3_reset_task_cancel() call earlier within the code block, prior to acquiring RTNL, prevents this from happening, but also exposes another deadlock issue where tg3_reset_task() may execute AFTER tg3_io_error_detected() has executed:

crash> foreach UN bt
PID: 159 TASK: c0000000067d2000 CPU: 9 COMMAND: "eehd"
...
#4 [c000000006867a60] rtnl_lock at c000000000c940d8
#5 [c000000006867a80] tg3_io_slot_reset at c0080000026c2ea8 [tg3] #6 [c000000006867b00] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004de88
...
PID: 363 TASK: c000000037564000 CPU: 6 COMMAND: "kworker/6:1"
...
#3 [c000000036c1bb70] msleep at c000000000259e6c
#4 [c000000036c1bba0] napi_disable at c000000000c6b848 #5 [c000000036c1bbe0] tg3_reset_task at c0080000026d942c [tg3] #6 [c000000036c1bc60] process_one_work at c00000000019e5c4
...

This issue can be avoided by aborting tg3_reset_task() if EEH error recovery is already in progress.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/tg3.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

index d1ca3d3f51a7..2cf144bbef3e 100644
@@ -11189,7 +11189,7 @@ static void tg3_reset_task(struct work_struct *work)
 	rtnl_lock();
 	tg3_full_lock(tp, 0);
 
-	if (!netif_running(tp->dev)) {
+	if (tp->pcierr_recovery || !netif_running(tp->dev)) {
 		tg3_flag_clear(tp, RESET_TASK_PENDING);
 		tg3_full_unlock(tp);
 		rtnl_unlock();

@@ -18240,6 +18240,9 @@ static pci_ers_result_t tg3_io_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 
 	netdev_info(netdev, "PCI I/O error detected\n");
 
+	/* Want to make sure that the reset task doesn't run */
+	tg3_reset_task_cancel(tp);
+
 	rtnl_lock();
 
 	/* Could be second call or maybe we don't have netdev yet */

@@ -18256,9 +18259,6 @@ static pci_ers_result_t tg3_io_error_detected(struct pci_dev *pdev,
 
 	tg3_timer_stop(tp);
 
-	/* Want to make sure that the reset task doesn't run */
-	tg3_reset_task_cancel(tp);
-
 	netif_device_detach(netdev);
 
 	/* Clean up software state, even if MMIO is blocked */

2.39.0

From: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>

commit 3c44e2b6cde674797b76e76d3a903a63ce8a18bb upstream.

This reverts commit ac5408991ea6b06e29129b4d4861097c4c3e0d59 because it causes loss of keyboard on HP 15-da1xxx.

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1206358

---
 drivers/input/mouse/synaptics.c |    1 -
 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)

@@ -192,7 +192,6 @@ static const char * const smbus_pnp_ids[
 	"SYN3221", /* HP 15-ay000 */
 	"SYN323d", /* HP Spectre X360 13-w013dx */
 	"SYN3257", /* HP Envy 13-ad105ng */
-	"SYN3286", /* HP Laptop 15-da3001TU */
 	NULL
 };
 

From: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>

commit 5fa55950729d0762a787451dc52862c3f850f859 upstream.

Baoquan reported that after triggering a crash the subsequent crash-kernel fails to boot about half of the time. It triggers a NULL pointer dereference in the periodic tick code.

This happens because the legacy timer interrupt (IRQ0) is resent in software which happens in soft interrupt (tasklet) context. In this context get_irq_regs() returns NULL which leads to the NULL pointer dereference.

The reason for the resend is a spurious APIC interrupt on the IRQ0 vector which is captured and leads to a resend when the legacy timer interrupt is enabled. This is wrong because the legacy PIC interrupts are level triggered and therefore should never be resent in software, but nothing ever sets the IRQ_LEVEL flag on those interrupts, so the core code does not know about their trigger type.

Ensure that IRQ_LEVEL is set when the legacy PCI interrupts are set up.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/i8259.c   |    1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c |    4 +++-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ static void make_8259A_irq(unsigned int
 	disable_irq_nosync(irq);
 	io_apic_irqs &= ~(1<<irq);
 	irq_set_chip_and_handler(irq, &i8259A_chip, handle_level_irq);
+	irq_set_status_flags(irq, IRQ_LEVEL);
 	enable_irq(irq);
 	lapic_assign_legacy_vector(irq, true);
 }