RDMA/cma: Distinguish between sockaddr_in and sockaddr_in6 by size
PATCH 1/1 RDMA/cma: Distinguish between sockaddr_in and sockaddr_in6 by size
Clang can do some aggressive inlining, which provides it with greater visibility into the sizes of various objects that are passed into helpers. Specifically, compare_netdev_and_ip() can see through the type given to the "sa" argument, which means it can generate code for "struct sockaddr_in" that would have been passed to ipv6_addr_cmp() (that expects to operate on the larger "struct sockaddr_in6"), which would result in a compile-time buffer overflow condition detected by memcmp(). Logically, this state isn't reachable due to the sa_family assignment two callers above and the check in compare_netdev_and_ip(). Instead, provide a compile-time check on sizes so the size-mismatched code will be elided when inlining. Avoids the following warning from Clang:
../include/linux/fortify-string.h:652:4: error: call to '__read_overflow' declared with 'error' attribute: detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)
__read_overflow();
^note: In function 'cma_netevent_callback'
note: which inlined function 'node_from_ndev_ip'
1 error generated.
When the underlying object size is not known (e.g. with GCC and older Clang), the result of __builtin_object_size() is SIZE_MAX, which will also compile away, leaving the code as it was originally.
--- drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c +12 -5
@@ -479,13 +479,20 @@ static int compare_netdev_and_ip(int ifindex_a, struct sockaddr *sa,if (sa->sa_family != sb->sa_family)return sa->sa_family - sb->sa_family; -if (sa->sa_family ==AF_INET ) -return memcmp ((char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr, - (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)sb)->sin_addr, +if (sa->sa_family ==AF_INET && +__builtin_object_size (sa,0 ) >=sizeof (struct sockaddr_in )) { +return memcmp (&((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr, + &((struct sockaddr_in *)sb)->sin_addr,sizeof (((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr)); + } + +if (sa->sa_family ==AF_INET6 && +__builtin_object_size (sa,0 ) >=sizeof (struct sockaddr_in6 )) { +return ipv6_addr_cmp (&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr, + &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sb)->sin6_addr); + } -return ipv6_addr_cmp (&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr, - &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sb)->sin6_addr); +return -1 ; }static int cma_add_id_to_tree (struct rdma_id_private *node_id_priv)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 23 lines · Kees Cook
Clang can do some aggressive inlining, which provides it with greater visibility into the sizes of various objects that are passed into helpers. Specifically,
compare_netdev_and_ip()can see through the type given to the "sa" argument, which means it can generate code for "structsockaddr_in" that would have been passed toipv6_addr_cmp()(that expects to operate on the larger "structsockaddr_in6"), which would result in a compile-time buffer overflow condition detected bymemcmp(). Logically, this state isn't reachable due to thesa_familyassignment two callers above and the check incompare_netdev_and_ip(). Instead, provide a compile-time check on sizes so the size-mismatched code will be elided when inlining. Avoids the following warning from Clang:
../include/linux/fortify-string.h:652:4: error: call to '__read_overflow' declared with 'error' attribute: detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)__read_overflow(); ^note: In function '
cma_netevent_callback'
note: which inlined function 'node_from_ndev_ip'
1 error generated.When the underlying object size is not known (e.g. with GCC and older Clang), the result of
__builtin_object_size()isSIZE_MAX, which will also compile away, leaving the code as it was originally.
Quoted 10 lines
Cc Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>Cc Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>Cc Mark Zhang <[email protected]>Cc Patrisious Haddad <[email protected]>Cc Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>Cc Nick Desaulniers <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Should this have a 'Cc: [email protected]', since we see this in 6.1?
Quoted 37 lines
--- drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c +12
-5@@ -479,13 +479,20 @@ static int compare_netdev_and_ip(int ifindex_a, struct sockaddr *sa,if (sa->sa_family != sb->sa_family)return sa->sa_family - sb->sa_family; -if (sa->sa_family ==AF_INET ) -return memcmp ((char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr, - (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)sb)->sin_addr, +if (sa->sa_family ==AF_INET && +__builtin_object_size (sa,0 ) >=sizeof (struct sockaddr_in )) { +return memcmp (&((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr, + &((struct sockaddr_in *)sb)->sin_addr,sizeof (((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr)); + } + +if (sa->sa_family ==AF_INET6 && +__builtin_object_size (sa,0 ) >=sizeof (struct sockaddr_in6 )) { +return ipv6_addr_cmp (&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr, + &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sb)->sin6_addr); + } -return ipv6_addr_cmp (&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr, - &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sb)->sin6_addr); +return -1 ; }static int cma_add_id_to_tree (struct rdma_id_private *node_id_priv)Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 34 lines · Kees Cook
Clang can do some aggressive inlining, which provides it with greater visibility into the sizes of various objects that are passed into helpers. Specifically,
compare_netdev_and_ip()can see through the type given to the "sa" argument, which means it can generate code for "structsockaddr_in" that would have been passed toipv6_addr_cmp()(that expects to operate on the larger "structsockaddr_in6"), which would result in a compile-time buffer overflow condition detected bymemcmp(). Logically, this state isn't reachable due to thesa_familyassignment two callers above and the check incompare_netdev_and_ip(). Instead, provide a compile-time check on sizes so the size-mismatched code will be elided when inlining. Avoids the following warning from Clang:
../include/linux/fortify-string.h:652:4: error: call to '__read_overflow' declared with 'error' attribute: detected read beyond size of object (1st parameter)__read_overflow(); ^note: In function '
cma_netevent_callback'
note: which inlined function 'node_from_ndev_ip'
1 error generated.When the underlying object size is not known (e.g. with GCC and older Clang), the result of
__builtin_object_size()isSIZE_MAX, which will also compile away, leaving the code as it was originally.Cc Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>Cc Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>Cc Mark Zhang <[email protected]>Cc Patrisious Haddad <[email protected]>Cc Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>Cc Nick Desaulniers <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Quoted 3 lines
--- drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
This seems hacky, but I guess I can see why it is unreasonable for the compiler to track the sa_family in this case.
Applied to for next
Jason