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6.2.1-rc1 review

PATCH New Greg Kroah-Hartman 1 participant 12 messages Feb 23, 2023 Stable branch

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author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/11 uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

commit 74e19ef0ff8061ef55957c3abd71614ef0f42f47 upstream.

The results of "access_ok()" can be mis-speculated. The result is that you can end speculatively:

	if (access_ok(from, size))
		// Right here

even for bad from/size combinations. On first glance, it would be ideal to just add a speculation barrier to "access_ok()" so that its results can never be mis-speculated.

But there are lots of system calls just doing access_ok() via "copy_to_user()" and friends (example: fstat() and friends). Those are generally not problematic because they do not _consume_ data from userspace other than the pointer. They are also very quick and common system calls that should not be needlessly slowed down.

"copy_from_user()" on the other hand uses a user-controller pointer and is frequently followed up with code that might affect caches. Take something like this:

	if (!copy_from_user(&kernelvar, uptr, size))
		do_something_with(kernelvar);

If userspace passes in an evil 'uptr' that *actually* points to a kernel addresses, and then do_something_with() has cache (or other) side-effects, it could allow userspace to infer kernel data values.

Add a barrier to the common copy_from_user() code to prevent mis-speculated values which happen after the copy.

Also add a stub for architectures that do not define barrier_nospec(). This makes the macro usable in generic code.

Since the barrier is now usable in generic code, the x86 #ifdef in the BPF code can also go away.

---
 include/linux/nospec.h |    4 ++++
 kernel/bpf/core.c      |    2 --
 lib/usercopy.c         |    7 +++++++
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/linux/nospec.h +4 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
 
 struct task_struct;
 
+#ifndef barrier_nospec
+# define barrier_nospec() do { } while (0)
+#endif
+
 /**
  * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
  * @index: array element index
kernel/bpf/core.c +0 -2
@@ -1910,9 +1910,7 @@ out:
 		 * reuse preexisting logic from Spectre v1 mitigation that
 		 * happens to produce the required code on x86 for v4 as well.
 		 */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86
 		barrier_nospec();
-#endif
 		CONT;
 #define LDST(SIZEOP, SIZE)						\
 	STX_MEM_##SIZEOP:						\
lib/usercopy.c +7 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #include <linux/fault-inject-usercopy.h>
 #include <linux/instrumented.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 
 /* out-of-line parts */
 
@@ -12,6 +13,12 @@ unsigned long _copy_from_user(void *to,
 	unsigned long res = n;
 	might_fault();
 	if (!should_fail_usercopy() && likely(access_ok(from, n))) {
+		/*
+		 * Ensure that bad access_ok() speculation will not
+		 * lead to nasty side effects *after* the copy is
+		 * finished:
+		 */
+		barrier_nospec();
 		instrument_copy_from_user_before(to, from, n);
 		res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
 		instrument_copy_from_user_after(to, from, n, res);
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/11 ext4: Fix function prototype mismatch for ext4_feat_ktype

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>

commit 118901ad1f25d2334255b3d50512fa20591531cd upstream.

With clang's kernel control flow integrity (kCFI, CONFIG_CFI_CLANG), indirect call targets are validated against the expected function pointer prototype to make sure the call target is valid to help mitigate ROP attacks. If they are not identical, there is a failure at run time, which manifests as either a kernel panic or thread getting killed.

ext4_feat_ktype was setting the "release" handler to "kfree", which doesn't have a matching function prototype. Add a simple wrapper with the correct prototype.

This was found as a result of Clang's new -Wcast-function-type-strict flag, which is more sensitive than the simpler -Wcast-function-type, which only checks for type width mismatches.

Note that this code is only reached when ext4 is a loadable module and it is being unloaded:

CFI failure at kobject_put+0xbb/0x1b0 (target: kfree+0x0/0x180; expected type: 0x7c4aa698)
...

 RIP: 0010:kobject_put+0xbb/0x1b0
 ...
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ext4_exit_sysfs+0x14/0x60 [ext4]
  cleanup_module+0x67/0xedb [ext4]
---
 fs/ext4/sysfs.c |    7 ++++++-
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/sysfs.c +6 -1
@@ -491,6 +491,11 @@ static void ext4_sb_release(struct kobje
 	complete(&sbi->s_kobj_unregister);
 }
 
+static void ext4_feat_release(struct kobject *kobj)
+{
+	kfree(kobj);
+}
+
 static const struct sysfs_ops ext4_attr_ops = {
 	.show	= ext4_attr_show,
 	.store	= ext4_attr_store,
@@ -505,7 +510,7 @@ static struct kobj_type ext4_sb_ktype =
 static struct kobj_type ext4_feat_ktype = {
 	.default_groups = ext4_feat_groups,
 	.sysfs_ops	= &ext4_attr_ops,
-	.release	= (void (*)(struct kobject *))kfree,
+	.release	= ext4_feat_release,
 };
 
 void ext4_notify_error_sysfs(struct ext4_sb_info *sbi)
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/11 randstruct: disable Clang 15 support

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Eric Biggers <[email protected]>

commit 78f7a3fd6dc66cb788c21d7705977ed13c879351 upstream.

The randstruct support released in Clang 15 is unsafe to use due to a bug that can cause miscompilations: "-frandomize-layout-seed inconsistently randomizes all-function-pointers structs"
(https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/60349). It has been fixed on the Clang 16 release branch, so add a Clang version check.

---
 security/Kconfig.hardening |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
security/Kconfig.hardening +3 -0
@@ -281,6 +281,9 @@ endmenu
 
 config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
 	def_bool $(cc-option,-frandomize-layout-seed-file=/dev/null)
+	# Randstruct was first added in Clang 15, but it isn't safe to use until
+	# Clang 16 due to https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/60349
+	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 160000
 
 choice
 	prompt "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/11 x86/alternatives: Introduce int3_emulate_jcc()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>

commit db7adcfd1cec4e95155e37bc066fddab302c6340 upstream.

Move the kprobe Jcc emulation into int3_emulate_jcc() so it can be used by more code -- specifically static_call() will need this.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h |   31 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c       |   38 +++++++----------------------------
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h +31 -0
@@ -184,6 +184,37 @@ void int3_emulate_ret(struct pt_regs *re
 	unsigned long ip = int3_emulate_pop(regs);
 	int3_emulate_jmp(regs, ip);
 }
+
+static __always_inline
+void int3_emulate_jcc(struct pt_regs *regs, u8 cc, unsigned long ip, unsigned long disp)
+{
+	static const unsigned long jcc_mask[6] = {
+		[0] = X86_EFLAGS_OF,
+		[1] = X86_EFLAGS_CF,
+		[2] = X86_EFLAGS_ZF,
+		[3] = X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF,
+		[4] = X86_EFLAGS_SF,
+		[5] = X86_EFLAGS_PF,
+	};
+
+	bool invert = cc & 1;
+	bool match;
+
+	if (cc < 0xc) {
+		match = regs->flags & jcc_mask[cc >> 1];
+	} else {
+		match = ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_SF) >> X86_EFLAGS_SF_BIT) ^
+			((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_OF) >> X86_EFLAGS_OF_BIT);
+		if (cc >= 0xe)
+			match = match || (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF);
+	}
+
+	if ((match && !invert) || (!match && invert))
+		ip += disp;
+
+	int3_emulate_jmp(regs, ip);
+}
+
 #endif /* !CONFIG_UML_X86 */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_TEXT_PATCHING_H */
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c +8 -30
@@ -464,50 +464,26 @@ static void kprobe_emulate_call(struct k
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kprobe_emulate_call);
 
-static nokprobe_inline
-void __kprobe_emulate_jmp(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs, bool cond)
+static void kprobe_emulate_jmp(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	unsigned long ip = regs->ip - INT3_INSN_SIZE + p->ainsn.size;
 
-	if (cond)
-		ip += p->ainsn.rel32;
+	ip += p->ainsn.rel32;
 	int3_emulate_jmp(regs, ip);
 }
-
-static void kprobe_emulate_jmp(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
-	__kprobe_emulate_jmp(p, regs, true);
-}
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kprobe_emulate_jmp);
 
-static const unsigned long jcc_mask[6] = {
-	[0] = X86_EFLAGS_OF,
-	[1] = X86_EFLAGS_CF,
-	[2] = X86_EFLAGS_ZF,
-	[3] = X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF,
-	[4] = X86_EFLAGS_SF,
-	[5] = X86_EFLAGS_PF,
-};
-
 static void kprobe_emulate_jcc(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	bool invert = p->ainsn.jcc.type & 1;
-	bool match;
+	unsigned long ip = regs->ip - INT3_INSN_SIZE + p->ainsn.size;
 
-	if (p->ainsn.jcc.type < 0xc) {
-		match = regs->flags & jcc_mask[p->ainsn.jcc.type >> 1];
-	} else {
-		match = ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_SF) >> X86_EFLAGS_SF_BIT) ^
-			((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_OF) >> X86_EFLAGS_OF_BIT);
-		if (p->ainsn.jcc.type >= 0xe)
-			match = match || (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF);
-	}
-	__kprobe_emulate_jmp(p, regs, (match && !invert) || (!match && invert));
+	int3_emulate_jcc(regs, p->ainsn.jcc.type, ip, p->ainsn.rel32);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kprobe_emulate_jcc);
 
 static void kprobe_emulate_loop(struct kprobe *p, struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
+	unsigned long ip = regs->ip - INT3_INSN_SIZE + p->ainsn.size;
 	bool match;
 
 	if (p->ainsn.loop.type != 3) {	/* LOOP* */
@@ -535,7 +511,9 @@ static void kprobe_emulate_loop(struct k
 	else if (p->ainsn.loop.type == 1)	/* LOOPE */
 		match = match && (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF);
 
-	__kprobe_emulate_jmp(p, regs, match);
+	if (match)
+		ip += p->ainsn.rel32;
+	int3_emulate_jmp(regs, ip);
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(kprobe_emulate_loop);
 
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/11 x86/alternatives: Teach text_poke_bp() to patch Jcc.d32 instructions

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>

commit ac0ee0a9560c97fa5fe1409e450c2425d4ebd17a upstream.

In order to re-write Jcc.d32 instructions text_poke_bp() needs to be taught about them.

The biggest hurdle is that the whole machinery is currently made for 5 byte instructions and extending this would grow struct text_poke_loc which is currently a nice 16 bytes and used in an array.

However, since text_poke_loc contains a full copy of the (s32) displacement, it is possible to map the Jcc.d32 2 byte opcodes to Jcc.d8 1 byte opcode for the int3 emulation.

This then leaves the replacement bytes; fudge that by only storing the last 5 bytes and adding the rule that 'length == 6' instruction will be prefixed with a 0x0f byte.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c |   62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c +47 -15
@@ -340,6 +340,12 @@ next:
 	}
 }
 
+static inline bool is_jcc32(struct insn *insn)
+{
+	/* Jcc.d32 second opcode byte is in the range: 0x80-0x8f */
+	return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0x0f && (insn->opcode.bytes[1] & 0xf0) == 0x80;
+}
+
 #if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
 
 /*
@@ -378,12 +384,6 @@ static int emit_indirect(int op, int reg
 	return i;
 }
 
-static inline bool is_jcc32(struct insn *insn)
-{
-	/* Jcc.d32 second opcode byte is in the range: 0x80-0x8f */
-	return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0x0f && (insn->opcode.bytes[1] & 0xf0) == 0x80;
-}
-
 static int emit_call_track_retpoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, int reg, u8 *bytes)
 {
 	u8 op = insn->opcode.bytes[0];
@@ -1772,6 +1772,11 @@ void text_poke_sync(void)
 	on_each_cpu(do_sync_core, NULL, 1);
 }
 
+/*
+ * NOTE: crazy scheme to allow patching Jcc.d32 but not increase the size of
+ * this thing. When len == 6 everything is prefixed with 0x0f and we map
+ * opcode to Jcc.d8, using len to distinguish.
+ */
 struct text_poke_loc {
 	/* addr := _stext + rel_addr */
 	s32 rel_addr;
@@ -1893,6 +1898,10 @@ noinstr int poke_int3_handler(struct pt_
 		int3_emulate_jmp(regs, (long)ip + tp->disp);
 		break;
 
+	case 0x70 ... 0x7f: /* Jcc */
+		int3_emulate_jcc(regs, tp->opcode & 0xf, (long)ip, tp->disp);
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		BUG();
 	}
@@ -1966,16 +1975,26 @@ static void text_poke_bp_batch(struct te
 	 * Second step: update all but the first byte of the patched range.
 	 */
 	for (do_sync = 0, i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++) {
-		u8 old[POKE_MAX_OPCODE_SIZE] = { tp[i].old, };
+		u8 old[POKE_MAX_OPCODE_SIZE+1] = { tp[i].old, };
+		u8 _new[POKE_MAX_OPCODE_SIZE+1];
+		const u8 *new = tp[i].text;
 		int len = tp[i].len;
 
 		if (len - INT3_INSN_SIZE > 0) {
 			memcpy(old + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
 			       text_poke_addr(&tp[i]) + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
 			       len - INT3_INSN_SIZE);
+
+			if (len == 6) {
+				_new[0] = 0x0f;
+				memcpy(_new + 1, new, 5);
+				new = _new;
+			}
+
 			text_poke(text_poke_addr(&tp[i]) + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
-				  (const char *)tp[i].text + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
+				  new + INT3_INSN_SIZE,
 				  len - INT3_INSN_SIZE);
+
 			do_sync++;
 		}
 
@@ -2003,8 +2022,7 @@ static void text_poke_bp_batch(struct te
 		 * The old instruction is recorded so that the event can be
 		 * processed forwards or backwards.
 		 */
-		perf_event_text_poke(text_poke_addr(&tp[i]), old, len,
-				     tp[i].text, len);
+		perf_event_text_poke(text_poke_addr(&tp[i]), old, len, new, len);
 	}
 
 	if (do_sync) {
@@ -2021,10 +2039,15 @@ static void text_poke_bp_batch(struct te
 	 * replacing opcode.
 	 */
 	for (do_sync = 0, i = 0; i < nr_entries; i++) {
-		if (tp[i].text[0] == INT3_INSN_OPCODE)
+		u8 byte = tp[i].text[0];
+
+		if (tp[i].len == 6)
+			byte = 0x0f;
+
+		if (byte == INT3_INSN_OPCODE)
 			continue;
 
-		text_poke(text_poke_addr(&tp[i]), tp[i].text, INT3_INSN_SIZE);
+		text_poke(text_poke_addr(&tp[i]), &byte, INT3_INSN_SIZE);
 		do_sync++;
 	}
 
@@ -2042,9 +2065,11 @@ static void text_poke_loc_init(struct te
 			       const void *opcode, size_t len, const void *emulate)
 {
 	struct insn insn;
-	int ret, i;
+	int ret, i = 0;
 
-	memcpy((void *)tp->text, opcode, len);
+	if (len == 6)
+		i = 1;
+	memcpy((void *)tp->text, opcode+i, len-i);
 	if (!emulate)
 		emulate = opcode;
 
@@ -2055,6 +2080,13 @@ static void text_poke_loc_init(struct te
 	tp->len = len;
 	tp->opcode = insn.opcode.bytes[0];
 
+	if (is_jcc32(&insn)) {
+		/*
+		 * Map Jcc.d32 onto Jcc.d8 and use len to distinguish.
+		 */
+		tp->opcode = insn.opcode.bytes[1] - 0x10;
+	}
+
 	switch (tp->opcode) {
 	case RET_INSN_OPCODE:
 	case JMP32_INSN_OPCODE:
@@ -2071,7 +2103,6 @@ static void text_poke_loc_init(struct te
 		BUG_ON(len != insn.length);
 	}
 
-
 	switch (tp->opcode) {
 	case INT3_INSN_OPCODE:
 	case RET_INSN_OPCODE:
@@ -2080,6 +2111,7 @@ static void text_poke_loc_init(struct te
 	case CALL_INSN_OPCODE:
 	case JMP32_INSN_OPCODE:
 	case JMP8_INSN_OPCODE:
+	case 0x70 ... 0x7f: /* Jcc */
 		tp->disp = insn.immediate.value;
 		break;
 
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/11 x86/static_call: Add support for Jcc tail-calls

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>

commit 923510c88d2b7d947c4217835fd9ca6bd65cc56c upstream.

Clang likes to create conditional tail calls like:

0000000000000350 <amd_pmu_add_event>:

  350:       0f 1f 44 00 00          nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1) 351: R_X86_64_NONE      __fentry__-0x4
  355:       48 83 bf 20 01 00 00 00         cmpq   $0x0,0x120(%rdi)
  35d:       0f 85 00 00 00 00       jne    363 <amd_pmu_add_event+0x13>     35f: R_X86_64_PLT32     __SCT__amd_pmu_branch_add-0x4
  363:       e9 00 00 00 00          jmp    368 <amd_pmu_add_event+0x18>     364: R_X86_64_PLT32     __x86_return_thunk-0x4

Where 0x35d is a static call site that's turned into a conditional tail-call using the Jcc class of instructions.

Teach the in-line static call text patching about this.

Notably, since there is no conditional-ret, in that case patch the Jcc to point at an empty stub function that does the ret -- or the return thunk when needed.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c |   50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c +47 -3
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ enum insn_type {
 	NOP = 1,  /* site cond-call */
 	JMP = 2,  /* tramp / site tail-call */
 	RET = 3,  /* tramp / site cond-tail-call */
+	JCC = 4,
 };
 
 /*
@@ -25,12 +26,40 @@ static const u8 xor5rax[] = { 0x2e, 0x2e
 
 static const u8 retinsn[] = { RET_INSN_OPCODE, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc, 0xcc };
 
+static u8 __is_Jcc(u8 *insn) /* Jcc.d32 */
+{
+	u8 ret = 0;
+
+	if (insn[0] == 0x0f) {
+		u8 tmp = insn[1];
+		if ((tmp & 0xf0) == 0x80)
+			ret = tmp;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+extern void __static_call_return(void);
+
+asm (".global __static_call_return\n\t"
+     ".type __static_call_return, @function\n\t"
+     ASM_FUNC_ALIGN "\n\t"
+     "__static_call_return:\n\t"
+     ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+     ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+     "ret; int3\n\t"
+     ".size __static_call_return, . - __static_call_return \n\t");
+
 static void __ref __static_call_transform(void *insn, enum insn_type type,
 					  void *func, bool modinit)
 {
 	const void *emulate = NULL;
 	int size = CALL_INSN_SIZE;
 	const void *code;
+	u8 op, buf[6];
+
+	if ((type == JMP || type == RET) && (op = __is_Jcc(insn)))
+		type = JCC;
 
 	switch (type) {
 	case CALL:
@@ -57,6 +86,20 @@ static void __ref __static_call_transfor
 		else
 			code = &retinsn;
 		break;
+
+	case JCC:
+		if (!func) {
+			func = __static_call_return;
+			if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK))
+				func = x86_return_thunk;
+		}
+
+		buf[0] = 0x0f;
+		__text_gen_insn(buf+1, op, insn+1, func, 5);
+		code = buf;
+		size = 6;
+
+		break;
 	}
 
 	if (memcmp(insn, code, size) == 0)
@@ -68,9 +111,9 @@ static void __ref __static_call_transfor
 	text_poke_bp(insn, code, size, emulate);
 }
 
-static void __static_call_validate(void *insn, bool tail, bool tramp)
+static void __static_call_validate(u8 *insn, bool tail, bool tramp)
 {
-	u8 opcode = *(u8 *)insn;
+	u8 opcode = insn[0];
 
 	if (tramp && memcmp(insn+5, tramp_ud, 3)) {
 		pr_err("trampoline signature fail");
@@ -79,7 +122,8 @@ static void __static_call_validate(void
 
 	if (tail) {
 		if (opcode == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE ||
-		    opcode == RET_INSN_OPCODE)
+		    opcode == RET_INSN_OPCODE ||
+		    __is_Jcc(insn))
 			return;
 	} else {
 		if (opcode == CALL_INSN_OPCODE ||
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/11 HID: mcp-2221: prevent UAF in delayed work

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>

commit 47e91fdfa511139f2549687edb0d8649b123227b upstream.

If the device is plugged/unplugged without giving time for mcp_init_work() to complete, we might kick in the devm free code path and thus have unavailable struct mcp_2221 while in delayed work.

Canceling the delayed_work item is enough to solve the issue, because cancel_delayed_work_sync will prevent the work item to requeue itself.

---
 drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c +3 -0
@@ -922,6 +922,9 @@ static void mcp2221_hid_unregister(void
 /* This is needed to be sure hid_hw_stop() isn't called twice by the subsystem */
 static void mcp2221_remove(struct hid_device *hdev)
 {
+	struct mcp2221 *mcp = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
+
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&mcp->init_work);
 }
 
 #if IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_IIO)
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/11 wifi: mwifiex: Add missing compatible string for SD8787

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>

commit 36dd7a4c6226133b0b7aa92b8e604e688d958d0c upstream.

Commit e3fffc1f0b47 ("devicetree: document new marvell-8xxx and pwrseq-sd8787 options") documented a compatible string for SD8787 in the devicetree bindings, but neglected to add it to the mwifiex driver.

Fixes e3fffc1f0b47 ("devicetree: document new marvell-8xxx and pwrseq-sd8787 options")
Cc [email protected] # v4.11+
Cc Matt Ranostay <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c +1 -0
@@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ static struct memory_type_mapping mem_ty
 };
 
 static const struct of_device_id mwifiex_sdio_of_match_table[] = {
+	{ .compatible = "marvell,sd8787" },
 	{ .compatible = "marvell,sd8897" },
 	{ .compatible = "marvell,sd8997" },
 	{ }
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/11 audit: update the mailing list in MAINTAINERS

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Paul Moore <[email protected]>

commit 6c6cd913accd77008f74a1a9d57b816db3651daa upstream.

We've moved the upstream Linux Kernel audit subsystem discussions to a new mailing list, this patch updates the MAINTAINERS info with the new list address.

Marking this for stable inclusion to help speed uptake of the new list across all of the supported kernel releases. This is a doc only patch so the risk should be close to nil.

---
 MAINTAINERS |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
MAINTAINERS +1 -1
@@ -3515,7 +3515,7 @@ F:	drivers/net/ieee802154/atusb.h
 AUDIT SUBSYSTEM
 M:	Paul Moore <[email protected]>
 M:	Eric Paris <[email protected]>
-L:	[email protected] (moderated for non-subscribers)
+L:	[email protected]
 S:	Supported
 W:	https://github.com/linux-audit
 T:	git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/11 platform/x86/amd/pmf: Add depends on CONFIG_POWER_SUPPLY

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Shyam Sundar S K <[email protected]>

commit 3004e8d2a0a98bbf4223ae146464fadbff68bf78 upstream.

It is reported that amd_pmf driver is missing "depends on" for CONFIG_POWER_SUPPLY causing the following build error.

ld: drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/core.o: in function `amd_pmf_remove':
core.c:(.text+0x10): undefined reference to `power_supply_unreg_notifier'
ld: drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/core.o: in function `amd_pmf_probe':
core.c:(.text+0x38f): undefined reference to `power_supply_reg_notifier' make[1]: *** [scripts/Makefile.vmlinux:34: vmlinux] Error 1
make: *** [Makefile:1248: vmlinux] Error 2

Add this to the Kconfig file.

---
 drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/Kconfig |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 config AMD_PMF
 	tristate "AMD Platform Management Framework"
 	depends on ACPI && PCI
+	depends on POWER_SUPPLY
 	select ACPI_PLATFORM_PROFILE
 	help
 	  This driver provides support for the AMD Platform Management Framework.
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/11 platform/x86: nvidia-wmi-ec-backlight: Add force module parameter

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

commit 0d9bdd8a550170306c2021b8d6766c5343b870c2 upstream.

On some Lenovo Legion models, the backlight might be driven by either one of nvidia_wmi_ec_backlight or amdgpu_bl0 at different times.

When the Nvidia WMI EC backlight interface reports the backlight is controlled by the EC, the current backlight handling only registers nvidia_wmi_ec_backlight (and registers no other backlight interfaces).

This hides (never registers) the amdgpu_bl0 interface, where as prior to 6.1.4 users would have both nvidia_wmi_ec_backlight and amdgpu_bl0 and could work around things in userspace.

Add a force module parameter which can be used with acpi_backlight=native to restore the old behavior as a workound (for now) by passing:

"acpi_backlight=native nvidia-wmi-ec-backlight.force=1"

---
 drivers/platform/x86/nvidia-wmi-ec-backlight.c |    6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/platform/x86/nvidia-wmi-ec-backlight.c +5 -1
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@
 #include <linux/wmi.h>
 #include <acpi/video.h>
 
+static bool force;
+module_param(force, bool, 0444);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(force, "Force loading (disable acpi_backlight=xxx checks");
+
 /**
  * wmi_brightness_notify() - helper function for calling WMI-wrapped ACPI method
  * @w:    Pointer to the struct wmi_device identified by %WMI_BRIGHTNESS_GUID
@@ -91,7 +95,7 @@ static int nvidia_wmi_ec_backlight_probe
 	int ret;
 
 	/* drivers/acpi/video_detect.c also checks that SOURCE == EC */
-	if (acpi_video_get_backlight_type() != acpi_backlight_nvidia_wmi_ec)
+	if (!force && acpi_video_get_backlight_type() != acpi_backlight_nvidia_wmi_ec)
 		return -ENODEV;
 
 	/*

Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 6.2.1-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.2.1 release. There are 11 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 25 Feb 2023 13:04:16 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.2.1-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.2.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 6.2.1-rc1

Eric Biggers <[email protected]>
randstruct: disable Clang 15 support

Kees Cook <[email protected]>
ext4: Fix function prototype mismatch for ext4_feat_ktype

Hans de Goede <[email protected]>
platform/x86: nvidia-wmi-ec-backlight: Add force module parameter

Shyam Sundar S K <[email protected]>
platform/x86/amd/pmf: Add depends on CONFIG_POWER_SUPPLY

Paul Moore <[email protected]>
audit: update the mailing list in MAINTAINERS

Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
wifi: mwifiex: Add missing compatible string for SD8787

Benjamin Tissoires <[email protected]>
HID: mcp-2221: prevent UAF in delayed work

Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
x86/static_call: Add support for Jcc tail-calls

Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
x86/alternatives: Teach text_poke_bp() to patch Jcc.d32 instructions

Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
x86/alternatives: Introduce int3_emulate_jcc()

Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
uaccess: Add speculation barrier to copy_from_user()

-------------

Diffstat:

 MAINTAINERS                                    |  2 +-
 Makefile                                       |  4 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/text-patching.h           | 31 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c                  | 62 +++++++++++++++++++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c                 | 38 ++++------------
 arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c                  | 50 +++++++++++++++++++--
 drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c                      |  3 ++
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c    |  1 +
 drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmf/Kconfig           |  1 +
 drivers/platform/x86/nvidia-wmi-ec-backlight.c |  6 ++-
 fs/ext4/sysfs.c                                |  7 ++-
 include/linux/nospec.h                         |  4 ++
 kernel/bpf/core.c                              |  2 -
 lib/usercopy.c                                 |  7 +++
 security/Kconfig.hardening                     |  3 ++
 15 files changed, 166 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)