Couple of trivial fixes for LAM vs. SVA interaction
Subsystems (2)
cover Couple of trivial fixes for LAM vs. SVA interaction
- Do not allow to set FORCE_TAGGED_SVA bit for other process;
- Use EINVAL instead of EINTR for LAM enabling failure due to SVA;
Kirill A. Shutemov (2):
x86/mm/iommu/sva: Fix error code for LAM enabling failure due to SVA x86/mm/iommu/sva: Do not allow to set FORCE_TAGGED_SVA bit from
outside
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.2
PATCH 1/2 x86/mm/iommu/sva: Fix error code for LAM enabling failure due to SVA
Normally, LAM and SVA are mutually exclusive. LAM enabling will fail if SVA is already in use.
Correct error code for the failure. EINTR is nonsensical there.
--- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +1 -1
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ static int prctl_enable_tagged_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_bits)if (mm_valid_pasid (mm) && !test_bit (MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA , &mm->context.flags)) -return -EINTR ; +return -EINVAL ;if (mmap_write_lock_killable (mm))return -EINTR ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.2
Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Fix error code for LAM enabling failure due to SVA
Quoted 9 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Normally, LAM and SVA are mutually exclusive. LAM enabling will fail if SVA is already in use.
Correct error code for the failure. EINTR is nonsensical there.
Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Fixes 23e5d9ec2bab ("x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive")Reported-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Quoted 20 lines
--- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +1
-2@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ static int prctl_enable_tagged_addr(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long nr_bits)if (mm_valid_pasid (mm) && !test_bit (MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA , &mm->context.flags)) -return -EINTR ; +return -EINVAL ;if (mmap_write_lock_killable (mm))return -EINTR ; --2.39.2
Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Fix error code for LAM enabling failure due to SVA
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovQuoted 8 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Normally, LAM and SVA are mutually exclusive. LAM enabling will fail if SVA is already in use.
Correct error code for the failure. EINTR is nonsensical there.
Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Fixes 23e5d9ec2bab ("x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive")Reported-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Hi Kirill,
These look fine. But in the future, Link:'s for Reported-by's would be very appreciated if the discussion happened in public.
Re: [PATCH 1/2] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Fix error code for LAM enabling failure due to SVA
Quoted 6 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 5 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Normally, LAM and SVA are mutually exclusive. LAM enabling will fail if SVA is already in use.
Correct error code for the failure. EINTR is nonsensical there.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Fixes 23e5d9ec2bab ("x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive")Reported-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>Hi Kirill,
These look fine. But in the future, Link:'s for Reported-by's would be very appreciated if the discussion happened in public.
Got it.
For this one it is:
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
PATCH 2/2 x86/mm/iommu/sva: Do not allow to set FORCE_TAGGED_SVA bit from outside
In reply to Kirill A. Shutemovarch_prctl(ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA) overrides the default and allows LAM and SVA to co-exist in the process. It is expected by called by the process when it knows what it is doing.
arch_prctl() operates on the current process, but the same code is reachable from ptrace where it can be called on arbitrary task.
Make it strict and only allow to set MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA for the current process.
--- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +2 -0
@@ -885,6 +885,8 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)case ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR :return prctl_enable_tagged_addr (task->mm, arg2);case ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA : +if (current != task) +return -EINVAL ;set_bit (MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA , &task->mm->context.flags);return 0 ;case ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS :
Signature · 1 line
2.39.2
Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Do not allow to set FORCE_TAGGED_SVA bit from outside
Quoted 23 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
arch_prctl(ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA)overrides the default and allows LAM and SVA to co-exist in the process. It is expected by called by the process when it knows what it is doing.
arch_prctl()operates on the current process, but the same code is reachable from ptrace where it can be called on arbitrary task.Make it strict and only allow to set
MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVAfor the current process.Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Fixes 23e5d9ec2bab ("x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive")Suggested-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2) · line 889
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +2
-0@@ -885,6 +885,8 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)case ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR :return prctl_enable_tagged_addr (task->mm, arg2);case ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA : +if (current != task) +return -EINVAL ;
prctl_enable_tagged_addr() checks "task->mm != current->mm". Should we check the same here for consistency? Or also change the check in prctl_enable_tagged_addr().
arch_prctl() can only do task==current, so I guess "current != task" is a more reasonable check for prctl_enable_tagged_addr() as well.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +0
-1set_bit (MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA , &task->mm->context.flags);return 0 ;case ARCH_GET_MAX_TAG_BITS : --2.39.2
Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Do not allow to set FORCE_TAGGED_SVA bit from outside
Quoted 35 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 23 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
arch_prctl(ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA)overrides the default and allows LAM and SVA to co-exist in the process. It is expected by called by the process when it knows what it is doing.
arch_prctl()operates on the current process, but the same code is reachable from ptrace where it can be called on arbitrary task.Make it strict and only allow to set
MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVAfor the current process.Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Fixes 23e5d9ec2bab ("x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive")Suggested-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +0
-0arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2) · line 889
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +2
-0@@ -885,6 +885,8 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)case ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR :return prctl_enable_tagged_addr (task->mm, arg2);case ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA : +if (current != task) +return -EINVAL ;
prctl_enable_tagged_addr()checks "task->mm!=current->mm". Should we check the same here for consistency? Or also change the check inprctl_enable_tagged_addr().
Quoted 2 lines
arch_prctl()can only do task==current, so I guess "current != task" is a more reasonable check forprctl_enable_tagged_addr()as well.
As of now, prctl_enable_tagged_addr() doesn't have the task on hands. It gets mm as input, so it cannot check the task directly. But functionally it is the same check.
I would prefer to keep it this way. Unless anyone feels strongly about it.
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Dmitry Vyukov
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCH 2/2] x86/mm/iommu/sva: Do not allow to set FORCE_TAGGED_SVA bit from outside
Quoted 37 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 35 lines · Dmitry Vyukov
Quoted 23 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
arch_prctl(ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA)overrides the default and allows LAM and SVA to co-exist in the process. It is expected by called by the process when it knows what it is doing.
arch_prctl()operates on the current process, but the same code is reachable from ptrace where it can be called on arbitrary task.Make it strict and only allow to set
MM_CONTEXT_FORCE_TAGGED_SVAfor the current process.Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Fixes 23e5d9ec2bab ("x86/mm/iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive")Suggested-by Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +0
-0arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2) · line 889
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +2
-0@@ -885,6 +885,8 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)case ARCH_ENABLE_TAGGED_ADDR :return prctl_enable_tagged_addr (task->mm, arg2);case ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA : +if (current != task) +return -EINVAL ;
prctl_enable_tagged_addr()checks "task->mm!=current->mm". Should we check the same here for consistency? Or also change the check inprctl_enable_tagged_addr().
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
arch_prctl()can only do task==current, so I guess "current != task" is a more reasonable check forprctl_enable_tagged_addr()as well.As of now,
prctl_enable_tagged_addr()doesn't have the task on hands. It gets mm as input, so it cannot check the task directly. But functionally it is the same check.I would prefer to keep it this way. Unless anyone feels strongly about it.
Fine with me.