x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv
Subsystems (9)
v6 cover x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
This patchset is to add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv. Hyperv uses Linux direct boot mode to boot up Linux kernel and so it needs to pvalidate system memory by itself.
In hyperv case, there is no boot loader and so cc blob is prepared by hypervisor. In this series, hypervisor set the cc blob address directly into boot parameter of Linux kernel.
Shared memory between guests and hypervisor should be decrypted and zero memory after decrypt memory. The data in the target address. It maybe smearedto avoid smearing data.
Introduce #HV exception support in AMD sev snp code and #HV handler.
Change since v6:
- Merge Ashish Kalr patch https://github.com/
ashkalra/linux/commit/6975484094b7cb8d703c45066780dd85043cd040
- Merge patch "x86/sev: Fix interrupt exit code paths from
#HV exception" with patch "x86/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest
support on hyperv".
- Fix getting processor num in the hv_snp_get_smp_config() when ealry is false.
Change since v4:
- Use pgcount to free intput arg page.
- Fix encrypt and free page order.
- struct_size to calculate array size
- Share asm code between #HV and #VC exception.
Change since v3:
- Replace struct sev_es_save_area with struct vmcb_save_area
- Move smp, cpu and memory enumerating code from mshyperv.c to ivm.c
- Handle nested entry case of do_exc_hv() case.
- Check NMI event when irq is disabled
Change since v2:
- Remove validate kernel memory code at boot stage
- Split #HV page patch into two parts
- Remove HV-APIC change due to enable x2apic from host side
- Rework vmbus code to handle error of decrypt page
- Spilt memory and cpu initialization patch.
Change since v1:
- Remove boot param changes for cc blob address and use setup head to pass cc blob info
- Remove unnessary WARN and BUG check
- Add system vector table map in the #HV exception
- Fix interrupt exit issue when use #HV exception
Ashish Kalra (1):
x86/sev: optimize system vector processing invoked from #HV exception
Tianyu Lan (13):
x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path
x86/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv x86/hyperv: Add sev-snp enlightened guest static key x86/hyperv: Mark Hyper-V vp assist page unencrypted in SEV-SNP
enlightened guest
x86/hyperv: Set Virtual Trust Level in VMBus init message x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp
enlightened guest
clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: decrypt hyperv tsc page in sev-snp
enlightened guest
hv: vmbus: Mask VMBus pages unencrypted for sev-snp enlightened guest
drivers: hv: Decrypt percpu hvcall input arg page in sev-snp
enlightened guest
x86/hyperv: Initialize cpu and memory for sev-snp enlightened guest x86/hyperv: Add smp support for sev-snp guest
x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 46 ++- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 42 +++ arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 196 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 6 + arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h | 7 + arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 52 +++- arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 14 +- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 74 ++++- arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 42 ++- arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 9 +- arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 404 +++++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 60 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 + arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 2 + drivers/clocksource/hyperv_timer.c | 2 +- drivers/hv/connection.c | 1 + drivers/hv/hv.c | 37 ++- drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 27 +- include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h | 3 +- include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 1 + include/linux/hyperv.h | 4 +- 28 files changed, 960 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 1/14 x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Add a #HV exception handler that uses IST stack.
---
Change since RFC V5:
* Merge Ashish Kalr patch https://github.com/
ashkalra/linux/commit/6975484094b7cb8d703c45066780dd85043cd040
Change since RFC V2:
* Remove unnecessary line in the change log.
--- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 22 ++++++---- arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h | 6 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 40 +++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c | 9 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c | 2 + 12 files changed, 183 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +14 -8
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym) #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT /** - * idtentry_vc - Macro to generate entry stub for #VC + * idtentry_sev - Macro to generate entry stub for #VC * @vector: Vector number * @asmsym: ASM symbol for the entry point * @cfunc: C function to be called
@@ -515,14 +515,18 @@ SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym) * * The macro is only used for one vector, but it is planned to be extended in * the future for the #HV exception. - */ -.macro idtentry_vc vector asmsym cfunc +*/ +.macro idtentry_sev vector asmsym cfunc has_error_code:req SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym) UNWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS ENDBR ASM_CLAC cld + .if \vector == X86_TRAP_HV + pushq $-1 /* ORIG_RAX: no syscall */ + .endif + /* * If the entry is from userspace, switch stacks and treat it as * a normal entry.
@@ -545,7 +549,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym) * stack. */ movq %rsp, %rdi /* pt_regs pointer */ - call vc_switch_off_ist + .if \vector == X86_TRAP_VC + call vc_switch_off_ist + .else + call hv_switch_off_ist + .endif + movq %rax, %rsp /* Switch to new stack */ ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
@@ -568,10 +577,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym) /* Switch to the regular task stack */ .Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@: - idtentry_body user_\cfunc, has_error_code=1 - -_ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym) -SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym) + idtentry_body user_\cfunc, \has_error_code .endm #endif
arch/x86/include/asm/cpu_entry_area.h +6 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@char VC_stack[optional_stack_size]; \char VC2_stack_guard[guardsize]; \char VC2_stack[optional_stack_size]; \ +char HV_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ +char HV_stack[optional_stack_size]; \ +char HV2_stack_guard[guardsize]; \ +char HV2_stack[optional_stack_size]; \char IST_top_guard[guardsize]; \/* The exception stacks' physical storage. No guard pages required */
@@ -52,6 +56,8 @@ enum exception_stack_ordering {ESTACK_MCE ,ESTACK_VC ,ESTACK_VC2 , +ESTACK_HV , +ESTACK_HV2 , N_EXCEPTION_STACKS };
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h +38 -2
@@ -317,6 +317,19 @@ static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs) __visible noinstr void kernel_##func(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code); \ __visible noinstr void user_##func(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) + +/** +* DECLARE_IDTENTRY_HV - Declare functions for the HV entry point +* @vector: Vector number (ignored for C) +* @func: Function name of the entry point +* +* Maps to DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW, but declares also the user C handler. +*/ +#define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_HV (vector, func) \ + DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(vector, func); \ + __visible noinstr void kernel_##func(struct pt_regs *regs); \ + __visible noinstr void user_##func(struct pt_regs *regs) +/** * DEFINE_IDTENTRY_IST - Emit code for IST entry points * @func: Function name of the entry point
@@ -376,6 +389,26 @@ static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_VC_USER (func) \ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(user_##func) +/** +* DEFINE_IDTENTRY_HV_KERNEL - Emit code for HV injection handler +* when raised from kernel mode +* @func: Function name of the entry point +* +* Maps to DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW +*/ +#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_HV_KERNEL (func) \ + DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(kernel_##func) + +/** +* DEFINE_IDTENTRY_HV_USER - Emit code for HV injection handler +* when raised from user mode +* @func: Function name of the entry point +* +* Maps to DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW +*/ +#define DEFINE_IDTENTRY_HV_USER (func) \ + DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(user_##func) +#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ /**
@@ -463,8 +496,10 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs, \ DECLARE_IDTENTRY(vector, func)# define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC (vector, func) \ - idtentry_vc vector asm_##func func + idtentry_sev vector asm_##func func has_error_code=1 +# define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_HV (vector, func) \ + idtentry_sev vector asm_##func func has_error_code=0#else # define DECLARE_IDTENTRY_MCE (vector, func) \ DECLARE_IDTENTRY(vector, func)
@@ -618,9 +653,10 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_DF, xenpv_exc_double_fault);DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (X86_TRAP_CP , exc_control_protection);#endif -/* #VC */ +/* #VC & #HV */ #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC (X86_TRAP_VC , exc_vmm_communication); +DECLARE_IDTENTRY_HV (X86_TRAP_HV , exc_hv_injection);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
arch/x86/include/asm/page_64_types.h +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@#define IST_INDEX_DB 2#define IST_INDEX_MCE 3#define IST_INDEX_VC 4 +#define IST_INDEX_HV 5/* * Set __PAGE_OFFSET to the most negative possible address +
arch/x86/include/asm/trapnr.h +1 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@#define X86_TRAP_XF 19/* SIMD Floating-Point Exception */ #define X86_TRAP_VE 20/* Virtualization Exception */ #define X86_TRAP_CP 21/* Control Protection Exception */ +#define X86_TRAP_HV 28/* HV injected exception in SNP restricted mode */ #define X86_TRAP_VC 29/* VMM Communication Exception */ #define X86_TRAP_IRET 32/* IRET Exception */
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +1 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible notracestruct pt_regs *fixup_bad_iret (struct pt_regs *bad_regs);void __init trap_init (void ); asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *eregs); +asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *hv_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *eregs);#endif extern bool ibt_selftest (void );
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +1 -0
@@ -2172,6 +2172,7 @@ static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss) tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_MCE ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (MCE );/* Only mapped when SEV-ES is active */ tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC ] =__this_cpu_ist_top_va (VC ); + tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_HV] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(HV); }#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c +7 -2
@@ -26,11 +26,14 @@ static const char * const exception_stack_names[] = { [ ESTACK_MCE ] = "#MC", [ ESTACK_VC ] = "#VC", [ ESTACK_VC2 ] = "#VC2", + [ ESTACK_HV ] = "#HV", + [ ESTACK_HV2 ] = "#HV2", + };const char *stack_type_name (enum stack_type type) { -BUILD_BUG_ON (N_EXCEPTION_STACKS !=6 ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (N_EXCEPTION_STACKS !=8 );if (type ==STACK_TYPE_TASK )return "TASK" ;
@@ -89,6 +92,8 @@ struct estack_pages estack_pages[CEA_ESTACK_PAGES] ____cacheline_aligned = {EPAGERANGE (MCE ),EPAGERANGE (VC ),EPAGERANGE (VC2 ), +EPAGERANGE (HV ), + EPAGERANGE(HV2), }; static __always_inline bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stack_info *info)
@@ -98,7 +103,7 @@ static __always_inline bool in_exception_stack(unsigned long *stack, struct stacstruct pt_regs *regs;unsigned int k; -BUILD_BUG_ON (N_EXCEPTION_STACKS !=6 ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (N_EXCEPTION_STACKS !=8 ); begin = (unsigned long )__this_cpu_read (cea_exception_stacks);/*
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c +1 -0
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = {#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT ISTG (X86_TRAP_VC , asm_exc_vmm_communication,IST_INDEX_VC ), +ISTG (X86_TRAP_HV , asm_exc_hv_injection,IST_INDEX_HV ), #endif SYSG(X86_TRAP_OF, asm_exc_overflow),
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +53 -0
59 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +58 -0
64 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c +2 -0
@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ static void __init percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu)if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT )) {cea_map_stack (VC );cea_map_stack (VC2 ); +cea_map_stack (HV ); +cea_map_stack (HV2 ); } } }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 2/14 x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Add check_hv_pending() and check_hv_pending_after_irq() to check queued #HV event when irq is disabled.
--- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 18 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 14 +++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +18 -0
@@ -1019,6 +1019,15 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit) +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + /* + * If a #HV was delivered during execution and interrupts were + * disabled, then check if it can be handled before the iret + * (which may re-enable interrupts). + */ + mov %rsp, %rdi + call check_hv_pending +#endif UNWIND_HINT_REGS /*
@@ -1143,6 +1152,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START(error_entry) SYM_CODE_END(error_entry) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_return) +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + /* + * If a #HV was delivered during execution and interrupts were + * disabled, then check if it can be handled before the iret + * (which may re-enable interrupts). + */ + mov %rsp, %rdi + call check_hv_pending +#endif UNWIND_HINT_REGS DEBUG_ENTRY_ASSERT_IRQS_OFF testb $3, CS(%rsp)
arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h +13 -1
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@/* * Interrupt control: */ +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +void check_hv_pending (struct pt_regs *regs); +void check_hv_pending_irq_enable (void ); +#endif /* Declaration required for gcc < 4.9 to prevent -Werror=missing-prototypes */ extern inline unsigned long native_save_fl (void );
@@ -40,12 +44,20 @@ static __always_inline void native_irq_disable(void) static __always_inline void native_irq_enable(void) { asmvolatile ("sti" : : :"memory" ); +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +check_hv_pending_irq_enable (); +#endif } static __always_inline void native_safe_halt(void) {mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers (); - asmvolatile ("sti; hlt" : : :"memory" ); + asmvolatile ("sti" : : :"memory" ); + +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +check_hv_pending_irq_enable (); +#endif + asmvolatile ("hlt" : : :"memory" ); } static __always_inline void native_halt(void)
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +38 -0
@@ -181,6 +181,44 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)this_cpu_write (cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC ], new_ist); } +static void do_exc_hv (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +/* Handle #HV exception. */ +} + +void check_hv_pending (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +if (!cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP )) +return ; + +if ((regs->flags &X86_EFLAGS_IF ) ==0 ) +return ; + +do_exc_hv (regs); +} + +void check_hv_pending_irq_enable (void ) +{ +struct pt_regs regs; + +if (!cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP )) +return ; + +memset (®s,0 ,sizeof (struct pt_regs )); + asmvolatile ("movl %%cs, %%eax;" :"=a" (regs.cs)); + asmvolatile ("movl %%ss, %%eax;" :"=a" (regs.ss)); + regs.orig_ax =0xffffffff ; + regs.flags =native_save_fl (); + +/* +* Disable irq when handle pending #HV events after +* re-enabling irq. +*/ + asmvolatile ("cli" : : :"memory" ); +do_exc_hv (®s); + asmvolatile ("sti" : : :"memory" ); +} + void noinstr __sev_es_ist_exit(void) {unsigned long ist;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 6/14 x86/hyperv: Mark Hyper-V vp assist page unencrypted in SEV-SNP enlightened guest
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
hv vp assist page needs to be shared between SEV-SNP guest and Hyper-V. So mark the page unencrypted in the SEV-SNP guest.
--- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c +6 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h> #include <asm/mshyperv.h> #include <asm/idtentry.h> +#include <asm/set_memory.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> #include <linux/version.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -113,6 +114,11 @@ static int hv_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu) }if (!WARN_ON (!(*hvp))) { +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) { +WARN_ON_ONCE (set_memory_decrypted ((unsigned long )(*hvp),1 )); +memset (*hvp,0 ,PAGE_SIZE ); + } + msr.enable =1 ;wrmsrl (HV_X64_MSR_VP_ASSIST_PAGE , msr.as_uint64); }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 7/14 x86/hyperv: Set Virtual Trust Level in VMBus init message
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
sev-snp guest provides vtl(Virtual Trust Level) and get it from hyperv hvcall via HVCALL_GET_VP_REGISTERS. Set target vtl in the VMBus init message.
---
Change since RFC v4:
* Use struct_size to calculate array size.
* Fix some coding style
Change since RFC v3:
* Use the standard helper functions to check hypercall result
* Fix coding style
Change since RFC v2:
* Rename get_current_vtl() to get_vtl()
* Fix some coding style issues
--- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h | 7 ++++++ drivers/hv/connection.c | 1 + include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 1 + include/linux/hyperv.h | 4 ++-- 5 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c +36 -0
@@ -384,6 +384,40 @@ static void __init hv_get_partition_id(void)local_irq_restore (flags); } +static u8 __init get_vtl (void ) +{ +u64 control =HV_HYPERCALL_REP_COMP_1 |HVCALL_GET_VP_REGISTERS ; +struct hv_get_vp_registers_input *input; +struct hv_get_vp_registers_output *output; +u64 vtl =0 ; +u64 ret; +unsigned long flags; + +local_irq_save (flags); + input = *this_cpu_ptr (hyperv_pcpu_input_arg); + output = (struct hv_get_vp_registers_output *)input; +if (!input) { +local_irq_restore (flags); + goto done; + } + +memset (input,0 ,struct_size (input, element,1 )); + input->header.partitionid =HV_PARTITION_ID_SELF ; + input->header.vpindex =HV_VP_INDEX_SELF ; + input->header.inputvtl =0 ; + input->element[0 ].name0 =HV_X64_REGISTER_VSM_VP_STATUS ; + + ret =hv_do_hypercall (control, input, output); +if (hv_result_success (ret)) + vtl = output->as64.low &HV_X64_VTL_MASK ; +else +pr_err ("Hyper-V: failed to get VTL! %lld" , ret); +local_irq_restore (flags); + +done: +return vtl; +} +/* * This function is to be invoked early in the boot sequence after the * hypervisor has been detected.
@@ -512,6 +546,8 @@ void __init hyperv_init(void)/* Query the VMs extended capability once, so that it can be cached. */ hv_query_ext_cap (0 ); +/* Find the VTL */ + ms_hyperv.vtl =get_vtl ();return ; clean_guest_os_id:
arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h +7 -0
@@ -301,6 +301,13 @@ enum hv_isolation_type {#define HV_X64_MSR_TIME_REF_COUNT HV_REGISTER_TIME_REF_COUNT#define HV_X64_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC HV_REGISTER_REFERENCE_TSC +/* +* Registers are only accessible via HVCALL_GET_VP_REGISTERS hvcall and +* there is not associated MSR address. +*/ +#define HV_X64_REGISTER_VSM_VP_STATUS 0x000D0003 +#define HV_X64_VTL_MASK GENMASK(3, 0) +/* Hyper-V memory host visibility */ enum hv_mem_host_visibility {VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE =0 ,
drivers/hv/connection.c +1 -0
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ int vmbus_negotiate_version(struct vmbus_channel_msginfo *msginfo, u32 version)*/ if (version >=VERSION_WIN10_V5 ) { msg->msg_sint =VMBUS_MESSAGE_SINT ; + msg->msg_vtl = ms_hyperv.vtl; vmbus_connection.msg_conn_id =VMBUS_MESSAGE_CONNECTION_ID_4 ; }else { msg->interrupt_page =virt_to_phys (vmbus_connection.int_page);
include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h +1 -0
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct ms_hyperv_info { }; };u64 shared_gpa_boundary; +u8 vtl; };extern struct ms_hyperv_info ms_hyperv;extern bool hv_nested;
include/linux/hyperv.h +2 -2
@@ -665,8 +665,8 @@ struct vmbus_channel_initiate_contact {u64 interrupt_page;struct {u8 msg_sint; -u8 padding1[3 ]; -u32 padding2; +u8 msg_vtl; +u8 reserved[6 ]; }; };u64 monitor_page1;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 4/14 x86/sev: optimize system vector processing invoked from #HV exception
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
Construct system vector table and dispatch system vector exceptions through sysvec_table from #HV exception handler instead of explicitly calling each system vector. The system vector table is created dynamically and is placed in a new named ELF section.
--- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 6 +++ arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 70 +++++++++++++---------------------- arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 ++++ 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +6 -0
@@ -419,6 +419,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym) _ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym) SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym) + .if \vector >= FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR && \vector < NR_VECTORS + .section .system_vectors, "aw" + .byte \vector + .quad \cfunc + .previous + .endif .endm /*
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +25 -45
94 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +7 -0
@@ -338,6 +338,13 @@ SECTIONS *(.altinstr_replacement) } + . = ALIGN(8); + .system_vectors : AT(ADDR(.system_vectors) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __system_vectors = .; + *(.system_vectors) + __system_vectors_end = .; + } + . = ALIGN(8); .apicdrivers : AT(ADDR(.apicdrivers) - LOAD_OFFSET) { __apicdrivers = .;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 5/14 x86/hyperv: Add sev-snp enlightened guest static key
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Introduce static key isolation_type_en_snp for enlightened sev-snp guest check.
---
Change since RFC-v3:
* Remove some Hyper-V specific config setting
--- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 9 +++++++-- drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 6 ++++++ 4 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +11 -0
@@ -409,3 +409,14 @@ bool hv_isolation_type_snp(void) {return static_branch_unlikely (&isolation_type_snp); } + +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (isolation_type_en_snp); +/* +* hv_isolation_type_en_snp - Check system runs in the AMD SEV-SNP based +* isolation enlightened VM. +*/ +bool hv_isolation_type_en_snp (void ) +{ +return static_branch_unlikely (&isolation_type_en_snp); +} +
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +3 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@union hv_ghcb ;DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (isolation_type_snp); +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (isolation_type_en_snp); typedef int (*hyperv_fill_flush_list_func)( struct hv_guest_mapping_flush_list *flush,
@@ -45,6 +46,8 @@ extern void *hv_hypercall_pg;extern u64 hv_current_partition_id; +extern bool hv_isolation_type_en_snp (void ); +extern union hv_ghcb *__percpu *hv_ghcb_pg;int hv_call_deposit_pages (int node,u64 partition_id,u32 num_pages);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +7 -2
@@ -402,8 +402,12 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)pr_info ("Hyper-V: Isolation Config: Group A 0x%x, Group B 0x%x\n" , ms_hyperv.isolation_config_a, ms_hyperv.isolation_config_b); -if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP ) + +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP )) { +static_branch_enable (&isolation_type_en_snp); + }else if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP ) {static_branch_enable (&isolation_type_snp); + } }if (hv_max_functions_eax >=HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES ) {
@@ -473,7 +477,8 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_HYPERV )if ((hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_VBS ) || - (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP )) + (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP + && !cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP )))hv_vtom_init ();/* * Setup the hook to get control post apic initialization.
drivers/hv/hv_common.c +6 -0
@@ -502,6 +502,12 @@ bool __weak hv_isolation_type_snp(void) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_isolation_type_snp); +bool __weak hv_isolation_type_en_snp (void ) +{ +return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_isolation_type_en_snp); +void __weak hv_setup_vmbus_handler (void (*handler)(void )) { }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 3/14 x86/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Enable #HV exception to handle interrupt requests from hypervisor.
---
Change since RFC V5:
* Merge patch "x86/sev: Fix interrupt exit code paths from #HV exception" with this commit.
Change since RFC V3:
* Check NMI event when irq is disabled.
* Remove redundant variable
--- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 12 +- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 349 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 + 5 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h +9 -3
@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@#include <asm/irq_stack.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +noinstr void irqentry_exit_hv_cond(struct pt_regs *regs, irqentry_state_t state); +#else +#define irqentry_exit_hv_cond (regs, state) irqentry_exit(regs, state) +#endif +/** * DECLARE_IDTENTRY - Declare functions for simple IDT entry points * No error code pushed by hardware
@@ -201,7 +207,7 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs, \kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d (); \ run_irq_on_irqstack_cond(__##func, regs, vector); \ instrumentation_end(); \ - irqentry_exit(regs, state); \ + irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state); \ } \ \ static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 vector)
@@ -241,7 +247,7 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs) \kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d (); \ run_sysvec_on_irqstack_cond(__##func, regs); \ instrumentation_end(); \ - irqentry_exit(regs, state); \ + irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state); \ } \ \ static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
@@ -270,7 +276,7 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs) \ __##func (regs); \ __irq_exit_raw(); \ instrumentation_end(); \ - irqentry_exit(regs, state); \ + irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state); \ } \ \ static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +2 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem (void );void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling (void ); +void __init sev_snp_init_hv_handling (void );#define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
@@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { }static inline void __init sme_enable (struct boot_params *bp) { }static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling (void ) { } +static inline void sev_snp_init_hv_handling (void ) { }static inline int __init early_set_memory_decrypted (unsigned long vaddr,unsigned long size) {return 0 ; }
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h +4 -0
@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE_ON_INIT 0#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_CREATE 1#define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY 2 +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_DOORBELL_PAGE 0x80000014 +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_GET_PREFERRED_HV_DOORBELL_PAGE 0 +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_HV_DOORBELL_PAGE 1 +#define SVM_VMGEXIT_QUERY_HV_DOORBELL_PAGE 2#define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES 0x8000fffd#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST 0x8000fffe#define SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REASON (reason_set, reason_code) \
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +293 -56
425 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +2 -0
@@ -1521,5 +1521,7 @@ void __init trap_init(void)cpu_init_exception_handling ();/* Setup traps as cpu_init() might #GP */ idt_setup_traps (); +sev_snp_init_hv_handling (); +cpu_init (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 8/14 x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp enlightened guest
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
In sev-snp enlightened guest, Hyper-V hypercall needs to use vmmcall to trigger vmexit and notify hypervisor to handle hypercall request.
---
Change since RFC V2:
* Fix indentation style
--- arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +33 -11
@@ -61,16 +61,25 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output)u64 hv_status;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -if (!hv_hypercall_pg) -return U64_MAX ; +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) { + __asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n" +"vmmcall" + : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, +"+c" (control),"+d" (input_address) + :"r" (output_address) + :"cc" ,"memory" ,"r8" ,"r9" ,"r10" ,"r11" ); + }else { +if (!hv_hypercall_pg) +return U64_MAX ; - __asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n" -CALL_NOSPEC - : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, -"+c" (control),"+d" (input_address) - : "r" (output_address), - THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) - :"cc" ,"memory" ,"r8" ,"r9" ,"r10" ,"r11" ); + __asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n" +CALL_NOSPEC + : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, +"+c" (control),"+d" (input_address) + : "r" (output_address), + THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) + :"cc" ,"memory" ,"r8" ,"r9" ,"r10" ,"r11" ); + }#else u32 input_address_hi =upper_32_bits (input_address);u32 input_address_lo =lower_32_bits (input_address);
@@ -104,7 +113,13 @@ static inline u64 _hv_do_fast_hypercall8(u64 control, u64 input1)u64 hv_status;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - { +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) { + __asm__ __volatile__( +"vmmcall" + : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, +"+c" (control),"+d" (input1) + ::"cc" ,"r8" ,"r9" ,"r10" ,"r11" ); + }else { __asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT,"+c" (control),"+d" (input1)
@@ -149,7 +164,14 @@ static inline u64 _hv_do_fast_hypercall16(u64 control, u64 input1, u64 input2)u64 hv_status;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - { +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) { + __asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n" +"vmmcall" + : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, +"+c" (control),"+d" (input1) + :"r" (input2) + :"cc" ,"r8" ,"r9" ,"r10" ,"r11" ); + }else { __asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n" CALL_NOSPEC : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 9/14 clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: decrypt hyperv tsc page in sev-snp enlightened guest
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Hyper-V tsc page is shared with hypervisor and it should be decrypted in sev-snp enlightened guest when it's used.
---
Change since RFC V2:
* Change the Subject line prefix
--- drivers/clocksource/hyperv_timer.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/clocksource/hyperv_timer.c +1 -1
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_stimer_global_cleanup);static union {struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page page;u8 reserved[PAGE_SIZE ]; -} tsc_pg__aligned(PAGE_SIZE) ; +} tsc_pg __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);static struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page *tsc_page = &tsc_pg.page;static unsigned long tsc_pfn;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 10/14 hv: vmbus: Mask VMBus pages unencrypted for sev-snp enlightened guest
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
VMBus post msg, synic event and message pages is necessary to shared with hypervisor and so mask these pages unencrypted in the sev-snp guest.
---
Change sicne RFC V4:
* Fix encrypt and free page order.
Change since RFC V3:
* Set encrypt page back in the hv_synic_free()
Change since RFC V2:
* Fix error in the error code path and encrypt pages correctly when decryption failure happens.
--- drivers/hv/hv.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/hv.c +34 -3
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@#include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h> #include <asm/mshyperv.h> +#include <linux/set_memory.h> #include "hyperv_vmbus.h" /* The one and only */
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ int hv_post_message(union hv_connection_id connection_id,int hv_synic_alloc (void ) { -int cpu; +int cpu, ret;struct hv_per_cpu_context *hv_cpu;/*
@@ -123,9 +124,29 @@ int hv_synic_alloc(void) goto err; } } + +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) { + ret =set_memory_decrypted ((unsigned long ) + hv_cpu->synic_message_page,1 ); +if (ret) + goto err; + + ret =set_memory_decrypted ((unsigned long ) + hv_cpu->synic_event_page,1 ); +if (ret) + goto err_decrypt_event_page; + +memset (hv_cpu->synic_message_page,0 ,PAGE_SIZE ); +memset (hv_cpu->synic_event_page,0 ,PAGE_SIZE ); + } }return 0 ; + +err_decrypt_event_page: +set_memory_encrypted ((unsigned long ) + hv_cpu->synic_message_page,1 ); + err:/* * Any memory allocations that succeeded will be freed when
@@ -143,8 +164,18 @@ void hv_synic_free(void)struct hv_per_cpu_context *hv_cpu =per_cpu_ptr (hv_context.cpu_context, cpu); -free_page ((unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_event_page); -free_page ((unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_message_page); +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) { +if (!set_memory_encrypted ((unsigned long ) + hv_cpu->synic_message_page,1 )) +free_page ((unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_event_page); + +if (!set_memory_encrypted ((unsigned long ) + hv_cpu->synic_event_page,1 )) +free_page ((unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_message_page); + }else { +free_page ((unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_event_page); +free_page ((unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_message_page); + } }kfree (hv_context.hv_numa_map);
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 11/14 drivers: hv: Decrypt percpu hvcall input arg page in sev-snp enlightened guest
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Hypervisor needs to access iput arg page and guest should decrypt the page.
---
Change since RFC V4:
* Use pgcount to free intput arg page
Change since RFC V3:
* Use pgcount to decrypt memory.
Change since RFC V2:
* Set inputarg to be zero after kfree()
* Not free mem when fail to encrypt mem in the hv_common_cpu_die().
--- drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hv/hv_common.c +20 -1
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/dma-map-ops.h> +#include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h> #include <asm/mshyperv.h>
@@ -359,6 +360,7 @@ int hv_common_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)u64 msr_vp_index;gfp_t flags;int pgcount = hv_root_partition ?2 :1 ; +int ret;/* hv_cpu_init() can be called with IRQs disabled from hv_resume() */ flags =irqs_disabled () ?GFP_ATOMIC :GFP_KERNEL ;
@@ -368,6 +370,17 @@ int hv_common_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)if (!(*inputarg))return -ENOMEM ; +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) { + ret =set_memory_decrypted ((unsigned long )*inputarg, pgcount); +if (ret) { +kfree (*inputarg); + *inputarg =NULL ; +return ret; + } + +memset (*inputarg,0x00 , pgcount *PAGE_SIZE ); + } +if (hv_root_partition) { outputarg = (void **)this_cpu_ptr (hyperv_pcpu_output_arg); *outputarg = (char *)(*inputarg) +HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ;
@@ -387,6 +400,7 @@ int hv_common_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu) {unsigned long flags;void **inputarg, **outputarg; +int pgcount = hv_root_partition ?2 :1 ;void *mem;local_irq_save (flags);
@@ -402,7 +416,12 @@ int hv_common_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu)local_irq_restore (flags); -kfree (mem); +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) { +if (!set_memory_encrypted ((unsigned long )mem, pgcount)) +kfree (mem); + }else { +kfree (mem); + }return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 12/14 x86/hyperv: Initialize cpu and memory for sev-snp enlightened guest
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Read processor amd memory info from specific address which are populated by Hyper-V. Initialize smp cpu related ops, pvalidate system memory and add it into e820 table.
---
Change since RFCv5:
* Fix getting processor num in the hv_snp_get_smp_config() when ealry is false.
Change since RFCv4:
* Add mem info addr to get mem layout info
--- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 87 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 17 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 3 ++ 3 files changed, 107 insertions(+)
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +87 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h> #include <asm/mshyperv.h> #include <asm/hypervisor.h> +#include <asm/coco.h> +#include <asm/io_apic.h> +#include <asm/sev.h> +#include <asm/realmode.h> +#include <asm/e820/api.h> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
@@ -57,6 +62,8 @@ union hv_ghcb {static u16 hv_ghcb_version__ro_after_init ; +static u32 processor_count; +u64 hv_ghcb_hypercall (u64 control,void *input,void *output,u32 input_size) {union hv_ghcb *hv_ghcb;
@@ -356,6 +363,86 @@ static bool hv_is_private_mmio(u64 addr)return false; } +static __init void hv_snp_get_smp_config (unsigned int early) +{ +if (early) +return ; + +/* +* There is no firmware and ACPI MADT table spport in +* in the Hyper-V SEV-SNP enlightened guest. Set smp +* related config variable. +*/ +while (num_processors < processor_count) { +early_per_cpu (x86_cpu_to_apicid, num_processors) = num_processors; +early_per_cpu (x86_bios_cpu_apicid, num_processors) = num_processors; +physid_set (num_processors, phys_cpu_present_map); +set_cpu_possible (num_processors, true); +set_cpu_present (num_processors, true); + num_processors++; + } +} + +__init void hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu (void ) +{ +struct memory_map_entry *entry; +struct e820_entry *e820_entry; +u64 e820_end; +u64 ram_end; +u64 page; + +/* +* Hyper-V enlightened snp guest boots kernel +* directly without bootloader and so roms, +* bios regions and reserve resources are not +* available. Set these callback to NULL. +*/ + x86_platform.legacy.rtc =0 ; + x86_platform.legacy.reserve_bios_regions =0 ; + x86_platform.set_wallclock = set_rtc_noop; + x86_platform.get_wallclock = get_rtc_noop; + x86_init.resources.probe_roms = x86_init_noop; + x86_init.resources.reserve_resources = x86_init_noop; + x86_init.mpparse.find_smp_config = x86_init_noop; + x86_init.mpparse.get_smp_config = hv_snp_get_smp_config; + +/* +* Hyper-V SEV-SNP enlightened guest doesn't support ioapic +* and legacy APIC page read/write. Switch to hv apic here. +*/ +disable_ioapic_support (); + +/* Get processor and mem info. */ + processor_count = *(u32 *)__va (EN_SEV_SNP_PROCESSOR_INFO_ADDR ); + entry = (struct memory_map_entry *)__va (EN_SEV_SNP_MEM_INFO_ADDR ); + +/* +* There is no bootloader/EFI firmware in the SEV SNP guest. +* E820 table in the memory just describes memory for kernel, +* ACPI table, cmdline, boot params and ramdisk. The dynamic +* data(e.g, vcpu nnumber and the rest memory layout) needs to +* be read from EN_SEV_SNP_PROCESSOR_INFO_ADDR. +*/ +for (; entry->numpages !=0 ; entry++) { + e820_entry = &e820_table->entries[ + e820_table->nr_entries -1 ]; + e820_end = e820_entry->addr + e820_entry->size; + ram_end = (entry->starting_gpn + + entry->numpages) *PAGE_SIZE ; + +if (e820_end < entry->starting_gpn *PAGE_SIZE ) + e820_end = entry->starting_gpn *PAGE_SIZE ; + +if (e820_end < ram_end) { +pr_info ("Hyper-V: add e820 entry [mem %#018Lx-%#018Lx]\n" , e820_end, ram_end -1 ); +e820__range_add (e820_end, ram_end - e820_end, +E820_TYPE_RAM ); +for (page = e820_end; page < ram_end; page +=PAGE_SIZE ) +pvalidate ((unsigned long )__va (page),RMP_PG_SIZE_4K , true); + } + } +} +void __init hv_vtom_init (void ) {/*
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +17 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,21 @@ extern bool hv_isolation_type_en_snp(void);extern union hv_ghcb *__percpu *hv_ghcb_pg; +/* +* Hyper-V puts processor and memory layout info +* to this address in SEV-SNP enlightened guest. +*/ +#define EN_SEV_SNP_PROCESSOR_INFO_ADDR 0x802000 +#define EN_SEV_SNP_MEM_INFO_ADDR 0x802018 + +struct memory_map_entry { +u64 starting_gpn; +u64 numpages; +u16 type; +u16 flags; +u32 reserved; +}; +int hv_call_deposit_pages (int node,u64 partition_id,u32 num_pages);int hv_call_add_logical_proc (int node,u32 lp_index,u32 acpi_id);int hv_call_create_vp (int node,u64 partition_id,u32 vp_index,u32 flags);
@@ -255,12 +270,14 @@ void hv_ghcb_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value);bool hv_ghcb_negotiate_protocol (void );void hv_ghcb_terminate (unsigned int set,unsigned int reason);void hv_vtom_init (void ); +void hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu (void );#else static inline void hv_ghcb_msr_write (u64 msr,u64 value) {}static inline void hv_ghcb_msr_read (u64 msr,u64 *value) {}static inline bool hv_ghcb_negotiate_protocol (void ) {return false; }static inline void hv_ghcb_terminate (unsigned int set,unsigned int reason) {}static inline void hv_vtom_init (void ) {} +static inline void hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu (void ) {}#endif extern bool hv_isolation_type_snp (void );
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +3 -0
@@ -529,6 +529,9 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)if (!(ms_hyperv.features &HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT ))mark_tsc_unstable ("running on Hyper-V" ); +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) +hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu (); +hardlockup_detector_disable (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 13/14 x86/hyperv: Add smp support for sev-snp guest
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
The wakeup_secondary_cpu callback was populated with wakeup_ cpu_via_vmgexit() which doesn't work for Hyper-V and Hyper-V requires to call Hyper-V specific hvcall to start APs. So override it with Hyper-V specific hook to start AP sev_es_save_area data structure.
---
Change since RFC v5:
* Remove some redundant structure definitions
Change sicne RFC v3:
* Replace struct sev_es_save_area with struct vmcb_save_area
* Move code from mshyperv.c to ivm.c
Change since RFC v2:
* Add helper function to initialize segment
* Fix some coding style
--- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 10 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 13 +++- include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h | 3 +- 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +98 -0
@@ -22,11 +22,15 @@#include <asm/sev.h> #include <asm/realmode.h> #include <asm/e820/api.h> +#include <asm/desc.h> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT #define GHCB_USAGE_HYPERV_CALL 1 +static u8 ap_start_input_arg[PAGE_SIZE] __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); +static u8 ap_start_stack[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); + union hv_ghcb { struct ghcb ghcb; struct {
@@ -443,6 +447,100 @@ __init void hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu(void) } } +#define hv_populate_vmcb_seg (seg, gdtr_base) \ +do { \ + if (seg.selector) { \ + seg.base = 0; \ + seg.limit = HV_AP_SEGMENT_LIMIT; \ + seg.attrib = *(u16 *)(gdtr_base + seg.selector + 5); \ + seg.attrib = (seg.attrib & 0xFF) | ((seg.attrib >> 4) & 0xF00); \ + } \ +} while (0) \ + +int hv_snp_boot_ap (int cpu,unsigned long start_ip) +{ +struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *) +__get_free_page (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); +struct desc_ptr gdtr; +u64 ret, rmp_adjust, retry =5 ; +struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *start_vp_input; +unsigned long flags; + +native_store_gdt (&gdtr); + + vmsa->gdtr.base = gdtr.address; + vmsa->gdtr.limit = gdtr.size; + + asmvolatile ("movl %%es, %%eax;" :"=a" (vmsa->es.selector)); +hv_populate_vmcb_seg (vmsa->es, vmsa->gdtr.base); + + asmvolatile ("movl %%cs, %%eax;" :"=a" (vmsa->cs.selector)); +hv_populate_vmcb_seg (vmsa->cs, vmsa->gdtr.base); + + asmvolatile ("movl %%ss, %%eax;" :"=a" (vmsa->ss.selector)); +hv_populate_vmcb_seg (vmsa->ss, vmsa->gdtr.base); + + asmvolatile ("movl %%ds, %%eax;" :"=a" (vmsa->ds.selector)); +hv_populate_vmcb_seg (vmsa->ds, vmsa->gdtr.base); + + vmsa->efer =native_read_msr (MSR_EFER ); + + asmvolatile ("movq %%cr4, %%rax;" :"=a" (vmsa->cr4)); + asmvolatile ("movq %%cr3, %%rax;" :"=a" (vmsa->cr3)); + asmvolatile ("movq %%cr0, %%rax;" :"=a" (vmsa->cr0)); + + vmsa->xcr0 =1 ; + vmsa->g_pat =HV_AP_INIT_GPAT_DEFAULT ; + vmsa->rip = (u64 )secondary_startup_64_no_verify; + vmsa->rsp = (u64)&ap_start_stack[PAGE_SIZE ]; + +/* +* Set the SNP-specific fields for this VMSA: +* VMPL level +* SEV_FEATURES (matches the SEV STATUS MSR right shifted 2 bits) +*/ ; + vmsa->vmpl =0 ; + vmsa->sev_features = sev_status >>2 ; + +/* +* Running at VMPL0 allows the kernel to change the VMSA bit for a page +* using the RMPADJUST instruction. However, for the instruction to +* succeed it must target the permissions of a lesser privileged +* (higher numbered) VMPL level, so use VMPL1 (refer to the RMPADJUST +* instruction in the AMD64 APM Volume 3). +*/ + rmp_adjust =RMPADJUST_VMSA_PAGE_BIT |1 ; + ret =rmpadjust ((unsigned long )vmsa,RMP_PG_SIZE_4K , + rmp_adjust); +if (ret !=0 ) { +pr_err ("RMPADJUST(%llx) failed: %llx\n" , (u64 )vmsa, ret); +return ret; + } + +local_irq_save (flags); + start_vp_input = + (struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *)ap_start_input_arg; +memset (start_vp_input,0 ,sizeof (*start_vp_input)); + start_vp_input->partition_id =-1 ; + start_vp_input->vp_index = cpu; + start_vp_input->target_vtl.target_vtl = ms_hyperv.vtl; + *(u64 *)&start_vp_input->vp_context =__pa (vmsa) |1 ; + +do { + ret =hv_do_hypercall (HVCALL_START_VP , + start_vp_input,NULL ); + }while (hv_result (ret) ==HV_STATUS_TIME_OUT && retry--); + +if (!hv_result_success (ret)) { +pr_err ("HvCallStartVirtualProcessor failed: %llx\n" , ret); + goto done; + } + +done: +local_irq_restore (flags); +return ret; +} +void __init hv_vtom_init (void ) {/*
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +10 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,13 @@ struct memory_map_entry {u32 reserved; }; +/* +* DEFAULT INIT GPAT and SEGMENT LIMIT value in struct VMSA +* to start AP in enlightened SEV guest. +*/ +#define HV_AP_INIT_GPAT_DEFAULT 0x0007040600070406ULL +#define HV_AP_SEGMENT_LIMIT 0xffffffff +int hv_call_deposit_pages (int node,u64 partition_id,u32 num_pages);int hv_call_add_logical_proc (int node,u32 lp_index,u32 acpi_id);int hv_call_create_vp (int node,u64 partition_id,u32 vp_index,u32 flags);
@@ -263,6 +270,7 @@ struct irq_domain *hv_create_pci_msi_domain(void);int hv_map_ioapic_interrupt (int ioapic_id,bool level,int vcpu,int vector,struct hv_interrupt_entry *entry);int hv_unmap_ioapic_interrupt (int ioapic_id,struct hv_interrupt_entry *entry); +int hv_snp_boot_ap (int cpu,unsigned long start_ip);#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT void hv_ghcb_msr_write (u64 msr,u64 value);
@@ -271,6 +279,7 @@ bool hv_ghcb_negotiate_protocol(void);void hv_ghcb_terminate (unsigned int set,unsigned int reason);void hv_vtom_init (void );void hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu (void ); +int hv_snp_boot_ap (int cpu,unsigned long start_ip);#else static inline void hv_ghcb_msr_write (u64 msr,u64 value) {}static inline void hv_ghcb_msr_read (u64 msr,u64 *value) {}
@@ -278,6 +287,7 @@ static inline bool hv_ghcb_negotiate_protocol(void) { return false; }static inline void hv_ghcb_terminate (unsigned int set,unsigned int reason) {}static inline void hv_vtom_init (void ) {}static inline void hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu (void ) {} +static int hv_snp_boot_ap (int cpu,unsigned long start_ip) {}#endif extern bool hv_isolation_type_snp (void );
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +11 -2
@@ -295,6 +295,16 @@ static void __init hv_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)native_smp_prepare_cpus (max_cpus); +/* +* Override wakeup_secondary_cpu_64 callback for SEV-SNP +* enlightened guest. +*/ +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) + apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64 = hv_snp_boot_ap; + +if (!hv_root_partition) +return ; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 for_each_present_cpu (i) {if (i ==0 )
@@ -502,8 +512,7 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)# ifdef CONFIG_SMP smp_ops.smp_prepare_boot_cpu = hv_smp_prepare_boot_cpu; -if (hv_root_partition) - smp_ops.smp_prepare_cpus = hv_smp_prepare_cpus; + smp_ops.smp_prepare_cpus = hv_smp_prepare_cpus;# endif /*
include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h +2 -1
@@ -146,9 +146,9 @@ union hv_reference_tsc_msr {/* Declare the various hypercall operations. */ #define HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE 0x0002#define HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST 0x0003 -#define HVCALL_ENABLE_VP_VTL 0x000f#define HVCALL_NOTIFY_LONG_SPIN_WAIT 0x0008#define HVCALL_SEND_IPI 0x000b +#define HVCALL_ENABLE_VP_VTL 0x000f#define HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE_EX 0x0013#define HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX 0x0014#define HVCALL_SEND_IPI_EX 0x0015
@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ enum HV_GENERIC_SET_FORMAT {#define HV_STATUS_INVALID_PORT_ID 17#define HV_STATUS_INVALID_CONNECTION_ID 18#define HV_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFERS 19 +#define HV_STATUS_TIME_OUT 120#define HV_STATUS_VTL_ALREADY_ENABLED 134/*
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RFC PATCH v6 14/14 x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES
In reply to Tianyu LanFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Add Hyperv-specific handling for faults caused by VMMCALL instructions.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +17 -0
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@#include <asm/nmi.h> #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h> #include <asm/numa.h> +#include <asm/svm.h> /* Is Linux running as the root partition? */ bool hv_root_partition;
@@ -577,6 +578,20 @@ static bool __init ms_hyperv_msi_ext_dest_id(void)return eax &HYPERV_VS_PROPERTIES_EAX_EXTENDED_IOAPIC_RTE ; } +static void hv_sev_es_hcall_prepare (struct ghcb *ghcb,struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +/* RAX and CPL are already in the GHCB */ +ghcb_set_rcx (ghcb, regs->cx); +ghcb_set_rdx (ghcb, regs->dx); +ghcb_set_r8 (ghcb, regs->r8); +} + +static bool hv_sev_es_hcall_finish (struct ghcb *ghcb,struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +/* No checking of the return state needed */ +return true; +} +const __initconst struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_ms_hyperv = { .name ="Microsoft Hyper-V" , .detect = ms_hyperv_platform,
@@ -584,4 +599,6 @@ const __initconst struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_ms_hyperv = { .init.x2apic_available = ms_hyperv_x2apic_available, .init.msi_ext_dest_id = ms_hyperv_msi_ext_dest_id, .init.init_platform = ms_hyperv_init_platform, + .runtime.sev_es_hcall_prepare = hv_sev_es_hcall_prepare, + .runtime.sev_es_hcall_finish = hv_sev_es_hcall_finish, };
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RE: [EXTERNAL] [RFC PATCH V6 13/14] x86/hyperv: Add smp support for sev-snp guest
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 149 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Sent: Monday, May 15, 2023 10:29 PM
To: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [RFC PATCH V6 13/14] x86/hyperv: Add smp support for sev-snp guestFrom: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
The
wakeup_secondary_cpucallback was populated withwakeup_cpu_via_vmgexit()which doesn't work for Hyper-V and Hyper-V requires to call Hyper-V specific hvcall to start APs. So override it with Hyper-V specific hook to start APsev_es_save_areadata structure.Signed-off-by Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>---
Change since RFC v5:
* Remove some redundant structure definitionsChange sicne RFC v3:
* Replace structsev_es_save_areawith structvmcb_save_area
* Move code frommshyperv.ctoivm.cChange since RFC v2:
* Add helper function to initialize segment
* Fix some coding style--- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 10 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 13 +++- include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h | 3 +- 4 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c index renamed from arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +0
-0
85e4378f052f..b7b8e1ba8223100644arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +61
-0@@ -22,11 +22,15 @@#include <asm/sev.h> #include <asm/realmode.h> #include <asm/e820/api.h> +#include <asm/desc.h> #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT #define GHCB_USAGE_HYPERV_CALL 1 +static u8 ap_start_input_arg[PAGE_SIZE] __bss_decrypted +__aligned(PAGE_SIZE); static u8 ap_start_stack[PAGE_SIZE] +__aligned(PAGE_SIZE); + union hv_ghcb { struct ghcb ghcb; struct {@@ -443,6 +447,100 @@ __init void hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu(void) } } +#define hv_populate_vmcb_seg (seg, gdtr_base) \ +do { \ + if (seg.selector) { \ + seg.base = 0; \ + seg.limit = HV_AP_SEGMENT_LIMIT; \ + seg.attrib = *(u16 *)(gdtr_base + seg.selector + 5); \ + seg.attrib = (seg.attrib & 0xFF) | ((seg.attrib >> 4) & 0xF00); \ + } \ +} while (0) \ + +int hv_snp_boot_ap (int cpu,unsigned long start_ip) { +struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa = (struct sev_es_save_area *) +__get_free_page (GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); +struct desc_ptr gdtr; +u64 ret, rmp_adjust, retry =5 ; +struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *start_vp_input; +unsigned long flags; + +native_store_gdt (&gdtr); + + vmsa->gdtr.base = gdtr.address; + vmsa->gdtr.limit = gdtr.size; + + asmvolatile ("movl %%es, %%eax;" :"=a" (vmsa->es.selector)); +hv_populate_vmcb_seg (vmsa->es, vmsa->gdtr.base); + + asmvolatile ("movl %%cs, %%eax;" :"=a" (vmsa->cs.selector)); +hv_populate_vmcb_seg (vmsa->cs, vmsa->gdtr.base); + + asmvolatile ("movl %%ss, %%eax;" :"=a" (vmsa->ss.selector)); +hv_populate_vmcb_seg (vmsa->ss, vmsa->gdtr.base); + + asmvolatile ("movl %%ds, %%eax;" :"=a" (vmsa->ds.selector)); +hv_populate_vmcb_seg (vmsa->ds, vmsa->gdtr.base); + + vmsa->efer =native_read_msr (MSR_EFER ); + + asmvolatile ("movq %%cr4, %%rax;" :"=a" (vmsa->cr4)); + asmvolatile ("movq %%cr3, %%rax;" :"=a" (vmsa->cr3)); + asmvolatile ("movq %%cr0, %%rax;" :"=a" (vmsa->cr0)); + + vmsa->xcr0 =1 ; + vmsa->g_pat =HV_AP_INIT_GPAT_DEFAULT ; + vmsa->rip = (u64 )secondary_startup_64_no_verify; + vmsa->rsp = (u64)&ap_start_stack[PAGE_SIZE ]; + +/* +* Set the SNP-specific fields for this VMSA: +* VMPL level +* SEV_FEATURES (matches the SEV STATUS MSR right shifted 2 bits) +*/ ; + vmsa->vmpl =0 ; + vmsa->sev_features = sev_status >>2 ; + +/* +* Running at VMPL0 allows the kernel to change the VMSA bit for a page
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +3
-0+* using the RMPADJUST instruction. However, for the instruction to +* succeed it must target the permissions of a lesser privileged +* (higher numbered) VMPL level, so use VMPL1 (refer to the RMPADJUST
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +13
-0+* instruction in the AMD64 APM Volume 3). +*/ + rmp_adjust =RMPADJUST_VMSA_PAGE_BIT |1 ; + ret =rmpadjust ((unsigned long )vmsa,RMP_PG_SIZE_4K , + rmp_adjust); +if (ret !=0 ) { +pr_err ("RMPADJUST(%llx) failed: %llx\n" , (u64 )vmsa, ret); +return ret; + } + +local_irq_save (flags); + start_vp_input = + (struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *)ap_start_input_arg;
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c __init void hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu(void) · line 532
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +10
-0+memset (start_vp_input,0 ,sizeof (*start_vp_input)); + start_vp_input->partition_id =-1 ; + start_vp_input->vp_index = cpu; + start_vp_input->target_vtl.target_vtl = ms_hyperv.vtl; + *(u64 *)&start_vp_input->vp_context =__pa (vmsa) |1 ; + +do { + ret =hv_do_hypercall (HVCALL_START_VP , + start_vp_input,NULL ); + }while (hv_result (ret) ==HV_STATUS_TIME_OUT && retry--);
can we restore local_irq here ?
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c __init void hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu(void) · line 536
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +4
-0+ +if (!hv_result_success (ret)) { +pr_err ("HvCallStartVirtualProcessor failed: %llx\n" , ret); + goto done;
No need of goto here.
Regards,
Saurabh
Quoted 111 lines
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +7
-0+ } + +done: +local_irq_restore (flags); +return ret; +} +void __init hv_vtom_init (void ) {/* (quoted diff) +0
-0
b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.hindex84e024ffacd5..9ad2a0f21d68100644arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +7
-0@@ -65,6 +65,13 @@ struct memory_map_entry {u32 reserved; }; +/* +* DEFAULT INIT GPAT and SEGMENT LIMIT value in struct VMSA +* to start AP in enlightened SEV guest. +*/ +#define HV_AP_INIT_GPAT_DEFAULT 0x0007040600070406ULL +#define HV_AP_SEGMENT_LIMIT 0xffffffff +int hv_call_deposit_pages (int node,u64 partition_id,u32 num_pages);int
hv_call_add_logical_proc(int node, u32 lp_index, u32 acpi_id); inthv_call_create_vp(int node, u64 partition_id, u32 vp_index, u32 flags); @@ - 263,6 +270,7 @@ structirq_domain*hv_create_pci_msi_domain(void); int hv_map_ioapic_interrupt(intioapic_id, bool level, int vcpu, int vector,
structhv_interrupt_entry*entry);
int hv_unmap_ioapic_interrupt(intioapic_id, structhv_interrupt_entry
*entry);
+inthv_snp_boot_ap(int cpu, unsigned long start_ip);#ifdef
CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
voidhv_ghcb_msr_write(u64 msr, u64 value); @@ -271,6 +279,7 @@ boolhv_ghcb_negotiate_protocol(void); voidhv_ghcb_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason); voidhv_vtom_init(void); voidhv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu(void);
+inthv_snp_boot_ap(int cpu, unsigned long start_ip);
#else
static inline voidhv_ghcb_msr_write(u64 msr, u64 value){} static inline voidhv_ghcb_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value){} @@ -278,6 +287,7 @@ static inline boolhv_ghcb_negotiate_protocol(void){ return false; } static inline voidhv_ghcb_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason){} static inline voidhv_vtom_init(void){} static inline voidhv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu(void){}
+static inthv_snp_boot_ap(int cpu, unsigned long start_ip){}
#endifextern bool
hv_isolation_type_snp(void); diff --gita/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.cb/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.cindexdea9b881180b..0c5f9f7bd7ba100644arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +10
-0@@ -295,6 +295,16 @@ static void __init hv_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)native_smp_prepare_cpus (max_cpus ); +/* +* Override wakeup_secondary_cpu_64 callback for SEV-SNP +* enlightened guest. +*/ +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) + apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64 = hv_snp_boot_ap; + +if (!hv_root_partition) +return ; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 for_each_present_cpu (i) {arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +1
-2if (i ==0 )@@ -502,8 +512,7 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)# ifdef CONFIG_SMP smp_ops.smp_prepare_boot_cpu = hv_smp_prepare_boot_cpu; -if (hv_root_partition) - smp_ops.smp_prepare_cpus = hv_smp_prepare_cpus; + smp_ops.smp_prepare_cpus = hv_smp_prepare_cpus;# endif /* include/asm-generic/hyperv- renamed from include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h +0
-0
tlfs.h
indexf4e4cc4f965f..92dcc530350c100644include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h +2
-2@@ -146,9 +146,9 @@ union hv_reference_tsc_msr {/* Declare the various hypercall operations. */ #define HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE 0x0002#define HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST 0x0003 -#define HVCALL_ENABLE_VP_VTL 0x000f#define HVCALL_NOTIFY_LONG_SPIN_WAIT 0x0008#define HVCALL_SEND_IPI 0x000b +#define HVCALL_ENABLE_VP_VTL 0x000f#define HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_SPACE_EX 0x0013#define HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX 0x0014#define HVCALL_SEND_IPI_EX 0x0015@@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ enum HV_GENERIC_SET_FORMAT {#define HV_STATUS_INVALID_PORT_ID 17#define HV_STATUS_INVALID_CONNECTION_ID 18#define HV_STATUS_INSUFFICIENT_BUFFERS 19 +#define HV_STATUS_TIME_OUT 120#define HV_STATUS_VTL_ALREADY_ENABLED 134/* -- 2.25.1
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 4 lines · Tianyu Lan
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Add a #HV exception handler that uses IST stack.
Urgh.. that is entirely insufficient. Like it doesn't even begin to start to cover things.
The whole existing VC IST stack abuse is already a nightmare and you're duplicating that.. without any explanation for why this would be needed and how it is correct.
Please try again.
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH V6 02/14] x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 38 lines · Tianyu Lan
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Add
check_hv_pending()andcheck_hv_pending_after_irq()to check queued #HV event when irq is disabled.Signed-off-by Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 18 ++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h | 14 +++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +11
-0@@ -1019,6 +1019,15 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit) +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + /* + * If a #HV was delivered during execution and interrupts were + * disabled, then check if it can be handled before the iret + * (which may re-enable interrupts). + */ + mov %rsp, %rdi + call check_hv_pending +#endif UNWIND_HINT_REGS /*@@ -1143,6 +1152,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START(error_entry) SYM_CODE_END(error_entry) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_return) +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + /*
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S SYM_CODE_START(error_entry) · line 1166
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +7
-0+ * If a #HV was delivered during execution and interrupts were + * disabled, then check if it can be handled before the iret + * (which may re-enable interrupts). + */ + mov %rsp, %rdi + call check_hv_pending +#endif UNWIND_HINT_REGS DEBUG_ENTRY_ASSERT_IRQS_OFF testb $3, CS(%rsp)
Oh hell no... do now you're adding unconditional calls to every single interrupt and nmi exit path, with the grand total of 0 justification.
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH V6 03/14] x86/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 59 lines · Tianyu Lan
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
Enable #HV exception to handle interrupt requests from hypervisor.
Co-developed-by Lendacky Thomas <[email protected]>Co-developed-by Kalra Ashish <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>---
Change since RFC V5:
* Merge patch "x86/sev: Fix interrupt exit code paths from #HV exception" with this commit.Change since RFC V3:
* Check NMI event when irq is disabled.
* Remove redundant variable--- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 12 +- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 349 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 2 + 5 files changed, 310 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h +8
-2@@ -13,6 +13,12 @@#include <asm/irq_stack.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +noinstr void irqentry_exit_hv_cond(struct pt_regs *regs, irqentry_state_t state); +#else +#define irqentry_exit_hv_cond (regs, state) irqentry_exit(regs, state) +#endif +/** * DECLARE_IDTENTRY - Declare functions for simple IDT entry points * No error code pushed by hardware @@ -201,7 +207,7 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs, \kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d (); \ run_irq_on_irqstack_cond(__##func, regs, vector); \ instrumentation_end(); \ - irqentry_exit(regs, state); \ + irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state); \ } \ \ static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 vector)@@ -241,7 +247,7 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs) \kvm_set_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d (); \ run_sysvec_on_irqstack_cond(__##func, regs); \ instrumentation_end(); \ - irqentry_exit(regs, state); \ + irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state); \ } \ \ static noinline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs) \ · line 282
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h +1
-1@@ -270,7 +276,7 @@ __visible noinstr void func(struct pt_regs *regs) \ __##func (regs); \ __irq_exit_raw(); \ instrumentation_end(); \ - irqentry_exit(regs, state); \ + irqentry_exit_hv_cond(regs, state); \ } \ \ static __always_inline void __##func(struct pt_regs *regs)
WTF is this supposed to do and why is this the right way to achieve the desired result?
Your changelog gives me 0 clues -- guess how much I then care about your patches?
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH V6 04/14] x86/sev: optimize system vector processing invoked from #HV exception
In reply to Tianyu LanOn Mon, May 15, 2023 at 12:59:06PM -0400, Tianyu Lan wrote:
So your subject states:
Quoted 1 line
Subject: [RFC PATCH V6 04/14] x86/sev: optimize system vector processing invoked from #HV exception
^^^^^^^^
Quoted 47 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +0
-43@@ -228,51 +238,11 @@ static void do_exc_hv(struct pt_regs *regs) }else if (pending_events.vector ==IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR ) {WARN (1 ,"syscall shouldn't happen\n" ); }else if (pending_events.vector >=FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR ) { -switch (pending_events.vector) { -#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_HYPERV ) -case HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR : -sysvec_hyperv_stimer0 (regs); -break ; -case HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR : -sysvec_hyperv_callback (regs); -break ; -#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP -case RESCHEDULE_VECTOR : -sysvec_reschedule_ipi (regs); -break ; -case IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR : -sysvec_irq_move_cleanup (regs); -break ; -case REBOOT_VECTOR : -sysvec_reboot (regs); -break ; -case CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR : -sysvec_call_function_single (regs); -break ; -case CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR : -sysvec_call_function (regs); -break ; -#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC -case ERROR_APIC_VECTOR : -sysvec_error_interrupt (regs); -break ; -case SPURIOUS_APIC_VECTOR : -sysvec_spurious_apic_interrupt (regs); -break ; -case LOCAL_TIMER_VECTOR : -sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (regs); -break ; -case X86_PLATFORM_IPI_VECTOR : -sysvec_x86_platform_ipi (regs); -break ; -#endif -case 0x0 : -break ; -default :
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c static void do_exc_hv(struct pt_regs *regs) · line 248
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +5
-2-panic ("Unexpected vector %d\n" , vector); -unreachable (); +if (!(sysvec_table[pending_events.vector -FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR ])) { +WARN (1 ,"system vector entry 0x%x is NULL\n" , + pending_events.vector); + }else { + (*sysvec_table[pending_events.vector -FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR ])(regs); } }else {common_interrupt (regs, pending_events.vector);
But your code replace direct calls with an indirect call. Now AFAIK, this SNP shit came with Zen3, and Zen3 still uses retpolines for indirect calls.
Can you connect the dots?
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH V6 08/14] x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp enlightened guest
In reply to Tianyu LanQuoted 40 lines · Tianyu Lan
From: Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>
In sev-snp enlightened guest, Hyper-V hypercall needs to use vmmcall to trigger vmexit and notify hypervisor to handle hypercall request.
Signed-off-by Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>---
Change since RFC V2:
* Fix indentation style--- arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +10
-7@@ -61,16 +61,25 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output)u64 hv_status;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 -if (!hv_hypercall_pg) -return U64_MAX ; +if (hv_isolation_type_en_snp ()) { + __asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n" +"vmmcall" + : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, +"+c" (control),"+d" (input_address) + :"r" (output_address) + :"cc" ,"memory" ,"r8" ,"r9" ,"r10" ,"r11" ); + }else { +if (!hv_hypercall_pg) +return U64_MAX ; - __asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n" - CALL_NOSPEC - : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, - "+c" (control), "+d" (input_address) - : "r" (output_address),
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output) · line 82
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +8
-2- THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) - : "cc", "memory", "r8", "r9", "r10", "r11"); + __asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n" +CALL_NOSPEC + : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, +"+c" (control),"+d" (input_address) + : "r" (output_address), + THUNK_TARGET(hv_hypercall_pg) + :"cc" ,"memory" ,"r8" ,"r9" ,"r10" ,"r11" ); + }
Wouldn't this generate better code with an alternative?
Re: [RFC PATCH V6 03/14] x86/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 6 lines
WTF is this supposed to do and why is this the right way to achieve the desired result?
Your changelog gives me 0 clues -- guess how much I then care about your patches?
Excuse me? No. This is incredibly rude and violates the community code of conduct. Please review examples of creating a positive environment here https://docs.kernel.org/process/code-of-conduct.html
Signature · 1 line
-Dionna Glaze, PhD (she/her)
Re: [EXTERNAL] [RFC PATCH V6 13/14] x86/hyperv: Add smp support for sev-snp guest
In reply to Saurabh Singh SengarQuoted 13 lines · Saurabh Singh Sengar
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c __init void hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu(void) · line 532
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +11
-0+ (struct hv_enable_vp_vtl *)ap_start_input_arg; +memset (start_vp_input,0 ,sizeof (*start_vp_input)); + start_vp_input->partition_id =-1 ; + start_vp_input->vp_index = cpu; + start_vp_input->target_vtl.target_vtl = ms_hyperv.vtl; + *(u64 *)&start_vp_input->vp_context =__pa (vmsa) |1 ; + +do { + ret =hv_do_hypercall (HVCALL_START_VP , + start_vp_input,NULL ); + }while (hv_result (ret) ==HV_STATUS_TIME_OUT && retry--);can we restore
local_irqhere ?
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c __init void hv_sev_init_mem_and_cpu(void) · line 536
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +4
-0+ +if (!hv_result_success (ret)) { +pr_err ("HvCallStartVirtualProcessor failed: %llx\n" , ret); + goto done;No need of goto here.
Nice catch. The goto label should be removed here. Will update in the next version.
Re: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 5 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 4 lines · Tianyu Lan
From: Tianyu Lan<[email protected]>
Add a #HV exception handler that uses IST stack.
Quoted 8 lines
Urgh.. that is entirely insufficient. Like it doesn't even begin to start to cover things.
The whole existing VC IST stack abuse is already a nightmare and you're duplicating that.. without any explanation for why this would be needed and how it is correct.
Please try again.
Hi Peter:
Thanks for your review. Will add more explanation in the next version.
Re: [RFC PATCH V6 02/14] x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 21 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 21 lines
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +9
-0@@ -1019,6 +1019,15 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit) +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + /* + * If a #HV was delivered during execution and interrupts were + * disabled, then check if it can be handled before the iret + * (which may re-enable interrupts). + */ + mov %rsp, %rdi + call check_hv_pending +#endif UNWIND_HINT_REGS /*@@ -1143,6 +1152,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START(error_entry) SYM_CODE_END(error_entry)
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S SYM_CODE_START(error_entry) · line 1166
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +9
-0SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_return) +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + /* + * If a #HV was delivered during execution and interrupts were + * disabled, then check if it can be handled before the iret + * (which may re-enable interrupts). + */ + mov %rsp, %rdi + call check_hv_pending +#endif UNWIND_HINT_REGS DEBUG_ENTRY_ASSERT_IRQS_OFF testb $3, CS(%rsp)Oh hell no... do now you're adding unconditional calls to every single interrupt and nmi exit path, with the grand total of 0 justification.
Sorry to Add check inside of check_hv_pending(). Will move the check before calling check_hv_pending() in the next version. Thanks.
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH V6 02/14] x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path
Quoted 37 lines · Tianyu Lan
Quoted 26 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 26 lines
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +15
-0@@ -1019,6 +1019,15 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit) +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + /* + * If a #HV was delivered during execution and interrupts were + * disabled, then check if it can be handled before the iret + * (which may re-enable interrupts). + */ + mov %rsp, %rdi + call check_hv_pending +#endif UNWIND_HINT_REGS /*@@ -1143,6 +1152,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START(error_entry) SYM_CODE_END(error_entry) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_return) +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + /* + * If a #HV was delivered during execution and interrupts were + * disabled, then check if it can be handled before the iret + * (which may re-enable interrupts). + */Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S SYM_CODE_START(error_entry) · line 1166
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +3
-0+ mov %rsp, %rdi + call check_hv_pending +#endif UNWIND_HINT_REGS DEBUG_ENTRY_ASSERT_IRQS_OFF testb $3, CS(%rsp)Oh hell no... do now you're adding unconditional calls to every single interrupt and nmi exit path, with the grand total of 0 justification.
Quoted 2 lines
Sorry to Add check inside of
check_hv_pending(). Will move the check before callingcheck_hv_pending()in the next version. Thanks.
You will also explain, in the Changelog, in excruciating detail, *WHY* any of this is required.
Any additional code in these paths that are only required for some random hypervisor had better proof that they are absolutely required and no alternative solution exists and have no performance impact on normal users.
If this is due to Hyper-V design idiocies over something fundamentally required by the hardware design you'll get a NAK.
Re: [RFC PATCH V6 04/14] x86/sev: optimize system vector processing invoked from #HV exception
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 14 lines · Peter Zijlstra
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c static void do_exc_hv(struct pt_regs *regs) · line 248
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +5
-2-panic ("Unexpected vector %d\n" , vector); -unreachable (); +if (!(sysvec_table[pending_events.vector -FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR ])) { +WARN (1 ,"system vector entry 0x%x is NULL\n" , + pending_events.vector); + }else { + (*sysvec_table[pending_events.vector -FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR ])(regs); } }else {common_interrupt (regs, pending_events.vector);But your code replace direct calls with an indirect call. Now AFAIK, this SNP shit came with Zen3, and Zen3 still uses retpolines for indirect calls.
Quoted 1 line
Can you connect the dots?
The title is no exact and will update in the next version. Thanks.
Re: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Add a #HV exception handler that uses IST stack.
Quoted 8 lines
Urgh.. that is entirely insufficient. Like it doesn't even begin to start to cover things.
The whole existing VC IST stack abuse is already a nightmare and you're duplicating that.. without any explanation for why this would be needed and how it is correct.
Please try again.
#HV handler handles both #NMI & #MCE in the guest and nested #HV is never raised by the hypervisor. Next #HV exception is only raised by the hypervisor when Guest acknowledges the pending #HV exception by clearing "NoFurtherSignal” bit in the doorbell page.
There is still protection (please see hv_switch_off_ist()) to gracefully exit the guest if by any chance a malicious hypervisor sends nested #HV. This saves with most of the nested IST stack pitfalls with #NMI & #MCE, also #DB is handled in noinstr code block(exc_vmm_communication()->vc_is_db {...}) hence avoid any recursive #DBs.
Do you see anything else needs to be handled in #HV IST handling?
Thanks,
Pankaj
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
Quoted 7 lines · Pankaj
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Add a #HV exception handler that uses IST stack.
Urgh.. that is entirely insufficient. Like it doesn't even begin to start to cover things.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
The whole existing VC IST stack abuse is already a nightmare and you're duplicating that.. without any explanation for why this would be needed and how it is correct.
Please try again.
#HV handler handles both #NMI & #MCE in the guest and nested #HV is never raised by the hypervisor.
I thought all this confidental computing nonsense was about not trusting the hypervisor, so how come we're now relying on the hypervisor being sane?
Re: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
In reply to Gupta, PankajQuoted 4 lines · Pankaj
#HV handler handles both #NMI & #MCE in the guest and nested #HV is never raised by the hypervisor. Next #HV exception is only raised by the hypervisor when Guest acknowledges the pending #HV exception by clearing "NoFurtherSignal” bit in the doorbell page.
There's a big difference between "is never raised by" and "cannot be raised by".
Either way, this series (and this patch in particular) needs some much better changelogs so that this behavior is clear. It would also be nice to reference the relevant parts of the hardware specs if the "hardware"* is helping to provide these guarantees.
* I say "hardware" in quotes because on TDX a big chunk of this behavior is implemented in software in the TDX module. SEV probably does it in microcode (or maybe in the secure processor), but I kinda doubt it's purely silicon.
Re: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 12 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 11 lines · Pankaj
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Add a #HV exception handler that uses IST stack.
Urgh.. that is entirely insufficient. Like it doesn't even begin to start to cover things.
The whole existing VC IST stack abuse is already a nightmare and you're duplicating that.. without any explanation for why this would be needed and how it is correct.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Please try again.
#HV handler handles both #NMI & #MCE in the guest and nested #HV is never raised by the hypervisor.
I thought all this confidental computing nonsense was about not trusting the hypervisor, so how come we're now relying on the hypervisor being sane?
That should really say that a nested #HV should never be raised by the hypervisor, but if it is, then the guest should detect that and self-terminate knowing that the hypervisor is possibly being malicious.
Thanks,
Tom
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
Quoted 18 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 17 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 15 lines · Pankaj
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Add a #HV exception handler that uses IST stack.
Quoted 8 lines
Urgh.. that is entirely insufficient. Like it doesn't even begin to start to cover things.
The whole existing VC IST stack abuse is already a nightmare and you're duplicating that.. without any explanation for why this would be needed and how it is correct.
Please try again.
#HV handler handles both #NMI & #MCE in the guest and nested #HV is never raised by the hypervisor.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I thought all this confidental computing nonsense was about not trusting the hypervisor, so how come we're now relying on the hypervisor being sane?
That should really say that a nested #HV should never be raised by the hypervisor, but if it is, then the guest should detect that and self-terminate knowing that the hypervisor is possibly being malicious.
I've yet to see code that can do that reliably.
Re: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
Quoted 4 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 3 lines
That should really say that a nested #HV should never be raised by the hypervisor, but if it is, then the guest should detect that and self-terminate knowing that the hypervisor is possibly being malicious.
I've yet to see code that can do that reliably.
By "#HV should never be raised by the hypervisor", I think Tom means:
#HV can and will be raised by malicious hypervisors and the guest must be able to unambiguously handle it in a way that will not result in the guest getting rooted.
Right? ;)
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 5 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 3 lines
That should really say that a nested #HV should never be raised by the hypervisor, but if it is, then the guest should detect that and self-terminate knowing that the hypervisor is possibly being malicious.
I've yet to see code that can do that reliably.
Tom; could you please investigate if this can be enforced in ucode?
Ideally #HV would have an internal latch such that a recursive #HV will terminate the guest (much like double #MC and tripple-fault).
But unlike the #MC trainwreck, can we please not leave a glaring hole in this latch and use a spare bit in the IRET frame please?
So have #HV delivery:
- check internal latch; if set, terminate machine
- set latch
- write IRET frame with magic bit set
have IRET:
- check magic bit and reset #HV latch
RE: [RFC PATCH V6 02/14] x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path
In reply to Peter ZijlstraFrom: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, May 17, 2023 6:10 AM
Quoted 45 lines · Tianyu Lan
Quoted 37 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 26 lines
Quoted 26 lines
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +15
-0@@ -1019,6 +1019,15 @@ SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry) * R15 - old SPEC_CTRL */ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit) +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + /* + * If a #HV was delivered during execution and interrupts were + * disabled, then check if it can be handled before the iret + * (which may re-enable interrupts). + */ + mov %rsp, %rdi + call check_hv_pending +#endif UNWIND_HINT_REGS /*@@ -1143,6 +1152,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START(error_entry) SYM_CODE_END(error_entry) SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(error_return) +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + /* + * If a #HV was delivered during execution and interrupts were + * disabled, then check if it can be handled before the iret + * (which may re-enable interrupts). + */Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S SYM_CODE_START(error_entry) · line 1166
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S +3
-0+ mov %rsp, %rdi + call check_hv_pending +#endif UNWIND_HINT_REGS DEBUG_ENTRY_ASSERT_IRQS_OFF testb $3, CS(%rsp)Oh hell no... do now you're adding unconditional calls to every single interrupt and nmi exit path, with the grand total of 0 justification.
Quoted 2 lines
Sorry to Add check inside of
check_hv_pending(). Will move the check before callingcheck_hv_pending()in the next version. Thanks.You will also explain, in the Changelog, in excruciating detail, *WHY* any of this is required.
Quoted 7 lines
Any additional code in these paths that are only required for some random hypervisor had better proof that they are absolutely required and no alternative solution exists and have no performance impact on normal users.
If this is due to Hyper-V design idiocies over something fundamentally required by the hardware design you'll get a NAK.
I'm jumping in to answer some of the basic questions here. Yesterday, there was a discussion about nested #HV exceptions, so maybe some of this is already understood, but let me recap at a higher level, provide some references, and suggest the path forward.
This code and some of the other patches in this series are for handling the #HV exception that is introduced by the Restricted Interrupt Injection feature of the SEV-SNP architecture. See Section 15.36.16 of [1], and
Section 5 of [2]. There's also an AMD presentation from LPC last fall [3].
Hyper-V requires that the guest implement Restricted Interrupt Injection to handle the case of a compromised hypervisor injecting an exception (and forcing the running of that exception handler), even when it should be disallowed by guest state. For example, the hypervisor could inject an interrupt while the guest has interrupts disabled. In time, presumably other hypervisors like KVM will at least have an option where they expect SEV-SNP guests to implement Restricted Interrupt Injection functionality, so it's not Hyper-V specific.
Naming the new exception as #HV and use of "hv" as the Linux prefix for related functions and variable names is a bit unfortunate. It conflicts with the existing use of the "hv" prefix to denote Hyper-V specific code in the Linux kernel, and at first glance makes this code look like it is Hyper-V specific code. Maybe we can choose a different prefix ("hvex"?) for this #HV exception related code to avoid that "first glance" confusion.
I've talked with Tianyu offline, and he will do the following:
1) Split this patch set into two patch sets. The first patch set is Hyper-V specific code for managing communication pages that must be shared between the guest and Hyper-V, for starting APs, etc. The second patch set will be only the Restricted Interrupt Injection and #HV code.
2) For the Restricted Interrupt Injection code, Tianyu will look at how to absolutely minimize the impact in the hot code paths, particularly when SEV-SNP is not active. Hopefully the impact can be a couple of instructions at most, or even less with the use of other existing kernel techniques. He'll look at the other things you've commented on and get the code into a better state. I'll work with him on writing commit messages and comments that explain what's going on.
Michael
[1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf
[2] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56421-guest-hypervisor-communication-block-standardization.pdf
[3] https://lpc.events/event/16/contributions/1321/attachments/965/1886/SNP_Interrupt_Security.pptx
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH V6 02/14] x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path
Quoted 5 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
I'm jumping in to answer some of the basic questions here. Yesterday, there was a discussion about nested #HV exceptions, so maybe some of this is already understood, but let me recap at a higher level, provide some references, and suggest the path forward.
Quoted 8 lines
2) For the Restricted Interrupt Injection code, Tianyu will look at how to absolutely minimize the impact in the hot code paths, particularly when SEV-SNP is not active. Hopefully the impact can be a couple of instructions at most, or even less with the use of other existing kernel techniques. He'll look at the other things you've commented on and get the code into a better state. I'll work with him on writing commit messages and comments that explain what's going on.
So from what I understand of all this SEV-SNP/#HV muck is that it is near impossible to get right without ucode/hw changes. Hence my request to Tom to look into that.
The feature as specified in the AMD documentation seems fundamentally buggered.
Specifically #HV needs to be IST because hypervisor can inject at any moment, irrespective of IF or anything else -- even #HV itself. This means also in the syscall gap.
Since it is IST, a nested #HV is instant stack corruption -- #HV can attempt to play stack games as per the copied #VC crap (which I'm not at all convinced about being correct itself), but this doesn't actually fix anything, all you need is a single instruction window to wreck things.
Because as stated, the whole premise is that the hypervisor is out to get you, you must not leave it room to wiggle. As is, this is security through prayer, and we don't do that.
In short; I really want a solid proof that what you propose to implement is correct and not wishful thinking.
RE: [RFC PATCH V6 02/14] x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path
From: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, May 31, 2023 8:49 AM
Quoted 33 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Quoted 6 lines
I'm jumping in to answer some of the basic questions here. Yesterday, there was a discussion about nested #HV exceptions, so maybe some of this is already understood, but let me recap at a higher level, provide some references, and suggest the path forward.
Quoted 8 lines
2) For the Restricted Interrupt Injection code, Tianyu will look at how to absolutely minimize the impact in the hot code paths, particularly when SEV-SNP is not active. Hopefully the impact can be a couple of instructions at most, or even less with the use of other existing kernel techniques. He'll look at the other things you've commented on and get the code into a better state. I'll work with him on writing commit messages and comments that explain what's going on.
So from what I understand of all this SEV-SNP/#HV muck is that it is near impossible to get right without ucode/hw changes. Hence my request to Tom to look into that.
The feature as specified in the AMD documentation seems fundamentally buggered.
Specifically #HV needs to be IST because hypervisor can inject at any moment, irrespective of IF or anything else -- even #HV itself. This means also in the syscall gap.
Since it is IST, a nested #HV is instant stack corruption -- #HV can attempt to play stack games as per the copied #VC crap (which I'm not at all convinced about being correct itself), but this doesn't actually fix anything, all you need is a single instruction window to wreck things.
Quoted 6 lines
Because as stated, the whole premise is that the hypervisor is out to get you, you must not leave it room to wiggle. As is, this is security through prayer, and we don't do that.
In short; I really want a solid proof that what you propose to implement is correct and not wishful thinking.
Fair enough. We will be sync'ing with the AMD folks to make sure that one way or another this really will work.
Michael
Re: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
That should really say that a nested #HV should never be raised by the hypervisor, but if it is, then the guest should detect that and self-terminate knowing that the hypervisor is possibly being malicious.
I've yet to see code that can do that reliably.
- Currently, we are detecting the direct nested #HV with below check and guest self terminate.
<snip>
if (get_stack_info_noinstr(stack, current, &info) &&
(info.type == (STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + ESTACK_HV) ||
info.type == (STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + ESTACK_HV2)))
panic("Nested #HV exception, HV IST corrupted, stack
type = %d\n", info.type);</snip>
- Thinking about below solution to detect the nested #HV reliably:
-- Make reliable IST stack switching for #VC -> #HV -> #VC case
(similar to done in __sev_es_ist_enter/__sev_es_ist_exit for NMI IST stack).
-- In addition to this, we can make nested #HV detection (with another
exception type) more reliable with refcounting (percpu?).
Need your inputs before I implement this solution. Or any other idea in software you have in mind?
Thanks,
Pankaj
Peter Zijlstra
maintainerRe: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
Quoted 16 lines · Pankaj
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
That should really say that a nested #HV should never be raised by the hypervisor, but if it is, then the guest should detect that and self-terminate knowing that the hypervisor is possibly being malicious.
I've yet to see code that can do that reliably.
- Currently, we are detecting the direct nested #HV with below check and guest self terminate.
<snip>
if (get_stack_info_noinstr(stack, current, &info) && (info.type == (STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + ESTACK_HV) || info.type == (STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION + ESTACK_HV2))) panic("Nested #HV exception, HV IST corrupted, stack type = %d\n", info.type);
Quoted 8 lines
</snip>
- Thinking about below solution to detect the nested #HV reliably:
-- Make reliable IST stack switching for #VC -> #HV -> #VC case
(similar to done in __sev_es_ist_enter/__sev_es_ist_exit for NMI IST stack).
I'm not convinced any of that is actually correct; there is a *huge* window between NMI hitting and calling __sev_es_ist_enter(), idem on the exit side.
Quoted 2 lines
-- In addition to this, we can make nested #HV detection (with another
exception type) more reliable with refcounting (percpu?).
There is also #DB and the MOVSS shadow.
And no, I don't think any of that is what you'd call 'robust'. This is what I call a trainwreck :/
And I'm more than willing to say no until the hardware is more sane.
Supervisor Shadow Stack support is in the same boat, that's on hold until FRED makes things workable.
Re: [RFC PATCH V6 01/14] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler
In reply to Peter ZijlstraQuoted 16 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 5 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 3 lines
That should really say that a nested #HV should never be raised by the hypervisor, but if it is, then the guest should detect that and self-terminate knowing that the hypervisor is possibly being malicious.
I've yet to see code that can do that reliably.
Tom; could you please investigate if this can be enforced in ucode?
Ideally #HV would have an internal latch such that a recursive #HV will terminate the guest (much like double #MC and tripple-fault).
But unlike the #MC trainwreck, can we please not leave a glaring hole in this latch and use a spare bit in the IRET frame please?
Quoted 7 lines
So have #HV delivery:
- check internal latch; if set, terminate machine
- set latch
- write IRET frame with magic bit sethave IRET:
- check magic bit and reset #HV latch
Hi Peter,
I talked with the hardware team about this and, unfortunately, it is not practical to implement. The main concerns are that there are already two generations of hardware out there with the current support and, given limited patch space, in addition to the ucode support to track and perform the latch support, additional ucode support would be required to save/restore the latch information when handling a VMEXIT during #HV processing.
Thanks,
Tom