Introduce a REQUIRE_NX Kconfig option
v2 cover Introduce a REQUIRE_NX Kconfig option
v2:
* Created assembly override for cases where XD_DISABLE is set
* Turned rdmsrl() into rdmsr_safe() when reading IA32_MSR_MISC_ENABLE in C
This option hardens Xen by forcing it to write secure (NX-enhanced) PTEs regardless of the runtime NX feature bit in boot_cpu_data. This prevents an attacker with partial write support from affecting Xen's PTE generation logic by overriding the NX feature flag. The patch asserts support for the NX bit in PTEs at boot time and if so short-circuits the cpu_has_nx macro to 1.
Alejandro Vallejo (2):
x86/boot: Clear XD_DISABLE from the early boot path
x86: Add Kconfig option to require NX bit support
xen/arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 ++++++ xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- xen/arch/x86/boot/trampoline.S | 3 +- xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c | 32 ++++++------ xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h | 9 ++++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 3 +- xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 +- 7 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 1/2 x86/boot: Clear XD_DISABLE from the early boot path
Intel CPUs have a bit in MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE that may prevent the NX bit from being advertised. Clear it unconditionally if we can't find the NX feature right away on boot.
The conditions for the MSR being read on early boot are (in this order):
* Long Mode is supported
* NX isn't advertised
* The vendor is Intel
The order of checks has been chosen carefully so a virtualized Xen on a hypervisor that doesn't emulate that MSR (but supports NX) doesn't triple fault trying to access the non-existing MSR.
While at it, make sure we use rdmsr_safe rather than rdmsrl in the Intel-specific init path so we don't accidentally crash if the MSR isn't emulated while Xen is virtualized.
--- xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c | 32 +++++++-------- xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +52 -8
@@ -142,8 +142,8 @@ efi_platform: .section .init.text, "ax", @progbits -bad_cpu: - add $sym_offs(.Lbad_cpu_msg),%esi # Error message +.Lbad_cpu: + add $sym_offs(.Lbad_cpu_msg),%esi jmp .Lget_vtb not_multiboot: add $sym_offs(.Lbad_ldr_msg),%esi # Error message
@@ -647,15 +647,59 @@ trampoline_setup: cpuid 1: mov %edx, CPUINFO_FEATURE_OFFSET(X86_FEATURE_LM) + sym_esi(boot_cpu_data) - /* Check for NX. Adjust EFER setting if available. */ + /* Check for availability of long mode. */ + bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_LM),%edx + jnc .Lbad_cpu + + /* Check for NX */ bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_NX), %edx + jc .Lhas_nx_bit + + /* + * NX appears to be unsupported, but it might be hidden. + * + * Intel CPUs (may) implement MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE. Among other + * things this MSR has a bit that artificially hides NX support in + * CPUID. Xen _really_ wants that feature enabled if present, so we + * have to determine if (a) the MSR exists and if so (b) clear the + * bit. + * + * For native boots this is perfectly fine because the MSR was + * introduced before Netburst, which was the first family to + * provide 64bit support. So we're safe simply accessing it as long + * as long mode support has already been checked. + * + * For the virtualized case the MSR might not be emulated though, + * so we make sure to do an initial check for NX in order to bypass + * this MSR read + */ + xor %eax,%eax + cpuid + cmpl $X86_VENDOR_INTEL_EBX,%ebx + jnz .Lno_nx_bit + cmpl $X86_VENDOR_INTEL_EDX,%edx + jnz .Lno_nx_bit + cmpl $X86_VENDOR_INTEL_ECX,%ecx + jnz .Lno_nx_bit + + /* Clear the XD_DISABLE bit */ + movl $MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, %ecx + rdmsr + btrl $2, %edx jnc 1f - orb $EFER_NXE >> 8, 1 + sym_esi(trampoline_efer) -1: + wrmsr + orb $MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE >> 32, 4 + sym_esi(trampoline_misc_enable_off) - /* Check for availability of long mode. */ - bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_LM),%edx - jnc bad_cpu +1: /* Check again for NX */ + mov $0x80000001,%eax + cpuid + bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_NX), %edx + jnc .Lno_nx_bit + +.Lhas_nx_bit: + /* Adjust EFER is NX is present */ + orb $EFER_NXE >> 8, 1 + sym_esi(trampoline_efer) +.Lno_nx_bit: /* Stash TSC to calculate a good approximation of time-since-boot */ rdtsc
xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +16 -16
@@ -305,23 +305,23 @@ static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_cache_alignment =128 ;/* Unmask CPUID levels and NX if masked: */ -rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable); - - disable = misc_enable & (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID | -MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE ); -if (disable) { -wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable & ~disable); -bootsym (trampoline_misc_enable_off) |= disable; -bootsym (trampoline_efer) |=EFER_NXE ; - } +if (rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable) ==0 ) { + disable = misc_enable & (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID | +MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE ); +if (disable) { +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable & ~disable); +bootsym (trampoline_misc_enable_off) |= disable; +bootsym (trampoline_efer) |=EFER_NXE ; + } -if (disable &MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID ) -printk (KERN_INFO "revised cpuid level: %d\n" , -cpuid_eax (0 )); -if (disable &MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE ) { -write_efer (read_efer () |EFER_NXE ); -printk (KERN_INFO -"re-enabled NX (Execute Disable) protection\n" ); +if (disable &MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID ) +printk (KERN_INFO "revised cpuid level: %d\n" , +cpuid_eax (0 )); +if (disable &MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE ) { +write_efer (read_efer () |EFER_NXE ); +printk (KERN_INFO +"re-enabled NX (Execute Disable) protection\n" ); + } }/* CPUID workaround for Intel 0F33/0F34 CPU */
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +1 -1
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_MONITOR_ENABLE (1<<18)#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID (1<<22)#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XTPR_DISABLE (1<<23) -#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE (1ULL << 34) +#define MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE (_AC(1, ULL) << 34)#define MSR_IA32_TSC_DEADLINE 0x000006E0#define MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS 0x000001b0
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 2/2 x86: Add Kconfig option to require NX bit support
In reply to Alejandro VallejoThis option hardens Xen by forcing it to write secure (NX-enhanced) PTEs regardless of the runtime NX feature bit in boot_cpu_data. This prevents an attacker with partial write support from affecting Xen's PTE generation logic by overriding the NX feature flag. The patch asserts support for the NX bit in PTEs at boot time and if so short-circuits the cpu_has_nx macro to 1.
It has the nice benefit of replacing many instances of runtime checks with folded constants. This has several knock-on effects that improve codegen, saving 2.5KiB off the text section.
The config option defaults to OFF for compatibility with previous behaviour.
--- xen/arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S | 15 ++++++++++++++- xen/arch/x86/boot/trampoline.S | 3 ++- xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h | 9 +++++++++ xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 3 ++- 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/Kconfig +16 -0
@@ -307,6 +307,22 @@ config MEM_SHARING bool "Xen memory sharing support (UNSUPPORTED)" if UNSUPPORTED depends on HVM +config REQUIRE_NX + bool "Require NX bit support" + help + No-eXecute (also called XD "eXecute Disable" and DEP "Data + Execution Prevention") is a security feature designed originally + to combat buffer overflow attacks by marking regions of memory + which the CPU must not interpret as instructions. + + The NX feature exists in every 64bit CPU except for some very + early Pentium 4 Prescott machines. + + Enabling this option will improve Xen's security by removing + cases where Xen could be tricked into thinking that the feature + was unavailable. However, if enabled, Xen will no longer boot on + any CPU which is lacking NX support. + endmenu source "common/Kconfig"
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +14 -1
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ multiboot2_header: .Lbad_ldr_nih: .asciz "ERR: EFI ImageHandle is not provided by bootloader!" .Lbad_efi_msg: .asciz "ERR: EFI IA-32 platforms are not supported!" .Lbag_alg_msg: .asciz "ERR: Xen must be loaded at a 2Mb boundary!" +.Lno_nx_bit_msg: .asciz "ERR: Not an NX-bit capable CPU!" .section .init.data, "aw", @progbits .align 4
@@ -151,6 +152,11 @@ not_multiboot: .Lnot_aligned: add $sym_offs(.Lbag_alg_msg),%esi # Error message jmp .Lget_vtb +#ifdef CONFIG_REQUIRE_NX +.Lno_nx_bit: + add $sym_offs(.Lno_nx_bit_msg),%esi + jmp .Lget_vtb +#endif .Lmb2_no_st: /* * Here we are on EFI platform. vga_text_buffer was zapped earlier
@@ -651,7 +657,12 @@ trampoline_setup: bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_LM),%edx jnc .Lbad_cpu - /* Check for NX */ + /* + * Check for NX + * - If Xen was compiled requiring it simply assert it's + * supported. The trampoline already has the right constant. + * - Otherwise, update the trampoline EFER mask accordingly. + */ bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_NX), %edx jc .Lhas_nx_bit
@@ -697,9 +708,11 @@ trampoline_setup: jnc .Lno_nx_bit .Lhas_nx_bit: +#ifndef CONFIG_REQUIRE_NX /* Adjust EFER is NX is present */ orb $EFER_NXE >> 8, 1 + sym_esi(trampoline_efer) .Lno_nx_bit: +#endif /* Stash TSC to calculate a good approximation of time-since-boot */ rdtsc
xen/arch/x86/boot/trampoline.S +2 -1
@@ -147,7 +147,8 @@ GLOBAL(trampoline_misc_enable_off) /* EFER OR-mask for boot paths. SCE conditional on PV support, NX added when available. */ GLOBAL(trampoline_efer) - .long EFER_LME | (EFER_SCE * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV)) + .long EFER_LME | (EFER_SCE * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV)) | \ + (EFER_NXE * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_REQUIRE_NX)) GLOBAL(trampoline_xen_phys_start) .long 0
xen/arch/x86/efi/efi-boot.h +9 -0
@@ -751,6 +751,15 @@ static void __init efi_arch_cpu(void) { caps[FEATURESET_e1d] =cpuid_edx (0x80000001 ); +/* +* This check purposefully doesn't use cpu_has_nx because +* cpu_has_nx bypasses the boot_cpu_data read if Xen was compiled +* with CONFIG_REQUIRE_NX +*/ +if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_REQUIRE_NX ) && + !boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_NX ) ) +blexit (L"This Xen build requires NX bit support." ); +if ( cpu_has_nx ) trampoline_efer |=EFER_NXE ; }
xen/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +2 -1
@@ -91,7 +91,8 @@ static inline bool boot_cpu_has(unsigned int feat)#define cpu_has_hypervisor boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)/* CPUID level 0x80000001.edx */ -#define cpu_has_nx boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX) +#define cpu_has_nx (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_REQUIRE_NX) || \ + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX))#define cpu_has_page1gb boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PAGE1GB)#define cpu_has_rdtscp boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP)#define cpu_has_3dnow_ext boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_3DNOWEXT)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 1/1 x86/boot: Clean up early error asm
In reply to Alejandro VallejoThe asm forming early error handling is a mix of local and non-local symbols, and has some pointless comments. Drop the "# Error message" comments, tweaking the style on modified lines, and make the symbols local.
However, leave behind one real symbol so this logic disassembles nicely without merging in to acpi_boot_init(), which is the thing that happens to be immediately prior in my build.
No functional change.
---
CC: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
CC: Wei Liu <[email protected]>
CC: Alejandro Vallejo <[email protected]>
Done in order to simplfy Alejandro's NX series a little.
--- xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S | 33 +++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +19 -14
@@ -142,25 +142,27 @@ efi_platform: .section .init.text, "ax", @progbits -bad_cpu: - add $sym_offs(.Lbad_cpu_msg),%esi # Error message +early_error: + +.Lbad_cpu: + add $sym_offs(.Lbad_cpu_msg), %esi jmp .Lget_vtb -not_multiboot: - add $sym_offs(.Lbad_ldr_msg),%esi # Error message +.Lnot_multiboot: + add $sym_offs(.Lbad_ldr_msg), %esi jmp .Lget_vtb .Lnot_aligned: - add $sym_offs(.Lbag_alg_msg),%esi # Error message + add $sym_offs(.Lbag_alg_msg), %esi jmp .Lget_vtb .Lmb2_no_st: /* * Here we are on EFI platform. vga_text_buffer was zapped earlier * because there is pretty good chance that VGA is unavailable. */ - add $sym_offs(.Lbad_ldr_nst),%esi # Error message + add $sym_offs(.Lbad_ldr_nst), %esi jmp .Lget_vtb .Lmb2_no_ih: /* Ditto. */ - add $sym_offs(.Lbad_ldr_nih),%esi # Error message + add $sym_offs(.Lbad_ldr_nih), %esi jmp .Lget_vtb .Lmb2_no_bs: /*
@@ -168,7 +170,7 @@ not_multiboot: * via start label. Then reliable vga_text_buffer zap is impossible * in Multiboot2 scanning loop and we have to zero %edi below. */ - add $sym_offs(.Lbad_ldr_nbs),%esi # Error message + add $sym_offs(.Lbad_ldr_nbs), %esi xor %edi,%edi # No VGA text buffer jmp .Lprint_err .Lmb2_efi_ia_32:
@@ -176,11 +178,11 @@ not_multiboot: * Here we are on EFI IA-32 platform. Then reliable vga_text_buffer zap is * impossible in Multiboot2 scanning loop and we have to zero %edi below. */ - add $sym_offs(.Lbad_efi_msg),%esi # Error message + add $sym_offs(.Lbad_efi_msg), %esi xor %edi,%edi # No VGA text buffer jmp .Lprint_err .Lget_vtb: - mov sym_esi(vga_text_buffer),%edi + mov sym_esi(vga_text_buffer), %edi .Lprint_err: lodsb test %al,%al # Terminate on '\0' sentinel
@@ -202,6 +204,9 @@ not_multiboot: .Lhalt: hlt jmp .Lhalt + .size early_error, . - early_error + .type early_error, @function + .code64 __efi64_mb2_start:
@@ -221,8 +226,8 @@ __efi64_mb2_start: cmp $MULTIBOOT2_BOOTLOADER_MAGIC,%eax je .Lefi_multiboot2_proto - /* Jump to not_multiboot after switching CPU to x86_32 mode. */ - lea not_multiboot(%rip),%r15 + /* Jump to .Lnot_multiboot after switching CPU to x86_32 mode. */ + lea .Lnot_multiboot(%rip), %r15 jmp x86_32_switch .Lefi_multiboot2_proto:
@@ -464,7 +469,7 @@ __start: /* Check for Multiboot bootloader. */ cmp $MULTIBOOT_BOOTLOADER_MAGIC,%eax - jne not_multiboot + jne .Lnot_multiboot /* Get mem_lower from Multiboot information. */ testb $MBI_MEMLIMITS,MB_flags(%ebx)
@@ -655,7 +660,7 @@ trampoline_setup: /* Check for availability of long mode. */ bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_LM),%edx - jnc bad_cpu + jnc .Lbad_cpu /* Stash TSC to calculate a good approximation of time-since-boot */ rdtsc
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/boot: Clear XD_DISABLE from the early boot path
In reply to Alejandro VallejoQuoted 17 lines · Alejandro Vallejo
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +2
-2@@ -142,8 +142,8 @@ efi_platform: .section .init.text, "ax", @progbits -bad_cpu: - add $sym_offs(.Lbad_cpu_msg),%esi # Error message +.Lbad_cpu: + add $sym_offs(.Lbad_cpu_msg),%esi jmp .Lget_vtb not_multiboot: add $sym_offs(.Lbad_ldr_msg),%esi # Error message@@ -647,15 +647,59 @@ trampoline_setup: cpuid
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S trampoline_setup: · line 656
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +6
-11: mov %edx, CPUINFO_FEATURE_OFFSET(X86_FEATURE_LM) + sym_esi(boot_cpu_data) - /* Check for NX. Adjust EFER setting if available. */ + /* Check for availability of long mode. */ + bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_LM),%edx + jnc .Lbad_cpu + + /* Check for NX */ bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_NX), %edx + jc .Lhas_nx_bit
This part of the diff is far more legible when rebased over the 0.5/2 patch I've just emailed out. I've got the rebase locally if you want it.
Although I'd suggest that this label name be .Lgot_nx.
Quoted 8 lines
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +8
-0+ + /* + * NX appears to be unsupported, but it might be hidden. + * + * Intel CPUs (may) implement MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE. Among other + * things this MSR has a bit that artificially hides NX support in + * CPUID. Xen _really_ wants that feature enabled if present, so we + * have to determine if (a) the MSR exists and if so (b) clear the
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S trampoline_setup: · line 674
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +10
-0+ * bit. + * + * For native boots this is perfectly fine because the MSR was + * introduced before Netburst, which was the first family to + * provide 64bit support. So we're safe simply accessing it as long + * as long mode support has already been checked. + * + * For the virtualized case the MSR might not be emulated though, + * so we make sure to do an initial check for NX in order to bypass + * this MSR read
I'd suggest reordering this a bit, and swapping some what for why. How about:
---
NX appears to be unsupported, but it might be hidden.
The feature is part of the AMD64 spec, but the very first Intel 64bit CPUs lacked the feature, and thereafter there was a firmware knob to disable the feature. Undo the disable if possible.
All 64bit Intel CPUs support this MSR. If virtualised, expect the hypervisor to either emulate the MSR or give us NX.
---
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S trampoline_setup: · line 678
Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +4
-0+ */ + xor %eax,%eax + cpuid + cmpl $X86_VENDOR_INTEL_EBX,%ebx
Where possible, spaces after commas and without size suffixes (the l on cmpl here). While not relevant here
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S trampoline_setup: · line 679
Quoted 1 line
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +1
-0+ jnz .Lno_nx_bit
The "_bit" is still redundant. Simply .Lno_nx will do.
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S trampoline_setup: · line 688
Quoted 9 lines
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +9
-0+ cmpl $X86_VENDOR_INTEL_EDX,%edx + jnz .Lno_nx_bit + cmpl $X86_VENDOR_INTEL_ECX,%ecx + jnz .Lno_nx_bit + + /* Clear the XD_DISABLE bit */ + movl $MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, %ecx + rdmsr + btrl $2, %edx
It's unfortunate that we don't have an asm-safe ilog2(). Oh well.
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S trampoline_setup: · line 693
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +3
-5jnc 1f - orb $EFER_NXE >> 8, 1 + sym_esi(trampoline_efer) -1: + wrmsr + orb $MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE >> 32, 4 + sym_esi(trampoline_misc_enable_off) - /* Check for availability of long mode. */ - bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_LM),%edx - jnc bad_cpu +1: /* Check again for NX */
Failing to clear XD_DISABLE wants to go to .Lno_nx, not to re-scan CPUID having done nothing to the MSR.
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S trampoline_setup: · line 700
Quoted 7 lines
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +7
-0+ mov $0x80000001,%eax + cpuid + bt $cpufeat_bit(X86_FEATURE_NX), %edx + jnc .Lno_nx_bit + +.Lhas_nx_bit: + /* Adjust EFER is NX is present */
"Adjust EFER, given that NX is present".
Quoted 8 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +0
-0@@ -305,23 +305,23 @@ static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_cache_alignment =128 ;/* Unmask CPUID levels and NX if masked: */
xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 308
Quoted 10 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +1
-9-rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable); - - disable = misc_enable & (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID | -MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE ); -if (disable) { -wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable & ~disable); -bootsym (trampoline_misc_enable_off) |= disable; -bootsym (trampoline_efer) |=EFER_NXE ; - } +if (rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable) ==0 ) {
There's no need to change rdmsrl() to rdmsr_safe(), and not doing so will shrink this diff a lot.
The only thing you need to alter the re-enable NX printk(), which probably wants to move ahead of the "if (disable)" and source itself from bootsym(trampoline_misc_enable_off) instead.
~Andrew
Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86: Add Kconfig option to require NX bit support
In reply to Alejandro Vallejoxen/arch/x86/Kconfig config MEM_SHARING · line 311
Quoted 10 lines · Alejandro Vallejo
xen/arch/x86/Kconfig +2
-0@@ -307,6 +307,22 @@ config MEM_SHARING bool "Xen memory sharing support (UNSUPPORTED)" if UNSUPPORTED depends on HVM +config REQUIRE_NX + bool "Require NX bit support"
"Require NX (No eXecute) support".
Quoted 22 lines
xen/arch/x86/Kconfig +14
-0+ help + No-eXecute (also called XD "eXecute Disable" and DEP "Data + Execution Prevention") is a security feature designed originally + to combat buffer overflow attacks by marking regions of memory + which the CPU must not interpret as instructions. + + The NX feature exists in every 64bit CPU except for some very + early Pentium 4 Prescott machines. + + Enabling this option will improve Xen's security by removing + cases where Xen could be tricked into thinking that the feature + was unavailable. However, if enabled, Xen will no longer boot on + any CPU which is lacking NX support. + endmenu source "common/Kconfig"xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +0
-0
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S multiboot2_header: · line 126
Quoted 4 lines
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +1
-0@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ multiboot2_header: .Lbad_ldr_nih: .asciz "ERR: EFI ImageHandle is not provided by bootloader!" .Lbad_efi_msg: .asciz "ERR: EFI IA-32 platforms are not supported!" .Lbag_alg_msg: .asciz "ERR: Xen must be loaded at a 2Mb boundary!" +.Lno_nx_bit_msg: .asciz "ERR: Not an NX-bit capable CPU!"
Still two too many "bit"'s in this line.
With these two adjusted, Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH 0.5/2] x86/boot: Clean up early error asm
In reply to Andrew CooperQuoted 11 lines · Andrew Cooper
The asm forming early error handling is a mix of local and non-local symbols, and has some pointless comments. Drop the "# Error message" comments, tweaking the style on modified lines, and make the symbols local.
However, leave behind one real symbol so this logic disassembles nicely without merging in to
acpi_boot_init(), which is the thing that happens to be immediately prior in my build.No functional change.
Signed-off-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>
with one request:
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S efi_platform: · line 145
Quoted 9 lines
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +1
-2@@ -142,25 +142,27 @@ efi_platform: .section .init.text, "ax", @progbits -bad_cpu: - add $sym_offs(.Lbad_cpu_msg),%esi # Error message +early_error:
This symbol, which isn't really used except by .size/.type below, could do with a comment saying that it's intentionally here despite having no real reference.
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S not_multiboot: · line 208
Quoted 6 lines
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +2
-0@@ -202,6 +204,9 @@ not_multiboot: .Lhalt: hlt jmp .Lhalt + .size early_error, . - early_error + .type early_error, @function
At the 1st and 2nd glance this looks unrelated to this patch. Which isn't to say I'm opposed, but of course once we have settled on an annotation model, it'll need touching again anyway.
Jan
Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] x86: Add Kconfig option to require NX bit support
In reply to Alejandro VallejoQuoted 7 lines · Alejandro Vallejo
This option hardens Xen by forcing it to write secure (NX-enhanced) PTEs regardless of the runtime NX feature bit in
boot_cpu_data. This prevents an attacker with partial write support from affecting Xen's PTE generation logic by overriding the NX feature flag. The patch asserts support for the NX bit in PTEs at boot time and if so short-circuits thecpu_has_nxmacro to 1.
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It has the nice benefit of replacing many instances of runtime checks with folded constants. This has several knock-on effects that improve codegen, saving 2.5KiB off the text section.
The config option defaults to OFF for compatibility with previous behaviour.
Signed-off-by Alejandro Vallejo <[email protected]>
Just one nit on top of Andrew's comments:
xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S trampoline_setup: · line 715
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xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +2
-0@@ -697,9 +708,11 @@ trampoline_setup: jnc .Lno_nx_bit .Lhas_nx_bit: +#ifndef CONFIG_REQUIRE_NX /* Adjust EFER is NX is present */ orb $EFER_NXE >> 8, 1 + sym_esi(trampoline_efer) .Lno_nx_bit: +#endif
In the comment the first "is" likely was meant to be "if".
Jan
Re: [PATCH 0.5/2] x86/boot: Clean up early error asm
In reply to Jan BeulichQuoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Andrew Cooper
The asm forming early error handling is a mix of local and non-local symbols, and has some pointless comments. Drop the "# Error message" comments, tweaking the style on modified lines, and make the symbols local.
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However, leave behind one real symbol so this logic disassembles nicely without merging in to
acpi_boot_init(), which is the thing that happens to be immediately prior in my build.No functional change.
Signed-off-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Thanks.
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with one request:
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xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +0
-0@@ -142,25 +142,27 @@ efi_platform:
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xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S efi_platform: · line 145
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xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +1
-2.section .init.text, "ax", @progbits -bad_cpu: - add $sym_offs(.Lbad_cpu_msg),%esi # Error message +early_error:This symbol, which isn't really used except by .size/.type below, could do with a comment saying that it's intentionally here despite having no real reference.
Ok. /* Here to make the disassembly better. */ ?
The .Lbad_cpu jmp will end up disassembling to early_error+0, so it is technically referenced, but I see your point.
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xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S not_multiboot: · line 208
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xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +2
-0@@ -202,6 +204,9 @@ not_multiboot: .Lhalt: hlt jmp .Lhalt + .size early_error, . - early_error + .type early_error, @functionAt the 1st and 2nd glance this looks unrelated to this patch. Which isn't to say I'm opposed, but of course once we have settled on an annotation model, it'll need touching again anyway.
I know it's going to need changing, but in the short term I'm at least making sure the metadata is correct on new additions to asm code.
~Andrew
Re: [PATCH 0.5/2] x86/boot: Clean up early error asm
Quoted 25 lines · Andrew Cooper
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 4 lines · Andrew Cooper
The asm forming early error handling is a mix of local and non-local symbols, and has some pointless comments. Drop the "# Error message" comments, tweaking the style on modified lines, and make the symbols local.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 7 lines
However, leave behind one real symbol so this logic disassembles nicely without merging in to
acpi_boot_init(), which is the thing that happens to be immediately prior in my build.No functional change.
Signed-off-by Andrew Cooper <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Thanks.
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with one request:
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xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +0
-0@@ -142,25 +142,27 @@ efi_platform: .section .init.text, "ax", @progbits
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xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S efi_platform: · line 145
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xen/arch/x86/boot/head.S +1
-2-bad_cpu: - add $sym_offs(.Lbad_cpu_msg),%esi # Error message +early_error:This symbol, which isn't really used except by .size/.type below, could do with a comment saying that it's intentionally here despite having no real reference.
Ok. /* Here to make the disassembly better. */ ?
Yes please.
Jan
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/boot: Clear XD_DISABLE from the early boot path
In reply to Andrew CooperSure, to everything before this
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xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +0
-0@@ -305,23 +305,23 @@ static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_cache_alignment =128 ;
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xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 308
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xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +1
-9/* Unmask CPUID levels and NX if masked: */ -rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable); - - disable = misc_enable & (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID | -MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE ); -if (disable) { -wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable & ~disable); -bootsym (trampoline_misc_enable_off) |= disable; -bootsym (trampoline_efer) |=EFER_NXE ; - } +if (rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable) ==0 ) {There's no need to change
rdmsrl()tordmsr_safe(),
I thought we established before some hypervisors might not implement it. In that case this function would crash. More gracefully than a triple fault, sure, but still not a very friendly thing to do.
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and not doing so will shrink this diff a lot.
This particular one, yes. That said, looking more carefully I'd say I should remove the XD_DISABLE parts of those lines altogether. It is unconditionally cleared on boot now and will never ever have a non-zero value at this point.
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The only thing you need to alter the re-enable NX
printk(), which probably wants to move ahead of the "if (disable)" and source itself frombootsym(trampoline_misc_enable_off)instead.
Alternatively I could just get rid of the printk. As it is after this patch even the BSP starts off with NX enabled. EFER is updated as early as the trampoline, which is as early as it would've happened before regardless of XD_DISABLE.
Alejandro
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/boot: Clear XD_DISABLE from the early boot path
Quoted 22 lines · Alejandro Vallejo
Sure, to everything before this
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xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +0
-0@@ -305,23 +305,23 @@ static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_cache_alignment =128 ;Quoted 13 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 308
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xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +1
-9/* Unmask CPUID levels and NX if masked: */ -rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable); - - disable = misc_enable & (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID | -MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE ); -if (disable) { -wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable & ~disable); -bootsym (trampoline_misc_enable_off) |= disable; -bootsym (trampoline_efer) |=EFER_NXE ; - } +if (rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable) ==0 ) {There's no need to change
rdmsrl()tordmsr_safe(),
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I thought we established before some hypervisors might not implement it. In that case this function would crash. More gracefully than a triple fault, sure, but still not a very friendly thing to do.
Yet then in early boot code you also don't (and can't) recover from getting #GP(0), in case that might really happen.
Jan
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/boot: Clear XD_DISABLE from the early boot path
Quoted 23 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 22 lines · Alejandro Vallejo
Sure, to everything before this
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xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +0
-0@@ -305,23 +305,23 @@ static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_cache_alignment =128 ;/* Unmask CPUID levels and NX if masked: */ xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 308
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xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +1
-9-rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable); - - disable = misc_enable & (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID | -MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE ); -if (disable) { -wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable & ~disable); -bootsym (trampoline_misc_enable_off) |= disable; -bootsym (trampoline_efer) |=EFER_NXE ; - } +if (rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable) ==0 ) {There's no need to change
rdmsrl()tordmsr_safe(),
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I thought we established before some hypervisors might not implement it. In that case this function would crash. More gracefully than a triple fault, sure, but still not a very friendly thing to do.
Yet then in early boot code you also don't (and can't) recover from getting #GP(0), in case that might really happen.
Jan
That's true, strictly speaking, but that case is restricted to the incredibly unlikely case of "no NX and no MSR". As is, if we ever boot on an Intel machine without that MSR we'll hit #GP(0), regardless of NX.
Not that it matters a whole lot though. It's pretty unlikely we'll ever trip there.
Alejandro
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/boot: Clear XD_DISABLE from the early boot path
Quoted 28 lines · Alejandro Vallejo
Quoted 27 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 25 lines · Alejandro Vallejo
Sure, to everything before this
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xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +0
-0@@ -305,23 +305,23 @@ static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) c->x86_cache_alignment =128 ;Quoted 13 lines
xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c static void cf_check early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 308
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xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c +1
-9/* Unmask CPUID levels and NX if masked: */ -rdmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable); - - disable = misc_enable & (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID | -MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_XD_DISABLE ); -if (disable) { -wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable & ~disable); -bootsym (trampoline_misc_enable_off) |= disable; -bootsym (trampoline_efer) |=EFER_NXE ; - } +if (rdmsr_safe (MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE , misc_enable) ==0 ) {There's no need to change
rdmsrl()tordmsr_safe(),I thought we established before some hypervisors might not implement it. In that case this function would crash. More gracefully than a triple fault, sure, but still not a very friendly thing to do.
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Yet then in early boot code you also don't (and can't) recover from getting #GP(0), in case that might really happen.
That's true, strictly speaking, but that case is restricted to the incredibly unlikely case of "no NX and no MSR". As is, if we ever boot on an Intel machine without that MSR we'll hit #GP(0), regardless of NX.
Well, my comment was meant to support Andrew's earlier one. Why check the MSR access here when we don't earlier on? Plus isn't it the case that the MSR can be implied to exist when NX is (in principle) available, as that "opt-out" existed specifically when Intel first introduced NX on their CPUs? If so,
- when NX is not available, we would have crashed much earlier,
- when NX is available (or was turned on successfully) the MSR exists either because we wrote to it earlier or because we're on a newer CPU.
Jan