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PMKID changes

PATCH In review James Prestwood 2 participants 6 messages Jun 20, 2023 – Jun 27, 2023

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover PMKID changes

v2:
* Pass checksum type to handshake_state_get_pmkid
* Added back in comments regarding AKMs and SHA sizes
* Moved comment regarding preath/SHA1 into station.c where SHA1 is passed directly
* The older discussion from past patchsets about preauthentication was mostly left out as it pertains to when you choose preauth as opposed to the SHA sizes that this patchset is about.

James Prestwood (3):
crypto: modify crypto_derive_pmkid to take the length/checksum type
handshake: split handshake_state_get_pmkid into separate APIs
handshake: handshake: add FT_OVER_8021X AKM for SHA256 PMKID
derivation

 src/crypto.c    | 10 ++++----
 src/crypto.h    |  5 ++--
 src/eapol.c     | 11 +++------
 src/handshake.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 src/handshake.h |  6 +++--
 src/station.c   | 10 +++++++-
 6 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/3 crypto: modify crypto_derive_pmkid to take the length/checksum type

The existing API was limited to SHA1 or SHA256 and assumed a key length of 32 bytes. Since other AKMs plan to be added update this to take the checksum/length directly for better flexibility.

---
 src/crypto.c    | 10 ++++------
 src/crypto.h    |  5 +++--
 src/eapol.c     |  4 ++--
 src/handshake.c |  9 ++++-----
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
src/crypto.c +4 -6
index 840d9ee4..099b8695 100644
@@ -1116,9 +1116,10 @@ exit:
 }
 
 /* Defined in 802.11-2012, Section 11.6.1.3 Pairwise Key Hierarchy */
-bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk,
+bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk, size_t key_len,
 				const uint8_t *addr1, const uint8_t *addr2,
-				uint8_t *out_pmkid, bool use_sha256)
+				uint8_t *out_pmkid,
+				enum l_checksum_type checksum)
 {
 	uint8_t data[20];
 
@@ -1126,10 +1127,7 @@ bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk,
 	memcpy(data + 8, addr2, 6);
 	memcpy(data + 14, addr1, 6);
 
-	if (use_sha256)
-		return hmac_sha256(pmk, 32, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
-	else
-		return hmac_sha1(pmk, 32, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
+	return hmac_common(checksum, pmk, key_len, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
 }
 
 enum l_checksum_type crypto_sae_hash_from_ecc_prime_len(enum crypto_sae type,
src/crypto.h +3 -2
index ed430abb..d2a96655 100644
@@ -154,9 +154,10 @@ bool crypto_derive_ft_ptk(const uint8_t *pmk_r1, const uint8_t *pmk_r1_name,
 				bool sha384, uint8_t *out_ptk, size_t ptk_len,
 				uint8_t *out_ptk_name);
 
-bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk,
+bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk, size_t key_len,
 				const uint8_t *addr1, const uint8_t *addr2,
-				uint8_t *out_pmkid, bool use_sha256);
+				uint8_t *out_pmkid,
+				enum l_checksum_type checksum);
 
 enum crypto_sae {
 	CRYPTO_SAE_LOOPING,
src/eapol.c +2 -2
index 37f5eaaa..f290f40a 100644
@@ -1112,8 +1112,8 @@ static void eapol_send_ptk_1_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm)
 	memcpy(ek->key_nonce, sm->handshake->anonce, sizeof(ek->key_nonce));
 
 	/* Write the PMKID KDE into Key Data field unencrypted */
-	crypto_derive_pmkid(sm->handshake->pmk, sm->handshake->spa, aa,
-			pmkid, false);
+	crypto_derive_pmkid(sm->handshake->pmk, 32, sm->handshake->spa, aa,
+			pmkid, L_CHECKSUM_SHA1);
 
 	eapol_key_data_append(ek, sm->mic_len, HANDSHAKE_KDE_PMKID, pmkid, 16);
 
src/handshake.c +4 -5
index cd9b3082..ac5bda51 100644
@@ -736,7 +736,7 @@ void handshake_state_set_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *pmkid)
 
 bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid)
 {
-	bool use_sha256;
+	enum l_checksum_type sha;
 
 	/* SAE exports pmkid */
 	if (s->have_pmkid) {
@@ -757,12 +757,11 @@ bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid)
 
 	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |
 			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256))
-		use_sha256 = true;
+		sha = L_CHECKSUM_SHA256;
 	else
-		use_sha256 = false;
+		sha = L_CHECKSUM_SHA1;
 
-	return crypto_derive_pmkid(s->pmk, s->spa, s->aa, out_pmkid,
-					use_sha256);
+	return crypto_derive_pmkid(s->pmk, 32, s->spa, s->aa, out_pmkid, sha);
 }
 
 void handshake_state_set_gtk(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *key,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/3 handshake: split handshake_state_get_pmkid into separate APIs

In reply to James Prestwood

The PMKID derivation has gotten messy due to the spec updating/clarifying the hash size for the FT-8021X AKM. This has led to hostapd updating the derivation which leaves older hostapd versions using SHA1 and newer versions using SHA256.

To support this the checksum type is being fed to handshake_state_get_pmkid so the caller can decide what sha to use. In addition handshake_state_pmkid_matches is being added which uses get_pmkid() but handles sorting out the hash type automatically.

This lets preauthentication use handshake_state_get_pmkid where there is the potential that a new PMKID is derived and eapol can use handshake_state_pmkid_matches which only derives the PMKID to compare against the peers.

---
 src/eapol.c     |  7 +------
 src/handshake.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-----------
 src/handshake.h |  6 ++++--
 src/station.c   | 10 +++++++++-
 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
src/eapol.c +1 -6
index f290f40a..6fb2f306 100644
@@ -1234,12 +1234,7 @@ static void eapol_handle_ptk_1_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm,
 		if (!found)
 			goto error_unspecified;
 	} else if (pmkid) {
-		uint8_t own_pmkid[16];
-
-		if (!handshake_state_get_pmkid(sm->handshake, own_pmkid))
-			goto error_unspecified;
-
-		if (l_secure_memcmp(pmkid, own_pmkid, 16)) {
+		if (!handshake_state_pmkid_matches(sm->handshake, pmkid)) {
 			l_debug("Authenticator sent a PMKID that didn't match");
 
 			/*
src/handshake.c +15 -11
index ac5bda51..46755841 100644
@@ -734,10 +734,9 @@ void handshake_state_set_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *pmkid)
 	s->have_pmkid = true;
 }
 
-bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid)
+bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid,
+				enum l_checksum_type sha)
 {
-	enum l_checksum_type sha;
-
 	/* SAE exports pmkid */
 	if (s->have_pmkid) {
 		memcpy(out_pmkid, s->pmkid, 16);
@@ -747,13 +746,15 @@ bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid)
 	if (!s->have_pmk)
 		return false;
 
-	/*
-	 * Note 802.11 section 11.6.1.3:
-	 * "When the PMKID is calculated for the PMKSA as part of RSN
-	 * preauthentication, the AKM has not yet been negotiated. In this
-	 * case, the HMAC-SHA1-128 based derivation is used for the PMKID
-	 * calculation."
-	 */
+	return crypto_derive_pmkid(s->pmk, 32, s->spa, s->aa, out_pmkid,
+					sha);
+}
+
+bool handshake_state_pmkid_matches(struct handshake_state *s,
+					const uint8_t *check)
+{
+	uint8_t own_pmkid[16];
+	enum l_checksum_type sha;
 
 	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |
 			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256))
@@ -761,7 +762,10 @@ bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid)
 	else
 		sha = L_CHECKSUM_SHA1;
 
-	return crypto_derive_pmkid(s->pmk, 32, s->spa, s->aa, out_pmkid, sha);
+	if (!handshake_state_get_pmkid(s, own_pmkid, sha))
+		return false;
+
+	return l_secure_memcmp(own_pmkid, check, 16) == 0;
 }
 
 void handshake_state_set_gtk(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *key,
src/handshake.h +4 -2
index 863ffac7..7200c361 100644
@@ -269,8 +269,10 @@ void handshake_state_install_igtk(struct handshake_state *s,
 void handshake_state_override_pairwise_cipher(struct handshake_state *s,
 					enum ie_rsn_cipher_suite pairwise);
 
-bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid);
-
+bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid,
+				enum l_checksum_type sha);
+bool handshake_state_pmkid_matches(struct handshake_state *s,
+					const uint8_t *check);
 bool handshake_decode_fte_key(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *wrapped,
 				size_t key_len, uint8_t *key_out);
 
src/station.c +9 -1
index f830ab7a..2473de2a 100644
@@ -2236,7 +2236,15 @@ static void station_preauthenticate_cb(struct netdev *netdev,
 					new_hs->supplicant_ie[1] + 2,
 					&rsn_info);
 
-		handshake_state_get_pmkid(new_hs, pmkid);
+		/*
+		 * IEEE 802.11 Section 12.7.1.3:
+		 *
+		 * "When the PMKID is calculated for the PMKSA as part of
+		 * preauthentication, the AKM has not yet been negotiated.
+		 * In this case, the HMAC-SHA-1 based derivation is used for
+		 * the PMKID calculation."
+		 */
+		handshake_state_get_pmkid(new_hs, pmkid, L_CHECKSUM_SHA1);
 
 		rsn_info.num_pmkids = 1;
 		rsn_info.pmkids = pmkid;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/3 handshake: handshake: add FT_OVER_8021X AKM for SHA256 PMKID derivation

In reply to James Prestwood

Hostapd commit b6d3fd05e3 changed the PMKID derivation in accordance with 802.11-2020 which then breaks PMKID validation in IWD. This breaks the FT-8021x AKM in IWD if the AP uses this hostapd version since the PMKID doesn't validate during EAPoL.

This updates the PMKID derivation to use the correct SHA hash for this AKM, and following patches will address backwards compatibility with older hostapd versions.

---
 src/handshake.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
src/handshake.c +32 -2
index 46755841..6b93774a 100644
@@ -756,8 +756,26 @@ bool handshake_state_pmkid_matches(struct handshake_state *s,
 	uint8_t own_pmkid[16];
 	enum l_checksum_type sha;
 
+	/*
+	 * 802.11-2020 Table 9-151 defines the hashing algorithm to use
+	 * for various AKM's. Note some AKMs are omitted here because they
+	 * export the PMKID individually (SAE/FILS/FT-PSK)
+	 *
+	 * SHA1:
+	 * 	00-0F-AC:1 (8021X)
+	 * 	00-0F-AC:2 (PSK)
+	 *
+	 * SHA256:
+	 * 	00-0F-AC:3 (FT-8021X)
+	 * 	00-0F-AC:5 (8021X-SHA256)
+	 * 	00-0F-AC:6 (PSK-SHA256)
+	 *
+	 * SHA384:
+	 * 	00-0F-AC:13 (FT-8021X-SHA384)
+	 */
 	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |
-			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256))
+			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256 |
+			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X))
 		sha = L_CHECKSUM_SHA256;
 	else
 		sha = L_CHECKSUM_SHA1;
@@ -765,7 +783,19 @@ bool handshake_state_pmkid_matches(struct handshake_state *s,
 	if (!handshake_state_get_pmkid(s, own_pmkid, sha))
 		return false;
 
-	return l_secure_memcmp(own_pmkid, check, 16) == 0;
+	if (l_secure_memcmp(own_pmkid, check, 16)) {
+		if (s->akm_suite != IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X)
+			return false;
+
+		l_debug("PMKID did not match, trying SHA1 derivation");
+
+		if (!handshake_state_get_pmkid(s, own_pmkid, L_CHECKSUM_SHA1))
+			return false;
+
+		return l_secure_memcmp(own_pmkid, check, 16) == 0;
+	}
+
+	return true;
 }
 
 void handshake_state_set_gtk(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *key,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#4 lore raw
In reply to James Prestwood

Hi James,

Quoted 9 lines · James Prestwood

v2:
* Pass checksum type to handshake_state_get_pmkid
* Added back in comments regarding AKMs and SHA sizes
* Moved comment regarding preath/SHA1 into station.c where SHA1 is passed directly
* The older discussion from past patchsets about preauthentication was mostly left out as it pertains to when you choose preauth as opposed to the SHA sizes that this patchset is about.

All applied. I changed the wording of patch 3 description slightly since it referred to forthcoming patches that I assume are no longer needed. Please make sure you're fine with the verbiage.

Regards,
-Denis

#5 lore raw
Quoted 13 lines · Denis Kenzior

Hi James,

Quoted 9 lines · James Prestwood

v2:
  * Pass checksum type to handshake_state_get_pmkid
  * Added back in comments regarding AKMs and SHA sizes
  * Moved comment regarding preath/SHA1 into station.c where SHA1 is passed directly
  * The older discussion from past patchsets about preauthentication was mostly left out as it pertains to when you choose preauth as opposed to the SHA sizes that this patchset is about.

Quoted 1 line

All applied.  I changed the wording of patch 3 description slightly since it referred to forthcoming patches that I assume are no longer needed.  Please make sure you're fine with the verbiage.

Yep, LGTM

Quoted 4 lines

Regards,
-Denis