orangefs: fix out-of-bounds fsid access
PATCH 1/1 orangefs: fix out-of-bounds fsid access
From: Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
orangefs_statfs() copies two consecutive fields of the superblock into the statfs structure, which triggers a warning from the string fortification helpers:
In file included from fs/orangefs/super.c:8:include/linux/fortify-string.h:592:4: error: call to '__read_overflow2_field' declared with 'warning' attribute: detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Werror,-Wattribute-warning]
__read_overflow2_field(q_size_field, size);
Change the memcpy() to an individual assignment of the two fields, which helps both the compiler and human readers understand better what it does.
Signed-off-by Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
--- fs/orangefs/super.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/orangefs/super.c +4 -1
@@ -201,7 +201,10 @@ static int orangefs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf) (long)new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.files_avail); buf->f_type = sb->s_magic; -memcpy (&buf->f_fsid, &ORANGEFS_SB (sb)->fs_id,sizeof (buf->f_fsid)); + buf->f_fsid = (__kernel_fsid_t ) {{ +ORANGEFS_SB (sb)->fs_id, +ORANGEFS_SB (sb)->id, + }}; buf->f_bsize = new_op->downcall.resp.statfs.block_size; buf->f_namelen =ORANGEFS_NAME_MAX ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.2