net/sched: act_ipt bug fixes
Subsystems (3)
v3 cover net/sched: act_ipt bug fixes
v3: prefer skb_header() helper in patch 2. No other changes. I've retained Acks and RvB-Tags of v2.
While checking if netfilter could be updated to replace selected instances of NF_DROP with kfree_skb_reason+NF_STOLEN to improve debugging info via drop monitor I found that act_ipt is incompatible with such an approach. Moreover, it lacks multiple sanity checks to avoid certain code paths that make assumptions that the tc layer doesn't meet, such as header sanity checks, availability of skb_dst, skb_nfct() and so on.
act_ipt test in the tc selftest still pass with this applied.
I think that we should consider removal of this module, while this should take care of all problems, its ipv4 only and I don't think there are any netfilter targets that lack a native tc equivalent, even when ignoring bpf.
Florian Westphal (3):
net/sched: act_ipt: add sanity checks on table name and hook locations net/sched: act_ipt: add sanity checks on skb before calling target net/sched: act_ipt: zero skb->cb before calling target
net/sched/act_ipt.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.3
PATCH v3 1/3 net/sched: act_ipt: add sanity checks on table name and hook locations
Looks like "tc" hard-codes "mangle" as the only supported table name, but on kernel side there are no checks.
This is wrong. Not all xtables targets are safe to call from tc. E.g. "nat" targets assume skb has a conntrack object assigned to it. Normally those get called from netfilter nat core which consults the nat table to obtain the address mapping.
"tc" userspace either sets PRE or POSTROUTING as hook number, but there is no validation of this on kernel side, so update netlink policy to reject bogus numbers. Some targets may assume skb_dst is set for input/forward hooks, so prevent those from being used.
act_ipt uses the hook number in two places:
1. the state hook number, this is fine as-is
2. to set par.hook_mask
The latter is a bit mask, so update the assignment to make xt_check_target() to the right thing.
Followup patch adds required checks for the skb/packet headers before calling the targets evaluation function.
--- net/sched/act_ipt.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/sched/act_ipt.c +20 -7
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static int ipt_init_target(struct net *net, struct xt_entry_target *t, par.entryinfo = &e; par.target = target; par.targinfo = t->data; - par.hook_mask = hook; + par.hook_mask =1 << hook; par.family =NFPROTO_IPV4 ; ret =xt_check_target (&par, t->u.target_size -sizeof (*t),0 , false);
@@ -85,7 +85,8 @@ static void tcf_ipt_release(struct tc_action *a)static const struct nla_policy ipt_policy[TCA_IPT_MAX +1 ] = { [TCA_IPT_TABLE ] = { .type =NLA_STRING , .len =IFNAMSIZ }, - [TCA_IPT_HOOK ] = { .type =NLA_U32 }, + [TCA_IPT_HOOK ] =NLA_POLICY_RANGE (NLA_U32 ,NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING , +NF_INET_NUMHOOKS ), [TCA_IPT_INDEX ] = { .type =NLA_U32 }, [TCA_IPT_TARG ] = { .len =sizeof (struct xt_entry_target ) }, };
@@ -158,15 +159,27 @@ static int __tcf_ipt_init(struct net *net, unsigned int id, struct nlattr *nla,return -EEXIST ; } } + + err = -EINVAL ; hook =nla_get_u32 (tb[TCA_IPT_HOOK ]); +switch (hook) { +case NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING : +break ; +case NF_INET_POST_ROUTING : +break ; +default : + goto err1; + } + +if (tb[TCA_IPT_TABLE ]) { +/* mangle only for now */ +if (nla_strcmp (tb[TCA_IPT_TABLE ],"mangle" )) + goto err1; + } - err = -ENOMEM ; - tname =kmalloc (IFNAMSIZ ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tname =kstrdup ("mangle" ,GFP_KERNEL );if (unlikely (!tname)) goto err1; -if (tb[TCA_IPT_TABLE ] ==NULL || -nla_strscpy (tname, tb[TCA_IPT_TABLE ],IFNAMSIZ ) >=IFNAMSIZ ) -strcpy (tname,"mangle" ); t =kmemdup (td, td->u.target_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (unlikely (!t))
Signature · 1 line
2.39.3
PATCH v3 2/3 net/sched: act_ipt: add sanity checks on skb before calling target
In reply to Florian WestphalNetfilter targets make assumptions on the skb state, for example iphdr is supposed to be in the linear area.
This is normally done by IP stack, but in act_ipt case no such checks are made.
Some targets can even assume that skb_dst will be valid. Make a minimum effort to check for this:
- Don't call the targets eval function for non-ipv4 skbs.
- Don't call the targets eval function for POSTROUTING emulation when the skb has no dst set.
v3: use skb_protocol helper (Davide Caratti)
--- net/sched/act_ipt.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+)
net/sched/act_ipt.c +33 -0
@@ -230,6 +230,26 @@ static int tcf_xt_init(struct net *net, struct nlattr *nla, a, &act_xt_ops, tp, flags); } +static bool tcf_ipt_act_check (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +const struct iphdr *iph; +unsigned int nhoff, len; + +if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,sizeof (struct iphdr ))) +return false; + + nhoff =skb_network_offset (skb); + iph =ip_hdr (skb); +if (iph->ihl <5 || iph->version !=4 ) +return false; + + len =skb_ip_totlen (skb); +if (skb->len < nhoff + len || len < (iph->ihl *4u )) +return false; + +return pskb_may_pull (skb, iph->ihl *4u ); +} + TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_ipt_act(struct sk_buff *skb,const struct tc_action *a,struct tcf_result *res)
@@ -244,9 +264,22 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_ipt_act(struct sk_buff *skb, .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, }; +if (skb_protocol (skb, false) !=htons (ETH_P_IP )) +return TC_ACT_UNSPEC ; +if (skb_unclone (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ))return TC_ACT_UNSPEC ; +if (!tcf_ipt_act_check (skb)) +return TC_ACT_UNSPEC ; + +if (state.hook ==NF_INET_POST_ROUTING ) { +if (!skb_dst (skb)) +return TC_ACT_UNSPEC ; + + state.out = skb->dev; + } +spin_lock (&ipt->tcf_lock);tcf_lastuse_update (&ipt->tcf_tm);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.3
PATCH v3 3/3 net/sched: act_ipt: zero skb->cb before calling target
In reply to Florian Westphalxtables relies on skb being owned by ip stack, i.e. with ipv4 check in place skb->cb is supposed to be IPCB.
I don't see an immediate problem (REJECT target cannot be used anymore now that PRE/POSTROUTING hook validation has been fixed), but better be safe than sorry.
A much better patch would be to either mark act_ipt as "depends on BROKEN" or remove it altogether. I plan to do this for -next in the near future.
This tc extension is broken in the sense that tc lacks an equivalent of NF_STOLEN verdict.
With NF_STOLEN, target function takes complete ownership of skb, caller cannot dereference it anymore.
ACT_STOLEN cannot be used for this: it has a different meaning, caller is allowed to dereference the skb.
At this time NF_STOLEN won't be returned by any targets as far as I can see, but this may change in the future.
It might be possible to work around this via list of allowed target extensions known to only return DROP or ACCEPT verdicts, but this is error prone/fragile.
Existing selftest only validates xt_LOG and act_ipt is restricted to ipv4 so I don't think this action is used widely.
--- net/sched/act_ipt.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
net/sched/act_ipt.c +10 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@#include <linux/tc_act/tc_ipt.h> #include <net/tc_act/tc_ipt.h> #include <net/tc_wrapper.h> +#include <net/ip.h> #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
@@ -254,6 +255,7 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_ipt_act(struct sk_buff *skb,const struct tc_action *a, struct tcf_result *res) { + char saved_cb[sizeof_field(struct sk_buff, cb)];int ret =0 , result =0 ;struct tcf_ipt *ipt =to_ipt (a);struct xt_action_param par;
@@ -280,6 +282,8 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_ipt_act(struct sk_buff *skb, state.out = skb->dev; } +memcpy (saved_cb, skb->cb,sizeof (saved_cb)); +spin_lock (&ipt->tcf_lock);tcf_lastuse_update (&ipt->tcf_tm);
@@ -292,6 +296,9 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_ipt_act(struct sk_buff *skb, par.state = &state; par.target = ipt->tcfi_t->u.kernel.target; par.targinfo = ipt->tcfi_t->data; + +memset (IPCB (skb),0 ,sizeof (struct inet_skb_parm )); + ret = par.target->target (skb, &par);switch (ret) {
@@ -312,6 +319,9 @@ TC_INDIRECT_SCOPE int tcf_ipt_act(struct sk_buff *skb,break ; }spin_unlock (&ipt->tcf_lock); + +memcpy (skb->cb, saved_cb,sizeof (skb->cb)); +return result; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.3
This series was applied to netdev/net.git (main) by Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This series was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>:
Quoted 11 lines · On Tue, 27 Jun 2023 14:38:10 +0200 you wrote:
v3: prefer
skb_header()helper in patch 2. No other changes. I've retained Acks and RvB-Tags of v2.While checking if netfilter could be updated to replace selected instances of
NF_DROPwith kfree_skb_reason+NF_STOLEN to improve debugging info via drop monitor I found thatact_iptis incompatible with such an approach. Moreover, it lacks multiple sanity checks to avoid certain code paths that make assumptions that the tc layer doesn't meet, such as header sanity checks, availability ofskb_dst,skb_nfct()and so on.
Quoted 1 line
[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net,v3,1/3] net/sched: act_ipt: add sanity checks on table name and hook locations
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/b4ee93380b3c - [net,v3,2/3] net/sched: act_ipt: add sanity checks on skb before calling target https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/b2dc32dcba08 - [net,v3,3/3] net/sched: act_ipt: zero skb->cb before calling target https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/93d75d475c5d
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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