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efi: Secure Boot fixes

PATCH Superseded Daniel Kiper 2 participants 6 messages Jun 28, 2023

v1 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

cover efi: Secure Boot fixes

Hi,

Here are two fixes for Secure Boot issues reported recently. Please review and test.

Daniel

Daniel Kiper (2):
efi: Drop __grub_efi_api attribute from shim_lock->verify() call
efi: Fallback to legacy mode if shim is loaded on x86 archs

 grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c      | 10 ++++++++++
 grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 include/grub/efi/api.h       |  2 +-
 include/grub/efi/sb.h        |  5 ++++-
 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 efi: Drop __grub_efi_api attribute from shim_lock->verify() call

... because (surprisingly) it uses System V AMD64 ABI on x86-64 architecture...

Fixes 6a080b9cd (efi: Add calling convention annotation to all prototypes)
---
 include/grub/efi/api.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/grub/efi/api.h +1 -1
index 16161e1f0..f3c50ed5d 100644
@@ -1777,7 +1777,7 @@ typedef struct grub_efi_block_io grub_efi_block_io_t;
 
 struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol
 {
-  grub_efi_status_t (__grub_efi_api *verify) (void *buffer, grub_uint32_t size);
+  grub_efi_status_t (*verify) (void *buffer, grub_uint32_t size);
 };
 typedef struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
Acked-by on v1 1/2
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/2] efi: Drop __grub_efi_api attribute from shim_lock->verify() call

Quoted 7 lines · Daniel Kiper

... because (surprisingly) it uses System V AMD64 ABI on x86-64 architecture...

Fixes 6a080b9cd (efi: Add calling convention annotation to all prototypes)
Quoted 20 lines
---
 include/grub/efi/api.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/grub/efi/api.h +1 -2
index 16161e1f0..f3c50ed5d 100644
@@ -1777,7 +1777,7 @@ typedef struct grub_efi_block_io grub_efi_block_io_t;
 
 struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol
 {
-  grub_efi_status_t (__grub_efi_api *verify) (void *buffer, grub_uint32_t size);
+  grub_efi_status_t (*verify) (void *buffer, grub_uint32_t size);
 };
 typedef struct grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol grub_efi_shim_lock_protocol_t;
 
--

2.11.0

#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 efi: Fallback to legacy mode if shim is loaded on x86 archs

In reply to Daniel Kiper

The LoadImage() provided by the shim does not consult MOK when loading an image. So, simply signature verification fails when it should not. This means we cannot use Linux EFI stub to start the kernel when the shim is loaded. We have to fallback to legacy mode on x86 architectures. This is not possible on other architectures due to lack of legacy mode.

This is workaround which should disappear when the shim provides LoadImage() which looks up MOK during signature verification.

On the occasion align constants in include/grub/efi/sb.h.

---
 grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c      | 10 ++++++++++
 grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 include/grub/efi/sb.h        |  5 ++++-
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c +10 -0
index 80cfa0888..60550a6da 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
 
 static grub_guid_t shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
 
+static bool shim_lock_enabled = false;
+
 /*
  * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
  *
@@ -215,6 +217,14 @@ grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (void)
   /* Enforce shim_lock_verifier. */
   grub_verifier_register (&shim_lock_verifier);
 
+  shim_lock_enabled = true;
+
   grub_env_set ("shim_lock", "y");
   grub_env_export ("shim_lock");
 }
+
+bool
+grub_is_shim_lock_enabled (void)
+{
+  return shim_lock_enabled;
+}
grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c +13 -0
index c1eef7c98..5fb2ad01f 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <grub/efi/fdtload.h>
 #include <grub/efi/memory.h>
 #include <grub/efi/pe32.h>
+#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
 #include <grub/i18n.h>
 #include <grub/lib/cmdline.h>
 #include <grub/verify.h>
@@ -458,6 +459,18 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
 
   grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
 
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+  if (grub_is_shim_lock_enabled () == true)
+    {
+      err = grub_cmd_linux_x86_legacy (cmd, argc, argv);
+
+      if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+	return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+      else
+	goto fail;
+    }
+#endif
+
   if (argc == 0)
     {
       grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("filename expected"));
include/grub/efi/sb.h +4 -1
index 30c4335bb..49a9ad01c 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 #include <grub/types.h>
 #include <grub/dl.h>
 
-#define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNSET	0
+#define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNSET		0
 #define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNKNOWN	1
 #define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED	2
 #define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED	3
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
 extern grub_uint8_t
 EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_get_secureboot) (void);
 
+extern bool
+EXPORT_FUNC (grub_is_shim_lock_enabled) (void);
+
 extern void
 grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (void);
 #else
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi: Fallback to legacy mode if shim is loaded on x86 archs

Quoted 60 lines · Daniel Kiper

The LoadImage() provided by the shim does not consult MOK when loading an image. So, simply signature verification fails when it should not. This means we cannot use Linux EFI stub to start the kernel when the shim is loaded. We have to fallback to legacy mode on x86 architectures. This is not possible on other architectures due to lack of legacy mode.

This is workaround which should disappear when the shim provides LoadImage() which looks up MOK during signature verification.

On the occasion align constants in include/grub/efi/sb.h.

---
 grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c      | 10 ++++++++++
 grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 include/grub/efi/sb.h        |  5 ++++-
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c +10 -0
index 80cfa0888..60550a6da 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
 
 static grub_guid_t shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
 
+static bool shim_lock_enabled = false;
+
 /*
  * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
  *
@@ -215,6 +217,14 @@ grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (void)
   /* Enforce shim_lock_verifier. */
   grub_verifier_register (&shim_lock_verifier);
 
+  shim_lock_enabled = true;
+
   grub_env_set ("shim_lock", "y");
   grub_env_export ("shim_lock");
 }
+
+bool
+grub_is_shim_lock_enabled (void)
+{
+  return shim_lock_enabled;
+}
grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c +1 -0
index c1eef7c98..5fb2ad01f 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <grub/efi/fdtload.h>
 #include <grub/efi/memory.h>
 #include <grub/efi/pe32.h>
+#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
 #include <grub/i18n.h>
 #include <grub/lib/cmdline.h>
 #include <grub/verify.h>

grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), · line 466

Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c +5 -0
@@ -458,6 +459,18 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
 
   grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
 
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+  if (grub_is_shim_lock_enabled () == true)
+    {
+      err = grub_cmd_linux_x86_legacy (cmd, argc, argv);
+

Even if we only have a fallback on x86, we may encounter this condition on other architectures too, so I think the check should be generic, and only the fallback specific.

Not sure what to do on other architecures, though - there is no backward compatibility concern here (at least not wrt users of mainline GRUB), so we could still *try* to use the firmware's loadimage/startimage, but perhaps issue a diagnostic message at the very least?

Quoted 36 lines
grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c +7 -0
+      if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+       return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+      else
+       goto fail;
+    }
+#endif
+
   if (argc == 0)
     {
       grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("filename expected"));
include/grub/efi/sb.h +4 -2
index 30c4335bb..49a9ad01c 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 #include <grub/types.h>
 #include <grub/dl.h>
 
-#define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNSET 0
+#define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNSET         0
 #define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_UNKNOWN       1
 #define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_DISABLED      2
 #define GRUB_EFI_SECUREBOOT_MODE_ENABLED       3
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
 extern grub_uint8_t
 EXPORT_FUNC (grub_efi_get_secureboot) (void);
 
+extern bool
+EXPORT_FUNC (grub_is_shim_lock_enabled) (void);
+
 extern void
 grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (void);
 #else
--

2.11.0

#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 2/2] efi: Fallback to legacy mode if shim is loaded on x86 archs

Quoted 74 lines · Ard Biesheuvel
Quoted 60 lines · Daniel Kiper

The LoadImage() provided by the shim does not consult MOK when loading an image. So, simply signature verification fails when it should not. This means we cannot use Linux EFI stub to start the kernel when the shim is loaded. We have to fallback to legacy mode on x86 architectures. This is not possible on other architectures due to lack of legacy mode.

This is workaround which should disappear when the shim provides LoadImage() which looks up MOK during signature verification.

On the occasion align constants in include/grub/efi/sb.h.

---
 grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c      | 10 ++++++++++
 grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 include/grub/efi/sb.h        |  5 ++++-
 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
grub-core/kern/efi/sb.c +10 -0
index 80cfa0888..60550a6da 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
 
 static grub_guid_t shim_lock_guid = GRUB_EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
 
+static bool shim_lock_enabled = false;
+
 /*
  * Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
  *
@@ -215,6 +217,14 @@ grub_shim_lock_verifier_setup (void)
   /* Enforce shim_lock_verifier. */
   grub_verifier_register (&shim_lock_verifier);
 
+  shim_lock_enabled = true;
+
   grub_env_set ("shim_lock", "y");
   grub_env_export ("shim_lock");
 }
+
+bool
+grub_is_shim_lock_enabled (void)
+{
+  return shim_lock_enabled;
+}
grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c +1 -0
index c1eef7c98..5fb2ad01f 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <grub/efi/fdtload.h>
 #include <grub/efi/memory.h>
 #include <grub/efi/pe32.h>
+#include <grub/efi/sb.h>
 #include <grub/i18n.h>
 #include <grub/lib/cmdline.h>
 #include <grub/verify.h>

grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), · line 466

Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/loader/efi/linux.c +5 -0
@@ -458,6 +459,18 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
 
   grub_dl_ref (my_mod);
 
+#if defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64__)
+  if (grub_is_shim_lock_enabled () == true)
+    {
+      err = grub_cmd_linux_x86_legacy (cmd, argc, argv);
+

Even if we only have a fallback on x86, we may encounter this condition on other architectures too, so I think the check should be generic, and only the fallback specific.

Quoted 5 lines

Not sure what to do on other architecures, though - there is no backward compatibility concern here (at least not wrt users of mainline GRUB), so we could still *try* to use the firmware's loadimage/startimage, but perhaps issue a diagnostic message at the very least?

Good point! I will add this in v2.

Daniel