Bluetooth: hci_event: Ignore NULL link key
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v2 1/1 Bluetooth: hci_event: Ignore NULL link key
This change is used to relieve CVE-2020-26555. The description of the CVE:
Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification 1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof the BD_ADDR of the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge of the PIN. [1]
The detail of this attack is in IEEE paper:
BlueMirror: Reflections on Bluetooth Pairing and Provisioning Protocols
[2]
It's a reflection attack. Base on the paper, attacker can induce the attacked target to generate null link key (zero key) without PIN code.
We can ignore null link key in the handler of "Link Key Notification event" to relieve the attack. A similar implementation also shows in btstack project. [3]
v2:
- Used Link: tag instead of Closes:
- Used bt_dev_dbg instead of BT_DBG
- Added Fixes: tag
--- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +6 -0
@@ -4684,6 +4684,12 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,bool persistent;u8 pin_len =0 ; +/* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */ +if (!memcmp (ev->link_key,ZERO_KEY ,HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE )) { +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR" , &ev->bdaddr); +return ; + } +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"" );hci_dev_lock (hdev);
Signature · 1 line
2.35.3
This is automated email and please do not reply to this email!
Dear submitter,
Thank you for submitting the patches to the linux bluetooth mailing list. This is a CI test results with your patch series:
PW Link:https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/bluetooth/list/?series=766763
---Test result---
Test Summary:
CheckPatch FAIL 0.81 seconds GitLint PASS 0.27 seconds SubjectPrefix PASS 0.09 seconds BuildKernel PASS 32.47 seconds CheckAllWarning PASS 35.57 seconds CheckSparse WARNING 40.49 seconds CheckSmatch WARNING 111.98 seconds BuildKernel32 PASS 31.15 seconds TestRunnerSetup PASS 476.51 seconds TestRunner_l2cap-tester PASS 22.02 seconds TestRunner_iso-tester PASS 40.00 seconds TestRunner_bnep-tester PASS 10.08 seconds TestRunner_mgmt-tester PASS 211.97 seconds TestRunner_rfcomm-tester PASS 15.18 seconds TestRunner_sco-tester PASS 16.01 seconds TestRunner_ioctl-tester PASS 16.96 seconds TestRunner_mesh-tester PASS 12.81 seconds TestRunner_smp-tester PASS 13.44 seconds TestRunner_userchan-tester PASS 10.61 seconds IncrementalBuild PASS 29.63 seconds
Details
##############################
Test: CheckPatch - FAIL
Desc: Run checkpatch.pl script
Output:
[v2] Bluetooth: hci_event: Ignore NULL link key
WARNING: From:/Signed-off-by: email address mismatch: 'From: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>' != 'Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>'
total: 0 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 12 lines checked
NOTE: For some of the reported defects, checkpatch may be able to
mechanically convert to the typical style using --fix or --fix-inplace.
/github/workspace/src/src/13316718.patch has style problems, please review.
NOTE: Ignored message types: UNKNOWN_COMMIT_ID
NOTE: If any of the errors are false positives, please report
them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS.
##############################
Test: CheckSparse - WARNING
Desc: Run sparse tool with linux kernel
Output:net/bluetooth/hci_event.c: note: in included file (through include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h):
##############################
Test: CheckSmatch - WARNING
Desc: Run smatch tool with source
Output:net/bluetooth/hci_event.c: note: in included file (through include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h):
---
Regards,
Linux Bluetooth
Dear Chun-Yi,
Thank you for your patch.
Am 18.07.23 um 05:43 schrieb Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>:
[…]
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>
As checkpatch.pl also reports, please make sure the author and Signed-off-by entry match.
$ git config --global user.name "Chun-Yi Lee"
$ git commit --amend --author="Chun-Yi Lee <[email protected]>" -s(It’s also common to write the name in the order, so no comma is needed.)
git format-patch should not generate a patch with a dedicated From: at the beginning, so you can send it from a different email account. (No idea, why upstream Linux kernel development shouldn’t work with your SUSE address.)
Kind regards,
Paul
Hi Paul,
Thanks for your review!
Quoted 17 lines · Paul Menzel
Dear Chun-Yi,
Thank you for your patch.
Am 18.07.23 um 05:43 schrieb Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>:
[…]
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>As checkpatch.pl also reports, please make sure the author and Signed-off-by entry match.
$ git config --global user.name "Chun-Yi Lee" $ git commit --amend --author="Chun-Yi Lee <[email protected]>" -s
Quoted 7 lines
(It’s also common to write the name in the order, so no comma is needed.)
git format-patchshould not generate a patch with a dedicatedFrom:at the beginning, so you can send it from a different email account. (No idea, why upstream Linux kernel development shouldn’t work with your SUSE address.)
I have set the from in .gitconfig and also tried git send-email --from "Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>". But gmail always modified it to From: Lee, Chun-Yi <[email protected]>. I have no idea why.
In next version, I will put Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]> to keep the From: to be sync with Signed-off-by.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
You know how when people are forwarding a patch from someone else it adds a From: as the first line in the body of the email? You could set your From to the @suse.com address that way.
This is sometimes done in companies where the corporate email server mangles patches so they have to use an outside server.
regards,
dan carpenter
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
maintainerHi Chun-Yi,
Quoted 8 lines · Chun-Yi
This change is used to relieve CVE-2020-26555. The description of the CVE:
Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification 1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof the
BD_ADDRof the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge of the PIN. [1]
Btw, it is probably worth mentioning that in BR/EDR the key generation is actually handled in the controller, below HCI.
Quoted 10 lines
The detail of this attack is in IEEE paper:
BlueMirror: Reflections on Bluetooth Pairing and Provisioning Protocols
[2]It's a reflection attack. Base on the paper, attacker can induce the attacked target to generate null link key (zero key) without PIN code.
We can ignore null link key in the handler of "Link Key Notification event" to relieve the attack. A similar implementation also shows in btstack project. [3]
Perhaps we could clarify this statement by stating that if we ignore the link key it means the stack will not consider the device is bonded and will not persist the link key, that said the controller will still consider it as paired, so I perhaps we should go one step forward and disconnect if we detect such a key is being used.
Quoted 34 lines
v2:
- Used Link: tag instead of Closes:
- Usedbt_dev_dbginstead ofBT_DBG
- Added Fixes: tagFixes 55ed8ca10f35 ("Bluetooth: Implement link key handling for the management interface")Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +6
-1@@ -4684,6 +4684,12 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,bool persistent;u8 pin_len =0 ; +/* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */ +if (!memcmp (ev->link_key,ZERO_KEY ,HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE )) { +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR" , &ev->bdaddr); +return ; + } +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"" );hci_dev_lock (hdev); --2.35.3
Signature · 1 line
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Hi Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
Quoted 7 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Hi Chun-Yi,
Quoted 4 lines · Chun-Yi
This change is used to relieve CVE-2020-26555. The description of the CVE:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification 1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof the
BD_ADDRof the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge of the PIN. [1]Btw, it is probably worth mentioning that in BR/EDR the key generation is actually handled in the controller, below HCI.
Yes, the key generation be handled by link manager. I will mention it in patch description.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
The detail of this attack is in IEEE paper:
BlueMirror: Reflections on Bluetooth Pairing and Provisioning Protocols
[2]It's a reflection attack. Base on the paper, attacker can induce the attacked target to generate null link key (zero key) without PIN code.
We can ignore null link key in the handler of "Link Key Notification event" to relieve the attack. A similar implementation also shows in btstack project. [3]
Quoted 6 lines
Perhaps we could clarify this statement by stating that if we ignore the link key it means the stack will not consider the device is bonded and will not persist the link key, that said the controller will still consider it as paired, so I perhaps we should go one step forward and disconnect if we detect such a key is being used.
I am new on bluetooth field. Did you mean like this patch? Sending HCI_Disconnect when we found zero link key?
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +8 -0
@@ -4698,6 +4700,15 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,if (!conn) goto unlock; +/* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */ +if (!memcmp (ev->link_key,ZERO_KEY ,HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE )) { +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR" , &ev->bdaddr); +hci_disconnect (conn,HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE ); +hci_conn_drop (conn); + goto unlock; + } +hci_conn_hold (conn); conn->disc_timeout =HCI_DISCONN_TIMEOUT ;hci_conn_drop (conn);
Is there anything I'm missing? Thanks a lot!
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 30 lines
v2:
- Used Link: tag instead of Closes:
- Usedbt_dev_dbginstead ofBT_DBG
- Added Fixes: tagFixes 55ed8ca10f35 ("Bluetooth: Implement link key handling for the management interface")Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +6
-0@@ -4684,6 +4684,12 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,bool persistent;u8 pin_len =0 ; +/* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */ +if (!memcmp (ev->link_key,ZERO_KEY ,HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE )) { +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR" , &ev->bdaddr); +return ; + } +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"" );
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +0
-1hci_dev_lock (hdev); --2.35.3
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
maintainerHi Joeyli,
Quoted 49 lines · joeyli
Hi Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
Quoted 7 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Hi Chun-Yi,
Quoted 4 lines · Chun-Yi
This change is used to relieve CVE-2020-26555. The description of the CVE:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification 1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof the
BD_ADDRof the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge of the PIN. [1]Btw, it is probably worth mentioning that in BR/EDR the key generation is actually handled in the controller, below HCI.
Yes, the key generation be handled by link manager. I will mention it in patch description.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
The detail of this attack is in IEEE paper:
BlueMirror: Reflections on Bluetooth Pairing and Provisioning Protocols
[2]It's a reflection attack. Base on the paper, attacker can induce the attacked target to generate null link key (zero key) without PIN code.
We can ignore null link key in the handler of "Link Key Notification event" to relieve the attack. A similar implementation also shows in btstack project. [3]
Quoted 6 lines
Perhaps we could clarify this statement by stating that if we ignore the link key it means the stack will not consider the device is bonded and will not persist the link key, that said the controller will still consider it as paired, so I perhaps we should go one step forward and disconnect if we detect such a key is being used.
I am new on bluetooth field. Did you mean like this patch? Sending
HCI_Disconnectwhen we found zero link key?net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +0
-0
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, · line 4709
Quoted 10 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +7
-0@@ -4698,6 +4700,15 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,if (!conn) goto unlock; +/* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */ +if (!memcmp (ev->link_key,ZERO_KEY ,HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE )) { +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR" , &ev->bdaddr); +hci_disconnect (conn,HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE ); +hci_conn_drop (conn); + goto unlock; + }
Yeah, something like that should do it, btw I hope you are testing these changes do actually work properly, even better if you could introduce a test into the likes of mgmt-tester to generate a ZERO_KEY so we are not caught by surprise if something doesn't quite work as expected, or some change cause a regression where this key is accepted again.
Quoted 44 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +0
-0hci_conn_hold (conn); conn->disc_timeout =HCI_DISCONN_TIMEOUT ;hci_conn_drop (conn);Is there anything I'm missing? Thanks a lot!
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 30 lines
v2:
- Used Link: tag instead of Closes:
- Usedbt_dev_dbginstead ofBT_DBG
- Added Fixes: tagFixes 55ed8ca10f35 ("Bluetooth: Implement link key handling for the management interface")Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +6
-0@@ -4684,6 +4684,12 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,bool persistent;u8 pin_len =0 ; +/* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */ +if (!memcmp (ev->link_key,ZERO_KEY ,HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE )) { +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR" , &ev->bdaddr); +return ; + } +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"" );Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +0
-1hci_dev_lock (hdev); --2.35.3
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
Signature · 1 line
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
maintainerHi Joeyli,
Quoted 56 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Hi Joeyli,
Quoted 52 lines · joeyli
Hi Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
Quoted 7 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Hi Chun-Yi,
Quoted 4 lines · Chun-Yi
This change is used to relieve CVE-2020-26555. The description of the CVE:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification 1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof the
BD_ADDRof the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge of the PIN. [1]Btw, it is probably worth mentioning that in BR/EDR the key generation is actually handled in the controller, below HCI.
Yes, the key generation be handled by link manager. I will mention it in patch description.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
The detail of this attack is in IEEE paper:
BlueMirror: Reflections on Bluetooth Pairing and Provisioning Protocols
[2]It's a reflection attack. Base on the paper, attacker can induce the attacked target to generate null link key (zero key) without PIN code.
We can ignore null link key in the handler of "Link Key Notification event" to relieve the attack. A similar implementation also shows in btstack project. [3]
Quoted 6 lines
Perhaps we could clarify this statement by stating that if we ignore the link key it means the stack will not consider the device is bonded and will not persist the link key, that said the controller will still consider it as paired, so I perhaps we should go one step forward and disconnect if we detect such a key is being used.
I am new on bluetooth field. Did you mean like this patch? Sending
HCI_Disconnectwhen we found zero link key?net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +0
-0@@ -4698,6 +4700,15 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,if (!conn) goto unlock;
Quoted 14 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, · line 4709
Quoted 7 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +7
-0+/* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */ +if (!memcmp (ev->link_key,ZERO_KEY ,HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE )) { +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR" , &ev->bdaddr); +hci_disconnect (conn,HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE ); +hci_conn_drop (conn); + goto unlock; + }Yeah, something like that should do it, btw I hope you are testing these changes do actually work properly, even better if you could introduce a test into the likes of mgmt-tester to generate a
ZERO_KEYso we are not caught by surprise if something doesn't quite work as expected, or some change cause a regression where this key is accepted again.
Are you still planning on updating these changes so we can apply it?
Quoted 49 lines
Quoted 37 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +0
-0hci_conn_hold (conn); conn->disc_timeout =HCI_DISCONN_TIMEOUT ;hci_conn_drop (conn);Is there anything I'm missing? Thanks a lot!
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 30 lines
v2:
- Used Link: tag instead of Closes:
- Usedbt_dev_dbginstead ofBT_DBG
- Added Fixes: tagFixes 55ed8ca10f35 ("Bluetooth: Implement link key handling for the management interface")Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +6
-0@@ -4684,6 +4684,12 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,bool persistent;u8 pin_len =0 ; +/* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */ +if (!memcmp (ev->link_key,ZERO_KEY ,HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE )) { +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR" , &ev->bdaddr); +return ; + } +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"" );Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +0
-1hci_dev_lock (hdev); --2.35.3
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee--
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Signature · 1 line
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Hi Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
Quoted 75 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Hi Joeyli,
Quoted 56 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Hi Joeyli,
Quoted 52 lines · joeyli
Hi Luiz Augusto von Dentz,
Quoted 7 lines · Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Hi Chun-Yi,
Quoted 4 lines · Chun-Yi
This change is used to relieve CVE-2020-26555. The description of the CVE:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Bluetooth legacy BR/EDR PIN code pairing in Bluetooth Core Specification 1.0B through 5.2 may permit an unauthenticated nearby device to spoof the
BD_ADDRof the peer device to complete pairing without knowledge of the PIN. [1]Btw, it is probably worth mentioning that in BR/EDR the key generation is actually handled in the controller, below HCI.
Yes, the key generation be handled by link manager. I will mention it in patch description.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
The detail of this attack is in IEEE paper:
BlueMirror: Reflections on Bluetooth Pairing and Provisioning Protocols
[2]It's a reflection attack. Base on the paper, attacker can induce the attacked target to generate null link key (zero key) without PIN code.
We can ignore null link key in the handler of "Link Key Notification event" to relieve the attack. A similar implementation also shows in btstack project. [3]
Quoted 6 lines
Perhaps we could clarify this statement by stating that if we ignore the link key it means the stack will not consider the device is bonded and will not persist the link key, that said the controller will still consider it as paired, so I perhaps we should go one step forward and disconnect if we detect such a key is being used.
I am new on bluetooth field. Did you mean like this patch? Sending
HCI_Disconnectwhen we found zero link key?net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +0
-0@@ -4698,6 +4700,15 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,if (!conn) goto unlock;Quoted 14 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data, · line 4709
Quoted 7 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +7
-0+/* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */ +if (!memcmp (ev->link_key,ZERO_KEY ,HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE )) { +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR" , &ev->bdaddr); +hci_disconnect (conn,HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE ); +hci_conn_drop (conn); + goto unlock; + }Yeah, something like that should do it, btw I hope you are testing these changes do actually work properly, even better if you could introduce a test into the likes of mgmt-tester to generate a
ZERO_KEYso we are not caught by surprise if something doesn't quite work as expected, or some change cause a regression where this key is accepted again.
Quoted 2 lines
Are you still planning on updating these changes so we can apply it?
Sorry for my delay! I am stucking at other stuff.
I will improve the patch and send new version again.
THanks a lot!
Joey Lee
Quoted 54 lines
Quoted 49 lines
Quoted 37 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +0
-0hci_conn_hold (conn); conn->disc_timeout =HCI_DISCONN_TIMEOUT ;hci_conn_drop (conn);Is there anything I'm missing? Thanks a lot!
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 30 lines
v2:
- Used Link: tag instead of Closes:
- Usedbt_dev_dbginstead ofBT_DBG
- Added Fixes: tagFixes 55ed8ca10f35 ("Bluetooth: Implement link key handling for the management interface")Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- net/bluetooth/hci_event.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +6
-0@@ -4684,6 +4684,12 @@ static void hci_link_key_notify_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, void *data,bool persistent;u8 pin_len =0 ; +/* Ignore NULL link key against CVE-2020-26555 */ +if (!memcmp (ev->link_key,ZERO_KEY ,HCI_LINK_KEY_SIZE )) { +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"Ignore NULL link key (ZERO KEY) for %pMR" , &ev->bdaddr); +return ; + } +bt_dev_dbg (hdev,"" );Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +0
-1hci_dev_lock (hdev); --2.35.3
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee--
Luiz Augusto von DentzSignature · 1 line
Luiz Augusto von Dentz
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Hi Markus,
Quoted 6 lines · Markus Elfring
Quoted 2 lines
… Base on the paper, attacker can induce the
attacked target to generate …Would you like to avoid also any wording weaknesses here?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
We can ignore null link key in the handler of "Link Key Notification event" to relieve the attack. …
Will corresponding imperative change descriptions become more helpful?
If possible, could you please direct change my original patch description for your suggestion? Then I will put it in next version.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee