kasan-improve-kasan_non_canonical_hook.patch removed from -mm tree
The quilt patch titled
Subject: kasan: improve kasan_non_canonical_hook
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
kasan-improve-kasan_non_canonical_hook.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
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From: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]>
Subject: kasan: improve kasan_non_canonical_hook
Date: Thu, 21 Dec 2023 21:04:45 +0100
Make kasan_non_canonical_hook to be more sure in its report (i.e. say "probably" instead of "maybe") if the address belongs to the shadow memory region for kernel addresses.
Also use the kasan_shadow_to_mem helper to calculate the original address.
Also improve the comments in kasan_non_canonical_hook.
---
mm/kasan/kasan.h | 6 ++++++ mm/kasan/report.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
mm/kasan/kasan.h renamed from mm/kasan/kasan.h~kasan-improve-kasan_non_canonical_hook +6 -0
@@ -307,6 +307,12 @@ struct kasan_stack_ring { #if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) +static __always_inline bool addr_in_shadow(const void *addr) +{ + return addr >= (void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START && + addr < (void *)KASAN_SHADOW_END; +} + #ifndef kasan_shadow_to_mem static inline const void *kasan_shadow_to_mem(const void *shadow_addr) {
mm/kasan/report.c renamed from mm/kasan/report.c~kasan-improve-kasan_non_canonical_hook +20 -14
@@ -635,37 +635,43 @@ void kasan_report_async(void)#if defined(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC ) || defined(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS )/* -* With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high -* canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads -* before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the -* address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds -* shadow memory access lands in the non-canonical part of the address space. -* Help the user figure out what the original bogus pointer was. +* With compiler-based KASAN modes, accesses to bogus pointers (outside of the +* mapped kernel address space regions) cause faults when KASAN tries to check +* the shadow memory before the actual memory access. This results in cryptic +* GPF reports, which are hard for users to interpret. This hook helps users to +* figure out what the original bogus pointer was. */ void kasan_non_canonical_hook (unsigned long addr) {unsigned long orig_addr;const char *bug_type; +/* +* All addresses that came as a result of the memory-to-shadow mapping +* (even for bogus pointers) must be >= KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET. +*/ if (addr <KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET )return ; - orig_addr = (addr -KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET ) <<KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT ; + orig_addr = (unsigned long )kasan_shadow_to_mem ((void *)addr); +/* * For faults near the shadow address for NULL, we can be fairly certain * that this is a KASAN shadow memory access. -* For faults that correspond to shadow for low canonical addresses, we -* can still be pretty sure - that shadow region is a fairly narrow -* chunk of the non-canonical address space. -* But faults that look like shadow for non-canonical addresses are a -* really large chunk of the address space. In that case, we still -* print the decoded address, but make it clear that this is not -* necessarily what's actually going on. +* For faults that correspond to the shadow for low or high canonical +* addresses, we can still be pretty sure: these shadow regions are a +* fairly narrow chunk of the address space. +* But the shadow for non-canonical addresses is a really large chunk +* of the address space. For this case, we still print the decoded +* address, but make it clear that this is not necessarily what's +* actually going on. */ if (orig_addr <PAGE_SIZE ) bug_type ="null-ptr-deref" ;else if (orig_addr <TASK_SIZE ) bug_type ="probably user-memory-access" ; +else if (addr_in_shadow ((void *)addr)) + bug_type ="probably wild-memory-access" ;else bug_type ="maybe wild-memory-access" ; pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type,
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from [email protected] are
kasan-stop-leaking-stack-trace-handles.patch